Sovereignty’s Gray Area: The Delimitation of Air and Space in the Context of Aerospace Vehicles and the Use of Force

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SOVEREIGNTY’S GRAY AREA: THE DELIMITATION OF AIR AND SPACE IN THE CONTEXT OF AEROSPACE VEHICLES AND THE USE OF FORCE

MATTHEW T. KING*

ABSTRACT

Debate over the delimitation of airspace and outer space has persisted since the dawn of the space age, without resolution. With the development of hybrid aerospace vehicles that can operate in and transition between the two zones, the line between their disparate legal regimes will be tested. And this test may not come with an after-the-fact courtroom debate over applicable liability regimes, but rather it may come with a real-time decision made in a military operations center as to whether an aerospace vehicle has violated sovereign airspace and should be shot down. The recent shoot-down of a Russian bomber by Turkish fighters is just one example of the sensitivity over violations of territorial integrity.

This article explores the controlling law, in the absence of a clear resolution from states, as to the legal regime governing the transition from air to space. While others have examined delimitation from the standpoint of liability, air and space traffic management, or other perspectives, this work addresses delimitation through the lens of the potential use of force and state security interests. It first breaks down air and space into their core, or black-and-white, elements, with particular attention to their

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The views expressed in this article represent the personal views and conclusions of the author writing in his personal capacity and are not necessarily the views, ideas, or attitudes of the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. The author has used only information available to the public in the researching and presentation of this work.
rules of sovereignty and the distinction of state and civilian vehicles. It then examines the gray area in between the regimes in two ways, using a conservative (or positivist) approach and a commensurability analysis. These modes of analysis reveal that under the current legal construct, the lowest satellite orbit should be regarded as the cap on state assertions of sovereignty, and therefore, the legal line between the airspace and outer space regimes from a use of force and security perspective.

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I. INTRODUCTION

IMAGINE A FLYING VEHICLE that can operate in a controlled, intentional manner in both airspace and outer space. It has the capacity to take off, fully maneuver, and safely land again—all while maintaining the capacity to conduct operations (of varying nature) both in the air and in space. Hopefully, offensive territorial incursions by, and attacks against, such craft are among the last thoughts to cross one’s mind when considering the incredible potential benefits of these vehicles. Nonetheless, their ability to test the limits of what states consider airspace and outer space begs a much debated question in air and space law—where, exactly, is the line between air and space?

This article examines the implications of these vehicles under the rules of law governing air and outer space, with specific attention to the repercussions for the possible use of force by states against such vehicles (particularly jus ad bellum). From this context, the author argues that, despite the numerous theories on the delimitation of air and space that have been articulated since the beginning of the space age, the presently existing legal structure applicable to such vehicles should be viewed as an airspace (as opposed to outer space) regime for any operations be-

1 Perhaps encouragingly, the bulk of academic discussion of these vehicles and their domain of operation focuses on other matters, leaving somewhat of a dearth of literature on the use of force against such vehicles.
low orbit. The practical effect of this finding is that the rules of state territorial sovereignty then apply. This makes overflight by such vehicles (while operating below clearly established outer space) a violation of territorial integrity, which—depending on the circumstances—may trigger various actions under international law, including the use of force. The potential for the use of force is even greater for overflight by state or military vehicles, which enjoy far more limited rights of passage under an airspace regime and are more likely to be construed as threatening by the states whose sovereignty is being violated.

The assertion that airspace is the appropriate regime is principally one by default. This work examines the two potentially relevant legal regimes governing the flight of these vehicles—air law and outer space law—and argues that notwithstanding their fundamental differences in matters related to the use of force, they essentially exist on one continuum defined by state sovereignty and security. Viewed in this context, the author argues that outer space law is a specific and limited deviation from the baseline position that states can (and do) assert rights of territorial sovereignty as high as possible. That is, outer space law is a defined cap on sovereignty—an exception to the default rule. Thus, if an area cannot be considered “outer space” (in physical, geographic, or functional terms) then it must be considered part of the default, or baseline: sovereign airspace. The delimitation debate among publicists and among states demonstrates the lack of clarity in a line between air and space. In the absence of clarity, we yield to the default legal position; that is, follow the rule and not the exception. Under this approach, airspace should be the going regime unless and until states agree to a change in the law (as they did for the outer space regime).

This work is divided into three substantive chapters. The first further develops the argument and its analytical framework and discusses some of the factual and legal premises underlying the analysis. The second chapter examines the airspace and outer space regimes as they exist presently and advances the idea of “gray space,” or the legally unclear zone existing at the edges of the more black-and-white aspects of airspace and outer space. The third chapter then addresses how the gray area should be addressed; that is, it explains why the default position should be toward sovereignty, with orbit as the dividing line between the two zones.

In all, this work is not intended as a prescription for what the law should be for the division of airspace and outer space legal
regimes. In the legal literature, there exist many good ideas on delimitation, based on many different concerns such as airspace and outer space traffic control, insurance, commercial development (in particular space tourism and hypersonic transportation), pure science, and a host of other notions. Any one of these concerns may be a firm basis on which a regime of delimitation can be founded (with the remaining concerns adjusting their regulations and practices to whatever line—assuming the consensus is for a line—is determined). But, as yet, there is no clear state consensus as to a line or the primary foundation upon which any such delimitation should be based. In the absence of a clear custom or convention under international law, which would trump any analysis here, this work attempts to explore the baselines and defaults that should guide state actions, with focus on a known, primary concern for states: their sovereignty and national security.

II. AEROSPACE VEHICLES AND THE USE OF FORCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

This chapter further develops the matters introduced above. It describes the nature of the vehicles in question throughout this work, addresses the use of force as used in this work, and establishes the general analytical framework set out to demonstrate the central thesis: that the zone encompassing the unclear upper edge of airspace and the unclear lower edge of outer space should be regarded as falling under an airspace regime, at least with regard to the use of force against vehicles operating in this zone.

A. AEROSPACE VEHICLES AND THEIR POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS

An aerospace vehicle, as described above, is nothing new or shocking to even the most peripheral viewer of science fiction. But the vision of such vehicles is not like suggestions of time travel, highways full of flying cars, or other only theoretically possible or distant advances in technology, divorced from current reality and research pursuits. Such craft have been considered, technologically, as a potential reality since at least the 1950s. And extant technology confirms the imminence of their

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2 See Section II.D.2 infra for more discussion of this term.
3 See, e.g., Roy Houchin, US Hypersonic Research and Development: The Rise and Fall of Dyna-Soar, 1944-1963 (2006) (describing the Boeing X-20, or Dyna-Soar, which was designed to take off like a plane but operate in high-alti-
existence and use. For instance, the U.S. Space Shuttle, first taking flight in 1981, was launched into space where it could orbit Earth and maneuver through space and then return to Earth as an aircraft (albeit a glider without powered flight). Spaceplanes that can execute single-stage take-offs more like a traditional airplane are also being pursued, though with far less success to date.


5 See The Shuttle, NASA, [https://perma.cc/74WZ-T7L7]. The Soviet Union also planned for a similar craft, the Buran, but it only executed one mission in 1988. Marietta Benko & Engelbert Plescher, Space Law: Reconsidering the Definition/Delimitation Question and the Passage of Spacecraft Through Foreign Airspace 21–22 (2013). Though it could transit the airspace, the Space Shuttle was exclusively intended for use in outer space. Id. According to Zanghi, it was considered an outer space object for two primary reasons: first, the definition of “space object” in the relevant space conventions is broad; and second, it fell to Earth much like a capsule (not like a plane) due to the steep inclination and “scarce maneuverability,” so it was more a space vehicle. Claudio Zanghi, Aerospace Object, in Outlook on Space Law Over the Next 30 Years: Essays Published for the 30th Anniversary of the Outer Space Treaty 115, 117 (Gabriel Lafferrandrie & Daphne Crowther eds., 1997). This second, and more important, prong would not apply to an aerospace vehicle that can engage in controlled flight at all altitudes. Id.

The current U.S. Air Force X-37B, presently a remotely piloted vehicle, operates in a similar fashion to the Space Shuttle, with an initial rocket launch, independent operation, and then glide return to Earth. However, if such a vehicle was combined with a propulsion system such as the SABRE (Synergetic Air-Breathing Rocket Engine), currently being designed and tested by Reaction Engines, Ltd., the stage could be set for a truly full-functional hybrid aerospace vehicle—transcending the traditional definitions of airplane and space-rocket. This work posits the eventual (and near-term) existence of such technologies.

The potential applications of this new technology are nearly limitless. Presently, the focus seems to be on suborbital tourism and adventure. But the opportunities for travel, scientific research, telecommunications, or a host of other applications abound.

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8 The SABRE Engine, Reaction Engines, http://www.reactionengines.co.uk/sabre.html [https://perma.cc/8QQZ-YUHP] (the SABRE has integrated air breathing and conventional rocket modes into one engine); see Alan Tovey, Concorde Mark 2: Airbus Files Plans for New Supersonic Jet, Telegraph (Aug. 6, 2015, 8:45 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/engineering/11782446/Concorde-Mark-2-Airbus-files-plans-for-new-supersonic-jet.html [https://perma.cc/RAA4-DEKK] (describing the proposed Concorde 2, which plans to integrate three engine types into one craft to achieve an upright rocket stage and cruising altitudes of 100,000 feet (over 30 kilometers)).

9 This includes travel to outer space, for instance to the International Space Station, as well as high-speed (hypersonic) point-to-point terrestrial destination travel, during which a specialized plane ascends to nearly 100 kilometers (62 miles or 329,000 feet) before rapidly descending to its destination. See Maria Fischer, New York to Tokyo by Way of Outer Space, Space Safety Mag. (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/aerospace-engineering/spacecraft-design/york-tokyo-outer-space/ [https://perma.cc/97WJ-GMYX] (discussing the XCOR Lynx program, which projects the New York to Tokyo trip taking ninety minutes).

