John Duns Scotus On the Trinitarian Center of the Graced Life

Mitchell Kennard

Southern Methodist University, mkennard@smu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/religious_studies_etds

Recommended Citation
https://scholar.smu.edu/religious_studies_etds/13

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Religious Studies at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Religious Studies Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

ON THE TRINITARIAN CENTER OF THE GRACED LIFE

A Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Faculty of

Dedman College

Southern Methodist University

in

Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

with a

Major in Religious Studies

by

Mitchell J. Kennard

B.Sc., Electrical & Computer Engineering, The University of Texas at Austin
M.A., Jewish Studies, Tel Aviv University
M.T.S., Duke Divinity School

May 18, 2019
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would first like to express my deep gratitude to Bruce Marshall. His invaluable counsel as advisor to this dissertation has made it much better than it otherwise would have been. His tireless commitment to his students has made me a much better scholar than I otherwise would have been. He not only introduced me to the theology of John Duns Scotus but helped me cultivate the habit of Christian theology in both its systematic and historical dimensions. For that I am truly grateful.

I would also like to thank the other members of my committee: William Abraham, James Lee, and Stephen Dumont. Special thanks to William Abraham for our many hours together, during which he taught me to think and to argue better. Thanks, also, to all of my colleagues in the Graduate Program in Religious Studies, particularly to David Moser, who read every page of this dissertation and offered many insightful and helpful comments.

I would like to express my thanks to Kerry Robichaux, who initiated my interest in studying Christian theology and has been a constant mentor and encouragement to me along the way. Finally, this dissertation would not have been possible without the constant support and sacrifice of my dear wife, Elizabeth, and it certainly would not have been as enjoyable without the coming of our beloved son, Jordan.
It is generally acknowledged that a high thirteenth-century evaluation of grace was replaced by a low fourteenth-century evaluation of grace. Thomas Aquinas is the standard representative of the former; William of Ockham is the standard representative of the latter. Franciscan theologian John Duns Scotus (d. 1308) is often identified as the cause of or midway point in this shift, but this dissertation argues that this is the wrong way to narrate the development of the late medieval theology of grace. Scotus is clearly closer to Ockham than to Aquinas on many particular questions in the theology of grace (e.g., the real identity of grace and charity, the non-necessity and non-sufficiency of grace for glory, and generous use of the distinction between the absolute and ordained power of God). But when we consider the fundamental conception of the relationship between the orders of nature and grace, it is clearly the case that Scotus is closer to Aquinas than he is to Ockham. Scotus has as high an evaluation of grace as Aquinas does. Grace, for Aquinas and for Scotus, is a deifying participation in the divine nature, a venerable theme in the Christian tradition which finds no place in Ockham and many under his general influence.
Scotus is rightly viewed not as the initiation or cause of the low fourteenth-century theology of grace but as the last great contributor to the high thirteenth-century theology of grace. His primary contributions are made not with respect to the relationship between nature and grace but with respect to the relationship between grace and the Trinitarian missions—the Incarnation of the Son and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. While Scotus is often maligned for his reflection on possible alternative economies of salvation in which God saves without the Trinitarian missions, Scotus thinks that the affirmation of these alternatives is necessary not only to defend the transcendent freedom of God but to rightly locate the Trinitarian missions in the order of divine intentions.

If God could have saved us without the Trinitarian missions, then the Trinitarian missions cannot be ultimately explained by our need for salvation. Further, given Scotus’s reflections on the perfection of the divine will, which never wills greater goods for the sake of lesser goods, it cannot be the case that the Trinitarian missions are explained by our need for salvation. Rather, the order of intelligibility must be precisely the other way around. For Scotus, the supreme goodness of the Trinitarian missions entails that they are necessarily intentionally primary. That is to say, Scotus thinks they are necessarily willed first in any possible created world in which they exist. That being the case, it must be the Trinitarian missions which serve as the source of intelligibility in any world in which God freely wills them. Scotus’s basic intuitions thus lead him to believe that the primary intention of God in creation was precisely to externalize His own Trinitarian life by sending the Son into our flesh and sending the Spirit through that flesh into a multitude of human beings, that they might together with Him constitute a mystical Body of God’s co-lovers. The Trinitarian missions are not willed for our sake; we and all else are willed
for their sake. We exist, and we are saved because the Father desires a mystical Body with His Son as its Head and their Spirit as its animating principle.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## CHAPTER 1—INTRODUCTION: John Duns Scotus on the Mystery of God’s Will

- Scotus’s Place in the History of the Theology of Grace ............................................................. 5
- Scotistic Axioms and Analytic Instruments .............................................................................. 13
  - Immediate-influence Axiom .................................................................................................. 13
  - Absolute and Ordained Power ............................................................................................... 17
  - Metaphysical-priority axiom ................................................................................................. 21
  - Rational Instants .................................................................................................................... 23
  - The Ordered-willing Axiom .................................................................................................. 25
- Grace and Charity ...................................................................................................................... 29

## CHAPTER 2—THE GRACE OF GOD: Grace as Deification of Nature

- The Thirteenth-Century Consensus View—Grace as Deification ............................................ 32
- Grace as Essentially Supernatural ............................................................................................ 41
  - Aquinas on the Essential Supernaturality of Grace .............................................................. 41
  - Scotus on the Essential Supernaturality of Grace ................................................................. 43
  - Ockham on the Essential Supernaturality of Grace .............................................................. 61
- Grace as Absolutely Essentially Supernatural .......................................................................... 73
  - Aquinas on the Absolutely Essential Supernaturality of Grace ......................................... 73
  - Scotus on the Absolutely Essential Supernaturality of Grace ............................................ 77
Ockham on the Absolutely Essential Supernaturality of Grace ......................................................... 94
Reactions to Ockham .......................................................................................................................... 106
Conclusion....................................................................................................................................... 110

CHAPTER 3—SPIRIT OF GRACE: The Infusion of Grace and the Indwelling of the Holy Spirit
.......................................................................................................................................................... 112
Scotus on the Non-necessity of Grace ............................................................................................. 114
Grace is necessary for the remission of sins .................................................................................... 115
Grace is necessary for loving God above all .................................................................................... 122
Grace is necessary for glory ............................................................................................................. 126
Scotus on the Necessity of Grace ..................................................................................................... 138
Uncreated and Created Grace .......................................................................................................... 139
Scotus on Uncreated and Created Grace ......................................................................................... 149
The Scotistic Inversion ...................................................................................................................... 159
After Scotus...................................................................................................................................... 164
Conclusion....................................................................................................................................... 173

CHAPTER 4—CHRIST’S GRACE AND OURS (1): The Alexandrian-Cappadocian Argument
.......................................................................................................................................................... 175
The Alexandrian-Cappadocian Argument ........................................................................................ 176
The Three Graces of Christ .............................................................................................................. 179
Scotus on the Grace of Christ.......................................................................................................... 182
To the Shepherd of my soul
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
John Duns Scotus on the Mystery of God’s Will

benedictus Deus et Pater Domini nostri Iesu Christi qui benedixit nos in omni benedictione spiritali in caelestibus in Christo sicut elegit nos in ipso ante mundi constitutionem ut essemus sancti et inmaculati in conspectu eius in caritate qui praedestinavit nos in adoptionem filiorum per Iesum Christum in ipsum secundum propositum voluntatis suae in laudem gloriae gratiae suae in qua gratificavit nos in dilecto...in quo et vos cum audissetis verbum veritatis evangelium salutis vestrae in quo et credentes signati estis Spiritu promissionis Sancto qui est pignus hereditatis nostrae in redemptionem acquisitios in laudem gloriae ipsius

Ephesians 1:3-6, 13-14

A cloud of opprobrium continues to linger over Franciscan theologian John Duns Scotus (d. 1308). His voluntarism has been blamed for the skepticism of our modern world; his univocity for its secularism; his haecceity for its individualism. The production of such grand narratives continues to gather pace with little signs of abating. They tend to spawn one another—each more vicious than the last—with little significant attention to Scotus’s actual words. The most egregious consequence of such genealogical sabotage is not mistaken historical consciousness but the general impression among theologians today that one need not (and, perhaps, ought not) risk a peek into the tomes of the Subtle Doctor. Even theologians of a Franciscan inclination are often surprised to discover that Scotus has anything at all (much less anything interesting or helpful) to contribute on theological matters.

Such has not always been the case. Scotist chairs could be found at universities throughout Europe by the end of the sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{2} If the infamous statement of seventeenth-century Cistercian John Caramuel y Lobkowicz is to be believed, “The Scotistic School is more numerous than all others combined.”\textsuperscript{3} Only in the eighteenth century did Scotism (along with scholastic theology as a whole) succumb to the pressures of the Enlightenment. For a period of several centuries, then, Scotus was afforded the same kind of considered reflection as was Thomas Aquinas. The neo-scholastic revival of the nineteenth century put Aquinas back at the center of Catholic theology, but the anti-Scotist narratives of Thomism—the very source of the modern anti-Scotist narratives cited above—have regrettably secured Scotus’s continued obscurity.\textsuperscript{4}

Scotus’s fate in contemporary theological circles is all the more striking when one considers his fate in contemporary philosophical circles. Scotus has attracted a considerable amount of scholarly attention in the past few generations for his far-ranging philosophical ideas. It is becoming increasingly clear that Scotus offers significant philosophical ideas that warrant careful investigation not only for historical understanding but also for contemporary normative consideration. The lion’s share of scholarly work on Scotus’s theology has been done by those trained in philosophy, and, understandably, such work has tended to focus on its more philosophical aspects (e.g., the metaphysics of the Trinity and the Incarnation, the relationship


\textsuperscript{3} For the convoluted history of the quotation, see Felix Bąk, “\textit{Scoti Schola numerosior est omnibus aliis simul sumptis},” Franciscan Studies 16, no. 1 (1956): 144-65.

\textsuperscript{4} For the neo-Thomist narratives that Gilson inherited, see John Inglis, Spheres of Philosophical Inquiry and the Historiography of Medieval Philosophy (Leiden: Brill, 1998).
between divine and human causality, and divine command ethics). Theological questions that are
not seen to be of intrinsic philosophical interest have been largely underserved. It is not
insignificant that all the fine introductions to Scotus’s theology in the English language have
been written by philosophers.⁵

There is nothing wrong with this, of course. Scotus has much of interest to say on all the
perennial questions in philosophical theology. But if Scotus were alive today, he would likely be
working in a department of theology, rather than a department of philosophy. Scotus used the
best of philosophical learning available to him and made considerable contributions to
philosophical investigation per se, but he did so in service to his basic task as theologian—to
investigate the mysteries of the Christian faith revealed in Scripture and safeguarded by the
Church of God.⁶

A few scholars have begun to challenge the intellectual genealogies into which Scotus
has been disparagingly inscribed.⁷ I will not do any of that here. What I offer instead is sustained
treatment of a properly theological nature on a single doctrinal locus in Scotus. In doing so, I
hope not only to fill a significant lacuna in the current scholarship but also to persuade my reader

⁵ See Richard Cross, Duns Scotus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Mary Beth Ingham, Understanding
John Duns Scotus: “Of Realty the Rarest-veined Unraveller” (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute

⁶ See, for instance, Scotus, Ordinatio II, dd. 34-37, n. 57 (Vatican VIII, p. 390): “The need here is not to inquire into
the moral doctrine of the philosophers but into the precepts of God in Scripture.” (hic enim non oportet quaerere
moralem doctrinam philosophorum, sed praecepta Dei in Scriptura.) Most English translations from the Ordinatio
are drawn, with modification where necessary or appropriate, from John Duns Scotus: Selected Writings on Ethics,
ed. Thomas Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) and Peter L. P. Simpson,

Reader: Contexts and Commonalities, ed. Edward J. Ondrako (New Bedford, MA: Academy of the Immaculate,
2015): 615-36; Daniel P. Horan, Postmodernity and Univocity: A Critical Account of Radical Orthodoxy and John
Duns Scotus (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2014); and Richard Cross, “Duns Scotus and Suárez at the Origins
of Modernity,” in Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy: Postmodern Theology, Rhetoric, and Truth, eds. Wayne J.
that Scotus is first and foremost a theologian and one worth listening to. I have chosen Scotus’s theology of grace because, at least in the Catholic tradition, the theology of grace is often the best way to get a sense of the general shape of a theologian’s overarching vision. At its best, the Catholic theology of grace is inextricably connected to Trinitarian theology, to Christology, and to Pneumatology.8 Scotus’s is no exception.

While what I provide here is (to the best of my knowledge) the first monograph on Scotus’s theology of grace in the English language, it is preceded by the two significant German studies of Minges and Dettloff. Parthenius Minges’s 1906 study, *Die Gnadenlehre des Duns Scotus - auf ihren angeblichen Pelagianismus und Semipelagianismus*, is, as its title suggests, primarily a defense of Scotus against the then (and still) common accusation that Scotus’s theology of grace is Pelagian or Semipelagian.9 As Minges aptly demonstrates, this common charge does not apply to Scotus at all. As James Halverson argues, the oft-cited “Semipelagianism” of the late medieval period originates not from Scotus but Peter Auriol and William of Ockham, both working after (and often explicitly against) Scotus.10

Werner Dettloff’s 1954 study, *Die Lehre von der acceptatio divina bei Johannes Duns Scotus mit besonderer Berucksichtigung der Rechtfertigungslehre*, is likewise primarily defensive in nature.11 As indicated by the title’s reference to the doctrine of justification, Dettloff

---


is particularly interested in the relationship between Scotus’s doctrine of divine acceptation and Luther’s doctrine of justification. Indeed, Dettloff followed his 1954 study with a second study tracing the lines of development between Scotus and Luther.\textsuperscript{12} Much of the scholarship on Scotus’s theology of grace has, thus, either corrected misreadings of Scotus or sought to clarify the relationship of his theology of grace to that of the Reformers. In addition, these older works are all based on pre-critical editions of Scotus’s works, which are some of the most unstable of any of the medieval schoolmen.\textsuperscript{13} We lack, then, a comprehensive positive account of Scotus’s significant contribution to the theology of grace, and the careful textual work of the past few generations has finally made that possible.\textsuperscript{14}

**Scotus’s Place in the History of the Theology of Grace**

In this dissertation, I will largely set aside issues in Scotus’s theology of grace that have already been well addressed by the works cited above. Rather than considering Scotus’s understanding of divine acceptation, predestination, sin, justification, and free will, I will instead consider Scotus’s understanding of the relationship between grace and nature (chapter 2), between grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit (chapter 3), and between Christ’s grace and ours (chapters 4 and 5). It is these relationships, it seems to me, that are most fundamental in the theology of grace.\textsuperscript{15} Scotus is clearly closer to Ockham than to Aquinas on many particular


\textsuperscript{13} For a helpful account of the various textual issues with Scotus’s works, see Vos, *The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus*, 103-47.

\textsuperscript{14} It should be noted, though, that critical editions of Scotus’s *Reportatio* are still forthcoming with the exception of the Wolter-Bychkov-Pomplun editions of *Reportatio* I-A and the first half of *Reportatio* IV-A.

questions in the theology of grace (e.g., the real identity of grace and charity, the absolute non-necessity and non-sufficiency of grace for glory, generous use of the absolute and ordained power distinction). But when we consider the larger issues of grace, nature, and the Trinitarian missions, it is clearly the case that Scotus is closer to Aquinas than to Ockham, so much so that I think it appropriate to view Scotus as the last great contributor to the high thirteenth-century conception of grace rather than a representative (or cause) of a much lower fourteenth-century conception of grace.

In making this argument, I offer a significant corrective to another set of narratives that have sought to implicate Scotus not in the origins of our modern ills but in the decline of grace from the thirteenth to fourteenth century. It is generally acknowledged that one of the most important thirteenth-century contributions to the theology of grace is the crucial concept of the *supernatural*, which I will explore in more detail in the next chapter. While Aquinas is often identified as the summative moment in the development of the concept of the supernatural, Scotus is often identified as a key figure in its erosion, an erosion that begins with Scotus and is sealed by nominalism. To give but one prominent example, the standard introduction to the history of the theology of grace remains Henri Rondet’s *Gratia Christi – Essai d’histoire du dogme et de théologie dogmatique*. Scotus receives no more attention than four pages and (at least in the English edition) is situated under the general heading, “Pelagian Tendencies of the Nominalists,” despite the fact that Scotus was neither a nominalist nor had Pelagian tendencies.

---


Looking at more specialized surveys does not yield much better results. Johann Auer’s two volumes on grace in the later medieval period do not accuse Scotus of Pelagianism or even Pelagian tendencies, but Auer still sees in Scotus the beginning of the erosion of the concept of the supernatural and a significant blow to Franciscan spirituality.

Ecumenical exigency, too, has made it tempting to group Scotus together with Ockham. On some ecumenically minded readings, Luther and Aquinas held deeply congruous theologies of grace. The Protestant Reformation was thus not an illicit rejection of the Catholic theology of grace but a licit rejection of the depravity of later medieval theology. While blame falls primarily on Ockham in such narratives, Scotus gets his fair share of criticism, or is at least thought interesting primarily as precursor to Ockham.

Arguing for a close connection between Scotus and Ockham is not always intended as an insult to Scotus. Richard Cross is perhaps most active in investigating the issues of interest to me in Scotus, and his various articles have presented Scotus as much more Ockhamist than I read him to be, though Cross never suggests that Scotus is to be berated for this. Cross argues in one article that Scotus rejects the standard thirteenth-century high estimation of grace as a deiformity in the soul, claiming that, for Scotus, grace does not make us any more like God than any other

---


created reality does. In another article, Cross argues that Scotus rejects Aquinas’s theology of the Mystical Body of Christ, opting instead for the church as a merely juridical body along clearly Ockhamist lines. In chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation, I will show that the former claim is unwarranted; in chapters 4 and 5, I will show that the latter is too.

Both detractors and champions of Scotus, then, have wanted to argue that Scotus belongs to the fourteenth rather than the thirteenth century, but this flies in the face of the late medieval and early modern tendency to classify Scotus as one of the “old masters” rather than one of the new. In my judgement, Scotus is more rightly viewed as the last of the great thirteenth-century scholastic theologians rather than the beginning of fourteenth-century theology. While Scotus clearly has the analytic tendencies so characteristic of the fourteenth century, he also clearly has the theological sensibilities of his great thirteenth-century forebears, and the combination of the two in Scotus is often the source of his most significant theological contributions.

After I show the fundamental continuity between Aquinas and Scotus on the relationship between nature and grace in chapter 2 (as well as the deep chasm that separates Scotus and Ockham), I will turn in the following three chapters to Scotus’s major contribution to the theology of grace, namely, his understanding of the relationship between grace and the Trinitarian missions—the visible mission of the Son and the invisible mission of the Holy

---


Spirit. A significant part of the patristic and early medieval tradition argues that our salvation would have been impossible without the Trinitarian missions. As modern deification studies have repeatedly shown, the Athanasian claim that God became a human being to make human beings God was by no means unique to him; indeed, it is almost impossible to find a significant teacher of the Christian church before the Enlightenment who would dare deny it. But in addition to this claim of fact, the fathers will also often make the logically stronger claim that, without the Incarnation of the Son and the indwelling of the Spirit, our deification would have been impossible. Athanasius, to cite but one example, can argue that without the Incarnation, we have no hope of being deified: “If the works of the Logos’s Godhead had not been done by means of the body, man had not been deified; and again, had not the properties of the flesh been ascribed to the Word, man had not been thoroughly delivered from them.” Scotus represents a significant break with this tradition, agreeing with the factual claim but arguing that our deification might have been possible without either the Incarnation of the Son or the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.

---

25 The missions were a discrete theological locus in medieval theology (typically addressed in commentary on distinctions 14-16 of the Lombard’s first book of Sentences). While interesting in its own right, I will not explicitly address medieval reflections on the missions in this dissertation. Instead, I use ‘Trinitarian missions’ to refer to the Incarnation of the Son and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit without worrying about what individual theologians thought a divine mission entailed.


28 That God could have saved us without the Incarnation is, of course, an equally ancient idea. Augustine, for instance, famously argues that the Incarnation was the most fitting way for God to save us but that there were, nonetheless, other means available to Him. Augustine, De Trinitate XIII, c. 10, n. 13 (CCSL 50A, pp. 399-400): “Eos itaque qui dicit: ‘Itane defuit deo modus alius quo liberaret homines a miseria mortalitatis huius ut unigenitum filium deum sibi coaeternum hominem fieri ullet induendo humanam animam et carnem mortalemque factum mortem perpetui?’, parum est sic refellere ut istum modum quo nos per mediatorem dei et hominum hominem Christum Iesum deus liberare dignatur asseramus bonum et diuinae congruum dignitati; uerum etiam ut ostendamus non alium modum possibilem deo defuisse eius potestati cuncta aequaliter subiunct, sed sanandae nostrae miseriae conuenientiorem modum alium non fuisse nec esse oportuisse.”
Here, Scotos’s ‘soteriological voluntarism’ often comes under heavy attack.²⁹ It is often argued, for instance, that this kind of voluntarism is profoundly damaging to the faith, that it results in deep skepticism with respect to God and divine revelation, that Scotos’s God is the *Deus absconditus* who so terrified the conscience of Luther.³⁰ I will argue in this dissertation that this is the wrong way to read Scotos’s soteriological voluntarism. First, it should be noted that speculation on counterfactual possibility was not original with Scotos. The claim that our salvation would have been impossible without Incarnation and indwelling is just as speculative as the claim that it would have been possible without them. That is to say, both sides take, or at least imply, a position on the relevant counterfactual. Second, it should be noted that Scotos is not merely engaged in speculative curiosity; instead, Scotos is interested in alternative possibilities for the sake of the light they might shed on the contours of the actual economy of salvation. By removing inadequate necessity arguments, Scotos is better able to understand which connections in the actual economy of salvation are necessary and which obtain by the will of God alone. In doing so, Scotos is trying to understand the mind of God, to discover what is deepest in the will of God, and to answer the fundamental question of the meaning and

---

²⁹ The term ‘voluntarism’ covers a broad set of commitments, not all of which have particular bearing on this project. By ‘soteriological voluntarism’ I mean Scotos’s position that the present economy of salvation is highly contingent. In particular, I mean Scotos’s position that neither the Incarnation nor the infusion of grace by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit are strictly necessarily for our salvation. More than most before him, Scotos was willing to reflect on possible alternative economies of salvation. For an introduction to Scotos’s voluntarism generally conceived, see Bernardine M. Bonansea, “Duns Scotos’ Voluntarism,” in *John Duns Scotos, 1265-1965*, eds. John K. Ryan and Bernardine M. Bonansea (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1965), 83-121.

³⁰ There are grounds for implicating some Scotists in this development, but their interpretations of Scotos clearly go beyond what Scotos himself says. Eugenio Randi, “A Scotist Way of Distinguishing between God’s Absolute and Ordained Powers,” in *From Ockham to Wyclif*, eds. Anne Hudson and Michael Wilks (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 43-50. Scotos nowhere says that God can break His promises (more on this later), but Randi identifies several Scotists who do.
intelligibility of the actual created order. To borrow Paul Vignaux’s helpful phrase, “The theology of Duns Scotus is an essay in divine psychology.”

For Scotus, God could have secured our future beatitude by any number of means, including a Pelagian economy of salvation (i.e., no interior grace by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit) or a Nestorian economy of salvation (i.e., no genuine Incarnation). But Scotus does not simply defend the possibility of these alternate economies of salvation. As has often been pointed out, Scotus defends these possibilities in order to secure divine freedom, but he also thinks these alternative economies of salvation tell us something important about the intelligibility of the divine economy. Far from showing the arbitrariness of the actual economy of salvation, Scotus’s alternate economies of salvation highlight the actual economy of salvation’s primary features.

If our salvation were possible without the Trinitarian missions, it cannot be the case that the Trinitarian missions are ultimately explained by our need for salvation. Indeed, given his reflections on the perfection of the divine will, which never wills lesser goods for the sake of greater goods, Scotus comes to conclude that the order of intelligibility between the Trinitarian missions and our salvation must be precisely the other way around. Given the supreme goodness of the Trinitarian missions, it cannot be the case that the Trinitarian missions are explained by our need for salvation; instead, it must be our salvation (and indeed existence) that are explained by the Trinitarian missions. This I call the “Scotistic inversion,” to which I will return in several of the chapters to follow. Future chapters of this dissertation will show that Scotus rarely takes

---


32 See, for instance, Dettloff, Die Lehre von der acceptatio divina bei Johannes Duns Scotus, 226-27.
away without giving something in return. He denies that the Incarnation is necessary for our salvation, for instance, but then shows that this sheds more rather than less light on the present economy of salvation.

This, I argue, is the right way to understand Scotus’s soteriological voluntarism. In the main, Scotus’s understanding of the actual relationship between grace, nature, and the Trinitarian missions is commensurate with that of Aquinas. Scotus’s great contribution to the thirteenth-century theology of grace is to show their appropriate order in the determinations of God. If Aquinas painted the panorama of the thirteenth-century theology of grace, we might say, Scotus turned the panorama the right way around: For Scotus, God did not first will nature, then grace, then the Trinitarian missions; instead, God first willed the Trinitarian missions, then grace as the conditions of possibility for those missions, then nature as the condition of possibility for grace.

As we will see, this order necessarily obtains in any possible world that can be brought about by God. God does not have to create nature; God does not have to infuse grace by the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit; God does not need to send the Son into our flesh. God can do some of these three without the others, but if He wills any combination of them, He must will them in a certain order. If He wills nature and grace, He must will nature for the sake of grace. If He wills the Trinitarian missions, He must will all else for their sake. What we find in Scotus, then, is a radical priority of the Trinitarian missions. God does not have to send the Son or the Spirit, but if He does freely will to send them, the Trinitarian missions cannot fail to be primary in any possible world that God can bring about. In no possible world that God can bring about, then, are the Trinitarian missions explained by some other created reality. Instead, it is the Trinitarian missions that render all of God’s other volitions intelligible. The Trinitarian missions
cannot be willed for the sake of some other thing in this or any other possible world. It must be all other things that are explained by the Trinitarian missions.

**Scotistic Axioms and Analytic Instruments**

Before turning to Scotus’s theology of grace, it will be helpful to introduce several important axioms and analytic instruments that Scotus employs in various contexts in the chapters to come. Pausing in later chapters to explain these axioms and instruments will only add unnecessary complexity to the already difficult task of investigating his position regarding the particular question at hand. Scotus himself does not often pause to explain them, so introducing them here as briefly and succinctly as possible will considerably ease the work of future chapters. Later chapters will simply refer in bold text to these axioms and instruments by their names as specified below (e.g., “using his immediate-influence axiom, Scotus argues that…”). The remainder of this chapter will thus serve both as a brief introduction and as a conceptual glossary for later reference as necessary. Because my primary aim in introducing these axioms and analytic instruments is to ease my investigation of Scotus’s theology of grace in later chapters, I will generally avoid historical comment on them. All of the axioms and instruments here considered have precedent in the medieval tradition even if Scotus employs them in novel and more programmatic ways than his great forebears did.

**Immediate-influence Axiom**

Scotus argues that the doctrine of creation requires Christian theology to affirm what no philosopher had ever dreamed to affirm, namely, that God is omnipotent. Not only did the philosophers fail to affirm divine omnipotence, many of them explicitly denied it:

From this it appears that the Philosopher would deny “The more perfect a cause, the more immediately it causes,” if by “more immediately” we mean the exclusion of intervening causal agents. Furthermore, he would say, “The more perfect the superior cause, the more
the intermediary causes through which it acts.” These intermediary agents are not required to contribute causal perfection. This exists already in all its fullness and perfection in the first cause alone. They are needed to tone down the perfection gradually until the least perfect effect is achieved. Such a tempering occurs only where there is a diminution of perfection and some measure of imperfection is introduced.33

Scotus here speaks of ‘the Philosopher,’ which was the medieval moniker for Aristotle, but Aristotle here stands in for the Neoplatonized Aristotelianism that reached the medieval West by way of Islamic philosophy and theology.34 It was this philosophy with which medieval Christian theology generally contended. For the philosophers in this tradition, it is a sign of God’s perfection that He cannot immediately create a human being or move a rock. God has to thin Himself out, as it were, through a variety of intermediary agents before He can cause these things together with these ordered secondary causes. On Scotus’s reading of the philosophers, “Where an essential order exists, nothing can be adjacent to the least perfect unless it is in some measure imperfect.”35 Nothing would be more unbefitting of God, the philosophers think, than for Him to enter into the womb of a human being and become one Himself.

In addition to the argument from imperfection, Scotus’s philosophers also proffer an argument from contingency:

It seems they felt that not only was God’s immediate omnipotence indemonstrable, but that it was simply impossible that he could be omnipotent in this way. The basis for their view seems to be this proposition: “A source or principle that is necessary and absolutely perfect is not related immediately to anything in a contingent fashion.” The proof is this:


34 For a helpful introduction, see Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy*, 387-402.

35 Scotus, *Quodlibet* 7, n. 55 (Alluntis, pp. 274-75): “Ubi enim est ordo essentialis, ibi non potest aliquid esse proximum imperfectissimo nisi ipsum sit aliquidem imperfectum.”
No novelty or contingency could be ascribed to what immediately emanates from such a source. To begin with, this principle, since it is simply necessary, can behave in but one way. And given this uniform behavior there is nothing else needed for it to act nor is there anything to impede its action. It is not an imperfect principle and therefore it cannot be impeded or be insufficient or require anything else. If the aforesaid proposition (namely, that a necessary and sufficient principle could not produce anything immediately and at the same time contingently) were true, it would follow at once that it could not cause every possible thing immediately.36

The basic idea here is that, because God is a necessary being and supremely perfect, He cannot but cause necessarily and most perfectly. Were He able to immediately produce all producibles, He would necessarily do so. Since not all producibles do, in fact, exist, it must be the case that God cannot produce them immediately.

The God of Christian Scripture, of course, is not like the God of the philosophers. The God of Christian Scripture is both necessary and supremely perfect, but He is neither aloof from this world nor does He act by necessity alone. Indeed, it is the central mystery of the Christian faith that God not only created a human being but became one Himself and did so in pure liberality. The fathers had fought long and hard to defend the doctrine of creation against pagan necessitarianism, and in the face of an increasingly confident Aristotelianism, Scotus and his contemporaries were unwilling to give up that hard-won victory.37 Nicæa’s confession of “the Father Almighty” requires us to believe, Scotus contends, that God can cause immediately

36 Scotus, Quodlibet 7, nn. 43-44 (Alluntis, pp. 269-70): “Secundum, scilicet de positione philosophorum. Circa hoc philosophi videntur sentire non solum quod non sit demonstrabile Deum esse omnipotentem immediate, sed etiam quod hoc sit impossibile; et videtur fundamentum eorum in ista propositione stare: ‘Principium necessarium et omnino perfectum ad nihil immediate contingenter se habet’. Hoe probatur: quia nulla novitas seu contingentia potest assignari in principiato immediate a tali principio; non enim quia illud principium aliter se habet, cum sit simpliciter necessarium, nec quia illo uniformiter se habente aliud aliquid requiritur vel impedit, quia non est principium imperfectum et, per consequens, nec impedibile, nec insufficiens, sive aliquid requirere. Si ista propositione iam probata vera esset, scilicet quod nihil potest esse immediate et contingenter a principio necessario et sufficiente, statim sequitur quod non potest causare omne possibile immediate.”

whatever He causes medially: “God is so omnipotent that without any other agent, He can cause
everything causable.”38

Scotus certainly thinks that the philosophers’ arguments against the Christian version of
divine omnipotence can be refuted (insofar as no demonstration against a truth of divine
revelation can possibly stand), but he does not think Christian theology can produce a
demonstration of its particular version of divine omnipotence. The theologian can offer probable
reasons, of course, but none that the pagan philosopher will find convincing or even invulnerable
to attack.39

Scotus employs his immediate-influence axiom consistently and often, not only to defend
divine omnipotence generally but also to offer novel solutions to many of the perennial questions
of Christian theology. Whatever God can do together with a secondary cause, Scotus repeatedly
insists, God can do without it. There are some exceptions to this rule, of course. God cannot
make a dog without matter or in some other way that would contradict its essence since this
would be logically impossible. But Scotus consistently affirms (as did Aquinas and many before
him) that God needs the help of no exterior secondary cause for causing anything causable:

For His power is not bound by sacraments, nor as a consequence by any other created
forms….For whatever he could do with [the help of] a secondary cause that is not of the
essence of a thing—I add this on account of matter and form, because He could not make
a composite without these causes—He could do immediately.40

38 Scotus, Quodlibet 7, n. 51 (Alluntis, p. 273): “Deum sic esse omnipotentem quod sine quocumque alio agente
possit causare quodlibit causabile.”

39 Scotus, Quodlibet 7, n. 63 (Alluntis, p. 277): “Although the theologians’ view is not demonstrable, since it is in
fact true, its opposite is not demonstrable either.” (Sed licet haec conclusio non sit demonstrabilis, quia, tamen, cum
vera sit, oppositum demonstrari non potest, ideo ad rationes adductas pro opinione philosophorum respondendum
est.) Here, Scotus is in full agreement with Aquinas. See, for instance, Summa theologiae I, q. 1, a. 8, resp.

40 Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 17, pt. 1, q. 1, n. 26 (Wolter-Bychkov, p. 467): “[Q]uia potentiam suam non alligavit
sacramentis, nec per consequens alis formis creatis….Nam quidquid potest cum causa secunda quae non est de
essentia rei — hoc addo propter materiam et formam, quia non potest facere compositum sine istis causis — hoc
potest per se immediate.” Most English translations from the Reportatio are drawn, with modification where
necessary or appropriate, from the Wolter-Bychkov-Pomplun editions.
For Scotus, that God can do immediately whatever He does mediately is not a speculative philosophical principle. As noted, he thinks natural reason inclines in precisely the other direction (i.e., that God cannot do immediately what He does mediately). Scotus’s strong defense of the omnipotence of God is, thus, clearly an exercise in fides quaeens intellectum. Indeed, the defense of the omnipotence of God was one of the preeminent features of the Condemnations of 1277, and a significant number of condemned propositions are precisely ones that limit God’s power.\(^{41}\)

**Absolute and Ordained Power**

It is in the context of his immediate-influence axiom that Scotus’s use of the analytic instrument of the distinction between absolute and ordained power is most appropriately understood.\(^{42}\) For Scotus, created secondary causes exist in the universe not because God needs them but because God wills them to exist. This applies both to the natural and the supernatural order. God does not need fire to warm things. God is entirely capable of warming without fire, but God has freely willed that there be fires, and He freely wills (in most cases) to concur with

---

\(^{41}\) The following propositions, for example, were condemned: (53) “That God of necessity makes whatever comes immediately from Him.—This is erroneous whether we are speaking of the necessity of coercion, which destroys liberty, or of the necessity of immutability, which implies the inability to do otherwise” (Quod deum necesse est facere, quicquid immediate fit ab ipso. – Error, siue intelligatur de necessitate coactionis, quia tollit libertatem, siue de necessitate inmutabilitatis, quia ponit impossibilitatem aliter faciendi); (54) “That the first principle cannot produce generable things immediately because they are new effects and a new effect requires an immediate cause that is capable of being otherwise” (Quod primum principium non potest inmediate producere generabilia, quia sunt effectus noui. Effectus autem nouus exigit causam immediatam que potest aliter se habere); (63) “That God cannot produce the effect of a secondary cause without the secondary cause itself” (Quod deus non potest in effectum cause secundarie sine ipsa causa secundaria); and (64) “That the immediate effect of the first being has to be one only and most like unto the first being” (Quod effectus inmediatus a primo debet esse unus tantum et simillimus primo). Stephen Tempier, *La condamnation parisienne de 1277. Nouvelle édition du texte latin, traduction, introduction et commentaire*, ed. David Piché (Paris: J. Vrin, 1999), 96, 100.

these fires so that they carry out their natural effects. God has also made a number of covenants with His people. He has freely decided that all who are baptized receive baptismal character; He has freely decided that all those who bring their mere attrition to penance will receive an infusion of grace; He has freely decided that all who die in a state of grace will obtain glory.

To the question “Whether God could make things other than He has ordained them to be made?” (utrum Deus possit aliter facere res quam ab ipso ordinatum est eas fieri) Scotus gives his most extensive ex professo account of the distinction between God’s ordained and absolute power:

In everyone acting by intellect and will, who is able to act in conformity with right law and yet not by necessity in conformity with right law, one must distinguish between ordained power and absolute power; and the reason for this is that he can act in conformity with that right law and so according to ordained power (for the power is ordained insofar as it is the principle of carrying things out in conformity with right law), and he can act without that law or against it, and here there is absolute power, exceeding ordained power. And therefore not only in God but in any agent acting freely – who can act according to the dictate of right law and without that law or against it – one must distinguish between ordained power and absolute power; therefore the jurists say that someone can do something de facto, that is by his absolute power – or de iure, that is by ordained power according to right.

But when that right law – according to which one must act in an ordered way – is not in the power of the agent, then his absolute power cannot exceed his ordained power about any object unless he acts about it in disordered way; for it is necessary that such law stand – comparing it to such agent – and yet that an action ‘not conformed to that right law’ is not right nor ordered, because such an agent is held to act according to the law he is subject to. Hence all those subject to the divine law, if they do not act according to it, act in disordered way.

But when the law and the rightness of law are in the power of the agent, so that it is only right because it is established, then an agent acting from his own freedom can ordain otherwise than that right law directs; and yet along with this he can act rightly, because he can establish another right law according to which he may act in ordered fashion. Nor does his absolute power then simply exceed his ordained power, because it would be ordered according to another law, just as it was according to the prior law; yet it exceeds ordained power precisely according to the prior law, against which or beyond which it acts. This can be exemplified in a prince and his subjects, and in positive law.43

---

43 Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 44, q. 1, nn. 3-5 (Vatican VI, pp. 363-65): “Respondeo: In omni agente per intellectum et voluntatem, potente conformiter agere legi rectae et tamen non necessario conformiter agere legi rectae, est distinguere potentiam ordinatam a potentia absoluta; et ratio huius est, quia potest agere conformiter illi legi rectae, et tunc secundum potentiam ordinatam (ordinata enim est in quantum est principium exsequendi aliqua conformiter
What Scotus means when he says that God can act beyond (*praeter*) or against (*contra*) the laws presently in place is debated. On the one hand, he might simply mean that God could act in this way had He instituted other laws than the ones presently in place. On the other hand, he might be claiming that God can act in this way even while the present laws stand. That is to say, Scotus might be claiming that God can break the laws that He has instituted even while these laws stand. Courtenay, citing precisely the passage above, wants to read Scotus in this second, much stronger, way, but he rightly recognizes that Scotus never actually uses the distinction in this stronger way anywhere in his corpus. Courtenay makes much of Scotus’s definition of the distinction, but the definition itself is at most ambiguous, and there is at least one place where Scotus says explicitly that while certain laws stand, God cannot act against them. As noted above, a number of Scotists later used the distinction in this second, stronger way to argue that

---

44 Courtenay, *Capacity and Volition*, 100-103.

45 See, for instance, Scotus, *Reportatio* I-A, d. 17, pt. 1, q. 1, n. 27 (Wolter-Bychkov, p. 467): “So long as this law is standing, He could not accept someone, apart from one having such a habit whereby one merits and as a consequence of which one might be rewarded.” (…*non posset aliquem acceptare, ista lege stante, sine habitu tali quo meretur et ex illo praemiaretur.* )
God can, in fact, break laws even while they presently stand, but Scotus is at most culpable for ambiguously defining the distinction.

If we read his admittedly ambiguous definition in conjunction with Scotus’s other explicit statements and the way he actually uses the distinction, it seems to me that Scotus in entirely traditional in the way that he uses it. The question that Scotus considers is not whether God can break His promises. The question is whether God could have made other promises. God always acts according to His determinations as revealed in Scripture, and Scotus never unambiguously suggests otherwise. What interests Scotus is whether God necessarily makes the promises that He makes. God necessarily acts in accordance with His promises, but He does not necessarily make those promises. Whenever Scotus considers a question of necessity, then, he recognizes that there are in fact two distinct questions that the theologian must address:

Just as in God a double potency is posited, namely an ordered one and an absolute one, so proportionately a double necessity is posited in Him.46

Something might be necessary given all of God’s promises revealed in Scripture, but it might not be necessary had God made other promises. The subjunctive mood of the question (possit) is important. The question is not whether God can act in ways other than He has ordained but whether He could have.

Again, Scotus is not driven to ask these additional questions by mere speculative fancy. He wishes to secure the freedom with which God has set up the order He has in fact brought about and thinks that, in doing so, we can know more rather than less about God. By showing that some particular connection that obtains in the actual economy of salvation is entirely contingent upon the divine will, the theologian must further consider why God has freely willed

46 Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 17, pt. 1, q. 1, n. 26 (Wolter-Bychkov, p. 466): “Quantum ad primum dico quod sicut in Deo ponitur duplex potentia, ordinata scilicet et absoluta, ita proportionaliter ponitur in eo duplex necessitas.”
this contingent connection. Scotus thus rarely takes away without giving something in return. Once he has shown the non-necessity of some connection in the actual economy of salvation, he often gives a further account of why they have been so connected. The former has long elicited the ire of his detractors; the latter, I argue, is Scotus’s valuable contribution to the theology of grace.

**Metaphysical-priority axiom**

In addition to his modal intuitions, Scotus also inherits from Aristotle a strong sense of metaphysical priority according to which \( a \) is prior to \( b \) just in case \( b \) requires \( a \) for its existence but not the other way around:

I understand prior here in the same sense as did Aristotle when in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*, on the authority of Plato, he shows that the prior according to nature and essence is what can exist without the posterior, but the reverse is not true. And this I understand as follows. Even though the prior should produce the posterior necessarily and consequently could not exist without it, it would not be because the prior requires the posterior for its own existence, but it is rather the other way about. For even assuming that the posterior did not exist, the existence of the prior would not entail a contradiction. But the converse is not true, for the posterior needs the prior. This need we can call dependence, so that we can say that anything which is essentially posterior [in this way] depends necessarily upon what is prior but not vice versa, even should the posterior at times proceed from it necessarily.47

Scotus employs this axiom in a variety of contexts: substances are prior to accidents; powers are prior to their actualization, absolute forms are prior to external relations, etc. Analyzing states of

---

47 Scotus, *De primo principio* 1.8 (Wolter, p. 5): “Huius prioris hanc intelligo rationem, quam etiam Aristoteles 5 Metaphysicae testimonio Platonis ostendit: Prius secundum naturam et essentiam est quod contingit esse sine posteriori, non e converso. Quod ita intelligo, quod, licet prius necessario causet posteriorius et ideo sine ipso esse non possit, hoc tamen non est quia ad esse suum egeat posterioriori, sed e converso; quia si ponatur posteriorius non esse, nihilominus prius erit sine inclusione contradictionis. Non sic e converso, quia posterius eget priore, quam indigentiam possimus dependentiam appellare, ut dicamus omne posterius essentialiter a priore necessario dependere; non e converso, licet quandoque necessario posterius consequatur istud.” Most English translations from *De primo principio* are drawn, with modification where necessary or appropriate, from John Duns Scotus, *A Treatise on God as First Principle*, trans. Allan B. Wolter (Chicago, IL: Franciscan Herald Press, 1966)
affairs in terms of metaphysical priority often provides the key for Scotus’s novel solutions to long-standing theological problems.

To give but one example, Scotus employs his metaphysical-priority axiom extensively in working out issues related to the sacrament of the Eucharist. Scotus defends the possibility that one body be simultaneously in two places and that two bodies be simultaneously in one place. Scotus responds to a number of objections to bilocation including whether a bilocated human being would need to eat in both places and whether a bilocated human being mortally wounded in one place would die in the other. Scotus’s general approach to these and other such questions is to say that Aristotle’s categories (i.e., substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, passion) are loosely arranged in order of metaphysical priority and that variations in place will propagate down the chain of categories but not up (e.g., someone in two places can perform a distinct act in each place [since action is metaphysically posterior to place] but cannot be happy in one and sad in the other [since happiness and sadness are qualities which are metaphysically prior to place]):

If any form whatsoever naturally exists in something before the latter’s ‘where,’ this form does not vary, does not begin to exist differently in that thing, and does not change its state in that thing on account of another ‘where’ or a change of that thing’s ‘where’—because something prior does not vary when something posterior varies. However, any form whatsoever that begins to exist in something simultaneously with the latter’s ‘where’ or after the latter’s ‘where,’ does vary with any change of the latter’s ‘where’—because something posterior does vary when something prior varies.

---

48 Scotus, Reportatio IV-A, d. 10, q. 2-3, n. 62 (Bychkov-Pomplun, pp. 285-86): “God can make two bodies exist in one and the same place; therefore, he can also make one and the same body exist in two places.” (Deus potest facere duo corpora in eodem loco; ergo et idem corpus in duobus locis.)

49 Scotus, Reportatio IV-A, d. 10, q. 2-3, nn. 89-90 (Bychkov-Pomplun, pp. 299-300).

50 Scotus, Reportatio IV-A, d. 10, q. 2-3, n. 80 (Bychkov-Pomplun, p. 295-96): “Ad solutionem argumentorum praemitto tres propositiones, quarum prima est haec: quaecumque forma prius naturaliter inest aliqui quam ‘ubi’, non variatur nec aliter inest vel aliter se habet in illo propter alius ‘ubi’ vel variationem circa ‘ubi’, quia prius non variatur ad variationem posterioris; sed quaecumque forma simul inest aliqui cum ‘ubi’, vel posterioris quam ‘ubi’ variatur ad variationem ‘ubi’ quia posterius variatur ad variationem prioris, et ea quae sunt simul, simul variantur.”
According to Scotus, then, if a bilocated person were to eat in one place only, she would be full in both (since eating is an action metaphysically posterior to being in a place, and being full is a quality that is metaphysically prior to being in a place). Similarly, if a bilocated person were decapitated in one place but not the other, she would bear the marks of the wounds in only one place (since state is metaphysically posterior to place) but both would die (since the union of soul and body is metaphysically prior to place).

Scotus employs this axiom in a variety of contexts to resolve a host of theological problems (most of them less frivolous than the ones above). He will apply it not only to a variety of created realities but also to the inner Trinitarian life of God, both in the productions of the divine persons and in the interplay between divine intellect and will in the determinations and counsels of God insofar as acts of will depend on acts of intellect but acts of intellect do not depend on acts of will (e.g., I cannot will what I do not know, but I need not will what I know).

Rational Instants

Scotus’s metaphysical-priority axiom allows him to deploy a second analytic instrument to a host of questions in Christian theology—his famed “rational instants” (instantia rationis), also sometimes called “instants of nature” (instantia naturae) or “signs of nature” (signo naturae). Scotus finds priority extremely helpful in analyzing complex realities not subject to temporal succession. While the inner life of the Trinity—both in the productions of the persons and in their knowing, willing, and externally acting—exists entirely outside of the temporal order in the single “now” of eternity, Scotus finds the priority axiom helpful and fruitful for

---

51 Scotus, Reportatio IV-A, d. 10, qq. 2-3, n. 90 (Bychkov-Pomplun, p. 300).

52 Scotus, Reportatio IV-A, d. 10, qq. 2-3, n. 89 (Bychkov-Pomplun, pp. 299-300).
investigating all its inner complexity. While God’s interior life cannot be broken up into discrete temporal instants, Scotus is willing to break immanent and external acts of God into discrete “rational instants” based on metaphysical priority and posteriority.

To cite but one important use of this analytic instrument, Scotus finds it helpful for capturing a traditional asymmetry between predestination and reprobation. It was standard to argue that predestination has no cause in us while reprobation does, but Scotus helpfully deploys his rational instants to show precisely how this can be the case in the single act of divine willing:

Without insisting on it, I say the following: In the first instant God wills Himself. However, in the second instant both Peter and Judas occur [to Him] in their natural being, in such a way that he wills them to be in the state that is appropriate [to those] that descended from Adam through generation, just as Michael and Lucifer occur to God in their natural state. There is yet no indication of innocence or glory [at this point].

It is only then that, in addition to that, God wills beatitude for Peter. And what does He will for Judas? Nothing so far in this second instant: again, in the second instant He wills Peter to be ultimately justified, but wills nothing yet for Judas. In the third instant He foresees the fall of Adam, and consequently that all his descendants are destined to be born from him by way of generation bearing the mark of the original sin. At that point both Peter and Judas occur [to Him] as equal in Adam—yet He foresees grace for Peter, but nothing except his natural state for the other, i.e., Judas. Therefore, it follows that Judas will end up being a sinner, because God foresaw neither beatitude nor grace for him.

Furthermore, in the third instant both, i.e., Peter and Judas, occur as sinners, because He foresees that both will sin. However, in the fourth instant He foresees that Judas will remain unrepentant to the end, but that Peter will be finally justified and receive grace: hence damnation for one and beatitude for the other. For in the third instant, when both were [seen as] sinners, He willed to give grace to one (Peter), and it is only in a negative sense [that one can say] that He ‘willed to punish’ the other.

---

53 See, for instance, Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 23, a. 3, ad 2.

The text is a crucial one in Scotus, and one of the key texts Minges used in his defense of Scotus against the charge of Semipelagianism (since election to glory is clearly prior to divine foreknowledge of our acts).\textsuperscript{55} The text will not feature strongly in this dissertation, though some of Scotus’s reasons for ordering the instants in the way that he does certainly will. I mainly cite it here as an illustration of the potency of the \textit{instantia rationis}. For Scotus, as for the whole scholastic tradition, all that God wills, He wills in the single “now” of eternity, but that does not entail that the internal complexity of the divine will is insusceptible to sophisticated analysis. By means of his metaphysical-priority axiom, Scotus is able to break the divine counsel into discrete logical (not temporal) moments so as better to understand the relationship between the divine intellect with its foreknowledge and the divine will with its determinations. Such rational instants will feature repeatedly in the chapters to come. They open up the space, as it were, for Scotus’s reflections on the order of intentions of God.

\textit{The Ordered-willing Axiom}

This bring us to the final and most important of the Scotistic axioms, at least for our purposes here. Scotus argues that all creaturely perfections are to be posited in God stripped of all creaturely imperfections: “We take what is a matter of perfection in our will with respect to its act, eliminate what is a matter of imperfection there, [and then] transfer that which is a matter

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{55} Minges, \textit{Gnadenlehre des Duns Scotus}, 31-43.}
One of the perfections of the will that Scotus repeatedly insists we attribute preeminently to God is that the order of intentions is opposite the order of execution: “Now the sequence in which the creative artist evolves his plan is the very opposite of the way he puts it into execution.” This seems intuitively obvious. Although I first board an airplane and then arrive in London, I first intend to go to London and then intend to board the airplane. God is the most perfect willer and thus wills in precisely the same way:

Everyone who wills in a reasonable way, first wills the end and secondly that which immediately attains the end, and thirdly other things that are more remotely ordered to the attainment of his end. And so it is [with] God, who is most reasonable, not of course by different acts, but in one single act which is said to tend in different ways to the different objects ordered in some way to one another.

In addition to his principle that the order of intentions is the opposite of the order of execution, Scotus also introduces a second principle that bears on the order of intentions. Scotus holds that God never wills greater goods for the sake of lesser goods but always the other way around (e.g., God would never become a doctor for the money since human health is a greater good than accumulating wealth). Perhaps Scotus’s most thorough treatment of this perfection of the divine will is found in his late De primo principio. This brief treatise is one of Scotus’s most ambitious projects. It is best known for his proof of the existence of God in chapters three and four, but it is the first two chapters that I wish to highlight here. In the first chapter, Scotus sets

---


57 Scotus, Ordinatio III, d. 7, q. 3, n. 69 (Vatican IX, p. 289): “Potest dici quod cum in actione artificis sit contrarius processus in exsequendo ei qui est in intendendo.”

58 Scotus, Ordinatio III, d. 32, q. 1, nn. 21-22 (Vatican X, p. 136): “…nam omnis rationabiliter volens, primo vult finem, et secundo immediate illud quod attingit finem, et tertio alia quae sunt remotius ordinata ad attingendum finem. Sic etiam Deus rationabilissime, licet non diversis actibus, unico tamen actu, in quantum ille diversimode tendit super obiecta ordinata.”
out six essential orders which constitute the universe as we know it; in the second, he reflects on the interrelationship of these six orders.

The first division of essential orders is that between the order of eminence and the order of dependence:

In the first place then I say that the primary division of essential order appears to be in the manner of an equivocal term into its equivocates, namely into the order of eminence and the order of dependence. In the first, what is eminent is said to be prior whereas what is exceeded in perfection is posterior. Put briefly, whatever in essence is more perfect and noble would be prior in this manner. In the second type of order, the dependent is said to be posterior whereas that on which it depends is prior.59

Any two things in the universe can be ordered by eminence such that one is more eminent than, less eminent than, or equally eminent as the other (e.g., angels are more eminent than squirrels). If \( a \) is more eminent than \( b \), \( a \) is prior to \( b \) in the order of eminence. Scotus, we might say, fully subscribes to the notion of the great chain of being.

Things are also ordered according to dependence. If \( a \) essentially depends on \( b \) in some way, \( b \) is prior to \( a \) in the order of dependence. Scotus further divides the order of dependence into several different subtypes, the important one for our purposes being the order of final causality. Two things are related to each other in the order of final causality just in case one of them is ordered to the other as its end. Crucially, Scotus insists that nothing prior to \( a \) in the order of final causality is posterior to \( a \) in the order of eminence for any possible \( a \). It is never the case, in other words, that a lesser good is the end of a greater good; greater goods are never willed for the sake of lesser goods:

Everything ordered to an end (*finitum*) is excelled. Proof for this is found in the fact that the end is better than anything ordered to it. This in turn follows from the fact that it is the end insofar as it is loved that incites the efficient cause to productivity. Let the end that moves be \( a \), and \( b \) the effect ordered to an end. Then we argue in this fashion. \( A \) is no worse than \( b \); neither is it equally good; consequently, it must be better. The second part of the antecedent (viz. that it is not equal) follows from this consideration. Whatever the reason might be why \( a \) would move an efficient cause, for the very same reason \( b \) could move it, since it is equally lovable and desirable. And so \( b \) could be its own final cause, which is contrary to the initial [conclusion] of this second [chapter]. From this consideration it can also be inferred that \( a \) is not worse than \( b \).

Scotus is arguing that if I do \( b \) for the sake of \( a \), it cannot be the case that \( b \) is better or equal in value to \( a \). If it were, I would do \( b \) for its own sake and not for the sake of \( a \). It would be odd, for instance, to learn that a President of the United States ran for office because the job includes a free personal trainer. Scotus recognizes that human beings do sometimes behave in odd ways, but he thinks the perfection of the divine will rules out this kind of behavior at least in the case of the first cause:

You may object that at times voluntary actions are motivated by the love of some inferior good and in such a case the end is not as good as the action performed to obtain it. This is illustrated in every action which is good in itself but evil by reason of the end or purpose for which it was performed, for in this case the action is ordered by the agent to an end inferior to itself. Now my answer to this is that our conclusion holds for those ends which

---

60 Scotus, *De primo principio* 2.47-48 (Wolter, pp. 33-35): “Comparatis membris primae divisionis ad invicem in communi, comparo in speciali posterius primi ordinis ad duo posteriora specialia secundi ordinis; comparo scilicet exessum ad effectum et finitum. Hic conclusionem unam propono, quae talis est: Decima Sexta Conclusio: Omne finitum est excessum. Probatur: quia finis est melior eo quod est ad ipsum. Hoc probatur: quia finis ut amatum movet efficiens ad causandum. A igitur non est minus bonum ipso B, nec aequale; ergo maius. Secunda pars antecedentis probatur, quia qua ratione aequale moveret, eadem ratione et idem posset movere, quia aequa est amabile et desiderabile, et ita posset esse causa finalis sui, contra primam huius secundi. Ex hoc concluditur quod nec minus.” Wolter translates *finitum* in this passage as ‘ordered to an end’ following Scotus’s lead in *De primo principio* 1.15 (Wolter, pp. 8-9): “Fourth Division: The cause mentioned in the first part of the second division is in turn divided into the famous fourfold classification of final, efficient, material and formal cause, which need no explanation. The posterior correlative to cause is subject to a corresponding division, namely (1) that which is ordered to an end — for the sake of brevity we shall call it *finitum*; (2) the effect; (3) what is made from matter — we may call it the *materiatum*; (4) what is given form — we may call it the *formatum*.” (*Quarta Divistio: Primum membrum secundae divisionis, quod est causa, famose subdividitur in quatuor causas satis notas: finalem,19 efficientem, materiale, et formatum. Et posterius sibi oppositum dividitur in quatuor sibi correspondentia, scilicet in ordinatum ad finem, quod, ut breviter loquar, dicatur finitum; et in effectum; et in causatum ex materia, quod dicatur materiatum; et in causatum per formam, quod dicatur formatum.*)
lie in the very nature of things such as is invariably the case with the goals which nature seeks or the aims of a well-ordered will.\textsuperscript{61}

For Scotus, the perfection of the divine will necessarily entails that God never will a greater good for the sake of a lesser good. It can never be the case, in other words, that something is prior to \( a \) in the order of eminence but posterior to \( a \) in the order of final causality.

Scotus thus has two axioms that bear on the order of intentions. The first axiom is that the order of intentions is the opposite of the order of execution (i.e., if \( a \) is prior to \( b \) in the order of execution, \( a \) is posterior to \( b \) in the order of intentions); the other is that the order of intentions is identical to the order of eminence (i.e., if \( a \) is prior to \( b \) in the order of eminence, \( a \) is also prior to \( b \) in the order of intentions). Scotus can thus determine the relationship between two created realities in the order of divine intentions either by appeal to the order of eminence or by appeal to the order of execution. As we will see in the chapters to come, Scotus will use both of these rules in his attempts to discern the orderly progress of divine volitions which he thinks necessarily characterizes the present or any possible economy of salvation. Because the divine will is well-ordered by nature, Scotus clearly thinks there are certain economies of salvation (namely, unorderly ones) which cannot possibly be brought about by God.

**Grace and Charity**

One final note before we begin. In my investigation of Scotus’s theology of grace, I will often draw on texts where Scotus speaks not of grace but of charity. I do so because Scotus, unlike Aquinas, thinks of grace and charity as numerically the same theological virtue. Much has

\textsuperscript{61} Scotus, *De primo principio* 2.50 (Wolter, p. 35): “Obiecties: Aliqua voluntas causat aliquid propter minus bonum amatum; igitur ibi finis est excessus. Antecedens patet in actu omni bono ex genere et malo ex fine, quia ordinatur ab agente ad finem inferiorem se. Respondeo: Conclusio procedit de fine ex natura rei, qualis est semper finis naturae et finis voluntatis ordinatae.”
been made of this difference between Scotus and Aquinas, but as we will see at several points in this dissertation, the difference is far less pronounced than is sometimes assumed.

In arguing that grace and charity are numerically the same theological virtue, Scotus simply adopts the position of a number of schoolmen before him:

There is another opinion, which says that grace is formally the virtue that is charity, because whatever excellences are attributed to charity are attributed also to grace, and conversely; for both equally “divide the sons of the kingdom from the sons of perdition” (De Trinitate XV, cap. 18) both are also the form of the virtues and neither can be unformed, and both join the wayfarer to the ultimate end with that perfect conjunction which is possible for wayfarers; and if they are posited as distinct, one of them would be superfluous because the other would suffice.62

Scotus’s identification of grace and charity, then, follows from the application of his principle of economy, today best known as “Ockham’s razor” but more commonly called “Scotus’s rule” in the fourteenth century.63 Charity does everything that grace does, and there is never a case where one is possessed without the other. Scotus thus concludes that there are neither good reasons nor Scriptural warrants to posit two discrete supernatural habits when one suffices. We will return to this issue in chapters 2 and 3; for now, it will be sufficient to note that I will often, following Scotus, speak of grace and charity interchangeably in this dissertation.

---

62 Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 27, q. 1, n. 8 (Vatican VIII, p. 286): “Ideo est alia opinio, quae dicit quod gratia formaliter est virtus quae est caritas, quia quaecumque excellentiae attribuuntur caritati, et gratiae, - et e converso: utraque enim aequaliter ‘dividit inter filios regni et perditionis’ (XV De Trinitate cap. 18), utraque etiam est forma virtutum et neutra potest esse informis, utraque coniungit fini ultimo perfecta conjunctione qualsis potest esse in via; et si ponerentur distincta, alterum superflueret, quia reliquum sufficeret.” Scotus goes on to argue that grace and charity are a single absolute thing but, nonetheless, formally distinct. We will return to this in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 2

THE GRACE OF GOD
Grace as Deification of Nature

per quae maxima et pretiosa nobis promissa donavit ut per haec efficiamini
divinae consortes naturae
2 Peter 1:4

When narrating the history of the theology of grace, many have wanted to lump Scotus together with Ockham or to identify Scotus as the cause of or midway point in the development from Aquinas to Ockham. As we will see, there is, indeed, a significant difference between Aquinas and Ockham on the relationship between nature and grace, but the burden of this chapter will be to show that Scotus is neither the cause of nor the midway point in this transition. It is true that Scotus is closer to Ockham than to Aquinas on a great number of particular issues in the theology of grace, like the identity of grace and charity or the non-necessity and non-sufficiency of grace for divine acceptation to glory. In fact, Ockham is often content simply to defend Scotus’s positions on these matters against the attacks of Peter Auriol. Nevertheless, with respect to the fundamental understanding of the relationship between nature and grace, the opposite is the case: Scotus is much closer to Aquinas than he is to Ockham.

Scotus is a representative of and significant contributor to what I will present as the thirteenth-century consensus view of grace. The significant difference between Aquinas and Ockham, I suggest, is not to be explained by a gradual development in which Scotus is cause or midway point. Rather, we ought to envision a much more radical shift from the high thirteenth-century view endorsed by Aquinas and Scotus alike, to the much lower view espoused by
Ockham and at least some of his followers. Whether Ockham’s view has precedent will likely require further critical scholarship on the unedited manuscripts of the important theologians between Scotus and Ockham, but I will argue that the novel positions of Scotus are neither necessary nor sufficient for the novelties of his great Franciscan confrère.

The Thirteenth-Century Consensus View—Grace as Deification

Modern deification studies has thus far generally ignored the medieval West. The lion’s share of attention has been paid to the patristic and Reformation periods. What has been unequivocally demonstrated is that no great teacher in the history of the Christian Church—East or West—has ever denied that Christian salvation is rightly described as deification. That said, modern deification studies has struggled appropriately to define and categorize accounts of deification. It is generally acknowledged that there are certain versions of deification that are


65 Barth is often identified as an exception to this rule, but he at least occasionally endorses such language so long as it is properly understood: “In the same sense Augustine had already been able to say that in man’s justificatio in so far as it makes us God’s children, a deificatio takes place, though he does not neglect to add the comment: sed hoc gratiae est adoptantis non naturae generantis (Enarr. in Ps. 492). Neither in Augustine nor in Luther is there anything about a deification in faith in the sense of a changing of man’s nature into the divine nature. What makes the expressions possible is the apprehensio Christi or habitatio Christi in nobis or unio hominis cum Christo that takes place in real faith according to the teaching of Gal. 20. In emphasising this more than mystical and more than speculative principle that faith means union with what is believed, i.e., with Jesus Christ, Calvin did not lag in the least behind Luther nor either of them behind an Augustine, Anselm, or Bernard of Clairvaux. Without this principle it is impossible to understand the Reformation doctrine of justification and faith. How it was distinguished from the idea of an essential deification of man in the Reformation period may be seen especially from Calvin’s controversy with A. Osiander (Instit., III, 11, 5 f.)” Church Dogmatics I,1 §6, (Hendrickson, p. 240).
clearly un-Christian. For example, those versions of deification in which the Christian is absorbed into deity and loses her own distinct creaturely identity have regularly been rejected by the Christian community. On the other hand, there are certain versions of deification that are clearly too reductionistic. For instance, it seems to me that some modern proposals that reduce deification to little more than moral exemplarism ought to be rejected. On this view, Christian striving after virtue can be thought of as deification because God is the perfect embodiment of the virtues.66

Norman Russell has proposed what has become something of a touchstone taxonomy of versions of deification, but his taxonomy is rife with difficulties.67 Lack of attention to the medieval period is all the more striking, then, because scholastic theologians (medieval and beyond) expended a great deal of energy thinking about the nature of Christian deification. In doing so, the schoolmen developed precisely the kind of taxonomy that modern deification studies needs. They did so by the introduction of the concept of the “supernatural” (that which is *super naturam*, that is, “above nature”), to which none of the few studies on deification in the medieval period have given adequate attention. While the concept of the supernatural has featured little in modern deification studies, it was central to the nineteenth-century Catholic renewal of the doctrine of deification, often traced back to Matthias Joseph Scheeben (d. 1888). In his various works on the relationship between nature and grace, Scheeben drew heavily on the Greek fathers, but he saw no discord between patristic and scholastic accounts of salvation. He

---

66 See, for instance, Wyndy Corbin Reuschling, “The Means and End in 2 Peter 1:3-11: The Theological and Moral Significance of Theösis,” *Journal of Theological Interpretation* 8, no. 2 (2014): 275-86. Reuschling may have a more robust account of deification than this, but her account tends to lean in this reductionist direction.

was equally a student of the neo-scholasticism of Kleutgen and the patristic renewal of Passaglia.68

That Scheeben should see no discord between the patristic and scholastic heritages on deification, of course, should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with the thirteenth-century theology of grace. Aquinas, for instance, when considering the question as to whether God is the efficient cause of grace simply argues that this must be the case since only God can deify:

Nothing can act beyond its species, since the cause must always be more powerful than its effect. Now the gift of grace surpasses every capability of created nature, since it is nothing short of a partaking of the Divine Nature, which exceeds every other nature. And thus it is impossible that any creature should cause grace. For it is as necessary that God alone should deify, bestowing a partaking of the Divine Nature by a participated likeness, as it is impossible that anything save fire should enkindle.69

The argument should be striking to anyone under the impression that deification was lost to the medieval West. Not only does Aquinas deploy the concept of deification, he employs it as the premise rather than the conclusion of an argument. He is not hoping to persuade his reader that Christian salvation is rightly described as deification; he assumes that his reader is already in agreement with him on this score.

