Does Takeover Activity Cause Managerial Discipline? Evidence from International M&A Laws
Publication Date
12-24-2010
Abstract
This paper exploits the staggered initiation of takeover laws across countries to examine whether the threat of takeover enhances managerial discipline. We show that following the passage of takeover laws (1) poorly performing firms experience more frequent takeovers; (2) the propensity to replace poorly performing CEOs increases, especially in countries with weak investor protection; and (3) directors of targeted firms are more likely to lose board seats following corporate control events. Our findings suggest that the threat of takeover causes managerial discipline through the incentives that the market for corporate control provides to boards to monitor managers.
Document Type
Article
Keywords
threat of takeover, managerial discipline, mergers and acquisitions laws, corporate control
Disciplines
Finance
DOI
10.2139/ssrn.1730316
Source
SMU Cox: Finance (Topic)
Language
English