10 See Joseph Pelton, Ph.D., Geosynchronous Satellites at 14 Miles Altitude?, 2Q95 New Telecom Q. 11, 11 (1995) (describing the potential for communications platforms that linger in suborbital “proto-space” to provide cost-effective and consistent telecommunications coverage); What is Project Loon, Project Loon, https://www.solveforx.com/loon/ [https://perma.cc/3WF9-ZG77] (a network of high-altitude balloons that can provide regional internet coverage).
But this potential is not without concerns—particularly when governments (and frequently the military departments of governments) are executing the operations. Distrust of other states is simply a part of world affairs. One contemporary example of this is the X-37B experimental spaceplane discussed above. It is not technology that is unique to the United States or to military research—Virgin Galactic, Swiss Space Systems (S3), and a host of others are working on similar vehicles that can operate in both air and space for civilian (or government) purposes. Still, in October 2014, when the X-37B returned to Earth from a 675-day mission—during which it launched from Earth, operated in outer space, and returned to base intact and ready for re-use—the mission garnered a great deal of attention. Abundant media coverage of the flight focused not just on the technological advances it represented, but also the mysteries and theories about its “secret” mission or possible uses. The “mysterious” nature of the craft and its mission persisted in coverage of its more recent May 2015 launch. The technology is only likely to


13 See, e.g., Mike Wall, US Air Force Launches X-37b Space Plane on 4th Mystery Mission, SPACE (May 20, 2015), http://www.space.com/29448-x37b-space-plane-launches-fourth-mission.html [https://perma.cc/CW55-5PGA]. Potentially adding fuel to the fire for those concerned with the potential malevolent uses of such a vehicle, the then-head of the U.S. Air Force Space Command, General John Hyten, was asked on a major news program about the X-37B, and he could not deny its potential as a weapons system. See David Martin, 60 Minutes: The Battle Above, Part One, CBS NEWS (Apr. 26, 2015, 12:24 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/the-battle-above-part-one/ [https://perma.cc/UJ9Y-KZDF]. The interview and news story overall focused on self-defense and anti-attack technology (as opposed to U.S. attack capabilities), with the Secretary of the U.S. Air Force even stating that the United States presently has no weapons in space. However the Air Force does not deny the X-37B’s potential use as an offensive weapon:

Q (David Martin): “So, here’s your chance to end all the speculation about what this space plane [the X-37B] is really for . . . . Can you tell me whether or not someday the spaceplane is going to become a weapons system?”
advance further, eventually allowing for both civilian and military vehicles that can fully operate at will in both airspace and outer space, at virtually any altitude, but with the advanced technology there is likely to be commensurate mistrust and concern.

And this mistrust and concern is not limited to individuals and news organizations. States and policymakers are wary of the aerospace capabilities of foreign governments because they could directly threaten their national security or territorial integrity. Two scenarios demonstrate the potential points of contention for actions conducted in aerospace based on emerging technologies.

First, there may be intentionally provocative territorial incursions by armed military aerospace vehicles. Such activities would not be simple high-altitude overflight for access to outer space, or matters of distress or other recognized exigency. Instead, they would constitute deliberate, provocative acts, presumably as an extension of state foreign policy goals. Such actions occur in the current state of international affairs. For instance, the Russian military has frequently tested the boundaries of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member-nation airspace, seemingly to gauge the response (both tactical and political) and to make a political statement. China also has a program to

A (General Hyten): “The intent is... I cannot answer that question... I'm not going to say what it's going to become because we're experimenting.”

Id.; cf. HOUCHIN, supra note 3, at 104–05 (discussing the U.S. Dyna-Soar spaceplane, which was intended for use as an orbital weapons system and hypersonic bomber in its second and third phases, but it was presented initially only as a suborbital (non-space) jet platform to avoid scrutiny from the Eisenhower administration as a space weapon).

14 See Brian Weeden, The End of Sanctuary in Space: Why America is Considering Getting More Aggressive in Orbit, War Is Boring (Jan. 7, 2015), https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-end-of-sanctuary-in-space-2d858fba741a [https://perma.cc/GV2A-E6QP] (discussing both the U.S. concerns and reactions to Chinese and Russian space activities, as well as concern created for China, Russia, and other states by the United States (particularly the X-37B, the articulation of a potentially aggressive space control policy and assets, and rejection of the U.N.-based attempts at a resolution on the placement of weapons in outer space)); see also Tim Schwarz, North Korean Space Scientist to U.S. People: 'Trust Us', CNN (July 3, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/03/asia/north-korean-space-program/ [https://perma.cc/8W6N-Y286] (examining U.S. concerns over North Korea’s non-military space program and agency, the National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA)).

broaden its territorial sea (and thereby airspace) through asserting control over various regional islands. Counter to this, the United States has a policy to test (that is, not respect through asserting passage rights) claims of territory beyond the perceived limits of international law. The tension between assertions of sovereignty and those eager to test it can have dangerous results. As it is occurring today with ships and air-


craft, there is little reason to doubt the potential for such incursions being employed as a policy tool in the future with aerospace vehicles as another tool for states.

Second, quasi-satellite systems may loiter in the aerospace region, such as the nascent Project Loon system. If unwanted, such a telecommunication or remote sensing capacity could be construed as highly offensive by a state receiving the transmissions (be it simple internet access or media broadcasts), eliciting an adverse reaction. For instance, in recent history, Iran was believed to be the source of jamming that targeted the French EUTELSAT (a traditional orbital satellite) and its media signals in response to the broadcast of unwanted television programming (such as BBC Persian) into Iran. An intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) asset operating in aerospace could provoke an equally, or even more, hostile response than just jamming.

In the above scenarios, if the aerospace vehicles are state—and particularly military—craft, the key factors in determining whether the use of force may be acceptable are the questions of where the vehicals are operating and whether the vehicles are encroaching on sovereign territory. States may dislike that orbital satellites overfly their territory, but that is no violation of territorial integrity, so no actions employing force would be appropriate. However, if aerospace vehicles are operating in a state’s sovereign territory, force may be an option to remedy the violation. Thus, it is the determination of whether the area of operation (aerospace) can legitimately be claimed as sovereign that will often drive the determination of the propriety of the use of force. Second to this, whether the craft in question is a civilian or state vehicle will also affect the use of force analysis.


19 See What is Project Loon, supra note 10.

B. The Use of Force as an Analytical Lens

As noted above, the potential for the use of force is a rubric through which this argument’s analysis is performed. This work is not intended as a study of the law of war or the law of armed conflict, per se; instead, this study uses existing understanding of law of war principles as a tool to develop the delimitation issue. At the outset, though, a few comments on the use of force under international law are important.

1. The Law of War

The law of war can be subdivided into two disciplines, *jus ad bellum*, the law of going to war, and *jus in bello*, the law applied during the conflict. Each are relevant to the present analysis of the potential application of force by states. These subfields are

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21 See U.S. Dep’t. of Def., Department of Defense Law of War Manual 7 (2015) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL] (“For the purposes of this manual, the law of war is that part of international law that regulates the resort to armed force; the conduct of hostilities and the protection of war victims in both international and non-international armed conflict; belligerent occupation; and the relationships between belligerent, neutral, and non-belligerent States.”). The term “Law of War” is used here for clarity in reference to both *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* and not to suggest a view the scope of prohibitions governing the use of force is limited only to declared “wars.” In some circles, the term Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) is used in this broad manner as a substitute for law of war. See id. at 8. (“The law of war is often called the law of armed conflict. Both terms can be found in DoD directives and training materials.”). However, in other circles, LOAC refers exclusively to *jus in bello*. For clarity, as both *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* are discussed herein, they will be referred to as such and the term LOAC will generally be avoided.


distinct and independent—the existence of legality under one
does not presume the other. That is, even if in an armed conflict
permissible under *jus ad bellum*, a state must still adhere to *jus in
bello* restrictions on the application of force; even if a prospective
target would meet all *jus in bello* criteria, that does not justify the
use of force absent an existing conflict or a recognized *jus ad
bellum* mechanism.

The primary legal triggers for conflict under *jus ad bellum* are
self-defense and collective action through the United Nations
(U.N.) Security Council, under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Self-defense is the most likely *jus ad bellum* issue, and can
be invoked either in the event of an “armed attack” pursuant to
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, or as a matter of customary
international law where a “‘necessity of self-defense is instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation.’” The scope of a state’s right to self-defense in
response to an attack (or, potentially, a threat thereof) varies in
the assertions of legal scholars and state practitioners. Murphy
identifies three main self-defense constructs:

“[S]elf-defense” refers to the use of armed coercion by a state
against another state in response to a prior use of armed coercion
by the other state or by a non-state actor operating from
that other state. “Anticipatory self-defense” refers to the use of
armed coercion by a state to halt an imminent act of armed coer-

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23 U.N. Charter arts. 41–42 (allowing the Security Council to act, with force if
necessary, to maintain or secure international peace and security).

24 Id. art. 51. (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures neces-
sary to maintain international peace and security.”).

Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, and Great Britain’s Lord Ashburton); see also
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27); Murphy, supra note 22, at 711 (discuss-
ing the Caroline incident in the context of anticipatory self-defense).
cion by another state (or non-state actor operating from that other state). Thus, anticipatory self-defense contemplates a situation where a state has not yet been the victim of such a coercive act, but perceives that such an act is about to occur in the immediate future. . . . “[P]reemptive self-defense” is used to refer to the use of armed coercion by a state to prevent another state (or non-state actor) from pursuing a particular course of action that is not yet directly threatening, but which, if permitted to continue, could result at some future point in an act of armed coercion against the first state.

While this work does not advocate any particular view of the scope of self-defense, it generally contemplates a preemptive self-defense model for its analysis. This is because, for planning purposes, aerospace-faring states should anticipate that their provocative overflights may encounter the most forward-leaning (from the likelihood of the use of force perspective) subjacent state. Also, as technology develops for both vehicles and weapons, states may become much more sensitive to the potential gravity of a territorial incursion, making the preemptive school of thought more common in state assertions.

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26 Murphy, supra note 22, at 704 (further noting that “preemptive self-defense is, of course, ‘anticipatory’ and might even be called ‘preventive’ self-defense, but for purposes of this Article, such terminology is not used to describe this form of self-defense.”). Murphy goes on to assess four schools of thought on the right of self-defense and their main proponents. Id. at 706–19 (developing the “strict-constructionist,” “imminent threat,” “qualitative threat,” and “Charter-is-dead” schools of thought); see also John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 729 (2004) (arguing, essentially, for a preemptive self-defense model).