Aquinas regularly speaks of sanctifying grace as a ‘deification’ or a ‘deiformity’ in the soul or as a ‘partaking’ or ‘participating’ in the divine attributes, persons, life, nature, or


essence. For Aquinas, grace is not what deifies us; grace is the very deification or deiformity itself, wrought in the soul by God and by God alone. The Angelic Doctor was not alone in this way of thinking about the relationship between nature and grace. The authors of the *Summa halensis* tell us that “the grace by which someone is said to be pleasing (*gratus*) to God necessarily entails some good in the one made pleasing (*gratificato*) by which he is pleasing (*gratus*) to God; for the one that is pleasing to God is the one who is deiform or assimilated to God.”\(^7^1\) Bonaventure tells us that “no soul pleases God unless it is conformed and assimilated to God through grace informing it and making it deiform.”\(^7^2\) Matthew of Aquasparta tells us that

> Man according to the essence of the soul participates in divine being through reparation, which is a quasi regeneration and a certain spiritual recreation; moreover, he is regenerated and recreated so that he might be a son of God insofar as it perfects the soul and gives to it a certain divine being and makes him, through a certain assimilation, a sharer of the divine nature, just as is found in 2 Peter 1, so that, just as through virtue he participates in and is made capable of a certain divine operation according to the powers, so through grace he shares a certain divine being according to the very nature and essence of the soul.\(^7^3\)

Many more such texts could be produced from these and other medieval authors.

This identification of grace with deification, of course, can be taken in at least two ways. Less generously, it might be argued that this identification is deplorably reductionist. While the

---

\(^7^0\) For an excellent survey of Aquinas’s use of participation language, see Marcelo Sorondo, *La gracia como participacion de la naturaleza divina segun Santo Tomas de Aquino* (Salamanca: Universidad Pontificia, 1979).

\(^7^1\) *Summa halensis* III, n. 608 (Quaracchi IV.2, p. 957): “Solutio: Dicendum quod gratia, qua aliquis dicitur esse gratus Deo, necessario ponit aliquod bonum in gratificato quo est gratus Deo; illud enim, quo est gratus Deo, est illud quo est deiformis vel assimilatus Deo.”

\(^7^2\) Bonaventure, *Sentences* III, d. 13, a. 1, q. 1 (Quaracchi III, p. 276): “Item, nulla anima placet Deo, nisi Deo conformetur et assimiletur per gratiam informantem ipsam et efficientem deiformem.”

\(^7^3\) Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* 10 (Doucet, p. 252): “Oportet enim quod homo secundum essentiam animae participet esse divinum per reparationem, quae est quasi regeneratio et recreatio quaedam spiritualis; per gratiam autem regeneratur et recreatur, ut sit filius Dei, in quantum perficit animam et dat ei quoddam divinum esse et facit eam per quamdam assimilationem consortem divinae naturae, sicut habetur II Petri, 1, ita quod, sicut per virtutem participat et habilitatur ad divinam quamdam operationem secundum potentias, ita per gratiam sortitur quoddam divinum esse quantum ad ipsam naturam et essentiam animae.”
schoolmen employ the language of deification, on this reading, they reduce it to no more than sanctifying grace. Conversely, we might read these texts as cluing us in that the schoolmen had a much more elevated view of sanctifying grace than we might otherwise think. By tending to the thirteenth-century concept of the ‘supernatural,’ I hope it will be obvious by the end of this chapter that the latter is the preferable reading: the schoolmen did not have a low view of deification; they had a high view of sanctifying grace.

Before we continue, the word ‘supernatural’ needs brief introduction since its semantic range has shifted considerably since its medieval coinage. Lexically, the supernatural is what is *super naturam*, that is, ‘above nature.’ In its medieval usage, the supernatural described both the relationship of grace to nature on the one hand, and, on the other, the strange, occult, and demonic. One need look no further than the subtitle of the *Dictionary of the Supernatural* to see which part of its semantic range has come to dominate in our own times: “An A to Z of Hauntings, Possession, Witchcraft, Demonology and Other Occult Phenomena.” It is the former, theological sense of the supernatural that will occupy us here. Sanctifying grace is supernatural because it does not simply repair fallen nature; grace also, and primarily, elevates nature, raising it above nature’s limits.

---

74 For a helpful account of both developments, see Robert Bartlett, *The Natural and the Supernatural in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).


76 See, for instance, Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 2, resp. (Marietti I, pp. 530-31): “And thus in the state of perfect nature man needs a gratuitous strength superadded to natural strength for one reason, namely, in order to do and wish supernatural good; but for two reasons, in the state of corrupt nature, namely, in order to be healed, and furthermore in order to carry out works of supernatural virtue, which are meritorious.” (*Sic igitur virtute gratuita superaddita virtuti naturae indiget homo in statu naturae integrae quantum ad unum, scilicet ad operandum et volendum bonum supernaturale. Sed in statu naturae corruptae, quantum ad duo: scilicet ut sanetur; et ulterius ut bonum supernaturalis virtutis operetur, quod est meritorium.*)
Since its medieval coinage, the Catholic scholastic tradition has continued to develop the theological concept of the supernatural. Scheeben gives a brief and helpful taxonomy which will help us trace the concept as used explicitly or implicitly by Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham. Scheeben introduces two distinctions in our understanding of supernaturality. The first is that between what is ‘accidentally’ supernatural and what is ‘essentially’ supernatural. In what is accidentally supernatural, God produces something in a creature that could have produced that same thing by its own ungraced acts. For instance, I could, with laborious effort, acquire by perfectly natural means the habit (or skill) of golf. If God were to save me the trouble and simply infuse into me the habit of golf, that would be accidentally supernatural. It is ‘accidentally’ supernatural because that in which it consists might have come into being by purely natural means.

Grace (sanctifying grace, that is) is not like this. Sanctifying grace is not simply a shortcut to moral betterment; it does not simply make me a better human being. In contrast to what is accidentally supernatural, what is essentially supernatural lifts its recipient above the capacities of its own nature. If grace is essentially supernatural, it does not simply make easier what was previously difficult; it makes possible what was previously impossible. If God were to enable me to fly unaided from Dallas to Austin, for instance, that would be essentially supernatural. I could not, even with perfect genes, nutrition, and training, ever do such a thing by my own natural endowments.

But even this does not sufficiently capture what sanctifying grace does in the life of the justified. Scheeben introduces a further distinction among those things that are essentially supernatural—the distinction between the relatively essentially supernatural and the absolutely

---

essentially supernatural.\textsuperscript{78} Flying unaided from Dallas to Austin lies outside of the possibilities available to \textit{human} nature, but not outside of the possibilities available to some other created nature (e.g., that of birds). Since flying exceeds my own nature but not that of another creature, it would only be \textit{relatively} essentially supernatural if infused into me by God. That is to say, flying is essentially supernatural with respect to \textit{my} nature, but not with respect to every created nature. Sanctifying grace is not like this either; it does not simply make us capable of acts proper to birds, angels, or, for that matter, any other possible created nature. Sanctifying grace, on Scheeben’s account, is \textit{absolutely} essentially supernatural. It lifts us above our nature by granting us a participation, not in some other actual or even possible created nature, but in that nature which could not possibly be created—the uncreated nature of God Himself:

But if the lower nature is raised in all these respects to the level of a higher nature, and especially if this elevation modifies the lower nature so deeply and affects its inmost being and essence so powerfully that the limits of possibility are reached; if God, purest light and mightiest fire wishes thoroughly to permeate His creature with His energy, to flood it with brightness and warmth, to transform it into His own splendor, to make the creature like to the Father of spirits and impart to it the fullness of His own divine life; if, I say, the entire being of the soul is altered in its deepest recesses and in all its ramifications to the very last, not by annihilation but by exaltation and transfiguration, then we can affirm that a sort of new, higher nature has come to the lower nature, because it has been granted a participation in the essence of Him to whom the higher nature properly belongs.\textsuperscript{79}

Scheeben’s attraction to the concept of the supernatural in his response to the naturalism of the modern era is already present here in his earliest work, and he continued to develop it with great care throughout his career. It would be hard to argue that the patristic heritage had nothing to do with his ‘rediscovery’ of the concept of the supernatural, but the concept itself came not from the patristic sources but from the scholastic West. Scheeben’s taxonomy of the supernatural

\textsuperscript{78} Scheeben, \textit{Nature and Grace}, 28-29.

was not his own creation. He points back to Juan Martinez de Ripalda (d. 1648), and Ripalda references the work of Giles of Coninck (d. 1633). Scheeben attributes the explicit taxonomy of the supernatural to the seventeenth-century scholastic tradition, but he sees its kernel already in the thirteenth century. Scheeben argues compellingly that the explicit, seventeenth-century taxonomy is a faithful development of the implicit logic of the supernatural already present in Aquinas and some of his contemporaries. As such, it will serve as a helpful guide in tracing the development of the concept of the supernatural in Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham in order better to understand the lines of continuity between them.

Everyone in the medieval scholastic tradition, so far as I know, holds that the grace by which we are saved in the actual economy of salvation is infused by God. In the actual economy of salvation, no one is saved without the infusion of sanctifying grace, a quality in the soul of the justified, received at baptism and rendering its recipient worthy in some sense of eternal blessedness should they end their course in that state. That said, Scheeben helps us see that there are at least three categories of qualities that can be infused into the soul by God, and it seems to me that not all of them would count as deification.

If sanctifying grace is merely accidentally supernatural (like the infusion of the skill of golf) one could hardly call it deification, for one could acquire that in which it consists by purely natural means. God’s supernatural infusion of something for which human nature already has a natural capacity for acquisition would at most count as humanification—a perfection of human nature that does not go beyond the limits of human nature and lift human nature above itself.

---


81 Juan Martinez de Ripalda, *De ente supernaturali disputationes in universam theologiam* I, d. 1, sec. 3, n. 23.

82 In what sense grace makes its recipient worthy, of course, was a matter of considerable debate.
Further, it seems to me that even the infusion of something relatively essentially supernatural cannot rightly be described as deification. Were God to infuse telepathy into a human being, this would certainly be essentially supernatural, but it would be more aptly described as angelification than deification. Telepathy is essentially supernatural with respect to human nature, but it is the proper mode of “speech” in angels, at least according to Aquinas.\(^{83}\) While the infusion of telepathy into a human being would be essentially supernatural, it would only be essentially supernatural with respect to human nature and thus only relatively essentially supernatural. There are, presumably, created natures that are not de facto created, but it seems to me that, even if the perfections proper to these possible creatures were infused into us, this still would not be appropriately described as deification. God knows all possible created natures; for each, there presumably exists a name, \(x\), adequate to capture its proper perfection; if one of these perfections were to be infused into human nature by God, it would better be described as \(x\)-ification than deification. Only if perfections proper to God alone are infused into the soul, it seems to me, can we rightly speak of a deification of human nature. Only the infusion of absolutely essentially supernatural perfections, in other words, is sufficient for deification.

In the remainder of this chapter, we will consider the ways in which Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham think about sanctifying grace with the goal of discerning whether they understand grace

---

\(^{83}\) Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 107, a. 1, ad 1 (Marietti I, pp. 506-507): “Our mental concept is hidden by a twofold obstacle. The first is in the will, which can retain the mental concept within, or can direct it externally. In this way God alone can see the mind of another….The other obstacle whereby the mental concept is excluded from another one’s knowledge, comes from the body; and so it happens that even when the will directs the concept of the mind to make itself known, it is not at once made known to another; but some sensible sign must be used….But an angel is under no such obstacle, and so he can make his concept known to another at once.” (*Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in nobis interior mentis conceptus quasi duplici obstaculo clauditur. Primo quidem, ipsa voluntate, quae conceptum intellectus potest retinere interius, vel ad extra ordinare. Et quantum ad hoc, mentem unius nullus alius potest videre nisi solus Deus….Unde cum etiam voluntas ordinat conceptum mentis ad manifestandum alteri, non statim cognoscitur ab alio, sed oportet aliquod signum sensibile adhibere….Hoc autem obstaculorum non habet angelus. Et ideo quam cito vult manifestare suum conceptum, statim alius cognoscit.*)
to be essentially supernatural (rather than merely accidentally supernatural) and, if so, whether they understand it to be relatively essentially supernatural or absolutely essentially supernatural. Only if they think of it as absolutely essentially supernatural can we rightly attribute to them an understanding of sanctifying grace as deifying participation in the divine nature.

As we will see, Scotus follows Aquinas to affirm grace as absolutely essentially supernatural while Ockham affirms grace as at most relatively essentially supernatural. Ockham not only fails to use language of participation in God and deification but significantly devalues grace in terms of its natural and meritorious goodness. When we trace the development of medieval understandings of the relationship between nature and grace, in other words, Scotus is much closer to Aquinas than he is to Ockham.

Grace as Essentially Supernatural

Aquinas on the Essential Supernaturality of Grace

To show the essential supernaturality of the habits infused into us by God in salvation, Aquinas will often argue that these habits enable in us acts that we could not possibly elicit without them. That is to say, what distinguishes natural and supernatural habits is their acts. Though he denies that human beings can love God above all by nature under the conditions of the fall, Aquinas affirms that they could do so (and would have done so naturally) before the fall:

Man in a state of perfect nature could, by his natural power, do the good natural to him without the addition of any gratuitous gift, though not without the help of God moving him. Now to love God above all things is natural to man and to every nature, not only rational but irrational, and even to inanimate nature according to the manner of love which can belong to each creature. And the reason of this is that it is natural to all to seek and love things according as they are naturally fit (to be sought and loved) since “all things act according as they are naturally fit” as stated in Phys. ii, 8. Now it is manifest that the good of the part is for the good of the whole; hence everything, by its natural
appetite and love, loves its own proper good on account of the common good of the whole universe, which is God.\textsuperscript{84}

One of the objections to this position is that this would entail the possibility that human beings acquire charity by their own acts, which Scripture clearly tells us we cannot do: “For to love God above all things is the proper and principal act of charity. Now man cannot of himself possess charity, since the ‘charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us,’ as is said in Romans 5.”\textsuperscript{85} Aquinas responds that this does not follow. His reason is that natural and supernatural love for God are distinguished by their objects: “Charity loves God above all things in a higher way than nature does. For nature loves God above all things inasmuch as He is the beginning and the end of natural good; whereas charity loves Him, as He is the object of beatitude, and inasmuch as man has a spiritual fellowship with God.”\textsuperscript{86}

To distinguish natural and supernatural love for God, Aquinas does not appeal to something about the habits but to something about the objects of the acts elicited by them. This is a basic rule, for Aquinas, about the relationship between powers, habits, and acts:

A power as such is directed to an act. Wherefore we seek to know the nature of a power from the act to which it is directed, and consequently the nature of a power is diversified,

\textsuperscript{84} Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} I-II, q. 109, a. 3 (Marietti I, p. 531): “Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est in Primo, in quo etiam circa naturalem dilectionem angelorum diversae opiniones sunt posita; homo in statu naturae integrae poterat operari virtute suae naturae bonum quod est sibi connaturale, absque superadditione gratuiti doni, licet non absque auxilio Dei moventis. Diligere autem Deum super omnia est quiddam connaturale homini; et etiam cuilibet creaturae non solum rationali, sed irrationali et etiam inanimatae, secundum modum amoris qui unicusque creaturae competere potest. Cuius ratio est quia unicusque naturale est quod appetat et amet aliquid, secundum quod aptum natum est esse, \textit{sic enim agit unumquodque, prout aptum natus est, ut dicitur in II Physic.} Manifestum est autem quod bonum partis est propter bonum totius. Unde etiam naturali appetitu vel amore unaquaeque res particularis amat bonum suum proprium propter bonum commune totius universi, quod est Deus.”

\textsuperscript{85} Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} I-II, q. 109, a. 3, obj. 1 (Marietti I, p. 531): “Diligere enim Deum super omnia est proprius et principalis caritatis actus. Sed caritatem homo non potest habere per se ipsum: quia \textit{caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum, qui datus est nobis, ut dicitur Rom. 5, [5].}”

\textsuperscript{86} Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} I-II, q. 109, a. 3, ad 1 (Marietti I, p. 532): “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caritas diligit Deum super omnia eminentius quam natura. Natura enim diligit Deum super omnia, prout est principium et finis naturalis boni: caritas autem secundum quod est obiectum beatitudinis, et secundum quod homo habet quandam societatem spiritualem cum Deo.”

42
as the nature of the act is diversified. Now the nature of an act is diversified according to the diverse nature of the object.87

Powers and their habits are specifically distinguished by their acts, and acts are specifically distinguished by their formal objects.88 Habits and acts, in other words, have a one-to-one relationship. Specifically different habits (i.e., habits that differ in species or kind) entail that specifically different acts are elicited by them, and specifically different acts require specifically different habits for their being elicited. In order to safeguard the essential supernaturality of charity, Aquinas insists that charity and natural love for God have identical material objects (i.e., God) but distinct formal objects (i.e., the particular aspect under which they consider God). If we could, by our nature alone, perform an act of the same kind as that elicited by means of charity, Aquinas seems to think, sanctifying grace would only be accidentally supernatural; it would not be essentially supernatural. It would only be supernatural in that God infuses it into us; it would fail to be supernatural in the sense that we could not possibly obtain a habit of the same species on our own.

Scotus on the Essential Supernaturality of Grace

While the distinction between accidental and essential supernaturality needs to be teased out of Aquinas, Scotus felt the need for the distinction much more acutely. Scotus distinguishes the supernatural from the natural in a number of different ways throughout his corpus. For our


88 Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 54, a. 2, ad 1 (Marietti I, p. 237): “In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must consider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect, which may differ in species or even in genus.” (Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in distinctione potentiarum, vel etiam habituum, non est considerandum ipsum obiectum materialiter; sed ratio obiecti differens specie, vel etiam genere.)
purposes, two particular ways of distinguishing the two will be sufficient to show that he recognizes both *accidental* and *essential* supernaturality.

In the prologue to the *Ordinatio*, Scotus considers whether our need for supernatural knowledge can be demonstrated from reason alone. At Scotus’s time, the question had engendered considerable debate between the Faculty of Arts and the Faculty of Theology. The theologians argued that such supernatural knowledge is necessary while the philosophers argued that such knowledge is impossible. Scotus disagrees with both—arguing, instead, for the more modest claim that supernatural knowledge is possible and the need for it probable—but his response to the philosophers is more important for our present purposes.

The philosophers argue that supernatural knowledge is impossible because the intellect by its nature is in potency to any knowledge whatsoever. Since any intellect whatsoever has a potency for any knowable whatsoever, so the argument goes, supernatural knowledge would not

---

89 For a helpful introduction to the debate, see Allan Wolter, “Duns Scotus on the Necessity of Revealed Knowledge,” *Franciscan Studies* 11 (1951): 231-72. English translations from the prologue are borrowed from Wolter with modification where appropriate.

90 Scotus, *Ordinatio*, pro., pt. 1, q. 1, n. 5 (Vatican I, p. 4): “In this question we are faced with the controversy between the philosophers and theologians. The philosophers insist on the perfection of nature and deny supernatural perfection. The theologians, on the other hand, recognize the deficiency of nature and the need of grace and supernatural perfection.” (*In ista quaestione videtur controversia inter philosophos et theologos. Et tenent philosophi perfectionem naturae, et negant perfectionem supernaturalem; theologi vero cognoscunt defectum naturae et necessitatem gratiae et perfectionem supernaturalem.*)

91 Scotus, *Ordinatio*, pro., pt. 1, q. 1, n. 12 (Vatican I, p. 9): “Three arguments can be raised against [the philosophers’] opinion. (Note: By natural reason nothing supernatural can be shown to exist in the wayfarer, nor can it be proved that anything supernatural is necessarily required for his perfection. Neither can one who has something supernatural know it is in him. Here then it is impossible to use natural reason against Aristotle. If one argues from beliefs, it is no argument against a philosopher since the latter does not concede a premise taken on faith. Hence, these reasons which are here urged against him have as one premise something believed or proved from something believed. Therefore, they are nothing more than theological persuasions from beliefs to a belief.)” (*Contra istam positionem tripliciter potest argui. ([Nota, nullum supernaturale potest ratione naturali ostendi inesse viatori, nec necessario requiri ad perfectionem eius; nec etiam habens potest cognoscere illud sibi inesse. Igitur impossibile est hic contra Aristotelem uti ratione naturali: si arguatur ex creditis, non est ratio contra philosophum, quia praemissam creditam non concedet. Unde istae rationes hic factae contra ipsum alteram praemissam habent creditam vel probatam ex credito; ideo non sunt nisi persuasiones theologicae, ex creditis ad creditum.])*)
be knowledge at all. All possible knowables are within the power of the natural intellect, so whatever is beyond the nature of the intellect is per se not intelligible.

Scotus responds by distinguishing two ways in which something can be said to be supernatural:

To the question, then, I reply first by distinguishing in what sense something may be called supernatural. For a capacity to receive may be compared to the act which it receives or to the agent from which it receives [this act]. Viewed in the first way, this potentiality is either natural or violent or neither natural nor violent. It is called natural, if it is naturally inclined towards the form it receives. It is violent, if what it suffers is against its natural inclination. It is neither the one nor the other, if it is inclined neither to the form which it receives nor to its opposite. Now from this viewpoint, there is no supernaturality. But when the recipient is compared to the agent from which it receives the form, then there is naturalness if the recipient is referred to an agent which is naturally ordained to impress such a form in such a recipient. Supernaturalness is had, however, when the recipient is referred to an agent which does not impress this form upon this recipient naturally.

Scotus here denies that any form or act could be supernatural with respect to the power in which it inheres. He thus agrees with the philosophers that, in a sense, there is no such thing as supernatural knowledge. On the other hand, Scotus identifies a second way of understanding

---

92 Scotus, *Ordinatio*, pro., pt. 1, q. 1, n. 7 (Vatican I, pp. 5-6): “Every natural passive faculty has some corresponding natural agent. Otherwise the passive faculty would seem to have no purpose in nature, since nothing in the realm of nature could reduce it to act. But the possible intellect is a passive faculty with regard to any intelligible object whatsoever. Some natural active power, consequently, corresponds to it. The thesis therefore follows. The minor is evident, since the possible intellect naturally seeks to know whatever can be known. Also it is naturally perfected by such knowledge. By nature then it is capable or receiving any knowledge whatsoever.” (Confirmatur ratione: omni potentiae naturali passivae correspondet aliquod activum naturale, alioquin videretur potentia passiva esse frustra in natura si per nihil in natura posset reduci ad actum; sed intellectus possibilis est potentia passiva respectu quorumcumque intelligibilium; ergo correspondet sibi aliqua potentia activa naturalis. Sequitur igitur propositum. Minor patet, quia intellectus possibilis naturaliter appetit cognitionem cuiuscumque cognoscibilis; naturaliter etiam perficitur per quamcumque cognitionem; igitur est naturaliter receptivus cuiuscumque intellectio.n.)

93 Scotus, *Ordinatio*, pro., pt. 1, q. 1, n. 57 (Vatican I, p. 35): “Ad quaestionem igitur respondeo, primo distinguendo quomodo aliquid dicitur supernaturale. Potentia enim receptiva comparatur ad actum quem recipit, vel ad agentem a quo recipit. Primo modo ipsa est potentia naturalis, vel violenta, vel neutra. Naturalis dicitur si naturaliter inclinetur, violenta si sit contra naturalem inclinationem passi, neutra si neque inclinetur naturaliter ad illam formam quam recipit neque ad oppositam. In hac autem comparatione nulla est supernaturalitas. Sed comparando receptivum ad agens a quo recipit formam, tunc est naturalitas quando receptivum comparatur ad tale agens quod naturum est naturaliter imprimere talem formam in tali passo, supernaturalitas autem quando comparatur ad agens quod non est naturaliter impressivum illius formae in illud passum.”
supernaturality. In this second way, a form or act is considered in reference not to the power in which it inheres but to the agent by which it comes to be in that power. According to this way of understanding the supernatural, a form or act is supernatural just in case the agent that produces it in the soul is not naturally bound to bestow it. For example, the agent that naturally produces knowledge in the soul is, in Aristotelian epistemology, the active intellect. If some other agent not naturally bound to bestow such knowledge (e.g., God) were to produce the same habit of knowledge in the soul without the agent intellect, that knowledge would count as supernatural in this second way. As Scotus recognizes, any knowledge infused immediately by God without the agent intellect, even geometry, would count as supernatural in this way. Anything infused into the soul by God, even if it could be naturally acquired, counts as supernatural is this way since God is not bound to bestow any such perfection on the soul naturally.

Elsewhere, Scotus introduces a different way of distinguishing the supernatural from the natural. In this way, something is supernatural if it is beyond the reach of nature and its natural powers:

The natural love we are asking about could be understood in two ways. It could mean an act elicited in accord with a natural inclination, as when the soul actually loves itself or actually loves what is advantageous. In another sense, it could be contrasted with ‘supernatural’ and would refer to such natural acts as the will could perform of itself, regardless of whether it be in harmony with a natural inclination or not. Thus the will of itself could have a vicious act, even though the Damascene would style such an act ‘against nature’ or ‘beyond nature.’ In this question, natural love seems to have this latter meaning....It should be noted, however, that the first sense of natural dilection perhaps falls under the second sense in most cases at least, for our natural powers suffice to elicit most acts to which we are naturally inclined. Not all, however, for we do have a natural inclination to the most perfect act of love for the ultimate end and yet we cannot attain that act by our nature alone.

---

94 Scotus, *Ordinatio*, pro., pt. 1, q. 1, n. 65 (Vatican I, p. 40): “If a supernatural agent were to cause knowledge of a natural object, for example, if it infused geometry into someone, that would be supernatural.” (*Puta, si agens supernaturale causaret notitiam obiecti naturalis, ut si infunderet geometriam alicui, ista esset supernaturalis.*)

95 Scotus, *Quodlibet* 17, a. 3, n. 5 (Alluntis, pp. 612-13): “Actus autem dilectionis naturalis, de quo quaeritur, posset uno modo intelligi actus elicitus secundum illam inclinationem naturalem, puta quando mens actu diliget se vel actu vult sibi commodum. Alio modo posset intelligi actus naturalis dilectionis, distinguendo contra supernaturalem; ille...
While Scotus here speaks primarily of the charitative *act* as exhibiting such supernaturality, he later extends such supernaturality to the habit of charity itself: “For it is reasonable that a merely natural act first receive such perfection as that of moral virtue which does not transcend nature’s powers, and only then, that it receive further such perfection as is simply supernatural.” Here, the supernatural is not simply what is infused by God but what is beyond what nature can produce on its own. In the second way of picking out the supernatural (i.e., caused immediately by God), infused geometry would count as supernatural, but in the third way of picking out the supernatural (i.e., beyond the reach of nature), infused geometry would not count as supernatural. According to Scotus, charity is not simply supernatural in the first way. It is not simply supernatural in that it is infused by God; it is additionally supernatural in that it can only come to be in us by God’s infusion since it is above the capacity of human nature and its powers. Charity, in other words, is not simply *accidentally* supernatural; it is *essentially* supernatural.

Scotus, then, is fully in agreement with Aquinas that charity is not merely accidentally supernatural. Charity does not simply happen to be infused by God; charity can only be infused by God because its acquisition lies entirely outside of the powers of human nature. But Scotus disagrees with Aquinas’s position that the essential supernaturality of charity requires that acts elicited by means of charity be specifically different (i.e., different in species or kind) from any

---

scilicet quem voluntas ex seipsa actu naturali potest habere, licet non sit secundum inclinationem naturalem, sicut voluntas ex seipsa potest habere actum vitiosum, et tamen ille actus est praeter naturam vel contra naturam, secundum Damascenum. Hoc secundo modo magis videtur intelligi in quaestione, quia sic procedit primum argumentum; tamen primo modo intelligendo dilectionem naturalis, illa forte continetur sub dilectione naturali secundo modo accepta, saltem ut in pluribus; quia plures actus dilectionis, ad quos naturaliter inclinamus, possimus potestate naturali elicer, licet non omnes, quia ad perfectissimum circa ultimum finem est inclinationis naturalis, licet ad illum non possit natura attingere ex se.”

96 Scotus, *Quodlibet* 17, a. 3, n. 17 (Alluntis, pp. 619-20): “Est enim rationabile ut actus mere naturalis per prius recipiat perfectionem illam quae non transcendent totam facultatem naturae, cuiusmodi perfectio est secundum virtutem moralem; et ulterior, illa habita, recipiat perfectionem simpliciter supernaturalem.”
act we can perform by nature alone. In fact, as we will see in the next chapter, Scotus thinks it cannot be the case that natural and supernatural habits of love for God produce specifically different acts. If they did, we would be able to tell whether we were in grace, and none of the schoolmen thought that was possible.

All Scotus thinks is required to uphold the essential supernaturality of charity is that the habit of charity itself be specifically different from any habit naturally acquirable by us. The acquired and essentially supernatural habits themselves need to be specifically different, but the acts elicited by virtue of each need not be. Scotus is aware of the concern regarding this position. Aquinas thinks that habits and acts have a one-to-one relationship. For Aquinas, specifically different habits correspond to specifically different acts. On this view, if infused habits do not enable new kinds of acts in us, we would be able to acquire habits of the same species by merely natural acts. Scotus responds that while it is generally the case that specifically different acts are associated with specifically different habits, there are some exceptions to this general rule, namely, when habits are ordered as superior and inferior:

When it is argued: “Moral virtue differs specifically from charity; therefore, their respective acts differ specifically in the moral order,” the entailment is not valid if we are speaking of subordinate virtues. Although it would seem that the acts of disparate virtues would be specifically distinct, at least in their moral being, nevertheless when one virtue is superior and the other inferior there is no need that the goodness which the act derives from one be absolutely distinct in species from the goodness derived from the other. It is rather that the higher virtue gives additional goodness which completes, as it were, that given by the inferior virtue.97

Scotus, then, is willing to grant to supernatural virtues an exception to the general rule that habits and acts have a one-to-one relationship. Generally, specifically different habits are associated

97 Scotus, Quodlibet 17, n. 18 (Alluntis, p. 620): “Licet enim de virtutibus disparatis videretur quod earum essent actus distincti specie, saltem in esse moralis, tamen quando una est superior et alia inferior, non oportet quod bonitas quam habet actus ab una sit distincta absolute specie a bonitate quam habet ab alia, sed magis quod virtus superior tribuat bonitatem ulteriorem, quae sit quasi completiva bonitatis illius quam tribuit inferior.”
with specifically different acts, but this does not apply in the case of supernatural habits like charity.

For Scotus, charity does not make a kind of act possible that was previously impossible; rather, it adds additional goodness or value to a kind of act already within our power. Charity is thus not, as it is for Aquinas, a parallel virtue to that love for God that we are able to acquire by our natural powers alone. Instead, charity perfects our natural love for God, completing it and adding to it its own goodness. That is to say, charity makes the will’s acts of love for God better than they would be without it, but it does not make possible an entirely different kind of act, an act different in species. For Scotus, then, where two specifically different habits are related as superior and inferior, they can be conjointly activated to perform a single act that is not specifically different from an act elicited by means of the inferior habit alone.

It might be argued that Scotus’s position entails a weaker, rather than a stronger, account of the essential supernaturality of grace since it does not enable a new kind of act in us, but there are good reasons to think otherwise. It is true that Scotus thinks infused and acquired love for God have specifically identical acts and that they bestow on those acts specifically identical goodness, but Scotus clearly denies that the habits themselves are specifically identical. In fact, Scotus elsewhere argues that the habits of infused and acquired love for God are not only specifically but generically different: “Nothing supernatural is formally opposed to anything [natural]…because they do not belong to the same genus of being.”

98 See, for instance, Oberman’s charge that the late medieval theology of grace is essentially Pelagian. Heiko A. Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 176-77. Oberman speaks mainly of Biel’s theology of grace, but his charge applies equally to Scotus and to Ockham. I will return to Oberman’s claim in the final chapter of this dissertation.

99 Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 16, q. 2, n. 65 (Bychkov-Pomplun, p. 670): “[N]ullum supernaturale est formaliter oppositum alicui, ut probat, quia sunt in eodem genere entis.”
natural and supernatural habits and the goodness that they bestow on those acts are specifically the same, the habits themselves differ not only in species but in genus. For Scotus, there is a categorical difference between natural and supernatural habits such that specifically distinct acts are not needed to distinguish them. Supernatural habits enable us to perform kinds of acts already in our power to a degree above the reach of our nature. For Scotus, this feature of supernatural habits is sufficient to ground the specific (and generic) difference between them and any possible acquired habits.

Interestingly, Aquinas himself recognizes this feature of habits even though he does not appeal to it to distinguish natural and supernatural love for God. In his programmatic statement regarding the distinction of habits, Aquinas identifies three ways in which habits are specifically distinguished:

A habit is both a form and a habit. Hence the specific distinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary way in which forms differ specifically; or according to that mode of distinction which is proper to habits. Accordingly, forms are distinguished from one another in reference to the diversity of their active principles, since every agent produces its like in species. Habits, however, imply order to something: and all things that imply order to something, are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they are ordered. Now a habit is a disposition implying a twofold order: viz. to nature and to an operation consequent to nature. Accordingly, habits are specifically distinct in respect of three things. First, in respect of the active principles of such dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of specifically different objects.  

For Aquinas, habits are distinguished not only by reference to the acts elicited by means of them but also by reference to a particular nature capable of those acts.

100 Aquinas, Summa theologiae I-II, q. 54, a. 2, resp. (Marietti I, p. 237): “Respondeo dicendum quod habitus et est forma quaedam, et est habitus. Potest ergo distinctio habituum secundum speciem attendi aut secundum communem modum quo formae specie distinguuntur; aut secundum proprium modum distinctionis habituum. Distinguuntur siquidem formae ad invicem secundum diversa principia active: eo quod omne agens facit simile secundum speciem. — Habitus autem importat ordinem ad aliquid. Omnia autem quae dicuntur secundum ordinem ad aliquid, distinguuntur secundum distinctionem eorum ad quae dicuntur. Est autem habitus dispositio quaedam ad duo ordinata: scilicet ad naturam, et ad operationem consequentem naturam. Sic igitur secundum tria, habitus specie distinguuntur. Uno quidem modo, secundum principia activa talium dispositionum; alio vero modo, secundum naturam; tertio vero modo, secundum obiecta specie differentia; ut per sequentia explicabitur.”
Aquinas elsewhere uses this double reference of habits (i.e., to objects and to natures) to defend the need for a habit of grace distinct from acquired and infused virtue:

The Philosopher says, “Virtue is the disposition of what is perfect—and I call perfect what is disposed according to its nature.” Now from this it is clear that the virtue of a thing has reference to some pre-existing nature, from the fact that everything is disposed with reference to what befits its nature. But it is manifest that the virtues acquired by human acts of which we spoke above are dispositions, whereby a man is fittingly disposed with reference to the nature whereby he is a man; whereas infused virtues dispose man in a higher manner and towards a higher end, and consequently in relation to some higher nature, i.e., in relation to a participation of the Divine Nature, according to 2 Peter 1:4: “He hath given us most great and most precious promises; that by these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature.” And it is in respect of receiving this nature that we are said to be born again sons of God. And thus, even as the natural light of reason is something besides the acquired virtues, which are ordained to this natural light, so also the light of grace which is a participation of the Divine Nature is something besides the infused virtues which are derived from and are ordained to this light.101

When addressing the distinction between natural and supernatural love for God, then, Aquinas did not need to appeal to distinct formal objects of acts to distinguish natural and supernatural habits. All he needed to do was appeal to the distinct natures to which natural and supernatural habits have reference. On this view, natural love for God would be the kind of thing that inclines its possessor to an act of love proper to human nature. Supernatural love for God, in contrast, is the kind of thing that inclines its possessor to an act of love for God that is specifically the same

---


51
as the act to which natural love inclines but that is nonetheless above human nature by a participation in a nature above human nature.

Aquinas, then, has the conceptual apparatus to posit a specific difference between natural and supernatural habits without appeal to formally distinct objects; he simply does not appeal to it. Scotus, on the other hand, does appeal to it, and it seems plausible that he did so because he was more, rather than less, aware of the essential supernaturality of grace. Once one sees that saving charity is essentially supernatural, one no longer needs to deny the possibility of natural love for God in order to safeguard our absolute dependence on God’s action in salvation. If grace only repairs human nature, enabling it to love God above all and to keep the commandments, one must deny that we can do these things on our own lest we make grace unnecessary. On the contrary, if grace not only heals but lifts human nature above itself, there is no longer any need to deny the possibility that nature could love God above all or keep the commandments. Even if human beings can do these things by nature, grace is not dispensable; grace is still necessary for human beings to do these things in a supernatural way. That is to say, once the essential supernaturality of grace is adequately grasped, the questions as to whether human beings can love God above all or keep the commandments without grace can stand on their own. When answering these questions, one no longer needs to consider whether one’s answer will rule out the necessity of grace. Whether we can do these things by nature alone is entirely irrelevant to the necessity of grace. Even if grace does not enable us to perform new kinds of acts, it still enables us to perform these acts supernaturally.

Scotus was not the first to see this. Philip the Chancellor, to whom the great thirteenth-century breakthrough discovery of the supernatural habit is often attributed, saw the defense of a natural love for God as precisely the key to highlighting the essential supernaturality of
Philip the Chancellor, like Aquinas after him, still goes on to distinguish natural and supernatural love in terms of their objects, but Scotus recognizes that one no longer needs to do so provided the profound difference between the two habits themselves is adequately grasped. Scotus thinks of the theological virtues as ‘superior’ virtues that add supernatural goodness to acts already within our power. They enable us to perform the same kinds of acts but in a way proper to a nature above our own.

The degree to which supernatural charity exceeds human nature will be addressed in the second half of this chapter when we turn to the absolutely essential supernaturality of grace. For now, it will be helpful to strengthen my case that Scotus was more aware of the essential supernaturality of grace than Aquinas by turning to Scotus’s disagreement with Aquinas over the increase or ‘augmentation’ of charity. While Aquinas thinks that supernatural divine causality is required for the initial infusion and maintenance of supernatural habits, he seems to think that the increase of supernatural habits is in some sense in the hands of its possessor. Scotus agrees with the former but emphatically denies the latter.

Aquinas’s view is that the variability of charity is due not to a change in the habit itself but to a change in the disposition of the subject:

Charity increases only by its subject participating in charity more and more, that is, insofar as its subject performs acts of charity more and is more subject to it. For this is the proper mode of increase in a form that is intensified, since the being of such a form consists wholly in its adhering to its subject. Consequently, since the magnitude of a thing follows on its being, to say that a form is greater is the same as to say that it is more in its subject, and not that another form is added to it: for this would be the case if the form, of itself, had any quantity, and not in comparison with its subject. Therefore,

---

Charity increases by being intensified in its subject, and this is for charity to increase in its essence; and not by charity being added to charity.\textsuperscript{103}

Charity increases because something happens to the subject, namely, the subject becomes more disposed to the inherence of the already existing habit of charity.

Scotus has a number of metaphysical reasons for rejecting this “famous opinion,” but for our purposes, his theological objection is more important.\textsuperscript{104} On Aquinas’s view, since the reason for the augmentation of charity lies in the disposition of the subject, the increase of charity is, in some sense, in the hands of its possessor. Aquinas thus argues that, “each act of charity disposes to an increase of charity, in so far as one act of charity makes man more ready to act again according to charity, and this readiness increasing, man breaks out into an act of more fervent love, and strives to advance in charity, and then his charity increases actually.”\textsuperscript{105} In other words, acts of charity (even if not each and every act) dispose the subject for an increase of charity. Charity increases because we use it. Our use of it depends on actual grace (God moving us to act), but it is our use of it, not the actual grace, that results in an increase of charity.

\textsuperscript{103} Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} II-II, q. 24, a. 5, resp. (Marietti II, p. 121): “Sic ergo caritas augetur solum per hoc quod subiectum magis ac magis participat caritatem: idest secundum quod magis reductur in actum illius et magis subditur illi. Hic enim est modus augmenti proprius cuiuslibet formae quae intenditur: eo quod esse huiusmodi formae totaliter consistit in eo quod inhaeret susceptibili. Et ideo, cum magnitudo rei consequitur esse ipsius, formam esse maiorem hoc est eam magis inesse susceptibili: non autem aliam formam advenire. Hoc enim esset si forma haberet aliquam quantitatem ex seipsa, non per comparationem ad subiectum. Sic igitur et caritas augetur per hoc quod intenditur in subiecto, et hoc est ipsam augeri secundum essentiam: non autem per hoc quod caritas addatur caritati.”

\textsuperscript{104} For his philosophical objections, see Scotus, \textit{Reportatio} I-A, d. 17, pt. 2, q. 2, nn. 110-25.

\textsuperscript{105} Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} II-II, q. 24, a. 6, resp. (Marietti II, p. 122): “Ita etiam non quolibet actu caritatis caritas actu augetur: sed quilibet actus caritatis disponit ad caritatis augmentum, inquantum ex uno actu caritatis homo redditur promptior iterum ad agendum secundum caritatem; et, habilitate crescente, homo prorumpit in actum ferventiorem dilectionis, quo conetur ad caritatis profectum; et tunc caritas augetur in actu.”
Scotus is suspicious of such a close connection between charitative acts and the increase of charity. For Scotus, every increase in charity requires a fresh infusion from God. This must be the case because

a habit is generated and augmented by the same thing, according to Bk. II of the Ethics. But God generates the habit of charity; therefore, He also augments it. But this occurs not according to its existence in the subject alone….Therefore, because God adds by augmenting, He adds some reality to what preceded that is different from it.106

Acquired habits are generated and increased by the same thing, namely, repeated actions; in the same way, infused habits are generated and increased by the same thing, namely, by the supernatural infusion of God. For Scotus, then, charitative acts cannot be the natural causal reason for the increase of charity. Interestingly, Scotus does think that acts of charity naturally increase a habit of love, but the habit of love that they naturally increase is not the infused but the acquired habit:

For if [the will] were to operate according to the habit of charity by eliciting acts of charity frequently, it would generate a habit of love by which it would delightfully produce works similar to the works of charity. And because of this habit, which inclines to acts very similar to those of charity, man could not know certainly that he was in charity, because charity and the acquired habit of love seem to produce very similar acts and have a very similar mode of acting and inclining; and, therefore, they could not easily be distinguished.107

Acts of charity have no necessary effect on the habit of charity, but that is not to say that they do not, in fact, increase charity as distinguished from the acquired friendship that they naturally

---


107 Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 17, pt. 2, q. 5, n. 210 (Wolter-Bychkov, p. 521): “Si enim operaretur secundum habitum caritatis frequenter eliciendo actus eius, generaret habitum amoris quo delectabiliter operaretur consimilia opera operibus caritatis. Et propter istum habitum, qui inclinat ad similes actus actibus caritatis, non potest homo certitudinaliter scire se esse in caritate, quia habitus amoris acquisitus et caritas videntur habere consimiles actus et consimilem modum agendi et inclinandi; et ideo non faciliter distinguuntur.” When Scotus says that the acts of natural and supernatural love for God are very similar, I take it he is not denying that these acts are specifically the same. The dissimilarity between them is not a specific difference but merely the fact that the one is with charity and the other is not.
increase. Scotus affirms that acts of charity result in an increase in charity, but he insists that this is only the case de potentia ordinata: “[Charity] is able to be increased determinately through a meritorious act according to divine law.”108 That is to say, God infuses charity into the soul of His own free will; acts of charity elicited by the will result naturally in an increase of the acquired habit of love but have no necessary effect on the supernatural, infused habit of charity except insofar as God has willed that such acts be the meritorious cause of His further infusion.

Scotus reasons similarly with respect to the diminishment and corruption of charity. He crucially distinguishes between an efficient and a demeritorious cause of a diminishment of charity.109 Nothing other than God, Scotus insists, can be the efficient cause of such diminishment: “Whatever being’s production is a creation, its corruption is the reverse or an annihilation. No created power, however, can annihilate some thing, but after its action it always leaves something behind that it presupposed. Therefore, it cannot corrupt what is produced from nothing and, as a consequence, it cannot diminish it either.”110 I, for example, can destroy a tree using a wood chipper, but I cannot annihilate its total reality. When the tree passes through the wood chipper, the tree ceases to exist, but the total reality that was the tree does not cease to exist. The substantial form of the tree has ceased to exist, but none of the matter has. Instead, the matter is now divided up into a multiplicity of form-matter composites, none of which is a tree.


109 Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 17, pt. 2, q. 5, n. 198 (Wolter-Bychkov, p. 518): “The diminution can be conceived either on the part of the charity itself, or according to how it is in the subject, or in respect to its efficient cause, as has been said, or to a demeritorious cause.” (Respondeo ergo ad quaestionem et dico quod diminutio potest intelligi vel ex parte caritatis in se, vel secundum esse eius in subiecto, vel comparando eum ad suam causam efficientem, ut dictum est, vel ad causam demeritoriam.)

For Scotus, charity is an *ex nihilo* creation in the soul. That being the case, its diminishment or corruption would be annihilation—the return of some created reality, in its totality and without remainder, to the *nihilo* (*ad nihilum*)—which power does not belong to any creature.

In addition, God’s supernatural activity is not only involved in the initial gift and many increases of charity but also in its continual conservation. God does not simply pour charity into our hearts at its initial generation or increase; He continually pours it into our hearts at each instant. Charity, then, would not be diminished by a positive action, not even a positive action of God. Instead, diminishment would be caused by a non-act on the part of God. God does not do something new in order to diminish charity; God diminishes charity by ceasing to do something He has already been continually doing: “Only God, then, can diminish or corrupt charity, not through some action, but by withdrawing His maintenance and continuous conservation or influence.”  

Since charity’s sustained existence in the soul of the just requires God’s continuous pouring forth, God would not diminish or destroy it by a positive action (since God is not the cause of privation) but by simply ceasing or decreasing His continuous outpouring. On this view, diminishing charity is not like removing a portion of water from a one-gallon jug; diminishing charity is like turning down the faucet.

Scotus thus disagrees with Aquinas regarding the relationship between charity and sin. Aquinas argues that venial sin cannot be an effective cause of the diminishment of charity because charity concerns our final end while venial sin concerns things directed to our end.  

---


other words, the reason venial sin does not result in the diminishment of charity is that the two operate at different levels and, thus, cannot possibly conflict with each other. Mortal sin is a different matter. For Aquinas, mortal sin destroys charity “effectively, because every mortal sin is contrary to charity.”¹¹³ Scotus disagrees: “Mortal sin according to its formality is not opposed to charity nor does it corrupt it.”¹¹⁴ By formal opposition, Scotus means that the definition of neither reality (mortal sin and charity) logically entails the absence of the other. Light and darkness, for instance, are formally opposed because darkness is, by definition, an absence of light. If charity is essentially supernatural, for Scotus, no natural virtue could be in its same species and no natural vice could be formally opposed to it. Since there are no supernatural vices, the ultimate cause of the diminishment or destruction of charity can be none other than the will of God to cease His upholding and sustaining influence. To conjecture a little (I am not aware of Scotus himself making such a claim), just as acts of charity cause an increase not of infused but of acquired love, it might similarly be the case that acts of venial sin naturally result not in the diminishment of infused charity but in the diminishment of acquired love for God. Similarly, acts of mortal sin result not in the corruption of supernatural charity but in the corruption of acquired love for God.¹¹⁵

¹¹³ Aquinas, Summa theologiae II-II, q. 24, a. 10, resp. (Marietti II, p. 125-26): “Neutro autem modo peccatum mortale diminuit caritatem, sed totaliter corrumpit ipsam: et effective, quia omne peccatum mortale contrariatur caritati…”

¹¹⁴ Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 17, pt. 2, q. 5, n. 219 (Wolter-Bychkov, p. 523): “Peccatum mortale secundum suam formalitatem non opponitur caritati, nec corrumpit eam.”

¹¹⁵ Scotus makes a parallel argument to this effect with respect to unfaithfulness and its effect (or lack thereof) on acquired and infused faith: Scotus, Reportatio IV-A, d. 1, q. 1, n. 53 (Bychkov-Pomplun, p. 22): “Indeed, infused faith and unfaithfulness are not opposed formally, but only by way of demerit, and for this reason unfaithfulness cannot formally corrupt infused faith, although unfaithfulness can formally corrupt acquired faith, to which it is formally opposed.” (Eodem modo dicendum est ad probationem de fide, quia fides infusa et infidelitas non sunt opposita formaliter, sed tantum demeritorie, et ideo fidem infusam non potest formaliter infidelitas corrumpere, potest tamen infidelitas formaliter corrumpere fidem acquisitam, cui formaliter opponitur.)
Given the essential supernaturality of charity, Scotus sees no necessary reason why God could not allow a person to be in a state of grace and in a state of mortal sin at the same time.¹¹⁶ That said, Scotus is, in fact, in agreement with Aquinas: venial sin does not diminish charity, and mortal sin corrupts it entirely. But Scotus again insists that both of these are true only de potentia ordinata. In the case of venial sin, Scotus argues that “although God by His absolute power could fail to conserve charity, and so corrupt it and diminish it because of venial sin, as He could because of mortal sin, He does not do so, however, by His ordained power.”¹¹⁷ This is not because it would be unjust for God to do so but because God “has established by law that never for a lesser evil does He take away a greater good.”¹¹⁸ Venial sin, then, might have served as a demeritorious cause of the diminishment of charity had God not willed to deal graciously with His creatures. Furthermore, Scotus insists, contra Aquinas, that precisely the same dependence on the will of God obtains in the relationship between mortal sin and charity. Again, mortal sin cannot of itself destroy charity, both because no created reality has the power of annihilation, and because no natural reality can be formally opposed to a supernatural one: “Mortal sin thus is only the demeritorious cause of the corruption of charity.”¹¹⁹ That is to say, mortal sin results in the corruption of charity, not because of any essential repugnance between the two, but because God

¹¹⁶ Scotus, Reportatio IV-A, d. 1, q. 1, n. 53 (Bychkov-Pomplun, p. 22): “Indeed, God could, without contradiction, create grace in the Devil or in a soul in a state of mortal sin, which means that it is something absolute, and it is not necessarily required to cast off a contrary form” (Posset enim Deus sine contradictione creare gratiam in Diabolo aut in anima existente in peccato mortali, ex quo est quid absolutum, nec requiritur forma contraria necessario abiicienda).


has willed to punish the one by the other. It is sometimes argued that Scotus’s view that charity and mortal sin are not formally opposed is a significant denigration to charity, but Scotus comes to hold this position for precisely the opposite reason. It is because he grasps the essential supernaturality of grace that he comes to the conclusion that no natural reality (not even mortal sin) could possibly be its formal opposite.

For Scotus, then, there are no acts that we can perform, whether good or evil, that have any necessary effects on the life of charity. The infusion, conservation, increase, diminishment, and corruption of charity all depend entirely on immediate divine agency. This decoupling of the relationship between our acts and the supernatural life of charity serves, for Scotus, not to engender deep anxiety regarding the dependability of God’s promises as revealed in Scripture, as is sometimes suggested regarding Scotus’s soteriological voluntarism. Nor is it simply an exercise in mere speculation. Scotus is not interested, primarily, in thinking of what might have been for its own sake; he appeals to alternative economies of salvation in order to shed light on the connections between things that obtain in the actual economy of salvation and to then reflect on what this tells us about the will and ways of God. Such reflection leads Scotus not to despair but to make utterances like this one: “But just as He freely gives a greater good for a lesser good, since He always rewards beyond deserved merit, so He punishes a major evil by a minor evil, since He always punishes less than what is deserved.”

---

120 See, for instance, Iserloh’s charge against Ockham’s defense of Scotus’s position. Erwin Iserloh, *Gnade und Eucharistie in der philosophischen Theologie des Wilhelm von Ockham: ihre Bedeutung für die Ursachen der Reformation* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1956), 96. I will return to Iserloh’s claim about the late medieval theology of grace in the final chapter of this dissertation.

121 See discussion on the absolute and ordained power distinction in chapter 1.

necessary and comparing this to the actual state of affairs that God has, in fact, brought about, Scotus thinks we can learn something about the graciousness and mercy of God that we might not otherwise know.

**Ockham on the Essential Supernaturality of Grace**

If Scotus marks an important moment in the distinction between accidental and essential supernaturality, we come to even greater clarity in Ockham. Ockham makes the distinction most clearly when considering two ways of understanding the supernaturality of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in question 6 of his *Quaestiones variae*. The gifts of the Holy Spirit are seven items mentioned in Isaiah 11:2 (wisdom and understanding, counsel and might, etc.) and are distinct from the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Ockham considers the gifts supernatural habits but wants to specify how we should understand this.

According to the first way, “they are called the gifts of the Holy Spirit because they are never able to be acquired through nature, nor some habit of the same species with them concerning the same object, but are only infused by God.” According to the second, “the aforementioned habits which are called the gifts of the Holy Spirit (knowledge, understanding, etc.) are not always infused habits…. And then it would be possible to say that the aforementioned habits are acquired and are always able to be naturally acquired.” According to the first way of understanding supernaturality, supernatural habits cannot be acquired; according to the second way, supernatural habits can be acquired even though they are often

---

123 Ockham, *Quaestiones varia* 6, a. 8 (OTh VIII, p. 243): “Circa dona Spiritus Sancti sciemund quod uno modo potest dici quod dicuntur dona Spiritus Sancti quia numquam possunt adquiri per naturam, nec aliqui habitus eiusdem speciei cum eis circa eadem obiecta, sed solum infunduntur a Deo.”

124 Ockham, *Quaestiones varia* 6, a. 8 (OTh VIII, pp. 244-45): “Aliter potest dici quod praedicti habitus qui dicuntur dona Spiritus Sancti, intellectus, scientia etc., non sunt habitus infusi semper, quia pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate….Et tunc potest dici quod praedicti habitus sunt adquisiti et possunt semper naturaliter adquiri.”
infused. For Ockham, then, it is not sufficient to distinguish acquired and infused habits. We need an additional distinction between acquirable and non-acquirable habits. God can infuse acquirable habits into the soul (e.g., the skill of golf), and God can also infuse non-acquirable habits into the soul. To use Scheeben’s parlance, if God infuses acquirable habits into the soul, they are at most *accidentally* supernatural; if God infuses non-acquirable habits into the soul, they are at least *essentially* supernatural.

Ockham’s general rule is that we should only posit essentially supernatural habits where Scripture requires that we do so:

Such [non-acquirable] infused habits are not to be posited on account of some evident reason, but only on account of the authority of sacred Scripture. And if these authorities are able to be explained and saved through acquired habits without infused just as well as with [non-acquirable] infused habits—just as is said in the second way—then these infused habits are superfluous.¹²⁵

Neither reason nor experience, Ockham insists, could require us to posit non-acquirable habits infused into the soul by God. Only Scripture could require us to do so, and Ockham clearly thinks we should do so only if there is no possible way to do justice to Scripture without them. That is to say, if it is possible to make sense of Scripture by means of infused acquirable habits alone, we should refrain from positing infused non-acquirable habits.

In the case of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, Ockham seems to think that we have no such compelling authorities that would require us to posit infused non-acquirable gifts of the Holy Spirit: “Such necessity does not appear for positing the aforementioned infused habits because

---

¹²⁵ Ockham, *Quaestiones varia* 6, a. 8 (OTh VIII, pp. 246-47): “Ad primum istorum dico quod tales habitus infusi non sunt ponendi propter aliquam rationem evidentem, sed solum propter auctoritatem Sacrae Scripturae. Et si illae auctoritates possent ita bene exponi et salvari per habitus adquisitos sine infusi sicut cum habitibus infusis, - sicut dicit secunda via -, tunc superfluerent tales habitus infusi.”
there exists neither demonstrative reason, nor experience, nor the authority of Holy Scripture.”

The gifts of the Holy Spirit, on Ockham’s account, are habits acquirable by nature; “nevertheless, de facto, they are frequently infused by God alone, and therefore are able to be called gifts of God and infused habits.” Ockham thus denies that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are essentially supernatural; the gifts of the Holy Spirit are, at most, accidentally supernatural.

While Ockham denies the necessity of positing infused non-acquirable gifts of the Holy Spirit, he does affirm the necessity of positing infused non-acquirable theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Ockham thus affirms the essential supernaturality of faith, hope, and charity, but he struggles to give a coherent account of such essential supernaturality. Ockham gives at least two basic accounts of the difference between non-acquirable and acquirable theological virtues. According to the first, they differ by virtue of having different objects; according to the second, they differ by inclining differently to identical objects. As we will see, the first solution is not entirely coherent, and Ockham seems to introduce the second solution to solve problems with the first.

Acquirable and non-acquirable theological virtues are distinguished by their objects

Ockham is convinced that we can acquire distinct habits of faith, each of which inclines us to believe one of the articles of Christian faith, for example, that God is a Trinity or that Christ rose from the dead. Experience, he argues, requires that we believe this. Unbaptized children

---

126 Ockham, Quaestiones varia 6, a. 8 (OTh VIII, p. 245): “Nunc autem non apparet talis necessitas ponendi praedictos habitus infusos quia nee est ad hoc ratio demonstrativa, nee experientia, nee auctoritas Sacrae Scripturae.”

127 Ockham, Quaestiones varia 6, a. 8 (OTh VIII, p. 245): “Tamen frequenter de facto infunduntur a solo Deo, et ideo possunt dici dona Dei et habitus infusi.”

128 For a helpful analysis and critique of Ockham’s general account of infused and acquired faith, see Giuseppe Barbaglio, Fede acquista e fede infusa secondo Duns Scoto, Occam e Biel (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1968).
raised among Christians are able to believe all the articles of the faith and heretics are able to believe some of them even though neither the unbaptized nor the heretics possess infused theological virtues:

Just as nothing ought to be posited unless experience or reason or authority requires it, so nothing ought to be denied if certain experience requires that we posit it. But for positing acquired faith, hope, and charity, we have certain experience. For pagans raised among Christians believe all the articles of the faith. Similarly, those who are heretical with respect to one article are able truly to believe another article. But neither of them has infused faith as it clear; therefore, they have acquired faith. 129

Experience, then, requires that we posit acquirable habits of faith; we cannot make sense of experience, Ockham argues, without positing such acquirable habits. We must posit a discrete acquirable habit of faith for each of the articles of faith not only because heretics can believe one and deny another but also because Ockham thinks specifically different acts of belief necessarily require specifically different habits inclining to such acts of belief. Because the contents of the articles of faith are different, the acts of belief and the habits inclining to those acts are necessarily specifically different:

Concerning the [unity of acquirable faith] there are two conclusions: First, that each article has a distinct acquired faith. Second, that these faiths are distinguished not only numerically but specifically.

The first is proved through the reason of John [Duns Scotus], in Metaphysics, concerning the unity of a science: If someone is able to have an act and habit of belief regarding one article and not concerning another—or, further, is able to error concerning the other—it is necessarily that case that these acts of believing those articles and the habits generated by these acts are distinct. But someone can have acquired faith concerning one article and not concerning the other and is even able to err concerning the other. Just as a heretic is able to have acquired faith concerning the article ‘God is three and one,’ and err concerning the Incarnation of Christ….

The second conclusion is proved, because whenever one thing stands with one side of a contradiction and another thing does not stand with it but is repugnant to it, that

129 Ockham, Reportatio III, q. 9 (OTh VI, p. 281): “Tertia conclusio probatur, quia sicut nihil debet poni nisi quando habetur experientia vel demonstratio vel auctoritas ad hoc, ita nihil debet negari quando habetur certa experientia ad hoc ponendum. Sed ad ponendum fidem adquisitam et spem et caritatem, habetur certa experientia. Nam paganus nutritus inter Christianos ita credit omnes articulos fidei. Similiter, haereticus circa unum articulum potest vere credere alium articulum. Sed neuter istorum habet fidem infusam; patet; igitur adquisitam.”
which stands with it and that which does not stand with it are necessarily distinguished specifically. To believe and to not believe that Christ rose from the dead are contradictories. Someone who does not believe that Christ rose from the dead necessarily cannot believe that Christ did rise from the dead; nevertheless, she can believe that God is a Trinity. Ockham thus argues that the acquirable habits of faith that incline us to believe that God is a Trinity and that Christ rose from the dead are necessarily specifically different.

These acquired habits of faith, Ockham argues, are sufficient to explain anything we might experience, but he is convinced that “beyond these acquired habits [of faith] it is necessary to posit infused faith on account of the authority of Sacred Scripture.” The Scriptural passage that convinces Ockham is Paul’s statement that there is but “one faith” (Eph. 4:5): “I respond that there is only numerically one infused faith….For that it is one numerically is clear through the authority of the Apostle.” The natural reading of the text in Ephesians seems to be that the content of the faith (i.e., what is believed) is common to all Christians, but Ockham takes it to mean that there is a numerically singular habit of faith in each Christian that inclines each Christian to believe all the articles of faith. Since the acquired habits of faith that have reference

---

130 Ockham, *Reportatio* III, q. 9 (OTh VI, p. 287): “Quantum ad primam sunt duae conclusiones. Prima, quod quilibet articulus habet fidel adquisitam distinctam. Secunda, quod istae fides non tantum distinguuntur numero sed specie. Prima probatur per rationem Ioannis, in Metaphysica, de unitate scientiae, quia quando aliquis potest habere actum et habitum credendi circa unum articulum et non circa alium - immo potest errare circa alium - necessario illi actus credendi illos articulos et habitus generati ex illis sunt distincti. Sed aliquis potest habere fidel adquisitam circa unum articulum et non circa alium, sed potest circa alium errare. Sicut haereticus potest habere fidel adquisitam circa istum articulum 'Deus est trinus et unus', et errare circa incarnationem Christi; igitur etc….Secunda conclusio probatur, quia quando cum uno contrariorum stat unum et alius non stat, sed sibi repugnat, illud quod stat cum uno contrariorum et alius quod non stat necessario distinguuntur specie.”

131 Ockham *Quaestiones varia* 6, a. 8 (OTh VIII, p. 248): “Et praeter istos habitus adquisitos necesses est ponere fidel infusam propter auctoritatem Sacrae Scripturae.”

132 Ockham *Quaestiones varia* 6, a. 8 (OTh VIII, p. 247): “Respondeo quod tantum est una fides numero infusa inclinans immediate ad assentendum quilibet articulo tam ad principia quam ad conclusiones. Quod enim sit una numero patet per auctoritatem Apostoli.”
to the particular articles of faith are not only numerically but specifically distinct, Ockham reasons that the numerically singular habit of faith that he takes Paul to affirm must be distinct from all of these acquired habits.

Since habits are distinguished by their objects, Ockham posits that the object of this numerically singular non-acquirable faith must be distinct from the objects of these acquirable habits of faith. As we saw above, Aquinas similarly distinguishes acquired and infused habits by their objects. Ockham differs from Aquinas, though, on what those objects are. Aquinas argues that natural and supernatural love of God are distinguished by their formal objects: by nature, we love God as beginning and end of natural good; by charity, we love God as object of beatitude. Ockham argues that acquirable theological virtues have particulars as their objects while non-acquirable theological virtues have ‘complexes’ as their objects:

The immediate object of these [non-acquirable theological] habits are diverse complexes. For the proximate object of faith is this complex: ‘everything revealed by God is true in the way it is revealed by God.’ The object of hope, this complex: ‘Future beatitude is conferred on man on account of merit.’ The object of charity is this complex: ‘God and everyone whom God wants to be loved by me charitatively.’

On Ockham’s view, an infused non-acquirable theological habit inclines the will immediately to its complex, and to remote particulars through the medium of acquired theological virtues.

After a lengthy treatment of how this works with acquirable and non-acquirable habits of faith, Ockham turns to the case of charity:

The same is the case with charity, the primary object of which is some complex (for instance, ‘God and everyone whom God wants to be loved by me’). Charity, then, mediately inclines to loving neighbor as a partial principle. Hence, if I love God and everyone that God wants me to love, and afterwards it is made known to me through Scripture that God wants a to be loved by me, then infused charity inclines mediately,

---

133 Ockham, Reportatio III, q. 9 (OTh VI, pp. 283-84): “Quantum ad secundam dico quod objecta immediata istorum habituum sunt diversa complexa. Nam objectum proximum fidei est hoc complexum: ‘omne revelatum a Deo est verum eo modo quo revelatur a Deo’. Objectum spei, hoc complexum ‘futura beatitudo est homini conferenda propter merita’. Objectum caritatis est hoc complexum ‘Deus et omne quod Deus vult diligi a me caritatively’.”
because its act mediately [inclines] to loving a with acquired charity and the will. Just as
now it stands through Scripture that God wants my enemies to be loved by me, then
through the infused habit of charity with acquired charity I am inclined to loving
enemies.\textsuperscript{134}

Non-acquirable charity inclines immediately to the complex ‘God and everyone whom God
wants to be loved by me,’ but because a baptized infant does not yet know whom God wishes to
be loved by her, this habit does not incline immediately to love for any particular person. In fact,
Ockham famously argues that we cannot even know by reason alone that God wants us to love
Him. Ockham’s God could command us to hate Him.\textsuperscript{135} Non-acquirable charity, then,
immediately inclines to its complex but not to an act of love for any particular person, not even
God. Once it has become clear to us by instruction or by reading the Bible that God wants us to
love someone (e.g., our enemy), non-acquirable charity inclines ‘mediately’ or remotely to love
for that person insofar as it is now known that this person is included in ‘God and everyone
whom God wants to be loved by me.’ That is to say, non-acquirable charity still does not directly
incline our will to love this person. Only by performing particular acts of charity toward them do
we acquire a habit of charity that inclines the will immediately to acts of love for this person.

By distinguishing their objects, then, Ockham seems to have secured the distinction
between non-acquirable and acquirable theological virtues. Non-acquirable theological virtues
have complexes as their objects; acquirable theological virtues have particulars as their objects

\textsuperscript{134} Ockham, \textit{Reportatio} III, q. 9 (OTh VI, pp. 298): “Eodem modo de caritate, quod obiectum eius primum est
qliquod complexum, puta hoc totum ‘Deus et omne quod Deus vult a me diligi’, et mediante illo, tamquam principio
purtali, inclinat caritas ad diligendum proximum, mediate tamen. Unde si diligam Deum et omne quod Deus vult a
me diligi, et post constet mihi per Scripturam quod Deus vult a diligari me, tunc caritas infusa inclinat mediate, quia
mediante actu suo cum caritate adquisita et voluntate ad diligendum a. Sicut nunc constat per Scripturam quod Deus
vult inimicum meum pro statu isto diligi a me, tunc per habitum caritatis infusae cum caritate adquisita ego inclinor
ad diligendum inimicum.”