27 Yoo addresses how modern considerations affect the imminence analysis of a potential attack, noting “the probability of an attack would be a function of two factors: capability and intention.” Yoo, supra note 26, at 757–58. He finds that “[t]his calculus explains why nineteenth-century uses of force of the type in the Caroline case would not justify a broad right of preemptive self-defense, as the harm from border incursions in an age before mechanized warfare was not that great.” Id. at 758. See The White House (George W. Bush), The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 15 (2002), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf [https://perma.cc/NLG9-NA2Q] (regarding the threats of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, noting that “[i]t is essential to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”). However, the 2010 and 2015 National Security Strategy documents retained a focus on weapons of mass destruction but removed the “preemptive” language. See The White House (Barack H. Obama), The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 4 (2010), http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZ2K-WC9E]; see also The White House (Barack H. Obama), The National Security Strategy of the United States 11 (2015), http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/TMC4-QXPJ].
The core aspects of *jus in bello*—also often called international humanitarian law (IHL)—relevant to this study are the principles of distinction, military necessity, proportionality, and humanity. Distinction compels belligerents to distinguish between military and civilian objects and targets and not to target purely civilian objects or engage in indiscriminate attacks. Military necessity similarly ensures that any potential target has a military-based purpose for its destruction or neutralization. Proportionality requires that belligerents ensure that any collateral civilian damage caused by an otherwise legal attack (having passed the distinction and necessity analyses) not be excessive relative to the anticipated military gain. Finally, humanity dictates that force not be employed for the purpose of causing “superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering” of otherwise lawful targets. This section is obviously not an exhaustive study of the law of war, but it provides the framework from which discussions of the use of force below emerge.

2. A Broad Notion of Force

This work takes a broad view of the use of force, both as the impetus to action and in response to an offensive overflight. In essence, force here lies at the intersection of politics and belligerent actions. Clausewitz famously described war as an extension of politics by other means. On this spectrum between political acts and outright war or open hostilities are varying degrees of action, to include force or the threat thereof. And as politics change, non-lethal technologies emerge, and state practice develops, the spectrum is ever-changing. Certainly, force can

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28 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 51.
29 See id. art. 52 (generally defining military objects, and limiting the destruction of specific types of targets such as cultural and religious objects, those indispensable for survival of the civilian population, those which would cause severe environmental damage, and those which contain dangerous forces (like dams, dykes, and nuclear power facilities)).
30 See id. art. 57.
31 Id. art. 35(2).
32 Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War* ch. 1, para. 24 (J.J. Graham trans., 1873) (1832), http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/BK1ch01.html [https://perma.cc/2WX7-MQ5D] (“We see, therefore, that war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.”); see also LC Green, Cicero And Clausewitz Or Quincy Wright: The Interplay Of Law And War, 47 Chitty’s L.J. & Fam. L., Rev. 37 (1999).
33 As a matter of illustration, U.S. policy has changed to make less clear whether the “use of force” is appropriate to defend access to and use of outer
mean kinetic actions with missiles, bombs, or sophisticated anti-
satellite weapons (ASATs). However, in the modern technologi-
cal era, responsive actions may also include cyber attacks (or
other non-“attack” cyber activities),\textsuperscript{34} jamming and other harm-
ful signal interference,\textsuperscript{35} or other acts designed to counteract an
offensive incursion or overflight that may or may not amount to
“uses of force” under the prevailing law (or the positions of
states).\textsuperscript{36} When force is referred to here, it may be any such ac-

space. The 1999 Space Policy asserted that “interference with U.S. space systems
will be viewed as an infringement on our sovereign rights. The [United States]
may take all appropriate self-defense measures, including . . . the use of force . . . .” U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 3100.10, SPACE POLICY para. 4.2.1 (1999).
However, the 2012 iteration removes the explicit mention of force, stating
“[s]uch interference, or interference with other space systems upon which the
United States relies, is irresponsible in peacetime and may be escalatory during a
crisis. The United States will retain the capabilities to respond at the time and
place of our choosing.” U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 3100.10, SPACE POLICY
para. 4.b (2012). So while the term “force” has been removed, the policy and
operative considerations remain the same.

\textsuperscript{34} See Schmitt, Cyber Operations, supra note 22, at 570 (discussing cyber
activities).

\textsuperscript{35} See Sarah Mountin, The Legality and Implications of Intentional Interference with
discussing harmful interference).

\textsuperscript{36} For an in-depth discussion of whether all “force” constitutes a “use of force”
under the prohibition of U.N. Charter Article 2(4), see Tom Ruys, The Meaning of
“Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus Ad Bellum: Are “Minimal” Uses of Force Excluded
from UN Charter Article 2(4)?, 108 A.J.I.L. 159 (2014). Ruys also notes the differ-
ences in position among some states as to whether all force constitutes an “armed
attack” triggering Article 51 of the U.N. Charter:

[I]f the characterization of certain acts as the use of force removes
the possibility of invoking grounds precluding wrongfulness, the in-
verse qualification—that is, a finding that certain acts do not constit-
tute the use of force—in principle rules out the possibility of
exercising or invoking the right of self-defense in reaction thereto.
It is widely accepted that every armed attack automatically constitu-
tes a use of force, but views differ in legal doctrine on the extent
of the gap between the two notions. Those who limit armed attacks
to large-scale attacks construe the gap widely, whereas others, who
accept that more small-scale attacks may equally trigger the right of
self-defense, construe the gap more narrowly (and some essentially
regard the two notions as materially identical). . . . The implication
is that, absent a use of force, there can be no armed attack—and,
accordingly, no recourse to self-defense. Conversely, it is safe to as-
sume that, whenever a state invokes the right of self-defense in re-
sponse to a certain act, it views the latter act as constituting an
armed attack and, by definition, a use of force.

Id. at 162–63. (footnotes omitted). See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in
(June 27). (describing actions less than full attacks by armed bands, such as “assis-
tion along this spectrum, directed at aerospace vehicles. It need not necessarily amount to an “armed attack” to warrant consideration in this work—though, kinetic actions, such as shooting down an aerospace vehicle, are the focus.

Writing in the early 1930s, Brierly noted:

War, however, is only the most extreme form that an appeal to force may take; and certain measures of coercion by violent means, but not amounting to war and regarded as consistent with the continuance of a state of peace between the parties, have also to be fitted into the international system.37

This is even truer today when formal “war” is no longer declared; there are debatable applications of the regimes for countermeasures and reprisals, and provocative actions and implicit threats of force seem almost to be another means of expression in international discourse.38 So, while *jus ad bellum*-appropriate


38 See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 191 (distinguishing "the most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms."); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 161 (Nov. 6) (addressing hostile acts and uses of force lesser than “armed attacks,” and further analyzing the Paramilitary Activities ruling); Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. at 333 (separate opinion by Simma, J.) (admonishing the Court for inadequately addressing defense and countermeasures against aggression not amounting to “armed attack”); see generally Ruys, supra note 36. This is not to argue that the law of countermeasures is unclear. To the contrary, it is broadly accepted that countermeasures are non-force actions available only in response to internationally wrongful acts (directly attributable to a derelict state) to compel the derelict state back into compliance with its obligations. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc A/56/10, at 328–55 (2001) (in particular, Article 50 notes that the assertion of countermeasures does not remove “the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations”); Michael N. Schmitt, "Below the Threshold" Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option and International Law, 54 Va. J. Int’l L. 697, 700–01 (2014) ("[C]ountermeasures are State actions, or omissions, directed at another State that would otherwise violate an obligation owed to that State and that are conducted by the former in order to compel or convince the latter to desist in its own internationally wrongful acts or omissions. They constitute a
uses of force are the general guiding principles herein, the threat of force broadly—and contemplation of what may trigger, legally or not, a forceful response from one state even though others may find it inappropriate—should also be considered.  

3. Why Territorial Sovereignty Matters

Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter states: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Territory is an existential matter for states, and threats to it are not taken lightly.

Gone are the days where a nomadic tribe, regarded as a sovereign body, can cross through and among lands only “casually attached to one territory as it passes through it[,] deserts it again[,] and is never permanently attached to any single territory.” States have borders; sovereignty and territory are permanently linked in the modern world. For instance, in addition to Article 2(4), the U.N. Charter notes that sovereign equality is a cornerstone of international relations. Similarly, in the Corfu Channel case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) noted, “[b]etween independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations.”

The degree to which states are inclined to protect territory also demonstrates its importance to them. Of the nine contentious cases that culminated at the ICJ in 2013 and 2014, more means of self-help in an international system generally devoid of compulsory dispute resolution mechanisms.” However, as discussed above, the factual predicates for what constitutes “force” (or even an internationally wrongful act) warranting countermeasures is not settled.

30 For instance, Yoo notes a perspective that “rejects the notion that international law can govern the use of force because security is too dear an interest to states.” Yoo, supra note 26, at 731. For such states, internal concerns, not external legal limitations, will be stronger drivers of a response to an unwanted overflight of sovereign territory.


32 See id. at 37 (“To so great an extent is this true that the idea of an independent State, as distinguished from the territory of the State, is almost inconceivable.”).

33 U.N. Charter art. 2(1) (“The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”).

than half involved delimitation of boundaries (maritime) and access to the sea. States also protect sovereign territory in the overflight context through the shoot-down of encroaching craft. The November 2015 incident in which Turkish F-16 fighters shot down a Russian Su-24 bomber while briefly transiting over a narrow extension of Turkish airspace is but a recent example. While future information about this incident may make it a notable data point in the evolution of self-defense and jus ad bellum, the issues are presently too cloudy to draw any such definitive conclusions. However, even at this point, it serves as

44 List of Contentious Cases by Date of Introduction, Int‘l Ct. of Just., http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3 [https://perma.cc/49DW-3Q5C]. Three more cases involve nuclear disarmament (a topic generally applicable to air and space force as well).