\textsuperscript{135} For a helpful account of Ockham’s position, see Marilyn McCord Adams, “The Structure of Ockham’s Moral
(e.g., particular articles of faith or particular persons whom God wants me to love). The problem
with this account, though, is that there is no reason why we could not acquire a habit that inclines
us to perform acts with respect to the complexes that the purportedly non-acquirable theological
virtues have as their objects. Ockham at least occasionally recognizes this problem. He not only
recognizes the possibility of acquiring habits with the complex objects posited above, he
sometimes even argues that an acquired habit inclining to an act with respect to faith’s complex
is necessary if we are to elicit an act by means of non-acquirable faith:

But there is a doubt whether infused faith is able, with the intellect, to be sufficient for
eliciting an act of believing concerning its first object, for instance, ‘everything revealed,’
etc., without acquired faith. I respond that it is not, as is clear concerning a baptized child
raised as in the aforementioned case who has infused faith with respect to this complex
and nevertheless is never able to elicit an act concerning it unless instructed that
everything revealed by God is true, etc., and believes through faith acquired by acts of
believing, having been instructed. Therefore, for the act of believing this complex, an
acquired faith is required just as with respect to the particular articles.136

Ockham is suggesting that in addition to having a numerically singular habit of non-acquirable
faith which inclines us to elicit an act with respect to the complex ‘everything revealed by God is
ture in the way it is revealed by God,’ we also must have a numerically singular habit of
acquirable faith which inclines us to an act with respect to the same complex. As it turns out,
then, even if we take Scripture’s affirmation that there is only ‘one faith’ to require a numerically
singular habit of faith, we can still save Scripture without non-acquirable habits.

Ockham does not seem to notice that his position annuls the initial reason for positing
non-acquirable theological virtues. He initially posited non-acquirable theological virtues

---

136 Ockham, Reportatio III, q. 9 (OTh VI, pp. 291-92): “Sed dubium est utrum fides infusa possit esse cum intellectu
sufficiens ad eliciendum actum credendi circa suum objectum primum, puta ‘omne revelatum’, etc., sine fide
adquisita: Respondeo quod non. Patet de puero baptizato et nutrito secundum casum praedictum, qui habet fidem
infusam respectu illius complexi, et tamen numquam potest aliquem actum circa illud elicere nisi instruatur quod
omne revelatum a Deo est verum etc., et credat per fide adquisitam ex actibus credendi, instruendo. Et ideo ad
actum credendi illud complexum ita requiritur fides adquisita sicut ad quicumque articulum in speciali.”
because he takes Scripture to require that we posit numerically singular theological virtues. But in working out how non-acquirable and acquirable theological virtues work together, he posits the necessity of numerically singular acquirable theological virtues, which means that we do not, after all, need to posit non-acquirable theological virtues to save Scripture. We could simply say that what God infuses in baptism are numerically singular acquirable theological virtues which incline to acts with respect to the three complexes that Ockham identifies above.

The unique feature of non-acquirable theological virtues, then, is not their numerical unicity; there are acquirable theological virtues with which non-acquirable theological virtues share this feature. The real difference between non-acquirable theological virtues and the numerically singular acquirable theological virtues is that if God infuses numerically singular acquirable theological virtues into the soul, these would be sufficient to elicit an act with respect to their complexes; in contrast, if God infuses numerically singular non-acquirable theological virtues into the soul, these are not sufficient to elicit such acts apart from numerically singular acquirable theological virtues. Ockham takes this to be a general rule about non-acquirable habits. Infused acquirable habits are of the same species as their actually acquired counterparts and are sufficient to incline to their acts; infused non-acquirable habits, on the contrary, are not sufficient to incline to their acts at any possible degree: “And however much these [non-acquirable] infused habits are augmented—even if we posit infinite increase—it would never sufficiently incline the intellect to eliciting an act without an acquired habit.”

This distinction between non-acquirable and numerically singular acquirable theological virtues seems to follow from the experience of unlearned baptized children. Scripture and

---

137 Ockham, Quaestiones varia 6, a. 8 (OTh VIII, p. 244): “Et quantumcumque talis habitus infusus augmentetur - etiam in infinitum ponamus - numquam inclinabit intellectum sufficienter ad actum eliciendum sine adquisito habitu.”
tradition require that we posit infused habits in them, but experience tells us that these habits are
not sufficient to incline to any particular acts, not even acts with respect to their complexes. The
child must be taught before these habits can incline to acts. The numerically singular acquirable
theological virtues incline to their complexes sufficiently, while the numerically singular non-
acquirable theological virtues incline to those same complexes non-sufficiently. This certainly
safeguards the essential supernaturality of the non-acquirable theological virtues, but it leaves
one wondering what good these non-acquirable theological virtues are; they do not seem to add
anything to the supernatural life.

Acquirable and non-acquirable theological virtues are distinguished by the way in which they
incline to particulars

On occasion, Ockham will offer an alternative understanding of how non-acquirable faith
inclines to acts of belief in distinction to the way numerically singular acquirable faith does. This
solution, it seems to me, does better justice to the essential supernaturality of faith. On this
second view, non-acquirable faith inclines immediately, rather than mediately, to all of the
articles of faith:

I respond that there is only numerically one infused faith inclining immediately to assent
to whatever article, as much to the principles [i.e., the complex ‘everything revealed by
God is true in the way it is revealed’] as to the conclusions [i.e., the particular articles of
faith which God has revealed]. For that it is one numerically is clear through the authority
of the Apostle. That, moreover, it inclines immediately to assent to whatever article
appears more reasonable—if it is able to be saved—than that it mediately [i.e., together
with numerically one acquirable habit of faith] inclines to assenting to one complex
universal and mediately [i.e., together with diverse acquirable habits of faith] inclines to
assent to the articles, according to the way elsewhere posited. It is possible, therefore, to
posit that just as the sun is an equivocal and non-univocal cause with respect to things
produced here below, and is an immediate cause for partially producing things distinct
according to species… In the same way it is necessary to posit specifically different
acquired faith with respect to each article on account of the reasons previously made.
And these specifically different habits incline to specifically different acts of assenting
with respect to diverse articles. And beyond these acquired habits it is necessary to posit infused faith on account of the authority of Sacred Scripture.\textsuperscript{138}

Ockham elaborates on the relationship between the causality of the sun and that of other, sublunary causes, the details of which need not detain us here. The point is that, in Aristotelian physics, the sun plays a role as universal cause in relation to all sublunary causes, and \textit{immediately} causes the production of a human being together with the human causes of that same production. Ockham is here proposing that non-acquirable faith functions in an analogous way with respect to eliciting acts of faith regarding particular articles. On this view, there is a significant difference between the way that the numerically singular non-acquirable and the numerically singular acquirable faith operate. It is not simply the case that the non-acquirable habit is insufficient and the acquirable habit sufficient for eliciting an act of belief. In addition, there is a difference between how they incline to believing the individual articles of faith. Both would incline immediately with respect to the complex ‘everything revealed by God is true in the way it is revealed by God.’ In contrast, the numerically singular acquirable faith would incline \textit{mediately} and the numerically singular non-acquirable faith would incline \textit{immediately} to

---

\textsuperscript{138} Ockham, Quaestiones varia 6, a. 8 (OTh VIII, pp. 247-48): “Respondeo quod tantum est una fides numero infusa inclinans immediate ad assentiendum cuilibet articulo tam ad principia quam ad conclusiones. Quod enim sit una numero patet per auctoritatem Apostoli. Quod autem inclinet immediate ad assentiendum cuilibet articulo appellant magis rationabile, - si potest salvari -, quam quod mediate inclinet ad assentiendum uni complexo universali et mediante illo inclinet ad assensum articulorum, secundum viam alibi positar. Potest igitur poni quod sicut sol est causa aequipasca et non univoca respectu productorum hic inferius, et est causa immediata ad producendum partialiter distincta secundum speciem, et causa universalis et aliae causae particulares univoce producentes diversificantur secundum speciem, sicut effectus eorum diversificantur secundum speciem. Patet exemplum de generatione aeris, asini, bovis etc., ita quod sol concurrort cum igne sicut causa partialis immediata aequivoce, et ignis univoce, et cum aere et cum asino, et licet ignis et aer qui producent univoce suos effectus distinguantur secundum speciem et secundum numerum, tamen sol qui est causa universalis et aequivoce est unus numero, quantumcumque producta sint plura et distincta secundum speciem. Eodem modo respectu cuiuslibet articuli necessae est ponere fidem adquisitam distinctam secundum speciem propter rationes alibi factas. Et isti habitus distincti secundum speciem inclinant ad actus assentiendi distinctos specie respectu diversorum articulorum. Et praeter istos habitus adquisitos necesse est ponere fidem infusam propter auctoritatem Sacrae Scripturae.”
believing particular articles of faith. On Ockham’s general theory of habits, no habit could be acquired that would immediately incline toward acts diverse in species.\textsuperscript{139}

This seems to me a much more adequate account of the essential supernaturality of the infused theological virtues. They incline immediately to a variety of specifically different acts, which no acquirable habit can do. This lends a degree of unity to acts of saving faith that is not possessed by those with merely numerically singular acquirable faith. Even numerically singular acquirable faith would not be activated when believing some particular article of faith, while non-acquirable faith would be activated each and every time a particular article of faith is believed, regardless of the content of the article.

Unfortunately, even if this second account shows us what difference non-acquirable theological virtues make, Ockham nowhere pauses to consider what it is about non-acquirable theological virtues that causes them to function in this way. He seems content to specify operational distinctions between acquirable and non-acquirable habits based on experience without further reflecting on the ontological difference between the habits that grounds the operational distinctions. This mode of reflection is, of course, not uncharacteristic of Ockham, but it leaves us with a number of unanswered questions. We do not know, for instance, whether non-acquirable habits cause more intense, more meritorious, or better acts than those with merely acquirable habits. We also do not know what the relationship is between acts by virtue of these non-acquirable and acquirable habits, on the one hand, and the increase or diminishment of these habits, on the other hand, either by God’s absolute or ordained power. Further, Ockham dedicates the lion’s share of his attention to non-acquirable faith and almost none at all to non-

\textsuperscript{139} For a general account of Ockham’s theory of habits, see the various articles in \textit{The Ontology, Psychology and Axiology of Habits (Habitus) in Medieval Philosophy}, eds. Nicolas Faucher and Magali Roques (Cham: Springer, 2018)
acquirable charity, which leaves us largely to speculate regarding his views on charity. For Ockham, the question of the relationship between natural and supernatural love for God, in other words, has lost most of the urgency that it has in Scotus.

When we turn to consider the absolutely essential supernaturality of grace in the remainder of this chapter, we will see that reflection on the relationship between nature and grace did not simply plateau with Ockham; the vast ontological gulf that the thirteenth-century schoolmen posited between nature and grace was considerably narrowed in his hands.

**Grace as Absolutely Essentially Supernatural**

*Aquinas on the Absolutely Essential Supernaturality of Grace*

With the rediscovery of the whole Aristotelian corpus and his importance in the burgeoning universities of the thirteenth century, it was perhaps inevitable that university theologians would begin to consider which of the ten categories was the most appropriate home for grace, charity, and the like. It was the standard position by Aquinas’s time that grace, charity, and the like should be categorized as accidental qualities in the soul, but this raised some difficulties, of which Aquinas was fully aware. In particular, it raised the worry that to call grace an accidental quality would be to denigrate it too much. Aristotle had taught that accidents are of lesser goodness than the substances in which they inhere, but Augustine had taught that the justification of one human being was a greater act than the creation of the entire natural world.

---

140 Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 110, a. 2, obj. 2 (Marietti I, p. 541): “Substance is nobler than quality. But grace is nobler than the nature of the soul, since we can do many things by grace, to which nature is not equal...therefore grace is not a quality.” (*Praeterea, substantia est nobilior qualitate. Sed gratia est nobilior quam natura animae: multa enim possimus per gratiam ad quae natura non sufficit, ut supra dictum est. Ergo gratia non est qualitas.)*

141 Augustine, *In Ioannis Euangelium* 72, n. 3 (CCSL 36, p. 508) "‘And greater works than these shall he do.’ Than what, pray? Shall we say that one is doing greater works than all that Christ did who is working out his own salvation with fear and trembling? Philippians 2:12 A work which Christ is certainly working in him, but not
Aquinas sees no cause for concern. He simply grants to grace an exception to the general rule about the relationship between accidents and substances. Grace is an accidental quality, Aquinas affirms, but it is unlike any accidental quality that Aristotle had ever encountered or even considered:

Because grace is above human nature, it cannot be a substance or a substantial form, but is an accidental form of the soul. Now what is substantially in God, becomes accidental in the soul participating the divine goodness, as is clear in the case of knowledge. And thus, because the soul participates in the divine goodness imperfectly, the participation of the divine goodness, which is grace, has its being in the soul in a less perfect way than the soul subsists in itself. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it is the expression or participation of the divine goodness, it is nobler than the nature of the soul, though not in its mode of being.142

Because grace is a participation in divine goodness, it is nobler than the soul in which it exists even if the soul, as self-subsistent, has a nobler mode of being.

Aquinas does not simply think that grace is greater than the particular substance in which it inheres; he further insists that it exceeds the goodness of any possible created nature:

Nothing can act beyond its species, since the cause must always be more powerful than its effect. Now the gift of grace surpasses every capability of created nature, since it is nothing short of a partaking of the divine nature, which exceeds every other nature. And thus it is impossible that any creature should cause grace. For it is as necessary that God alone should deify, bestowing a partaking of the divine nature by a participated likeness, as it is impossible that anything save fire should enkindle.143

without him; and one which I might, without hesitation, call greater than the heavens and the earth, and all in both within the compass of our vision. For both heaven and earth shall pass away, Matthew 24:35 but the salvation and justification of those predestinated thereto, that is, of those whom He foreknows, shall continue forever.” (Et maiora horum faciet. Quorum, obsecro? Numquidnam omnium operum Christi maiora facit, qui cum timore et tremore suam ipsius salutem operatur? Quod utique in illo, sed non sine illo Christus operatur. Prorsus maius hoc esse dixerim, quam est caelum et terra, et quaecumque cernuntur in caelo et in terra. Et caelum enim et terra transibit; praedestinatorum autem, id est eorum quos praescit, salus et iustificatio permanebit.)

142 Aquinas, Summa theologiae I-II, q. 110, a. 2, ad 2 (Marietti I, p. 542): “Et quia gratia est supra naturam humanam, non potest esse quod sit substantia aut forma substantialis: sed est forma accidentalis ipsius animae. Id enim quod substantialiter est in Deo, accidentaliter fit in anima participante divinam bonitatem: ut de scientia patet. Secundum hoc ergo, quia anima imperfecte participat divinam bonitatem, ipsa participatio divinae bonitatis quae est gratia, imperfectior modo habet esse in anima quam anima in seipsa subsistat. Est tamen nobilior quam natura animae, inquantum est expressio vel participatio divinae bonitatis: non autem quantum ad modum essendi.”

143 Aquinas, Summa theologiae I-II, q. 112, a. 1, resp. (Marietti I, p. 550): “Donum autem gratiae excedit omnem facultatem naturae creatae: cum nihil aliud sit quam quaedam participatio divinae naturae, quae excedit omnem
Aquinas only speaks here of ‘created’ nature, not of ‘creatable’ nature, but his argument makes it clear that he is not thinking merely of actual created natures but of all possible creatable natures. He is not simply considering human and angelic natures and then affirming that grace is above each. Because grace is a “partaking of the divine nature,” it cannot possibly be proper to a creature. To use Scheeben’s idiom, grace is not simply relatively essentially supernatural with respect to human nature, it is absolutely essentially supernatural. Because it is a participation in what is proper to God alone (the divine nature), it cannot, by definition, be part of the nature of a creature and is, thus, above every possible creatable nature.

Grace is not simply greater than any possible created nature; grace is greater than the whole natural goodness of the entire created order:

A work may be called great in two ways: first, on the part of the mode of action, and thus the work of creation is the greatest work, wherein something is made from nothing; secondly, a work may be called great on account of what is made, and thus the justification of the ungodly, which terminates at the eternal good of a share in the Godhead, is greater than the creation of heaven and earth, which terminates at the good of mutable nature. Hence, Augustine, after saying that “for a just man to be made from a sinner is greater than to create heaven and earth,” adds, “for heaven and earth shall pass away, but the justification of the ungodly shall endure.”

In the reply to the second objection, Aquinas makes it clear that he is not simply making the claim that the sum total of all supernatural goodness is a greater good than the sum total of all

---

144 Aquinas, Summa theologiae I-II, q. 113, a. 9, resp. (Marietti I, p. 563): “Respondeo dicendum quod opus aliquod potest dici opus magnum dupliciper. Uno modo, ex parte modi agendi. Et sic maximum est opus creationis, in quo ex nihilo fit aliquid. — Alio modo potest dici opus magnum propter magnitudinem eius quod fit. Et secundum hoc, maius opus est justificatio impii, quae terminatur ad bonum aeternum divinae participacionis, quam creatio caelei et terrae, quae terminatur ad bonum naturae mutabilis. Et ideo Augustinus, cum dixisset quod maius est quod ex impio fiat iustus, quam creare caelum et terram, subiungit: Caelum enim et terra transibit: praedestinatorum autem salus et justificatio permanebit.”
natural goodness; he is making the stronger claim that “the good of grace in one is greater than
the good of nature in the whole universe.” A single habit of grace, presumably even in its
lowest degree, is of more value than the whole of the natural order. It would be difficult to
imagine a more categorical approbation of grace.

For Aquinas, then, the distinction between nature and grace is not an arbitrary one. God
did not simply decide, first, to withhold certain perfections from His creatures which He could
have made proper to them and, second, to then freely bestow those perfections on them as grace.
For Aquinas, that in which grace now consists could not possibly be that in which created nature
might consist. If grace is indeed absolutely essentially supernatural, even God could not make a
creature that, by its nature, was as perfect as graced creatures are in the actual economy of
salvation. The distinction between nature and grace is a categorical one, and if we wonder why
God could not create a creature with the accidental quality of grace as a constitutive part of its
nature, we simply are not thinking of grace in the right way. Because grace’s categorical
difference consists in the creature’s participation in what is proper to God and to God alone, the
distinction between nature and grace is one that even God Himself cannot collapse. The
distinction between nature and grace is as radical a difference as there can be among created
realities. It is true that the thirteenth-century schoolmen came to the consensus view that grace is
rightly described as an accidental quality in the soul, but grace is clearly not like any other
accidental quality; it does not play by all of the rules.

145 Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 113, a. 9, ad 2 (Marietti I, p. 563): “Sed bonum gratiae unius maius est quam
bonum naturae totius universi.”
Scotus on the Absolutely Essential Supernaturality of Grace

Scotus, like Aquinas, also considers the objection that grace cannot be an accidental quality in the soul because all accidents are of lesser goodness than the substances in which they inhere. Like Aquinas before him, Scotus has no problem granting grace an exception to the general rule:

I respond that the least substance is more perfect in its natural being than grace, because no accident is more perfect in its being than any substance whatsoever. If, however, we are talking about supernatural being, then I say that since supernatural being is to conjoin the soul to God, that which more perfectly conjoins is more perfect with respect to supernatural perfection,—and such is grace.146

Scotus, like Aquinas, is willing to grant some sense in which grace is greater than the substance in which it inheres; grace is greater in ‘supernatural being’ than the substance in which it inheres. His position seems also to entail that grace is not only greater than the particular substance in which it happens to inhere, but also greater than any creatable nature whatsoever. It is axiomatic, for Scotus, that “God, under the proper character of divinity, is not present to a created intellect except purely voluntarily.”147 No possible creature, then, could be naturally conjoined to God, and because grace conjoins to God by its very definition, the accidental quality of grace must be greater in supernatural being than any creatable nature, indeed greater than the sum total of all natural goodness. For Scotus, as for Aquinas before him, grace is not simply relatively essentially supernatural; it is absolutely essentially supernatural. Grace does not simply exceed

146 Scotus, Lectura III, d. 13, q. 4, n. 70 (Vatican XX, p. 293): “Respondeo quod minima substantia in esse suo naturali perfectior est quam gratia, quia nullum accidentis in esse suo est perfectius quam substantia quaecumque. Si autem loquamur de esse supernaturali, dico tunc quod cum esse supernaturalis sit coniungere animam Deo, illud quod perfectius coniungit, est perfectior perfectio supernaturalis, - et illa est gratia.”

147 Scotus, Quodlibet 14, n. 36 (Alluntis, p. 510): “Deus autem, sub propria ratione divinitatis, non est praesens alicui intellectui creato, nisi mere voluntarie.”
human or angelic nature in value or goodness; it exceeds the value or goodness of any possible creatable nature.

Scotus, in fact, clearly affirms that even God cannot collapse the distinction between nature and grace and make that in which grace consists be that in which nature consists. He does so when considering the question as to whether God can make a will impeccable (i.e., incapable of sin) by nature. Scotus argues that there are no demonstrative reasons against this possibility, but he denies it nonetheless on account of the authority of the saints. The details of his account need not detain us here. What is important for our purposes is Scotus’s denial of one of the arguments in favor of the possibility that God could create a will impeccable by nature. One of the arguments in favor of the possibility of a naturally impeccable creature is that whatever God can do by grace, He can do by nature: “God is able to make a will impeccable through grace (just as is clear in the blessed); therefore, He can do this through nature.” Scotus’s response is worth quoting at length:

The consequence is therefore to be denied when it is argued that “God is able to make a will impeccable through grace, therefore also through nature.”

And for the proof, when it is argued that “every created and limited perfection is able to be made the same as another, and so grace is able to be made the same as the will, so that through identity [the will] contains it,” it ought to be said that those things which according to proper ratio are [related as] perfection and perfectible are diverse such that, so long as the ratio of each remains, they are not able to be the same, nor is one able to contain the other through identity. And I say “things which according to ratio are [related as] perfection and perfectible” by definition (propter genus et differentiam), which is not the case except for matter and form, subject and accident, for the more something perfectible is perfect and has more being, the more perfection it requires. Hence, the more perfect a will is, the greater is its perfection, because it is not immediately conjoined to

---

148 Scotus, Lectura II, d. 23, q. 1, nn. 22-23 (Vatican XIX, p. 213): “Ideo nisi essent auctoritates sanctorum, quae sunt plane in contrarium et expressae, posset concedi et sustiniri quod non includat contradictionem aliquam voluntatem creatam esse impeccabilem per naturam, - sicut nunc non est inconveniens de voluntate creata beata, quae non potest peccare. Verumtamen consentiendo illis auctoritatibus et aliquibus rationibus, cum auctoritatibus dico quod Deus non potest facere aliquam voluntatem creatam impeccabilem per naturam.”

149 Scotus, Lectura II, d. 23, q. 1, n. 5 (Vatican XIX, pp. 207-208): “Praeterea, Deus potest per gratiam voluntatem facere impeccabilem (sic patet in beatis); igitur hoc potest facere per naturam.”
God, but through the medium of some perfection, just as a less perfect will by a lesser perfection.\textsuperscript{150}

Scotus seems to be arguing that the distinction between nature and grace is as basic as that between form and matter or between substance and accident. That in which grace consists cannot be that in which nature consists any more than that in which form consists could be that in which matter consists. Scotus does not think this basic distinction holds between all things related as perfectible and perfection. Impeccability, for instance, is a perfection of the will, but, again, Scotus denies that there are any demonstrative reasons against the possibility of a naturally impeccable will. The distinction between perfectible and perfection is only uncollapsible if things are related as perfectible and perfection \textit{by definition}. Scotus denies that the will and impeccability are related in this way, but he clearly thinks that nature and grace are.

Nature, by definition, is precisely that which is perfectible by grace; grace, by definition, is precisely that which perfects nature. As such, the distinction cannot be collapsed even by God. This makes sense, of course. As we have already seen, Scotus thinks that grace, by definition, conjoins us to God, and he also thinks that nothing can be conjoined to God by nature since God is only available to creatures by divine will. It is not, then, the case that as God creates greater and greater natures, they need less and less of grace; Scotus argues that greater and greater natures would need \textit{more} grace rather than less. As we ascend the great chain of being, we might

\textsuperscript{150} Scotus, \textit{Lectura} II, d. 23, q. 1, nn. 42-43 (Vatican XIX, p. 217): “Neganda est igitur consequentia, quando arguitur quod ‘Deus potest facere voluntatem impeccabilem per gratiam, ergo et per naturam’. Et ad probationem, quando arguitur quod ‘omnis perfectio creat et limitata potest fieri eadem alteri, et ita gratia potest fieri eadem voluntati, ut per identitatem continet eam’, dicendum quod illa quae secundum propriam rationem sunt perfectio et perfectibile, sunt diversa, ut quandu manet ratio utiusque, non possunt esse eadem, nec unum continet alterum per identitatem. Et dico ‘qua secundum rationem sunt perfectio et perfectibile’ propter genus et differentiam, quae non sic se habent, sed materia et forma, subjectum et accidentis, nam quanto aliquod perfectibile est perfectius et maioris entitatis, tanto maiorem perfectionem requirit. Unde voluntas quanto est perfectior, tanto sua perfectio est maior, quia non immediate coniungitur Deo, sed mediante aliqua perfectione, sicut voluntas minus perfecta minore perfectione.”
say, increasingly perfect natures will simply have an increasingly large surface area for union with God, each requiring more and more grace for such union. God does not give grace because He made us less perfect than we could have been by nature. Even if He had made us as perfect by nature as He could have made us, He still would have needed to give us grace if we were to be conjoined to Him. For Scotus, no creature can be made for which grace is natural; grace is above every possible created nature.

Scotus is thus happy to speak of grace as a participation in God or as a deification of the creature. He does so less often than Aquinas does, and many such texts in Scotus are quotations of other thinkers or Scotus’s engagement with those quotations, but Richard Cross’s judgment that we should be cautious in attributing such concepts to Scotus himself is surely overstated.151 Cross argues that Scotus “seems to have abandoned the view of his predecessors that grace in any sense makes a creature more like God than any creature without grace is,” but there are several texts in Scotus, many of which Cross fails to address, which suggest otherwise.152

It is certainly the case that Scotus uses the language of participation and deification more sparingly than Aquinas does, but it is certainly not the case that Scotus never uses such language

151 Richard Cross, “Some Late Medieval Discussions of Participation in the Divine” (forthcoming in a volume on participation ed. Douglas Hedley, University of Notre Dame Press), quoted with the author’s permission: “Scotus rarely uses the language of participation in this context. The exceptions are all passages in which he quotes Augustine (with apparent approval, but only in passing, in the context of opinions not his own) saying that the mind ‘is his [viz. God’s] image by the fact that it is capable of him, and can be a partaker (particeps) of him.’ Neither does he – with just a couple of exceptions – talk of deification or deiformity. Here is the principal exception, in the context of a rejection of Aquinas’s view that grace inhere primarily in the soul itself, not its powers….Here, obviously, Scotus is using in support of Aquinas the language of another of Scotus’s opponents, Henry of Ghent….So I do not know whether Scotus would accept the language here.”

152 Cross, “Participation”: “Indeed, these occurrences of ‘partaker’, ‘deiform’, and ‘deified’ are causal, without any theoretical elaboration. The notions signified do not play much, if any, role in Scotus’s thinking on grace. Still, having said this, his account of grace in some sense follows the contours of the discussion in Bonaventure and Aquinas, though with crucial differences. Like Bonaventure and Aquinas, Scotus holds that grace is a created quality in the soul. But he seems to have abandoned the view of his predecessors that grace in any sense makes a creature more like God than any creature without grace is.”
in his own name. Scotus, for instance, is happy to contrast God’s beatitude and that of the
blessed as that which is beatitude by essence and that which is beatitude by participation:

To [the divine nature] the divine will first and *per se* immovably and necessarily adheres,
because not by participation in anything other than itself, for this will, not by habit nor by
a deferring act nor in virtue of any superior cause, most perfectly and necessarily loves
the supreme good.

In second rank is a blessed created will, which not first, but by participating
in God, yet *per se*, because by its own intrinsic form, adheres firmly to this good, and that
because it is made to be as it were intrinsic to the will that is first at rest, because it
always abides in that will’s good pleasure.\textsuperscript{153}

Scotus similarly speaks not only of charity but of faith as a participation in God: “For the light of
infused faith…is a certain participation of the divine light.”\textsuperscript{154} In neither of these cases does
Scotus quote or summarize the position of another.

Scotus likewise follows his scholastic forebears to use the language of deification: “For
justice is the great beauty of the soul, namely which distinguishes the just from the sinner. As in
the Old Testament the wise is distinguished from the fool, so in the New Testament the just is
distinguished from the sinner by grace. In this way justice is a certain beauty and deiform
similitude.”\textsuperscript{155} It is true that Scotus is here drawing on a text of Augustine regarding justice as a
beauty in the soul, but Augustine himself nowhere uses the language of deification in the cited

\textsuperscript{153} Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 1, q. 5, n. 174-75 (Vatican II, pp. 114-15): “Huic centro voluntas divina primo et per se,
quia non participatione cuiuscumque alterius a se, immobile et necessario adhaeret, quia ista voluntas, non per
habitum, nec per actum differentem, nec in virtute alicuius causae superioris, perfectissime et necessario amat illud
bonum summum. In secundo gradu est voluntas creatae beata, quae non primo sed participando a Deo, per se tamen,
quia per formam suam intrinsecam, adhaeret firmiter huic bono, et hoc quia facta est quasi intrinsecum voluntati primo
quiescenti, quia in eius beneplacito semper manens.”

\textsuperscript{154} Scotus, *Quodlibet* 17, a. 3, n. 26 (Alluntis, p. 624): “Illud enim lumen fidei infusae, quia est participatio quaedam
luminis divini, non potest inclinare intellectum, nisi in aliquod determinate verum.”

pulchritudo qua scilicet distinguetur justus a peccatore. Sicut in Veteri Testamento distinguitur sapiens ab insipiente,
sic in Novo per gratiam distinguitur iustus a peccatore. Sic iustitia est quaedam pulchritudo et similitudo
deiformis...”
passage.\textsuperscript{156} Without any reference whatsoever to another author (scholastic or patristic), Scotus also tells us that “God, who loves only Himself for His own sake, can give to a creature some deiform form; he who has such is loved in a special way, and the work it inclines him to do will be especially accepted to the degree it accords with that inclination.”\textsuperscript{157} There is no reason to think, then, that Scotus is any less committed to the special nature of the supernatural virtues. They are a deifying participation in God Himself. That is intrinsic to what they are. As such, that in which they consist cannot possibly be proper to a creature.

Scotus makes precisely this point with respect to blessedness when considering whether the good angels merit the blessedness which they receive. They do, Scotus argues, and he simply quotes Aquinas to make his point:

Because every nature attains its perfection by its proper operation, but the perfection and end of any rational creature is blessedness, which is natural only to God. Now every “such operation, which leads to the end, is either maker of the end, namely when the end does not exceed the virtue of the one operating (as medication in respect of health), or is meritorious of the end, namely when the end exceeds the virtue ‘of what operates for the sake of the end’, and then the end is expected from the gift of another; but ultimate blessedness exceeds both angelic and human nature; therefore both man and angel merit their blessedness.”\textsuperscript{158}

\textsuperscript{156} Augustine, \textit{De Trinitate} VIII, c. 6, n. 9 (CCSL 50, p. 281): “For justice is a sort of beauty of the soul by which many men are beautiful even though they have ugly misshapen bodies.” (\textit{Est enim quaedam pulchritudo animi iustitia qua pulchri sunt homines plerique etiam qui corpore distorti atque deformes sunt}.)

\textsuperscript{157} Scotus, \textit{Quodlibet} 17, a. 2, n. 12 (Alluntis, pp. 616-17): “Deus enim, qui se solum et propter seipsum diliget, potest aliquam formam deiformem dare creaturae, quam habens specialiter diligatur, et opus eius, ad quod ipsa inclinant, pro quanto sit secundum ipsius inclinationem, specialiter acceptetur.”

\textsuperscript{158} Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} II, dd. 4-5, q. 2, n. 16 (Vatican VIII, p. 7): “Primum declaratur, quia omnis natura consequitur perfectionem suam per operationem propriam; sed perfectio et finis ciuslibet creaturae rationalis est beatitudo, quae soli Deo est naturalis. Omnis autem ‘operatio talis, in finem ductens, vel est factiva finis, quando scilicet finis non excedit virtutem operantis (sicut medicatio respectu sanitatis), - vel est meritoria finis, quando scilicet finis excedit virtutem “operantis propter finem”, et tunc expectatur finis ex dono alterius; beatitudo autem ultima excedit et naturam angelicam et humanam; tam ergo homo quam angelus suam beatitudinem meruit’, - et sic patet primum.” The quote is from Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} I, q. 62, a. 4, resp.
For Scotus, glory is no more than (or no less than) consummate grace, so the same logic would apply to grace with the difference that grace is that by which we merit rather than that which we merit. That in which grace and glory consist are natural only to God; they can be in creatures only by participation, not by nature.

Still, even if Scotus retains participation and deification, it is sometimes argued that he degrades the supernatural life of grace by eliminating a number of discrete supernatural habits posited by his thirteenth-century forebears. In Aquinas, for instance, we find the spiritual life at its most baroque. He posits more discrete supernatural habits than anyone before him, and the Thomist tradition continues its attempt to work out the coherence of his system to this very day. Aquinas first distinguishes between the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity on the one hand, and the habit of grace on the other. While the theological virtues reside in the powers of the soul, the habit of grace is in the essence of the soul:

For if grace is the same as virtue, it must necessarily be in the powers of the soul as in a subject; since the soul’s powers are the proper subject of virtue, as stated above. But if grace differs from virtue, it cannot be said that a power of the soul is the subject of grace, since every perfection of the soul’s powers has the nature of virtue, as stated above. Hence it remains that grace, as it is prior to virtue, has a subject prior to the powers of the soul, so that it is in the essence of the soul. For as man in his intellective powers participates in the divine knowledge through the virtue of faith, and in his power of will participates in the divine love through the virtue of charity, so also in the nature of the soul does he participate in the divine nature, after the manner of a likeness, through a certain regeneration or re-creation.

---


160 For a helpful guide to the forest which manages not to get lost in the trees, see John M. Meinert, “*Donum Habituale: Grace and the Gifts of the Holy Spirit in St. Thomas Aquinas*” (dissertation, The Catholic University of America, 2015).

161 Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 110, a. 4, resp. (Marietti I, p. 544): “Si enim gratia sit idem quod virtus, necesse est quod sit in potentia animae sicut in subiecto: nam potentia animae est proprium subiectum virtutis, ut supra dictum est. Si autem gratia differt a virtute, non potest dici quod potentia animae sit gratiae subiectum: quia omnis perfectio potentiae animae habet rationem virtutis, ut supra dictum est. Unde relinquitur quod gratia, sicut est prius virtute, ita habeat subiectum prius potentis animae: ita scilicet quod sit in essentia animae. Sicut enim per potentiam intellectivam homo participat cognitionem divinam per virtutem fidei; et secundum potentiam voluntatis
Grace perfects the essence of the soul and then overflows into the powers of the soul as the theological virtues.

In addition to the theological virtues, Aquinas also posits supernaturally infused intellectual and moral virtues. We need the theological virtues, Aquinas suggests, because we are disposed by them to an entirely new object, namely, God as supernatural end. Why, then, do we need the infused intellectual and moral virtues, which Aquinas holds to be distinct from their natural counterparts? Aquinas thinks that the life of grace affects the total reality of human existence, life, and action, imparting not only a new orientation to God but a new orientation to the world created by Him. Aquinas thus insists that “all virtues, intellectual and moral, that are acquired by our actions, arise from certain natural principles pre-existing in us…instead of which natural principles, God bestows on us the theological virtues, whereby we are directed to a supernatural end….Wherefore we need to receive from God other habits corresponding, in due proportion, to the theological virtues.”162 While the acquired virtues suffice for our relationship with other things in se, “the soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things, yet in relation to God.”163

Aquinas further suggests that we also have supernatural “gifts” of the Holy Spirit which are distinct from both the theological virtues and the infused intellectual and moral virtues. Why

---

162 Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 63, a. 3, resp. (Marietti I, pp. 277-78): “Omnes autem virtutes tam intellectuales quam morales, quae ex nostris actibus acquiruntur, procedunt ex quibusdam naturalibus principiis in nobis praeexistentibus, ut supra dictum est. Loco quorum naturalium principiorum, conferuntur nobis a Deo virtutes theologicae, quibus ordinamur ad finem supernaturalem, sicut supra dictum est. Unde oportet quod his etiam virtutibus theologicis proportionaliter respondeant alii habitus divinitus causati in nobis.”

do we need these? Aquinas offers a basic principle: “Whatever is moved must be proportionate to its mover, and the perfection of the mobile as such consists in a disposition whereby it is disposed to be moved well by its mover.”\(^\text{164}\) As an example, Aquinas helpfully draws an analogy from the relationship between the sensitive powers and reason. The sensitive powers have what Aquinas calls a natural “instinct” or non-rational impulse according to which they are sufficiently productive of operation. For that reason, animals need no habits perfecting their sensitive powers.\(^\text{165}\) In contrast to non-rational animals, the sensitive powers of human beings are the subjects of habits, not because they lack natural instinct in themselves but because, in addition to natural instinct, the sensitive powers in the human being are additionally subject (or at least ought to be) to what Aquinas calls “rational instinct” or the governance of reason.\(^\text{166}\)

But Aquinas argues that human beings have yet another principle of movement in addition to reason: “In man there is a twofold principle of movement, one within him, namely, reason; the other extrinsic to him, namely, God.”\(^\text{167}\) Just as the sensitive powers require habits if they are to obey the rational principle of movement, so the intellective and appetitive powers require additional habits if they are to obey the extrinsic principle of human acts, namely, suprarational divine inspiration: “These perfections are called gifts, not only because they are infused by God, but also because by them the human being is disposed to become amenable to

\(^{164}\) Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 68, a. 1, resp. (Marietti I, p. 300): “Manifestum est autem quod omne quod movetur, necesse est proportionatum esse motori: et haec est perfectio mobilis inquantum est mobile, dispositio qua disponitur ad hoc quod bene moveatur a suo motore.”

\(^{165}\) Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 50, a. 3, resp. and ad 2.

\(^{166}\) Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 50, a. 3, ad 1 (Marietti I, p. 221): “Sed vires sensitivae natae sunt obedire imperio rationis: et ideo in eis esse possunt aliqui habitus.”

\(^{167}\) Aquinas *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 68, a. 1, resp. (Marietti I, p. 300): “Est enim considerandum quod in homine est duplex principium movens: unum quidem interius, quod est ratio; aliud autem exterius, quod est Deus.”
the divine inspiration.” The argument is similar to that for the need of the infused intellectual and moral virtues in relation to the theological virtues, but Aquinas is convinced that these are two distinct matters: “The gifts, as distinct from infused virtue, may be defined as something given by God in relation to His motion.” The infused intellectual and moral virtues make us amenable, we might say, to the governance of the theological virtues, but the gifts make us amenable to the promptings of God Himself. This is necessary, Aquinas thinks, because the theological virtues, though greater in perfection than the natural intellectual and moral virtues, are possessed by us in a less perfect manner “because man has the former in his full possession, whereas he possesses the latter imperfectly, since we love and know God imperfectly.” Anything that possesses some “nature, or form, or virtue imperfectly,” Aquinas argues, is not sufficient to act by virtue of it unless it be “moved by another.” For Aquinas, then, the Christian life is a life under the instant and constant direction of the Holy Spirit by means of His gifts: “In matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man’s reason moves him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the theological virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless it receive in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Spirit, according to Romans 8:14, 17: Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are sons of God.”

---

168 Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 68, a. 1, resp. (Marietti I, p. 300): “Et istae perfectiones vocantur dona: non solum quia infunduntur a Deo; sed quia secundum ea homo disponitur ut efficiatur prompte mobilis ab inspiratione divina.”

169 Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 68, a. 1, ad 3 (Marietti I, p. 300): “Similiter autem donum, prout distinguitur a virtute infusa, potest dici id quod datur a Deo in ordine ad motionem ipsius.”

170 Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 68, a. 2, resp. (Marietti I, p. 301): “Et quamvis haec secunda perfectio sit maior quam prima, tamen prima perfectiori modo habetur ab homine quam secunda: nam prima habetur ab homine quasi plena possessio, secunda autem habetur quasi imperfecta; imperfecte enim diligimus et cognoscimus Deum.”

171 Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 68, a. 2, resp. (Marietti I, p. 301): “Sed id quod imperfecte habet naturam aliquam vel formam aut virtutem, non potest per se operari, nisi ab altero moveatur.”

172 Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 68, a. 2, resp. (Marietti I, p. 301): “Sed in ordine ad finem ultimum supernaturalem, ad quem ratio movet secundum quod est aliqualiter et imperfecte formata per virtutes theologicas;
No one could reasonably accuse Aquinas of having an impoverished account of the supernatural life. Aquinas additionally posits, in addition to these supernatural realities, the beatitudes and the fruits of the Spirit, all of which are distinct from grace, the theological and infused moral virtues, the gifts, and from each other. On Aquinas’s account, any particular virtuous act of a Christian requires the concert of a rich array of discrete supernatural habits in response to the immediate promptings of the Holy Spirit. It is understandable, then, that those sustained by the deep wells of the *Summa theologiae* would be disappointed to discover in Scotus that the whole Thomistic panoply has been reduced to no more than faith, hope, and charity.

It is true that Scotus reduces the whole of the supernatural life to the theological virtues: “A human being who is perfected by the three theological virtues and the speculative and practical virtues, and the moral virtues ordered both to self and to others, is as fully perfected as a wayfarer can be. So there does not appear to be any necessity to posit other habits besides the theological, intellectual, and moral virtues.” From the context, it is clear that Scotus is not talking here about infused intellectual and moral virtues. His position is that, in addition to acquired intellectual and moral virtues, the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity are all that is necessary to render a human being as perfect as she can possibly be in this life. But tending to Scotus’s arguments against Aquinas and others on the necessity of additional discrete

non sufficit ipsa motio rationis, nisi desuper adsit instinctus et motio Spiritus Sancti; secundum illud Rom. 8, [14-17]: *Qui Spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt.*”


174 Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 34, q. 1, n. 30 (Vatican X, p. 190): “Ergo homo perfectus tribus virtutibus theologicis et virtutibus speculativis et practicis et virtutibus moralibus, ordinantibus ad se et ad alterum, perficitur quantum potest competere viatori. Non videtur igitur aliqua necessitas ponendi aliquos alios habitus ab illis qui sunt virtutes theologicae, intellectuales et morales.”
supernatural habits indicates that this clearly is not because Scotus has a lesser view of the spiritual life. If anything, Scotus holds the position that he does because he has a much higher view of charity. For Scotus, there are no good reasons to think that charity could not do, on its own, what Aquinas thinks requires a distinct habit in the essence of the soul (grace as distinct from charity), infused intellectual and moral virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The supernatural life itself is not any less rich and profound for Scotus than it is for Aquinas; there is, at most, a descriptive difference between their accounts—a difference over how many discrete supernatural habits are necessary to give an adequate account of a qualitatively identical supernatural life. Aquinas and Scotus differ not in what they describe but in how they describe it.175

We see this most clearly when we consider Scotus’s arguments against the various kinds of distinctions that Aquinas wants to make: “Another says that something is necessary to dispose the will so that it is able to be moved by right reason, and that is virtue. But something else is needed so that the Holy Spirit can move it, and that is the gift.”176 Scotus’s response is not that the Holy Spirit does not move us but that the Holy Spirit does not need a virtue in addition to charity to do so:

Since God gave the will this habit, He continues to assist both will and habit to act accordingly….The same habit, then, disposes the will to be moved in both the first and the second way, for though the habit disposes the will to move itself, it also disposes it to

---

175 As Yves Congar helpfully points out, the Tridentine fathers were perfectly clear about this: “Certain theologians, among them Duns Scotus, rejected the specific distinction between the gifts and the virtues. The Council of Trent was careful not to condemn Duns Scotus’ position. I am personally all the more inclined to stress the aspect of the theological interpretation and construction in this matter for noting, as we cannot help noting, how the saints and mystics themselves make no distinction in their own experience between the grace of the virtues and that of the gifts of the Spirit. It is their spiritual directors, biographers or interpreters who speak here of the action of the ‘gifts’ and who even state precisely which gift is active.” Yves Congar, *I Believe in the Holy Spirit: ‘He is Lord and Giver of Life,*’ trans. David Smith (New York, NY: Seabury, 1983), 2:134.

176 Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 34, q. 1, n. 22 (Vatican X, p. 186): “Aliter dicitur quod oportet aliquid disponere voluntatem ut est mobilis a ratione recta, et tale est virtus; aliquid autem oportet disponere eam ut est mobilis a Spiritu Sancto, et tale est donum.”
be moved by the Holy Spirit as the other mover; but this is no reason why other habits need to be postulated here.\(^{177}\)

Scotus likewise rejects the necessity of infused cardinal virtues, not because he thinks there is no difference between Christian and non-Christian prudence but because the theological virtues are sufficient to do that for which Aquinas thinks infused cardinal virtues necessary:

Indeed, through these seven virtues [the three infused theological virtues and the four acquired cardinal virtues]…if they are as perfect as possible in themselves, a human being is as perfect as possible with regard to God in Himself and with regard to all things other than God, both as intelligible by practical reason and as desirable for himself or for another, and this as ordered to himself, as the appetitive virtues can order him in their own right, and as ordered to the ultimate end, to which the acquired virtues can order him when they are conjoined with charity.\(^{178}\)

Aquinas was not the only one to contrive ways of distinguishing the virtues and the gifts. Scotus considers two other accounts and, in each case, employs the same argument: it is not the case that the distinctions are inadequate but that discrete supernatural habits are unnecessary for their explanation. First, Bonaventure’s argument:

Another explanation is that the virtues enable one to act rightly; the gifts, to act perfectly; and the beatitudes, to act quickly. On the contrary: by the same virtue I act rightly (because virtue is rectitude in the faculty) and quickly (because virtue is a habit making the operation quick and easy) and perfectly (because virtue is a perfection in the one who has it and is that whereby the action is rendered perfect).\(^{179}\)

\(^{177}\) Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 34, q. 1, n. 23 (Vatican X, pp. 186-87): “…et tertio, ex quo Deus dedit habitum voluntati, semper assisit et voluntati et habitui ad actus sibi convenientes (sicut postquam illuminavit caecum miraculose, semper assistebat illuminato ut posset moveri illa potentia). Ergo per idem est aliquid proportionatum moventi secundo et primo; igitur si per habitum proportionatur potentia sibi ipsi, per idem sufficienter proportionatur Spiritui Sancto ut alii moventi. Non igitur propter istam rationem oportet ibi necessario ponere alios habitus.”

\(^{178}\) Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 34, q. 1, n. 53 (Vatican X, p. 202): “Per istas quippe seipsum virtutes, intelligendo de eis et de speciebus earum necessariis (de quibus postea dictur), si sint in se perfectissimae, simpliciter perfectissimus est homo et circa Deum in se et circa omnia alia a Deo, et ut intelligibilis ratione practica et ut appetibilis sibi vel alteri, et hoc in ordine ad se, in quod possunt virtutes appetitivae ex se, vel in ordine ad finem ultimum, in quem possunt virtutes acquisitae cum caritate.”

\(^{179}\) Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 34, q. 1, nn. 20-21 (Vatican X, pp. 185-86): “Alio modo dicitur quod contingit per virtutes recte agere, per dona perfecte, per beatitudines expedite. Contra istud: eadem virtute recte ago, quia virtus est rectitudo potentiae, - et expedite ago, quia virtus est habitus faciens expedite et faciliter operari, - et eadem perfecte ago, quia virtus est perfectio et habentis in se et qua opus eius perfectum redditur, II Ethicorum.”
Bonaventure suggests that the virtues, gifts, and beatitudes enable us to act rightly, perfectly, and quickly. Scotus’s response is that charity enables us to act in all three of these ways without additional, discrete supernatural habits. Once again, Scotus is not de-supernaturalizing the Christian life; he is simply arguing for parsimony of description.

Henry of Ghent had attempted to distinguish the theological virtues from the gifts and the beatitudes by distinguishing human, superhuman, and inhuman (or “quasi-godlike”) modes of action: “Virtues, it is said, perfect a person humanly; gifts, superhumanly; beatitudes, inhumanly.” Scotus responds not that these modes of action are impossible but that the theological virtues in their various degrees of intensity are able fully to account for them without positing additional supernatural habits:

The first objection to this is that charity is the most excellent of the gifts of God, according to Augustine, and even more, according to the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 13: “If I have fortitude and hand over my body to be burned”—which seems to be nonhuman or godlike, because one seeks to burn for God—“but have not charity, I gain nothing”; therefore it does not seem that any gift perfects one more than even the first degree of charity, which is a virtue.

Again, Scotus is not denying that human beings are capable of “godlike” action. He is simply arguing that charity, at a high enough degree, is sufficient for such action.

Scotus not only denies discrete gifts of the Holy Spirit and infused cardinal virtues; he also denies, as we noted in the introductory chapter, that we need a discrete habit of grace in

---

180 Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 34, q. 1, n. 11 (Vatican X, p. 180): “Dicitur ergo quod virtutes perficiunt hominem modo humano, dona modo superhumano, beatitudines inhumano modo.”

181 Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 34, q. 1, n. 12 (Vatican X, p. 181): “Sed contra istud obicitur multipliciter: Primo, quia caritas est excellentissimum donorum Dei, secundum Augustinum XV Trinitatis cap. 19, - et quod plus est, secundum Apostolum Cor. 13: Si fortitudinem habuero et tradidero corpus meum ita ut ardeam (quod videtur esse modo inhumano, quia quaerere ‘ardere’ pro Deo), caritatem autem non habeam, nihil mihi prodest; igitur non videtur quod aliquod donum perficiat excellentius quam caritas, - quae tamen est virtus, et de primo gradu si loquamur de virtutibus moralibus et theologicis.”
addition to the theological habit of charity. Thomists often argue that the distinction between them is a necessary one if Christian salvation is to be rightly described as deification. Grace, it is argued, is an ‘entitative habit’ in the soul that renders it deiform prior to any action performed by the deified person in keeping with the general principle that being is presupposed by acting. It is often argued that Scotus rejects this elevation of the essence of the soul and thinks of charity solely in terms of its enabling certain kinds of action.182

It is true that Scotus denies that grace and charity are really distinct, but he also denies that they are merely conceptually distinct. Instead, Scotus employs his much-discussed formal distinction, which lies intermediate between a real distinction and a merely conceptual distinction. As with conceptual distinction, formal distinction entails real inseparability (things that are merely conceptually or formally non-identical cannot actually exist apart from one another); as with real distinction, formal distinction entails extra-mental distinction (things that are really or formally non-identical are distinct independently of mental operation).183 Grace and charity, for Scotus, are formally distinct. There is an extra-mental distinction between grace and charity such that, though they are really inseparable, the definition of neither is included in the definition of the other. “Charity is that whereby he who has it holds God as beloved, so that charity considers God not under the idea of lover but under the idea of lovable; grace is that

---


183 For a helpful introduction to Scotus’s account of the formal distinction, see Allan B. Wolter, “The Formal Distinction,” in John Duns Scotus, 1265-1965, eds. John K. Ryan and Bernardino M. Bonansea (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1965), 45-60. There has been considerable disagreement, both among medieval and modern interpreters of Scotus, as to the degree of realism Scotus’s formal distinction entails, particularly when applied to God. Specifically, there is disagreement as to whether the later Scotus was willing to allow distinct “entities” or “formalities” in God correlative to the formal distinction. While many have wanted to deny that the later Scotus granted such distinct formalities in God, Stephen Dumont has shown that even the late Scotus is willing to grant such distinct “formalities” in God just so long as they do not entail any absolute distinction in God. Stephen D. Dumont, “Duns Scotus’s Parisian Question on the Formal Distinction,” Vivarium 43, no. 1 (2005): 7-62.
whereby God holds someone as pleasing, so that grace considers God as approving or loving, not as loved.”184 Importantly, these two functions of the single habit of grace-charity are distinct and cognitively separable even if not actually separable:

But there is a doubt about how this habit [i.e., grace-charity] may be the reason for accepting the nature and the act. The reason indeed for accepting the nature seems to be just a sort of comeliness of nature, pleasing to the divine will, such that, whether the habit is posited as active or non-active, from the mere fact that it is such a form, beautifying and adorning the soul, it can be a reason of acceptance and a reason for accepting the nature.

But for the acceptance of an act more is required than that the agent have this spiritual comeliness, otherwise he who has such a habit could not have any act that was indifferent, nor could commit venial sin, which is discordant. – The proof of the consequence is that neither of these things [indifferent acts and venial sin] takes away the comeliness from the actor, and so each of them would be accepted if an act were to be accepted merely from the comeliness of the actor. One must therefore say that the habit, besides the fact that it is a spiritual comeliness, also inclines toward definite acts.185

---

184 Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 27, q. 1, n. 11 (Vatican VIII, pp. 287-88): “Caritas dicitur qua habens eam habet Deum ‘carum’, ita quod ipsa respicit Deum non in ratione diligenti sed in ratione diligibilis; gratia est qua Deus habet aliquem ‘gratum’, ita quod ipsa respicit Deum acceptantem sive diligentem, non autem dilectum.” Later in the same passage, Scotus draws the analogy to science and doctrine which, he argues, are not “distinct…in form” but are “distinct from each other formally.” *Ordinatio* II, d. 27, q. 1, n. 13 (Vatican VIII, pp. 288-89): “Nec tamen ista distinctio rationum vel non-convertibilitas concludit quod ubi concurrunt in eadem anima gratia et caritas, quod sint distincta secundum formam, - sicut licet 'sapientia' sit perfectio simpliciter et 'sapientia talis' sit perfectio limitata, ubi tamen concurrunt non sequitur quod haec ab illa sit distincta forma (vel secundum formam), et tamen sunt distincta ab invicem formaliter: idem enim est quod est in intellectu meo scientia et quod est acquisitum per doctrinam, et tamen in Deo est sapientia et non talis aliquis habitus limitatus.”

The difference between Aquinas and Scotus, then, is clearly not as drastic as some would make it out to be. Scotus grants to grace-charity a beautifying effect that is entirely independent of its inclination of the will to charitative acts.186

While Scotus’s parsimony of description regarding grace, the virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, etc. is often taken to signal an impoverished understanding of the supernatural life, it seems just as easy to make the opposite claim: Scotus does not have an impoverished view of the supernatural life; he has a more exalted view of the supernaturality of charity. Charity takes up much more space, as it were, in the supernatural life of the Christian. Scotus’s charity is sufficient to do what his various forebears thought required a variety of additional discrete supernatural habits. As Scotus says in response to Henry’s threefold distinction at the close of the Lectura commentary on this distinction: “Charity does all of these.”187 For Scotus, it seems, positing additional, discrete supernatural habits does not amount to an enrichment the spiritual life but to a denigration of charity. For Scotus, then, charity is absolutely essentially supernatural, and there are good reasons for thinking that he was even more clear about this than Aquinas was.

One final claim that Scotus makes regarding charity is often taken to entail a significant denigration of it, namely, Scotus’s claim that charity is neither necessary nor sufficient for acception to glory. In the next chapter, we will see that Scotus’s position on the non-necessity and non-sufficiency of grace for glory does not entail in any way a denigration of grace. As we will see in the next section of this chapter, Ockham defends Scotus’s position on the non-

186 Bernard Lonergan is surely right to argue in his “De ente supernaturali” that “The disputed question whether sanctifying grace and the habit of charity are really distinct does not affect the substance of our treatment but only the way in which the matter is presented. It does not affect the substance of the doctrine, for all Catholic schools of thought admit a created communication of the divine nature; but it does influence the manner of presentation, inasmuch as different authors arrange the matter differently in order to expound it in an intelligible way.” Lonergan, Early Latin Theology, trans. Michael G. Shields (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 73.

187 Scotus, Lectura III, d. 34, q. 1, n. 50 (Vatican XXI, p. 309): “[C]aritas facit illa omnia.”
necessity and non-sufficiency of grace for glory, but in doing so he clearly does devalue charity considerably.

**Ockham on the Absolutely Essential Supernaturality of Grace**

If Richard Cross’s claim regarding language of participation and deification in Scotus requires revision, he is certainly correct to note the total absence of such language in Ockham.188 Ockham nowhere uses language of deification, and none of his few uses of participation language have any theological implications.

It might be argued that the lack of such language should come as no surprise given the fact that Ockham clearly rejects the intelligibility of participation on philosophical grounds.189 While this is certainly the case, it does not seem to me that this would require Ockham to reject grace as participation in God. There is at least one case where Ockham rejected a theory as philosophically untenable but held it to be theologically licit and, indeed, necessary: Ockham rejected Scotus’s formal distinction as philosophically untenable and claims that it should only

---

188 Cross, “Participation”: “For Ockham, participation, in short, is not only taken out of the order of nature, as for Bonaventure, but taken out of the life of grace, too, as for Scotus.”

189 Cross, “Participation”: “After Scotus’s profound appropriation of and reflection on this aspect of the Platonic tradition, far more theoretically sophisticated than anything we find in his predecessors, we enter a very different world with William of Ockham. In the light of the apparent metaphysical extravagance of Scotus’s positing a distinction between the divine essence, attributes, and ideas, Ockham takes a view of divine simplicity even more stringent and austere than that of Aquinas. In modern terms, we might think of Scotus’s view as amounting to some kind of anti-reductionism: the divine attributes and ideas are in some sense really non-identical to the divine essence; and we might think of Aquinas’s view of the divine attributes and ideas as reductive: he simply identifies them with the divine essence. By contrast, Ockham’s view on both questions is eliminativist. Anything which ‘is really God’ is just ‘one perfection, inseparable in both reality and reason’. This means that, in contrast to Scotus, the only available divine *relatum* for a participation relation is this simple and utterly undifferentiated divine essence. But Ockham is not prepared to allow even this: like Bonaventure, Ockham does not use the term ‘participation’ to talk about the general similarity-relation between creatures and God, though, as we have seen, he uses it on occasion to talk about the relation between particular and universal. But, unlike Bonaventure, the reason (I suppose) that Ockham finds the term inappropriate in talking about the relation between creatures and God is that he in effect silently dismantles the whole Platonic edifice that had been so carefully completed by Scotus.”
be posited if the faith requires it. He denies that the faith requires us to posit such non-identity in the case of the distinction between the divine essence and the divine attributes:

I say that divine wisdom is the same as the divine essence in all the ways in which the divine essence is the same as the divine essence, and this is also the case for divine goodness and justice; nor is there any extramental (\textit{ex natura rei}) distinction there at all, nor even any non-identity...such a formal distinction or non-identity...ought only to be posited where it evidently (\textit{evidenter}) follows from the things believed (\textit{credita}), handed down in Sacred Scripture or in the determinations of the Church (on account of whose authority all reason ought to be held captive). And thus, since all the things handed down in Sacred Scripture and the determinations of the Church and the assertions of the saints can be saved without positing [a formal distinction or non-identity] between essence and wisdom, so I deny without qualification that such a distinction is possible there, and I deny it everywhere in creatures.\textsuperscript{190}

While Ockham denied that the faith requires non-identity in the case of the distinction between the divine essence and the divine attributes, Ockham recognized that such non-identity is necessary to save Catholic teaching on the Trinity. After summarizing Scotus’s position on the formal non-identity of essence and relation (e.g., paternity) in God, Ockham proceeds to endorse it:

A third opinion [Scotus’s] is that the essence and relation are one real thing [\textit{res}] and nevertheless they are not in every way the same in reality, but in reality have some sort of non-identity. And this non-identity is enough for a real distinction between the divine persons (\textit{supposita}).\textsuperscript{191}

\textsuperscript{190} Ockham, \textit{Ordinatio I}, d. 2, q. 1 (OTh II, pp. 17-18): “Ideo propter istam rationem dico quod sapientia divina omnibus modis est eadem essentiae divinae quibus essentia divina est eadem essentiae divinae, et sic de bonitate divina et iustitia; nec est ibi penitus aliquam distinctio ex natura rei vel etiam non-identitas. Cuius ratio est, quia quamvis talis distinctio vel non-identitas formalis posset poni acue faciliter inter essentiam divinam et sapientiam divinam sicut inter essentiam et relationem, quia tamen est difficillima ad ponendum ubicumque, nec credo eam esse faciliorem ad tenendum quam trinitatem personarum cum unitate essentiae, ideo non debet poni nisi ubi evidenter sequitur ex creditis traditis in Scriptura Sacra vel determinatione Ecclesiae, propter cuius auctoritatem debet omnis ratio captivari. Et ideo cum omnia tradita in Scriptura Sacra et determinatione Ecclesiae et dictis Sanctorum possunt salvari non ponendo eam inter essentiam et sapientiam, ideo simpliciter nego talem distinctionem ibi possibilem, et eam universaliter nego in creaturis, quamvis posset teneri in creaturis sicut in Deo.” Translation, with modification, from Russell L. Friedman, \textit{Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 125.

Therefore, I reply with this [last] position, which seems more probable to me, that there is some sort of non-identity between the divine nature and the divine person [suppositum]. It can be said that in a good sense, they are distinct formally, although they are not really distinct.\footnote{Ockham, \textit{Ordinatio} I, d. 2, q. 11 (OTh II, p. 364): “Ideo respondeo cum ista opinione, quae videtur mihi probabilior, quod est aliquis modus non-identitatis inter naturam divinam et suppositum. Et potest dici, secundum bonum intellectum, quod distinguuntur formaliter, quamvis non realiter.”}

It is thus perfectly conceivable that Ockham might have denied the philosophical tenability of participation and yet maintained grace as participation in God given its considerable patristic and Scriptural warrant.

It might also be argued that Ockham’s nominalism (i.e., his position on universals) is what explains the disappearance of language of participation and deification, but it is not clear to me that this follows either. Both Gregory of Rimini and Nicholas of Cusa were philosophical nominalists and, yet, both were happy to speak of grace in terms of participation in God and deification. Cusa, in fact, has one of the most vigorous accounts of deification in the medieval period.\footnote{See Nancy J. Hudson, \textit{Becoming God: The Doctrine of Theosis in Nicholas of Cusa} (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 2007).} It might be claimed that Rimini and Cusa were simply confused about the philosophical implications of claiming that grace is a participation in God. On this reading, theological participation and philosophical nominalism are incompatible, but even if this were true, it would be no defense of Ockham. As already mentioned, Ockham was willing to grant what he held philosophically untenable where he felt that the Christian faith required him to do so. He clearly did not think that the faith required him to do so in this case.

Adams’s article is a thorough and helpful account of Ockham’s general rejection but Trinitarian deployment of the formal distinction.
Still, pronouncing judgement on Ockham (or anyone, for that matter) based solely on an argument from absence ought to be avoided. Failing to employ language of participation in God and deification does not, of itself, signal an erosion of the concept of the supernatural. Scotus uses such language infrequently, and it would be difficult to imagine that excising these few statements would alter Scotus’s understanding of grace in any fundamental way. To credit someone for the erosion of the supernatural, we need some positive claims, and such are, indeed, present in Ockham. We find them in his various defenses of Scotus against the objections of Auriol on the question of the necessity and sufficiency of grace for acceptation to glory.

Scotus famously argues that created grace—that is, charity—is neither necessary nor sufficient for divine acceptation to glory. Again, his arguments for the position will be considered in the next chapter. Auriol argues, against Scotus, that grace is, indeed, both necessary and sufficient for glory. Critical scholarship on Auriol’s manuscripts is still forthcoming, but Ockham is a fair guide:

One new opinion says that beyond the Holy Spirit is is necessary to posit created charity informing the soul so that the soul is pleasing and dear to God such that, without it, God would not be able to accept a rational soul [to glory]. For the confirmation of this opinion he posits these three propositions and proves them: The first is that there is some created form upon which the divine complacency necessarily falls just as on an object of divine complacency through which the one having it necessarily is dear to God. The second is that this complacency does not fall upon the rational soul immediately out of divine acceptation; rather, this form is the object of divine complacency, and this is the reason that the soul having this object is accepted by God [i.e., this form is the cause, not the effect, of divine acceptation]. The third is that this form is habitual love (amor) which is only able to be infused by God such that through nothing else is it able to be caused in the soul.194

---

194 Ockham, Quaediones variae I (OTh VIII, pp. 3-4): “Una nova opinio dicit quod praeter Spiritum Sanctum necesse est ponere caritatem creatam informantem animam ad hoc quod quod anima sit grata et cara Deo, ita quod sine illa Deus non posset acceptare animam rationalem. Pro confirmatione istius opinionis ponit ipse tres propositiones et ipsas probat. Quarum prima est quod est aliqua forma creatada super quam necessario cadit complacentia divina tamquam super objectum divinae complacentiae per quam habens illam necessario est carus Deo. Secunda est ista quod haec complacentia non cadit super animam rationalem immediate ex divina acceptatione, sed illa forma est objectum divinae complacentiae. Et haec est ratio quare talis anima habens illud objectum acceptatur a Deo. Tertia est quod illa forma est amor habitualis possibilis infundi a solo Deo, ita quod per nihil aliud potest causari in anima.”
Auriol’s arguments are notoriously complex and need not be reviewed here.\(^{195}\) It is sufficient for our purposes to note his disagreement with Scotus, which elicited a variety of responses. Almost all the fourteenth-century schoolmen came to Scotus’s defense, but several of them employed novel arguments that Scotus himself did not. Some of these novel arguments were helpful, and it would be easy to imagine Scotus making the same arguments; others betray a very different evaluation of the relationship between nature and grace that is entirely foreign to what I have presented as the thirteenth-century consensus view.

While Scotus’s position entails the possibility of a Pelagian economy of salvation (i.e., one in which grace is not necessary for glory), Ockham argues that Auriol’s position entails an actual Pelagian economy of salvation. Auriol argues that grace is both necessary and sufficient for acceptation to glory in all possible economies of salvation. As we will see, Ockham makes the striking claim that if this is the case, God would have to accept all intellectual creatures to glory or at least all those rational creatures who elicit an act of love for God by nature alone. As we will see, this striking conclusion depends on a number of premises that are deeply at odds with the general thirteenth-century consensus view.

To make his point, Ockham argues that, “if such a form [sanctifying grace], which is an inhering quality, is necessarily accepted by God, either this is on account of its natural goodness or on account of moral goodness.”\(^{196}\) We will start by considering Ockham’s understanding of


\(^{196}\) Ockham, *Sentences* I, d. 17, q. 1 (OTh III, p. 450): “Praeterea, si talis forma quae est qualitas inhaerens, necessario sit accepta Deo, aut hoc est propter bonitatem suam naturalem, aut propter bonitatem moralem.”
charity’s place in the order of moral goodness and then turn to his understanding of charity’s place in the order of natural goodness.