45 See generally Bernard Donahue, Attacks on Foreign Civil Aircraft Trespassing in National Airspace, 30 A.F.L. Rev. 49, 54 (1989). Donahue found: In the post-World War II era [to 1988], four notorious incidents have occurred involving the downing or destruction of civil passenger aircraft that violated the sovereign airspace of another nation. In 1955 an Israel Airlines (El Al) Constellation flying from London to Tel Aviv with an enroute stop in Vienna strayed into Bulgarian airspace and was destroyed without warning. The second event also involved Israel. In 1973 the Israeli Air Force destroyed a Libyan passenger aircraft over the Israeli-occupied Sinai Desert. The third episode involved Korean Air (KAL) Flight 902 that was downed over Soviet territory in 1978, and the fourth incident likewise involved a Korean aircraft over the Soviet Union—the destruction of KAL Flight 007 in 1983. Id. (citations omitted); see also Brian Foont, Shooting Down Civilian Aircraft: Is There an International Law?, 72 J. Air L. & Com. 695, 711–16 (2007) (recounting the 1988 U.S.S. Vincennes destruction of Iran Air Flight 655 and four other incidents); Int‘l Law Comm’n, supra note 38, at 78 (Commentary to Article 24) (describing United States incursions over Yugoslavia under distress); Foont, supra note 45, at 700–01 (addressing the United States-Yugoslavia incident); MH17 Ukraine Plane Crash: What We Know, BBC News (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28357880 (last visited Nov. 8, 2016) (outlining the limited facts surrounding the 2014 shoot-down of Malaysian Airlines MH17 over an embattled portion of Ukraine).


47 For instance, the short window (in both distance and time) of the airspace violation, the justification asserted by Turkey, and support from Turkey’s allies suggest a strong potential right to defend territory. See Turkey’s Downing of Russian Warplane—What We Know, supra note 46; Steve Rosenberg, Putin: Turkey ‘Knew Downed Fighter Jet Was Russian’, BBC News (Nov. 26, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/
a powerful, cautionary example of what states might do in response to unwanted overflight, even an arguably de minimis one.

Article 2(4) does not provide a clear remedy for violation of territorial integrity. Certainly, any responsive use of force would have to be judged on a case-by-case basis, but a violation of sovereignty may open the door to force. The violation of territorial sovereignty is a potential indicator of a threat tantamount to an armed attack, thereby warranting the use of force in self-de-
fense, in some states’ analyses. In assessing the propriety of use of force, or the likelihood of the use of force in the event of the overflight by an aircraft or space craft, whether the craft is in sovereign territory is an essential factor.

4. Why State Versus Civilian Vehicles Matters

The civilian or state (particularly military) status of a craft can also be a determining factor in the use of force. Article 3bis of the Protocol amending the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944 (Chicago Convention) precludes the use of force against civilian aircraft for territorial incursions. But this applies only in times of peace and does not prejudice states in the exercise of self-defense. More broadly, three of the four core principles of LOAC interrelate to ensure protection of civilians and civilian objects, to include civilian aircraft or spacecraft. Basically, if an object is civilian, it should not be targeted absent very unique circumstances. Military (and generally state) objects, however, enjoy no such protections; their destruction is entirely permissible once the legal analysis reaches the *jus in bello* stage (save the few limitations imposed by humanity considerations, and considerations of collateral effects on civilians).

Also, whether a craft can be distinguished as a state vehicle or civilian one can play a role in how it is perceived as a potential threat under *jus ad bellum*. This would especially be the case for

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48 See Section II.B.4 infra for discussion of how mere incursions by a state vehicle can be perceived as particularly threatening. Moreover, even if an incursion does not amount to an “armed attack” triggering formal self-defense, states may still elect to employ force or other actions against such an encroaching craft as a lesser form of self-help as described above.

49 Protocol Relating to an Amendment to the Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 3bis, May 10, 1984, ICAO Doc. 9436 (“States recognize that every State must refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight and that, in case of interception, the lives of person on board and the safety of aircraft must not be endangered.”); see Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.

50 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, art. 89 (“In case of war, the provisions of this Convention shall not affect the freedom of action of any of the contracting States affected, whether as belligerents or as neutrals.”); see Protocol Relating to an Amendment to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, art. 3bis; see also Michael Schmitt, *Air Law and Military Operations*, in *HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS* 303, 318 (Terry Gill & Dieter Fleck eds., 2010) (though the Chicago Convention applies only in peacetime, civilian airliners are already protected under laws of war).

51 For example, for some vehicles, particularly state ones (the focus here), there can be a presumption of aggression in noncompliance with transit norms. See George Walker, *Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense in the Charter Era: What the
states subscribing to a preemptive construction of self-defense.\cite{52}

In general, a civilian craft operating on its own behalf and for private interests would typically be less threatening than a state vehicle (particularly military), which is possibly armed and executing the will of another state.\cite{53} Thus, a vehicle’s status alters the self-defense analysis—the lower the threat, the less likely (prudentially) and appropriate (legally) the use of force would be. Conversely, the greater the perceived threat, the more likely that force may be employed against a craft.

Therefore, it makes a significant difference from a use of force perspective, both in terms of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, whether a craft is a civilian or state craft.

C. The Analytical Framework

This article suggests that a sovereignty-based airspace legal regime should apply to both of the above scenarios, as well as any other activities or operations below orbit. Beyond this chapter, the analysis is divided into two primary parts.

First, this work examines the physical, geographic, and legal distinctions between airspace and outer space, drawing attention to the area in between the two. Though air law does not define the upper limits of airspace, outer space law does not

\textit{Treaties Have Said}, 31 Cornell Int’l L.J. 321, 346–347 (1998) (discussing the presumption that submarines not surfacing and following innocent passage norms have hostile intentions); see also John Astley & Michael Schmitt, The Law of the Sea and Naval Operations, 42 A.F.L. Rev. 119, 131 (1997) (“If a warship engages in non-innocent passage, the coastal State may request that it take appropriate corrective actions. Failure to do so justifies a demand that the naval vessel depart the territorial seas. Should it not, the coastal State may use minimum force to compel its departure.”); Ruys, supra note 36, at 174.

\cite{52} See Section II.B.1 supra.

\cite{53} Compounding this distinction is the prevalence of “dual-use” craft. Solis, supra note 22, at 534 (“A dual-use target is one with both military and civilian functions, such as an airfield from which both civilian and military aircraft fly. Examples also include electric power grids, oil-refining facilities, and radio and television broadcasting sites.”).

This topic is beyond the scope of this work, but others have addressed the use of force implications for dual use satellites and space objects. See, e.g., Bourbonnière & Lee, Jus ad Bellum, supra note 22, at 205–06 (discussing dual use satellites, and breaking their classification into three categories: “(1) military hosted payloads; (2) long-term leased capacity; and (3) commercial suppliers on demand.”); Ramey, supra note 22, at 144. (noting that the dual use analysis for space assets may be more complex due to the normal military versus civilian aspect, but also the frequent multi-state ownership or interest of space assets); Mountin, supra note 35, at 113 (“Almost all satellites in orbit are dual-use, that is, they can perform missions supporting both military and civilian applications.”).
define its lower boundaries, and debate abounds about how to draw a line between the two regions, the author argues that there are indeed settled minimum standards for each of these domains. As the two key factors for the use of force are sovereignty and state versus civil craft, these criteria are the primary focus for the discussion of the respective legal regimes. Then, as a matter of contrast and to focus the discussion of aerospace (both the area, and the vehicles that operate therein), the article introduces the less settled zone between the two domains. In juxtaposition to the black-and-white nature of the settled aspects of airspace and outer space, this area is termed “gray space” to reflect the perceived murkiness of its borders, both physically and legally.

Then the last chapter addresses how the delimitation problem should be resolved in the context of this lack of consensus. There is a saying that one should look to the 30,000 feet view to assess a problem. But here a mere 30,000 feet are inadequate for proper perspective; instead the argument attempts to take a 30,000 kilometer view to look at both the settled zones of airspace and outer space in their entirety to examine how (and where) they transition. It takes two approaches to reach one conclusion: that orbit should be regarded as the division between the airspace and outer space regimes.

First, taking a positivist approach, the argument builds upon the discussions of the origins and history of, and the interactions between, the airspace and outer space regimes and argues that the default position for states is an assertion of sovereignty to its greatest limits of reason. Outer space is an exception to the rule—a cap on the extent of sovereignty. But it is an exception that must be narrowly construed.\(^5\) Second, this section will ad-

\(^5\) The narrow construction of exceptions to a rule is a common canon of interpretation. See Natasha Balendra, *Defining Armed Conflict*, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2461, 2490 (2008). Though frequently cited by common law courts, the canon applies to analyses of international law as well as assessments of how *lex specialis* interfaces with general rules. See id. at 2491. (“[B]ecause a special law that derogates from a general one operates identically to an exception, in the absence of indications to the contrary, a special law too (a) must be triggered only in a narrow set of circumstances; and (b) once activated, must be interpreted to minimize the deviation from the rule.”); see also William Bradford, *The Changing Laws of War: Do We Need a New Legal Regime after September 11?: “The Duty to Defend Them”: A Natural Law Justification for the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War*, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365, 1378 (2004) (demonstrating the narrow construction with the “restrictivist camp” for the use of force, which narrowly reads Article 51 of the U.N. Charter as a deviation from Article 2(4), the general rule). Narrow construction is particu-
address the potential commensurability of the airspace and outer space regimes. They seem diametrically opposed, but when viewed in the proper context—sovereignty and security—they actually fall on a consistent continuum designed to maximize state power and avoid a third world war. This further supports the finding that airspace (and sovereignty) is the baseline or default regime and should be applied to emerging activities that do not clearly fall under an outer space regime.

D. Methodology, Terminology, Assumptions, and Disclaimers

1. Legal Methodology—A Doctrinal Approach with Historical Perspective

Discussions of history, policy, and politics are inherent and appropriate in a work focused on international law, but this work is written with a legal focus. Thus, the legal methodology is best described as doctrinal, focusing on primary and secondary legal sources. To the degree that history and political science are implicated, the focus is on reporting and incorporating the works of others and not creating a new study under the framework of those independent disciplines; it is not intended as an exhaustive history of the positions on delimitation of air and space, either from legal publicists or states.

That said, central to the thesis of this work is the notion that there is existing legal (and policy) precedent for the new developments in aerospace technology. The factual context for the application of law may change, but the law does not automatically or necessarily have to change. If there is change, such as after Sputnik, it is affirmatively done by authorities competent to alter the law (states); it does not occur due to the mere existence of a new technology. To accentuate that the specifics of technology may change but that the thinking does not necessarily need to, instead of using only the most recent articulations of the law or legal thinking, the author incorporated historical (or simply older) articulations when available, appropriate, and instructive for the discussion of the current state of airspace and outer space. Also, in divining the legal status of the gray area, the author relied on historical accounts of the development of outer space law as a regime distinct from airspace law. This historical perspective will demonstrate the baseline of thinking

larly important to a positivist approach, as taken here, which defers to states as the ultimate authorities in international law. See Section IV.C.1 infra.
from which new issues are to be tackled, as well as provide the context for the formation of the laws that this work argues remain applicable today. That is, the differences between the two, and how outer space law grew from—and in opposition to—the dispositions of air law then guide the analysis of where aerospace stands.

2. Aerospace, Aerospace Vehicles, and Gray Space

The term aerospace should be addressed.\(^{55}\) Herein, it is meant to encompass both the geographic, or spatial, area and functional capacity of vehicles, generally referring to operational areas and operations beyond that of normal aircraft, like higher altitudes than airplanes but generally below orbital outer space. As will be developed further below, this area is also termed “gray space” throughout this work, as it represents a legal gray area in between the more settled—or black-and-white—aspects of airspace and outer space.

For the physical or geographic zone (aerospace), the term will be applied specifically to draw focus on the area that is not clearly airspace (with full oxygen and atmosphere needed for traditional engine combustion and aerodynamic lift) but not clearly orbital outer space and beyond. While in many contexts—legal, commercial, and otherwise—the term aerospace is intended broadly to encompass both air and space applica-

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\(^{55}\) With the above note in mind, there is little improvement to be made on a definition of aerospace introduced in a security context in 1962:

The reader might be interested to know the meaning and derivation of the term aerospace. The following definitions apply to the present study:

AERONAUTICS: the science and technology of locomotion in the atmosphere.

ASTRONAUTICS: the science and technology of locomotion outside the terrestrial atmosphere.

The definitions are simple and clear, but they do not cover the intermediate types of vehicles and devices circulating on the outer fringes of the atmosphere. Even at heights of several hundred miles traces of air are still present and the word astronautics is not strictly applicable; therefore, the term aerospace will be used to indicate the region where aerodynamics and ballistics interact or closely succeed each other as parts of a combined pattern.

MICHAEL GOLOVINE, CONFLICT IN SPACE: A PATTERN OF WAR IN A NEW DIMENSION xiii (1962) (emphasis in original). While Golovine offers the above definition, his text (written before any formal prohibition on weapons of mass destruction in outer space) primarily addresses orbital weapons systems. Id.
tions, here it is intended to focus on the area between the two. The spatial definition is generally guided by physical, scientific, or natural attributes, but it must be noted that this work is a legal (and policy) endeavor—not a scientific one. So, the concept of aerospace here merely uses scientific and engineering information in the search of legal clarity; it does not seek to rearticulate or redefine any laws of physics or astronautical or aeronautical phenomena. This aerospace zone should be read as overlapping or generally encompassing what other works term near space, proto-space, suborbital space, or other high-altitude applications.

For vehicles—aerospace vehicles—the term is to be construed inclusively. It is intended to include all vehicles that can reasonably operate in this zone but may be intended primarily for outer space (or airspace) activities. If read exclusively—including only vehicles designed to operate in the zone between what is clearly airspace and outer space—the definition would not only be nearly impossible to meet (as one must transit through the air to reach any intermediary zone above it, so some functionality in the air must be practically assumed), but it would also exclude the future developments at which this work is directed: vehicles that can smoothly operate in nearly any environment (air or space). Thus, the term should be read with some breadth, or at least not defined in an overly narrow fashion.

56 John Cobb Cooper, Aerospace Law—Subject Matter and Terminology, 29 J. Air L. & Com. 89 (1963) (advocating that what is commonly regarded as the two disciplines of “Air Law” and “Space Law” should really be a unified “Aerospace Law” branch of law, a sentiment with which this author agrees). See also Section IV.D.3 infra.

57 These terms are generally found throughout relevant literature, except “proto-space” and “protozone,” used in the works of Dr. Joseph Pelton. See, e.g., Pelton, Geosynchronous, supra note 10; Joseph N. Pelton, Presentation at the ICAO Space Symposium: Inclusiveness in the New Space & Protozone Transportation Services (Mar. 18–20, 2015), http://www.icao.int/Meetings/SPACE2015/Presentations/6%20-%20J.%20Pelton%20-%20ISU%20GWU.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RU-26NE].

58 For instance, the now-retired U.S. Space Shuttle, which launched directly into orbit attached to a multi-stage rocket system but returned to Earth (typically to Houston, Texas) as a gliding aircraft upon atmospheric reentry, would be considered an aerospace vehicle. The same would apply to the X-37B discussed above. However, for purposes of this work, a rocket that merely transits airspace and enters outer space would not be considered an aerospace vehicle; nor would a traditional airplane.
3. International Consensus

This article is contingent upon the notion that there is a lack of international consensus as to the delimitation of airspace and outer space. The assertion that airspace sovereignty is the default position is only valid unless or until states agree to a regime applicable to such vehicles, activities, and geographic zones—as they did with the U.N. Convention(s) on the Law of the Sea, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, or other documents. To be clear, the notion that the sovereignty paradigm exists until states affirmatively change it by consent should not be read to require a convention or treaty to the exclusion of a properly realized custom of international law. However, the ongoing debate about the proper regime for these vehicles strongly suggests that no adequately clear consistent state practice, guided by *opinio juris*, has emerged. And there is no great indication that such consensus will emerge, particularly as states explore different approaches to security in space and disparities in space capabilities persist.

Accordingly, this work is not an argument against consensus among states, space-faring or otherwise, on the issue of delimitation and the use of force in aerospace. (In fact, a specific treaty or norm of international law would be the clearest and most efficient way to address the problems for aerospace vehicles vis-à-vis sovereignty expressed herein.) However, this work recognizes that there may come instances of necessity of action in the gray areas of the law and seeks to address the appropriate legal default in this lack of an obvious regime of clear and controlling law.

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61 The status of sovereignty as the “default” position is developed further below. See Section IV.B infra.

4. A Note on Technology

This is not intended as a technical or scientific work. While current and emerging technologies, particularly with regard to new aerospace vehicles, form an important factual basis for the legal analysis herein, the underlying assumption is that regardless of what exists today the technologies will improve tomorrow. Therefore, while this work’s factual landscape does not envision that simply anything from the imagination of science fiction writers is possible, it does take a broad view of what vehicles and modes of transport for air, space, and in between will be available in the reasonably foreseeable future.

5. A Note on Measurements

Throughout this work, altitude matters. For ease of reference, altitudes will typically be given in both feet (commonly used in airspace altitudes) and kilometers (commonly used in high-altitude airspace and outer space altitudes). Many authors and states use miles (both statute and nautical) as well, but for consistency and ease such measurements will typically be omitted herein. Where distances are not provided in a desired measurement (and when they were calculated by the author from other metrics), the conversion table created by the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence is instructive, which is recreated here.63

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<th>Nautical Miles (NM)</th>
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III. THE BLACK AND WHITE: LEGAL FRAMEWORKS IN AIRSPACE AND OUTER SPACE—SOVEREIGNTY AND STATE VEHICLES

The debate over where the air ends and outer space begins is as old as space exploration itself, and even predates the bulk of the international outer space law.64 With the foundational pub-

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64 See MANFRED LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY LAW-MAKING 53 (2010); see also Nicholas Katzenbach, Law and Lawyers in Space, 14 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 220, 220 (1958) (addressing the
lic international air law documents, the Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation of 1919 (Paris Convention)\textsuperscript{65} and the Chicago Convention,\textsuperscript{66} states never defined the “vertical limit”\textsuperscript{67} of the concept of airspace. Instead, with the establishment of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),\textsuperscript{68} states focused on creating a mechanism by which international civil aviation—which functioned squarely and clearly in airspace—could be managed.\textsuperscript{69} Similarly, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty) does not define the borders of outer space; instead, that document focuses on the principles guiding the uses of space, the Moon, and celestial bodies for space objects.\textsuperscript{70} So, the general rules that apply while operating in airspace or outer space are fairly black-and-white; the scope (physical or functional) of these legal regimes, though, is more of a gray area.

65 Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919, 11 L.N.T.S. 173 [hereinafter Paris Convention] (no longer in force); \textsc{John \textsc{C.} Cooper}, \textsc{The Right to Fly} 291 (1947).

66 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49.

67 See Reinhardt, supra note 3.

68 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, art. 43 (Part II, Articles 43 to 66, goes on to define the objectives and inner mechanisms of ICAO in addition to the substantive and reporting requirements contained in the remainder of the Convention); see also Paris Convention, supra note 65, art. 34 (creating the International Commission for Air Navigation, (or CINA, abbreviated from French) under the League of Nations, generally the predecessor to ICAO with a similar goal of creating uniformity in civil aviation); \textsc{Michael Milde}, \textsc{International Air Law} and \textsc{ICAO} 11 (2d ed. 2012).

69 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, art. 44 (listing the objectives of ICAO, which generally focus on safety and development of civil aviation).

70 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60.
This chapter discusses the fundamental aspects, physical and legal, of the space and air domains with particular emphasis on two aspects relevant to the use of force against vehicles in these domains: state sovereignty and distinction between state and civilian craft. The goal is to establish that there are indeed some areas of accepted definition for both airspace and outer space law, and within these areas of accepted definition are clear legal rules relevant to the application of force. Airspace is addressed first, followed by a discussion of outer space. The third section then briefly addresses the area of ambiguity between the well-defined portions of these two more established regimes, the legal gray area. While this section demonstrates a degree of possible legal uncertainty, discussion of the zone of ambiguity also helps draw focus to the fact that there are indeed settled areas of law from which the discussion of using force against vehicles operating between the zones will proceed.

A. AIRSPACE: SOVEREIGN TERRITORY

The zone known as airspace is defined both by its physical, geographic aspects as well as through its use by aircraft. The result is a widely accepted area that extends at least to 21 kilometers or 70,500 feet. In this domain, states can exercise exclusive sovereignty over their territorial airspace. This assertion of control, though, is limited by various agreements, most importantly the Chicago Convention, which distinguishes between state and civil aircraft. The nature of the airspace domain, the role of sovereignty therein, and the importance of the distinction between state and civil aircraft are discussed in this section.