**Ockham on the moral goodness of charity**

It cannot be that the moral goodness of sanctifying grace is what secures its necessarily compelling divine acceptation, Ockham argues, because, if that were so, God would necessarily have to accept anyone who loved God above all things by natural love alone: “But to love God above all is an act accepted by God, and has more of the character of acceptability by its nature than the habit, not only because it is more meritorious, but also because it is more in the power of the will, and, consequently, since it would be good, it is more laudable.”¹⁹⁷ Ockham goes on to generalize the principle regarding the relationship between natural acts and habits of any kind: “An act elicited out of purely natural endowments is more in the power of the will than any habit whatsoever. Therefore, the gratuitous love and remuneration of God is more merited.”¹⁹⁸

Ockham, of course, does not think that the *per se* goodness of any created thing (i.e., the ‘objective’ goodness of a thing apart from God’s special acceptation) can necessarily require that God reward its possessor with the glory of eternal life. His argument is that if there is some created reality *a* that God necessarily rewards with glory, God will also necessarily reward with glory anything that is better than *a*. In other words, if created reality *a* in the “great chain of being” (for lack of a better phrase) necessitates reward with glory, anything higher up the chain than *a* will likewise necessitate at least the same reward. Auriol, of course, thinks that charity is

---

¹⁹⁷ Ockham, *Sentences* I, d. 17, q. 1 (OTh III, pp. 448-49): “Sed diligere Deum super omnia est actus acceptus Deo, et magis habet rationem acceptabilis ex natura sua quam habitus, tum quia est magis meritorius, tum quia est magis in potestate voluntatis, et per consequens, cum sit bonus, est magis laudabilis.”

necessarily rewarded by God with glory. Ockham thus argues that Auriol’s God also necessarily rewards with glory anything that is better than charity. Ockham then argues that an act of love for God has more moral goodness than a habit of any kind (supernatural or not) and that such an act can be performed without a habit of any kind (supernatural or not). This being the case, Ockham contends that Auriol’s God necessarily rewards an act of love for Him apart from charity. Ockham is arguing that Auriol’s position on the necessary connection between grace and glory is incompatible with Auriol’s negation of an actual Pelagian economy of salvation. Auriol must give up one or the other.

Ockham not only claims that an act of love for God without charity is more per se acceptable with respect to moral goodness than the mere possession of the supernatural habit of charity; he also claims that the habit of charity actually renders acts of love for God less per se laudable. This he argues because habits incline the will in the mode of nature:

Further, nothing is meritorious unless voluntary, and this only because elicited or done freely, because nothing is meritorious except because it is in us, that is, in our power. But nothing is in our power such that we are able to act or not to act unless it is from the will as from a moving principle, and not from a habit. Because, since a habit is a natural cause, nothing is indifferent on account of a habit. Therefore, the character or merit principally consists in the power of the will, from the fact that it elicits freely.199

Nature, Ockham argues, inclines only to one, while will is inclined to opposites. Insofar as merit depends on the possibility for opposites, and habits incline toward one opposite rather than the other, habits (supernatural or not) diminish the per se acceptability of an act. A drunkard’s

199 Ockham, Sentences I, d. 17, q. 2 (OTh III, p. 470): “Praeterea, nihil est meritorium nisi quia voluntarium, et hoc nisi quia liberum elicitum vel factum, quia nihil est meritorium nisi quod est in nobis, hoc est in nostra potestate. Sed nihil est in nostra potestate ut possimus agere et non agere nisi quia est a voluntate tamquam a principio movente, et non ab habitu. Quia cum habitus sit causa naturalis, nihil est indifferentem propter habitum. Igitur ratio meriti principaliter consistit penes voluntatem, ex hoc quod ipsa liberum elicit.”
rejection of a free beer is more *per se* meritorious, on this account, than the rejection of the same beer by a lifelong teetotaler.

Ockham goes further still: If acquirable charity renders acts of love for God above all less *per se* acceptable than they would have been otherwise, non-acquirable charity renders those same acts even less *per se* acceptable. This he holds, again, because *per se* meritoriousness is a function of the degree to which something lies in the power of the will:

No habit renders someone detestable unless it is caused by a detestable and odious act. Therefore, similarly, no habit renders someone acceptable out of the nature of the habit unless it is caused by an acceptable act. This is confirmed, because nothing is acceptable of its nature unless it is in the power of the one having it. Therefore, since such a supernatural form is not in the power of the one having it, it will not be acceptable of its nature.\(^{200}\)

Ockham, then, is willing to grant some degree of *per se* acceptability to acquired habits on account of the acts that generate them, but he is not willing to grant any such *per se* acceptability to supernatural habits. Since non-acquirable charity is, by definition, outside of the power of the will, Ockham holds that it renders acts of love for God even less *per se* meritorious than acquired charity does.

Here Ockham differs considerably from his great scholastic forebears. Grace featured heavily in thirteenth-century accounts of merit, and Scotus is no exception. Scotus disagrees with some of his forebears on whether grace is necessary or sufficient for acceptation to glory, but that is because he more highly esteems divine power, not because he less highly esteems grace. As I will argue in the next chapter, Scotus thinks that an act of love for God above all in charity

\(^{200}\) Ockham, *Sentences* I, d. 17, q. 1 (OTh III, p. 462): “Praeterea, nullus habitus reddit aliquem detestabilem nisi quia causatur ab actu detestabili et odibili. Igitur similiter nullus habitus reddet aliquem ex natura habitus acceptabilem nisi quia causatur ab actu acceptabili. Confirmatur, quia nihil est acceptabile ex natura sua nisi sit in potestate habentis. Igitur cum talis forma supernaturalis non sit in potestate habentis, non erit ex natura sua acceptabilis.”
is the most *per se* acceptable thing there could be; Scotus just denies that the *per se* acceptability of anything can necessarily secure divine acceptation to glory. On Scotus’s account, the great chain of being has no bearing on acceptation to eternal life. God is free to deny glory to the highest thing on the chain (i.e., charity), and He is free to bestow it on something lower down the chain (e.g., acquired friendship with God or a natural act of love for God without any habit whatsoever). Auriol disagrees with Scotus regarding the connection between the most *per se* acceptable thing and divine acceptation (for Auriol the highest thing on the chain of being does, indeed, require God’s reward in glory), but despite this disagreement, Scotus and Auriol do not have radically different chains of being. On the contrary, though Ockham agrees with Scotus against Auriol that nothing in the chain of being can necessitate divine acceptation to glory, his additional arguments against Auriol betray a radically different chain of being from the one that Scotus and Auriol share in common. At least when the chain is ordered by moral goodness, Ockham not only denies that the supernatural habit of charity is at the top of the chain, he argues that it is, at best, third from the top. For Ockham, supernatural charity is bested both by an act of love for God in acquired charity and by an act of love for God without any habit whatsoever.

*Ockham on the natural goodness of charity*

Above, Ockham identifies two distinct ways in which charity might necessarily secure divine acceptation: (1) natural goodness and (2) moral goodness. Having addressed his argument that the moral goodness of charity is not sufficient for divine acceptation, we turn to his argument that the natural goodness of charity is likewise insufficient: “If [charity is necessarily accepted] on account of natural goodness and perfection, then the rational creature, which of itself, ignoring any such form, is better and more perfect with respect to natural perfection [than
any such form] would be much more accepted by God, which you [Auriol] deny.”201 Ockham is here arguing that if it were the case that the natural goodness of charity is sufficient for the acception of its possessor to glory, it would likewise be the case that the natural goodness of rationality would be sufficient for the acception of its possessor to glory. Ockham argues that this must be the case because possessing a rational nature without any other perfecting forms gives its possessor more natural goodness than any possible perfecting form (supernatural or not) could give to it. This is not to say that supernatural forms do not add natural goodness and perfection to their possessors; it is just to say that the natural goodness that they bestow on their possessors is not greater than the natural goodness that rational natures bestow on their possessors.

While the schoolmen of the thirteenth century were happy to exempt sanctifying grace from the general rule that accidents are of lesser goodness than the substances in which they inhere, it is clearly the case that, with Ockham, this exemption expires. Aquinas was willing to say that, while substances are nobler with respect to mode of being, sanctifying grace is nevertheless nobler than the soul in which it inhere. Scotus was willing to say that, while substances are better with respect to natural being, grace is better with respect to supernatural being. For Ockham, moral goodness and natural goodness exhaust the possible modes of ordering goodness, and on both counts, charity falls short of the top of the chain. Sanctifying grace, like all other accidental qualities, is of lesser goodness than the rational substance in which it inhere. Again, Ockham is not arguing that any degree of natural goodness could be sufficient to require recompense in glory. His argument is that, if Auriol is correct that

201 Ockham, *Sentences* I, d. 17, q. 1 (OTh III, p. 450): “Si propter bonitatem et perfectionem naturalem, ergo creatura rationalis quae ex se, omni tali forma circumscripta, est melior et perfectior perfectione naturali, multo magis erit accepta Deo, quod negas.”
sanctifying grace has sufficient natural goodness to necessitate God’s acceptation to glory, it will also be the case that God necessarily accepts all intellectual creatures to glory, because there is more natural goodness in an intellectual nature than there is in the sanctifying grace infused into it.

Notice that Ockham’s argument does not work against Auriol unless it is true that rational nature is higher up the chain of being than charity. Auriol clearly does not grant the premise that rational nature is a better thing than charity, so Ockham is not merely using one of Auriol’s commitments against him. Ockham himself, then, clearly holds that charity falls short of the top of the chain of being, and this is not the only place that Ockham makes this remarkable claim. In the first of his *Quaestiones variae*, Ockham again considers Auriol’s position and makes precisely the same argument as clearly as one could imagine: “Similarly, [Auriol] posits that general complacency falls on something created, but special on some noble subject. Then I respond in this way: angelic nature or the rational soul is an object more noble than charity.”

This, it seems to me, is a clear break from the thirteenth-century consensus view concerning sanctifying grace. On Ockham’s account, sanctifying grace is certainly not a greater good than the sum total of all natural goodness. On his account, sanctifying grace cannot even make us twice as good as we are simply by virtue of possessing a rational nature. The justification of the sinner is no longer a greater work than the whole work of creation; the justification of the sinner is not even a greater work than the creation of a single rational creature in a purely natural state or even in a sinful state.

---


104
What we have here, in Ockham’s defense of Scotus against Auriol, are positive words which suggest that a radical reordering of the chain of being (or at least a radical narrowing of the modes of ordering it) has transpired in Ockham’s theology of grace. What we find in him is an account of grace drastically different from what we find in Aquinas or any of the thirteenth-century schoolmen, including Scotus. The difference between Scotus and Ockham on this score far outweighs their similarities on a multitude of other issues in the theology of grace, for example, the identity of charity and grace and the non-necessity and non-sufficiency of grace for glory.

For Scotus, God is free to choose a less than maximally-fitting condition for salvation. God could have chosen a condition for acceptation other than grace or not have granted glory to those in grace, but grace remains the most fitting possible condition for glory (a claim to which we will return in the next chapter); for Ockham, on the contrary, God is free to choose a less than maximally-fitting condition for salvation and, indeed, has. His position seems to entail not only that a Pelagian economy of salvation was possible for God (a claim that Scotus defends) but also that a Pelagian economy of salvation would have been a more fitting choice since acts of love for God by nature are more *per se* laudable than the same acts in charity. Not only would a Pelagian economy of salvation have been more fitting than the actual one; so too would universalism, since the recipient of charity gains by it no more goodness than she already possesses by her mere rationality. While Scotus has sometimes been blamed for the erosion of the concept of the supernatural, it seems to me that there are more grounds for laying this charge at the feet of his great Franciscan confrère.
Reactions to Ockham

It is difficult to trace the reception of Ockham’s novelty because a number of other questions came to dominate the fourteenth-century commentary tradition on distinction seventeen of the first book of the Sentences. The debate regarding how best to understand the increase and diminishment of forms—or the ‘latitude’ of forms—takes an increasingly large portion of their attention. In the mid- and late-fourteenth century, the pressing question when considering grace is no longer its relationship to glory but what is happening metaphysically when a form intensifies, for example, when a pot becomes more and more hot.\textsuperscript{203} The debate was not new, of course, to the fourteenth century. The thirteenth-century schoolmen also devoted attention to the problem of the latitude of forms when reflecting on the increase and diminishment of charity, but it was never the dominant question in distinction seventeen. Even where it was treated, theological considerations tended to dominate, and the thirteenth-century schoolmen were willing to grant exceptions to supernatural forms that might not apply to natural forms. In the fourteenth century, theological considerations fade into the background, and exceptions intervene less and less. The question of the latitude of forms takes up more and more space, and for at least one fourteenth-century schoolman, distinction seventeen ceases almost entirely to be a theological question. For William Crathorn, question seventeen simply reads “Whether a quality is able to be augmented,” and Crathorn speaks more of whiteness and heat than he does of charity; indeed, he mentions neither charity nor the Holy Spirit in the whole of his treatment of the question.\textsuperscript{204}

\textsuperscript{203} For helpful treatments of these issues, see Rega Wood, “Calculating Grace: The Debate about the Latitude of Forms according to Adam de Wodeham,” in Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy: Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy, eds. Monika Asztalos, John E. Murdoch, and Ilkka Niiniluoto (Helsinki: Acta Philosophica Fennica, 1990), 1:373-91.

\textsuperscript{204} William Crathorn, Quästionen zum ersten Sentenzenbuch, ed. Fritz Hoffmann (Münster: Aschendorff, 1988).
A second question that comes to dominate the fourteenth-century commentary tradition on distinction seventeen is that regarding predestination. In addition to his attack on Scotus’s account of the non-necessity and non-sufficiency of grace for glory, Auriol also introduced an account of predestination that, together with Ockham’s account of predestination, would draw a strong reaction from all of the mendicant orders, both on the continent and across the channel. The “Pelagian” controversy and Auriol’s place in it have already been well charted. As did the philosophical debate over the latitude of forms, the theological debate over predestination tended to crowd out reflection on the relationship between grace and glory, and Ockham’s innovative position unfortunately did not garner the attention it well deserved.

That said, it did not go entirely unnoticed. At least one of the Oxford schoolmen, Adam Wodeham, fully endorsed Ockham’s position, and at least one, Walter Chatton, heartily rejected it. Adam Wodeham affirms, following Ockham, that “an act of loving God above all caused freely by the will has more of the character (ratio) of acceptability out of its nature than any habit of the wayfarer whatsoever.” Again, Wodeham is not arguing that God has to accept natural acts of love. What he is arguing is that Auriol’s position would entail that God would have to do so since, on Wodeham’s account, natural love acts have more per se acceptability than the habit of charity does, and Auriol contends that the per se acceptability of charity compels God to accept its possessor to glory.

---

205 Again, see Halverson, Predestination, for the strong reaction to both Auriol and Ockham in the later medieval period.

206 Interestingly, it is highly likely that Ockham, Wodeham, and Chatton at one point all lived together in the same Franciscan convent at the time Chatton was working on his Lectura. See William J. Courtenay, “Ockham, Chatton, and the London Studium: Observations on Recent Changes in Ockham’s Biography,” in Die Gegenwart Ockhams, eds. Wilhelm Vossenkuhl and Rolf Schönberger (Weinheim: Weinheim, 1990), 327-37.

207 Adam of Wodeham, Lectura I, d. 17, q. 1, §3 (Gal-Wood III, p. 208): “Item, actus diligendi Deum super omnia libere causatus a voluntate magis habet rationem acceptabilis ex natura sua quam quicumque habitus viatoris.”
Walter Chatton, like Ockham and Wodeham, defends Scotus against Auriol’s objections with respect to the non-necessity and non-sufficiency of grace for acceptation to glory, but Chatton recognizes that at least one of the innovative arguments of Ockham and his followers represents a considerable break with the scholastic tradition before him. Chatton reproduces Ockham’s argument as follows:

Eighth: If this habit [infused charity] is a form accepted in this way [i.e., necessarily], then the rational creature in itself without any such form would be accepted to glory, because in itself it is more perfect in nature; nor on account of the second [i.e., moral goodness is infused charity necessarily accepted] because there is no moral goodness unless the form is in the power of the one acting, but this form is not in the power of a human being.\(^{208}\)

Chatton thus recognizes Ockham’s denial that infused charity bestows more natural goodness on its possessor than rational nature and his denial that infused charity bestows more moral goodness on its possessor than an act of love with acquired charity or not habit at all. Chatton responds that Ockham has erred with respect to both claims:

It ought to be said that infused charity is that by which the one having it is worthy to be accepted to glory, and this belongs to it out of its supernatural rectitude and goodness, with respect to which God has promised that He gives eternal life to the one having it finally. If, therefore, by moral goodness you wish to understand only the goodness of the second act which is caused by us, or even the good habit caused by us, then the division [between natural and moral goodness] is insufficient unless they wish to extend moral goodness to the goodness of the supernatural habit which is not caused immediately by us (just as in the proposition). For such goodness it is not required that it be caused immediately by us; rather, for this habit to be imputable to us, it suffices that the preparation and disposition or previous good motion, to which it is regularly conferred, is in the power of the human being.\(^{209}\)

---

\(^{208}\) Walter Chatton, *Lectura I*, d. 17, q. 1, n. 19 (Wey-Etzkorn, pp. 291-92): “Octavo. Ille habitus, si sit forma sic acceptum, tunc rationalis creatura secundum se sine omni tali forma esset accepta ad gloriam, quia est secundum se perfectior in natura; nec propter secundum, quia numquam est bonitas moralis nisi quia forma est in potestate facientis, sed ista forma non est in potestate hominis."

\(^{209}\) Walter Chatton, *Lectura I*, d. 17, q. 1, n. 62 (Wey-Etzkorn, pp. 302-303): “Ad octavum, dicendum quod caritas infusa est, quam habens est dignus acceptari ad gloriam, et hoc convenit sibi ex sua rectitudine et bonitate supernaturali, de qua promisit Deus quod habenti eam finaliter daret vitam aeternam. Si ergo per bonitatem moralem velis intelligere solum bonitatem actus secundi qui causatur a nobis, vel etiam bonitatem habitus causati a nobis, tunc divisio est insufficiens. Sed si bonitatem moralem velint extendere ad bonitatem habitus supernaturalis qui non causatur immediate a nobis, sic est in proposito, sed ad talem bonitatem non requiritur quod causetur immediate a nobis."
Chatton clearly wants to deny Ockham’s claim that God’s decision that sanctifying grace be the condition for acceptation to glory is in any sense a display of God’s freedom to select a less-than-maximally-fitting economy of salvation. Chatton would certainly agree with Scotus that God is free to choose a less-than-maximally-fitting economy of salvation, but he would disagree with Ockham’s seeming position that God has in fact done so in the actual economy of salvation. The argument to which Chatton is responding is not that it is unfitting for God to promise glory to those having charity but that it would have been more fitting for God to bestow glory on all intellectual natures. The response thus seems to entail that Chatton rejects Ockham’s account of charity’s place in the chain of being as ordered by either natural or moral goodness. Ockham located it below intellectual natures and a purely natural act of love for God; Chatton insists—like his great thirteenth-century forebears—that its supernaturality places it at the top of both chains.

John Lutterell, too, seems to have grasped the radical departure of Ockham’s position. Lutterell was appointed to the commission that was to review Ockham’s works for possible heresy. Several of the articles that he submitted for review would have applied to both Scotus and Ockham, but at least one article applies to Ockham’s theology of grace but not Scotus’s:

---

nobis. Ad hoc tamen quod ille habitus sit nobis imputabilis, sufficit quod praeparatio et dispositio seu bonus motus praevious, ad quem regulariter confertur, sit in potestate hominis. Et ita est in proposito, vel in ministrantibus baptismum parvulo, vel in ipsomet in aetate virili, sicut dictum est.”

---

210 For example, (14) “That God is able to accept an act as condignly meritorious of eternal life which is elicited by purely natural endowments just as much as if it were elicited by means of charity” (Quod Deus potest acceptare actum tanquam ex condigno meritorium vitae eternae, qui est ex puris naturalibus elicitus, sicud <si> eliceretur ex caritate), (19) “That God is able not to accept an act elicited by means of charity” (Quod Deus potest non acceptare actum elicitum a caritate), (32) “That between grace and sin (culpa) there is no repugnance from the nature of the forms, so that they are able to be simultaneously in the same subject” (Quod inter gratiam et culpa nulla est repugnantia ex natura formarum, quin possent esse simul in eodem subiecto), (35) “That an act elicited by means of a supernatural form is not meritorious of eternal life, but only because God contingently accepts it” (Quod actu elicitus ex forma supernaturali non est meritorius vitae eternae, sed solum quia Deus contingenter eum acceptat). John Lutterell, Libellus (Fritz, pp. 3-5).
“That charity is not laudable of itself; hence it is not the cause by which an act is laudable and meritorious.” In his explanation as to why this article is problematic, Lutterell tells us that it is dangerous to deny the laudability of the very thing by which a human being as much in via as in patria is conjoined to God and concerning which the Apostle says that among the theological virtues...“the greater of these is charity.” Who would doubt that it is badly said that the very thing which the apostle of the Lord praises is not laudable? Nor does he have any other motive than that charity is a habit inclining through the mode of nature; therefore, an act is neither praised nor blamed on account of charity since we are neither praised nor blamed on account of nature.211

Lutterell’s inclusion of the article shows that Chatton was not the only one who recognized the significant departure of Ockham from the traditional position. That it did not garner more attention in the commentary tradition represents, at least, a considerable change of tide in the fourteenth-century theology of grace. Attention had turned from the basic relationship between nature and grace to the philosophical question regarding the latitude of forms and the theological question of the relationship between predestination and free choice.

Conclusion

On the basic understanding of the relationship between nature and grace, then, Scotus is in full agreement with Aquinas. Grace is a deifying participation in God that elevates nature to another category of being. Grace is not simply accidentally supernatural, nor is it merely relatively essentially supernatural; grace is absolutely essentially supernatural, granting to the creature a participation in what can only be proper to the uncreated divine nature. But Scotus is not simply an adherent to the thirteenth-century consensus view of grace; he also makes

211 John Lutterell, Libellus, art. 17 (Fritz, p. 51): “Quod caritas <non est> de se laudabilis; <unde non est causa quod actus sit laudabilis et meritorious>. Hoc est periculosum dicere quod idem, quo homo tam in via quam in patria Deo coniungitur, non sit laudabile, de quo Apostolus inter virtutes theologicas, que sunt maxime, dicit enumeratis fide, spe et caritate quod ‘maior horum est caritas’ (1 Kor 13,13). Quod id quod apostolus Domini laudavit, dicere id non esse laudabile, est pessime dictum, quis dubitat? Nec quod habeat alius motivum nisi quod, quia caritas est habitus inclinans per modum nature, pro natura nec laudamur nec vituperamur? Igitur pro caritate nec laudatur actus nec vituperatur.”
considerable contributions to it. This chapter has identified some of these contributions, for example, that no created reality can be the formal opposite of a supernatural virtue and that none of our actions can naturally increase, diminish, or corrupt supernatural virtues. The following three chapters will argue that Scotus’s more significant contribution to the thirteenth-century consensus view concerns not the relationship between grace and nature but the relationship between grace and the Trinitarian missions.

A number of Scotus’s innovations in the theology of grace, I argue, are best understood as an attempt rightly to understand the relationship between the divine volitions regarding our salvation on the one hand and the Trinitarian missions on the other. By denying a number of necessity claims that were an important part of the patristic and earlier medieval heritage, Scotus was able to see that the Trinitarian missions are not ordered to our salvation; on the contrary, our salvation is ordered to the Trinitarian missions. In the next chapter, we will consider Scotus’s understanding of the relationship between grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit; in the following two, we will consider Scotus’s understanding of the relationship between Christ’s grace and ours.
CHAPTER 3
SPIRIT OF GRACE
The Infusion of Grace and the Indwelling of the Holy Spirit

spes autem non confundit quia caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris
per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis
Romans 5:5

One of the standard questions in scholastic theology is whether and in what sense grace is necessary. Anyone familiar with modern Catholic theology will know that the question did not die in the Middle Ages. The necessity of grace is a perennial question in Christian theology, and it was intensely debated by the schoolmen. Scotus’s great scholastic forebears offered a number of arguments for the necessity of grace: (1) Some argued that the infusion of grace is necessary for the remission of sins. (2) Some argued that grace is necessary for us to perform certain kinds of acts that are either (a) above our nature or at least (b) above our nature under the conditions of sin. (3) Some argued that grace is necessary for meriting eternal life. Finally, (4) some argued that grace is necessary for the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. As we will see in this chapter, Scotus was perhaps the first to deny that grace is necessary in any of the first three ways. There is no necessary connection, Scotus argues, between the infusion of grace and our salvation; God could have saved us without the infusion of grace. The commentary tradition after

---

212 Henri de Lubac’s position regarding the natural desire for the supernatural, for instance, has become one of the most important modern issues in the Catholic theology of grace. For a helpful introduction, see Surnatural: A Controversy at the Heart of Twentieth-Century Thomistic Thought, ed. Serge-Thomas Bonino, trans. Robert William and Matthew Levering (Ave Maria, FL: Sapientia Press, 2009).
Scotus would overwhelmingly agree with him in denying the first three necessity claims, but it also went beyond him to deny the fourth necessity claim. Scotus retains the standard thirteenth-century view that the infusion of grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit are mutually necessary and sufficient conditions for one another. The fourteenth-century consensus position was that the infusion of grace was not necessary even for divine indwelling. In fact, the fourteenth-century schoolmen struggled to give an account of the necessity of grace altogether. For most of them, grace was not necessary for anything at all.

By denying any necessity for the infusion of grace whatsoever, those after Scotus make grace seem superfluous, arbitrary, or even puzzling in the economy of salvation, as we will see in the final section of this chapter. In stark contrast, by denying that grace is necessary for our salvation but maintaining that it is necessary for the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, Scotus is rightly able to see the place of grace in the order of divine intentions. What he allows us to see is that the requirement of grace in the present economy of salvation is ultimately explained not by a divine volition with respect to us (e.g., that we be saved) but by a divine volition with respect to the mission of the Holy Spirit. Once it is established that God could have saved us in numerous ways without the infusion of grace, it follows that it is not the economy of salvation that explains the indwelling of the Holy Spirit but precisely the other way around: the indwelling of the Holy Spirit explains the economy of salvation. For Scotus, the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit is not an accessory to our relationship with the Father and the Son. On the contrary, it is we who are an accessory to the Spirit’s relationship with them. We exist, and we are saved because the Father and the Son freely will to breathe the Spirit forth not only in their eternal immanent life but also in their temporal economic activity.
In the first part of this chapter, we will consider Scotus’s denial that grace is necessary for our salvation. In the second, we will establish that Scotus maintains the thirteenth-century consensus view that the infusion of grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit are mutually necessary and sufficient for one another not only in the actual economy of salvation but in all possible economies of salvation. In the third, we will examine the Scotistic inversion that his unique position makes possible, namely, that once we deny the absolute necessity of the infusion of grace for our salvation, we are rightly able to see that the infusion of grace is primordial in the order of divine intentions. In the final section, we will show that Scotus’s novel position is largely absent in the commentary tradition after him, when it became standard to deny the necessity of the infusion of grace altogether.

**Scotus on the Non-necessity of Grace**

It is important to point out that Scotus’s novelty on some of these matters is sometimes explained by the fact that he is asking different questions than his forebears were. More accurately, he is often asking additional questions to the ones that concerned them. While his forebears were concerned primarily with the necessity of grace in the actual economy of salvation, Scotus considers most of these questions long settled. What interests Scotus is not what is necessary in the actual economy of salvation but whether that necessity is absolute or contingent. Scotus is interested, we might say, in possible alternative economies of salvation, but his interest in these possibilities is not driven by mere speculative curiosity. Instead, Scotus is interested in the light these possibilities might shed on the contours of the actual economy of salvation revealed in Scripture.

If, for instance, the infusion of grace is logically necessary for \( x \) (i.e., there are no possible economies of salvation in which \( x \) obtains but not the infusion of grace), then we can
say fairly strongly that God wills the infusion of grace for the sake of \( x \). If, on the other hand, grace is only contingently necessary for \( x \) (i.e., there are possible economies of salvation in which \( x \) obtains but not the infusion of grace), then we need to ask at least two further questions: (1) why did God will the infusion of grace, and (2) why did God contingently will to connect the infusion of grace and \( x \) in the actual economy of salvation. Thus understood, Scotus’s soteriological voluntarism has potential to shed considerable light on the actual economy of salvation. Far from resulting in skepticism regarding the actual economy of salvation that God has revealed in Scripture, Scotus’s soteriological voluntarism has the potential to illumine it all the more. It is often argued that Scotus’s use of the distinction between God’s absolute and ordained power is motivated by a desire to preserve the absolute freedom of God or the absolute gratuity of grace. This is certainly the case, but what I hope to show here is that, more profoundly than this, Scotus uses the distinction as an instrument for rightly understanding the order of volitions in God so as better to discern the purposes of God.

**Grace is necessary for the remission of sins**

We begin with the claim that the infusion of grace is necessary for the remission of sins. Aquinas clearly holds this view:

Now an offense is remitted to anyone, only when the soul of the offended is at peace with the offender. Hence sin is remitted to us when God is at peace with us, and this peace consists in the love whereby God loves us. Now God’s love, considered on the part of the Divine act, is eternal and unchangeable; whereas, as regards the effect it imprints on us, it is sometimes interrupted, inasmuch as we sometimes fall short of it and once more require it. Now the effect of the Divine love in us, which is taken away by sin, is grace, whereby a man is made worthy of eternal life, from which sin shuts him out. Hence we could not conceive the remission of guilt, without the infusion of grace.\(^{213}\)

---

\(^{213}\) Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 113, a. 2, resp. (Marietti I, p. 556): “Offensa autem non remittitur alicui nisi per hoc quod animus offensi pacatur offendenti. Et ideo secundum hoc peccatum nobis remittit dicitur, quod Deus nobis pacatur. Quae quidem pax consistit in dilectione qua Deus nos diligat. Dilectio autem Dei, quantum est ex parte actus divini, est aeterna et immutabilis; sed quantum ad effectum quem nobis imprimit, quandoque interrumpitur, prout scilicet ab ipso quandoque deficimus et quandoque iterum recuperamus. Effectus autem divinae
The argument seems to be that remission of sins depends on God’s being at peace with us. This love of God toward us, which is a necessary condition of remission of sins, has a necessary effect in us, namely, the infusion of grace. It thus cannot be the case that sins are remitted without the infusion of grace; the infusion of grace is the necessary effect of a necessary condition for the remission of sins.

Bonaventure, too, affirms the necessity of the infusion of grace for the remission of sin, but he argues that the connection between them is secured by a divine volition:

Because in every work of the Lord there is mercy and truth, this ought to be maximally the case in this noble work, namely, in the work of justification. Because, therefore, man sinned and merited nothing in the sight of God before the infusion of grace, God, as a just judge, does not remove all the effects of sin (culpa), rather, penalty remains; and therefore He does not immediately restore man to his prior state. And because He is merciful, [God] also restores the good to a greater extent, because [man] needs it to a greater extent; therefore, He not only restores innocence, but also gives grace. Therefore, although God was able to remove culpa without a medium, He nevertheless decreed to remove [it] through grace, which not only makes one innocent, but also habilitates debilitated nature to good.214

God could have simply restored the human race without the medium of grace, but God has freely willed that the work of justification show forth both His mercy and His justice.215 In God’s wisdom, justification manifests divine justice insofar as not all the effects of sin are immediately erased; it manifests divine mercy insofar as more is restored to the human race than was lost.

dilectionis in nobis qui per peccatum tollitur, est gratia, qua homo fit dignus vita aeterna, a qua peccatum mortale excludit. Et ideo non posset intelligi remissio culpae, nisi adesset infusion gratiae.”

214 Bonaventure, Sentences IV, d. 17, pt. 1, a. 1, q. 1, resp. (Quaracchi IV, p. 419): “RESPONDEO: Dicendum: quia in omni opere Domini est misericordia et veritas, hoc maxime in nobili opere oportet esse, scilicet in opere justificationis. Quoniam igitur homo peccavit et nihil ante gratiae infusionem apud Deum meruit, Deus iusto iudicio non omnino effectum culpae tollit, immo poenam relinquit; et ideo in priorem statum hominem non statim, restituit. Et quoniam misericors est, ideo etiam amplius bonum reddit, quia magis indiget; ideo non tantum restituit innocentiam, sed etiam dat gratiam. Ideo, quamvis delere posset Deus sine medio culpam, decrevit tamen delere per gratiam, quae non tantum faceret innocentem, immo etiam naturam debilitatam habilitaret ad bonum.”

215 Bonaventure seems to treat ‘truth’ and ‘justice’ as convertible in this context.
Despite his position in the respondeo, Bonaventure repeatedly argues in the replies to the objections that sin and grace are formally opposed: “When it is objected that God alone removes culpa, it should be said that this is true effectively, but grace removes it formally; God, moreover, is not the perfective form of anything.” God alone removes fault as efficient cause, but there must be some formal cause of its removal. Because God cannot be the formal cause of a creature, we must posit grace as the created form in which the removal of culpa consists. As we saw in the previous chapter, if two things are formally opposed it is logically impossible that the two exist together in the same subject precisely because one is logically the opposite of the other. A room cannot be both entirely bright and entirely dark, for instance, because darkness is logically the opposite or lack of light. Bonaventure offers no comment on how we might reconcile his apparently contradictory position that grace is both unnecessary and formally necessary for the removal of culpa. While he affirms that God could have remitted sin by divine power alone, he still seems to think of sin and grace as formally opposed.

The Franciscans between Bonaventure and Scotus also seem to think of grace and sin as formally opposed. Richard of Middleton, for instance, argues that “Grace is the secondary formal cause of justification, not the efficient cause; therefore, just as God is not able to make something white without whiteness, so neither is He able to make someone just without grace.” It might be objected that Richard here speaks only of justification and not of the remission of sins, but he later says precisely the same thing about grace and sin: “A privation is not able to remain after

---

216 Bonaventure, Sentences IV, d. 17, pt. 1, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1 (Quaracchi IV, p. 419): “Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod Deus solus delet; dicendum, quod verum est effective, sed formaliter delet ipsa gratia; Deus autem nullius est forma perfectiva.”

217 Richard of Middleton, Sentences IV, d. 17, a. 4, q. 2, ad 1 (Brixiae IV, p. 261): “Ad primum in oppositum dicendum, quod illa propositio intelligenda est de secunda causa efficien, gratia autem est iustificationis causa secunda formalis non efficiens, et ideo sicut Deus non potest facere aliquid esse album sine albedine, sic nec iustum sine gratia.”
the infusion of the opposite form, just as it is clear that darkness does not remain after the
infusion of light to the sin. Therefore, the remission of \textit{culpa} transpires in the same instant as the
infusion of grace.”

Matthew of Aquasparta, too, argues that there can be no forgiveness for
sins without the infusion of grace:

If the objection is raised that God “is able not to impute without grace,” I say that He is
not able to do so. The reason for this is both on the part of the sinner and on the part of
the forgiver. On the part of the sinner, because as long as the will is sinning, it is
impossible for it not to be imputed to it. Therefore, for sin not to be imputed to it, it is
necessary that the will of the sinner be changed to detest sin and love justice, which is not
able to happen without grace. On the part of the forgiver, the reason is that God cannot
first impute sin and then not impute it on account of a new affect; therefore on account of
a new effect and gift, by which the rational creature is made dear to God.

As I argued in the previous chapter, the thirteenth-century schoolmen are often credited
with the discovery of the concept of the supernatural, but at least on this question, the great lights
of the thirteenth century continue to think of grace as the opposite of sin. If grace is the formal
opposite of sin, so the argument goes, it clearly follows that the removal of sin without the
infusion of grace is not only impossible but simply unintelligible. Sin is the privation of grace, so
it is impossible, by definition, to remove sin without infusing grace just as it is impossible (and
unintelligible) to remove darkness without shining light.

Scotus disagrees for reasons that follow straightforwardly from his position, presented in
the previous chapter, that no possible natural habit can be formally opposed to any possible

\footnotesize

\textsuperscript{218} Richard of Middleton, \textit{Sentences} IV, d. 17, a. 4, q. 6, resp. (Brixiae IV, p. 265): “Privatio autem remanere non
potest post formae oppositae infusionem, sicut patet, quod tenebra non remanet post infusionem peccati luminis:
dergo in eodem instanti est remissio culpae, in quo est gratiae infusio.”

\textsuperscript{219} Matthew of Aquasparta, \textit{Quaestiones disputatae de gratia} 6, ad 4 (Doucet, p. 161): “Quod obicit: ‘potest non
imputare sine gratia’, dico quod non potest. Cuius ratio est ex parte peccantis et ex parte remittentis: ex parte
peccantis, quoniam, quandiu est in voluntate peccandi, non potest sibi non imputari. Ergo ad hoc quod sibi
peccatum non imputetur, necesse est voluntatem peccantis mutari ad detestationem peccati et amorem iustitiae, quod
esse non potest sine gratia. - Ex parte remissentis etiam ratio est, quoniam quod Deus primo peccatum imputet,
postea non imputet, hoc non est nisi quia primo erat iratus, postea fit pacatus, quia primo non diligebat, postea
diliget; sed hoc, ut visum est, in Deo non est propter aliquem novum affectum: ergo propter novum effectum et
donum, quo creatura rationalis efficitur Deo grata.”
supernatural habit. Only a natural habit could be the formal opposite of another natural habit, and because there are no supernatural vices, it is impossible for any created reality to be the formal opposite of grace. If sin and grace are not formally opposed, it follows straightforwardly that sin can be remitted without the infusion of grace.

Scotus argues that the non-formal opposition of grace and sin is straightforwardly entailed by something that everyone grants in the actual economy of salvation. Everyone admits, Scotus points out, that at least some persons have received the infusion of grace without the remission of sins, namely, the good angels. If the good angels received the infusion of grace but not the remission of sins, the two cannot be formally opposed:

The same thing is not separated from itself....but the remission of sin and the infusion of grace are able to be separated....For it was possible in the human race’s state of innocence that grace be infused without the remission of any sin, because no sin was there (and so it happened in the angels who did not sin). Similarly, sin is able to be remitted without the infusion of grace. The proof of this is that God is able, by absolute power, to create a human being in a purely natural state, without sin and without grace; therefore also after the fall, He is able to repair the human race and, thus, remit sin without the infusion of grace.220

That fact that the good angels (to say nothing of the Incarnate Son) received the infusion of grace without the remission of sins means that the two cannot be the same thing. When Scotus argues that the remission of sin and the infusion of grace are not ‘the same thing,’ I take it he means that grace and sin are not formally opposed. The shining of light and the scattering of darkness, for instance, are the same thing since light and darkness are formally opposed. One cannot shine

---

220 Scotus, *Ordinatio* IV-A, d. 16, q. 2, n. 41 (Vatican XIII, p. 142): “Item, secundo sic: idem non separatur ab eodem, accipiendo uniformiter identitatem et separationem (puta si realiter, realiter, - si ratione, ratione), quia hoc includit oppositum primi principii, scilicet quod idem 'ut est idem' sit simul et non sit; sed remissio culpae et infused gratiae possunt separari, - quod patet tam comparando primum ad secundum, quam e converso. Posset enim in statu innocentiae in genere humano (et ita factum est in angelis qui non peccaverunt) gratia infundi sine remissione alicuius culpae, quia nulla culpa infuit; simuliter, potest culpa remitti absque hoc quod infundatur gratia (probatio: Deus potest de potentia absoluta creare hominem in puris naturalibus, sine culpa et sine gratia; ergo et post lapsum, talem reparare, et ita remittere culpam sine infusione gratiae).”
light without scattering darkness, and one cannot scatter darkness without shining light. If you do
one of the two, you necessarily do the other. If sin and grace are formally opposed, Scotus
argues, the remission of sin and the infusion of grace would be the same thing. Wherever we
affirm one, we would have to affirm the other. If we want to affirm that the Father infuses grace
into the humanity of His Incarnate Son, we would logically also have to say that the Father
forgave the sins of His Incarnate Son. In fact, since the Father bestows more grace on the
Incarnate Son than on any other creature, we would have to say that the Father forgives no one
more than He forgives the Son. If we want to avoid this inference, we have to admit the real
separability of the infusion of grace and the remission of sins, and thus have to deny that sin and
grace are formally opposed. If the infusion of grace and the remission of sin are not the same
thing, Scotus argues, either can be given by God without the other. God actually infuses grace
without remitting sin in at least some cases (i.e., the good angels, Mary, and Christ), and,
therefore, God could simply remit sin by divine power without infusing grace, though He never
actually does so.221

Scotus further argues that grace and sin cannot be formally opposed because, otherwise,
creatures would be able to destroy grace, which Scotus insists only God can do:

Sin and grace are not formally opposed nor formally repugnant. The proof is that, if this
were the case, any agent with effective or defective power over the being of one would
have effective or defective power over the non-being of the other, just as is clear
universally concerning incompossibles. The created will, moreover, has effective or
defective power over the being of sin, because sin is from it; therefore, it would have

221 Scotus, Reportatio IV-A, d. 16, q. 2, n. 37 (Bychkov-Pomplun, p. 654): “Item, infusio gratiae potest esse et est
sine expulsione culpae: patet, quia tempore innocentiae nulla fuit expulsio culpae, quia nulla culpa—et tamen
innocentes habuisset tantam vel maiorem gratiam quantam nos habemus. In beata etiam Virgine descendit
plenitudo gratiae, quia fuit ‘gratia plena’—et tamen nullam habuit culpam praecedentem quae tunc expellebatur, vel
aliquando post, quia numquam peccavit culpa actuali. Idem etiam patet de angelis beatis qui habuerunt gratiam et
sine omnii culpa aliquando expellenda.”
effective or defective power over the non-being of grace, which is false, because grace is not destroyed unless it is annihilated, and a creature is not able to annihilate anything.\textsuperscript{222} Scotus here argues that the essential supernaturality of grace entails that grace and sin cannot be formally opposed. If they were, human beings could do what only God can do, namely, destroy grace. As we saw in the previous chapter, Scotus argues that the infusion of grace is a work of creation which only God can do. Since things producible by God alone are also destroyable by God alone, it cannot be the case that sin and grace are formally opposed. If they were, we could destroy grace by sinning. In the actual economy of salvation, mortal sins do result in the annihilation of grace, but this is only because God freely wills that He will annihilate grace when such sins are committed.

Scotus affirms that “based on God’s ordained power and in fact, the external remission of sin…is accompanied by a real change, namely by an infusion of grace,” so he is not denying that the two are joined together in the actual economy of salvation.\textsuperscript{223} What he is denying is that the only possible way for God to remit is to infuse grace. The two are connected in the actual economy of salvation, but they need not have been. Infusion of grace and remission of sins go together in the actual economy of salvation because God has contingently willed their connection. God could have arranged the economy of salvation otherwise, and this allows us to see that the remission of sins cannot be the ultimate explanation for God’s decision to infuse

\textsuperscript{222} Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} IV-A, d. 16, q. 2, n. 42 (Vatican XIII, pp. 142-43): “Tertio sic: culpa et gratia non sunt formaliter opposita nec formaliter repugnantia (probatio, quia tunc agens effective vel defective, potens super ‘esse’ unius, posset effective vel defective super non-esse alterius, sicut patet universaliter in incompossibilibus; voluntas autem creat a potest effective vel defective super ‘esse’ culpae, quia ab ipsa est culpa; ergo ipsa posset effective vel defective super non-esse gratiae, - quod falsum est, quia gratia non destruitur nisi annihiletur; creatura autem non potest aliquid annihilare.”

\textsuperscript{223} Scotus, \textit{Reportatio} IV-A, d. 16, q. 2, n. 52 (Bychkov-Pomplun, p. 663): “Dico tamen quod de potentia Dei ordinata et de facto remissionem culpae extra, ut est in obiecto actum existente extra (non dico remissionem culpae objecti existentis in intellectu vel voluntate divina)—talem, inquam, remissionem culpae concomitatur realis mutatio, scilicet infusion gratiae...”
grace. God could have dealt with sin without supernaturalizing nature, so we need to continue
our search for the reason God freely decides to do so.

**Grace is necessary for loving God above all**

A second argument for the necessity of grace is that, without it, we cannot love God
above all, at least not under the conditions of sin. Aquinas argues that human beings in a state of
integral nature could have loved God without sanctifying grace but not after the fall:

Hence in the state of perfect nature man referred the love of himself and of all other
things to the love of God as to its end; and thus he loved God more than himself and
above all things. But in the state of corrupt nature man falls short of this in the appetite of
his rational will, which, unless it is cured by God’s grace, follows its private good, on
account of the corruption of nature. And hence we must say that in the state of perfect
nature man did not need the gift of grace added to his natural endowments, in order to
love God above all things naturally, although he needed God’s help to move him to it; but
in the state of corrupt nature man needs, even for this, the help of grace to heal his
nature.224

Under the conditions of sin, human beings do not, and indeed cannot, love God above all other
things. Instead, they love supremely their own private good. Fallen human beings need the
infusion of grace to be able to fulfill their obligation to God.

Bonaventure holds the same position. One of the questions that he considers is whether,
by charity, we ought to love God above ourselves. Bonaventure unsurprisingly argues
affirmatively, but one of the objections he considers is that “Grace is the perfection of nature,
and nature without grace loves itself more than God. If, therefore, [nature’s] perfection does not
destroy the order of its perfectibility, it seems that the same order would have to be maintained

dilectionem sui ipsius referebat ad amorem Dei sicut ad finem, et similiter dilectionem omnium aliarum rerum. Et ita
Deum diligebat plus quam seipsum, et super omnia. Sed in statu naturae corruptae homo ab hoc deficit secundum
appetitum voluntatis rationalis, quae propter corruptionem naturae sequitur bonum privaturn, nisi sanetur per gratiam
Dei. Et ideo dicendum est quod homo in statu naturae integrae non indigebat dono gratiae superadditae naturalibus
bonis ad diligendum Deum naturaliter super omnia; licet indigeret auxilio Dei ad hoc eum moventis. Sed in statu
naturae corruptae indiget homo etiam ad hoc auxilio gratiae naturam sanantis.”
(salvari) in charity. Therefore, we ought, by charity, to love our own selves more than God.”

Bonaventure grants that human nature under the conditions of sin cannot avoid loving itself more than God; he simply denies that this belongs to human nature positively:

When the objection is raised that grace is the perfection of nature, it ought to be said that some things are considered in nature positively (per modum positionis) and others by way of privation, defect, and corruption. What is in nature positively is perfected and retained (salvari) by grace; what is there by way of corruption and privation is corrected and restored (suppleri). When, therefore, it is said that it belongs to nature to love itself more than God, it ought to be said that this is not a condition found in nature when we consider its perfection, but rather its corruption. Therefore, it does not follow that it must be retained through grace; on the contrary, it follows that through grace it must be removed.

It belongs to human nature to love God above itself, but this feature of human nature has been corrupted by the fall and can only be restored by grace.

Scotus agrees with his great forebears that grace was not necessary for loving God above all prior to the fall: “I concede the conclusion that by purely natural means any will could love God above all, at least as human nature existed in the state in which it was instituted.” The ‘at least,’ however, suggests that Scotus thinks the act possible to human beings even after the fall, and the arguments Scotus gives in defense of his position all indicate that he does.

---

225 Bonaventure, Sentences III, d. 29, a. 1, q. 2, obj. 1 (Quaracchi III, p. 641): “Gratia est perfectio naturae, natura autem carens gratia magis diligit se ipsam quam Deum: si ergo perfectio non pervertit ordinem sui perfectibilis, videtur, quod idem ordo in caritate habeat salvari: igitur caritate magis debemus diligere nosmetipsos quam Deum.”

226 Bonaventure, Sentences III, d. 29, a. 1, q. 2, ad 1 (Quaracchi III, p. 642): “Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratia est perfectio naturae; dicendum, quod in natura est considerare aliquid per modum positionis, et aliquid per modum privationis et defectus et corruptionis. Illud autem, quod est in natura per modum positionis, a gratia habet perfici et salvari; quod autem est ibi per modum corruptionis et privationis a gratia habet corrigi et suppleri. Cum ergo dicitur, quod naturae est plus se ipsam quam Deum diligere; dicendum, quod haec non est conditio reperta in natura, spectans ad ipsius perfectionem, sed potius ad ipsius corruptionem; ideo non sequitur, quod per gratiam habeat salvari, immo potius sequitur, quod per gratiam habeat amoveri.”

227 Scotus, Ordinatio III, d. 27, q. 1, n. 53 (Vatican X, p. 72): “Concedo conclusionem quod ex puris naturalibus potest quaelibet voluntas – saltem in statu naturae institutae – diligere Deum super omnia.”
Scotus’s first argument makes an anthropological point: “Natural reason dictates that only the infinite Good ought to be loved supremely. Consequently, the will can do this by its purely natural endowments.” Otherwise, Scotus argues, the will would be unable to carry out a dictate of natural reason and would, thus, be naturally evil or at least not naturally free. This argument by itself, of course, need not apply to human nature under the conditions of sin. The following arguments, however, seem to work for fallen human nature as well.

Scotus’s second argument makes an empirical point, reasoning a fortiori from the self-sacrifice of a soldier. If a human being under the conditions of sin can sacrifice his own existence for the sake of the country without grace, much more so ought a human being under the conditions of sin be able to love the supreme Good above itself without grace. The evidence for the argument, of course, is that plenty of people have, in fact, died for their countries. All of these people died for their countries under the conditions of sin, and at least some of them without sanctifying grace. Scotus notes that some argue the self-sacrifice of the soldier is actually a selfish act in which the soldier wills not the good of the city but the brief splendor of the highest degree of virtue possible. Scotus responds that, even if this is the case, “Brave persons of this sort are willing that both themselves and their act of virtue should cease to exist rather than that evil befall their state or country. Therefore, they simply love the public good, which they wish to preserve, more than they love themselves or love to have this act of virtue.”

---

228 Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 27, q. 1, n. 47 (Vatican X, p. 68): “Ergo dictat solum Bonum infinitum esse summe diligendum. Et per consequens voluntas potest in hoc ex puris naturalibus.”

229 Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 27, q. 1, n. 48 (Vatican X, p. 70): “Secundum autem rectam rationem, magis est diligendum bonum divinum et politicum quam bonum alicuius rei particularis; ergo quilibet secundum rectam rationem debet velle se non esse propter bonum divinum.” Williams notes that BNQ omits “et politicum” (Williams, *John Duns Scotus: Selected Writings on Ethics*, 171).

230 Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 27, q. 1, n. 50 (Vatican X, p. 71): “Talis fortis, ne male sit reipublicae, vult et se et actum virtutis non esse; ergo simpliciter magis diliget bonum publicam—quod vult salvari—quam se vel actum virtutus.”
Scotus’s third argument makes a theological point and is, perhaps, the strongest of the three: “If [no one] could have a perfected virtuous act of loving God above all by purely natural means, then whoever would find himself prone to such an act would know himself to be in charity, because, without charity, he would not be so inclined to love God above all. But the consequent is false; hence the antecedent is also.” Like the second argument, this third argument works for human beings under the conditions of sin. If it were impossible for fallen human beings to love God above all without the help of grace, anyone who found herself eliciting such acts would know with certainty (or at least as much certainty as she has regarding her own internal states and external acts) that she was in grace. Since we cannot know whether we are in grace, no feature of our acts of love for God can betray that they are elicited by means of grace: “One can say that from no act which we experience, whether from the substance of the act, or from the intensity of the act, or from the pleasure or ease in doing it, or from the goodness or the moral rectitude of the act, can we conclude that some such supernatural habit is present.” All the features of our acts of love for God in this life must be explainable in terms of natural powers and habits alone.

Charity, then, does not make possible a previously impossible kind of act, even under the conditions of sin. Scotus thus affirms that it is entirely within the power of fallen human beings

---

231 Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 27, q. 1, nn. 51-52 (Vatican X, pp. 71-72): “Si aliquis potest habere actum virtutis perfectum diligendi Deum super omnia ex puris naturalibus, ergo qui inveniret se pronum ad tales actum, posset scire se esse in caritate, quia sine caritate non esset talis prontitas ad diligendum Deum super omnia. Consequens falsum; ergo et antecedens.” The critical edition settles on *aliquis* at the beginning of the sentence, but as is admitted in the apparatus, the argument does not work unless we take him to mean ‘no one.’ Williams seems to have missed the issue and simply translates the Latin as it stands in the Vatican edition (Williams, *John Duns Scotus: Selected Writings on Ethics*, 171-72).

232 Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 17, pt. 1, q. 2, n. 126 (Vatican V, p. 200): “Ex nullo actu quem experimur, nec ex substantia actus, nec ex intensione actus, neque ex delectabilitate sive ex facilitate in operando, neque ex bonitate sive ex rectitudine morali actus, possimus concluere aliquem talem habitum supernaturalem inesse.”
to love God above all, either by virtue of acquired friendship for God or even by means of no habit whatsoever. We still lack, then, a sufficient reason for the infusion of grace. While Aquinas and Bonaventure could say that God willed the infusion of grace so that we could perform certain kinds of acts above our nature under the conditions of sin, anyone who finds Scotus’s position convincing will have to continue the search.

**Grace is necessary for glory**

Even if it is true that human beings under the conditions of sin can perform acts of love for God above all, it might be the case that only the possession of grace in this life is sufficient for obtaining glory in the next. In other words, Aquinas might grant Scotus’s argument that we can love God above all without grace in this life but deny that this would make us sufficiently worthy of eternal life. The ontological gap, in other words, between acquired friendship for God and infused charity for God is so great that the latter requires recompense in justice while the former does not. This is precisely what Aquinas says with regard to the possibility of meriting eternal life by our natural endowments:

> Acts conducing to an end must be proportioned to the end. But no act exceeds the proportion of its active principle; and hence we see in natural things, that nothing can by its operation bring about an effect which exceeds its active force, but only such as is proportionate to its power. Now eternal life is an end exceeding the proportion of human nature, as is clear from what we have said above. Hence man, by his natural endowments, cannot produce meritorious works proportionate to eternal life; and for this a higher force is needed, namely, the force of grace. And thus without grace man cannot merit eternal life.233

---

233 Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 5, resp. (Marietti I, p. 533): “Respondeo dicendum quod actus perducentes ad finem oportet esse fini proportionatos. Nullus autem actus excedit proportionem principii activi. Et ideo videmus in rebus naturalibus quod nulla res potest perficere effectum per suam operationem qui excedat virtutem activam, sed solum potest producere per operationem suam effectum suae virtutis proportionatum. Vita autem aeterna est finis excedens proportionem naturae humanae, ut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo homo per sua naturalia non potest producere opera meritoria proportionata vitae aeternae, sed ad hoc exigitur altior virtus, quae est virtus gratiae. Et ideo sine gratia homo non potest mereri vitam aeternam.”
This argument would presumably still apply even if we were able to love God above all without grace under the conditions of sin. Aquinas is arguing that eternal life is above nature and therefore cannot be obtained by nature alone. Nature must be supernaturalized, on his account, if it is to perform an act that would be proportionate to eternal life as its reward.

Scotus’s Franciscan forebears agree entirely with Aquinas. Bonaventure, for instance, argues that

It is impossible that free choice merit without the help of sanctifying grace, on account of the fact that the merited reward is eternal beatitude. Eternal beatitude, moreover, consists in having Him who is all and the highest good, and who is exalted above every nature and dwells in inaccessible light. It is therefore impossible that human beings merit to ascend and attain this highest good except through some help that is beyond nature. Therefore, human beings in a state of instituted nature without the gift of grace were not able to merit.  

Without grace, it is impossible for creatures to merit eternal life. Due to the infinite ontological gap between Creator and creature, a supernatural habit is necessary for there to be any proportion at all between a creaturely act and the reward of eternal life.

Scotus disagrees. In his various commentaries on distinction 17 of the first book of the Sentences, Scotus famously argues that there is no absolutely necessary connection between the possession of grace in this life and the bestowal of glory in the next. That is not to say that Scotus denies the connection between the two in the actual economy of salvation:

By His ordained power, according to His law of wisdom, He has established that never will someone be accepted unless such a habit inheres in the soul, whereby the soul will merit eternal life: the habit that He would confer on it, and whereby the soul formally would be pleasing to Him. So long as this law is standing, He could not accept someone,
apart from one having such a habit whereby one merits and as a consequence of which one might be rewarded.\textsuperscript{235}

In the actual economy of salvation, grace is necessary for glory. Scotus argues later in the same paragraph that grace is not only necessary but also sufficient for glory in the actual economy of salvation: “These laws…are based on [God’s] grace and free will, and are not necessary from their terms, but according to divine acceptation, so that one having grace will be saved and one not having it will not be saved. And this is according to ordained power which we have from Scripture.”\textsuperscript{236}

Scotus, then, is no Pelagian. He clearly affirms that, in the actual economy of salvation, all and only those who die in grace enter into glory. What interests Scotus, however, is not the necessity and sufficiency of grace for eternal life in the actual economy of salvation. He considers this already settled by divine revelation and defended by his great forebears. What interests Scotus is not whether Pelagius was right about the actual economy of salvation but whether Pelagius’s economy of salvation was a possible one. This is no mere speculation for Scotus. He is not interested in mere possibility. The question that interests him is whether the actual connection between grace and glory in the present economy of salvation is a necessary one or merely a contingent one. He clearly thinks it is only contingent:

Just as in God a double potency is posited, namely an ordered one and an absolute one, so proportionately a double necessity is posited in Him. God, however, according to His absolute potency is not necessitated to infuse charity for the specific purpose that the soul formally be accepted by Him and ordered to eternal life. For His power is not bound by sacraments, nor as a consequence by any other created forms, so as to hinder His ability,

\textsuperscript{235} Scotus, \textit{Reportatio} I-A, d. 17, pt. 1, q. 1, n. 27 (Wolter-Bychkov, p. 467): “Potentia tamen ordinata qua secundum legem sapientiae suae statuit ut nunquam aliquis acceptaretur nisi tali habitu animae inhaerente, quo anima meretur vitam aeternam, quem conferret sibi et quo formaliter anima esset sibi grata, non posset aliquem acceptare, ista lege stante, sine habitu tali quo meretur et ex illo praeemiaretur.”

\textsuperscript{236} Scotus, \textit{Reportatio} I-A, d. 17, pt. 1, q. 1, n. 27 (Wolter-Bychkov, p. 467): “Leges autem istae sunt ex gratia et libertate, non necessariae ex terminis, sed secundum acceptationem divinam sic quod habens gratiam salvabitur et non habens non salvabitur, et haec est potentia ordinata quam habemus ex Scriptura.”
by His absolute power, if He willed, to accept that nature for eternal life as it is in itself without some formally inhering habit or anything else whatsoever, such as merit. . . . For whatever He could do with [the help of] a secondary cause that is not of the essence of a thing . . . He could do immediately, and so He could justify or save a bare nature in itself just as one informed by charity, speaking of His absolute power.

By means of his immediate-influence axiom, Scotus denies that the infusion of grace (or any other created habit) is necessary for obtaining glory since no created reality or its absence can block God’s free bestowal of glory on whomever He wishes to bestow it. Grace, then, is not necessary for glory.

In his commentary on distinction 41 of the first book of the Sentences, Scotus argues that grace is not sufficient for glory either. There he distinguishes two ways of understanding a statement of the kind ‘a is willed because of b’: “One is that I will a because of b, [where b is] the reason for willing….The other is that I will ‘a because of b’ [where b is] not the primary object of intention or volition, but the way I will [a] to be accomplished.” Scotus uses the example of health and a bitter potion. When I say that I will medicine because of health, I am making a statement of the first kind: health is the reason for my willing of the potion and explains why I will the potion. When, conversely, I say that I will health because of medicine, I

237 Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 17, pt. 1, q. 1, n. 26 (Wolter-Bychkov, pp. 466-67): “Quantum ad primum dico quod sicut in Deo ponitur duplex potentia, ordinata scilicet et absoluta, ita proportionaliter ponitur in eo duplex necessitas. Deus autem, de potentia absoluta, non necessitatur ut infundat caritatem ad hoc quod anima formaliter sit sibi accepta et ordinetur ad vitam aeternam, quia potentiam suam non alligavit sacramentis, nec per consequens aliis formis creatis, quin de potentia absoluta posset illam naturam in se sine aliquo habitu formaliter inhaerente vel quocumque alio ut merito acceptare, si vellet, ad vitam aeternam. Nec si hoc vellet, male vellet, nec inordinatum vellet. Sed ex hoc quod sic vellet, bene vellet. Nam quidquid potest cum causa secunda quae non est de essentia rei — hoc addo propter materiam et formam, quia non potest facere compositum sine istis causis — hoc potest per se immediate, et ita potest iustificare vel salvare nudam naturam in se sicut informatam caritate, loquendo de potentia absoluta.”

238 Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 41, q. 1, n. 51 (Wolter-Bychkov, p. 501): “Ex hoc sequitur in omnibus talibus quod ubi unum ordinatur ad abud et appetitur propter alium, quod duplex potest esse sensus: vel quod velim a propter b sicut propter rationem volendi et primum in intentione (sicut velim ea quae sunt ad finem propter finem), vel quod volo a propter b, non sicut primum voluntum in intentione, sed propter rationem volendi in fieri et primum in exsecutione. Exemplum est de sanitate et potione, quia potio amara non est ex se volenda, sed tantum propter sanitatem habendam per eam, ut per rationem volendi eam. Sed cum dico ‘velo sanitatem propter potionem’, hoc est propter volitum in fieri disponens ad sanitatem.”
am making a statement of the second kind: medicine is my contingently chosen means of obtaining health. I could, in other words, will health because of (that is, by means of) rest rather than because of (that is, by means of) medicine. When we turn to the statement that God wills glory because of grace, Scotus argues that this is an example of the second kind of statement:

God does ‘will Peter to be saved because-of-his-merits’ in the sense of the ‘preferred way of accomplishing this,’ [where ‘because of merits’ indicates] the process or some disposition that comes before salvation. In this sense it is true. However, [it is] not [true in the sense] that God wills to save him because of his merits [where ‘because of merits’ is understood] as the reason for willing [to choose] him for salvation. In fact, it is rather the opposite, i.e., he first wills beatitude—i.e., the ultimate goal—for someone, and only then ordains something—such as this person’s merits—to that goal.”

Merit, which Scotus regularly interchanges with ‘grace’ in this question, does not explain why some are accepted to glory. Grace is not logically sufficient for glory; grace is simply God’s freely and contingently chosen means to accomplish His salvation. Even though God first gives grace and then glory, He does not first will to give grace and then to give glory as a reward for grace. Rather, given Scotus’s ordered-willing axiom (God first wills the end and then the means to the end), God first wills glory for this one and then, surveying all the possible ways of accomplishing this, settles on grace. Grace is sufficient for glory only because God has freely and contingently decided that it should be. God was free to choose some other means.

Scotus thus argues that grace is neither logically necessary nor logically sufficient for glory. The connection between the two in the actual economy of salvation is merely contingent. God has willed that they go together, but He did not have to. By denying this third necessity

---

239 Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 41, q. 1, n. 64 (Wolter-Bychkov, p. 504): “Deus Petrum vult salvari propter merita, tamquam volitum praecedens in fieri et dispositionem quandam ad salutem; et sic est vera. Sed non vult ipsum salvare propter merita ut propter rationem volendi eum ad salutem, sed potius e verso prius voluit alicui beatitudinem et finem suum quam aliquid ordinet ut merita sua ad illum finem. Unde in primo instanti post volitionem suae bonitatis vult beatitudinem Petro ut finem sine aliquo alio ut ratione vel causa volendi illud sibi. In secundo instanti videns sua merita futura ordinat illa in illum finem tamquam quasdam dispositiones in fieri ad illum finem.” Here I borrow Wolter and Bychkov’s translation which, as they themselves admit in a footnote, is “translated freely following the initial discussion of these two senses above in n. 51-52.”
claim, Scotus has severed any logically necessary connection between the infusion of grace and our salvation. The infusion of grace is not logically necessary for remission of sin, for loving God above all, or for obtaining eternal life. God could have forgiven our sins, and we could have obtained eternal life without the infusion of grace. Nothing about our salvation can provide a sufficient answer to our question regarding the purposes of God in willing the infusion of grace. Anyone who finds Scotus’s position compelling will need to look outside of humanity’s need for salvation to secure the necessity of the infusion of grace.

Before we turn to our final claim of necessity, it is important to note that Scotus’s soteriological voluntarism with respect to the relationship between grace and glory is not as extreme as is sometimes assumed. It is often argued, for instance, that Scotus’s account makes the relationship between grace and glory entirely arbitrary, as if God could have just as easily chosen winning a marathon as the condition for glory.240 Scotus would likely agree that God could have chosen winning a marathon as the condition for glory, but he also clearly wants to say that this would be a much less fitting economy of salvation than the current one. Scotus certainly wants to say that it is not strictly necessary for God to bestow glory on the one having grace, but he also wants to say that there is something inherently fitting or suitable in God’s freely willing that glory be obtained in just this way.

The fittingness of rewarding grace with glory is only marginally addressed in the Ordinatio. Scotus raises a doubt and then briefly responds:

But there is a doubt about how this habit may be the reason for accepting the nature and the act. The reason indeed for accepting the nature seems to be just a sort of comeliness of nature, pleasing to the divine will, such that, whether the habit is posited as active or

240 For the charge that Scotus’s economy of salvation is arbitrary, see, for instance, Laurence William Grensted, A Short History of the Doctrine of the Atonement (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1920), 162.
non-active, from the mere fact that it is such a form, beautifying and adorning the soul, it can be a reason of acceptance and a reason for accepting the nature.\textsuperscript{241}

In general, Scotus is content to argue that grace is neither logically necessary nor logically sufficient for glory in the \textit{Lectura} and the \textit{Ordinatio}, but he is clearly also concerned to argue that it is fitting for God to reward grace with glory. In the \textit{Reportatio}, this fittingness becomes much more urgent, and Scotus devotes significant attention to it.

To make his point, Scotus first distinguishes three kinds of acceptation: (1) God’s general complacency with respect to all possibles insofar as they imitate divine perfection, (2) God’s efficacious willing that certain possibles actually exist, and (3) “the acceptation by which He wills one good as ordered to a greater good, and this happens only with respect to a rational creature. This acceptance is called a certain ordered volition, namely of merit leading to a reward, and of that which tends to complete a lesser good.”\textsuperscript{242} Scotus tells us that it is the third kind of acceptation that concerns him here. In other words, he is not saying that the goodness of a possible or actual thing depends on the will of God but that the ordination of a lesser good to a greater good depends entirely on the divine will. The basic idea is that there is no possible created gift that God could bestow on a creature which would necessarily require that God

\textsuperscript{241} Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} I, d. 17, nn. 130-31 (Quaracchi V, p. 203): “Sed dubium est qualiter habitus iste sit ratio acceptandi naturam et actum. Ratio quidem acceptandi naturam videtur esse sicut quidam decor naturae, complacens voluntati divinae, ita quod sive ponatur habitus iste activus sive non-activus, ex hoc solo quod est talis forma decorans et ornans animam, potest esse ratio acceptationis et acceptandi naturam.”

bestow a greater gift on that same creature. Any order between two gifts depends absolutely on
the divine will.

Scotus introduces another distinction between a formal elective reason and a formal
objective reason for acceptation. The formal elective reason, Scotus tells us, is not charity but the
divine will alone.\textsuperscript{243} That is to say, this one is accepted to eternal life ultimately because God
wills it—because God elects this one for glory. The formal elective reason for ordination to
glory, I take it, is both strictly necessary and sufficient for glory, it is that in which God’s
election formally consists. If God elects this one to glory, this one gets glory; if God does not
elect this one to glory, this one does not get glory. As Scotus argues earlier on the same question,
“Nothing in a creature can be the reason why God accepts some person, since ‘divine
acceptance’ asserts an intrinsic act by God, and nothing created can be the formal reason why
there is an intrinsic act in God.”\textsuperscript{244} No created gift could possibly compel God to give its
possessor glory, so no created gift could be the formal elective reason for divine acceptation.
That is to say, no created gift could be logically necessary and sufficient for divine acceptation.

Grace, on the contrary, is at most a formal objective reason for acceptation, and Scotus is
careful to insist that it is not “the necessary reason of acceptance, but only the \textit{ratio} of suitability
for providing the term for divine acceptence. And therefore one is not accepted through charity
as worthy according to justice.”\textsuperscript{245} The one with charity is not worthy of salvation according to

\textsuperscript{243} Scotus, \textit{Reportatio} I-A, d. 17, pt. 1, q. 2, n. 60 (Wolter-Bychkov, p. 477): “\textit{Dico ergo quod caritas non est
formalis ratio acceptationis elicitiva respectu acceptantis sed voluntas divina}.”

\textsuperscript{244} Scotus, \textit{Reportatio} I-A, d. 17, pt. 1, q. 2, n. 48 (Wolter-Bychkov, p. 475): “\textit{Nihil in creaturis potest esse ratio
quare Deus acceptet aliquam personam, cum ‘acceptare divinum’ dicat actum intrinsecum Deo, et nihil creatum
possit esse ratio formalis actus intrinseci in Deo; ergo etc.”

\textsuperscript{245} Scotus, \textit{Reportatio} I-A, d. 17, pt. 1, q. 2, n. 61 (Wolter-Bychkov, p. 478): “\textit{…nec ratio necessaria acceptandi, sed
tandum ratio habilitans ut terminet terminum acceptationis divinae. Et ideo non acceptatur per caritatem tanquam
dignus secundum iustitiam.”
justice strictly speaking, Scotus argues, because “the ratio of ‘justified’ (iusti) does not include that one ought to receive such eternal life.”246 When Scotus speaks here of the ratione ‘iusti’ he means not the justice of God but the justice of a soul in charity. Scotus here thinks of charity and justice as convertible. Charity, Scotus is saying, does not include as part of its definition that its possessor is owed eternal life. Thus far, Scotus simply argues, once again, that charity is not logically sufficient for glory. Nevertheless, Scotus argues that “the suitability that is charity is included in the subject, namely, in the notion of a justified person.”247 Charity is thus what Scotus earlier calls “the ratio of suitability in the order of justice.”248 In other words, the definition of charity does not include a right to eternal life but it does include an intrinsic suitability for such reward.

This suitability or fittingness, Scotus argues, is intrinsic to charity; it belongs to the definition of charity. It does not depend on divine ordination. What depends on divine ordination is that charity be actually rewarded with that for which it has an intrinsic suitability by its very nature: “And in this way God has ordained through His practical intellect that such be beatified according to this practical principle constituted according to this law: namely to every grace there is to be finally repayment. And then, the divine will as free, with no necessitating justice, accepts the justified.”249 God contingently wills that He will freely reward every grace, and the


divine intellect thereby understands that all those in charity are to receive glory as that for which charity has an intrinsic suitability.

Scotus next tells us that he will demonstrate “through reason” that “charity is able to be the...objective reason for acceptability unto eternal life.”²⁵⁰ That is to say, he will give an account of why charity, in particular, is fittingly (though non-necessarily) rewarded with glory:

The one loving by natural love something for its own sake, like God does, wills Himself or that [object] to be loved by others capable of loving [it], and thus since God wills Himself to the highest degree for His own sake, He wills that other rational things love Him. And He accepts others to Himself inasmuch as they are the ones loving this object, namely God. Therefore, since this habit of charity is the formal reason for loving, so it will be a formal secondary objective reason of acceptance.²⁵¹

Scotus is not arguing that God must create some others to love Him, nor is he arguing that if some others love God, God must accept them to Himself. He is simply arguing that God’s own love for Himself makes it intrinsically suitable (but not logically necessary) that He freely accept unto eternal life precisely those who love Him. It is God’s love for Himself, in other words, that grounds the intrinsic suitability of charity’s reward in glory. Scotus thus clearly does not think that the non-necessity and non-sufficiency of charity for glory mean that charity is in any sense arbitrary in the economy of salvation. God does not have to reward charity with glory, and God does not need to bestow charity in order to reward someone with glory, but Scotus argues there is something intrinsically fitting about setting up the economy of salvation in just this way.

²⁵⁰ Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 17, pt. 1, q. 2, n. 62 (Wolter-Bychkov, p. 478): “Quod autem caritas posset esse secunda ratio obiectiva acceptabilis in vita aeterna, ostendo per rationem sic.”

²⁵¹ Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 17, pt. 1, q. 2, n. 64 (Wolter-Bychkov, p. 479): “Sed diligens amore naturali aliquid propter se, sicut Deus, vult se sive illud diligi ab aliis potestibus diligere, et sic cum Deus velit se summe propter se, vult quod alia rationalia eum diligent. Et acceptat alios ad se in quantum diligentes sunt illud objectum, scilicet Deum. Cum igitur iste habitus caritatis sit ratio formalis diligentis, ista erit ratio formalis obiectiva secundaria acceptationis.”
To illustrate his point, Scotus alludes to a gravitational analogy that appears much more elaborately in his reflections on beatitude in distinction 1 of the first book of the *Sentences*. His discussion is worth quoting at length:

To these [questions regarding beatitude] one can reply by way of an example about corporeal bodies.

The center is the primary location where corporeal bodies are suited by nature to be perfectly at rest, in a threefold way. There must be (a) something that is primarily and *per se*, completely and immovably at rest, namely the earth; and (b) something that can be immovably at rest of itself, but not primarily, but in so far as it is an [integral] part of some whole, as are the interior parts of the earth, such as the minerals which are certain bodily parts of the earth; and (c) thirdly, something which is just at rest but not primarily or *per se* or immovably, just as the heavy adheres to the surface of the earth….

As for the case proposed, therefore, the primary center of all intelligible beings is God, who is the ultimate term of all activity in spirits, according to that definition of Cicero: “God is an intelligible sphere whose center is everywhere and circumference nowhere.” The mass or weight by which something is moved to this center is love (*amor*) according to Augustine. That which rests immovably in that center primarily and in an unqualified way is the divine will, hence, in this end and term of the motion of all spirits is the divine will, which is joined to this good not by way of habit or act or participation but by way of essence.

Second, at rest in this center is the will of those beatified, whose will through love has stolen, by divine benevolence, into the center as a quasi-inner part.

Third, the will of the pilgrim [rests in this center] in an unqualified way, because by reason of charity it is united *per se* to the same immobile object, to which the blessed in heaven are joined, but not primarily or immovably.252

---

252 Scotus, *Reportatio I-A*, d. 1, pt. 3, qq. 1-3 (Wolter-Bychkov, pp. 111-12): “Ad ista tria simul respondeo per unum exemplum in corporibus. Primum quietativum est centrum in corporibus, quae nata sunt quietari, in quo tripliciter quietantur: [a] unum necessario, per se, et primo, et immobiliter, et se toto, scilicet terra; [b] et aliquod immobiliter per se, sed non primo sed in quantum est aliquod totius, sicut partes terrae intrinsecae, ut mineralia, quae sunt quaedam partes intrinsecae; [c] tertio aliquod quietatur per se et simpliciter, sed non primo, nec immobiliter, sicut grave adhaerens superficie terrae — quod non quietatur primo, quia est ut pars, nec immobiliter, quia in superficie continetur, sed tamen per se, quia per gravitatem...Ad propositum ergo, primum centrum omnium intelligibilium est Deus, qui est ultimus terminus omnium motuum in spiritibus, secundum definitionem Tullii: “Deus est sphaera intelligibilis cuius centrum ubique et circumferentia nusquam”. Pondus autem quo aliquid movetur ad illud centrum est amor secundum Augustinum. Illud quod quiescit in isto centro primo modo, simpliciter, et primo immobiliter, est voluntas divina; unde in isto fine et termino motus omnium spirituum est voluntas divina, quae est coniuncta huic bono non per habitum vel per actum vel per participationem sed per essentiam. Secundo quiescit in hoc centro voluntas beatorum, quasi subintrans beneplacitum divinae voluntatis per amorem quasi partes intraneae. Tertio voluntas viatoris simpliciter, quia eodem immobili obiecto cum beato in nititur per se per caritatem, non tamen primo, nec immobiliter.”
There is nothing arbitrary about God’s ordination that charity be rewarded with glory. The divine will’s love for the divine essence is the primary act at the center of Trinitarian life, and so there is an intrinsic suitability in charity to be the formal objective reason that the divine will contingently ordains to reward in glory.

Simply to say that charity has an intrinsic suitability for reward in glory, of course, does not entail that there are no other created forms that might also possess such suitability. In particular, it seems like Scotus’s argument for the suitability of charity would apply equally well to acquired friendship for God or even an act of love for God without any habit whatsoever. As we saw in the previous chapter, there are good reasons to think Scotus would argue that charity is a more suitable formal objective reason for acceptation to eternal life than acquired friendship for God since the former is more perfect than the latter. To recall the point we made in the previous chapter, charity is an absolutely essentially supernatural participation in God and a deification of the soul. In fact, it is precisely in the context of his argument from reason that charity is suitably rewarded with glory that Scotus speaks of charity as a deification of the soul.\footnote{Scotus, \textit{Reportatio} I-A, d. 17, pt. 1, q. 2, n. 67 (Wolter-Bychkov, p. 480).} Given its deifying character, it would be easy to see Scotus claim that charity is not only intrinsically suitable for reward in glory but maximally intrinsically suitable for such reward. As we will see in the remainder of this chapter, Scotus provides us with an additional reason for thinking of grace as the maximally-fitting condition for glory. For Scotus, the infusion of grace is neither logically necessary nor logically sufficient for our salvation, but it is both logically necessary and logically sufficient for the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.
Some of the schoolmen took issue with Scotus’s innovative positions on the non-necessity and non-sufficiency of grace for remission of sins, love of God above all, and acceptation to eternal life. Peter Auriol, in particular, defended the older view, but the commentary tradition as a whole would overwhelmingly embrace Scotus’s soteriological voluntarism. In fact, a significant portion of fourteenth-century commentary on these questions simply defends Scotus against Auriol’s objections. That said, Scotus retains one final claim of logical necessity with respect to grace that the great lights of the fourteenth century were willing to discard. While they simply followed Scotus when they argued for the contingency of the infusion of grace with respect to our salvation, they went further than him when they severed the connection between the infusion of grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.

The thirteenth-century schoolmen generally agreed that the infusion of grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit are logically necessary and sufficient for one another. That is to say, the two do not simply happen to go together in the actual economy of salvation; there are no possible economies of salvation in which one obtains without the other. In the last chapter, we saw that grace is not simply ‘accidentally supernatural,’ in Scheeben’s parlance; it is ‘essentially supernatural’ and, indeed, ‘absolutely’ so. It cannot naturally belong to any possible creature. The thirteenth-century schoolmen were thus happy to call it a participation in the divine nature, a conformity to God, an assimilation to God, a deification of the creature. Grace, in the thirteenth century, does not deify us; grace is the very deification itself. In the remainder of this chapter, we will see that this deification is not wrought in us from the outside, as it were. Instead, grace is

---

infused when the Holy Spirit is sent by the Father and the Son to impress His own inner-Trinitarian character on the innermost recesses of the soul. For the thirteenth-century schoolmen, grace is precisely the supernatural change wrought in the soul by virtue of or so that the Holy Spirit can indwell it. Grace is the shape of a soul indwelt by the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit cannot dwell in an ungraced soul, and the soul cannot have grace unless it is indwelt by the Holy Spirit.

**Uncreated and Created Grace**

A question arose in the twelfth century as to whether the love with which we love God is a habit infused into us by God or the indwelling Holy Spirit Himself. Peter the Lombard famously argued that the love with which we love God is the Holy Spirit Himself. Thirteenth-century schoolmen would almost unanimously argue that we must posit a created habit of charity in the soul. In doing so, they did not deny the real indwelling of the Holy Spirit. While the thirteenth-century schoolmen often retain the either-or form of the question (i.e., the explicit question that they consider is whether charity is created or uncreated), they all reject the adequacy of formulating the question in this either-or way. Alexander of Hales introduced what was to become a standard scholastic distinction between ‘uncreated’ and ‘created’ grace and affirmed that both are in the soul of the justified. According to the authors of the *Summa halensis*,

> Created and uncreated grace are in the one having grace. Uncreated Grace is the Holy Spirit; and the Holy Spirit is called “Grace” because He is called “Gift;” and He is called

---


“Gift” because He is called “Love;” for it is proper to the Holy Spirit to be Love, and He proceeds from the Father and Son as Love.\textsuperscript{257}

The authors of the \textit{Summa halensis} affirm the infusion of a created habit of grace, but this does not entail a denial of the real indwelling of the Holy Spirit. In addition to the created habit of grace infused into the soul, the Holy Spirit is rightly called indwelling Uncreated Grace. All three divine persons come to indwell the soul, but it belongs particularly to the Holy Spirit to be Uncreated Grace because it is He that proceeds by way of love and, crucially, by way of gift in the eternal, imminent life of the Trinity. For the authors of the \textit{Summa halensis}, it does not simply happen to be the case that both the infused created habit and the indwelling Holy Spirit are rightly called grace. The Holy Spirit, they claim, is not merely the efficient cause of created grace but also its formal cause:

The Holy Spirit makes us pleasing (\textit{gratos}) by means of Himself when He makes us deiform; He does this, moreover, because He is love (\textit{amor})....Because, therefore, the Holy Spirit is love (\textit{amor}), nay, the first power of love (\textit{amor}), when He is given to us He transforms us into the divine splendor (\textit{speciem}) so that the soul itself is assimilated to God. We ought to understand created grace as a similitude and disposition in the rational soul by virtue of which [the soul] is accepted by and assimilated to God. Here there is a transforming form (i.e., Uncreated Grace) and there is a transformed form, by means of which He remains in that which is transformed, namely, in the soul, by means of its transformation (and this is created grace).\textsuperscript{258}

\textsuperscript{257} \textit{Summa halensis} III, n. 609 (Quaracchi IV.2, p. 959): “Dicendum quod est gratia creata et increata in habente gratiam. Gratia increata est Spiritus Sanctus; et dicitur Spiritus Sanctus gratia, secundum quod dicitur donum, et dicitur donum, secundum quod dicitur amor; ipse enim Spiritus Sanctus secundum suam proprietatem amor est, et ut amor procedit a Patre et Filio.”

\textsuperscript{258} \textit{Summa halensis} III, n. 609 (Quaracchi IV.2, p. 959): “Spiritus enim Sanctus eo facit nos gratos quo facit nos deiformes; hoc autem facit, quia amor est. Unde dicit Richardus de S. Victore: ‘Scio, anima mea, quia dilectio tua vita tua est; et quidquid diligis ipsa vi dilectionis in eius similitudinem transformaris’. Quia ergo Spiritus Sanctus amor est, immo et virtus prima amoris, inde est, cum datur nobis, transformat nos in divinam speciem, ut sit ipsa anima assimilata Deo. Ex alia parte de bemus intelligere gratiam creatam velut similitudinem et dispositionem ex parte animae rationalis, ex qua habet quod sit accepta Deo et assimilata, quia ibi est forma transformans, et haec est gratia increata; similiiter ibi est forma transformata, quae dereliquitur in transformato, scilicet in anima, ex transformatione, et haec est gratia creat.”
The Holy Spirit comes to indwell us as transforming form and therefore necessarily transforms the soul into the very thing that He Himself is in the inner-Trinitarian life of God. It does not simply happen to be the case that both the infused habit and the indwelling Holy Spirit are called grace, nor is it simply fitting that the two are given to us together. There is a necessary connection between the two gifts. God does not simply infuse the habit and give the Holy Spirit; God infuses the habit precisely by giving the Holy Spirit: “God’s love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit that has been given to us” (Rom. 5:5, NRSV).

As one example of the kind of relationship they have in mind, the authors of the *Summa halensis* appeal to the relationship between the soul and the body. Patristic authors often spoke of the relationship between God and the soul as something like the relationship between the soul and the body: God is the life of the soul just as the soul is the life of the body. In a way, Aristotelian hylomorphism made it somewhat easier to investigate what this might mean. The authors of the *Summa halensis* argue that the soul is united to the body *without* (*sine*) a medium but, nevertheless, *through* (*per*) a medium. This is, for them, a basic truth about the relationship between form and what is informed. It is true of any form-informed relation whatsoever: “Form unites itself by its essence,” while what receives form requires a disposition for such receptivity. The soul, then, is not changed by its being the form of this body, but the body (or the matter that makes up this body) is certainly changed by being informed. Applying the principle to the present case, the authors of the *Summa halensis* argue that “Uncreated Grace is united to the soul without a medium, nor is a medium required on the part of the one informing

---

259 *Summa halensis* III, n. 609 (Quaracchi IV.2, p. 960): “Anima secundum se est vita corporis, id est sine medio, quia anima sine medio unitur corpori, et tamen per medium unitur corpori.”

260 *Summa halensis* III, n. 609 (Quaracchi IV.2, p. 960): “Forma se unit per suam essentiam. Per medium dico, quia est disposition ex parte corporis media ad hoc ut uniatur anima ipsi.”
but on the part of the one receiving.”\textsuperscript{261} Just as the body requires a disposition to be united to the soul, so the soul requires a disposition to be united to the Holy Spirit. The soul is changed by the Holy Spirit as its formal cause, but the Holy Spirit is not changed when it transforms the soul.

Despite this striking claim that the Holy Spirit is the form of the soul, the authors of the \textit{Summa halensis} elsewhere clearly deny that God can be the form of any creature. True and highest simplicity, they argue, excludes composability with another, “just as is matter, which is composable with form, and form, which is composable with matter, and ‘that by which,’ which is composable with ‘what is.’”\textsuperscript{262} God alone, they argue, is incapable of being composed with some other thing.

It might be the case that the \textit{Summa halensis} is simply inconsistent on the possibility of God being the form of the soul. When considering the infusion of grace, it claims that the Holy Spirit is the transforming form of the soul; when it considers divine simplicity, it claims that God cannot be the form of anything. Given its multiple authorship, this might come as no surprise. But there is an easy way to resolve the tension by noting other places where the authors of the \textit{Summa halensis} speak of formal exemplar causality:

The similitude of the rational creature to God is either a similitude according to the character of efficiency, and so it is called a similitude of virtue….or it is a similitude according to the character by which God is the exemplar or formal cause, and so it is called a similitude of expression or according to expression….or it is a similitude according to the character by which God is the final cause, and so it is called a similitude of inclination or order.\textsuperscript{263}

\textsuperscript{261} \textit{Summa halensis} III, n. 609 (Quaracchi IV.2, p. 960): “Similiter gratia increata sine medio unitur animae nec requiritur medium ex parte informantis, sed ex parte recipientis.”

\textsuperscript{262} \textit{Summa halensis} I, n. 33 (Quaracchi I, p. 53): “Nec componibile cum alio: sicut est materia, quae est componibilis formae, et forma componibilis materiae, et ipsum ’quo est’ componibile ei ’quod est.’”

\textsuperscript{263} \textit{Summa halensis} III, n. 622 (Quaracchi IV.2, p. 986): “Sed similitudo rationalis creaturae ad Deum potest esse vel quod sit ei similis secundum rationem efficientis, et sic dicitur similitudo virtutis,…Aut est similitudo secundum rationem qua Deus est causa exemplarvis sive formalis, et sic dicitur similitudo expressionis sive secundum
The key phrase here is “a similitude according to the character by which God is the exemplar or formal cause.” I do not think that the authors of the *Summa halensis* are unsure about the nature of the causal relationship between God and the soul. They seem to be using ‘exemplar’ and ‘formal’ interchangeably. The ‘or’ is functioning explanatorily rather than introducing an alternative.

Exemplar causality, of course, requires some explanation. An exemplar cause is not typically thought of as a distinct cause from Aristotle’s four causes (i.e., efficient, formal, material, and final). Instead, it bears a resemblance to all but the material cause. A standard instance of exemplar causality is that of a portrait painter. The painter is the efficient cause of the portrait, and the one being pictured is the exemplar cause of the portrait. That is to say, the one being pictured is not the form of the painting; the painting has its own form. The pictured person and the portrait do not enter into composition of any kind. Still, there is a similitude between the pictured person and the intrinsic form of the painting, and it is precisely this similarity that makes it a painting of *that* particular person. In the work of grace, God does not take an exemplar cause other than Himself. God Himself, then, is both the efficient and exemplar cause of the work of grace. The work of grace, we might say, is God’s self-portrait in the soul of the justified. God is not the form of the soul. The soul has its own created form (created grace or charity), but, precisely by virtue of that created form, there is a similitude between God and the soul.

Even this image of self-portrait, though, does not adequately capture the intimacy between God and the soul that the authors of the *Summa halensis* have in mind. They go on to explain what they mean by a “similitude of expression,” saying that “in this way there is said to

---

expressionem…Aut est similitudo secundum rationem qua Deus est causa finalis, et sic dicitur similitudo inclinationis vel ordinis.”
be a similitude between a seal and a wax impression by the seal, similarly, the wisdom of God is, as it were, a seal, and His express similitude is in the rational creature.”264 On this view, God is an extrinsic cause in the work of grace, but He is by no means an absent cause. He might be extrinsic, but He is not exterior, we might say. God does not enter into composition with the soul, just as the seal and the wax do not enter into composition with one another, but He is not exterior to the soul, just as the seal enters into the wax in order to assimilate the wax to itself. In the case of the portrait, we may speak of Lisa Gherardini (or whoever she might have been) being in da Vinci’s Mona Lisa, but she is not in the painting in any real sense. In contrast, the seal impresses its image on the wax precisely by its contact with it. The impression is what makes full contact possible. Only if the wax is assimilated to the seal can the wax come into full and intimate contact with the seal. God, then, as interior exemplar cause, transforms the soul not by painting Himself into it from afar but by impressing His own being into the soul by giving Himself to it.

There is a problem, here, in that the schoolmen often speak of God as the exemplar cause of all things. To speak of God as the exemplar cause of the soul in the work of grace, in other words, does not seem to be an adequate account of the supernatural relationship between God and the soul if God is already the exemplar cause of the soul itself even without the work of grace. One way the schoolmen address this worry is to speak of grace as a similitude not only of the divine essence but of the divine persons. The authors of the Summa halensis hold, for

264 Summa halensis III, n. 622 (Quaracchi IV.2, p. 986): “Quo modo dicitur esse similitudo inter sigillum et ceram impressam in sigillo, similiter ipsa Dei sapientia est quasi sigillum, et eius similitudo expressa est in rationali creatura.”
instance, that grace does not simply conform us to the divine essence; for them, “grace is a similitude of the whole Trinity and assimilates us to the whole Trinity.”

We see this particularly when the authors of the *Summa halensis* consider the effects of grace. The *Summa halensis* introduces questions regarding three triads of the effects of grace: (1) purgation, illumination, and perfection, (2) vivification, assimilation, making-pleasing, and (3) justification, inciting, and meritorious-motion-eliciting. The first triad comprises the effects of grace as light, which is a similitude of the Son as highest Truth; the second triad comprises the effects of grace as life, which is a similitude of the Spirit as highest Goodness; the third triad comprises the effects of grace as mover, which is a similitude of the Father as highest Power.

Grace, then, assimilates us to and brings us into intimate contact with each of the three in a particular way according to their own intrinsic inner-Trinitarian characteristics. According to the authors of the *Summa halensis*, the work of grace belongs particularly to the Holy Spirit, but it is carried out by Him in such a way that the soul of the justified is brought into the life of the whole Trinity:

If it is asked which effect of grace is prior principally and simply, it ought to be said that the comparison of grace to the soul as life is prior to the other comparisons, because the configuration or conformation of the soul to the highest Goodness, which is the Holy Spirit, is prior; hence the Holy Spirit first configures us to Himself, and, thereafter, there is in us, based on that configuration, a communion of the whole Trinity.

---

265 *Summa halensis* III, n. 633 (Quaracchi IV.2, p. 1001): “Ideo gratia similitudo est totius Trinitatis et assimilat nos toti Trinitati.”

266 *Summa halensis* III, n. 633 (Quaracchi IV.2, p. 1001): “Respondeo: Intelligendum est quod gratia comparatur ad animam ut vita et ut motor et ut lux, quia gratia est similitudo summae Veritatis, et sic comparatur ut lux; est etiam similitudo summae Bonitatis, et sic comparatur ut vita; est etiam similitudo potestatis et virtutis, et sic comparatur ut motor arbitrii ad animam. Potentia autem attribuitur Patri, veritas Filio, bonitas Spiritui Sancto, et ideo gratia similitudo est totius Trinitatis et assimilat nos toti Trinitati. Secundum autem quod comparatur ut lux, eo quod est similitudo primae Veritatis, sumuntur tres effectus gratiae; secundum quod comparatur ut vita, eo quod est similitudo summae Bonitatis, sumuntur tres alii effectus; secundum vero quod comparatur ut motor, scilicet eo quod est similitudo summae potestatis sive virtutis, sunt eius effectus tres, scilicet justificare, excitare, motus meritorios elicere.”

267 *Summa halensis* III, n. 636 (Quaracchi IV.2, p. 1007): “Tamen, si quaeratur quis effectus gratiae prior est principaliter et simpliciter, dicendum quod prior est comparatio gratiae ad animam ut vita quam aliae comparationes,
The Holy Spirit’s indwelling presence first conforms us to Himself, then to the Son, and finally to the Father. The progress of our relationship with God in the economy of salvation, then, is the opposite of the order of processions in the immanent life of God. In the immanent life of God, the order is Father, Son, Spirit. In the economy of salvation, we return to the Father through the Son in the Spirit: “For through [the Son] both of us [Jews and Gentiles] have access in one Spirit to the Father” (Eph. 2:18, NRSV).

This way of understanding the relationship between God and the soul in grace proved remarkably fruitful. Bonaventure, too, affirms that both uncreated and created grace are in the soul of the justified. The Holy Spirit comes to indwell, and the created habit is infused. For Bonaventure, “all right thinking people concede that the gift of grace is in the just, and they believe also that there is in him the Uncreated Gift which is the Holy Spirit. And this is determined by faith and Scripture, and, therefore, whoever thinks the contrary of this is a heretic.”

Like the authors of the *Summa halensis*, Bonaventure also understands the relationship between the graced soul and the indwelling Holy Spirit as that of transformed to exemplar form:

> It is necessary that some gift be posited in the soul which informs the soul itself. But God is in no way able to be the *perfecting* form, although He could be in the *ratio* of an *exemplar* form. Therefore, beyond the Uncreated Gift, which is God, it is necessary to posit a created gift for making the soul pleasing.

---

268 Bonaventure, *Sentences* II, d. 26, a. 1, q. 2, resp. (Quaracchi II, p. 635): “Et ideo omnes recte intelligentes concedunt, in iustis esse gratiae donum, et credunt etiam, in eis esse donum increatum, quod est Spiritus sanctus. Et hoc a fide et a Scriptura determinatur; et ideo, qui contrarium huius sentiret, esset haereticus.”

269 Bonaventure, *Sentences* II, d. 26, a. 1, q. 2 (Quaracchi II, p. 634): “Necessum est, aliud donum ponit in anima, quod sit ipsius animae informativum. Sed Deusnullius potest esse forma perficiens, quamvis possit se habere in ratione formae exemplaris: ergo praeter donum increatum, quod Deus est, ad hoc quod anima gratificetur, necesse est ponere donum creatum.”
Bonaventure thus distinguishes two kinds of form—a perfecting form (which, presumably, enters into composition with what it informs) and an exemplar form (which, presumably, does not). Bonaventure, too, appeals to the metaphor of the seal and wax: “For, properly speaking, the image [of God in the soul] consists in the unity of essence and the trinity of powers, according to which the soul is begotten by the highest Trinity itself to be sealed (sigillari) with the image of similitude, which consists in grace and the theological virtues.”

Bonaventure, too, appeals to the metaphor of the seal and wax: “For, properly speaking, the image [of God in the soul] consists in the unity of essence and the trinity of powers, according to which the soul is begotten by the highest Trinity itself to be sealed (sigillari) with the image of similitude, which consists in grace and the theological virtues.”

The highest Trinity comes to indwell the soul (which is the image of the Trinity) and to thereby impress on it the infused habits of grace and the theological virtues (i.e., faith, hope, and charity) as the image of similitude.

Aquinas likewise affirms that in addition to the created habit of grace infused into the soul, “there is a certain gift given freely which is indeed uncreated, namely, the Holy Spirit.” Similarly, in his treatment of charity, Aquinas assures us that affirming a created habit of charity in the soul does not entail a denial that “the Holy Spirit, who is Uncreated Charity, is in the person having created charity.” Like the authors of the Summa halensis and Bonaventure, Aquinas, too, understands the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in terms of exemplar form: “God is

---

270 Bonaventure, Sentences I, d. 3, pt. 2, a. 2, q. 1, resp. (Quaracchi I, p. 89): “Nam proprie loquendo, imago consistit in unitate essentiae et trinitate potentiuum, secundum quas anima nata est ab illa summa Trinitate sigillari imagine similitudinis, quae consistit in gratia et virtutibus theologicis.”

271 Aquinas, Sentences II, d. 26, q. 1, a. 1, resp. (Mandonnet II, p. 669): “Est enim quoddam donum gratis datum quod quidem increatum est, scilicet Spiritus sanctus.”

272 Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de caritate, q. 1, a. 1, resp. (Marietti II, p. 755): “Relinquitur igitur quod oporteat esse quendam habitum caritatis in nobis creatum, qui sit formale principium actus dilectionis. Nec tamen per hoc excluditur quin Spiritus sanctus, qui est caritas increata, sit in homine caritatem creatam habente.”
not the form of the soul, except its exemplar form.”273 Such exemplar formal causality, Aquinas insists, requires the intimate and immediate contact between God and the soul:

Because grace is posited as uniting the soul to the final end, it is not able to be understood except either through the mode of formal cause or through the mode of efficient cause. If through the mode of efficient cause, it would be the case that some created substance would be a medium between the soul and God, which would join it to God; in this case, the soul would not be immediately made pleasing and glorified by God, which is alien to the faith.274

In other words, no conclusion can be allowed to stand so long as it entails that God and the soul are joined through some medium that stands between them. In such a case, God and the soul would be joined precisely by some separating medium, as is the case when we join two slices of bread by means of peanut butter. Aquinas insists that we must not understand the union between God and the soul in this way. Whatever account of grace we give, it must not offend the faith by denying immediate contact between the soul and God as its final end. For Aquinas, as for the authors of the Summa halensis and Bonaventure, the habit of grace does not stand between the soul and God; grace is precisely the transformation of the soul that enables full and intimate contact between the soul and its God.275

All of Scotus’s great scholastic forebears thus argue that the soul and the indwelling Holy Spirit are related as transformed and interior transforming exemplar form. The infused habit of grace is not what transforms us. The Holy Spirit Himself transforms us, and the created habit is

273 Aquinas, Sentences II, d. 26, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5 (Mandonnet II, p. 670): “Deus autem non est forma animae, nisi exemplaris.”

274 Aquinas, Sentences II, d. 26, q. 1, a. 2, resp. (Mandonnet II, p. 671): “Cum enim ponatur gratia esse conjungens animam fini ultimo, hoc non potest intelligi nisi vel per modum formae vel per modum efficientis. Si per modum efficientis, sic oporteret aliquam substantiam creatam esse medium inter animam et Deum, quae eam Deo conjungeret: et sic anima non immediate a Deo gratificaretur et glorificaretur, quod est alienum a fide.”

275 For a helpful account of Aquinas’s understanding of the relationship between created grace and the indwelling Holy Spirit and a defence of this view against some common objections, see Bruce D. Marshall, “Ex Occidente Lux? Aquinas and Eastern Orthodox Theology,” Modern Theology 20, no. 1 (2004): 28-30.
the very transformation of the soul. There is a weakness, of course, in the metaphor of the seal and the wax. The interior presence of the seal is a *sufficient* condition for the transformation of the wax because the seal cannot be *in* the wax unless the wax is thus transformed. The problem is that the interior presence of the seal is not a *necessary* condition for this impression. After impressing its image in the wax, the impression remains even after the seal has been removed. Many of the thirteenth-century schoolmen were unhappy with this weakness in the otherwise helpful metaphor. To compensate for it, some of them propose that we think instead of the impression of a seal in a more plastic substance like water or air. Matthew of Aquasparta, for example, argues that “just as an impression made by a seal in a fluid material or nature like air or water does not remain unless the seal is present...so the impression of grace in the changeable soul does not remain unless God is present.”²⁷⁶ For the great lights of the thirteenth century, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is both necessary and sufficient for the presence of the created habit of grace. The created habit of grace cannot exist in the soul unless the Holy Spirit indwells, and if the Holy Spirit indwells, the created habit of grace cannot fail to exist. The two do not simply happen to go together in the actual economy of salvation; there are no possible economies of salvation in which one is bestowed without the other.

**Scotus on Uncreated and Created Grace**

While Scotus denies many of the necessity claims of his forebears regarding the infusion of grace, I have not found anything to suggest that he wanted to deny this one. On the contrary, several passages indicate that he was in full agreement with the standard thirteenth-century

---

²⁷⁶ Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* 7, resp. (Doucet, p. 184): “Tamen, sicut impressio facta in materia vel natura fluxibili a sigillo, utpote in aëre vel aqua, non manet, nisi praeacente sigillo, non quod fiat semper nova impressio, ita impressio gratiae in anima, quae vertibilis est, non manet, nisi Deo praeacente, non semper novam gratiam imprimente, sed eam sua praesentia conservante.”
position. Scotus maintains, for instance, the distinction between uncreated and created charity: “Just as it does not follow that indwelling Uncreated Wisdom is immediately a form of the intellect, especially if it is active, so neither will Uncreated Charity be immediately the reason why our will is moved to a meritorious act.”²⁷⁷ Scotus is arguing that the uncreated gifts of the divine persons do not entail the absence of corresponding created habits. Even though the Word comes really to indwell the soul as Uncreated Wisdom and the Spirit comes really to indwell the soul as Uncreated Charity, we still need the infusion of the supernatural habits of faith and charity.

As we will see below, Scotus likewise affirms that the bestowal of the divine person and the created habit do not simply happen to go together in the actual economy of salvation. The two are not only fittingly bestowed together; they are necessarily bestowed together. One cannot be given without the other in any economy of salvation. Scotus thus agrees with his great forebears that, (1) the infusion of charity and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit are mutually necessary and sufficient conditions for one another because, (2) created charity is a participation in the Holy Spirit as indwelling Uncreated Charity.

*Created charity as necessary and sufficient for the indwelling of the Holy Spirit*

Scotus defends the Lombard’s position that the Holy Spirit is the love with which we love God by pointing out that the Lombard does not deny all infused supernatural habits. The Lombard elsewhere affirms the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in baptized children, and Scotus takes this as sufficient for the Lombard’s admission of a created habit of grace. The argument

²⁷⁷ Scotus, *Reportatio I-A*, d. 17, pt. 1, q. 1, n. 35 (Wolter-Bychkov, p. 470): “Sed sicut non sequitur quod sapientia increata inhabitans non est immediata forma intellectus, praecipue si sit activus, sic nec caritas increata erit immediata ratio movendi voluntatem ad actum meritorium.”
seems to be that no one who affirms the Holy Spirit’s indwelling of baptized children can deny that a created habit is infused into the soul:

The Master does not deny every supernatural habit. He himself indeed, in distinction 37 of the first book, in the chapter ‘That also is marvelous’, adduces Augustine to Dardanus saying that “to the temple of God belong sanctified children, who are not able to know God”; therefore, God dwells in a child who, however, cannot have an elicited act about God. This indwelling, which belongs to a regenerated child and not to some other, cannot exist in the child without a supernatural habit; for it cannot be posited there either because of an act, because a child has (and can have) no such act, or because of nature alone, because God does not indwell some other non-regenerated child, although the same nature nevertheless exists in him.278

The Lombard says nothing regarding created habits in what was to become distinction 37 of the first book of his Sentences, but Scotus takes it as sufficient for affirming a created habit of grace that one affirms the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in children. Scotus clearly affirms that “this indwelling…cannot exist in the child without a supernatural habit.”

Scotus makes the same claim that a created habit is necessary for divine indwelling in the Reportatio: “God would not inhabit the soul any more than in wood or a stone unless in the soul some habit is posited.”279 The context of the argument makes it clear that the habit he has in mind is the supernatural habit of charity which, again, Scotus thinks numerically identical to the Lombard’s purported created habit of grace. Without a created habit of charity infused into the soul by God, there can be no divine indwelling. The infusion of a created habit of grace, or charity, is logically necessary, Scotus is arguing, for the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.

278 Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 17, pt. 1, q. 2, n. 165 (Vatican V, p. 217): “Quantum ad tertium articulum, posset dici quod Magister non negat omnem habitum supernaturalem. Ipse quippe distinctione 37 primi, capitulo illo ‘Illud quoque mirabile’, adducit Augustinum Ad Dardanum, dicentem quod ‘ad templum Dei pertinent pueri sanctificati, qui non valent cognoscere Deum’; ergo Deus inhabitat parvulum, qui tamen non potest actum elicitum habere circa Deum. Ista inhabitatio, quae competit parvulo regenerato et non alii, non potest esse sine habitu supernaturali in ipso parvulo: nec enim potest poni propter actum, quia talem non habet (nec habere potest), nec propter solam naturam, quia non inhabitat alium parvulum non-regeneratum, cum tamen in eo sit eadem natura.”

Scotus also affirms that the created habit of grace is sufficient for the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. No one can possess the created supernatural habit of charity unless they are indwelt by the Holy Spirit. We see this, for instance, when comparing parallel passages in the *Lectura* and *Ordinatio* where Scotus argues that charity can only be lost demeritoriously. In the *Lectura*, Scotus simply speaks of the annihilation of charity: “Hence such is necessary by precept and ordination, because *de facto*—because of the transgression of the commandment—charity ceases in the soul, because God annihilates it.”

Here, Scotus merely speaks of the annihilation of charity, but in the corresponding discussion in the *Ordinatio*, Scotus instead says that “a transgression of the commandment does not positively corrupt the act, or even the habit, of loving God; rather, it earns demerit, so that God withdraws Himself (*se subtrahat*), with the result that neither the act nor the habit can be present.” Notice the strong modal language that Scotus employs. God withdraws Himself, and neither the act nor the habit is able (*possit*) to remain.

Scotus thinks of the annihilation of charity and the withdrawal of divine indwelling as co-extensive. Withdrawal of divine indwelling, then, is sufficient for annihilation of created charity. As we saw in the previous chapter, the infused habit of charity does not cease by virtue of a positive act of annihilation on God’s part. The infused habit of charity is not annihilated because God does something new but because He stops doing something He was doing before, namely, continually pouring charity into the heart. What we additionally see here is that God continually pours charity into our hearts precisely by virtue of the indwelling of His Holy Spirit. The Holy

---


281 Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 28, q. 1, n. 17 (Vatican X, p. 89): “[T]ransgressio enim praecepti non corrumpit positive actum diligendi Deum, nec etiam habitum, sed demeretur ut Deus se subtrahat, ut neque actus neque habitus possit inesse.”
Spirit does not pour charity into the soul from the outside, as it were; charity is infused by the Holy Spirit who is given to us (Rom. 5:5). Scotus thus affirms that the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and the infusion of charity are mutually necessary and sufficient conditions for one another. If the Holy Spirit indwells the soul, the soul cannot fail to have a created habit of charity; if the Holy Spirit withdraws from the soul, the soul cannot fail to lose the created habit of charity. The relationship between the two does not depend on a divine ordination. God has not simply decided to give the two gifts together in the actual economy of salvation. There are no possible economies of salvation in which one is given without the other.

*Created charity as participation in Uncreated Charity*

Scotus understands the infusion of the created habit and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit to be so closely linked together that they transpire at one and the same rational instant. In doing so, he contradicts Richard’s account of the relationship between the two. Richard of Middleton locates the indwelling of the Holy Spirit at a rational instant posterior to that of the infusion of grace:

> Since giving is ordered to having and rational creatures have the Holy Spirit on account of the fact that they have charity, which is a gift appropriated to the Holy Spirit (because the capacity for enjoying the Holy Spirit is in the creature through charity), we have charity earlier in the order of nature than we have the Holy Spirit simply; because, nevertheless, the Holy Spirit is the efficient cause of our charity, I say that the operating Holy Spirit is in us earlier in the order of nature than we have charity, because we have it [charity] through the operation of the Holy Spirit.282

---

282 Richard of Middleton, *Sentences* I, d. 14, q. 2, ad 4 (Brixiae I, p. 134): “Ad quartum dico, quod cum dare ordinetur ad habere, et creatura rationalis habeat spiritum sanctum per hoc, quod habet charitatem, quae est donum spiritui sancto appropriatum: quia per charitatem est in creatura facultas ad freundum spiritu sancto: prius ordine naturae habemus charitatem, quam simpliciter habeamus spiritum sanctum, quia tamen nostrae charitatis causa efficiens est spiritus sanctus, dico, quod prius ordine naturae est in nobis operans spiritus sanctus, quam charitatem habeamus, quia ipsam per spiritus sancti operationem habemus.”
For Richard, the Holy Spirit operates in us efficiently prior to the infusion of grace but does not yet indwell the soul. Indwelling, presumably, requires something more than efficient causality. According to Richard, the Holy Spirit does not indwell the soul (i.e., He is not given to the soul and possessed by it) until after it has charity. Charity, then, explains how it is that the Holy Spirit indwells the soul because charity is that by which we enjoy the Holy Spirit. The soul first receives the habit of charity by the efficient causality appropriated to the Holy Spirit; it then receives the Holy Spirit Himself by eliciting acts of enjoying the Holy Spirit. This way of understanding divine indwelling was not unique to Richard. Many of the schoolmen will often explain divine indwelling in virtue of certain acts that terminate on the divine persons and the habits that enable such acts. Aquinas, for instance, will often argue that “above and beyond this common mode [of God’s omnipresence], however, there is one special mode belonging to the rational nature wherein God is said to be present as the object known is in the knower, and the beloved in the lover.”

There is a problem with this view, of which Richard seems to be aware. His position here seems to entail that the Holy Spirit is given precisely by our use of infused charity. Elsewhere, Richard argues that the habit of charity is necessary so that the Holy Spirit will be possessed by the soul and united to it even when the soul is not eliciting an act of love for God. Perhaps the view is that the Holy Spirit dwells in the soul that loves Him and that, by extension, we can say that He indwells the one who is able to love Him (i.e., the one having the habit of charity).

---


284 Richard of Middleton, *Sentences* I, d. 17, a. 1, q. 1, resp. (Brixiae I, p. 156): “Ad tria tamen necessarius est in voluntate charitatis habitus ad hoc, scilicet, ut per ipsum voluntas etiam non actu agens habeat spiritum sanctum: ita ut sibi habitualiter unita remaneat...”
Whatever Richard’s position is, Scotus clearly disagrees with him on how to order the rational instants. If, as Richard suggests, the habit of charity is infused at a rational instant distinct from and prior to the giving of the Holy Spirit, Scotus can simply argue that charity could be infused, and the Holy Spirit not given. To recall Scotus’s **metaphysical-priority axiom**, “What is naturally prior can coexist with the opposite of what is naturally posterior.”285 If the indwelling of the Holy Spirit occurs at a rational instant after that at which charity is infused, God could infuse charity and stop short of giving the Holy Spirit.

Perhaps for this reason, Scotus disagrees with Richard’s position (though Richard is nowhere mentioned):

> As I understand it, in the first rational instant (*instanti naturae*), grace or charity is in the soul and, simultaneously, the Holy Spirit inhabits. Moreover, in the second rational instant (*signo naturae*), there is faith in the intellect, hope in whatever power it is posited in, and no other habit besides grace. Moreover, in the third rational instant, [the will] elicits an act of faith by means of the habit of faith and an act of hope by means of the habit of hope. In the fourth rational instant, the will elicits an act of loving, not by a virtue distinct from the grace through which [the Holy Spirit] inhabits, but by means of the informing habit and the inhabiting Holy Spirit.286

On this account, the infusion of grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit are so closely related that they occur at precisely the same rational instant, three rational instants prior to that at which the will elicits an act of love for God. For Scotus, then, it is not the act of love that explains divine indwelling but divine indwelling that explains the act. It is only once the Holy Spirit has taken up special residence in the soul that the soul is then capable of performing acts that


286 Scotus, *Lectura* I, d. 17, pt. 1, q. 1, n. 38 (Vatican XVII, p. 194): “Intelligo, igitur sic, quod in primo instanti naturae gratia sive caritas sit in anima et simul inhabitat Spiritus Sanctus; in secundo autem signo naturae, est fides in intellectu, et spes, in quacumque potential ponitur, et nullus alius habitus a gratia; in tertio autem instanti naturae, elicit actum fidei mediante habitu fidei et actum sperandi mediante habitu spei; et in quarto instanti naturae, elicit actum diligendi, non virtute distincta a gratia per quam inhabitat, sed voluntas mediante habitu informante et inhabitante Spiritu Sancto elicit actum dilectionis.”
terminate on Him. This is because the Holy Spirit comes to indwell us precisely by supernaturally imprinting His own inner-Trinitarian character of love into the soul. This supernatural impression does take the form of a created habit that makes possible certain kinds of acts, but the exercise of these acts is not essential to the Holy Spirit’s indwelling nor does it explain the Holy Spirit’s indwelling.

As we saw in the previous chapter, charity and grace are numerically identical but formally non-identical for Scotus. The beautifying function of the habit is non-separable but conceptually distinct from its action-enabling function. For Scotus, it is not the action-enabling function that explains divine indwelling but the beautifying function. It is not that the Holy Spirit indwells us because we can perform certain kinds of acts but the other way around: we can perform supernatural acts of love for God because the Holy Spirit indwells us precisely as inner-Trinitarian Love, which cannot fail to transform us into the same image.

Scotus’s defense of the Lombard is important in another way in that it additionally specifies the profound difference that charity makes. As we saw in the previous chapter, charity does not enable a different kind of act in us, but it does add supernatural goodness to an act already within our power. What we see here is that acts in charity and acts of acquired friendship for God differ in an additional way: acts of love for God by natural friendship alone (or no habit at all) are merely our acts, but acts of love for God in charity are a participation in the love act at the center of inner-Trinitarian life.

To see this more clearly, it will be helpful to see why Scotus thinks the Lombard has a better account of charity than Aquinas does. As noted in the previous chapter, Aquinas thinks grace is infused into the essence of the soul and charity into one of the powers of the soul, namely, the will. In Aquinas’s view, the Lombard has erred by positing one too few created
habits (i.e., grace in the essence but no charity in the will). Scotus argues that it was Aquinas, rather than the Lombard, who had erred. The Lombard had not erred by positing one too few infused habits; Aquinas had erred by positing one too many (i.e., a distinct habit of charity in addition to the habit of grace). Given that the Lombard affirms a created habit of grace in distinction 37, Scotus argues that the Lombard is merely denying a habit of charity as distinct from the habit of grace in distinction 17:

Hence, by means of grace and the inhering and inhabiting of the whole Trinity, and appropriated to the Holy Spirit, the will elicits a meritorious act, so that the Holy Spirit makes the soul pleasing by some habit when He inhabits it; and afterward, two acts are elicited, namely believing and hoping, and on account of the imperfection of the acts, two imperfect habits are posited for eliciting those acts. Hence, the Holy Spirit by means of a mediating habit cooperates with the acts of believing and hoping; but the Holy Spirit without a mediating habit cooperates with the will in eliciting a pleasing act; and so the Holy Spirit is the form of the virtues.  

By ‘mediating habit’ Scotus means a habit other than the habit by which the Holy Spirit indwells (i.e., grace, or charity). The habit by which the Holy Spirit indwells is sufficient for enabling the will to perform an act of charity, but additional ‘mediating habits’ are necessary for the Holy Spirit to cooperate with the intellect’s act of faith and the will’s act of hope. Scotus holds that this is the right view because the Holy Spirit comes to indwell the soul immediately through grace, and, by that indwelling, to imprint His very own perfection into the soul. Because the Holy Spirit is Uncreated Charity, the sheer fact of His indwelling (and the habit of charity which necessarily attends that indwelling) is sufficient to make charitative acts possible without any additional intervening supernatural habit: “The Holy Spirit is not formally our love; still, He is

---

287 Scotus, Lectura I, d. 17, pt. 1, q. 1, n. 41 (Vatican XVII, pp. 195-96): “Unde mediante gratia et inexistente et inhabitante tota Trinitate, et appropriate Spiritu Sancto, elicit voluntas actum meritorium, ita quod Spiritus Sanctus gratificat animam aliquo habitu, inhabitando eam; et post eliciuntur duo actus, scilicet credendi et sperandi, et propter imperfectionem actus ponuntur duo habitus imperfecti ad eliciendum illos actus. Unde Spiritus Sanctus mediante habitu medio cooperatur actui credendi et sperandi; sed Spiritus Sanctus sine habitu medio cooperatur voluntati ad hoc quod elicit actum gratum; et sic Spiritus Sanctus est forma virtutum.”
charity formally according to the same ratio of charity with our charity, and therefore has an immediation for eliciting an act of loving, which He does not have with respect to the acts of believing or hoping.”

Created charity, Scotus argues, has the same ratio as God’s own love for Himself. As Scotus says elsewhere, “Charity is the noblest habit, because it receives its specific form [directly] from the ultimate end that is loved in itself.”

Because Uncreated Charity (i.e., the indwelling Holy Spirit) and the created charity that He imprints in the soul fall under the same ratio, acts performed in charity have a special relation to the indwelling Holy Spirit that acts performed by the will with acquired friendship alone do not. For Scotus, then, acts of love done in charity are different from those done by our natural powers and acquired habits alone not because the substance of the acts is different or merely because charity makes the acts more intense than they otherwise would have been. They differ, additionally, because the charitative act is a participation in God’s own love of Himself.

Scotus explicitly describes created charity as a participation in Uncreated Charity in his response to one of the objections against a created habit. The objection quotes Augustine: “No gift is more excellent than this gift, which is love; and no gift of God is more excellent than the Holy Spirit; therefore, the Holy Spirit is love.” Scotus’s response is worth quoting in full:

About his second argument, namely about the most excellent gift, one could say that the argument holds as follows: ‘no created gift is more excellent than created charity, therefore charity is perfection simply, and includes of its nature no imperfection or

---

288 Scotus, Lectura I, d. 17, pt. 1, q. 1, n. 119 (Vatican XVII, p. 217): “Spiritus Sanctus non sit formaliter caritas nostra; est tamen formaliter caritas secundum eandem rationem caritatis cum caritate nostra, et ideo habet immediationem ad eliciendum actum diligendi, quam non habet respectu actus credendi vel sperandi.”

289 Scotus, Reportatio IV-A, d. 14, q. 2, n. 58 (Bychkov-Pomplun, p. 567): “Charitas autem est habitus nobilissimus, quia sortitur speciem a fine ultimo in se amato.”

290 Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 17, pt. 1, q. 1, n. 2 (Vatican V, p. 140): “Item, XV De Trinitate cap. 19: ‘Nullum est donum excellentius isto dono, quod est caritas; et nullum est donum Dei excellentius Spiritu Sancto; ergo Spiritus Sanctus est caritas’. Istud argumentum non valeret nisi esset de caritate formali et quod praecise Spiritus Sanctus esset illa.”
limitation.’ The proof of this consequence is that more eminent than any gift which is not perfection simply is some other gift in creatures that is perfection simply. Further: every perfection simply belongs more formally to the Holy Spirit from the fact that He is the simply most excellent gift, and thereby from God being so (because God can give Himself), and so the most excellent gift is God. Therefore, the Holy Spirit, from His being the simply most excellent gift, is every perfection simply. But there stands along with this the fact that this ‘perfection simply’ is participated in by us and is essentially other than the divine person who is perfect by this perfection simply.291

Our created charity is a participation in indwelling Uncreated Charity. Elsewhere, Scotus is even willing to say that an act in charity “is our act formally but effectively from God or is an act of God.”292 The created habit of charity, then, is a participation in the Holy Spirit, and our acts in charity can thus be thought of as God’s own act of love in us—a participation in the very love act of God for Himself. For Scotus, then, created and uncreated charity are mutually necessary and sufficient conditions for each other precisely because created charity is precisely a supernatural participation in indwelling Uncreated Charity.

The Scotistic Inversion

While Scotus is certainly an innovator in his rejection of a variety of his great forebears’ necessity claims regarding the infusion of grace, he is clearly a traditionalist on the crucial question of the relationship between the infusion of grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. In fact, by denying all of the necessity claims that tie the infusion of grace to our salvation,

---

291 Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 17, pt. 1, q. 2, n. 172 (Vatican V, p. 221): “De secundo argumento eius, videlicet de dono excellentissimo, dici posset quod argumentum sic tenet: ‘nullum donum creatum est excellentius creatae caritate, ergo caritas est perfectio simpliciter et non ex ratione sui includens imperfectionem vel limitationes’. - Consequentia ista probatur, quia omni dono quod non est perfectio simpliciter, eminentius est aliud donum in creaturis quod est perfectio simpliciter. Ulterius: omnis perfectio simpliciter formalius competit Spiritui Sancto, ex hoc quod ipse est donum simpliciter excellentissimum, ac per hoc Deus (quia Deus potest dare se ipsum), et ita excellentissimum donum est Deus; ergo Spiritus Sanctus, ex hoc quod est donum excellentissimum simpliciter, est omnis perfectio simpliciter. Sed cum hoc stat quod ista ‘perfectio simpliciter’ sit in nobis participata, et essentialiter alia ab illa persona divina, quae est perfecta hac perfectione simpliciter.”

292 Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 17, pt. 1, q. 1, n. 37 (Wolter-Bychkov, p. 470): “Est actus noster formaliter, sed effective a Deo sive est actus Dei.”
Scotus is able to see that the intelligibility of the infusion of grace is grounded not in its relationship to us and our salvation but in its relationship to the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.

That is to say, what explains the infusion of grace is not some divine volition with respect to us but some divine volition with respect to the mission of the Holy Spirit.

Indeed, given the intrinsic goodness of the Holy Spirit’s mission and indwelling, Scotus locates the infusion of grace very early, indeed, in the order of divine intentions:

Therefore, since God wills most reasonably…He first wills the end. And in this His act is perfect and His will happy. Second, He wills those things that are immediately ordered to the end, namely, by predestinating the elect, who immediately attain the end. This He does by way of reciprocity, as it were, by willing that those others love the same object along with Him….For someone who loves himself ordinately, and consequently not with inordinate jealousy or envy, wills in this second way to have other lovers, and this is to will that others have His love (amorem suum) in themselves, and this is to predestinate them if He wills this good for them finally. Third, He wills those things that are necessary for attaining this end, namely, the goods of grace.293

It might be the case that amorem suum should be read as an objective genitive (i.e., ‘love for Him’), in which case either charitative love or acquired friendship would suffice, but it might also be a possessive genitive, as I have translated it here (i.e., “His love”). If the latter reading is correct, God has not simply willed to be loved by others with whatever love is naturally proper to them (acquired friendship in the case of human beings). Instead, He has willed to be loved by others with His own love—a love that is a supernatural participation in His own love for Himself.

293 Scotus, Ordinatio III, d. 32, q. 1, n. 21 (Vatican X, pp. 136-37): “Sic etiam Deus rationabilissime…primo vult finem, et in hoc est actus suus perfectus et intellectus eius perfectus et voluntas eius beata; secundo vult illa quae immediate ordinatur in ipsum, praeestinando scilicet electos, qui scilicet immediate attingunt eum, et hoc quasi reflectendo, volendo alios condiligere idem obiectum secreum…: qui enim primo se amat ordinate (et per consequens non inordinate, zelando vel inviendo), secundo vult alios habere condiligentes, et hoc est velle alios habere amorem suum in se, — et hoc est praeestinare eos, si velit eos habere huiusmodi bonum finaliter et aeternaliter; tertio autem vult illa quae sunt necessaria ad attingendum hunc finem, scilicet bona gratiae.”
The final sentence in the quotation seems to require that we read the passage this way, since Scotus says that the “goods of grace” are “necessary for attaining this end.” As we have already seen, Scotus spends a great deal of time arguing precisely that grace (i.e., charity) is not necessary for loving God above all in this life. Having established that Scotus maintains the connection between the infusion of grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, we can now see that ‘the goods of grace’ are indeed necessary if God wills not simply love for Him but His own love in us by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit as Uncreated Charity. In other words, God does not first will something with respect to us, and then will the indwelling of the Holy Spirit to make that possible. Instead, God first wills the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit (i.e., ‘that others have His love in themselves’), and only then wills the infusion of grace which is necessary for that indwelling. For Scotus’s great forebears, the answer to the question of the necessity of grace was that we could not otherwise be saved. This cannot be the answer for Scotus, as we have seen. For Scotus, the answer to the question of the necessity of grace is that God willed to externalize His own inner-Trinitarian love through the sending of the Holy Spirit.

The critical edition of the Reportatio is still forthcoming, but Balić provides an edition of Reportatio III, d. 7, q. 4, which makes the point even more forcefully:

First, God loves (diliget) Himself; second, He desires Himself in others (diliget se aliis), and so His love is pure; third, He wills that He be loved by those who are able to love Him most highly, speaking concerning the love of one exterior.294

Here, Scotus introduces a second rational instant between God’s love of Himself and His desire to be loved by some others. What he means by diliget se aliis is not entirely clear, but it would be easy to interpret this in line with what I have been suggesting here. Before God wills our love for

---

294 Scotus, Reportatio III, d. 7, q. 4 (Balić, pp. 14-15): “Primo Deus diliget se, secundo diliget se aliis, et iste est amor castus; tertio vult se diligi ab illo qui potest eum summe diligere, loquendo de amore alicuius extrinseci…”
Him, He wills that His own love be in some others by the mission and indwelling of the Holy Spirit. God thus wills the infusion of grace because He wills that His own inner-Trinitarian love be in some outside of His inner-Trinitarian life.

While Scotus is often maligned for his soteriological voluntarism and its alleged deleterious effects on theology, it is precisely this voluntarism that sheds light on the proper place of the infusion of grace in the order of divine volitions. Scotus is not arguing that God must create some hearts into whom He might send His Spirit. God does not have to create anything at all, and even if He freely wills to create, He need not supernaturalize nature. What Scotus is arguing is that, if God freely wills to create and if He freely wills to supernaturalize nature, He cannot fail to do these two things in a certain order. Given that the order of grace is categorically greater and closer to the end than the order of nature, God must first will the order of grace and then the order of nature. God did not first will to create and then will to supernaturalize nature; God first willed grace and then willed nature as the condition of grace. Nature exists so that God might have something to supernaturalize.

Given Scotus’s **ordered-willing axiom** (God first wills the end and then what is ordered to the end), this order not only obtains in the actual world but in all possible worlds in which God wills both nature and grace. That is to say, God could have freely willed to refrain entirely from creating and He could have freely willed to create nature without grace, but if He freely wills both nature and grace, He cannot fail to will nature for the sake of grace.

It thus cannot be the case that grace is willed as the contingent remedy for nature’s fall. In his reflections on predestination, Scotus argues that all of our acts and merits (and, we might easily add, remission for sins) are caused by God’s will to give glory and grace, not the other way around:
He who in an ordered way wills the end and what is for the end wills the end first before any of the things for the end, and He wills other things for the end; therefore, since, in the whole process by which a creature capable of beatification is led to the perfect end, the ultimate end is perfect beatitude, God—willing something of this order for this person—first wills the end for this creature capable of beatification and as it were afterwards wills him other things, which are in the order of things that pertain to the end. But grace, faith, merits and good use of freewill, all these things are for the end (although some more remotely and others more near to it). Therefore, God wills beatitude for this person first before any of the other things; and He wills for him each of these others first before He foresees that he will have each of them, therefore not because of foreseeing any of these does He will him beatitude.295

Here, Scotus argues that grace and these other things are willed for the sake of glory and says nothing about the order between grace itself and these other things, but Scotus elsewhere argues that the will for grace comes earlier than at least the will for good use of free choice: “God wishes whatever He wished in an orderly fashion. Now He is Himself the end; the end that is closest to it is our beatitude; therefore, it is according to this order that God wishes: first beatitude before He wishes grace, and first grace before He wishes appropriate use.”296 Grace is closer to the end than good use of free choice, so it has to be willed first. The same, it seems, would go for merit and forgiveness of sins, so it cannot be the case that grace is willed for the sake of these things. Instead, it is they that are contingently willed for the sake of grace.

By maintaining the logically necessary connection between the infusion of grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, Scotus grounds the intelligibility of the order of grace in the

295 Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 41, q. 1, n. 41 (Vatican VI, pp. 332-33): “Primum probatur, quia ordinate volens finem et ea quae sunt ad finem, prius vult finem quam aliquod entium ad finem, et propter finem vult alia; ergo cum in toto processu quo creatura beatificabilis perducitur ad perfectum finem, finis ultimus sit perfecta beatitudo, Deus - volens huic aliquid istius ordinis - primo vult huic creaturae beatificabilis finem, et quasi posterius vult sibi alia, quae sunt in ordine illorum quae pertinent ad illum finem. Sed gratia, fides, merita et bonus usus liber arbitrii, omnia ista sunt ad istum finem (licet quaedam remotius et quaedam propinquius). Ergo prius vult Deus isti beatitudinem quam aliquod istorum; et prius vult ei quodcumque istorum quam praevideat ipsum habiturum quodcumque istorum, ergo propter nullum istorum praevissum vult ei beatitudinem.”

296 Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 41, q. 1, n. 60 (Wolter-Bychkov, pp. 503-504): “Deus ordinate vult quidquid vult: finis est ipsemet; finis autem propinquus huic est beatitudo nostra; ergo ordinate Deus vult prius beatitudinem quam gratiam, et prius gratiam quam bonum usum.”
Trinitarian life of God. Scotus’s voluntarism with respect to the connection between the infusion of grace and our salvation is not an exercise in speculative curiosity. On the contrary, it gives prominence to the connection between the infusion of grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and allows us to see that the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is not an accessory to our relationship with the Father and the Son but the other way around. It is our relationship in charity that is the accessory to the Spirit’s relationship with the Father and the Son. The Father and the Son did not send the Spirit into our hearts because our salvation was otherwise impossible; we exist so that there might be some hearts into whom the Holy Spirit might be sent.

After Scotus

While Scotus defended the traditional thirteenth-century position on the connection between the infusion of grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and indeed brings this connection into clearer focus by removing all other claims of necessity for the infusion of grace, the vast majority of the great schoolmen after Scotus dispensed with it altogether. There is nothing at all, most of them claimed, for which the infusion of grace is strictly necessary.

In the final section of this chapter, we will briefly consider five fourteenth-century schoolmen. First, we will look at Ockham and two of those under his general influence: Adam of Wodeham and Marsilius of Inghen. Second, we will turn to two fourteenth-century schoolmen outside of and generally opposed to Ockham’s influence (at least in the theology of grace): Gregory of Rimini and John of Ripa. While the two sets of fourteenth-century schoolmen hold contrary positions on a number of important issues in the theology of grace (e.g., on issues of predestination, grace, and free will), they all hold in common the real separability of the infusion of grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.

We begin with Ockham, Wodeham, and Inghen. Ockham argues that
The Holy Spirit is given in His own proper person, because something which is so given that it is able to be given circumscribing all other gifts is given in itself, and not only because some other thing is given; but the Holy Spirit is given in such a way that He is able to be given circumscribing all other gifts; therefore, He is given in Himself and not only in His gifts.297

In affirming that the Holy Spirit is given in Himself and not simply in His gifts, Ockham is entirely traditional, but Ockham makes the additional claim that the Holy Spirit can be given in Himself without any created gifts. Here Ockham takes a novel position, so far as I am aware. In the thirteenth century, to affirm that the Holy Spirit is given in Himself and not simply in His gifts was to affirm that the created habit of grace is not given in place of the Holy Spirit. Instead, the created habit of grace is given precisely by virtue of the Spirit’s self-gift or so that He can give Himself to us. In the fourteenth century, it became the consensus view that to affirm that the Holy Spirit is given in Himself and not simply in His gifts is to affirm that the Holy Spirit can be given without the infusion of grace. Ockham seems to think that this must be true if there is to be a true mission of the Holy Spirit.

Ockham denies, of course, that this ever happens in the actual economy of salvation. In the actual economy of salvation that God has freely established, “the Holy Spirit is not given except for the sanctification of the rational creature; but He does not sanctify the rational creature without His gifts.”298 In the actual economy of salvation, the infusion of grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit always go together, but the connection between them is only contingent.

297 Ockham, Sentences I, d. 14, q. 2 (OTh III, pp. 430-31): “Spiritus Sanctus in propria persona datur. Quia illud quod sic datur quod posset dari omni alio dono circumscripto, datur in se, et non tantum quia aliquid alius datur; sed Spiritus Sanctus sic datur quod posset dari omni alio dono circumscripto; igitur in se et non tantum in suo dono datur.”

298 Ockham, Sentences I, d. 14, q. 2 (OTh III, p. 431): “Spiritus Sanctus non datur nisi ad sanctificandum creaturam rationale; sed non sanctificat creaturam rationale sine suis donis.”
Ockham seems to think of divine indwelling primarily on the model of one human being giving herself to another human being in friendship:

Something is said to be given to someone when he is able to use it however he pleases, just as it is said that someone gives himself to another in this alone that he offers himself to him so that he will do what the other asks of him. But even if no other created gift is given to the rational creature, the Holy Spirit is able to be furnished to that rational creature for whatever it reasonably wants.299

Elsewhere, Ockham identifies all that he thinks strictly necessary for such furnishing:

The Holy Spirit is able to be given to a rational nature without charity or any other created gift whatsoever, because for the Holy Spirit to be given nothing more is required except that the rational creature is accepted as worthy of eternal life and that it is able to act meritoriously. But both of these are able to apply to a rational nature though the coexistence of the Holy Spirit without any other gift.300

For Ockham, then, there is no necessary connection between the infusion of grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. All that is required for divine indwelling is the Holy Spirit’s ‘coexistence’ with the soul which, in turn, is connected in some unspecified manner with divine acceptation and the possibility of eliciting meritorious acts, neither of which depends absolutely on the infusion of grace.