Further adjustments to sovereign authority may be self-imposed by states, under their internal laws and regulations relating to domestic control of airspace. For instance, since 1926 the U.S. government has asserted federal control over its domestic airspace, to the exclusion of individual property or control interests. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Aviation Liability Law 5.11 (2nd ed. 2013); David Loth & Morris Ernst, How High Is Up 2–3 (1964); see also Paul Stephen Dempsey, Public International Air Law 109 (2008) (discussing the general framework for domestic Civil Aviation Authorities). The focus of this work, however, involves international law; that is, the issues of sovereignty and rights among states (not internal to them). For an early discussion of the vertical boundaries of sovereignty and rights for individuals vis-à-vis national authorities, see Loth & Ernst, supra; Terrence Benshoof, Air Law—The Memory Lingers On: Ad Coelum in the 1970’s—Some New Approaches, 20 DePaul L. Rev. 525, 528 (1970) (discussing the rejection of cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum as a basis for individual property rights in U.S. domestic jurisprudence).
1. The Physical Nature of Airspace: The Domain of Aircraft

Perhaps the most succinct definition of this area comes from Cheng, who stated “[a]irspace is space where air is normally to be found and is, therefore, identical with atmospheric space.”\(^72\) Of course, this seemingly straightforward definition disguises many unclear areas, both technical and legal.\(^73\) But, at its core, it expresses the black-and-white of airspace: certainly, it is where there is air and where traditional aircraft can fly.

The legal regime for airspace, therefore, is primarily designed for the flight of such “aircraft.” ICAO defines aircraft as “[a]ny machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface.”\(^74\) Regarding this definition, ICAO states that “[y]ears of considerable effort permit the classification of aircraft to be as simple as possible, and yet encompass as many types of flying machines as the human mind can devise.”\(^75\) As such, the purposefully expansive definition includes airplanes, gliders, balloons, helicopters, and a host of other lighter- and heavier-than-air vehicles. The notable exclusions from “aircraft” are rockets, missiles, or other similarly thrust-driven flying machines.\(^76\) Hovercraft are also excluded, based on a 1968 amend-

\(^72\) CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 18.

\(^73\) For instance, “trace amounts of atmospheric gases can still be detected as high as 10,000 kilometers (6,200 miles) above sea level, far above many orbiting spacecraft.” MATTHEW J. KLEIMAN ET AL., THE LAWS OF SPACEFLIGHT: A GUIDEBOOK FOR NEW SPACE LAWYERS 3 (2012); see also SPACE ACTIVITIES AND EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW 375 (Nicolas Matte ed., 1984) (“establishing a point of delineation predicated on the atmosphere is quite unsuitable if it is considered that some hydrogen atoms are believed to be orbiting the [E]arth at distances of 50,000 kilometers.”). So the question of airspace is not just a matter of where one can technically claim to find “air” or “atmosphere.”

\(^74\) Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, annex 7. This definition has been in effect since 1968. Id.


\(^76\) ICAO’s position on rockets, generally and in the context of suborbital travel, is captured in the discussion of SpaceShipOne, a vehicle that is carried by an aircraft to 50,000 feet, dropped, and then uses a rocket motor to reach approximately 100 kilometers, after which it travels back to Earth like a glider: SpaceShipOne, strictly speaking, does not operate as an aeroplane or even as an aircraft during the ballistic portion of the flight while it is not supported by the reactions of the air, even though some degree of aerodynamic control exists throughout the trajectory from launch altitude until the craft enters the upper reaches of the atmosphere where the air density is no longer sufficient for aerodynamic flight.
ment to Annex 7 of the Chicago Convention. Though hovercraft do not directly impact the aerospace domain and the definition has not been altered since 1968, this modification does demonstrate that the aircraft definition is not entirely static, and ICAO—when member states desire—can modify the Annexes to clarify the vehicles that do and do not fall under its purview. However, while there are present calls to expand the definition of aircraft to encompass more objects (particularly rocket-like thrust-driven conveyances) to bring them into the ICAO traffic management, security, and safety regimes, the current definition is limited to the named vehicles and craft.

Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its Forty-Ninth Session, U.N. Doc. C-WP/12436, at 2 (2010) [hereinafter ICAO Working Paper], http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_C2_2010_CRP 09E.pdf [https://perma.cc/FLH6-85ZW] (emphasis added). However, the ICAO Working Paper goes on to state that, "After apogee, during [re]entry into the atmosphere the vehicle transitions to unpowered aerodynamic (gliding) flight for the return to [E]arth. Consequently, depending upon some design and operational aspects, it could be considered operating as an aircraft in flight during this latter portion of the journey." Id. Thus, the nature of a craft can change throughout its operation; however, in the "rocket" portions it is not subject to the regime of aircraft. See also Milde, supra note 68, at 60 (noting that "rockets also travel through the air space but do not derive support from the reactions of the air."). But see I.H. Ph Diederiks-Verschoor & M. A. Butler, An Introduction to Air Law 6 (8th rev. ed. 2006) (arguing that a rocket can meet the ICAO definition).

77 ICAO Annexes Booklet, supra note 75, at 12 (noting that the 1968 amendment “implemented a decision that all air-cushion-type vehicles, such as hovercraft and other ground-effect machines, should not be classified as aircraft.”); see also Milde, supra note 68, at 60.

78 See The Need for an Integrated Regulatory Regime for Aviation and Space: ICAO for Space? 64 (Ram Jakhu et al., eds., 2011) (“as the United Nations arm for air transportation, ICAO should provide clarification on the issues of what is contemplated by aircraft, and what is contemplated by airspace, and then proffer standards of harmonization as SARPs, which member States would be obliged to follow.”). The authors note that ICAO has already begun to examine whether its regulations would impact any suborbital flights that cross international borders, and advocate:

It is therefore reasonable to predict that, in due course, ICAO not only should but would expand its jurisdiction to cover space-related matters by slowly starting with those space activities that affect the safety of civil aviation. The Chicago Convention vests in ICAO ample jurisdiction to address these critical issues. Article 37 authorizes the promulgation of SARPs addressing “such other matters concerned with the safety, regularity, and efficiency of air navigation as may from time to time appear appropriate.” Under this provision, for example, ICAO has promulgated Annexes addressing environmental issues and aviation security, areas not contemplated when the Chicago Convention was originally drafted in 1944. It is mani-
The required “reactions of the air” for aircraft have a vertical limit. As an aircraft moves forward, due to the shape and angle of the wing “the static air pressure above the wing decreases while it remains substantially stable below it due to the shape of the wing . . . [and this] difference in pressure causes the aerodynamic lift.”

This lift effect requires adequate density of the air, which decreases as altitude rises. Additionally, air affects the amount of power (and forward motion, thus lift) a plane can produce—again, as altitude rises, the air thins and engines cannot produce adequate momentum. Given these requirements, it has been concluded that “[i]t is unlikely . . . that an aircraft will ever fly above 60 kilometers with an air-breathing engine.”

As the defining feature of airspace, the effective vertical geographic range of current aircraft must be discussed. As a baseline, at the dawn of aviation, planes such as those operated by the Wright Brothers or Alberto Santos-Dumont flew only a few feet off the ground but are certainly considered aircraft. On the upper tier of aircraft operation are specialized (typically military) aircraft such as the U-2 and SR-71 that fly at altitudes festly desirable for the same essential rules of safety and navigation to be applied to all users of common airspace – aircraft and aerospace vehicles and space objects on launch and re-entry, as a first step. The extension of these regulations to the geosynchronous orbit would be a desirable second step.

Id. at 42–43.

79 BENKÖ & PLESCHER, supra note 5, at 7.
80 Id. at 7.
81 Id. at 8.
82 DANIEL HAULMAN, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF FLIGHT: USAF CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT AIR AND SPACE EVENTS, 1903-2002, at 1 (2003) (detailing the first flights, piloted by Orville and Wilbur Wright on Dec. 17, 1903). The famous image of the flight shows it was at best only a few feet off the ground. Photograph of First Flight, 120 Feet in 12 Seconds, 10:35 AM, Kitty Hawk, North Carolina by John T. Daniels (1903), in Prints and Photographs Online Catalog, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/resource/ppprs.00626/ [https://perma.cc/9T7K-KUVW]. While some debate whether the Wright Brothers were actually the first to fly, there is no indication that any other pilots achieved significantly superior altitude in an airplane. See Linda Shiner, Not the First?, AIR & SPACE MAG. (2013), http://www.airspacemag.com/daily-planet/not-the-first-3384507/ [https://perma.cc/QV4G-WA5H] (discussing claims that Gustave Whitehead of Connecticut was actually the first to fly an airplane).
83 Perry Turner, 10 Milestone Flights, AIR & SPACE MAG. (2003), http://www.airspacemag.com/history-of-flight/10-milestone-flights-4056259/ [https://perma.cc/7IWG-JYHW] (in the first public flight of an airplane, Santos-Dumont is estimated to have flown at an altitude of two feet for a distance of 23 feet).
up to 85,000 feet (approximately 26 kilometers or 16 miles). While typically described as aircraft, these vehicles push the limits of what is black-and-white airspace and venture into the gray areas of altitude discussed below. More squarely in airspace are civilian aircraft, which typically operate with a ceiling of approximately 40,000 feet (12 kilometers) but with a high end of 51,000 feet (under 16 kilometers).

Perhaps the best demonstration of the vertical extent of airspace came with the 1960 shoot-down of a U.S. U-2 plane by the Soviet Union. The CIA plane, on a spy mission over Soviet airspace, was shot down at 70,500 feet (over 21 kilometers). As will be discussed further below, national airspace is sovereign, and therefore, its incursion potentially triggers hostile action, which is just what the Soviet Union did, downing the plane. Had the shoot-down been over free airspace (such as over the high seas or another sovereign’s territory with permission), the United States could have protested the use of force. However, the U.S. government did not assert legality of overflight; instead it initially prepared a more defensible cover story—that the

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plane was a NASA weather plane off course and in distress. This incident reflects acceptance by both the Soviet Union (which acted) and the United States (which did not protest the action) that vertical airspace sovereignty extends at least to 70,500 feet (21 kilometers). Writing shortly after the incident, Cheng noted “that the U-2 flight constituted a violation of Soviet territorial sovereignty is so elementary a point in international law that it would be merely flogging a dead horse to [labor] it here.”

2. The Legal Nature of Airspace: Sovereign Territory

The assertion of state sovereignty over airspace has a long history. At the dawn of aviation there were academic and political debates over whether the skies should be free. However, by 1919 (with the Paris Convention) and consistently thereafter, states had asserted sovereign control over their airspace. As stated in Article 1 of the Chicago Convention, “The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.” This echoes the sovereignty asserted in the Paris Convention. From this fundamental premise the relevant legal scheme emerges for operations in airspace, specifically that the air is sovereign territory.