Those under Ockham’s influence largely agreed with him regarding the relationship between the infusion of grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Adam of Wodeham, for instance, argues that “the Holy Spirit is able to be given even if no created gift is given.”301

---

299 Ockham, Sentences I, d. 14, q. 2 (OTh III, p. 431): “Sed minorem probo, quia illud dicitur dari alicui quando potest illo uti ad aliquid agendum sicut placet. Sicut dicitur quod aliquis dat se ipsum alteri in hoc solo quod offert se ipsum sibi ut faciat quod alius dixerit sibi. Sed Spiritus Sanctus - si nullum donum creatum daret creaturae rationali - posset esse paratus quidquid creatura illa rationalis rationaliter vellet.”

300 Ockham, Quaestiones variae I, a. 2 (OTh VIII, p. 20): “Tertia conclusio est quod Spiritus Sanctus potest dari natuare rationali sine caritate vel quocumque alio dono creato. Quia ad hoc quod detur Spiritus Sanctus non plus requiritur nisi quod creatura rationalis acceptetur tamquam digna vita aeterna et quod possit meritorie agere. Sed omnia ista possunt competere natuare rationali per solam coexistentiam Spiritus Sancti sine omnia alio dono.”

that is strictly necessary for divine indwelling is that “in this instant and following, that rational creature would be capable, through special divine cooperation, of producing some effect...of which it was not capable previously.”  For Wodeham, all that is required for the Holy Spirit’s beginning to indwell is God’s volition to grant special divine cooperation from that point forward. Perhaps he intends this as a specification of what Ockham means by a divine person giving Himself to do what the rational creature reasonably requests. The Holy Spirit comes to indwell the soul, making it such that the soul is able, if it wants, to perform meritorious acts by special divine cooperation.

Marsilius of Inghen, likewise, affirms that “the Holy Spirit is not given without His created gifts according to current or ordained law” but that “according to the absolute power of God, the Holy Spirit can be given to the soul without a created gift.” He, too, joins divine indwelling closely to divine acceptation. The Holy Spirit, he tells us, “is able to approve a soul for eternal life and inhabit it anew without infusing some created gift to it.” Again, “by the absolute power of God it is possible (staret) that charity be given and, nevertheless, He would not inhabit the soul approving it for eternal life, because this is freely done.”

---


304 Marsilius of Inghen, *Sentences* I, q. 18 (Wieland-Noya-Hoenen-Schulze II, p. 249): “Potest enim approbare animam ad aeternam vitam et eam inhabitare de novo sine hoc, quod aliquod donum creatum ei infundat, quia hoc donum utique Deus libere infundit. Tertio dicitur quod etiam est possibile de potentia absoluta Dei dare dona et non dare Spiritum Sanctum. Patet, quia de potentia Dei absoluta staret quod caritatem dare et tamen animam non inhabitaret approbando eam ad vitam aeternam, quia hoc libere facit. Potest ergo dare donum creatum et non dare seipsum; potest etiam dare seipsum sine dono creato.”
It is not particularly surprising that those under Ockham’s influence would follow his lead in understanding what is necessary for divine indwelling. What is more surprising is that even some expressly opposed to Ockham affirm with him that the actual connection between the infusion of grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is only contingent. Gregory of Rimini, for instance, opposed the ‘Pelagianism’ he sees in the Ockhamist theology of grace, but agrees with Ockham’s position that the Holy Spirit can be given without any created gifts:

Everything that God can give to a human being is able to be given to him by God without anything else being given which is not essentially the same as Him or something of His nature. Therefore, it is possible for the Holy Spirit to be given to a human being, without any other created gift of the Holy Spirit being given to him. The consequence is clear, because the Holy Spirit is givable to human beings, as is clear from the first conclusion, and no created gift is essentially the same as the Holy Spirit or of the essence of the Holy Spirit.  

While Rimini agrees with Ockham’s position regarding the real separability of the infusion of grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, the strong connection that Ockham sees between indwelling and acceptation seems to be broken. Ockham, Wodeham, and Inghen all connect divine indwelling and divine acceptation in some way, but Rimini affirms that “someone could obtain eternal life not having the Holy Spirit in the way by which He is said to be had by a human being when He is temporally sent and given to him, although de facto and by the ordained power of God, no one is able to obtain eternal life not having the Holy Spirit and grace, because

---

305 Gregory of Rimini, Sentences I, dd. 14-16, q. 1 (Trapp-Marcolino-Noya II, p. 205): “Tertia conclusio est quod est possibile dari spiritum sanctum homini, absque quod detur aliquod donum; et loquor de dono creato. Hanc probo sic: Omne dabile a deo homini possibile est ei dari a deo, non dato aliquo, quod non sit essentialiter idem cum eo nec alicquid de essentia illius. Ergo possibile est dari spiritum sanctum homini, non dato ei aliquo dono spiritus sancti creato. Consequentia patet, quia spiritus sanctus est dabilis homini, ut patet ex prima conclusione, et nullum donum creatum est essentialiter idem cum spiritu sancto aut de essentia spiritus sancti. Antecedens autem probatur: Tum quia ipso concesso nulla sequitur contradicto.” The argument is an interesting one, but it seems to me that a representative of the thirteenth-century consensus view could simply say that, though the infusion of grace is neither essentially the same as the Holy Spirit nor something of His nature, it is, nonetheless, essential to the Holy Spirit’s givability. Rimini’s argument, in other words, should be that God is able to give anything givable by Him without anything that is the same as it, essential to it, or essential to its givability.
so God was pleased to ordain.”

Clearly, if you can be accepted to eternal life without the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, divine acceptance and divine indwelling are not necessarily connected. As to what this special presence of the Holy Spirit is, Rimini dares not reflect: “Just as the first mode, by which the whole Trinity itself is in every creature generally, is incomprehensible to us...so is this mode, by which the rational creature is said to be specially inhabited, is not able to be comprehended by us.” Divine indwelling, for Rimini, is simply an irreducible relation that entails nothing more than a divine mission.

One final fourteenth-century schoolman deserves special attention. John of Ripa, influenced by Scotus but diverging from him on a variety of issues, is often identified as an exception to the general rule that reflection on Uncreated Grace diminishes in the fourteenth century. Like Rimini, Ripa agrees with Ockham that the connection between the infusion of grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is contingent. In the actual economy of salvation, Ripa argues, the Uncreated Charity that is the indwelling Holy Spirit and the created charity infused into the soul are always given together, but “absolutely, it is possible for the created will to be interiorly sanctified through the Holy Spirit without the conferral of created charity or any other created gift whatsoever.”

---


308 John of Ripa, *Determinationes* I, q. 3, a. 3, p. 2, c. 4, corr. 1 (Combes, p. 438): “In qualibet voluntate per Spiritum sanctum sanctificata ponenda est de facto caritas habitualis create.”

309 John of Ripa, *Determinationes* I, q. 3, a. 3, p. 2, c. 4, corr. 2 (Combes, p. 438): “Absolute possible est voluntatem creatam per Spiritum sanctum interius sanctificari sine collatione caritatis create sive cujusvis alterius creati doni.”
Unlike Rimini, however, Ripa has more to say about divine indwelling than perhaps any other medieval schoolman before or after him. What he says about it is striking indeed. He denies that the efficient causality of the ‘moderns’ is sufficient for grounding divine indwelling. In contrast to these ‘modern’ proposals, Ripa insists on some kind of formal causality of the Holy Spirit with respect to the soul:

The union of the Holy Spirit to the mind is necessarily a causal union on the part of the Holy Spirit. This kind of union is not able to be according to a causal mode other than according to the mode of formal causality. In any intrinsic union of the Holy Spirit to the mind, the divine essence intrinsically actuates the rational creature as a form.

This formal causality, he reasons, cannot be the communication of the divine essence to the creature as its substantial form. It cannot be what he calls “real communication” or, elsewhere, “informing,” but it still has to be some kind of formal causality, presumably that of an accidental form, which he calls “vital change.”

The proposal is strikingly like the position in the *Summa halensis* as visited previously in this chapter. Ripa, in fact, quotes the *Summa halensis* on a number of occasions. Unlike the *Summa halensis* and the thirteenth-century consensus position in general, however, Ripa does not identify this ‘vital change’ in the soul as created charity. As already mentioned, Ripa thinks uncreated and created charity are really separable. The Holy Spirit can be given to us without

---

310 John of Ripa, *Conclusiones* I, d. 17, pt. 1, q. 1, a. 3 (Combes, p. 138) regarding how properly to interpret the Lombard: “Non solum posuit Spiritum sanctum ut caritatem assistere menti, sed etiam inexistere.”

311 John of Ripa, *Conclusiones* I, d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, cc. 4-6 (Combes, p. 126): “Unio Spiritus sancti ad mentem est necessario unio causalis ex parte Spiritus sancti. Non est possibile hujusmodi unionem esse secundum alium modum causalem quam secundum modum causalitatis forme. In qualibet Spiritus sancti ad mentem unione intrinseca, divina essentia intrinsece actuat creaturam rationalem ut forma.”

312 John of Ripa, *Conclusiones* I, d. 14, q. 2, a. 2, cc. 1-3 (Combes, p. 127): “Omnis formalis et intrinseca actuatio est vel per realem communicationem vel per vitalem immutationem. Sola actuatio divine essentie per vitalem immutationem potest esse et non esse per plenitudinem. Hujusmodi illapsus formalis Spiritus sancti ad mentem est intrinseca actuatio mentis solum secundum vitalem immutationem.”

created charity, so created charity cannot be the change necessarily wrought in us by virtue of the Uncreated Gift. In fact, Ripa argues that the Uncreated Grace that is the indwelling Holy Spirit bestows its own mutation on the soul which is distinct from the mutation wrought by the infusion of created charity. The two mutations are so distinct, in fact, that Ripa feels the need to argue that they are by no means incompatible: “The mutation by which the mind is intrinsically actuated through the Uncreated Gift is other than the [mutation] through the created gift, and the ratio [of each] is different. The modes of the actuations and mutations according to each gift are neither incompossible nor repugnant to one another.”

While the thirteenth-century schoolmen understand Uncreated Grace to be the substantial ‘thing’ in us (the divine person of the Holy Spirit) and created grace to be the change wrought in the soul by the supernatural presence of this substantial ‘thing,’ Ripa seems to imagine two substantial ‘things’ in us, each working its own distinct mutation in the soul. Ripa argues that the mutation wrought by created grace precedes the mutation wrought through Uncreated Grace as a preceding disposition for it in the actual economy of salvation, but he again insists that each could be given without the other. Ripa even argues that nothing at all would be lost to the soul if it had Uncreated Grace but not created grace: “Neither with respect to being nor with respect to supernaturally elevating, nor with respect to habitually loving God or the capacity for merit, does the subtraction of created charity diminish the perfection of the created will where the

---


uncreated actuation remains.”317 If created charity seems arbitrary in Ockham and his followers because it is not necessary for anything other than acceptation in the actual economy of salvation, it seems arbitrary in Ripa because it does hardly anything at all in the actual economy of salvation. If it exists in the actual economy of salvation (as it does), it exists as prior disposition for Uncreated Grace, but it need not be posited for the bestowal of Uncreated Grace nor does it add anything to it.

Critical editions of Ripa’s works are still forthcoming, and little exegetical work has been done to make sense of the dizzying number of distinctions he makes with respect to possible modes of union between God and creatures. At most, then, only a tentative proposal can be made regarding how best the characterize Ripa’s place in the development of the medieval understanding of the relationship between the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and the infusion of grace. Perhaps we can say that, by Ripa’s time, the real separability of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and the infusion of grace had so impoverished the concept of created grace that a return to the thirteenth-century consensus view appeared to Ripa to require the positing of a new and entirely distinct change wrought in the soul by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. So far as I can tell, Ripa thinks this change both necessary and sufficient for divine indwelling. Were any of the thirteenth-century schoolmen to read Ripa, it seems likely to me that they would tell Ripa it is precisely his ‘vital change’ that they call created charity.

317 John of Ripa, *Conclusiones* I, d. 16, q. 1, a. 3, c. 6 (Combes, p. 133): “Nec quoad esse nec quoad supernaturaliter eleovere nec quoad habitualiter Deum diligere vel posse mereri, subtractio caritatis create minuit perfectionem voluntatis create, stante eadem actuatione increate.”
Conclusion

Something significant was lost to the fourteenth-century theology of grace by removing every claim for its necessity. By removing the necessity claims that connect the infusion of grace to our salvation but maintaining the necessity claim that connects it to the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, Scotus made a considerable contribution to the thirteenth-century theology of grace. By denying this final necessity claim, fourteenth-century schoolmen are left with little to say about created charity. It seems to have no intelligibility in the actual economy of salvation. God requires created charity for acceptation to eternal life, but we have little to say about why He has so willed.

Ockham considers an objection that his position makes charity unnecessary and, thus, vain: “In vain is it done by many what can be done by few; but without charity it is possible for an act to be meritorious.”318 In the actual economy of salvation, of course, charity does account for merit, but the objection seems to be that this, too, depends entirely on the divine will. This being the case, God’s free decision that we merit our salvation need not require the infusion of charity. In response to the objection, Ockham has little to say other than that God is perfectly free to will superfluities: “God frequently does through many means what He was able to do through fewer means. Nor does He act badly on account of this, because by the very fact that He wills it, it is well and rightly done.”319 God’s freedom and the gratuity of grace are certainly secure, but it is difficult to conclude otherwise than that something has been lost to the theology of grace.

318 Ockham, Sentences I, d. 17, q. 3 (OTh III, p. 475): “Frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora; sed sine caritate potest actus esse meritorius.”

319 Ockham, Sentences I, d. 17, q. 3 (OTh III, p. 478): “Frequenter facit Deus mediantibus pluribus quod posset facere mediantibus paucioribus. Nec ideo male facit, quia eo ipso quod ipse vult, bene et iuste factum est.”
Rimini, too, considers the objection that “if this were possible [to love God meritoriously apart from grace], it would follow that God would pour out the habit of charity in vain, since charity is not given to humankind by God on account of anything other than that they might love God meritoriously by means of it.” Rimini responds by drawing a parallel to the non-necessity of the Incarnation: “Just as it does not follow: God was able to repair humankind without the Incarnation and Passion of the Son, therefore in vain was the Son incarnated and allowed to suffer for human salvation. Neither does it follow: God was able to save humankind without the sacrament of baptism, therefore in vain did He institute baptism for human salvation.”

Unfortunately, Rimini simply remains silent (at least here) as to how the infusion of grace and the Incarnation are not in vain even though non-necessary for our salvation. As we have seen in this chapter, Scotus has plenty to say about the deep intelligibility of God’s freely willing to infuse grace even though it is not strictly necessary for our salvation. As we will see in the next chapter, Scotus likewise has plenty to say about the deep intelligibility of God’s freely and non-necessarily willing the Incarnation.

---


321 Gregory of Rimini, *Sentences* I, d. 17, q. 1 (Trapp-Marcolino-Noya II, p. 249): “Sicut non sequitur: Deus potuit reparare hominem absque incarnatione filii et passione, igitur frustra filius fuit incarnatus et passus pro salute humana. Nec sequitur: Deus poterat sine sacramento baptismatis hominem salvare, igitur frustra instituit baptismum pro salute hominis.” Why he makes the jump from the infusion of charity to the institution of baptism is not entirely clear to me.
CHAPTER 4
CHRIST’S GRACE AND OURS
(1)
The Alexandrian-Cappadocian Argument

*et de plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus et gratiam pro gratia*
John 1:16

In the history of Christian thought, many have argued that the Incarnation of a divine person was necessary. Two arguments undoubtedly tower above the rest—that of the Alexandrians and their Cappadocian followers and that of Anselm of Canterbury. The Alexandrians and the Cappadocians argued that the full and intimate contact of deity and humanity in the Incarnate person of Christ was a necessary step in God’s deification of other human beings. Anselm argued that only the death of a God-man was a gift sufficiently worthy to make satisfaction for humanity’s debt of sin incurred in Adam.

In modern times, it has become fashionable to contrast these two as distinctively ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ accounts of salvation fundamentally at odds with each other. Those who make such comparisons do not typically hide their assessment that the ‘Eastern’ conception of salvation is the correct one and that the ‘Western’ conception is insufficient at best and perfidious at worst.322 As we saw in the first chapter and will see again in this chapter, the

---

Alexandrian-Cappadocian conception is by no means absent from medieval Western reflection on the salvation wrought through the mission of the Son. Scotus, those before him, and those after him addressed both arguments regarding the necessity of the Incarnation. Reflection on the Alexandrian-Cappadocian argument found its home in the commentary tradition on distinction 13 of the third book of the *Sentences*; reflection on Anselm’s argument found its home in the commentary tradition on distinction 20 of the third book of the *Sentences*. In this chapter, I will consider Scotus’s contribution to the former; in the next, his contribution to the latter.

This chapter and the next will trace the gradual voluntarist shift in the scholastic tradition with particular attention to Scotus’s place within that shift. I will show that Scotus’s soteriological voluntarism is not his alone, though he certainly plays a pivotal role in its development. I will also further develop my argument that Scotus’s soteriological voluntarism does not entail the arbitrariness of the present economy of salvation. Scotus does not think that removing limits on God results in our knowing less about Him. Much to the contrary, once we discard specious necessity claims, we are able to know more about God. By denying such claims in relation to Christ, Scotus thinks we are able rightly to see the place of Christ in the divine will. When we penetrate most deeply into the mystery of God’s will, what we find is the Incarnate Christ. It is He that explains the economy of salvation and not the other way around. He is not an accessory to our relationship with the Father; rather, it is we who are the accessory to the Father’s relationship with Him.

**The Alexandrian-Cappadocian Argument**

Athanasius of Alexandria deployed a number of arguments against the Arian demotion of the Son to sub-deity. Scripture’s predication of divine things to the human being Jesus (e.g., “the Son of Man has authority to forgive sins” [Mark 2:10]) and of things true of this human being to
God (e.g., killing the “Lord of glory” [1 Cor. 2:8] and “the Author of Life” [Acts 3:15]) was arguably the most potent weapon in the patristic arsenal, but Athanasius did not shy away from arguments according to reason. Chief among the latter was his argument that, unless Jesus Christ is true God, we have no hope of being deified: “If the works of the Logos’s Godhead had not been done by means of the body, man had not been deified; and again, had not the properties of the flesh been ascribed to the Word, man had not been thoroughly delivered from them.”

While he does not raise the counterfactual question explicitly (e.g., whether God could have deified us without Incarnation), Athanasius seems to be arguing that the Incarnation of a divine person was necessary for the deification of humanity.

The Cappadocians employed precisely the same kind of argument (if one will allow a conflation of healing and deification) in defense of the full humanity of the Incarnate Word. To cite but one example, Gregory of Nazianzus argues that “whoever has set his hope on a human being without mind is actually mindless himself and unworthy of being saved in his entirety. The unassumed is the unhealed, but what is united with God is also being saved.” Apollinarius had argued that the Word took on a body without a complete human soul, and Gregory is arguing that, if that is the case, we cannot be healed in that part of our being which most needs healing. This Cappadocian argument that “what is not assumed is not healed” was to become axiomatic in medieval theology.


325 Scotus, for instance, takes this axiom together with the position that a human person was not assumed in the Incarnation to conjointly entail that personhood (created personhood, at least) must be negatively construed. Scotus, *Quodlibet* 19, nn. 56, 60 (Allunis, pp. 685-87): “There is some doubt as to whether personality proper is constituted formally by something positive. It seems so for the following reasons....But against this view are the words of Damascene: ‘God, the Word, lacked none of those things He implanted in our nature when He formed us in the

177
In both of these cases, Athanasius and Gregory seem to be arguing more than mere points of fact. They are not merely arguing that Christ has come to deify us but that the Incarnation is, in some sense, a necessary condition for our deification. None of them raise the question of the counterfactual possibility explicitly, but they all seem to suggest implicitly that unless God becomes a human being, it would be impossible for human beings to be made God. These arguments were, again, neither the only nor even the most prominent arguments made by patristic authors for genuine Incarnation. Nonetheless, their consistent and widespread deployment suggests a broad patristic consensus that our deification depends on the Incarnation as a necessary condition. Only if deity and humanity come into sufficiently full and intimate contact in the person of the Son can our salvation in its most profound aspects be realized.

As we saw in chapter 2, such conceptions of salvation were by no means absent in the medieval West. The schoolmen happily speak of grace as deifying participation in the divine nature, and Scotus is no exception. In this chapter we turn to medieval reflections on the relationship between the deification of Christ’s humanity and the deification of ours. While the Lombard only lightly touches on these matters in what was to become distinction 13 of the third book of the Sentences, the commentary tradition on this distinction soon concentrated its attention on what were to be called the “three graces of Christ.”

beginning: He assumed them all…for He was wholly united to me, so that He might bestow the grace of salvation upon the whole; for what has not been assumed, cannot be healed. He wants to say, then, that every positive entity our nature contains is united to the Word.”” (Est autem dubium an personalitas propria sit formaliter per aliquid positivum. Et videtur quod sic:...Sed contra: Damascenus, cap. 55: “Nihil enim eorum quae plantavit in nostra natura Deus, Verbum a principio plasmans non defecit, sed omnia assumpsit; totus enim toti unitus est mihi, ut totum toti tribuat; quod est inassumptibile est incurabile”. Vult dicere igitur quod quaecumque entitas positiva in nostra natura est unita Verbo.) Scotus deploys a number of sophisticated philosophical arguments in favor of his position, but as indicated by the quote from the Damascene, he is driven by deeply theological intuitions about the nature of our salvation as secured by the Incarnation.
The Three Graces of Christ

Emile Mersch remains the standard reference on the development of the commentary tradition on distinction 13 of the third book of the Sentences. He addresses the distinction in the context of his survey of the development of the Church’s teaching on the mystical Body of Christ. Augustine had famously described Christ and the Church as the *totus Christus*, the whole Christ. The Church, on Augustine’s account, is like a single corporate person, having Christ as its Head and the Spirit as its Soul. According to Mersch’s narrative, the doctrine of the mystical Body gradually regresses from its Augustinian heights through the whole medieval period, not being restored to its original patristic “energy and richness” until the seventeenth-century “French School.”

Still, Mersch admits that the schoolmen had their place in the development of the doctrine, supplying the missing piece in Augustine’s reflection on the matter: the crucial importance of the hypostatic union, which furnished a sufficient instrument for the infusion of deifying grace. As Mersch rightly points out, the basic logic of much medieval theology on the headship of Christ insists, or at least assumes, that Christ must possess the highest possible personal grace if He is to serve as principle, or source, of grace for others. Only if Christ is full of grace, in other words, can that grace overflow from Him into others. Many medieval

---


327 For Christ as the Head of the Body, see Augustine, e. 187.40 and *agon. Christ*. 20.22. For the Spirit as the Soul of the Body, see Augustine, s. 267.4 and s. 268.2.


theologians further thought that the humanity of Christ had to be joined to a divine person if it was to possess this overflowing fullness of grace. Thus, hypostatic union was thought necessary for human beings to participate in the very life and nature of God.

The schoolmen thus distinguish three graces in Christ—His unitive, personal, and capital graces. Unitive grace is that grace by which a human nature was uplifted to union with the divine nature in the one person of the Son. Unitive grace, in other words, is that which constitutes hypostatic union. This grace is possessed by Christ alone; it is not shared with any other creature.

In addition to unitive grace, the schoolmen spoke of a second grace possessed by Christ—His personal grace. Unlike unitive grace, which is possessed only by Christ, personal grace is qualitatively identical to ours. As seen in the previous chapter, personal grace is, in Him as in us, the supernatural transformation or deification of His assumed humanity by virtue of, or as a condition for, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. While Christ’s personal grace is qualitatively identical to ours, the schoolmen were careful to insist that His and ours are not quantitatively equivalent. Christ’s grace is greater than that of any who come before or after Him. Christ came “full of grace” (John 1:14), and many of the schoolmen spend at least some time distinguishing His fullness of grace from the fullness of grace that Scripture ascribes to various other persons (e.g., Mary, John the Baptist, and Stephen).

Finally, the schoolmen speak of a third grace of Christ—His capital grace. Christ, they held, is not simply “full of grace”; Christ as human being was so full of grace that His personal grace overflows and becomes the source of grace to all others who receive it. The Gospel of John says not only that He was “full of grace” but also that we receive our grace from the fullness of His: “From his fullness we have all received, grace upon grace” (John 1:16 NRSV). Our grace, they held, is a participation in Christ’s grace. Insofar as His grace serves as source in the order of
grace, it can be called capital grace—the grace that makes Him Head (*caput*) of the Church and makes the Church His mystical Body.

For Mersch, this contribution developed gradually and evenly throughout the medieval period. It was almost completely absent in the immediate aftermath of Augustine; it began to coalesce with Hugh of St. Victor; it was enshrined in the Western theological tradition with the Lombard’s *Sentences*. Distinction thirteen of the third book of the Lombard’s *Sentences* became the *locus classicus* for reflection on the three graces of Christ which gradually developed into a veritable treatise on the Church as the mystical Body. In the context of scholastic commentary on the *Sentences*, the medieval doctrine of the mystical Body gradually took shape, beginning with the commentary of Peter of Poitiers and culminating with that of Thomas Aquinas. After Aquinas, Mersch suggests, little more was added. Those faithful to Aquinas continued to affirm it, while “the Scotists, following the example of the Doctor Subtilis, often say nothing about it.” This last statement, I argue, is unfair to Scotus. It is true that Scotus says less about the headship of Christ than Aquinas did, but what he says contributes a great deal to our understanding of what the mystical Body is. Not only so, there is also at least a possibility that Scotus’s contributions are precisely what made possible the remainder of Mersch’s narrative development, even if only indirectly. After considering what Scotus himself says, I will suggest a possible line of continuity between Scotus and the French School at the end of this chapter.

---


Scotus on the Grace of Christ

As we will see, Scotus grants all three of these graces in Christ. His most significant contribution to the discussion lies in his understanding of the relationships between the three. In particular, Scotus rejects a number of his great forebears’ claims that the Incarnation and deification of Christ’s humanity were necessary because, without them, our own deification would have been impossible. First, I will address the relationship between the second and third graces (i.e., Christ’s fullness of grace and His grace as Head of the Body); then, I will address the relationship between the first and second graces (i.e., the Incarnation and Christ’s fullness of grace).

Personal Grace and Capital Grace

There are a number of texts which seem, at least at first blush, to indicate Scotus agreed with the broad consensus position that the deification of Christ’s humanity was necessary for our own reception of deifying grace. Scotus seems to hold, for instance, that God can create a worm without creating the highest possible creature, but that He cannot create inferior graces without bestowing grace most perfectly on at least one creature who would then serve as source in the order of grace:

The highest created nature, if it should exist, would not have *influentia* in other natures, just as a superior species in the universe by no means necessarily flows into (*influit*) the inferior; on the other hand, the highest grace flows into (*influit*) the inferior according to the being (*esse*) of grace; and, therefore, it seems more necessary that something having the highest grace be posited before some highest nature.334

---

334 Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 13, n. 77 (Vatican IX, p. 416): “Et cum quaeritur causa quare Deus fecit summam gratiam et non naturam summam, - respondeo: summa natura creata, si esset, non haberet influentiam in alias naturas, sicut nec modo superior species in universo necessario influit in inferiorem; summa autem gratia influit secundum esse gratiae in inferiora; et ideo videtur maior necessitas ut ponatur aliquod summum habens gratiam prius quam aliqua summum natura.” The Latin word, *influentia*, is difficult to render in English. It is the present active participle of *influo*, which literally means “to flow into.” The English transliteration, *influence*, has come to mean, primarily, the exercise of some kind of indirect or intangible causal efficacy. The Latin entails a much stronger, direct and internal causality. It is sometime applied to God’s general efficient causality with respect to creation (I thus speak of Scotus’s ‘immediate-influence axiom’) but is often applied in a special sense to God’s gracious
The passage is Scotus’s response to an objection to his position that God bestows the highest possible grace on the soul of Christ. The objector argues that the order of the universe consists more in its variety of creature-types than in the variety of individuals within those creature-types (e.g., a universe with a giraffe and an elephant is better than one with only two giraffes, regardless of how much more perfect one giraffe is than the other). That being the case, were God to have a choice between creating the highest possible creature and bestowing the highest possible grace on a creature, He ought to choose the former since it would make the universe more perfect than the latter would (e.g., once God has created a giraffe, if He can only do one more thing, He ought then to create an elephant rather than the best possible giraffe). Since God has not created the most perfect creature, it follows that He has not bestowed the highest possible grace, since it would be unfitting for God to bestow the latter without having already created the former.

Scotus begins his response to this objection with something very similar to the Alexandrian-Cappadocian argument for the necessity of the Incarnation. Scotus claims that his objector has it precisely the wrong way around. It is not more but less fitting that God create the highest possible creature-type than that He bestow the highest possible grace. This is because, even if the highest possible creature-type existed, it would not have influentia in inferior creatures. On the contrary, Scotus argues that the highest possible grace would exercise supernatural activity in the soul and the act by which God pours that grace into the soul. It is this latter, theological meaning of the word which concerns us in the pages to follow.

---

335 Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 13, n. 14 (Vatican IX, p. 389): “Praeterea, summa natura non est facta; ergo nec summa gratia. - Antecedens probatur, quia - quacunque natura facta - possibile est aliam excellentiorem fieri, quia illa posset esse finita. Consequentia probatur, quia ordo universi magis consistit in speciebus quam in individuis, quia magis attenditur perfectio universi secundum species quam secundum individua; ergo magis videtur aliquid differre ab alis naturis secundum speciem quam supremam gratiam esse factam, quae differret ab aliis secundum numerum tantum.”
influentia in the order of grace. What Scotus is getting at is perhaps clearer in the parallel passage in the *Lectura*. There, Scotus insists that where a superior exercises influentia in the inferior, some imperfection results in the inferior where the superior is absent. The absence of a highest possible creature-type, in other words, entails no imperfection in inferior creature-types, but the absence of a highest possible grace would entail some imperfection in inferior graces.

Had Scotus not continued, we might have something like the Alexandrian-Cappadocian argument: unless God maximally deifies human nature in the person of Christ, He cannot deify us (or, at least, there would be some imperfection in our deification). But having made this point, Scotus immediately qualifies the argument: “Still, just as God supplies the influentia of a superior nature, if there were any, in the more inferior because He flows (influit) immediately into all, so He would be able to supply immediately the influentia of the highest grace, because He pours (influit) grace into all.” Just as God stands in the place of the highest nature, exercising influentia immediately in the whole natural order, so too could He have done in the order of grace. Should highest possible grace exist, it would exercise influentia in the order of grace, but if it does not exist, God is perfectly able to supply such influentia immediately as He does in the case of created natures.

---

336 Scotus, *Lectura* III, d. 13, n. 89 (Vatican XX, p. 296): “Et una ratio huius potest esse ista, quia species superior universi non semper influit in secundam necessario; ideo cum non habeat necessarium influentiam respectu inferiorum, non est necessaria ad esse inferiorum, sed Deus immediate influit in illas; ideo licet sit non suprema species, imperfectionis nihil accrescit inferioribus; sed habens summam gratiam, qui est caput Ecclesiae, influit secundum gratiam ei datam in membra.”

337 Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 13, n. 77 (Vatican IX, p. 416): “Si tamen sicut Deus supplet influentiam naturae superioris, si qua esset, in inferiorem, quia influit immediate in omnia, ita posset immediate supplere influentiam summi grati, quia ille influit gratiam in omnes.”
This follows straightforwardly, of course, from Scotus’s **immediate-influence axiom:**

God can do immediately whatever He does mediately. God does not need a created principle of grace in order to bestow grace on us. He, as Author of grace, can bestow it on us just as easily without a created principle. God’s capacity to deify us does not depend, in any way, on His prior deification of the humanity of Christ. As we will see, Scotus is not denying that Christ’s grace is in fact the source of ours; he is simply denying that the connection between them is a necessary one. The difference between the highest possible creature-type and the highest possible grace, in other words, is not that God can create inferior creature-types without the highest possible creature-type but cannot create inferior graces without the highest possible grace; rather, the difference is that, were a highest possible creature-type to be created it would not exercise *influentia* together with God while the highest possible grace, if created, would. In other words, the *influentia* of the highest possible grace belongs to the “being of grace” (*esse gratiae*); it is not contingent. God can give us grace immediately, without bestowing a highest possible grace of Christ, but if He bestows a highest possible grace, He cannot give grace immediately; it will have to come from the highest possible grace.

**The Scotistic Inversion**

Scotus has here severed what was something like an implicit patristic axiom that went unchallenged in the early medieval reflection that preceded him. A created source of grace was not, on Scotus’s view, causally necessary for our deification. God could have deified us directly without a created source. Our need for deification, then, cannot explain why the Father maximally deifies Christ, but this does not mean that the economy of salvation is thereby rendered arbitrary. As I have shown throughout this dissertation, Scotus does not take something without giving something in return. By denying that a created source of grace was necessary for
the existence of the whole order of grace, we are left to consider why God freely decided to act in precisely this way even though He did not have to. If God could give us grace without a created source of grace, why give it through a created source?

Scotus gives a number of answers, but the most interesting for our purposes is that God bestowed the highest possible grace on the soul of Christ because He willed that Christ be the Head of the Church and that the Church be His mystical Body:

Because it is fitting that what has the ratio of influentialia in others in the being of grace should have the ratio of the highest in the being of grace (just as that which flows [influit] into others in the being of nature is the first in nature); since, therefore, Christ, who is the Head of the Church, flows (influat) into the members of the Church in the being of grace, it is fitting that He should have the highest (although finite).338

Here in the Lectura, Scotus merely makes a claim regarding the fittingness of bestowing fullness of grace on the Head of the mystical Body, but in the Ordinatio, he makes a much stronger claim:

Similarly, John 3: “God gives the Spirit not according to measure,” and it is understood concerning Christ, because “of His fullness we have all received,” etc.; grace “not according to measure” is the highest possible grace; in addition, the fullness which is able to be participated in by that other grace according to some grade does not seem to exist except in the highest grace.339

Only the highest possible grace, in other words, can make its possessor the source of all grace in others.

338 Scotus Lectura III, d. 13, n. 61 (Vatican XX, p. 290): “Quia decet quod illud quod habet rationem influentis in alia in esse gratiae, habeat rationem summi in esse gratiae (sic ut illud quod influit in alia in esse naturae, est primum in natura); cum igitur Christus, qui est caput Ecclesiae, influat in membra Ecclesiae in esse gratiae, decet quod habeat summam (licet finitam).”

339 Scotus, Ordinatio III, d. 13, n. 17 (Vatican IX, p. 390): “Item, Ioan. 3: Non dat Deus spiritum ad mensuram, et intelligitur de Christo, quia de eius plenitudine nos omnes accepimus etc.; gratia ‘non ad mensuram’ est gratia summa possibilis; plenitudo etiam quae potest participari ab illa gratia alia, secundum aliquem gradum, non videtur esse nisi in summa gratia.”
There is no necessary connection, Scotus argues, between the bestowal of the highest possible grace and the possibility of our grace, but there is a necessary connection between the highest possible grace and being the source in the whole order of grace. One cannot be the source of grace unless one has the highest possible grace. Once we deny that the possibility of our grace depends on Christ’s, we are able to see that God bestows highest possible grace on Christ because, without it, Christ could not be the Head of the mystical Body. What explains Christ’s fullness of grace, in other words, is not some divine volition with respect to us (e.g., that we have grace) but a divine volition with respect to Christ (i.e., that He be not only full of grace but also the source in the whole order of grace).

What this shows us, in addition, is that the mystical Body is in no way accidental in the divine economy. The mystical Body did not come into existence because the only possible way for God to deify us was to do it through a maximally-deified instrument. God could have simply deified us one by one without the bestowal of highest possible grace. The fact that God could have but did not deify us one by one tells us that He willed not simply a collection of the deified but that they be members of a mystical Body with Christ as its Head.

Without highest possible grace, Christ would still be the Head of the Church, but He would be its Head in a much narrower sense. To borrow from another schoolman, Aquinas suggests that the headship of Christ consists in: (1) His being the highest recipient of grace and thus possessing the highest dignity within the Church, (2) His governance within the Church, and (3) His *influentia* within the Church insofar as He is the principle of its grace.340 Christ would

---

only need the highest actual grace, not the highest possible grace, to be the Head of the Church in the first two senses. He would only need the highest possible grace to be the Head of the Church in the third sense. Were He not to have the highest possible grace, the Church would be a social body or political body but not a ‘natural’ body (like the physical body of a single human being), for it is precisely internal \textit{influentia} that makes Christ a more perfect similitude of the natural head than are princes and prelates.\footnote{Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} III, q. 8, a. 6, resp. (Marietti III, p. 62): “The head influences the other members in two ways. First, by a certain intrinsic influence, inasmuch as motive and sensitive force flow from the head to the other members; second, by a certain exterior guidance, inasmuch as by sight and the senses, which are rooted in the head, man is guided in his exterior acts. Now the interior influx of grace is from no one save Christ, Whose manhood, through its union with the Godhead, has the power of justifying; but the influence over the members of the Church, as regards their exterior guidance, can belong to others.” (\textit{Respondeo dicendum quod caput in alia membra influit dupliciter. Uno modo, quodam intrinseco influxu, prout virtus motiva et sensitiva a capite derivatur ad cetera membra. Alio modo, secundum exteriorem quandam gubernationem: prout scilicet secundum visum et alios sensus, qui in capite radicantur, dirigitur homo in exterioribus actibus. Interior autem effluxus gratiae non est ab aliquo nisi a solo Christo, cuitis humanitas, ex hoc quod est divinitati adiuncta, habet virtutem iustificandi. Sed influxus in membra Ecclesiae quantum ad exteriorem gubernationem, potest aliis convenire.)}  

Scotus not only thinks that highest possible grace is necessary for \textit{influentia} in the order of grace; he also thinks that it is sufficient. It is not simply the case that a creature must have the highest possible grace in order to exercise \textit{influentia} in the supernatural order; a creature with it cannot fail to exercise such \textit{influentia}. This too, Scotus thinks, helps us understand that the bestowal of highest possible grace on Christ is explained by a divine volition with respect to Him rather than with respect to us. If we take ‘highest possible grace’ to entail unsurpassable grace rather than unequalled grace, Scotus considers the question as to whether God could bestow an equal grace on someone other than Christ.

Could there have been a grace equal to [Christ’s] considering God’s ordained power? It appears not, for no nature other than His could be the head of those possessing grace, for there cannot be two heads, even as there cannot be two supreme beings in the same order….What could be said here is that even though—considering His absolute power—God could have given such grace to another nature (whether it be assumed or, perhaps,
not assumed), the same is not true of His ordained power, for according to the laws
divine wisdom has set up there will be but one Head in the Church, from whom graces
flow to its members.342

Scotus begins by giving two arguments for why God cannot bestow highest possible grace on
another in addition to Christ. The first is a metaphysical argument: “for there cannot be two
heads, even as there cannot be two supreme beings in the same order.” The second (not included
above), is that this would entail an equivalent amount of merit to that of the Incarnate Christ.
Interestingly, Scotus does not address either of these arguments (at least not here), opting instead
for a purely theological reason: God could have bestowed highest possible grace on another in
addition to Christ; He did not do this because He willed that there be only one Head in the
mystical Body.

By severing the necessary connection between Christ’s personal grace and our grace,
Scotus has shown that God’s bestowal of the fullness of grace on Christ is to be understood in
terms of God’s will concerning Christ rather than His will concerning us. By arguing that
fullness of grace is both necessary and sufficient for being the Head of the mystical Body, Scotus
has shown what those divine volitions regarding Christ actually are, namely, that Christ be the
Head and the only Head in the mystical Body of God’s deified elect. God’s granting fullness of
grace to Christ is explained not by God’s will to deify us, but by His will to deify us precisely as
members of Christ’s mystical Body. Christ, in other words, is not an accessory to the Father’s
relationship with us (i.e., in order to deify us, the Father deified Christ); rather, we are an

342 Scotus, Ordinatio III, d. 13, nn. 50-52 (Vatican IX, p. 405): “Hic iuxta secundum membrum distinctionis, scilicet
exponendo superlativum negative, est unum dubium: utrum de potentia ordinate Dei posset fieri alia gratia aequalis
isti. Et videtur quod non: Quia nulla alia natura posset esse caput habentium gratiam, quia non possunt esse duo
capita, sicut nec duo suprema in eodem ordine….Hic posset dici quod licet Deus de potentia Dei absoluta posset
tantam gratiam conferre alii naturae, sive assumptae sive forte non assumptae, non tamen de potentia ordinata, quia -
secundum leges iam positas a Sapientia divina - non erit nisi unum caput in Ecclesia, a quo sit influentialia gratiarum
in membris.”
accessory to the Father’s relationship with Christ (i.e., the Father willed not only that Christ receive grace but also that He be the created source of deifying grace in the mystical Body).

**Personal and Unitive Grace**

We turn, now, to Scotus’s understanding of the relationship between Christ’s personal grace and His unitive grace, that is, the relationship between the deification of Christ’s humanity and the hypostatic union. At the end of the final quotation above, Scotus considers the possibility that God bestow highest possible grace even on an unassumed nature: “God could have given such grace to another nature (whether it be assumed or, perhaps, not assumed).” While Scotus only glancingly considers the possibility in this text, he clearly affirms it elsewhere, arguing that Christ’s soul can receive as much grace as an angel can because “a subject, susceptible of an appropriate accident admitting of degrees, is not of itself limited to some particular grade, but could receive it in any degree so far as itself is concerned.”

Anything with an intellect and will, Scotus insists consistently in distinction 13 of the third book of the *Ordinatio*, can receive any degree of grace whatsoever, including highest possible grace. The Incarnation, it seems, is not necessary for the bestowal of highest possible grace. God could have bestowed it on an unassumed rational nature.

By taking this position, Scotus has broken with another set of his forebears’ claims—this time regarding the relationship between Christ’s personal grace and hypostatic union. Medieval theologians before Scotus had made four distinct claims regarding the relationship between the two: (1) that fullness of grace is causally necessary for hypostatic union, (2) that fullness of grace

---

343 Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 13, n. 45 (Vatican IX, p. 402): “Primo, quia subiectum receptivum accidentis convenientis, habentis gradus, quod tamen non determinatur ex se ad aliquem illorum graduum, potest - quantum est ex se - recipere illud accidens secundum quemcumque ipsorum graduum…”

190
is causally sufficient for hypostatic union, (3) that hypostatic union is causally necessary for fullness of grace, (4) that hypostatic union is causally sufficient for fullness of grace. Scotus rejects all four of these claims.\textsuperscript{344}

The first claim was held by the authors of the \textit{Summa halensis}: “It is not possible for that human creature through the gift of the condition of nature to be elevated and disposed to divine union, and therefore grace is necessary for it, which elevates and disposes it to divine union.”\textsuperscript{345} The claim is similar to the one in chapter 3 regarding the connection between sanctifying grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Just as the schoolmen argued that sanctifying grace is causally necessary for the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, so too, the authors of the \textit{Summa halensis} argue that some gift of grace is causally necessary for hypostatic union. Whether this disposition to union is prior to union (conceptually if not temporally) is not entirely clear in the \textit{Summa halensis}. Bonaventure explicitly takes a position on the order between them: “The soul would not be suitable to be assumed to the Word unless it were deiform and assimilated to God perfectly through grace. Therefore, that this human being is God does not exclude but rather

\textsuperscript{344} It might be thought that these four claims are, in reality, reducible to two (1 and 4, and 2 and 3 being identical claims) insofar as ‘\textit{p} is a necessary condition for \textit{q}’ is convertible with ‘\textit{q} is a sufficient condition for \textit{p}.’ The convertibility of these two claims certainly stands when mere inferential necessity and sufficiency are being posited: if the truth of \textit{p} is necessary for inferring the truth of \textit{q}, then the truth of \textit{q} is sufficient for inferring the truth of \textit{p}. But when causal necessity and sufficiency are considered, as in this case, the convertibility does not stand: if \textit{p} is causally necessary for \textit{q}, this does not entail that \textit{q} is causally sufficient for \textit{p}. An example might help: if using a key is causally necessary for entering a room, this does not entail that entering a room causes us to use a key, sufficiently or otherwise. The claims that \textit{p} is causally necessary for \textit{q} and that \textit{q} is causally sufficient for \textit{p} are, thus, two distinct claims, because they purport not only logical relations of inference but also the metaphysical mechanisms which explain the logical relations. A holder of (1) claims that fullness of grace is the mechanism by which a created nature is assumed into hypostatic union with a divine person; a holder of (4) claims, to the contrary, that hypostatic union is the mechanism by which a created nature inevitably comes to possess fullness of grace. As we will see below, Alexander of Hales holds to (1) and, thus, argues that God could not become a rock; Aquinas, to the contrary, holds to (4) and, thus, has no problem with the possibility that God become a rock.

\textsuperscript{345} \textit{Summa halensis} III, n. 96 (Quaracchi IV.2, p. 139): “Non est possibile ipsi creaturae humanae per donum conditionis naturae quod elevetur et disponatur ad divinam unionem, et ideo necessaria est ei gratia, quae elevet et disponat ipsam ad unionem divinam.”
presupposes deiformity of grace and glory.” Bonaventure, is not simply entailed by hypostatic union but is presupposed by it.

Richard of Middleton rejects this argument. Grace is necessary for our union with God but not for hypostatic union: “Grace is required in distinct ways in us, so that we might be united with God as object through cognition and love, and so that the human nature of Christ be united to a divine person as supposit. For the first, it is required of necessity; for the second, it is required congruously.” Richard does not go on to explain what it means for something to be congruously required, but he seems to be arguing that fullness of grace is fitting to an Incarnate person but not strictly necessary.

Scotus agrees with Richard, denying the position of their great Franciscan forebears. For Scotus, grace is fittingly bestowed on Christ, but such bestowal is not necessary. Scotus gives a fairly straightforward reason, employing his **metaphysical-priority axiom**: what is naturally prior can coexist with the opposite of what is naturally posterior. Being a supposit is metaphysically prior to the possession of qualities, particularly accidental qualities like grace: “To operate belongs to a supposit; therefore, the nature would first naturally have the idea of supposit in itself before it had any grace or habit, which is only a principle of operating.”

---

346 Bonaventure, *Sentences* III, d. 13, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3 (Quaracchi III, p. 277): “Anima esset idonea, ut assumeretur a Verbo, nisi esset deiformis et Deo assimilate perfecte per gratiam: et ideo hoc, quod ille homo est Deus, deiformitatem gratiae et gloriae non excludit, quin potius praesupponit.”

347 Richard of Middleton, *Sentences* III, d. 13, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1 (Brixiae III, p. 124): “Alio modo requiritur gratia in nobis ad hoc, ut uniamur cum Deo in ratione obiecti per cognitionem, et amorem, et ad hoc, ut natura humana Christi uniretur divinae personae in ratione suppositi, quia primo modo requiritur de necessitate. Secundo modo requiritur de congruitate. Unde ipsa non fuit causa illius unionis, sed facta est concurrentibus ex parte Dei gratuita eius voluntate, et ex parte naturae humanae eius assumptibilitate.”

348 Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 2, q. 2, n. 88 (Vatican IX, p. 156): “[O]perari autem est suppositi; ergo prius naturaliter haberet in se rationem suppositi quam gratiam vel habitum aliquem, qui tantum est principium operandi.”

192
Habits (like grace) exist for the sake of act, and because acting belongs to a supposit, human nature must exist in a supposit before it can possess grace.

In addition to this metaphysical reason, Scotus also provides a theological argument that fullness of grace cannot be causally necessary for Incarnation. Because the Christian faith holds that the assumed nature exists only and always as precisely the human nature of the Word, it cannot be that the deification of that nature was a presupposition of hypostatic union. As Scotus goes on to say: “The nature itself, where grace is, exists in a person, and for that reason all its accidents are united to the person accidentally and mediately; therefore, in the case of this union no accident could have been the medium.”\(^{349}\) The argument seems to be that if fullness of grace were causally necessary for hypostatic union, there would be at least one rational instant at which this human nature was not precisely the human nature of the Word, namely, that rational instant at which the human nature came into existence but did not yet possess fullness of grace. There are no metaphysical blocks to the Word’s becoming a human being in this way (i.e., fullness of grace before Incarnation), but Catholic faith requires that this human nature belong to the Word from its first moment of conception. Fullness of grace, Scotus holds, cannot be causally necessary for Incarnation since Incarnation necessarily precedes fullness of grace.

I will return to the second claim (that fullness of grace is causally sufficient for hypostatic union) in a moment, since it is the most complex of the four claims. The third and fourth claims (i.e., that hypostatic union is causally necessary and sufficient for fullness of grace) seem to have been jointly held by Aquinas. For Aquinas, as for Richard and Scotus, fullness of grace cannot

---

\(^{349}\) Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 2, q. 2, n. 91 (Vatican IX, p. 157): “[I]psa ‘natura in qua est gratia’ personatur, et per hoc omne accidens eius accidentaliter et mediate unitur personae; ergo in ista unione nullum accidens potuit esse medium.” Scotus makes the point more clearly in the interpolation: “Sed anima Christi non habuit realem existentiam nisi in Verbo; ergo prius ordine naturae assumebatur a Verbo quam fuit subjectum gratae.”
be the cause of Incarnation, because “the union of the human nature with the Word of God is in personal being, which depends not on any habit, but on the nature itself.”350 Aquinas goes further to make the claim that fullness of grace is not the cause but the effect of Incarnation: “The habitual grace pertaining to the spiritual holiness of the man is an effect following the union.”351 For Aquinas, fullness of grace follows inevitably from Incarnation and only Incarnation because of what we might call his principle of proximity:

It is necessary to suppose habitual grace in Christ...on account of the union of His soul with the Word of God. For the nearer any recipient is to an inflowing cause, the more does it partake of its influence. Now the influx of grace is from God according to Psalm 83:12, “The Lord will give grace and glory.” And hence it was most fitting that His soul should receive the influx of Divine grace.352

Aquinas seems to suggest that the degree of grace received by a particular rational creature corresponds to the degree of its proximity to God, the overflowing source of grace. Since it is impossible for a creature to be closer to God than in hypostatic union, the assumed nature of the Word is necessarily the highest recipient of grace, and Aquinas’s position seems to entail that a created reality this close to the divine essence could not but receive as much grace as it does (though language of ‘fittingness’ suggests he might not be entirely sure about this).353

350 Aquinas, Summa theologiae III, q. 6, a. 6, ad 1 (Marietti III, p. 46): “Sed unio naturae humanae ad Verbum Dei est secundum esse personale: quod non dependet ab aliquo habitu, sed immediate ab ipsa natura.”

351 Aquinas, Summa theologiae III, q. 6, a. 6, resp. (Marietti III, p. 45): “Gratia autem habitualis, pertinens ad specialem sanctitatem illius hominis, est effectus quidam consequens unionem.”


353 It should be noted that there is some disagreement regarding whether Aquinas thinks fullness of grace necessary or simply fitting given the proximity of His assumed humanity to the divine essence. For a helpful introduction to the debate, see Dominic Legge, The Trinitarian Christology of St Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 135-45.
As seen above, Scotus denies that hypostatic union is necessary for fullness of grace. Again, he claims that “God could have given such grace to another nature, whether it be assumed or, perhaps, not assumed.” Scotus does not explicitly take up the question of the sufficiency of hypostatic union for fullness of grace, but he does address it when considering whether it would be contradictory for a rational nature to be hypostatically united to a divine person and not elicit a beatific act. Scotus argues that “there is no contradiction for this nature to be personated in a divine person and yet not perform an act of enjoyment.”\(^{354}\) This must be the case for Scotus because of a basic position that he holds regarding access to the enjoyment of God, namely, that no soul can enjoy God unless God, by a free act of will, makes Himself immediately present to it:

First because no nature necessarily enjoys an object unless it is necessarily affected by the object as present; but this [assumed] soul is not necessarily affected by the object, [both] because it is not so affected by it as to act of understanding, because the object necessarily affects no intellect but the divine intellect (for the object causes nothing outside itself save voluntarily and contingently).\(^{355}\)

Scotus here merely applies an axiomatic principle regarding divine presence: “God, under the proper character of divinity, is not present to a created intellect except purely voluntarily.”\(^{356}\)

This is a radical position, particularly when applied to the Incarnate human nature of the Word. Even after a human nature has been assumed into the unity of a divine person and is as close to the divine essence as a created reality can possibly be, it still has no access to that


\(^{355}\) Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 2, n. 16 (Vatican IX, pp. 123-24): “Primo, quia nulla natura necessario fruitur objecto nisi quae necessario immutatur ab eo ut praesente; sed ista anima non necessario immutatur ab eo: tum quia nec ad actum intelligendi, quia objectum istud non necessario immutat aliquem intellectum nisi divinum (nihil enim extra causat nisi voluntarie et contingenter).”

\(^{356}\) Scotus, *Quodlibet* 14, n. 36 (Alluntis, p. 510): “Deus autem, sub propria ratione divinitatis, non est praesens alicui intellectui creato, nisi mere voluntarie.”
essence unless God freely grants such access to it. God does in fact grant such access to the assumed human nature of His Son, but Scotus firmly insists that God did not have to do so. God is the overflowing source of the *influxus* of grace, but He does not flow inevitably, not even to the humanity of His Incarnate Son. An act of will distinct from the will to assume human nature is necessary on God’s part if the assumed nature is to receive the outpouring of grace and glory so that the Son, as human being, might see and enjoy the divine essence to which it has been united.

This, of course, only answers the question about whether hypostatic union is a sufficient cause of a beatific act. But the same *metaphysical-priority axiom* that Scotus uses to resolve the question about the act would apply to the question about the habit: “A prior, by reason of being a prior, can exist in the absence of a posterior without contradiction (and this when there is no necessary connection between them), otherwise the priority of the one to the other would not be preserved.”³⁵⁷ In other words, since the rational instant at which the assumed human nature begins to exist as the human nature of the Word is metaphysically prior to the rational instants at which it possesses grace and elicits a beatific act, God can bestow hypostatic union and withhold both habit and act. Fullness of grace does not follow from hypostatic union inevitably. The Incarnate Christ certainly receives highest possible grace, but He receives it by an act of the divine will that is distinct from the act of will to assume human nature. For Scotus, then, hypostatic union is neither necessary nor sufficient for receiving highest possible grace. God can be Incarnate in a human nature without granting it highest possible grace, and God can give

highest possible grace to an unassumed nature. Scotus, then, clearly denies the third and fourth claims.

Finally, we turn to the claim that fullness of grace is causally sufficient for hypostatic union. On this claim, if God grants highest possible grace to a rational nature, that rational nature cannot fail to be hypostatically united to a divine person. This view seems to have been held by Henry of Ghent. Henry nowhere addresses the question directly, but he employs the principle as a premise in a number of other arguments, the most interesting being the fifth question of Quodlibet 13 regarding whether God can hypostatically unite to Himself a non-intellectual nature. The common scholastic position at the time was that God can indeed assume a non-intellectual nature (a brute) and even a non-animate nature (a rock). Henry denies the claim, and his crucial premise is that the only created natures susceptible to hypostatic union are those with elevatable powers. Since the only elevatable powers are those of intellect and will, only intellectual natures can be assumed.

To defend his position, Henry distinguishes two modes of God’s presence to creatures, one natural and the other supernatural: “God has a double existence in creatures: one mode naturally and fitting to nature, another mode voluntarily and surpassing the limits of nature. In the first way, He has existence by illapsus into every nature and creature. In the second way, He has existence in an assumed nature only through circumincession.”

---


359 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 13, n. 5 (Decorte, p. 30): “Ad euis intellectum est advertendum quod Deus dupliciter habet esse in creaturis: uno modo naturaliter et modo congruenti naturae, alio modo voluntarile et modo supergregienti limites naturae. Primo modo habet esse per illapsum in omni natura et creatura. Secundo modo habet esse solummodo in natura assumpta per circuminessionem.”
and sustaining causality with respect to them. Circumincession was a common term for the mutual inherence of two realities (e.g., the three persons in God, the two natures in Christ, or Christ and the Christian).\textsuperscript{360} For Henry, God is so close to the creature in circumincession that it yields up its created supposit (if it had one) and begins to subsist in the supposit of a divine person.\textsuperscript{361} Further, Henry holds that circumincession can only take place by way of rational powers:

I understand, moreover, through a mingling called union through circumincession of the divine intellect with the human, which, according to three powers (memory, intelligence, and will) existing in the unity of the essence of the soul, [the soul] is united through circumincession to one of the Trinitarian persons in the unity of the divine nature.\textsuperscript{362}

Henry is arguing that hypostatic union is accomplished through divine circumincession with the powers of the assumed nature. Since there are no such powers with which God might ‘mingle’ in a rock or a brute, God simply cannot hypostatically unite one of them to Himself.

There is a problem here, of course, because Henry also thinks that divine-human circumincession takes place in our grace and glory even though we are not hypostatically united to God. Henry distinguishes circumincession in Christ and in the blessed by saying that circumincession takes place in Christ according to substance and powers, while circumincession

\textsuperscript{360} For an introduction to the concept of circumincession (or ‘perichoresis,’ the equivalent Greek notion), see Nonna Verna Harrison, “Perichoresis in the Greek Fathers,” \textit{St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly} 35, no. 1 (1991): 53-65.

\textsuperscript{361} Henry of Ghent, \textit{Quodlibet} 13, n. 5 (Decorte, p. 30): “Per intimationem enimcircumincessionis natura assumpta in tantum unitur ineffabiliter et incomprehensibiliter naturae assumptae, quod necesse est naturam assumptam amittere prorsum esse subsistentiae, si quod ante assumptionem in ea fuit, vel eo carere, si numquam ipsum habuit, et subintrait esse subsistentiae naturae ad quam assumitur, ut sit idem suppositum subsistens in duplici natura.”

\textsuperscript{362} Henry of Ghent, \textit{Quodlibet} 13, n. 5 (Decorte, p. 35): “Intelligo autem per mixtionem dictam unionem per circumincessionem intellectus divini cum humano, qui secundum tres potentias, quae sunt memoria, intelligentia et voluntas, existentes in unitate essentiae animae, unitur per circumincessionem quandam trinitatibus personarum in unitate divinae naturae, ut sic per se et proxima causa sive ratio propter quem aliquid sit susceptible a Deo, sit ratio imaginis Dei, quae non est nisi in substantia intellectuali, et propter eius ipsa sola substantia intellectualis sit susceptibilis.”
takes place in us according to powers alone.\textsuperscript{363} It is not entirely clear how this is to be understood. If substance-circumincension is a distinct kind of circumincension from powers-circumincension, Henry has defeated his own position, since one could simply posit substance-circumincension between Christ and a non-rational nature. Only if substance-circumincension causally depends on powers-circumincension in some way can Henry use the argument to defend his position that only rational natures can be hypostatically united because only they have elevatable powers. One way to make sense of Henry’s position might be to say that substance-circumincension is caused by maximal powers-circumincension. Once circumincension with the powers reaches its highest limit of perfection, it pours over into the nature, causing the nature to give up its own subsistence (if it already had one) and begin to subsist together with the divine nature in the person of the Word. If this is the correct way to read Henry, he holds the second claim above, namely, that fullness of grace (i.e., maximal powers-circumincension) is causally sufficient for hypostatic union (i.e., substance-circumincension).

Scotus rejects Henry of Ghent’s position because it entails too close a connection between grace and hypostatic union. In particular, Scotus argues that fullness of grace cannot be the mechanism of assumption because he insists that no positive reality (e.g., the habit of grace) is entailed by hypostatic union: “Nothing superadded is here posited formally in the will by this [hypostatic] union; all that is posited is a certain dependence on the Word.”\textsuperscript{364} Scotus gives a number of metaphysical arguments for why this must be the case, but he also has cogent theological arguments:

\textsuperscript{363} Henry of Ghent, \textit{Quodlibet} 13, n. 5 (Decorte, pp. 34-35): “[N]ihil sit susceptibile nisi ratione imaginis Dei, quae est in illo ut per circumincessionem, vel secundum substantiam et secundum potentiam simul, ut in solo Christo, vel secundum potentiam solum, ut in omnibus beatis.”

\textsuperscript{364} Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} III, d. 2, n. 16 (Vatican IX, p. 124): “Sed nihil hic ponitur superadditum formaliter in voluntate per istam unionem, sed tantum ponitur quaedam dependentia ad Verbum; ergo etc.”
Further, in virtue of the [hypostatic] union, the Word alone is present to the assumed soul with respect to personal being; therefore if, by virtue of such presence or union, that same thing should be present as beatific object (in ratione obiecti immutantis), it would follow that, in virtue of the union, the Word alone and not the whole Trinity affects the created intellect—which is false, because the works of the Trinity when operating externally are undivided.365

Scotus is arguing that Henry has conflated two distinct modes of God’s supernatural presence to a creature. God’s supernatural presence to the powers of a rational creature (whether Christ, the good angels, or human beings in grace) and God’s supernatural presence to an assumed nature cannot both belong to a single mode of God-creature relationship (e.g., circumincession). This is because grace and glory unite a created nature to the whole Trinity, while hypostatic union unites a created nature to a single divine person. In other words, Henry is arguing for a two-tier understanding of God’s relationship to the world, while Scotus is defending the more common three-tier understanding according to which God’s presence to a creature by nature, grace, and hypostatic union are categorically distinct.366 If the whole Trinity indwells the soul by grace and glory, hypostatic union to one divine person cannot be reduced to a species of union by grace and glory. That being the case, no degree of the deification of the powers of a rational creature could possibly be causally sufficient for hypostatic union.

Having severed the connection between Christ’s grace and ours, Scotus has now severed the connection between Christ’s grace and hypostatic union. God could have assumed a human

365 Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 2, n. 22 (Vatican IX, p. 126): “Praeterea, ex vi unionis solum Verbum est praesens animae assumptae, et hoc secundum esse personale; ergo si ex tali praesentia vel unione sit idem praesens in ratione obiecti immutantis, sequitur quod ex vi unionis solum Verbum immutet intellectum creatum et non tota Trinitas, - quod est falsum, quia opera Trinitatis sunt indivisa in operatione ad extra.”

366 See, for instance, Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 8, a. 3, ad 4 (Marietti I, p. 38): “No other perfection, except grace, added to substance, renders God present in anything as the object known and loved; therefore, only grace constitutes a special mode of God’s existence in things. There is, however, another special mode of God’s existence in man by [hypostatic] union.” (Ad quartum dicendum quod nulla alia perfectio superaddita substantiae, facit Deum esse in aliquo sicut objectum cognitum et amatum, nisi gratia: et ideo sola gratia facit singularem modum essendi Deum in rebus. Est autem alius singularis modus essendi Deum in homine per unionem: de quo modo suo loco agetur.)
nature into the unity of a divine person without bestowing highest possible grace on it, and God could have bestowed highest possible grace on a mere creature. Scotus, of course, affirms that both Incarnation and highest possible grace coincide in a single created nature in the actual economy of salvation. His contention is that there is no reason God could not separate them if He wanted to, and Scotus reflects on which would be more perfect were they bestowed on two distinct created natures:

[Hypostatic] union is greater as to first act, because by this union the being of the person assuming is communicated to the assumed nature; and in fact even now this union includes the other union, which is union with second act and operation; but if the unions were separated, as they could be, that union would be greater which is of the nature to the Word as to term in respect of first act, but not to it in respect of second act and of beatific existence, because blessedness exists in operation more than terms for operation do. Or, to speak more properly, one can say that neither union is greater than the other because they are of different ideas—and since neither includes the other, one of them can exist without the other.367

The Scotistic Inversion

As in previous cases, Scotus does not simply sever the necessary connection between Incarnation and fullness of grace. After the connection is severed, the theologian must consider why God has contingently willed the connection between Incarnation and fullness of grace. In the first half of this chapter, I argued that God’s will to bestow grace by means of a created source even though He did not need one is explained by the fact that God willed not simply a collection of the deified but that they be one mystical Body with Christ as its Head. In this section, we see that even the mystical Body cannot be the reason for the Incarnation. God could

367 Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 2, n. 34 (Vatican IX, p. 132): “Ad primum, cum arguitur - quantum ad primum membrum divisionis - de comparatione duarum unionum, respondeo et dico quod ista est maior quantum ad actum primum, quia per hanc communicatur ‘esse personae assumentis’ naturae assumptae; et etiam modo de facto ista includit aliam unionem, quae est ad actum secundum et operari; sed de possibili, si separarentur, illa esset major quae est naturae ad Verbum ut terminum quantum ad actum primum, sed non quantum ad actum secundum et ‘esse beatificum’, quia beatitudo magis est in operatione quam termini ad operationem. Vel, magis proprie loquendo, potest dici quod neutra est maior alia, quia sunt alterius rationis, - et cum neutra necessario includat aliam, potest una esse sine altera.”
have secured a mystical Body of the deified by bestowing highest possible grace on a mere creature who would then inevitably serve as source in the order of grace. God could have assumed a nature and not deified it. He could have most highly deified a human nature and not assumed it. Why, then, did God freely will to bestow highest possible grace on an Incarnate divine person?

Scotus has carefully argued that highest possible grace and hypostatic union are neither causally necessary nor causally sufficient for each other, but that is not all that Scotus says. He also says that it is fitting for God to bestow such grace on an Incarnate person and (perhaps more puzzlingly) that it would be unfitting for God to bestow it on an unassumed nature: “The second man [Christ]—because He is God—was, by congruity, filled with supreme grace, whereby He was incapable of sin; and it was not appropriate for the first man [Adam] to be filled with as much grace, because he was not God.”368 To say that fullness of grace is fittingly bestowed on an Incarnate nature, is, of course, not at odds with saying that its non-bestowal is possible, a claim to which I will return below. The claims that it is possible to bestow highest possible grace on an unassumed nature and that it is unfitting to do so is considerably more problematic, since no medieval theologian wanted to admit that God could do something unfitting.

While Scotus does not explain this unfittingness anywhere in this distinction, what he says in distinction 7 might provide a solution to this seeming aporia:

God first wills some non-supreme [sc. non-angelic] nature to have supreme glory, showing that He need not confer glory according to the order of natures, and then

368 Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 2, n. 38 (Vatican IX, p. 135): “Ad secundam probationem, ad Anselmum, dico quod secundus homo - quia ‘Deus’ - de congruo replebatur summa gratia, per quam erat impeccabilis; et hoc non decebat primum hominem, quia non erat Deus, replei tanta gratia.”
secondly, as it were, He willed that this nature exist in the person of the Word (so that the angel would thus not be placed beneath a human being).\footnote{369} Perhaps, then, there is no absolute unfittingness in bestowing highest possible grace on an unassumed nature. Instead, the unfittingness follows from a consequence of doing so in certain possible worlds, namely, those in which God freely decides to create creature-types higher up the great chain of being than the nature on which highest possible grace is bestowed. It would be unfitting, in other words, for God to bestow highest possible grace on a rational nature that is not the highest actually-created nature. This would be unfitting not because the mere creature is an unfitting recipient of highest possible grace but because this would entail the unfitting consequence that higher creatures receive their grace from a lower creature that is not God.