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90 Id. at 178. For more on the politics of the incident and the failed cover-up by the United States, see generally id.; Cheng, Studies, supra note 62, at 105–06.
91 See also Section IV.B.2.c infra (discussing a 1956 incident between the United States and the Soviet Union involving overflight of weather balloons, which similarly demonstrated a high-altitude assertion of territorial sovereignty, though with a less defined height and less definitive response).
92 Cheng, Studies, supra note 62, at 105 (extracted from a 1961 article by Cheng).
93 See Dempsey, Public International Air Law, supra note 71, at 11–12 (noting that in 1900, French jurist Paul Fauchille argued that “[b]ecause the air cannot be appropriated, . . . real property of the air is impossible, and the same principle prescribes State assertions of dominance over it; airspace therefore is its communies, and L'air est libre.”). For a thorough history of the development of the present air regime, see Reinhardt, supra note 4, at 70; Dempsey, Public International Air Law, supra note 71, at 9; Milde, supra note 68, at 5; John C. Cooper, Explorations in Aerospace Law: Selected Essays of John Cobb Cooper, 1946-1966, at 104–155 (Ivan Vlasic ed., 1968) (including three articles by Cooper regarding the Paris Convention and its history). See also Section IV.B.1 infra (further discussing the debate over air sovereignty and its effect on air and space delimitation).
94 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, art. 1.
95 Paris Convention, supra note 65, art. 1 (“The High Contracting Parties recognise that every Power has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory.”).
Addressing the spatial extent of territorial sovereignty, Lachs noted that the notion of *cuius est solum eius est usque ad coelum et ad sidera* was “inherited from Roman law, [and] was accepted by international law and adapted to its needs.”96 The oft-cited phrase (and its varying articulations) essentially means “whoever owns the land owns it all the way to the sky and to the stars.”97 While the precise language may not have originated in Rome, the concept did.98 And its present applicability is a clear articulation of air sovereignty, such as that recognized (and not created) in the Paris Convention and Chicago Convention with their respective first articles.99 More recently, the sovereignty of

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96 Lachs, supra note 64, at 40; see also Dempsey, Public International Air Law, supra note 71, at 746–47.

97 Abramovitch notes:

This rule means: "Whose is the soil, his it is up to the sky," or in a more simple explanation "He who possesses the land possesses also that which is above it." Other elucidations are: "He who owns the soil owns everything above (and below) from heaven (to hell)," and "He who owns the land owns up to the sky."

Yehuda Abramovitch, *The Maxim "Cujus Est Solum Ejus Usque ad Coelum" as Applied in Aviation*, 8 McGill L.J. 247, 247 (1962) (citations omitted); see also Milde, supra note 68, at 5 (translating the related phrase *cuius est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos*); John C. Cooper, *Roman Law and the Maxim “Cujus est solum” in International Air Law, in Explorations in Aerospace Law: Selected Essays of John Corb Cooper, 1946-1966*, supra note 93, at 54; Ian Brownlie, *Principles of Public International Law* 115–16 (7th ed. 2008); Katzenbach, supra note 64, at 220 (noting that *ad coelum* can be translated to mean both “to the sky” or “to the heavens”).

98 Milde disputes that this is actually “Roman law” as it is often described. While the Latin is the popular text for the phrasing of the concept, he found no actual link to the Romans or Byzantine *Corpus Iuris Civilis*. Milde, supra note 68, at 5; see also Cooper, Roman Law, supra note 97, at 55 (Author’s Note). Instead, its first use appears to be in the 13th century in a commentary on Roman texts. Id. However, while Cooper agrees that this terminology did not appear in Roman text, “[w]hen the maxim is carefully analyzed, however, and reasonably construed, it is apparent that it must have sprung originally from principles of Roman law—though stated in a non-Roman manner.” Id. at 85. Cooper goes on to note that overly-extensive articulations of sovereignty based on this notion may exceed the Roman roots, but are grounded in later English statements “of the existence of present ownership of space to infinity.” Id.

99 See Milde, supra note 68, at 10 (discussing the Paris Convention provision in the context of then-existing customary international law).

The *ad coelum* expression had its more practical legal origins in property rights and authorities, frequently in an individual-to-state context in the early stages of aviation law. See Loth & Ernst, supra note 71; Benshoof, supra note 71. However, Brierly notes that these private law concepts are directly applicable to assessments of sovereignty (and authority) among equal states:

Territorial sovereignty bears an obvious resemblance to ownership in private law. . . . As a result of this resemblance early international
This exclusive state sovereignty applies to “the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection[,] or mandate of such State.” The extension of sovereignty over the territorial sea, then, implicates the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which sets twelve nautical miles from the baseline as the maximum limit of territorial waters. It further defines and limits the horizontal extent of sovereignty by way of rights of passage for aircraft. For instance, littoral states cannot assert full air sovereignty over international straits or archipelagic sea lanes and the broader exception of innocent passage through territorial waters has been affirmed by the ICJ in the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua case (Nicaragua v. United States) and the Frontier Dispute case (Benin/Niger).

Law borrowed the Roman rules for the acquisition of property and adapted them to the acquisition of territory, and these rules are still the foundation of the law on the subject. J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace 91–92 (1st ed. 1928) (Brierly’s position is echoed through the sixth edition of this work in 1963). As Cooper explains, for states to convey or (allow assertion of rights over) property to their citizens, they must have right to it in the first place. Cooper, Roman Law, supra note 97, at 56.

Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 251 (June 27) (“The principle of respect for territorial sovereignty is also directly infringed by the unauthorized overflight of a State’s territory by aircraft belonging to or under the control of the government of another State.”). The ICJ also notes that the Chicago Convention “reproduces the established principle of the complete and exclusive sovereignty of a State over the air space above its territory,” as opposed to creating the right. Id. ¶ 212. (emphasis added).

Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 90, 142 (July 12) (in resolving a river-based border dispute, the Court noted “a boundary represents the line of separation between areas of State sovereignty, not only on the Earth’s surface but also in the subsoil and in the superjacent column of air.”); see Jinyuan Su, The Delimitation Between Airspace and Outer Space and the Emergence of Aerospace Objects, 78 J. Air L. & Com. 355, 357–58 (2013).

Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, art. 2. This represents no significant deviation from the effect of the Paris Convention. Paris Convention, supra note 65, art. 1 (“For the purpose of the present Convention the territory of a State shall be understood as including the national territory, both that of the mother country and of the colonies, and the territorial waters adjacent thereto.”).

UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 3.

Id. art. 38. (Right of transit passage); see Astley & Schmitt, supra note 51, at 133.

UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 53 (right of archipelagic sea lanes passage); see Astley & Schmitt, supra note 51, at 135.
rrial seas does not apply to aircraft. These rules apply for both civilian and state (including military) aircraft. Also, airspace sovereignty can be limited under unique circumstances such as distress.

It should be noted that while China, India, Japan, Russia, and other space-faring states have ratified UNCLOS, two major space actors, the United States and Kazakhstan, have not. This is germane to the degree that its effect on airspace sovereignty and navigation regimes is relevant to the launch and return of vehicles, however termed, that can operate in or near outer space as well as in airspace (aerospace vehicles). However, for the purposes of this work, the relevant UNCLOS regime will be treated as binding on all states as a matter of customary international law. The United States formally follows the UNCLOS air and sea navigation regimes as customary international law, a position spanning both time and various administrations. Similarly,

106 See UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 17 (“Subject to this Convention, ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.”); Astley & Schmitt, supra note 51, at 130.

107 See UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 18 (providing an exception to innocent passage for aircraft rescues); id. arts. 39, 54. (providing an exception during transit passage and in archipelagic sea lanes); Astley & Schmitt, supra note 51, at 132 (regarding the right of assistance entry, “[a]s to the use of aircraft and helicopters, which are otherwise forbidden from entering another State’s national airspace without consent, U.S. policy is to employ them when needed in life-threatening situations.”); Schmitt, Air Law and Military Operations, supra note 50, at 320–21 (addressing military aircraft, particularly medical craft, over a neutral state’s territory).

108 While Kazakhstan does not have a major space program of its own, its Baikonur Cosmodrome is a major launch facility for Russian and other international space programs. As the launch site of a space object, Kazakhstan bears potential international responsibility and liability as a “launching state.” See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. VII (“each State party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies.”); Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects art. I(c), Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention] (entered into force on Sept. 1, 1972) (“The term ‘launching State’ means: . . . (ii) A State from whose territory or facility a space object is launched”).


110 See Ronald Reagan, supra note 17. While the decree does not explicitly describe the UNCLOS as reflecting customary international law, subsequent statements from the United States do. See William H. Taft, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of
Kazakhstan, though landlocked except for Caspian Sea access, seems to call upon the UNCLOS for territorial matters as well.111 The exclusive sovereignty of states over their airspace is endorsed throughout the Chicago Convention as well. Beyond Article 1’s recognition of sovereignty, Articles 6 (Scheduled air services) and 7 (Cabotage) confirm that international carriers may not operate in or over a state without that state’s permission.112 Additionally, Articles 11 (Applicability of air regulations), 13 (Entry and clearance regulations), and 16 (Search of aircraft) further “confirm the complete jurisdiction of the State within its territorial airspace.”113 These convention principles are effectuated and translated into practical guidance through ICAO and its promulgation of Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) as Annexes to the Chicago Convention and other procedural guides and requirements.114 Of course, the ter-

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112 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, art. 6 (“No scheduled international air service may be operated over or into the territory of a contracting State, except with the special permission or other authorization of that State, and in accordance with the terms of such permission or authorization.”); id. art. 7 (“Each contracting State shall have the right to refuse permission to the aircraft of other contracting States . . . .” to take on passengers and cargo); see also MILDE, supra note 68, at 43 (noting that Article 6’s “‘special permission or other authorization’ is usually exchanged between States in the form of a bilateral air services agreement (BASA).”).

113 MILDE, supra note 68, at 46.

114 See DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 71, at 51–52 (discussing “ICAO’s quasi-legislative authority” and its various rule-making mechanisms).
territorial sovereignty is not without limits or exception. For instance, aircraft in distress must be accommodated to a degree.\textsuperscript{115}

Thus, under current law (the Chicago Convention and the long-standing custom of sovereignty) and in practice (as established by ICAO in executing the Chicago Convention, as well as states in incidents such as the 1960 U-2 shoot-down), the airspace above a state and its territorial waters is sovereign.