Now that we have addressed Scotus’s claim that bestowal of highest possible grace on an unassumed nature is both possible and unfitting, we turn to his claim that bestowal of highest possible grace on an assumed nature is fitting but not necessary. Again, it is not contradictory to say that some non-necessary thing is fitting. There are many fitting things that God does not do necessarily. For instance, the Christian tradition has, in the main, claimed that the act of creation is fitting but not necessary. Scotus says that hypostatic union and fullness of grace are fittingly bestowed on the same nature in a number of different contexts, but nowhere reflects extensively on that in which such fittingness consists. Above, he says that fullness of grace was fittingly bestowed on Christ so that His humanity would be rendered impeccable, but that is not a sufficient account of the fittingness between hypostatic union and fullness of grace. The blessed

\footnote{369} Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} III, d. 7, q. 3, n. 69 (Vatican IX, p. 289): “Deus primo volens aliquam naturam non summam habere summam gloriam, ostendens quod non oportet eum conferre gloriam secundum ordinem naturarum, et quasi secundo voluit illam naturam esse in persona Verbi (ut sic angelus non ponatur subesse homini).”
are impeccable and do not possess highest possible grace, so Christ’s need of impeccability sufficiently grounds the fittingness of some degree of grace, but not of highest possible grace.

We might simply say that the two perfections are fittingly bestowed together because God bestows grace in accordance with nature. Since an Incarnate nature is elevated far above all other created natures by virtue of its union with a divine person, perhaps God fittingly bestows the highest possible perfections on it.\textsuperscript{370} Scotus claims that the bestowal of highest possible grace is the highest possible display of divine mercy: “Now it seems, according to right reason, to be simply better that the highest grace has been conferred on someone than not conferred, for thereby is displayed the highest mercy of God in giving the highest good of grace without preceding merits.”\textsuperscript{371} He also claims that the Incarnation was the highest possible display of divine gratuity: “In all the works of God there was not a work of pure grace other than the Incarnation of the Son of God alone, and this because no merits preceded it.”\textsuperscript{372} All other divine works, Scotus seems to be saying, are preceded by at least some merits (at very least, the merits of Christ), but the Incarnation was preceded by no merits whatsoever. Perhaps we might say that it is supremely fitting for God to bestow these two greatest perfections together on a single created nature. The problem with this view is that Scotus consistently denies that God acts in this way, as he did in the quote above: “God first wills some non-supreme nature to have supreme glory, showing that He need not confer glory according to the order of natures.”


\textsuperscript{371} Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} III, d. 13, n. 54 (Vatican IX, p. 406): “[V]idetur autem simpliciter melius - secundum rectam rationem - summam gratiam esse aliqui collatam quam non esse collatam, quia in hoc maxime manifestatur summa misericordia Dei in dando summum bonum gratiae sine meritis.”

\textsuperscript{372} Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} IV, d. 2, n. 41 (Vatican XI, p. 155): “[P]osset concedi quod in operibus Dei omnibus non fuit aliquod opus merae gratiae nisi sola incarnatio Filii Dei, et hoc si ad illam nulla merita praecesserunt.”
Even if he nowhere explicitly makes the following claim, Scotus does provide resources to make a Scotistic claim that the fittingness of the conjoint bestowal of hypostatic union and highest possible grace consists in their relationship to the inner-Trinitarian life of God. Perhaps the best way to make this case is to appeal to the Scriptural passage Scotus cites as support that hypostatic union and fullness of grace are fittingly conjoined:

Again, John 1:14, “We saw His glory as of the only begotten from the Father”—where John seems to say that ‘to be the only begotten’ is the proximate reason for the congruence whereby He has the fullness of grace; therefore, the nature was subsistent in the Word before so great a grace was conferred on it, because it would seem improper for so great a fullness of grace to be conferred on the nature in an instant in which the nature is understood not to be united with the Word.373

The congruity of the bestowal of fullness of grace, here, does not simply follow from being an Incarnate divine person but, particularly, from being the Incarnate Son of the Father. When we recall, from chapter 3, the necessary connection between the infusion of grace and the mission and indwelling of the Holy Spirit, it is easy to imagine a Trinitarian account of the fittingness that the Incarnate Son receive the fullness of grace. The fullness of grace is the most perfect mission of the Holy Spirit. Having already bestowed on the Son the fullness of His own divine nature in the imminent life of the Trinity, the Father wills to bestow on Him the fullest created participation in that same divine nature in the economy of salvation by the most-perfect-possible mission of their common Spirit.

We might say, then, that when we peer into the mystery of God’s will as far as we can, what we find is the Spirit’s most perfect mission to the Father’s Incarnate Son. As we saw in the previous chapter, God wills glory and grace as the necessary condition for the invisible mission

373 Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 2, n. 90 (Vatican IX, p. 157): “Item, Ioan. 1: Vidimus gloriam quasi unigeniti a Patre, - ubi videtur dicere quod 'esse unigenitum' sit proxima ratio congruentiae quare ipse habeat plenitudinem gratiae; ergo prius erat natura subsistens in Verbo quam tanta gratia sibi conferebatur, quia videretur indecens quod tanta plenitudo gratiae in instanti naturae conferretur in quo intelligitur non unita Verbo.”
of the Holy Spirit, who comes to indwell the rational creature by imprinting His own Trinitarian character on the innermost recesses of her soul so that she might, together with the Holy Spirit, love God with God’s own love. What we see in this chapter is that God willed not simply that His own love be in some creatures but that it be there maximally, that is, that the mission of the Holy Spirit be realized in at least one creature in the most perfect way possible. Further still, the Father has freely willed to bestow the maximal possession of His Spirit on none other than His Beloved Son in our flesh. At the center of the economy of salvation, then, we find the externalization of God’s own Trinitarian life by the perfect confluence of the Trinitarian missions.

God, of course, did not have to externalize His own Trinitarian life and did not have to do so in precisely this way. But if He does so will, this externalization of Trinitarian life cannot fail to be the meaning of the whole created order. The maximal deification of the humanity of the Incarnate Son by the perfect mission of the Holy Spirit is the highest possible *ad extra* act of God. It is the perfect confluence of His mercy and grace and most-perfectly manifests His own inner-Trinitarian life. According to his *ordered-willing axiom* (God never wills greater goods for the sake of lesser goods), it cannot possibly be the case that some other created reality (e.g., our grace and glory) is the motive of the Incarnation and fullness of Christ’s grace. To the contrary, the perfect confluence of the Trinitarian missions is precisely the motive of the entire created order and, indeed, cannot fail to be the motive of all else in any possible created order in which it exists. We should not be asking what it is about our grace and glory that makes the Trinitarian missions intelligible, then; we should be asking what it is about the Trinitarian missions that makes our grace and glory intelligible. Scotus not only allows us to ask the question the other way around, he also helps us answer the question.
As we saw in the previous chapter, the first created thing that is willed by God is the glory of the predestined, but in a number of other passages, Scotus wants to further break this first volition into a number of discrete rational instants. God does not, on Scotus’s account, will Christ’s glory and ours at the same instant:

Just as He first intends one to have glory before grace, so among those to whom He has foreordained glory, He who wills ordinately would seem to intend first the glory of the one He wishes to be nearest the end, and therefore He intends glory to this soul [of Christ] before He wills glory to any other soul.374

Glory is the first thing that is willed by God in the created order, and within the heavenly choir, it is the glory of Christ’s soul that most captures the eternal gaze of the Father’s will in predestination. It seems untrue, Scotus argues, that “the highest good in the whole of creation is something that merely chanced to take place, and that only because of some lesser good”375 This lesser good, for Scotus, is not simply the redemption of the human race from sin but even the inferior graces and glories of the elect. Even these goods, Scotus argues, could not be the motive of the Incarnation and fullness of grace manifest in Christ.

Once it has become clear that Christ’s grace and glory were willed in an instant before ours, the question then arises: Christ’s grace and glory cannot be willed because of ours, but are there reasons that our grace and glory are willed because of His? As far as I know, Scotus does not address the question directly, but there are certainly resources in Scotus to make a fairly strong claim that, contrary to the consensus position before him, our grace and glory were,


375 Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 7, n. 64 (Vatican IX, p. 288): “Nec est verisimile tam summun Bonum in entibus esse tantum occasionatum propter minus bonum solum.”
indeed, predestined for the sake of His. To see how, we turn to Scotus’s reflections on the perfection of charity, where he appeals to Richard of St. Victor:

But God could be held dear with a private love, such that the lover does not want God to have any other lovers, as is evident in jealous men who hold their wives too dear. But this habit would be neither ordinate nor perfect.

I say it would not be *ordinate* because God, who is the universal good, does not will to be the individual, private good of any person, nor, according to right reason, should anyone appropriate the universal good to himself. And so this habit of love that inclines one to that good as one’s own individual good, not to be loved or possessed by anyone else, would be an inordinate love.

It would also not be *perfect* because one who loves something perfectly wills that the beloved be loved by another, as is evident from what Richard says in *On the Trinity* III, ch. 11.

So by infusing the love by which the soul tends perfectly and ordinate to Himself, God gives the habit by which He is held dear as the universal good and as a good that is to be loved in company with others.\(^\text{376}\)

Scotus employs Richard’s argument in a distinctively different context than Richard did. Richard had argued that the perfection of charity necessarily entails that God be a Trinity.\(^\text{377}\) Scotus applies Richard’s principle not with respect to God’s charity but with respect to ours.

Charity, Scotus argues (following Richard), is corporate by nature. It is, as Scotus says elsewhere, “apt to incline one to love God non-privately.”\(^\text{378}\) The same habit by which we love God (i.e., charity) causes us to love our neighbor precisely by desiring that they too have the same charity in them. While Scotus does not make the Christological link directly, it is easy to understand why.

\(^{376}\) Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 28, q. 1, nn. 10-11 (Vatican X, p. 85): “Posset autem haberi carus aliquo amore privato, quo amans nollet habere condiligentem, sicut apparebat in zelotypis habentibus suos esse caros. Sed iste habitus non esset ordinatus nec perfectus: Non, inquam, ordinatus, quia Deus, qui bonum est commune, non vult esse bonum proprium et privatum alicuius personae, nec secundum rectam rationem debet aliquis sibi appropriare bonum commune; et ideo habitus vel amor iste, inclinans ad illud bonum ut ad bonum proprium non condiligendum nec habendum ab alio, esset amor inordinatus. Non perfectus etiam, quia perfecte diligens vult dilectum ab alio dili, sicut apparebat per illud Richardi *De Trinitate* III 11. Deus ergo, amorem infundens quo omnia perfecte et ordinate tendant in ipsum, dat habitum quo habeatur carus ut Bonum commune et ut Bonum condiligendum ab alis.”

\(^{377}\) Richard of St. Victor, *De Trinitate* III, c. 11 (Ribaillier, pp. 146-47).

\(^{378}\) Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 28, q. 1, n. 18 (Vatican X, p. 89): “Iste habitus, qui ex natura sua non est privatus sed communis, natus est inclinare ad Deum amandum non private.”
see how one might do so: Once God bestows the most perfect charity on His Incarnate Son, His Son cannot fail to desire that there be some others who possess the same love for the Father that He Himself has. The Father, for the sake of His Son’s created perfection, wills to grant the deepest desire of His Son in our flesh and, so, wills our grace and glory as a participation in His.

For Scotus, the Head does not exist for the sake of the Body; the Body exists for the sake of the Head. The Body exists so that the Son might not only love the Father as intensely as a creature possibly can but also be the source of a multitude of God’s co-lovers who love the Father together with and by participation in His own created love. Once the necessity claims have been rejected, it becomes clear that the consensus position (i.e., that the Incarnate Christ’s deification is explained by our need for salvation) had the order of intelligibility entirely the wrong way around. Denying that our salvation necessarily depends on the deification of an Incarnate person, in other words, is not an exercise in mere speculative curiosity; instead, it serves a profoundly theological purpose, enabling us rightly to grasp the centrality of the Son’s Incarnation and deification in the economy of salvation. He is necessarily the pinnacle and explanation of the whole economy of salvation, not its contingent remedy.

After Scotus

Once Scotus’s position and its consequent implications have been grasped, his absence from Emil Mersch’s narrative is all the more surprising. On Mersch’s account, the next great moment in the development of the doctrine of the mystical Body after the scholastic period is

\[379\] It might be argued that Scotus actually denies that a positive act of love for neighbor is necessary for charity. It is perfectly licit, he argues, for a contemplative to live on his own with no thought or act of love for his neighbor. But Scotus clearly is speaking only of one’s relationship to close acquaintances. The contemplative fulfills the perfection of charity despite not having any acquaintances because charity moves him (necessarily I think) to love, at very least, the blessed. Scotus, Lectura III, d. 28, n. 35 (Vatican XXI, p. 228): “Unde distinguendum est de proximis, quia beatos et bonos debemus - si debemus actum affirmativum - diligere et non odire, damnatos odire, viatores in speciali diligere cum condicione si sint proximi, sicut dictum est.”
that of the “French School,” which he sees as the highest peak in the development of the doctrine after Augustine, the two overlooking the valley of the medieval period between them. It does seem to be the case that the potentiality of Scotus’s inversion was underemployed in his immediate aftermath. The commentary tradition continues to address fewer and fewer questions, and commentary on book 3 of the *Sentences* suffers more than any other. Many of the schoolmen drop distinctions altogether in their commentaries on book 3 and offer, instead, a brief running commentary on the whole book. What attention was given to the question of the three graces of Christ tended to home in on whether there is such a thing as highest possible grace.380

For Ockham, Christ has the highest grace *de potentia ordinata*, but God could easily have bestowed a higher grace on another creature *de potentia absoluta*.381 In doing so, Ockham rejects the mechanism Scotus proposes to make sense of Scripture’s affirmation that our grace is a participation in Christ’s and not just bested by His. According to Scotus, Christ must have the highest possible grace *de potentia absoluta* for our grace to be a participation in His. This is because, given the *esse gratiae*, highest possible grace is necessary for being a created source of grace. Ockham denies the possibility of a highest possible grace *de potentia absoluta*. Presumably, Ockham might have imagined an alternative mechanism for our grace being a participation in Christ’s, but if he did, he does not tell us anything about it. Nowhere in his commentary on distinction 13 of book 3 of the *Sentences* does Ockham affirm the standard view that our grace is a participation in Christ’s. In addition, Ockham rejects Scotus’s rational instants

---


381 Ockham, *Sentences* III, q. 8 (OTh VI, p. 261): “Christus habuit perfectissimam et summam gratiam de potentia Dei ordinata, non absoluta.”
and thus the tools for discerning what comes earlier and later in the order of divine intentions.\footnote{For a helpful account of Ockham’s arguments against Scotus’s rational instants (none of which she finds convincing), see Marilyn McCord Adams, \textit{William of Ockham} (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 1044-50.} Even the Scotists did not, in the main, develop Scotus’s inversion.\footnote{Antonius Andreas, for instance, follows Scotus in the main but includes nothing regarding the mystical Body other than to cite John 1 and John 3 as authorities in favor of Christ’s possession of the highest possible grace. Francis Myronnes, like many others, skips distinction 13 of book 3 altogether. A full survey of early followers of Scotus, of course, will require significant critical work on existing manuscripts.}

Still, there are reasons to believe that Scotus’s innovation was not entirely lost on Christian reflection on the mystical Body. Strikingly, what Mersch notes as the marks of progress in Bérulle’s “French School” revival of the doctrine is a commitment to the absolute primacy of Christ and an insistence that the activity of the Christian is an extension of Christ’s own activity, even an extension of the procession of the Holy Spirit at the heart of the Trinity itself.\footnote{Mersch, \textit{The Whole Christ}, 533-41.} As should be readily apparent, these are precisely the kinds of insights that I drew from Scotus’s denial of the necessity claims that had characterized discussion of the three graces of Christ prior to him. Interestingly, the extensive scholarship on the motive of the Incarnation has provided us with some indication that Scotus might well be partly responsible for Bérulle’s insights, for as Mersch suggests, the most likely candidate for Bérulle’s interest in the doctrine of the mystical Body is his contact with the School of Salamanca.\footnote{Mersch, \textit{The Whole Christ}, 532.}

Francis Pancheri and Juniper Carol have shown that Scotus’s position on the primacy of Christ in relation to the motive of the Incarnation proved immensely persuasive. Thomists generally criticized it harshly, but even some of their number attempted to reconcile Scotus’s position with that of Aquinas. One of the crucial steps in the development of this ‘Mitigated
Thomist’ perspective was none other than the School of Salamanca.\textsuperscript{386} Carol notes that, despite Bérulle’s being a “Strict Thomist” on the question of the motive of the Incarnation, “there are some passages in his writings in which he sounds rather Scotistic.”\textsuperscript{387} Of course, Pancheri and Carol are primarily interested in the question of the motive of the Incarnation, but it seems at least possible that adoption of Scotus on the primacy of Christ spilled over into the French School’s reflections on the mystical Body. It is, of course, dangerous to paint with broad strokes when it comes to historical development, but it seems difficult to deny at least the possibility that Scotus might have had more of a role in Bérulle’s revival of the doctrine of the mystical Body than Mersch has let on.

\textsuperscript{386} Francis Xavier Pancheri, \textit{The Universal Primacy of Christ} (Front Royal, VA: Christendom Press, 2004), 58-61.

\textsuperscript{387} Juniper B. Carol, \textit{Why Jesus Christ?: Thomistic, Scotistic, and Conciliatory Perspectives} (Manassas, VA: Trinity Communications, 1986), 72.
CHAPTER 5
CHRIST’S GRACE AND OURS
(2)
The Anselmian Argument

iustitia et iudicium praeparatio sedis tuae
misericordia et veritas praecdent faciem tuam
Psalm 88:15

In this chapter, we turn to Scotus’s treatment of the second classic argument for the necessity of the Incarnation, that of Anselm of Canterbury. Scotus has already shown that the Incarnation and the deification of Christ’s humanity are the highest possible display of God’s grace and mercy as well as the most perfect externalization of His own inner-Trinitarian life. What Scotus further shows with respect to the Anselmian argument is that God sees in the fall of the human race an opportunity to make Christ not only the most perfect recipient of His grace and mercy, but also the most perfect recipient of His justice. The Father freely determines the conditions for satisfaction in the way that He does, not because He cannot save us without the merit of Christ, but because He desires to save us precisely as an act of His supreme justice toward Christ.

The Anselmian Argument

Despite relative neglect in the twelfth century, Anselm’s Cur Deus homo became the point of departure for thirteenth-century university reflection on how Christ redeems.388

388 Michael Robson has traced the fortunes of Cur Deus homo with considerable care. His general thesis is that Alexander of Hales and Grosseteste respectively introduced the arguments of Cur Deus homo in the university
Interestingly, the Lombard himself nowhere addresses Anselm’s argument. The crucial concept of ‘satisfaction’ is entirely absent in the Lombard’s own reflections on how Christ saves in distinction 20 of the third book of the Sentences, appearing only in his treatment of penance in the fourth book. This absence makes it all the more striking that the great lights of the thirteenth century work within an obviously Anselmian conceptual matrix. One need read no more than the questions that thirteenth-century theologians entertained to intuit the profound impact that Cur Deus homo had on their consideration of the saving work of Christ (e.g., Are the Incarnation or the Passion necessary? Are they fitting? Was it necessary for God to redeem the human race and, if so, to redeem it through satisfaction?). We will first briefly outline Anselm’s argument in Cur Deus homo and then trace its fortunes in the commentary tradition, tracking the gradual voluntarist modification of Anselm’s argument that begins almost immediately after the Summa halensis and reaches its culmination in Scotus.

Anselm’s Argument

Anselm argues that, even if we assume Christ did not exist, reason alone can establish the necessity that God become a human being and die to make satisfaction for the human race.389 His

389 Anselm, Cur Deus homo, preface (Schmitt II, p. 42): “It goes so far as to prove by necessary reasons—leaving Christ out of the picture, as if nothing concerning him had ever taken place—that it is impossible for any human being to be saved apart from Christ.” (Ac tandem remoto Christo, quasi numquam aliquid fuerit de illo, probat rationibus necessariis esse impossible illum hominem salvare sine illo.) All English translations of Cur Deus homo are taken, with occasional minor adjustment, from Anselm: Basic Writings, trans. Thomas Williams (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2007).
argument rests on a series of four related necessity claims that he nicely summarizes near the end of the treatise.\textsuperscript{390} It runs something like this:

\textbf{C1:} If human beings fall, some of them must be restored (otherwise, none of them will reach beatitude and will thus have frustrated God in His purpose for creating them in the first place).

\textbf{C2:} If human beings are to be restored, they must make satisfaction (otherwise they will either be punished and not reach beatitude or God would be permitting disorder in His kingdom).

\textbf{C3:} If the human race is to make satisfaction, it must be by a God-man (since only God can give a gift proportionate to the crime, and only human beings owe satisfaction).

\textbf{C4:} If a God-man is to make satisfaction, it must be by His own death (since death is the only thing that He, as human being, does not already owe to God).

Each necessity claim takes the consequent of the previous claim as its own conditional. Anselm thus thinks that the fall of the human race is a sufficient condition for the death of a God-man. If human beings had not fallen, the death of a God-man would have been, presumably, impossible since Anselm thinks that death is a consequence of sin. But if human beings fall, the death of a God-man follows necessarily.

Before turning to the fate of each necessity claim, it will be helpful to identify two controlling theses that govern Anselm’s reflections on God’s \textit{ad extra} operations. He identifies them early in the treatise as something like ground rules for the dialogue:

\textbf{T1:} God’s infinite goodness entails that there can be no unfittingness in His operations.\textsuperscript{391}

\textsuperscript{390} Anselm, \textit{Cur Deus homo} II, c. 15 (Schmitt II, pp. 115-16): “A: At this point you see how the necessity of reason shows that the heavenly city is to be completed by human beings, and that this can be done only through forgiveness of sins, which no human being can have except through a human being who is himself God and reconciles sinners to God by his own death. Therefore, we have clearly discovered Christ, whom we confess to be both God and man and to have died for our sake.” (\textit{ANSELMUS: Quid iam quaeris amplius? Ecce vides quomodo rationabilis necessitas ostendat ex hominibus perficiendum esse supernam civitatem, nec hoc posse fieri nisi per remissionem peccatorum, quam homo nullus habere potest nisi per hominem, qui idem ipse sit deus atque morte sua homines peccatores deo reconciliet. Aperte igitur invenimus Christum, quem deum et hominem confitemur et mortuum propter nos.) My presentation of his argument is, essentially, the distilled summary in this quote together with as concise an account as I could muster of his reasoning in support of each distinct claim. His argument for each claim will be more fully spelled out in the pages below as we consider the development of the commentary tradition on each in turn.

\textsuperscript{391} Anselm, \textit{Cur Deus homo} I, c. 10 (Schmitt II, p. 67): “A: Since in this debate you are playing the role of those who are unwilling to believe anything unless it has first been demonstrated by reason, I want to strike a deal with you: we will not accept anything unsuitable, however slight, concerning God…” (\textit{ANSELMUS: Quoniam accipis in
T2: God’s infinite goodness entails that God will always pick the most-fitting of two courses of action.  

These two theses jointly entail that the categories of (1) impossible, (2) unfitting, (3) fitting, and (4) necessary essentially collapse into two: unfittingness and non-maximal fittingness entail impossibility for God, and maximal-fittingness entails necessity for God. It seems, then, that the only time Anselm’s God has a genuine choice between alternatives is when He is presented with two mutually exclusive courses of action that are equally- and maximally-fitting. For Anselm, if God has done something, the theologian can be assured that (1) it was the maximally-fitting thing for God to have done, and that (2) there was no unfittingness of any kind in His having done so. Anselm clearly does not think that these limits on God’s possible courses of action entail that God is not free. Divine freedom, on his account, requires only that God is not coerced by something outside of Himself.

---

hac quaestione personam eorum, qui credere nihil volunt nisi praemonstrata ratione, volo te cum pacisci, ut nullum vel minimum inconveniens in deo a nobis accipiatur…)

392 Anselm, Cur Deus homo I, c. 10 (Schmitt II, p. 67): “…and we will not throw out any argument, however modest, that is not defeated by some weightier argument. For just as an impossibility follows from anything unsuitable in God, however slight, so too necessity accompanies every argument, however modest, that is not defeated by some weightier argument.” (…et nulla vel minima ratio, si maior non repugnat, reiciatur. Sicut enim in deo quamlibet parvum inconveniens sequitur impossibilitas, ita quamlibet parvam rationem, si maiori non vincitur, comitatur necessitas.)

393 For an instance of the latter, see Anselm, Cur Deus homo II, c. 16 (Schmitt II, p. 119): “B: We can conclude that this is not merely fitting but indeed necessary. For if this is more fitting and more reasonable than the opposite…and if there is nothing that undermines this argument, it is necessary.” (BOSO: Quod non solum conveniens sed etiam necessarium esse possumus concludere. Si enim convenientius et rationabilius est hoc, quam aliquando nullum fuisse, de quo intentio dei qua hominem fecit perficere tur, nec est aliquid quod huic obviet rationi, necesse est.)

394 Anselm, Cur Deus homo II, c. 5 (Schmitt II, p. 100): “A: God does nothing out of necessity, since he is in no way compelled to do or prevented from doing anything. And when we say that God does something as though out of the necessity of avoiding dishonorableness (which God certainly does not fear), we should understand this more properly as meaning that he does it out of the necessity of preserving honorableness. This necessity is nothing other than the immutability of his honorableness, which he has from himself and not from another, and for that reason it is improperly called necessity.” (ANSELMUS: Denique deus nihil facit necessitate, quia nullo modo cogitare aut prohibetur facere aliquid; et cum dicimus deum aliquid facere quasi necessitate vitandi inhonestatem, quam utique non timet, potius intelligendum est quia hoc facit necessitate servandae honestatis. Quae scilicet necessitas non est aliid quam immutabilitas honestatis eius, quam a se ipso et non ab alio habet, et idcirco improprie dicitur necessitas.)
While all of the thirteenth-century schoolmen we will consider in this chapter agree with T1, none of them agree with T2. God cannot do anything that is unfitting, but He does not have to do what is maximally fitting. They all agree with Anselm, for instance, that the Incarnation and death of a God-man are in fact the maximally-fitting way for God to save us, but they are all equally committed to the Augustinian position that there were other means available to Him. This rejection of Anselm’s second thesis explains much of the reception history of Cur Deus homo. Once the second thesis is rejected, it is much easier to show that a particular course of action is not necessary for God. In order to show that a particular course of action is not necessary, one no longer needs to show that an alternative course of action is equally or more fitting; one only has to show that an alternative course of action would not be unfitting.

Anselm’s Fortunes

Before we turn to the fortunes of Cur Deus homo in the commentary tradition, it should be noted that it is often difficult to determine what a particular theologian thinks about each of Anselm’s individual claims, though Scotus is, more often than his forebears, unambiguously clear about each one. Virtually everyone in the thirteenth century denied that the death of a God-man was strictly necessary. In and of itself, though, denying the necessity of the death of a

---

Augustine, De Trinitate XIII, c. 10, n. 13 (CCSL 50A, pp. 399-400): “Eos itaque qui dicunt: ‘Itane defuit deo modus alius quo liberaret homines a miseria mortalitatis huius ut unigenitum filium deum sibi coaeternum hominem fieri uellet induendo humanam animam et carnem mortalemque factum mortem perpeti?,’ parum est sic refellere ut istum modum quo nos per mediatorem dei et hominum hominem Christum iesum deus liberare dignatur asseramus bonum et diuinae congruum dignitati; uerum etiam ut ostendamus non alium modum possibilem deo defuisse cuius potestati cuncta aequaliter subiactum, sed sanandae nostrae miseriae conuenientiorem modum alium non fuisse nec esse oportuisse.”

By this I mean no slight to thinkers other than Scotus. There are certainly other ways of reading Cur Deus homo, according to which these four claims play less of a central role. That Scotus considers each claim explicitly simply follows from the fact that he sees Anselm’s summary in Cur Deus homo II, c. 15 as key to the basic logic of the treatise. See Scotus, Lectura III, d. 20, n. 10 for a full quotation of Cur Deus homo II, c. 15 followed by a presentation of the four necessity claims as I have outlined them.
God-man tells us nothing about what a particular theologian thinks about C4 in particular (i.e., if a God-man must make satisfaction, He can only do it by means of His freely offered death). All it tells us is that a particular theologian denies at least one of the four claims. Due to the conditional nature of these claims and the close dependence of each claim on the preceding claims, denying the consequent of one of them only tells us that a particular theologian denies that particular claim or one of the preceding claims. For example, one might affirm the consequence of C3 (if God requires satisfaction, then a God-man is necessary) but might deny the consequent (i.e., that a God-man is necessary) by denying C2 (i.e., that repair makes satisfaction necessary). Even if the requirement of satisfaction would make a God-man necessary, a God-man is not, in fact, necessary if repair can be made without satisfaction. Due to the relationship between Anselm’s necessity claims, all one needs to do to deny that the death of a God-man is necessary is to break one of the links in the chain. As we will see, thirteenth-century theologians often went on to break more than one.

In the pages to come, we will trace a gradual voluntarist shift in which Anselm’s appeals to various divine attributes to explain the economy of salvation are replaced by appeals to various divine volitions. For Anselm, God’s goodness necessitates restoration if human beings fall, God’s justice necessitates satisfaction if human beings are to be restored, God’s majesty necessitates a God-man if there is to be satisfaction, and God’s supreme worthiness necessitates death if a God-man is to make satisfaction. By the time Scotus first lectured on the Sentences, the thirteenth-century schoolmen before him had already replaced a number of Anselm’s appeals to divine attributes with appeals to divine volitions. Scotus is the first to appeal to divine volitions to ground all four claims.
C1: If human beings fall, some of them must be restored

Before considering the fate of this crucial first claim, it is important to note, again, Anselm’s denial that all necessity encroaches on divine freedom. Nothing external to God could possibly coerce God to restore the human race. Nevertheless, Anselm does think something internal to God can ground the necessity of restoration without impinging upon divine freedom.397 In this, the commentary tradition is entirely agreed. God cannot be frustrated from acting by anything outside of Himself, and God cannot be forced to act by anything outside of Himself. Nevertheless, everyone thinks it is appropriate to say that things internal to God make it necessary for Him to act in certain ways. In the case at hand, everyone denies that God is compelled by something outside of Himself to restore the human race; everyone, likewise, affirms that something internal to Himself makes it possible to affirm in some sense that such restoration is necessary. They differ, of course, in their accounts of what it is in God that grounds this necessity.

There are two possibilities: first, a divine attribute; second, a divine volition. Some divine attribute (e.g., goodness or justice) might make it necessary for God to restore. Likewise, some divine volition might make it necessary for God to restore. For those who claim that a divine volition is what grounds the necessity of the restoration of the human race, there are, again, two different ways of explaining this. Some simply affirm that the divine decision to restore the human race is what makes such restoration necessary (i.e., \(a\) is necessary because God has willed \(a\)). Others affirm that the restoration of the human race is necessary because of some divine volition distinct from the decision to restore but necessarily connected to it in some way (i.e., \(a\) is necessary because \(a\) is necessarily entailed by \(b\), and God has willed \(b\)).

397 See, in particular, Anselm, Cur Deus homo II, c. 10.
As already noted, Anselm falls squarely in the former camp with respect to all four claims: for each of the four claims, necessity is grounded in a divine attribute. At the beginning of book 2 of *Cur Deus homo*, Anselm argues that God cannot create a creature-type (e.g., penguins) without purpose and seems to think that the purpose of a particular creature-type can be discerned by reflecting on its particular features without reference to any divine intentions.\(^398\)

Human beings, Anselm argues, are created with intellect and will so that they can know, love, and attain to the enjoyment of God.\(^399\) This purpose is intrinsic to rational natures; God cannot create rational creatures for any other purpose. That being the case, if an entire rational creature-type (e.g., the whole human race) were to perish without at least some of their number attaining to the enjoyment of God, the divine purpose in creating the creature-type would be frustrated, and Anselm can think of nothing more unfitting than that.\(^400\)

\(^398\) Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* II, c. 1.

\(^399\) Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* II, c. 1 (Schmitt II, p. 97): “[A: Rational nature] received this power of discernment so that it might hate and avoid evil, so that it might love and choose good, and so that it might love and choose the greater good to a greater degree. Otherwise God would have given it this power of discernment in vain, since its discernment would be in vain if it did not love and avoid things in accordance with its discernment; and it is not fitting that God should bestow so great a power in vain. And so it is certain that rational nature was made for the purpose of loving and choosing the supreme Good above all other things, not for the sake of something else, but for his own sake….Now given that it was made just so that it might choose and love the supreme Good, it was made to be just either so that it would at some time attain what it loves and chooses, or not. But if it was not made just so that it would attain what it loves and chooses in this way, its being made just, so that it loves and chooses this, would be in vain.” (ANSELMUS: Simili ratione probatur quia ad hoc accepit potestatem discernendi, ut odisset et vitaret malum, ac amaret et eligeret bonum, atque magis bonum magis amaret et eligeret. Aliter namque frustra illi deus dedisset potestatem istam discernendi, quia in vanum discerneret, si secundum discretionem non amaret et vitaret. Sed non convenit ut deus tantam potestatem frustra dederit. Ad hoc itaque factam esse rationalem naturam certum est, ut sumnum bonum super omnia amaret et eligeret, non propter alium, sed propter ipsum….Quod si ad sumnum bonum eligendum et amandum iusta facta est, aut talis ad hoc facta est, ut aliquando assequatur quod amaret et eligeret, aut non. Sed si ad hoc iusta non est facta, ut quod sic amat et eligat assequatur, frustra facta est talis, ut sic illud amet et eligat.)

\(^400\) Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* II, c. 4 (Schmitt II, p. 99): “A: On the basis of these considerations it is easy to recognize that either God will complete what he began in human nature or else he made so sublime a nature for so great a good in vain. And since we know that God made nothing more precious than rational nature, which he created so that it might rejoice in him, it is utterly foreign to him that he should allow any rational nature to perish entirely.” (ANSELMUS: Ex his est facile cognoscere quioniam aut hoc de humana perficiet deus natura quod incepit, aut in vanum fecit tam sublimem naturam ad tantum bonum. At si nihil pretiosius cognoscitur deus fecisse quam...
goodness thus necessarily entails that, if God creates a rational creature-type, some number of them must reach the enjoyment of Him: “Because, in His goodness, He created them, He spontaneously obligated Himself (as it were) to bring to completion the good thing that He had undertaken.”\textsuperscript{401} Anselm will also call this obligation of God the “necessity of upholding honor” (\textit{necessitate servandae honestatis}) or the “immutability of His honor” (\textit{immutabilitas honestatis eius}).\textsuperscript{402} God’s decision to create human beings, in other words, is sufficient for some number of human beings to make it to beatitude. In fact, Anselm thinks there is some number-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought of human beings and angels which God’s goodness entails will make it to eternal glory.\textsuperscript{403} God does not first decide to create human beings and then, by a distinct act of will, decide that some number of them will make it to glory. For Anselm, divine goodness is sufficient to ground the necessity of restoration (in the case of human fall) without appeal to any additional divine volitions.

The authors of the \textit{Summa halensis} and Bonaventure both seem to grant C1 in precisely this way. They deny, like Anselm, that something extrinsic to God compels Him to ensure that some of each created rational creature-type make it to the heavenly city, but they both appeal to Anselm’s ‘divine honorableness’ as grounding the necessity of restoration. They not only agree

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textit{rationalem naturam ad gaudendum de se, valde alienum est ab eo, ut ullam rationalem Naturam penitus perire sitat.}}

\footnote{Anselm, \textit{Cur Deus homo} II, c. 5 (Schmitt II, p. 100): “ANSELMUS: [B]onitate sua illum creando sponte se ut perficeret inceptum bonum quasi obligavit.”}

\footnote{Anselm, \textit{Cur Deus homo} II, c. 5 (Schmitt II, p. 100): “ANSELMUS: Denique deus nihil facit necessitate, quia nullo modo cogitur aut prohibetur facere aliquid; et cum dicimus deum aliquid facere quasi necessitate vitandi inhonestatem, quam utique non timet, potius intelligendum est quia hoc facit necessitate servandae honestatis. Quae scilicet necessitas non est aliud quam immutabilitas honestatis eius, quam a se ipso et non ab alio habet, et idcirco improprie dicitur necessitas.”}

\footnote{Anselm, \textit{Cur Deus homo} I, c. 16.}
\end{footnotes}
with Anselm but do little more than quote him.\textsuperscript{404} For both the authors of the \textit{Summa halensis} and Bonaventure, the argument of Anselm needs no further elaboration or modification: human fall plus divine goodness and honorableness are sufficient for restoration without appeal to any additional divine volitions.

Aquinas, on the contrary, explicitly grounds the necessity of restoration not on the divine nature (i.e., a divine attribute like goodness or ‘honorableness’) but on the divine will (i.e., a particular divine volition): “It was necessary on the part of God for human nature to be repaired, because He foreknew and ordained that they would be repaired.”\textsuperscript{405} Aquinas does say that some call this “necessity of immutability,” but he clearly thinks this is the immutability of God’s foreknowledge and predestination, not the immutability of God’s goodness in creation.\textsuperscript{406}

Among the Franciscans between Bonaventure and Scotus, Richard of Middleton, at least, was willing to diverge from Bonaventure in ways similar to Aquinas. Richard explicitly rejects Anselm’s argument that the goodness of God entails that some human beings will reach final beatitude in God. Should the entire human race perish, he reasons, there is no reason to think that they would have been created in vain. Their mere existence as living and thinking creatures, he

\textsuperscript{404} The authors of the \textit{Summa halensis} give an extended account of Anselm’s understanding of necessity and then quote the crucial passage from \textit{Cur Deus homo} II, c. 5: “Unde dicit Anselmus quod ‘Deus nihil facit necessitate, quia nec cogitur aut prohibetur aliquid facere. Et cum dicimus: Deum facere aliquid necessitate vitandi inhonestatem, quam utique non timet, potius intelligendum est quod hoc facit necessitate servandi honestatem, quae necessitas non est aliud quam immutabilitas honestatis, et improprie dicitur necessitas in Deo” (\textit{Summa halensis} III, n. 3 [Quaracchi IV.2, p. 14]). Bonaventure, too, gives an Anselmian taxonomy of necessity and then quotes the same passage: “Unde Anselmus in secundo \textit{Cur Deus homo}: « Cum dicimus, Deum aliquid facere necessitate, intelligendum est, quod hoc facit necessitate servandi honestatem, quae necessitas non est aliud quam immutabilitas honestatis »” (Bonaventure, \textit{Sentences} III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 1, resp. [Quaracchi III, p. 418]).

\textsuperscript{405} Aquinas, \textit{Sentences} III, d. 20, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3, resp. (Moos III, p. 615): “Et per hunc modum necessarium fuit ex parte Dei humanam naturam reparari, quia ipse praeveniderat et ordinavertat reparandum.”

\textsuperscript{406} Aquinas, \textit{Sentences} III, d. 20, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3, resp. (Moos III, p. 615): “Sed ex suppositione alicujus quod est in ipso, scilicet praescientiae, vel voluntatis, quae mutari non possunt: secundum quem modum dicitur, quod necessarium est praedestinationem salvare; et haec dicitur necessitas immutabilitatis a quibusdam.”
argues, would have been a sufficiently meaningful participation in the goodness of God.\textsuperscript{407} For Richard, it is not God’s nature, but God’s will that grounds the necessity of restoration, because “no effect proceeding from something through will proceeds of necessity: but the reparation of the human race was from God through will.”\textsuperscript{408} Richard first suggests that restoration is necessary simply because God has ordained to restore.\textsuperscript{409} He later identifies why God has so ordained: “Furthermore, if human nature was to reach its end, namely to the clear vision of God, repair was necessary, because otherwise to reach that vision would have been in no way possible.”\textsuperscript{410} The crucial volition that grounds the necessity of the restoration of the human race, then, is not simply God’s will to restore (Aquinas’s answer) but His conceptually prior volition to order some of the rational creatures created by Him to final beatitude in Him. This volition, for Richard, is distinct from the will to create and not necessitated by the combination of the will to create and the divine attributes. While the authors of the \textit{Summa halensis} and Bonaventure appeal to a divine attribute to ground the necessity of human restoration, Richard follows Aquinas to appeal to a divine volition.

Scotus concurs in rejecting C1 for precisely the same reason as Richard does. There would be no unfittingness for God to create the human race and not restore it should it fall. The

\textsuperscript{407} Richard of Middleton, \textit{Sentences} III, d. 20, ad 1 (Brixiae III, p. 209): “[S]i natura humana non fuisset reparata non tamen fuisset frustra, quia adhuc fuisset ad divinae iustitiae manifestationem, et ostensionem bonitatis, inquantum in ea esset aliqua participatio bonitatis divinae, inquantum fuisset ens vivens, et intelligens.”

\textsuperscript{408} Richard of Middleton, \textit{Sentences} III, d. 20, contra (Brixiae III, p. 208): “[N]ullus effectus procedens ab aliquo per voluntatem, procedit de necessitate: sed reparatio naturae humanae fuit a Deo per voluntatem: ergo non fuit facta de necessitate.”

\textsuperscript{409} Richard of Middleton, \textit{Sentences} III, d. 20, resp. (Brixiae III, p. 208-9): “[E]x prasuppositione divinae ordinationis qua Deus ordinaverat naturam humanam reparare, necessarium fuit non necessitate coactionis, sed immutabilitatis, quod eam repararet.”

\textsuperscript{410} Richard of Middleton, \textit{Sentences} III, d. 20, resp. (Brixiae III, p. 209): “Si etiam natura humana perventura erat ad suum finem, scilicet ad claram Dei visionem, necessarium fuit causa reparari, quia aliter ad illam visionem pertingerenullatus potuisset.”
necessity of restoration stems not from the divine nature but from the divine will—in particular, the predestination of some creatures to beatitude in God:

The predestination of human beings was contingent, not necessary; for just as God from eternity contingently predestined human beings, and in no way necessarily (since He performs nothing of necessity with respect to others beyond Himself in ordaining them to good), so He was able to not predestine. Nor is it unfitting that human beings be frustrated from beatitude, unless the predestination of human beings is presupposed. Therefore, there was no necessity of their redemption absolutely, just as neither was there of their predestination.411

Restoration is only as necessary as predestination to glory is, and predestination to glory, Scotus insists, is entirely contingent. Scotus, here, simply follows the position of some of his great forebears. His innovation is to be found in others of the Anselmian necessity claims.

_C2: If human beings are to be restored, they must make satisfaction_

Anselm argues that God has only two choices if human beings fall. God cannot simply forgive, since that would be for God to act against His own justice and allow disorder in His kingdom.412 Since this would be unfitting, it entails impossibility. To maintain order in His kingdom, either God must punish the human race or the human race must make satisfaction.413

---


412 Anselm, _Cur Deus homo_ I, c. 12 (Schmitt II, p. 69): “A: Let’s go back and see whether it is fitting for God to forgive sin by mercy alone, without any repayment of the honor that has been taken from him….Forgiving sin in this way is the same as not punishing it. But to order sin in the right way when no recompense is made just is to punish sin. So if sin is not punished, it is left unordered….But it is not fitting for God to leave anything unordered in his kingdom….So it is not fitting for God to leave sin unpunished in this way.” (ANSELMUS: _Redeamus et videamus utrum sola misericordia, sine omni solutione ablati sibi honoris deceat deum peccatum dimittere….Sic dimittere peccatum non est aliquid quam non punire….Deum vero non decet aliquid inordinatum in suo regno dimittere….Non ergo dect deum peccatum sic impunitum dimittere._)

413 Anselm, _Cur Deus homo_ I, c. 13 (Schmitt II, p. 71): “A: Necessarily, then, when God’s honor is taken away, either it is paid back or else punishment follows. Otherwise, either God would not be just toward himself, or he would lack the power to enforce either repayment or punishment. And it is impious even to think such a thing.”
For Anselm, punishment (*poena*) and satisfaction (*satisfactoria*) are two mutually exclusive possibilities for God.\(^{414}\) Since punishment would entail that no human being would make it to beatitude, satisfaction is the only real possibility for God. Since it is the more fitting of the two possibilities (indeed, it is the only one that is fitting at all since the other is unfitting), satisfaction is necessary.\(^{415}\)

When considering the necessity of human satisfaction, the authors of the *Summa halensis* appeal to the distinction between God’s absolute and ordained power (satisfaction is necessary only by ordained power). At first blush, this might seem to suggest a break from Anselm, but the way the distinction is used makes it clear that the authors of the *Summa halensis* are in full agreement with Anselm. As William Courtenay has helpfully pointed out, care is needed when determining precisely how the absolute and ordained power distinction is used by particular authors in particular contexts.\(^{416}\) At least in this particular case, the authors of the *Summa*

---

\(^{414}\) Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* I, c. 15 (Schmitt II, p. 73): “A: Since these two conclusions are as impossible as they are absurd, it is necessary that every sin is followed by either satisfaction or punishment.” (*ANSELMUS*: *Quae duo quoniam sicut sunt inconvenientia, ita sunt impossibilia, necesse est ut omne peccatum satisfactio aut poena sequatur.*)

\(^{415}\) Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* I, c. 25 (Schmitt II, pp. 95-96): “A: Do you not understand, on the basis of what we said above, that it is necessary that some human beings will attain happiness? For if it is unfitting for God to bring human beings who are in any way blemished to that state for which he created them unblemished, lest he seem to regret the good he had undertaken or to be unable to achieve his purpose, much more so is it impossible, on account of that same unfittingness, that no human being is advanced to the state for which he was created. So either some recompense for sin, of the sort we showed earlier ought to exist, must be found outside the Christian faith—and no reasoning can reveal any such thing—or else one must believe in that faith without doubting.” (*ANSELMUS*: *An non intelligis ex iis quae supra diximus, quia necesse est aliquos homines ad beatitudinem pervenire? Nam si deo inconveniens est hominem cum aliqua macula perducere ad hoc, ad quod illum sine omni macula fecit, ne aut boni incepti paenitere aut propositum impleare non posse videatur: multo magis propter eandem inconvenientiam impossibile est nullum hominem ad hoc provehi ad quod factus est. Quapropter aut extra fiden Christianam invenienda est peccati satisfactio, qualem supra esse debere ostendimus - quod ratio nulla potest ostendere -, aut indubitanter in illa esse credenda est.*)

\(^{416}\) Courtenay has shown not only that the understanding of the distinction varies between individual authors but also that individual authors themselves often deploy it inconsistently. William J. Courtenay, “The Dialectic of Divine
halensis seem to understand God’s absolute power to be God’s power as conceptually abstracted from all other divine attributes—the crucial one in this case being divine justice. If we consider divine power apart from divine justice, we can say that God is able to restore the human race without satisfaction. If, on the other hand, we consider divine power in conjunction with divine justice, satisfaction is necessary for restoration:

There are two ways to consider divine power, namely, absolutely or according to order. Considering divine power absolutely, we understand a certain infinite power, and in this way divine power is not limited, and it is to be conceded in this way that He is able to repair the human nature without satisfaction for sin. But considering [divine power] according to order, so we consider it in the order of justice and mercy, and in this way it is to be conceded that He is able to do nothing except by means of mercy and justice.417

If divine power is considered in abstraction from divine justice, we must affirm that God can forgive without satisfaction. But if we consider divine power together with divine justice and mercy, we must affirm, to the contrary, that God must receive satisfaction for sins before He can forgive: “Just as justice without mercy is cruel and vicious, so benevolence without justice is vicious, and so, if He should discharge sin without satisfaction, this benevolence would be injustice and would be performed according to unbecomingness in God: hence, it would not be benevolence.”418

This is, to my knowledge, a fairly idiosyncratic use of the distinction between God’s absolute and ordained power. The authors of the Summa halensis are not affirming that


418 Summa halensis III, n. 4 (Quaracchi IV.2, p. 16): “Unde sicut iustitia sine misericordia crudelis est et vitiosa, ita benignitas sine iustitia vitiosa est, et ita, si dimitteret peccatum sine satisfactione, ista benignitas esset iniustitia et operaretur ad indecentiam in Deo: unde non esset benignitas.”
forgiveness without satisfaction is a real possibility for God. What they are affirming is that, *per impossibile*, if God were as powerful as He is without being as just as He is, He could forgive without satisfaction. In fact, of course, God is necessarily as powerful and as just as He is, so the authors of the *Summa halensis* wholeheartedly endorse C2: if the human race is to be restored, there must be satisfaction. For the authors of the *Summa halensis*, human fall plus divine goodness is sufficient for restoration, and human fall plus divine goodness and justice is sufficient for restoration by satisfaction. No additional divine volitions are necessary.

On this question, Bonaventure, too, appeals repeatedly to the confluence of divine attributes, but with a crucial divergence from the *Summa halensis*. Bonaventure distinguishes divine power, on the one hand, from divine goodness and mercy on the other. Divine justice, he suggests, goes with goodness and mercy rather than with power.419 God could have restored the human race without satisfaction, but He preferred to do so in another way:

> Although divine *power* is manifest in every work of God, in the work of reparation, *benevolence* and mercy (and, consequently, the *justice* conjoined to them) are more manifest. Therefore, although He was able to repair the human race with a single word, He preferred (*maluit*) to repair it with difficulty and penalty, because it was more suitable thus to show forth *mercy* than *power*.420

Since divine justice is intrinsically connected to His benevolence and mercy (i.e., there is no goodness and mercy in God without justice), God’s preference to restore us in a way more demonstrative of His benevolence and mercy necessarily entails that He restore by way of

---

419 Bonaventure, *Sentences* III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 2 (Quaracchi III, p. 421): “Summa *benignitas* et misericordia in Deo non excludunt *iustitiam*, et ideo non sic debutit manifestari in opera reparationis, quod iustitia non haberet locum; sed ita debutit manifestari divina *misericordia*, quod simul cum hoc ostenderetur divine *iustitia*.”

420 Bonaventure, *Sentences* III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 2 (Quaracchi III, p. 421): “Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod modus alius magis manifestaret divinam potentiam; dicendum quod etsi in omni opere Dei ostendatur divina *potentia*, in opere tamen reparationis magis manifestatur *benignitas* et misericordia, et per consequens ipsa *iustitia* eis annexa. Et ideo, cum posset uno verbo genus humanum reparare, maluit tamen reparare cum difficultate et poenalitate, quia magis opportunum erat, ibi ostendi *misericordiam* quam *potentiam*. *Potentia enim* satis claruerat in rerum eductione; sed adhuc latebat *misericordia*, quam ostendebat Deus in hominis reparacione.”
satisfaction. The word ‘preferred’ (maluit) here is significant. God restores by way of satisfaction not because His benevolence, mercy, and justice necessarily entail that He does so, as seems to be the case in Anselm and in the Summa halensis; instead, God restores by way of human satisfaction because He chooses to display His benevolence and mercy (which include His justice) most prominently in this act.

For Bonaventure, then, God’s justice by itself does not secure the necessity of satisfaction for restoration. Bonaventure insists that God could have restored the human race with a single word and, unlike the authors of the Summa halensis, sees no unfitness in such a mode of action with respect to divine justice in and of itself. Restoring without satisfaction would not have been unjust;\(^421\) it simply would not make divine justice as manifest as it could be. What secures the necessity of satisfaction is not the divine nature alone but the divine will. For Bonaventure, human fall plus divine goodness is sufficient for restoration (C1), but human fall plus divine justice is not sufficient for restoration by satisfaction. There must be an intervening divine volition, namely, that in this act God’s goodness (plus justice) be more manifest than His power. Already in Bonaventure, then, the voluntarist shift has been made.

Aquinas also denies C2, but he addresses questions of justice more thoroughly than Bonaventure does. Bonaventure tells us that God could have restored by a single word but does not pause to tell us how this would fail to impinge on divine justice. The authors of the Summa halensis had argued that God cannot restore without satisfaction just as a judge cannot forgive a civil offence without satisfaction even if he can freely forgive a child for a familial offence.\(^422\)

\(^{421}\) Bonaventure, Sentences III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 6 (Quaracchi III, p. 431): “[E]t ita si sine satisfactione genus humanum liberasset non propter hoc contra iustitiam fecisset.”

\(^{422}\) Summa halensis III, n. 4 (Quaracchi IV.2, p. 16): “Ad primum autem dicendum quod misericordia hominis laudatur in remissione delicti sine satisfactione, cum homo est privata persona; cum autem homo est persona
Aquinas argues that the analogy does not hold.\footnote{Aquinas, Summa theologiae III, q. 46, a. 2, ad 3 (Marietti III, p. 257): “Ad tertium dicendum quod haec etiam iustitia dependet ex voluntate divina ab humano genere satisfactionem pro peccato exigente. Alioquin, si voluisset absque omni satisfactione hominem a peccato liberare, contra iustitiam non fecisset. Ille enim iudex non potest, salva iustitia, culpam sive poenam dimittere, qui habet punire culpam in alium commissam, puta vel in alium hominem, vel in totam rempublicam, sive in superiorem principem. Sed Deus non habet aliquem superiorum, sed ipse est supremum et commune bonum totius universi. Et ideo, si dimittat peccatum, quod habet rationem culpae ex eo quod contra ipsum committitur, nulli facit iniuriam.”} A judge can forgive a familial offense without satisfaction because he is the highest authority in the family; he cannot forgive a civil offense without satisfaction because he is not the highest authority in the state. The capacity justly to forgive without satisfaction thus belongs to anyone who is the highest authority in the jurisdiction within which the offense is made. Since God is the highest authority there is, He can freely restore the human race without demanding satisfaction and would be guilty of no injustice in doing so.

Among the Franciscans between Bonaventure and Scotus, we again find a divergence on this question. Matthew of Aquasparta, for instance, insists that it would have been unjust for God to forgive without demanding satisfaction: “Therefore, one considers the forgiveness of injury and offense without satisfaction for private mercy, but not for public and communal compassion, because this is repugnant to justice, without which mercy is not able to be.”\footnote{Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de Incarnatione 7, ad 9 (Quaracchi, p. 144): “Et est exemplum in ista republica: persona enim aliqua privata debet iniuriam sibi illatam dimittere et misericorditer indulgere, quia ad eam non spectat vindicta; sed iudex, qui est persona communis, non debet, ad quem spectat exercere iustitiam; et si iudex, ut privata persona est, iniuriam sibi illatam debet indulgere, tamen ut iudex debet eam punire.”} To make his point, Matthew appeals precisely to the example of the judge that the authors of the Summa halensis had employed and Aquinas had rejected.\footnote{Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de Incarnatione 7, ad 9 (Quaracchi, p. 144): “Ad misericordiam ergo privatam spectat dimittere iniuriam et offensam sine satisfactione, sed non ad miserationem publicam et communem, quia hoc repugnat iustitiae, sine qua misericordia esse non potest.”} Richard of Middleton, on the other hand, insists with...
Bonaventure that God could have repaired the human race without satisfaction: “For just as, without preceding merit, through pure liberality, human nature was so exalted that He united it to Himself in unity of person, so without any satisfaction He was able to repair human nature if He wanted.”

Of Anselm’s four necessity claims, Scotus’s reasons for rejecting C2 are the most difficult to ascertain. Scotus clearly identifies C2 as one of Anselm’s four necessity claims and clearly wants to deny all four, but when he addresses C2 directly, he simply refers his reader to what he says regarding the sacrament of penance in distinction 15 of book 4. Book 4 of the Lectura is sadly missing, and there is nothing in distinction 15 of Ordinatio IV or Reportatio IV-A that strikes me as obviously addressing the issue at hand. That said, there are certainly other places in Scotus that provide good reasons for rejecting C2. In question 2 of Reportatio IV-A, d. 16, for instance, Scotus says that “God by His absolute power can create someone who, in his purely natural endowments, would be in a state of neither being a friend nor an enemy [of God]; therefore, God can also restore such a person to the same state after he commits a sin.”

Scotus argues that it is perfectly within God’s power simply to reverse the effects of the fall. God

426 Richard of Middleton, Sentences III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 4, resp. (Brixiae III, p. 210): “Respondeo, quod si reparatio accipiatur pro liberatione Deus per alium modum, quam per mortem Christi naturam humanam potuit liberare: sicut enim nullis praecedentibus meritis, per meram liberalitatem humanam naturam ita exaltavit, quod eam sibi univit in unitate personae, ita absque omni satisfacione naturam humanam potuisset reparare si voluisse. Sed noluit, quia nullus alius modus, ita conveniens fuit. Per nullum enim modum alium, ita aperte vim suae dilectionis ad nos demonstrasset, nec spem nostram, ita firmiter erexisset.”

427 Scotus, Lectura III, d. 20, n. 30 (Vatican XXI, p. 49).

428 There is no consensus as to whether this is because Scotus never lectured on book 4 or because we simply do not have any surviving record of it. Thomas Williams, “Introduction: The Life and Works of John Duns the Scot,” in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 8.

429 Scotus, Reportatio IV-A, d. 16, n. 38 (Bychkov-Pomplun, p. 654): “Deus de potentia sua absoluta potest aliquem creare in puris naturalibus suis et in tali statu quod nec tunc est amicus nec inimicus; ergo potest talem post lapsum et peccatum commissum in eodem statu reparare expellendo culpam.”
can create a non-sinner; therefore, nothing blocks God from bringing it about that a sinner is no
longer a sinner. This is not, in fact, how God has chosen to relate to His creatures, but it was
fully within His power to do so:

Indeed, an elicited act of the will, such as an act of willing to punish herself for her
offense against God, and an ordered act of rejecting and detesting her sin, enables her,
based on what is congruous, to stop being someone who is positioned and obligated to
receive punishment and become someone who is not so positioned—although God by His
absolute power could arrange things otherwise, because, as has been said, He could remit
sin and bestow grace without any punishment.430

When Scotus speaks at the end of ‘any punishment,’ he presumably means either God’s
punishment of us or our own punishment of ourselves in satisfaction. To defend his position,
Scotus appeals to his immediate-influence axiom (God can do immediately whatever He does
mediately): “Whatever God can accomplish by means of a secondary cause from the genus
‘efficient cause,’ He can accomplish directly on His own without it; therefore, He could have
justified sinners directly.”431 Secondary causes exist because God wills them to exist, not
because He needs them to exist. In the actual economy of salvation, God has willed that
satisfaction be made for sin as a necessary condition for restoration, but God did not have to
arrange the economy of salvation in just this way.432

430 Scotus, Reportatio IV-A, d. 16, n. 49 (Bychkov-Pomplun, p. 661): “[I]lle per actum elicitum voluntatis, ut velle
punire se pro offensa Dei, et actum imperatum nolitionis peccati et detestationis eius fit de congruo, et ordinato, et
obligato ad poenam non sic ordinatus—licet Deus posset de potentia sua absoluta aliter facere, quia sine omni
punitione posset remittere culpam et dare gratiam, ut dictum est.”

431 Scotus, Reportatio IV-A, d. 15, n. 13 (Bychkov-Pomplun, p. 591): “[S]ed quidquid potest Deus facere per
causam secundam in genere causae efficientis, potest sine ea immediate et per se; ergo potuit immediate justificasse
peccatores.”

432 There is at least one passage in Scotus, however, that seems flatly to contradict his standard position. In
Ordinatio IV, d. 15, n. 23 (Vatican XIII, p. 63), Scotus says that “it is not possible justly to beatify the sinner
without satisfaction” (non potest iuste peccatorem sine satisfactione beatificare). The sentence does not appear in
the corresponding paragraph in Reportatio IV-A, and I am tempted simply to say this was a slip on Scotus’s part or
that he is speaking of God’s ordained power in some sense. With the exception of this sentence (so far as I am
aware), Scotus otherwise consistently holds that God could have restored and bestowed grace and glory without
satisfaction.
C3: If the human race is to make satisfaction, it must be by a God-man

This claim was, by far, the most long-lasting of the four. In a thought experiment that was to prove remarkably resilient, Anselm asks Boso whether he would disobey God in the slightest way if it would avoid the destruction not only of this world and all its goods but even of a great number of such worlds. Boso concludes that he still ought not disobey God even to save an infinite number of such worlds, and Anselm draws the conclusion that the slightest sin against God is of a magnitude greater than the sum total of all worlds. Given that this is the case, the debt incurred by even the slightest sin could not be repaid except by the offering of something more valuable that the totality of all possible worlds. No created good could possibly meet such a criterion because every creature is included in the set of all possible worlds. Since only God is more worthy than the sum total of all possible created goods, only an offering of God can repay the incurred debt. Since no human can offer God, and God Himself does not owe the debt, there must be a God-man who freely offers Himself if there is to be satisfaction for even the slightest sin.

The authors of the *Summa halensis*, generally faithful to Anselm, deny that it is impossible for us to make satisfaction at all, and the commentary tradition generally follows their

---

433 Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* I, c. 21 (Schmitt II, p. 89): “B: I admit that I ought not to do anything contrary to God’s will, even to preserve the whole of creation. A: What if there were many worlds, as full of creatures as this one is? B: Even if there were infinitely many worlds spread out before me, I would give the same answer.” (BOSO: *Fateri me necesse est quia pro conservanda tota creatura nihil deberem facere contra voluntatem dei. ANSELMUS: Quid si plures essent mundi pleni creaturis, sicut iste est? BOSO: Si infinito numero multiplicarentur et similiter mihi obtenderentur, id ipsum responderem.)

434 Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* II, c. 6 (Schmitt II, p. 101): “A: And someone who can give God something of his own that surpasses everything that is less than God must himself be greater than everything that is not God…But nothing other than God surpasses everything that is not God…But no one other than a human being ought to make it, since otherwise human beings would not make recompense…Then it is necessary that a God-man make this recompense.” (ANSELMUS: *Illum quoque qui de suo poterit deo dare aliquid, quod superet omne quod sub deo est, maiorem esse necesse est quam omne quod non est deus…Nihil autem est supra omne quod deus non est, nisi deus…Sed nec facere illam debet nisi homo. Alioquin non satisfacit homo…. [N]ecesse est ut eam faciat deus-homo.)
lead. Everyone insists that we can make satisfaction for our own actual sins in some sense, though the schoolmen introduce a number of distinctions which we cannot visit here. That said, everyone before Scotus wants to uphold Anselm’s claim at least with respect to original sin. No mere creature, they all explicitly argue, could make satisfaction for the entire human race. This, they hold, follows from the fact that no mere creature could return to God a gift proportional to the entire human race.\footnote{See, for instance, Summa halensis III, n. 6 (Quaracchi IV.2, p. 20) and Bonaventure, Sentences III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 3, resp. (Quaracchi III, p. 423)} Anselm’s claim that only a human being from the stock of Adam is able to make satisfaction (thus the necessity of a God-\textit{man}) likewise seems to have been the consensus position before Scotus.

So far as I can tell, Scotus is the first to argue that the one who makes satisfaction for the entire human race could have been neither God nor human:

Against that which is said in the fourth article, that no one but a human being ought to make satisfaction, this does not seem to be absolutely necessary, because one who is not a debtor is able to make satisfaction for another, just as also to pray for another; hence just as Christ, not existing as a debtor, made satisfaction, so—if it had pleased God—a good angel could have been able to make satisfaction by offering to God something pleasing for us, which God Himself might have accepted for us, since every created offering counts for as much as God accepts it, and no more, just as was said above.

Further, it seems that a mere human being was able to make satisfaction for all, if conceived without sin, just as was possible—concerning possibility—by the operation of the Holy Spirit and his mother (just as was Christ), and God bestowed on him the highest grace which is able to be received (just as He gave to Christ), without preceding merit, out of His liberality, and such a person would have been able to merit deletion of sin just as also beatitude.\footnote{Scotus, Lectura III, d. 20, q. 1, nn. 32-33 (Quaracchi XXI, p. 50): “Contra illud quod dicitur in quarto articulo, quod non nisi homo debuit satisfacere, hoc non videtur absolute necessarium, quia unus qui non est debitor potest pro alio satisfacere, sicut pro alio orare; unde sicut Christus, non existens debitor, satisfecit, sic - si plauisset Deo - potuisset unus angelus bonus satisfecisse offerendo Deo aliquid placitum pro nobis, quod Deus ipse acceptasset pro omnibus, cum tantum valeat omne oblatum creatum pro quanto Deus acceptat, et non plus, sicut supra dictum est. Praeterea, videtur quod unus purus homo potuit satisfacisse pro omnibus, si fuisse conceptus sine peccato, sicut potuisset - de possibili - operatione Spiritus Sancti et matris (sicut Christus fuit), et Deus dedisset sibi gratiam summam quam posset recipere (sicut dedit Christo), sine meritis praecedentibus, ex liberalitate sua, et talis potuisset meruisse deletionem peccati sicut et beatitudinem.” Scotus’s articles do not quite match up. The articles which he rejects are not numbered the same as the ones that he presents. By ‘fourth article’ here, he actual means the third article of Anselm as he presents the argument of \textit{Cur Deus homo}.}
Scotus makes a very voluntarist claim indeed: “Every created offering counts for as much as God accepts it, and no more.” But caution is needed in understanding what Scotus is claiming here. The claim is often taken to mean that God can count whatever created reality for as much as He wants, but this is not what Scotus thinks.\footnote{For a helpful introduction to the recent scholarly debate regarding the degree of Scotus’s voluntarism, see Mary Beth Ingham, “Letting Scotus Speak for Himself,” \textit{Medieval Philosophy and Theology} 10 (2001): 175-216. For a particularly bold charge that Scotus’s voluntarism makes the economy of salvation entirely arbitrary, see Douglas Langston, “Scotus’ Departure from Anselm’s Theory of the Atonement,” \textit{Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale} 50 (1983): 227-41. Andrew Rosato has responded at length to such charges in his “Duns Scotus on the Redemptive Work of Christ” (dissertation, The University of Notre Dame, 2009).} He elsewhere explicitly holds that there are definite limits on God’s valuation of things. For one, Scotus says that God cannot count any possible act of any possible mere creature with any possible perfection as sufficient satisfaction for an infinite number of sinners. God cannot do this because, in doing so, He would love a creature as much as He loves Himself (a direct contradiction of the first principle of practical reasoning that God is to be loved \textit{alone} as God).\footnote{Scotus, \textit{Lectura} III, d. 19, n. 13 (Vatican XXI, p. 29): “Et ultra sequitur quod si persona Christi tantum acceptetur a Trinitate quantum persona eius diligitur, tantum diligeret velle naturae assumptae sicut velle Verbi increati, - quod nihil est dictum, quia non est ponere nisi ‘creatum’ habere tantam diligibilitatem sicut ‘increatum’!”} This is true even in the case of the Incarnate Christ’s created acts, though Scotus thinks that God does count Christ’s created acts as sufficient for an infinite number of sinners on account of the infinite dignity of the divine person to whom those acts belong.\footnote{Scotus, \textit{Lectura} III, d. 19, n. 23 (Vatican XXI, p. 34): “Et quia omne aliud a Deo est bonum ‘quia a Deo est volitum et acceptatum’, ideo pro aliqua condicione personae merentis - quae non est formaliter condicio actus merendi - potest acceptare illud merum tamquam sufficiens pro infinitis; et sic meritum Christi fuit quasi infinitum, non tamen formaliter infinitum, sed ut infinite acceptatum, quia pro infinitis, - quod non fuisset si fuisset purus homo, quia infinitum acceptavit propter infinitatem personae merentis.” For a helpful treatment of Scotus’s understanding of how Christ’s merit is formally finite but infinitely acceptable, see Andrew S. Yang, “Scotus’ Voluntaristic Approach to the Atonement Reconsidered,” \textit{Scottish Journal of Theology} 62, no. 4 (2009): 421-40.}

God’s inability to accept an act of a mere creature as satisfaction for an infinite number of sinners presents no problem for Scotus’s proposal that a mere human being (or angel) could
make satisfaction for the whole human race. While the schoolmen generally affirmed that God could have created an eternal world with an infinite number of sinners in it, they also denied that God has acted in this way. Since there are only a finite number of sinners, there is no reason God could not count the act of a mere creature as sufficient to satisfy for the entire human race. Still, Scotus clearly does not think that any finite reality can be accepted by God as equivalent to any other finite reality whatsoever. After arguing that a mere human being could make satisfaction for the entire human race, Scotus then enumerates various conditions of a mere creature that could perform such an act. Were Scotus the extreme voluntarist that some have made him out to be, no qualification would have been necessary.

The crucial condition, for our purposes here at least, is that the mere creature would have to have highest possible grace. Scotus does not pause to tell us why he thinks highest possible grace would be necessary for making satisfaction for the whole human race, but what he says in the previous distinction might help: “If there should be someone so perfect that nothing of perfection is lacking, just as is the case with Christ, [God] rewards others for whom he merits.” 440 In a rather beautiful passage, Scotus gives an illustration:

I say that if he who earns merit for another person has obtained the maximum grace he could have (and Christ was such a person), he can well earn merit for someone other than himself. Here is an example: if someone loved another person as much as he could love her, and it were impossible for her to be loved more by him; and if she were to render her lover some pleasing service on someone else’s behalf—the lover would receive this with utmost pleasure and value it more than the damage done by the offending person on whose behalf [his beloved] offered [the said service]. 441

---

440 Scotus, *Lectura III*, d. 18, n. 16 (Vatican XXI, p. 5): “Si tamen sit ita perfectus quod non indiget perfectione, sicut Christus, retribuit aliis pro quibus meretur.”

441 Scotus, *Reportatio IV-A*, d. 2, n. 32 (Bychkov-Pomplun, pp. 67-68): “Dico quod si ille qui meretur alteri sit in termino gratiae, cuiusmodi fuit Christus, bene potest mereri alteri et non ipsi. Exemplum huius est: si aliquis diligeret aliquem inquantum potest ipsum diligere et sit impossible magis diligi ab eo, si alius serviat sibi et offerat sibi obsequium aliquod gratum pro alio, diligens illud gratissime acceptat et magis quam offensam alterius pro quo offert pensat.”
Christ *de facto* and this mere creature *de possibilia* are able to merit for the human race precisely because there is nothing left with which God might reward them. Scotus is thus not the extreme voluntarist that he is often taken to be. Scotus does affirm that a mere creature could make satisfaction for the whole human race, but he does not say that *any* mere creature could do so. Scotus does not elaborate on whether or not these two conditions (i.e., born without sin and receiving highest possible grace without preceding merit) are strictly necessary for making satisfaction for the whole human race, but he clearly does not want to say that any mere creature could make such satisfaction.

Some of Scotus’s great forebears had already denied C1 and C2 well before he began to lecture on the *Sentences*, though he certainly does more than simply agree with them. With C3, on the contrary, Scotus seems to be the first to make the bold move of rejecting Anselm’s claim *in toto*. Obviously, if Scotus does not think that a God-man is necessary for satisfaction, he does not think that the death of a God-man is necessary for satisfaction. That said, Scotus still contributes significantly to the commentary tradition on C4 itself, to which we now turn.

**C4: If a God-man is to make satisfaction, it must be by His own death**

Anselm argues that a creature can only make satisfaction for sin by the free offering of something not already owed to God.\(^{442}\) Since even a God-man already owes His whole life as human to God, the only possible candidate for making satisfaction is the free offering of His death, which Anselm thinks we undergo only as punishment for sin.\(^{443}\)

---

\(^{442}\) Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* I, c. 20 (Schmitt II, p. 87): “A: When you repay God what you already owe him even if you have not sinned, you should not count this as payment for the debt you owe for sinning. And you owe God all the things you have mentioned….For you owe everything you are, everything you have, and everything you can do to his command.” (*ANSELMUS: Cum reddis aliquid quod debes deo, etiam si non peccasti, non debes hoc computare pro debito quod debes pro peccato. Omnia autem ista debes deo quae dicis….In oboedientiia vero quid das deo quod non debes, cui iubenti totum quod es et quod habes et quod potes debes?*)

\(^{443}\) Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* II, c. 1 (Schmitt II, pp. 110-11): “A: If we say that he will give himself to obey God, so that by persevering in preserving justice he subordinated himself to God’s will, that will not be a case of giving
free from both actual and original sin, His death is not owed and is thus an eligible offering for satisfaction.

The authors of the *Summa halensis* agree with Anselm that the death of Christ is necessary for satisfaction.\(^{444}\) The reason they give in support of Anselm’s position, however, is fundamentally opposed to his account of satisfaction itself. As was pointed out above, Anselm identifies satisfaction (*satisfactio*) and penalty (*poena*) as two mutually exclusive options for God. For Anselm, *either* the human race makes satisfaction or God punishes; the human race does not make satisfaction by being punished. The authors of the *Summa halensis* argue that the suffering of death was necessary for the God-man to make satisfaction because only it was a sufficiently extensive suffering to make up for the pleasures of sin.\(^{445}\) For the authors of the *Summa halensis*, the suffering of some penalty (*poena*) is necessary for satisfaction, and the satisfaction required for the redemption of the entire human race requires the maximal suffering of penalty: “The redemption of the human race ought to be made through satisfaction for sin; satisfaction for sin, moreover, ought to be penal (*poenalis*) and afflictive, on account of which the redemption of the human race ought to be not through a life of prosperity, but rather of penal

---

\(^{444}\) *Summa halensis* III, n. 149 (Quaracchi IV.2, p. 209): “Respondeo: Dicendum secundum Anselmum quod de necessitate redemptionis passus est Christus.”

\(^{445}\) *Summa halensis* III, n. 149 (Quaracchi IV.2, p. 209): “Unde sicut ab elatione inchoavit peccatum Adae, ita fuit consummatio in comestationis delectatione. Eodem modo dispensatio nostrae redemptionis fuit in initio humilitatis incarnationis, progressus in conversatione, in qua passus est per compassionem, unde flevit, Luc. 19, 41; consummatio vero fuit in passione, unde dixit: Consummatum est. Decuit enim sic adimplere omnem iustitiam, ut sicut delectatio fuit per omnes sensus praevaricatoris, ut patet, Gen. 3, 6, ita Christus passus est per omnes sensus, ut patet in Evangelio.”
adversity.”

In this way, the authors of the *Summa halensis* depart from Anselm’s reasoning not only in that they conflate satisfaction and punishment but also in that they appeal to arguments of fittingness that Anselm rejects early in *Cur Deus homo* as insufficient to ground the necessity of the Incarnation and death of a God-man.

In an odd turn of events, the vast majority of the thirteenth-century commentary tradition, seemingly unaware of its disagreement with Anselm, will follow the *Summa halensis* to speak of *poena satisfactoria*—satisfactory penalty. While Anselm had distinguished and, indeed, opposed the two, *poena* becomes a part of the very definition of satisfaction in the early commentary tradition. If *poena* is required for satisfaction, it seems that some degree of material suffering is necessary for the God-man to make satisfaction for the entire human race. While agreed that some degree of suffering was necessary for satisfaction, the early thirteenth-century schoolmen disagreed regarding the extent of suffering necessary. Not all agreed with the authors of the *Summa halensis* that only Christ’s Passion with all of its sufferings would have sufficed.

---

446 *Summa halensis* III, n. 152 (Quaracchi IV.2, p. 212): “[P]otest dici quod redemptio hominis debuit fieri per satisfactionem pro peccato; satisfactio autem pro peccatis debet esse poenalis et afflictiva, propter quod debuit esse redemptio hominis non per incessum in via prosperitatis, sed potius adversitatis poenalis.”

447 Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* I, cc. 3-4 (Schmitt II, p. 51): “A: For it was fitting that just as death entered the human race through the disobedience of a human being, so too life should be restored by the obedience of a human being. It was fitting that just as the sin that was the cause of our damnation had its origin from a woman, so too the author of our justice and salvation should be born of a woman. And it was fitting that the devil, who through the tasting of a tree defeated the human being whom he persuaded, should be defeated by a human being through the suffering on a tree that he inflicted. And there are many other things that, if carefully considered, demonstrate the indescribable beauty that belongs to our redemption, accomplished in this way. B: All these things are beautiful, and they have to be treated like pictures. But if there is nothing sturdy underneath them, unbelievers do not think they provide a sufficient explanation for why we ought to believe that God willed to undergo the things we say he underwent.”

(ANSELMUS: Oportebat namque ut, sicut per hominis inoboedientiam mors in humanum genus intraverat, ita per hominis oboedientiam vita restitueretur. Et quemadmodum peccatum quod fuit causa nostrae damnationis, initium habuit a femina, sic nostrae iustitiae et salutis auctor nasceretur de femina. Et ut diabolus, qui per gustum ligni quem persuasit hominem vicerat, per passionem ligni quam intulit ab homine vinceretur. Sunt quoque multa alia quae studiose considerata, inenarrabilem quandam nostrae redemptionis hoc modo procuratae pulchritudinem ostendunt. BOSO: Omnia haec pulchra et quasi quaedam picturae suscipienda sunt. Sed si non est aliquld solidum super quod sedeant, non videntur infidelibus sufficere, cur deum ea quae dicimus pati voluisse credere debeamus.)
Bonaventure, like the authors of the *Summa halensis*, argues that “the merit of eternal life consists in the root of charity while the merit of the remission of punishment consists not only in charity but also in the hardship of suffering.” While some suffering was necessary, Bonaventure does not explicitly address how much suffering was necessary (at least not here). He tentatively proposes that the smallest suffering of Christ would have sufficed for the restoration of the whole human race, but he seems to think that this would have only been sufficient for liberation, not redemption through satisfaction.

Aquinas is much less timid: “The very least one of Christ’s sufferings was sufficient of itself to redeem the human race from all sins; but as to fittingness, it sufficed that He should endure all classes of sufferings, as stated above.” This is because Aquinas thinks the degree of poena required is inversely proportional to the degree of charity in the one making satisfaction. Aquinas holds in at least one place that, were charity sufficiently strong, the requirement of poena might be dropped altogether: “Consequently, through the strength of one’s love for God, and of one’s hatred of past sin, there is removed the need for penalties of satisfaction or of

---


449 Bonaventure, *Sentences* III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 6, ad 4 (Quaracchi III, p. 431): “Potest etiam responderi per interemptionem illius, quod nullo alio modo potuit satisfacere nisi per mortem. Quamvis enim hoc esset magis congruum, fortassit modicum supplicium in tam nobili persona suffecisset ad humili generis redditionem; sed Dominus in liberando superrogavit, propter quod dicitur: Copiosa apud eum redemptio. Esto tamen, quod non alio modo potuisset satisfaceri pro genere humano, nec genus humano aliter redimi, sicut multi concedunt; tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod alio modo non potuerit liberari. De liberatione enim firmiter credo, quod alio modo potuit liberare; de redemptione vero nec nego nec audeo affirmare, quia temerarium est, cum de divina potentia agitur, terminum ei praefigere. Amplius enim potest, quam nos possumus cogitare.”

purification. Moreover, if this strength be not great enough to set aside penalties entirely, nevertheless, the stronger it is, the smaller will be the penalty that suffices."\(^{451}\) As far as I know, Aquinas never appeals to this principle in relation to Christ’s satisfaction, but it seems that he easily could have in order to deny the necessity of any penalty whatsoever for Christ to make satisfaction.

Richard of Middleton, too, argues that some *poena* was necessary but that the least amount would have sufficed: “Since He was infinite goodness, whatever penalty (*poena*) that He sustained for us would have been sufficient for satisfaction if God had ordained that satisfaction be made through another payment of Christ short of death. But God had ordained that the human race not be redeemed through a payment other than the death of Christ.”\(^{452}\) I take it, then, that Richard would agree with Aquinas that the least penal suffering would have sufficed for the redemption of the human race, but some penal suffering was still necessary for satisfaction.

Scotus denies that even the slightest penal suffering is necessary for Christ to make satisfaction. Scotus distinguishes Christ’s satisfaction for the whole human race from that made by mere creatures in the sacrament of penance. For Scotus, the definition of satisfaction as it exists in the sacrament of penance is different from the general definition of satisfaction. This is

\(^{451}\) Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 158, n. 3310 (Marietti III, p. 236): “Unde per vehementiam dilectionis Dei, et odii peccati praeteriti, excluditur necessitas satisfactoriae vel purgatoriae poenae: et, si non sit tanta vehementia quod totaliter poenam excludat, tamen, quanto vehementius fuerit, tanto minus de poena sufficiet.”

\(^{452}\) Richard of Middleton, *Sentences* III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 4, resp. (Brixiae III, p. 210): “Quidam enim dicunt, quod cum sit bonitatis infinitae quaelibet poena quam pro nobis sustinuit suifficiens satisfactio fuisset. Si Deus per aliam poenam Christi sit mortem satisfactionem fieri ordinasset. Sed Deus ordinaverat genus humanum non redimendum per aliam poenam, quam per Christi mortem.” I say that he ‘seems’ to hold this position because he gives this argument as one side of the debate regarding the necessity of the death of Christ. While he never explicitly gives his own position, he rejects all the arguments for the necessity of death on grounds other than divine ordination and concedes the position quoted above, again stressing divine ordination: “Ad rationem autem illorum, qui dixerunt Christum satisficisse de condigno pro peccatis, per poenas quas sustinuit ante mortem. Potest dici, quod quamvis satisficisset quantum est ex radice vel conditione satisfaciens personae non tamen quantum est ex genere poenae pensata divina ordinatione, quia ex divina ordinatione mors debetur ad mortis debitum relaxandum.” Richard of Middleton, *Sentences* III, d. 20, a. 1, q. 4 (Brixiae III, p. 211).
not because there are two kinds of satisfaction but because satisfaction as it exists in the sacrament of penance has certain features that do not belong to the concept of satisfaction per se. While the work of Christ clearly falls under the general definition of satisfaction, it does not fall under the narrower sacramental definition: “This is the definition of satisfaction generally understood: ‘satisfaction is a voluntary returning of an equivalent not otherwise owed.’” In contrast, satisfaction as a part of the sacrament of penance is defined like this: “Satisfaction is a laborious or penal exterior operation, voluntarily undertaken, for punishing one’s own committed sin, and this in order to placate the offended God.” The crucial differences for our purposes are that sacramental satisfaction is exterior and penal while an interior non-penal act would suffice for satisfaction according to its more general definition.

In the previous section, Scotus denied that only a God-man could make satisfaction for the whole the human race. Here we see that, even if it were the case that only a God-man could make satisfaction, He could have done it without death and, indeed, without any suffering at all. Interestingly, then, while Scotus rejects the argument of Cur Deus homo more meticulously than any of his great forebears had, he is more in agreement with Anselm than they

---

453 Scotus, Ordinatio IV, d. 15, n. 11 (Vatican XIII, p. 60): “De primo sciemendum quod satisfactionis generaliter acceptae haec est ratio: ‘satisfactio est voluntaria redditio aequivalentis alias indebiti.’” Interestingly, Scotus occasionally employs penal language to explain general satisfaction in the Ordinatio but drops it completely in the Reportatio.

454 Scotus, Ordinatio IV, d. 15, n. 44 (Vatican XIII, p. 69): “De primo dico quod ‘satisfactio est operatio exterior laboriosa vel poenalis, voluntarie assumpta, ad puniendum peccatum commissum a se, et hoc ad placandum divinam offensam.’”

455 Scotus does not say this explicitly, though his definition of satisfaction in general clearly entails it. Further, Scotus thinks that Adam could have made satisfaction by a single act of love for God for His own sake, and since Christ elicited such an act from the first instant of His conception, there is no reason to think that God could not have accepted this first act as sufficient for the redemption of the entire human race: “[S]i Adam per gratiam datam et caritatem habuisset unum vel multi actus diligendi Deum propter se, ex maiore conatu liberi arbitrii quam fuit conatus in peccando, talis dilectio suffecisset pro peccato suo redimendo et remittendo, et fuisset satisfactio.” Scotus, Lectura III, d. 20, n. 31 (Vatican XXI, p. 49).
were on at least one foundational point. Scotus accepts Anselm’s mutually exclusive alternatives of satisfaction and poena and rejects the thirteenth-century consensus position that Christ’s satisfaction requires poena. Anyone who wishes to spell out a non-violent theory of the atonement will find in Scotus a significant scholastic ally.

For Scotus, then, there is only one sense in which it is right to say that Christ’s death is necessary if there is to be restoration by satisfaction: “Speaking of God’s ordained power, no complete and proper satisfaction could be made in any other way except through Christ’s passion, because God has decreed that a complete and ultimate satisfaction would be made through it.”^456 In the actual economy of salvation, the Father accepts no less than the death of His Incarnate Son as sufficient satisfaction for the whole human race, but He need not have set up the economy of salvation in just this way.

The Scotistic Inversion

Scotus is the first of the schoolmen to clearly and explicitly deny each of Anselm’s four necessity claims, or at least that their necessity is explained by the divine attributes in and of themselves. Instead, each of the necessities (i.e., restoration, satisfaction, Incarnation, Passion) is explained by a free volition of God: “All of these things that were done by Christ concerning our redemption were not necessary except presupposing divine ordination by which, just as He wills, so it is done; and then, only by necessity of consequence was it necessary for Christ to suffer—but the whole was contingent, both antecedent and consequent.”^457

^456 Scotus, Reportatio IV-A, d. 15, n. 17 (Bychkov-Pomplun, p. 592): “[D]e potentia tamen ordinata non potuit aliter esse satisfactio debita et completa quam per passionem eius, quia sic ordinavit quod per eam fieret completa et ultima satisfactio.”

^457 Scotus, Lectura III, d. 20, n. 36 (Vatican XXI, p. 51): “Respondeo ergo ad quaestionem et dico quod omnia haec quae facta sunt a Christo circa redemptionem nostram, non fuerunt necessaria nisi praesupposita ordinatione divina
As I have suggested repeatedly in this dissertation, Scotus does not take without giving something in return. Scotus does more than simply deny Anselm’s four claims. Denying the claims is important for upholding the transcendent freedom of God, but also for upholding the utter gratuity of grace. In Scotus’s brief reflections on why God chose this particular course of action when so many other options were open to Him, he argues that the satisfactory death of a God-man was the most appropriate means of eliciting the love that draws us to Him. This is not only because of the immensity of the work itself; it is precisely the fact that God had so many other options available to Him that all the more enflames our loving embrace:

Nevertheless, in fact freely, by His grace, He ordained and offered His passion to the Father for us. And for that reason, we are bound to Him more; for if the human race was able to be otherwise redeemed, and yet out of free will He redeemed in such a way, we are greatly bound to Him, and much more than if it were necessarily so and not otherwise that we were able to be redeemed. Therefore, for enticing us to love of Him, He did this chiefly (as I believe) and because He willed the human race to be bound more to God,—just as if someone should first give birth to someone and afterward instruct him in discipline and sanctity, he is more obligated to him than if he only begot him and another did these others for him. And this is congruity, not necessity.1458

This, of course, is simply Scotus’s rendition of Augustine’s position (other ways were possible but none so fitting) which was quoted throughout the commentary tradition against Anselm’s hard necessity. The death of a God-man is in fact the most fitting means of redemption, but God does not have to do what is most fitting, and it is precisely this non-necessity that further

___________________________

qua sic ordinavit facere; et tunc tantum necessitate consequentiae necessarium fuit Christum pati, - sed tamen totum fuit contingens, et antecedens et consequens.”

458 Scotus, Lectura III, d. 20, n. 38 (Vatican XXI, pp. 51-52): “Tamen de facto libere, sui gratia, passionem suam ordinavit et obtulit Patri pro nobis. Et ideo multum tenemur ei: ex quo enim homo aliter potuituisse redemptus, et tamen ex libera voluntate redemit sic, multum ei tenemur, et amplius quam si sic necessario — et non aliter — potuisseususuisse redempti. Ideo ad alliciendum nos ad amorem sui, hoc praecepue (ut credo) fecit et quia hominem voluit magis Deo teneri, - sicut si alius primo genuisset aliquem et postea instruxit eum in disciplina et sanctitate, amplius obligaretur ei quam si tantum genuisset eum, et alius sibi fecisset alia. Et haec est congruitas, non necessitas.”
enhances the love-enflaming effect of His freely offered death. Scotus’s contribution to this
Augustinian tag is to show just how unnecessary the death of a God-man was.

As important as this contribution is, Scotus does not simply deliver a novel rendition of
Augustine’s position. By breaking the chain of necessity claims, Scotus is able to see that it is
not the exigencies of the economy of salvation that explain Christ but the other way around. It is
not the Father’s relationship with us that renders the mission of the Son intelligible; instead, it is
the Father’s relationship with the Son that makes His dealings with us intelligible.

In *Reportatio* IV-A, d. 2, Scotus reflects on the perfect confluence of the Father’s mercy
and justice in the redemption of the human race through the death of the Incarnate Son:

> And in this way it is clear how true justice and mercy coexist in the eternal Father, for his
two universal ways are mercy and true justice, in terms of remitting our offense and
accepting us for glory: mercy in remitting [our] offense, in the absence of [our] own merit
and obedience, through the most pleasing obedience of His Son, who was the only one
who could compensate for this offense in a merciful way, having become obedient to the
point of death; true justice, because it is just to accept the service of the most beloved Son
of God, which exceeds the offense, with a satisfaction greater than the displeasure
brought about by the offense, and for this reason to remit the offense on account of the
service. It is also just that the creature who can lead the elect to the goal of their
predestination should lead them [there], all the more so since no one else can accomplish
this—otherwise this creature would not be perfectly obedient to God, who destines the
elect for this goal. Christ could accomplish this; therefore, it was just for Him to offer
Himself for us in some way to His Father as a spotless sacrifice, so that He might lead us
to the goal of blessedness, to which we had been destined before our first forefather
sinned—all the more so since we could not be restored through anyone else’s service
[offered] to the Father.\(^{459}\)

\(^{459}\) Scotus, *Reportatio* IV-A, d. 2, n. 26 (Bychk-Pomplun, p. 65): “Et sic patet quomodo in Patre aeterno
concurrunt veritas et misericordia iustitiae, quia universae viae eius misericordia et veritas iustitiae nobis remittendo
offensam et acceptando ad gloriam: misericordia in remittendo offensam sine proprio merito et obsequo per
obsequium gratissimum filii sui, qui pro illa offensa solus potuit satisfacere misericorditer, factus obediens usque ad
mortem; iustitia et veritas quia iustum est obsequium filii Dei dilectissimi excedens offensam magis grate acceptari
quam illa displicuit, et ideo illam per illud remitti. Iustum est etiam quod creatura quae potest perducere electos ad
finem praedestinationis eorum, quod eos perducat, maxime si nullus alius hoc potest facere; aliter non videtur illa
creatura perfecte obodire Deo ordinanti electos ad illum finem. Christus hoc potuit; ergo iustum fuit aliquo modo se
ipsum offrere pro nobis suo Patri hostiam immaculatam, ut nos perducet ad finem beatitudinis, ad quam ordinati
erasmus antequam primus pater noster peccavit, maxime cum non possemus per alicuius alterius obsequium Patri
reformari.”
This claim that only the death of Christ could satisfy for sin seems directly to contradict Scotus’s insistence that Adam himself could have made satisfaction for sin in distinction 15 of the same book. One way to resolve this seeming discrepancy is to note the crucial divine volition in distinction 15 (already quoted above) that, though satisfaction could be made by various different means, God willed that it only be made through the death of a God-man.\textsuperscript{460} When Scotus says that no other way would have sufficed, I take it he is speaking \textit{de potentia ordinata}. Given the fact that God has freely willed to accept for full satisfaction nothing less than the death of a God-man, no other satisfaction would suffice.

But why accept only the death of a God-man? As we saw above, one reason is that it enflames our love more greatly, but Scotus gives a different reason here. Scotus here reflects on the cross as the perfect confluence of divine mercy and justice. Far from being new with Scotus, the confluence of divine mercy and justice was a classic patristic theme, and it was central to Anselm’s project in \textit{Cur Deus homo}.\textsuperscript{461} For most of the tradition, justice and mercy were primarily understood as features of our relationship with God that explain the Incarnation and the Passion. On this reading, it is precisely because God is just with respect to Himself and merciful with respect to us that the Father sends the Son into our flesh and to the cross. Because God is just with respect to Himself, sending the Son is the only way He can be merciful with respect to us.

Scotus reproduces much of this in the lengthy passage above but with a crucial difference. For Scotus, God’s decisions that we be restored by way of satisfaction, that this

\textsuperscript{460} Scotus, \textit{Reportatio} IV-A, d. 15, n. 17.

satisfaction be made only by a God-man, and that it be made only through the God-man’s death are not explained by the fact that this is the only way possible for God to redeem us given the interplay of the divine attributes. Scotus does not say that the Father’s justice is displayed by His requirement of satisfaction or by His only accepting the death of a God-man as sufficient satisfaction. For Scotus, the actual economy of salvation manifests “true justice, because it is just to accept the service of the most beloved Son of God.” Scotus does not say that, in the actual economy of salvation, true justice is manifest because God refrains from restoring without satisfaction or does not accept any acts of a mere creature as sufficient satisfaction for original sin. As we have seen, Scotus argues that God could have restored us in either of these ways. God could have simply dismissed our sins, or He could have allowed us to make satisfaction for our own sins, or He could have allowed creatures to make satisfaction for one another’s sins. He even could have bestowed maximal grace on a mere creature (angelic or human) and allowed that creature to make satisfaction for the whole human race. God did not, in fact, choose to save us in any of these ways, and Scotus allows us to see that God’s refraining from saving us in these alternative ways allowed the Father to make His Incarnate Son the object not only of His supreme grace and mercy but also the object of His supreme justice.

God could have restored us without satisfaction or with a satisfaction other than Christ’s, but had He chosen to do so, the Father would have exercised no justice in relation to the Incarnate Son. There was no necessity, of course, for the Father to exercise justice with respect to His Incarnate Son, but the Father saw an opportunity to do so after the fall of the human race and freely willed to grasp that opportunity. While the lengthy passage above still identifies us as the object of God’s mercy, we have already seen in the previous chapter that this mercy falls
short of the highest possible mercy. The highest possible mercy is manifest in the bestowal of the highest possible grace without preceding merit of any kind.

To close off this chapter, then, we might combine the insights of this and the previous chapter in the following Scotistic take on the interplay between the Father and the Son that provides, for Scotus, the very intelligibility of the economy of salvation: At the very beginning of the process of the determinations of the divine will, we find the Father’s free decision to externalize the imminent life of the Divine Trinity by sending to His Incarnate Son their common Spirit in the most perfect way possible. Having willed this, the Father then perceives that His Son cannot fail to desire that His own created love for the Father, animated by their Spirit, be in some others also. The Father then predestines some number of rational creatures to participate in His Son’s created grace and glory as the many members of His mystical Body. Then, foreseeing the fall of the human race, the Father sees an opportunity to bestow on His Son, not only His perfect mercy and grace, but also His perfect justice. The Father thus freely decides that only someone with highest possible grace could make satisfaction for the whole human race. The Incarnate Son, seeing that the Father freely decreed that only someone with highest possible grace could elicit an act sufficient to bring the elect to their final end in God, and seeing that the Father had freely decreed that He and only He possess highest possible grace, understands that only His obedience will be sufficient, and, so, justly offers it to the Father on our behalf. The Father, supremely pleased with His Son’s act of justice, desires to reward Him in justice, but seeing that He has nothing left with which to reward Him (having already bestowed on Him the highest possible created gifts), rewards, instead, those elect for whom the Son offers the obedience. That, on Scotus’s account, is the story that makes intelligible the whole counsel of God. It is not our
relationship with the Father that explains the Father’s relationship with the Son; it is the Father’s relationship with the Son that explains the Father’s relationship with us.

**After Scotus**

As noted in the previous chapter, it becomes increasingly difficult to trace the development of these questions into the fourteenth century due to the tendency to give less and less attention to the third book of the *Sentences*. A thorough treatment of the development of fourteenth-century Christology and soteriology will have to await considerable critical work on surviving manuscripts, but what I have proposed here already gives us resources to contest at least one of the standard claims regarding that development. Alister McGrath has argued that the disappearance of Christology in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is to be explained by the rise of the *pactum* theory, stemming, on his account, from Scotus’s reflections on the non-necessity of the death of a God-man.⁴⁶² Given the kinds of insights we have drawn from Scotus throughout this chapter, this thesis needs revision. It certainly seems to be the case that later generations were more interested in rejecting necessity claims than they were in reflection on fittingness, but this was by no means a necessary consequence of Scotus’s position. Scotus himself saw that rejecting the necessity of the Incarnation and Passion of Christ is precisely the key to rightly understanding not that they are superfluous to the economy of salvation but that they are the key to its very intelligibility.

---

⁴⁶² Alister McGrath, “Some Observations Concerning the Soteriology of the Schola Moderna,” *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 52 (1985): 182-93. It is not clear that Christology does, in fact, disappear in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, but it is certainly the case that the commentary tradition on Book III of the *Sentences* is drastically reduced.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION
John Duns Scotus and the Late Medieval Theology of Grace

\[ ut \textit{notum faceret nobis sacramentum voluntatis suae secundum bonum placitum eius quod proposuit in eo in dispensationem plenitudinis temporum instaurare omnia in Christo quae in caelis et quae in terra sunt in ipso } \]

Ephesians 1:9-10

This is hardly the place to offer a full reevaluation of the late medieval theology of grace. Even if it were the right place, I am far from adequately qualified to offer one. Still, the reading of Scotus that I have proposed in the preceding chapters of this dissertation warrants at least a corrective to some of the dominant narratives presently on offer.463 First, I will argue that Scotus has often featured too prominently in explanations for the devaluation of grace in Ockham and his followers. Scotus’s theology of grace was certainly innovative, and it exerted considerable influence on those after him, but his influence cannot explain the late medieval devaluation of grace. Second, I will argue that Scotus’s innovations in the theology of grace were not without precedent. Scotus, I argue, is best seen as the culmination of a broad movement within the thirteenth-century theology of grace. Scotus’s theology of grace is thus best understood not as

---

the inauguration of the fourteenth-century theology of grace but as the culmination of the thirteenth-century theology of grace.

**Scotus and the Fourteenth-century Theology of Grace**

A number of scholars have rightly discerned that the Ockhamist theology of grace is characterized by three core elements: (1) the radical contingency of the present economy of salvation, (2) a high estimation of nature and its capacities, and (3) a low evaluation of grace. They have, likewise, rightly pointed out that the Ockhamist theology of grace inherits its first and second core elements from John Duns Scotus. In his analysis of the economy of salvation, Scotus employs the distinction between God’s absolute and ordained power more programmatically than any before him. He likewise has a higher estimation of nature and its capacities than most of the schoolmen who preceded him. To review, Scotus affirms that God could have forgiven our sins without grace, that we can love God above all without grace, that God could have accepted this natural love for Him as sufficient for eternal life, that God could have infused grace into us without the Incarnation and death of a divine person, and that a mere creature could have made satisfaction for the whole human race. In general, Ockham and those under his influence will defend Scotus with respect to all of these positions.

Thus far, I am in full agreement with the dominant narratives of the late medieval theology of grace. Where these narratives need adjustment is in their tendency to explain the final core element—a low evaluation of grace—in terms of the first two core elements. As we will see, it is often suggested that the radical contingency of the present economy of salvation entails a low evaluation of grace. That is to say, if grace is neither necessary nor sufficient for

---

464 By ‘Ockhamist’ I mean both Ockham himself and those generally under his influence.
glory in a variety of alternative economies of salvation, then it is assumed entirely arbitrary that God choose grace as the condition for glory in this economy of salvation. Similarly, it is often suggested that a high estimation of our nature and its capacities entails a low evaluation of grace. That is to say, the more nature can do, the less grace is assumed necessary. If our natural powers are sufficient for avoiding sin and loving God above all without the help of supernatural habits, then grace is assumed to take up considerably less space in the Christian life, as it were.

As presented in this dissertation, Scotus’s theology of grace shows that a low evaluation of grace by no means follows obviously either from the contingency of the present economy of salvation or from a high estimation of nature and its capacities. Even if the Ockhamist theology of grace received its first and second core elements from Scotus, it certainly did not receive from him its final core element, namely, its low evaluation of grace. Scotus has as high an evaluation of grace as any of his great thirteenth-century forebears. It simply cannot be the case, then, that the contingency of the present economy of salvation or a high estimation of nature and its capacities entails a low evaluation of grace in any straightforward way.

**The Contingency of Grace and the Devaluation of Grace**

We begin with the claim that the contingency of the present economy of salvation entails a concomitant devaluation of grace. We will first consider Erwin Iserloh’s critique of Ockham’s theology of grace and then turn to Berndt Hamm’s account of Scotus’s place in the transition from the thirteenth-century theology of grace to that of Ockham. Iserloh, following Joseph Lortz before him, argues that Luther’s theology of grace cannot be adequately understood without tracing its medieval roots.\(^{465}\) According to Iserloh, Luther rightly rejects much of the Ockhamism

that he inherits, though not enough of it to recover a “fully Catholic” theology of grace.\textsuperscript{466} One of the things that Iserloh finds so objectionable in Ockham is his low evaluation of grace, which Iserloh assumes to follow from the variety of possible alternative economies of salvation that Ockham affirms.\textsuperscript{467} Iserloh seems to assume that the mere contingency of the present economy of salvation, in and of itself, entails its utter meaninglessness.\textsuperscript{468} For him, Ockham has defended the transcendent freedom of God, to be sure, but he has done so to the detriment of any intelligibility of the present economy of salvation.

As I argued in chapter 2 of this dissertation, Ockham does have a much less exalted view of grace than his thirteenth-century forebears, but this is clearly not entailed by the contingency of the present economy of salvation. In most cases, Ockham simply defends Scotus on the contingency of the present economy of salvation, but Scotus does not take this contingency to entail that the present economy of salvation is arbitrary or unintelligible. For Scotus, the transcendent freedom of God does, indeed, entail that no created reality could require that God grant its possessor glory, but this, in itself, does not entail a low evaluation of grace. In contrast to Ockham, who thinks that grace is less \textit{per se} acceptable than a natural act or habit of love for God, Scotus thinks that grace is greater in supernatural goodness than all other created realities, conjoining its possessor immediately to God by a participation in the divine nature and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Iserloh rightly notes Ockham’s position that natural love for God is more \textit{per se} acceptable than charity, but he does so only briefly and in a list of positions he takes

\textsuperscript{466} Iserloh, \textit{Gnade und Eucharistie}, 130-31.

\textsuperscript{467} Iserloh, \textit{Gnade und Eucharistie}, 111-17.

\textsuperscript{468} Iserloh, \textit{Gnade und Eucharistie}, 281.
to illustrate the contingency of the present economy of salvation for Ockham.\textsuperscript{469} It is certainly the case that Ockham’s low evaluation of grace entails the contingency of the present economy of salvation, since Ockham’s position seems to imply that a Pelagian or universalist economy of salvation would have been more fitting than the actual one. In contrast, Scotus’s theology of grace shows that it is certainly not the case that the contingency of the economy of salvation entails a low evaluation of grace. Whatever accounts for the difference between Scotus’s and Ockham’s evaluation of grace, then, it clearly is not the contingency of the present economy of salvation. If the contingency of the economy of salvation does not logically entail a devaluation of grace, it cannot be what explains the Ockhamist devaluation.

Berndt Hamm, too, has given Scotus a prominent role in the late medieval devaluation of grace. In his study on the development of the concept of God’s freely ‘self-binding’ Himself in covenant with His people, Hamm helpfully distinguishes two versions of divine self-binding. Hamm labels these two distinct understandings ‘exclusive’ self-binding and ‘restrictive’ self-binding.\textsuperscript{470} ‘Restrictive’ self-binding entails that the actual reward of grace with glory depends on God’s self-binding but that the meritoriousness of grace for glory does not. That is to say, grace is not necessarily rewarded with glory, but grace still deserves glory in some way. Grace has an intrinsic merit for glory, but it is not sufficient to attain this glory without God’s promise. In contrast, ‘exclusive’ self-binding entails that both the actual order of grace to glory and the

\textsuperscript{469} Iserloh, \textit{Gnade und Eucharistie}, 114-15.

intrinsic relationship between grace and glory depend on God’s self-binding. The distinction is a helpful one, and Hamm uses it to trace several lines of development from Augustine to Luther.

Given what Scotus says in the *Reportatio* regarding the intrinsic suitability of charity to serve as the formal objective reason for acceptation to glory (see chapter 3 of this dissertation), one would assume that Scotus has a ‘restrictive’ account of the self-binding of God. That is to say, the actual reward of grace with glory depends on God’s ordination, but the fittingness of grace for reward with glory does not. Despite such texts, Hamm categorizes Scotus as holding to an ‘exclusive’ self-binding of God. Hamm further argues that by reviving an older ‘exclusive’ self-binding of God, Scotus has radicalized the standard ‘restrictive’ Franciscan view of Bonaventure and others, Scotus’s radicalization in turn leading to the Ockhamist theology of grace.  

On Hamm’s account, then, Scotus plays a significant role in the transition from the high thirteenth-century view of grace to the low Ockhamist view of grace. As I have argued in this dissertation, this is clearly not the case. Hamm himself often seems to recognize the need to heavily qualify his own overarching narrative. Despite the crucial role that Hamm grants to Scotus in the development of the concept of the self-binding of God, Hamm recognizes that Scotus’s account of grace and merit are not so different from Aquinas’s after all. Hamm notes that Scotus does not deny the intrinsic relevance of grace and cites approvingly Dettloff’s point that Scotus elevates the transcendent freedom of God rather than devalues grace. He elsewhere affirms, with Auer, that Scotus wishes to defend the objective value of grace and that Aquinas

---


wants to uphold the freedom of God, the two differing primarily in emphasis.\textsuperscript{473} How this comports with Hamm’s general thesis that Aquinas and Scotus represent two fundamentally different accounts of God’s self-binding is not entirely clear. It seems to me that Hamm’s qualification of his basic position is the more accurate judgement. Scotus and Aquinas have fundamentally similar accounts of the relationship between grace and glory, and what differences there are between them is certainly not sufficient to implicate Scotus in the Ockhamist devaluation of grace.

Scotus differs from Aquinas not in how highly they value grace but in whether created realities, however high, can bind God without God’s own self-binding. Scotus denies that they can, and while he is often taken to contradict Aquinas in this respect, it is not entirely clear that Aquinas and Scotus disagree even here. Aquinas himself denies that there is any strict merit between God and human beings, and he appeals to “divine ordination” (\textit{divinae ordinationis}) to ground even the limited kinds of merit that he is willing to affirm.\textsuperscript{474} What Aquinas intends by the ‘divine ordination’ that grounds the possibility of merit has been diversely interpreted by

\textsuperscript{473} Hamm, \textit{Promissio, Pactum, Ordinatio}, 346.

\textsuperscript{474} Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} I-II, q. 114, a. 1, resp. (Marietti I, pp. 565-66): “Now it is clear that between God and man there is the greatest inequality: for they are infinitely apart, and all man's good is from God. Hence there can be no justice of absolute equality between man and God, but only of a certain proportion, inasmuch as both operate after their own manner. Now the manner and measure of human virtue is in man from God. Hence man’s merit with God only exists on the presupposition of the Divine ordination, so that man obtains from God, as a reward of his operation, what God gave him the power of operation for, even as natural things by their proper movements and operations obtain that to which they were ordained by God; differently, indeed, since the rational creature moves itself to act by its free-will, hence its action has the character of merit, which is not so in other creatures.”

(\textit{Manifestum est autem quod inter Deum et hominem est maxima inaequalitas: in infinitum enim distant, et totum quod est hominis bonum, est a Deo. Unde non potest hominis ad Deum esse iustitia secundum absolutam aequalitatem, sed secundum proportionem quondam: inquantum scilicet uterque operatur secundum modum suum. Modus autem et mensura humanae virtutis homini est a Deo. Et ideo meritum hominis apud Deum esse non potest nisi secundum praesuppositionem divinae ordinationis: ita scilicet ut id homo consequatur a Deo per suam operationem quasi mercedem, ad quod Deus ei virtutem operandi deputavit. Sicut etiam res naturales hoc consequuntur per proprios motus et operationes, ad quod a Deo sunt ordinatae. Differenter tamen: quia creatura rationalis seipsam movet ad agendum per liberum arbitrium, unde sua actio habet rationem meriti; quod non est in alis creaturis.)
readers of Aquinas.\textsuperscript{475} Some of these interpretations, at least, would make Aquinas’s and Scotus’s accounts of grace and merit nearly identical. Scotus and Aquinas use language of merit differently, but they both deny that grace is necessarily rewarded with glory and affirm an intrinsic proportion between grace and glory.\textsuperscript{476}

While the contingency of the present economy of salvation is often taken to entail the devaluation of grace, then, Scotus’s theology of grace shows that the former does not necessarily entail the latter in any straightforward way. Scotus does think that the present economy of salvation is highly contingent, but he by no means takes this to entail that the present economy of salvation is arbitrary. Scotus’s theology of grace thus shows that the Ockhamist devaluation of grace cannot be explained by the mere contingency of the present economy of salvation. Affirming the contingency of the present economy of salvation entails neither a high nor a low evaluation of grace. We ought, then, to stop explaining the Ockhamist devaluation of grace in terms of the mere contingency of the economy of salvation.\textsuperscript{477}

\textit{The High Estimation of Nature’s Capacities and the Devaluation of Grace}

Having considered the alleged connection between the contingency of the present economy of salvation and the Ockhamist devaluation of grace, we turn to the alleged connection between a high estimation of nature’s capacities and the devaluation of grace. Here, the dominant

\textsuperscript{475} For a brief introduction to this debate in Aquinas scholarship, see Joseph P. Wawrykow, \textit{God’s Grace and Human Action: ‘Merit’ in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas} (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 7-16.

\textsuperscript{476} For Scotus’s use of the distinction between condign and congruous merit, see Cross, \textit{Duns Scotus}, 103-107.

\textsuperscript{477} There are, of course, some claims of contingency which, I have argued, do entail a lower evaluation of grace. In particular, it seems to me that severing the connection between the infusion of grace and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit has a significant effect on our evaluation of grace. But this claim of contingency rarely gets the attention it deserves. It is more typically argued that the claims of contingency which Ockham shares with Scotus are the cause of Ockham’s devaluation of grace.
narrative is Oberman’s. In his account of Biel’s theology of grace, Oberman exhibits a common tendency to think that the evaluation of nature and grace are conversely related. That is to say, the more highly one elevates nature, the more one devalues grace. Oberman makes much of Biel’s high estimation of nature’s capacities and sees this position as a form of “naturalism” that greatly reduces the necessity of grace. Oberman thus argues that Biel (with Ockham) has an essentially Pelagian theology of grace in which God’s part in salvation is primarily reduced to determining the conditions for salvation.

I cannot here address the question of whether Oberman’s account of Biel’s theology of grace is fair. All I wish to point out is that the Ockhamist low evaluation of grace does not follow straightforwardly from a high estimation of nature’s capacities. As I pointed out in several of the chapters of this dissertation, Scotus has a similarly high view of the capacities of human nature. Scotus argues that nature alone, even under the conditions of sin, is adequate to avoid sin and to love God above all other things without the supernatural habit of charity. But if Ockham and Biel take this to entail that the supernatural habit takes up much less space in the life of the Christian, Scotus certainly does not. For Scotus, a higher evaluation of our natural powers does not entail a concomitant devaluation of grace; rather, a sufficiently high view of grace as enabling supernatural love for God entails that grace is necessary even if nature alone is sufficient for natural love for God.

Our evaluation of nature and grace are inversely proportional, in other words, only if grace is thought of primarily in its healing function. That is to say, if grace is primarily thought of as undoing the effects of the fall, the less severely one estimates the effects of the fall, the less

---

478 Oberman, *The Harvest of Late Medieval Theology*, 47-50.

479 Oberman, *The Harvest of Late Medieval Theology*, 176-77.
one will estimate the necessity of the work of grace. If, on the contrary, grace is thought of primarily in its elevating function, even if human nature was not damaged at all by the fall, grace is still necessary since nature can at most love God naturally. By grasping the absolutely essential supernaturality of grace, in other words, Scotus was able to see that affirming the ability of nature to love God above all naturally would have no effect on our absolute dependence on the infusion of grace as long as we understand that what God desires as the condition for glory is not love for Him per se but supernatural love for Him, that is, a participation in the love act at the very center of Trinitarian life itself. If God simply desires love for Him as the condition for glory, we must deny the sufficiency of nature for such love if we want to safeguard the necessity of grace. But if God desires supernatural love for Him as the condition for glory, we are free to affirm nature’s sufficiency for natural love for God without thereby rendering grace superfluous. Even if nature is sufficient to love God naturally, we still need grace to love Him supernaturally.

Even if the Ockhamist high evaluation of nature’s capacities entails a low evaluation of grace, then, a high evaluation of nature’s capacities in and of itself does not entail such devaluation. The devaluation of grace is only entailed by a high estimation of nature’s capacities if grace does no more than heal fallen nature. As we saw in chapter 2 of this dissertation, Scotus affirms the standard thirteenth-century view that grace does not merely or even primarily heal nature. Grace is, by definition, the supernatural perfection of rational nature. Grace makes possible supernatural love for God, and nature’s capacity to love God naturally does not detract from this supernaturalizing character of grace in any way.

It is certainly true, then, that Scotus contributes to the Ockhamist theology of grace both a deep sense of the contingency of the present economy of salvation and a high estimation of
nature’s capacities. It is certainly not the case, however, that he contributes to Ockhamist
technology its low evaluation of grace. Scotus’s theology of grace is as high as that of any of his
great thirteenth-century forebears. What is unique to the Ockhamist theology of grace, then, is
primarily its low evaluation of grace, and there is nothing about Scotus’s theology of grace that
explains the Ockhamist devaluation.

For Scotus, grace is a participation in the divine nature, it is a necessary and sufficient
condition for the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and it flows to us from the Incarnate Christ as its
overflowing created source, incorporating us into His mystical Body. For Ockham, grace does
none of these things. Grace is, at most, a relatively supernatural habit that cannot even make us
twice as good as we are without it, it has no necessary relationship to the indwelling of the Holy
Spirit, and it is merely bested by that grace which the Incarnate Christ possesses. Scotus, then, is
a significant representative of the high thirteenth-century conception of grace while Ockham
represents a significant departure from this high view. Whatever the similarities between
Scotus’s and Ockham’s theologies of grace, there are much more significant dissimilarities. It is
these dissimilarities between Scotus and Ockham, rather than the similarities between them, that
should control our narratives of the development of the late medieval theology of grace.

**Scotus and the Thirteenth-century Theology of Grace**

When we consider the relationship between nature and grace as primary, Scotus clearly
belongs to the thirteenth century rather than the fourteenth century. But Scotus is not adequately
appreciated merely as an upholder of the thirteenth-century high view of grace. Scotus also
makes a significant contribution to that high view and does so precisely by his much-maligned
appreciation of the contingency of the present economy of salvation. Even if this contingency led
some of the fourteenth-century schoolmen to devalue grace, it certainly did not lead Scotus to do
so. Scotus used the contingency of the present economy of salvation to rightly discern the relationship between our salvation and the Trinitarian missions in the order of divine intentions. If our salvation does not necessarily depend on the Trinitarian missions, it cannot be the case that the Trinitarian missions are ultimately explained by our need for salvation. Further, given his intuitions regarding the perfection of the divine will and the intrinsic goodness of the Trinitarian missions, Scotus comes to conclude that it must be our salvation that is explained by the Trinitarian missions.

This ‘Scotistic inversion,’ to which I have alluded several times in this dissertation, is thus grounded in two basic intuitions:

(1) The non-existential dependence of our salvation on the Trinitarian missions.
(2) The necessary intentional primacy of the Trinitarian missions.

By ‘non-existential dependence,’ I mean that our salvation could have been possible without the Trinitarian missions. In the actual world, our salvation does depend on the Trinitarian missions (e.g., our grace flows from Christ’s fullness thereof), but the possibility of our salvation does not strictly depend on the Trinitarian missions. God could have chosen to forgive our sins and give us grace and glory without the perfect mission of His Spirit to His Incarnate Son. Our salvation depends on the Trinitarian missions in this world (and many other possible worlds), but there are plenty of other possible worlds in which our salvation exists without the Trinitarian missions.

By ‘necessary intentional primacy,’ I mean Scotus’s position that God cannot but will the Trinitarian missions first in any possible world in which they exist. Given the intrinsic goodness of the Trinitarian missions and their proximity to the end, Scotus is clearly uncomfortable with the possibility that God intends some other created reality before the Trinitarian missions. For Scotus, this would be for God to will in an unorderly way. To revisit a text we considered previously:
But not for this redemption alone does God seem to have predestined this soul for such great glory, since the redemption or glory of a soul needing to be redeemed is not as great a good as the glory of the soul of Christ. Nor does it seem true that so supreme a good among beings was only occasioned because of a merely lesser good. Nor does it seem true that God preordained Adam to so great a good before He preordained Christ, which however would follow. Indeed, what is more absurd, it would also follow further that God, when preordaining Adam to glory, would have foreseen that Adam would fall into sin before He would have predestined Christ to glory—supposing the predestination of Christ’s soul was only for the redemption of others. One can therefore say that God, prior to foreseeing anything about sinner or sin or punishment, pre-chose for His heavenly court all those whom He wished to have there—angels and men—in definite and determinate degrees.480

Given the perfection of the divine will, if God wills $a$ and $b$, and $a$ is of greater value than $b$, it is ‘absurd’ to think that God willed $a$ for the sake of $b$. That is to say, it is absurd to explain God’s willing of $a$ by appeal to God’s willing of $b$. Since the externalization of the inner-Trinitarian life of God is the highest possible created reality, Scotus consistently refuses to explain them in terms of other created things. Given their inherent goodness, it must be the Trinitarian missions that explain all other things. God can will our salvation without the Trinitarian missions, of course, but in any world in which God wills both our salvation and the Trinitarian missions, He cannot fail to will the Trinitarian missions before He wills our salvation or anything else.

These two basic intuitions respectively entail, first, that the Trinitarian missions cannot be ultimately explained by our need for salvation and, second, that our salvation must be ultimately explained by the Trinitarian missions. It might be the case that these two intuitions are related only in that they conjointly shed light on the order of intelligibility between our salvation and the

---

480 Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 7, nn. 63-67 (Vatican IX, pp. 288-89): “Sed non propter illam solam videtur Deus praedestinasse illam animam ad tantam gloriem, cum illa redemptio sive gloria animae redimendae non sit tantum bonum quantum est illa gloria animae Christi. Nec est verisimile tam summum Bonum in entibus esse tantum occasionatum propter minus bonum solum. Nec est verisimile ipsum prius praeorundasse Adam ad tantum bonum quam Christum, quod tamen sequeretur. Immo, quod absurdius est, ulterior sequeretur etiam quod, praedestinando Adam ad gloriem, prius praevidisset ipsum casurum in peccatum quam praedestinasset Christum ad gloriem, si praedestinatio illius animae tantum esset pro redemptione aliorum. Potest igitur dici quod prius natura quam aliiquid praevidebatur circa peccatorem, sive de peccato sive de poena, Deus praeeligit ad illam curiam caelestem omnes quos voluit habere - angelos et homines - in certis et determinatis gradibus.”
Trinitarian missions, but there are good reasons to suppose that they are connected in a stronger way. We might suppose, for instance, that Scotus’s second intuition (i.e., the necessary intentional primacy of the Trinitarian missions) does not necessarily entail his first intuition (i.e., the non-existential dependence of our salvation on the Trinitarian missions). One could conceivable affirm the necessary intentional primacy of the Trinitarian missions but deny the non-existential dependence of our salvation on the Trinitarian missions. But affirming Scotus’s second intuition while denying his first intuition would lead to some odd incongruities.

In particular, one could easily image possible economies of salvation in which God’s purposes are thwarted. Let us suppose, for example, that God refrains from willing the Trinitarian missions but freely wills our grace and glory. After willing our grace and glory, God then foresees the fall of the human race. The necessary intentional primacy of the Trinitarian missions entails that God cannot now will the Trinitarian missions. Since the opportunity to will the Trinitarian missions has already passed God by, as it were, it would then be impossible for God to secure our salvation. Anyone who holds to the necessary intentional primacy of the Trinitarian missions, in other words, will have to deny the existential dependence of our salvation on the Trinitarian missions if they want to avoid the possibility that God’s purposes be thwarted. Scotus clearly wants to affirm the necessary intentional primacy of the Trinitarian missions and deny the possibility that God’s purposes be thwarted, so it seems to me that his second intuition necessarily entails his first intuition: the necessary intentional primacy of the Trinitarian missions necessarily entails the non-existential dependence of our salvation on the Trinitarian missions.

Scotus’s two basic intuitions, in other words, do not simply happen to go together. There is a good case to be made that they necessarily go together, and Scotus’s considerable
contribution to the thirteenth-century theology of grace, I argue, consists precisely in the confluence of these two intuitions. These two intuitions, of course, are not entirely novel with Scotus. Even if Scotus took them more seriously and applied them more programmatically than any of his great forebears, his contribution to the thirteenth-century theology of grace is best understood, I argue, not as the introduction of ideas from the outside, as it were. Instead, the Scotistic inversion is best understood as a kind of Kuhnian paradigm shift, the culmination of a development inherent to the thirteenth-century theology of grace itself, which progresses gradually and steadily throughout the commentary tradition.

To illustrate my point, it might be helpful to consider Anselm and Scotus on the Incarnation again. Anselm introduces his project in *Cur Deus homo* as motivated by the need to give an answer to the claim that the Incarnation of a divine person is an inherently unfitting course of action for God.481 To defeat this objection of the pagan, Anselm sets out to show that the Incarnation was necessary for our salvation. In other words, Anselm tends to think that the intelligibility of the Incarnation depends in some way on its relationship to our salvation. Had God not willed our salvation, it is not clear how Anselm would respond to the pagan’s objection. As we have seen, Scotus has entirely different intuitions: our salvation does not depend in any necessary way on the Incarnation, and the Incarnation is the most fitting thing God can possibly do. The intelligibility of the Incarnation, in other words, needs no reference to us and our salvation as its grounds. Even if God did not create us or will to save us, it would still be maximally fitting for God to be Incarnate in a human nature. But as we saw in chapter 5, Scotus

---

481 Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* I, c. 3 (Schmitt II, p. 50): “BOSO: Obiciunt nobis deridentes simplicitatem nostram infideles quia deo facimus iniuriam et contumeliam, cum eum asserimus in uterum mulieris descendisse, natum esse de femina, lacte et alimentis humanis nutritum crevisse, et - ut multa alia taceam quae deo non videntur convenire - lassitudinem, famem, sitim, verbera et inter latrones crucem mortem que sustinuisset.”
was not the first to push against the Anselmian way of thinking. Throughout the thirteenth century, we find an increasing discomfort with Anselmian-style necessity claims and an increasing appreciation of the intrinsic goodness of the Incarnation in and of itself.

Aquinas is instructive with respect to both of these shifts. In another context, Aquinas clearly warns that inadequate necessity claims do more damage to the faith than good:

Whoever, then, tries to prove the trinity of persons by natural reason, derogates from faith in two ways. First, as regards the dignity of faith itself, which consists in its being concerned with invisible things, that exceed human reason; wherefore the Apostle says that faith is of things that appear not (Heb 11:1), and the same Apostle says also, We speak wisdom among the perfect, but not the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world; but we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery which is hidden (1 Cor 2:6, 7). Second, as regards the utility of drawing others to the faith. For when anyone in the endeavor to prove the faith brings forward reasons which are not cogent, he falls under the ridicule of the unbelievers: since they suppose that we stand upon such reasons, and that we believe on such grounds.

Therefore, we must not attempt to prove what is of faith, except by authority alone, to those who receive the authority; while as regards others it suffices to prove that what faith teaches is not impossible. Hence it is said by Dionysius (Div. Nom. ii): Whoever wholly resists the word, is far off from our philosophy; whereas if he regards the truth of the word—i.e., the sacred word, we too follow this rule.\footnote{Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} I, q. 32, a. 1, resp.: “Qui autem probare ntitur Trinitatem personarum naturali ratione, fidei dupliciter derogat. Primo quidem, quantum ad dignitatem ipsius fidei, quae est ut sit de rebus invisibilibus, quae rationem humanam excedunt. Unde Apostolus dicit, ad Heb. XI, quod fides est de non apparentibus. Et Apostolus dicit, I Cor. II, sapientiam loquimur inter perfectos, sapientiam vero non huius saeculi, neque principum huius saeculi; sed loquimur Dei sapientiam in mysterio, quae abscondita est. Secundo, quantum ad utilitatem trahendi alios ad fides. Cum enim aliquis ad probandum fides inducit rationes quae non sunt cogentes, cedit in irissionem infidelium, credunt enim quod huiusmodi rationibus innitamur, et propter eas credamus. Quae igitur fidei sunt, non sunt tentanda probare nisi per auctoritates, his qui auctoritates suscipiant. Apud alios vero, sufficit defendere non esse impossibile quod praedicat fides. Unde Dionysius dicit, II cap. de Div. Nom., \textit{si aliquis est qui totaliter eloquiires resistit, longe erit a nostra philosophia; si autem ad veritatem eloquiorum, scilicet sacrorum, respicit, hoc et nos canone utimur.”}
general voluntarist trajectory that progressed rather consistently throughout the thirteenth-century. Scotus’s ‘soteriological voluntarism,’ in other words, was not his alone. Scotus merely brings to culmination a general development already at work in the thirteenth-century commentary tradition.

With regard to the intrinsic perfection of the Incarnation, Aquinas affirms that “God loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe: because He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him ‘a name that is above all names,’ in so far as He was true God.” That is to say, the Incarnation is a good in and of itself, and one needs not appeal to the dependence of our salvation on it to ground its intrinsic intelligibility. Even if no other human being were created, the Incarnation would still be an intrinsic good, indeed, the supreme created good.

Scotus’s contribution to the thirteenth-century theology of grace is best seen as the combination and culmination of these two trends already at work in the thirteenth century, namely, the increasing primacy of the Trinitarian missions and the increasing contingency of the economy of salvation. The key element that Scotus supplies in order to enact the ‘Scotistic inversion’ is his reflections on the perfection of the divine will. Once it is seen that God cannot will a greater good for the sake of a lesser good, Scotus sees that the Anselmian argument is entirely the wrong way around. It cannot be the case that our salvation makes the Trinitarian missions intelligible; if anything, it is the Trinitarian missions that make our salvation intelligible.

---

483 Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 20, a. 4, ad 1: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus Christum diligit, non solum plus quam totum humanum genus, sed etiam magis quam totam universitatem creaturarum, quia scilicet ei maius bonum voluit, quia dedit ei nomen, quod est super omne nomen, ut verus Deus esset.”
It is the Trinitarian missions, in other words, that shed light on all else in any world in which they exist. As shown in previous chapters, Scotus consistently attempts to make sense of the particularities of the economy of salvation by appeal to the Trinitarian missions. God wills to give grace and glory because He wills the Holy Spirit as Trinitarian love to be in some others. The Father wills the perfect mission of the Spirit for His Incarnate Son because of the likeness of this confluence of the Trinitarian missions to the inner life of the Trinity. God wills our grace and glory because He sees that Christ’s grace and glory cannot be perfect without some others to participate in His.

Even here, though, Scotus’s theology of grace is best seen as the culmination of a development already well under way in the thirteenth-century theology of grace. Aquinas is again instructive. Aquinas fully recognizes that being the source of our grace and the instrument of our redemption redounds more to Christ’s goodness than to ours. With respect to being the source of grace, Aquinas says (admittedly with respect to the higher ranks of angels) that “each gift is more perfectly possessed by the one who can communicate it, than by the one who cannot communicate it; as the hot thing which can communicate heat is more perfect than what is unable to give heat.” Aquinas, here, recognizes that being able to give a gift is better than merely possessing a gift. As far as I know, Aquinas never applies this principle in his Christology, but it would be easy to see how he might. Christ’s giving of grace does not simply make us better; it also makes Him better insofar as giving grace makes one better than merely possessing it, even in its highest degree. With respect to Christ’s serving as instrument of our redemption, Aquinas explicitly makes the claim that this redounds more to Christ’s good than to ours: “even in

484 Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 108, a. 2, ad 2: “Unumquodque autem perfectius habetur ab eo qui potest illud communicare, quam ab eo qui non potest, sicut perfectius est calidum quod potest calefacere, quam quod non potest.”
Christ’s being given on behalf of men, the greatest good redounded to Christ Himself, inasmuch as through this giving of Himself His virtue was manifested and He became the cause of human salvation, which makes Him exceedingly honorable.485

Interestingly, these last three quotations from Aquinas all come from his replies to objections. What were \textit{ad hoc} replies to objections in Aquinas become programmatic intuitions for Scotus, and this is not unusual in observing the development of the thirteenth-century theology of grace. Many of Scotus’s final positions appear early in the thirteenth century as objections to be argued against. Closer to the end of the thirteenth century, they appear as \textit{ad hoc} responses to other objections. In Scotus, they become programmatic intuitions that fundamentally reshape not our conceptions of nature, grace, and the Trinitarian missions \textit{per se} but our conceptions of the relationships between them. Scotus shares with his thirteenth-century forebears his basic conceptions of nature, grace, and the Trinitarian missions. What Scotus contributes to the thirteenth-century theology of grace is to turn the rich thirteenth-century panorama the other way around, or perhaps the right way around. The thirteenth-century schoolmen tended to think that God first willed nature, then grace, then the Trinitarian missions. Scotus’s reflections on the perfection of the divine will lead him to conclude that the Trinitarian missions are necessarily primary in the divine intentions in any possible world in which they exist. This world, of course, is included in the set of all possible worlds, so it must be the case that the Trinitarian missions are the pinnacle and meaning of our universe. For Scotus, the non-existential dependence of our salvation on the Trinitarian missions does not render the present economy of salvation arbitrary or meaningless; the non-existential dependence of our salvation

\textsuperscript{485} Aquinas, \textit{Sentences} III, d. 32, q. 1, a. 5, qc. 4, ad 1: “Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in hoc etiam quod Christus pro hominibus fuit datus, maximum bonum ipsi Christo fuit, secundum quod in hoc virtus sua manifesta fuit, et causa fuit salutis humanae, quod est sibi valde honorificum.”
on the Trinitarian missions simply serves to reorient our attention. The supreme goodness of the
Spirit’s mission to the Son necessarily entails that if God freely wills it, it cannot fail to be the
luminous grounds of intelligibility for the whole created order in which it exists.

Significantly, as we saw in chapter 4 of this dissertation, Scotus consistently locates the
perfect mission of the Holy Spirit (i.e., the conferral of highest possible grace) before the
Incarnation of the Son in the order of divine intentions.486 The Father first wills the perfect
mission of the Spirit and then the Incarnation of the Son as recipient of this perfect mission of
their common Spirit. This suggests, at least, that we ought to modify our common reference to
Scotus’s ‘Christocentrism.’ Scotus privileges not only the Incarnation of the Son but also the
indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Indeed, Scotus privileges indwelling even more highly than he
does the Incarnation. God does not have to will either of the Trinitarian missions, and He is free
to will one without willing the other, but if He wills them both, He must will the perfect mission
of the Spirit before He wills the Incarnation of the Son. We might better speak, then, of Scotus’s
‘Pneumato-Christocentrism,’ and thus see in Scotus yet another counter to the common charge of
the West’s ‘Pneumatological deficit.’487

Scotus’s basic intuitions lead him to believe that the primary intention of God in creation
was precisely to externalize His own Trinitarian life by sending the Son into our flesh and
sending the Spirit through that flesh into a multitude of human beings, that they might together
with Him constitute a mystical Body of God’s co-lovers. This, I suggest, is Scotus’s primary
contribution to the thirteenth-century theology of grace and to the theology of grace in general.

486 See, again, Scotus’s various commentaries on distinction 7 of the third book of the Sentences.

487 See, for instance, Vladimir Lossky’s charge against the West in his In the Image and Likeness of God, ed. John
H. Erickson and Thomas E. Bird (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1974).
Christian theology is a fundamentally ecclesial task,\textsuperscript{488} and insofar as the Church extends not only spatially but temporally, it cannot adequately perform its task but in intimate fellowship with the great theologians of its past. John Duns Scotus is surely one of the Church’s great theologians, even if he has not yet been recognized as one of its official doctors.\textsuperscript{489} Until that day comes, I hope this dissertation will serve, in small part, to give Scotus the hearing he rightly deserves.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES


———. *De fide et symbolo, De fide et operibus, De agone christiano, De continentia, De bono coniugali, De sancta virginitate, De bono viduitatis, De adulterinis coniugiis, De mendacio, Contra mendacium, De opere monachorum, De divinatione daemonum, De cura pro mortuis gerenda, De patientia*. Edited by J. Zycha. Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 41. Vienna, 1900.


SECONDARY SOURCES


———. “Some Late Medieval Discussions of Participation in the Divine.” (Forthcoming in a volume on participation ed. Douglas Hedley, University of Notre Dame Press.)


Faucher, Nicolas and Magali Roques, eds. The Ontology, Psychology and Axiology of Habits (Habitus) in Medieval Philosophy. Cham: Springer, 2018.