3. The Legal Nature of Airspace: Civil and State Aircraft

While the recognition of sovereignty over the airspace found in Article 1 of the Chicago Convention is absolute, it is not without exceptions. Reflecting the desire of early proponents of “open skies” for commercial aviation, Article 5 carves out an exception to allow for non-scheduled aircraft (that is, not in the regular passenger business) “to make flights into or in transit non-stop across [a State’s] territory and to make stops for non-traffic purposes without the necessity of obtaining prior permission.”\textsuperscript{116} Similarly, Article 6 sets the foundation for the creation of bilateral and multilateral agreements between states to allow for entry, stoppage, and traditional international air services, which most states have adopted.\textsuperscript{117}

However, the scope of the Chicago Convention’s exemptions and exclusions are far narrower than its confirmation of sovereignty. Aside from Article 1, the rules and exceptions for flight under the Chicago Convention apply only to civil aircraft, not state craft.\textsuperscript{118} Article 3 (Civil and state aircraft) distinguishes between the two:

(a) This Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft, and shall not be applicable to state aircraft.
(b) Aircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be deemed to be state aircraft.
(c) No state aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the territory of another State or land thereon without authorization by special agreement or otherwise, and in accordance with the terms thereof.

\textsuperscript{116} Convention on International Civil Aviation, \textit{supra} note 49, art. 5 (though such flights are subject to limitations imposed by the territorial state); Dempsey, \textit{Public International Air Law}, \textit{supra} note 71, at 49.
\textsuperscript{117} See Dempsey, \textit{Public International Air Law}, \textit{supra} note 71, at 520.
\textsuperscript{118} Convention on International Civil Aviation, \textit{supra} note 49, art. 3.
(d) The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety and navigation of civil aircraft.

Article 3(b) is a departure from the Paris Convention, which further subdivided state craft into military craft and aircraft “exclusively employed in State service, such as posts, customs, police.”119 This separation allowed for further subdivision of rights of passage and a framework geared toward allowing non-military state vehicles rights akin to those enjoyed by civil craft under the Chicago Convention.120

Overall, the practical effect, vis-à-vis territorial sovereignty, is that state vehicles enjoy less freedom of movement over territorial airspace; there is no grant of innocent or transit passage and specific rights have to be explicitly negotiated.

4. Airspace: Conclusion

In conclusion, there is a core, black-and-white understanding of airspace—it includes, at a minimum, the range of operation of aircraft at least to 70,500 feet (21 kilometers). In airspace, territorial sovereignty can be asserted by subjacent states and must be respected by other states. While the Chicago Convention allows for overflight for civilian craft, the airspace regime shows no such deference to state craft—they are distinct from civilian aircraft. This means that overflight options are limited if an area is regarded as airspace, and aerospace (or other) vehicles engaging in overflight run the risk of committing a territorial incursion and provoking a hostile response.

B. Outer Space: Free Use and Exploration (The Province of All Humankind)

The zone known as outer space has no outward boundaries; it extends beyond Earth as far as exploration can take our law. On the lower end, however, the widely accepted notion of outer space (and outer space law) extends at least to 150 kilometers (approximately 492,100 feet or 93 miles). In outer space, states cannot assert or exercise any territorial sovereignty over the space, the Moon, or other celestial bodies, but states are free to

119 Paris Convention, supra note 65, art. 30. While the Paris Convention deemed “every aircraft commanded by a person in military service” to be “military aircraft” (Article 31), it did not give any further definition. Milde, supra note 68, at 64–65.

120 Paris Convention, supra note 65, art. 32; Milde, supra note 68, at 64.
use and explore the domain. This use and exploration is open to state and civil craft without distinction, though states are required to assert responsibility and control over the craft of their nationals and organizations in outer space. This section discusses the nature of the outer space domain, its status regarding state sovereignty, and the lack of distinction between state and civil aircraft.

1. The Physical Nature of Outer Space: The Domain of Space Objects in Orbit and Beyond

Perhaps the most fitting definition (or lack thereof) for space is found in the glossary portion of the U.S. Department of Defense publication on Space Operations: “space. None.” While it goes on to define many other aspects of space use and operations, the guide cannot clearly define the domain itself.

Defining space by the craft that operate in it is equally unavailing. The outer space treaties use the terms “space objects” and “national activities in outer space,” but neither of those are clearly defined or delimited in scope. The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects of 1972 (Liability Convention) and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched Into Outer Space of 1975 (Registration Convention) merely state that the “space object” term “includes component parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof.” Dempsey noted that, “[p]resumably, a spacecraft should be capable of moving in outer space (either orbital or suborbital) without any support from the air, and it would have a power source not dependent upon external oxygen.” But, the parenthetical caveat of “either orbital or suborbital” reveals the difficulty of using craft to define what is clearly “outer space.” To state the obvious, humans are terrestrial beings and airspace lies between Earth and outer space; similarly, the suborbital area, however defined, lies below orbit. There-

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123 DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 71, at 755. Compare Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, annex 7 (defining aircraft by its capacity to derive support from the air).
fore, to reach outer space, the farthest zone from Earth, a vehicle must pass through (and be able to function, to some degree at least) in all zones.\(^{\text{124}}\) So, the nature or capacity of a spacebound vehicle and where it can operate should not be a determining factor for where “outer space” exists. With the further development of vehicles that can more seamlessly operate in outer space and airspace, this distinction is becoming even less useful as a discriminating criterion.

Further, while the outer space treaties extend jurisdiction and responsibility over “national activities in outer space,”\(^{\text{125}}\) one cannot definitively declare what the notion of “space activities” includes.\(^{\text{126}}\) This is a new topic that the U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) intended to address, but as of 2014, the committee has no headway as yet.\(^{\text{127}}\)

The fragility of human life does not help define outer space either. Even at civilian airliner cruising altitudes (36,000 feet, or 11 kilometers—far below the limits of what is clearly accepted as airspace), without cabin pressurization, passengers and crew would fall victim to persistent unconsciousness “as a prelude to death from oxygen starvation.”\(^{\text{128}}\) Once a human reaches 60,000 feet (just over 18 kilometers, still well below the line established by the U-2 incident), the liquids in a human body would begin to boil.\(^{\text{129}}\) Certainly, a major aspect of space flight and exploration is that “bubbles of life support must be artificially created,

\(^{\text{124}}\) For instance, while a rocket is not particularly maneuverable as an airspace vehicle, it has the capacity to cut through the air to reach beyond airspace.

\(^{\text{125}}\) See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. VI.

\(^{\text{126}}\) In much of the “national activities” analysis, the discussion tends to focus on the “national” portion (that is, attribution to the state) and less on the matter of what constitutes activity in space. See, e.g., Bin Cheng, Article VI of the 1967 Space Treaty Revisited: “International Responsibility,” National Activities,” and “the Appropriate State”, 26 J. SPACE L. 7, 20–26 (1998).


\(^{\text{128}}\) FONG, supra note 87, at 183.

\(^{\text{129}}\) Id. at 185 (describing the Armstrong Line, at which—due to low pressure—the boiling point of water falls below the normal core body temperature of a human (98.6 degrees Fahrenheit)).
maintained, and sealed against the exterior.”130 But, this alone is not a determining factor for when one reaches outer space.

The most effective definition for when one is in outer space, and clearly subject to outer space law, may be reached by a negative definition—what it is not.131 The often discussed idea of “near space” encompasses areas that may or may not be outer space. So that which is clearly outer space must be beyond near space, which can be “defined as space above where commercial airliners fly but below orbiting satellites.”132

An object reaches orbit when it achieves a balance between its velocity (pushing it out) and the gravitational pull of the Earth (pulling it in) such that it is continually in a state of freefall.133

130 Id. at 191.

131 This incremental approach is reflected in the thinking of Bin Cheng, who commented, “outer space can be said to begin arguably at an altitude of 96 kilometer[s] above the Earth, clearly so at 110 kilometer[s] and definitely so at 130 kilometer[s].” Bin Cheng, “Space Objects”, “Astronauts” and Related Expressions, 34 Proc. Colloq. L. OUTER SPACE 17, 26 (1991), quoted in Katherine M. Gorove, Delimitation of Outer Space and the Aerospace Object – Where is the Law, 28 J. SPACE L. 11, 12 (2000); see also CHENG, STUDES, supra note 62, at 450–451 (“Above this height [110 kilometers,] one is definitely in outer space. . . .”).

132 Taro Kuusholma & Ram Jakhu, Presentation to the Legal Subcomm. of the Comm. on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in Its Fifty-Fourth Session: The Need for International Approach and Framework for Operations in Near-Space 2 (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/lsc2015/tech-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/FKD2-D8PV]; see also Leonard David, Sky Trek to the “Near Space” Neighborhood, SPACE (Nov. 9, 2005), http://www.space.com/1761-sky-trek-space-neighborhood.html [https://perma.cc/288F-MXBD] (“Near Space is between 65,000 feet (20 kilometers) and 325,000 feet (99 kilometers) above sea level.”). However, near space is a zone without a fixed legal definition; so it may encompass areas that may be considered otherwise part of airspace or outer space.

133 BENKO & PLESCHER, supra note 5, at 8. For a simple, but effective, explanation of orbits from early in the space age, see Dwight Eisenhower, President of the United States, Statement Prepared by the President’s Science Advisory Committee: Introduction to Outer Space 2–3 (Mar. 26, 1958), http://fas.org/spp/guide/usa/intro1958.html [https://perma.cc/SW6Z-P633]. The document invites the reader to imagine throwing a stone: the harder it is thrown, the further it flies. If it was thrown at 18,000 miles per hour, though:

It would travel so far that it would overshoot the Earth, so to speak, and keep falling until it was back where it started. Since in this imaginary example there is no atmospheric resistance to slow the stone down, it would be travelling at the original speed, 18,000 m.p.h., when it hit the ground back to its starting point. So around the Earth it goes again. From the stone’s point of view, it is continuously falling, except that its very slight downward arc exactly matches the curvature of the Earth, and so it stays aloft—or as the scientist would say, “in orbit”—indefinitely.

Since the Earth has an atmosphere, of course, neither stones nor satellites can be sent whizzing around the Earth at tree-top level.
Orbits come in numerous varieties, but all reflect this balance of outward velocity and the gravitational effect of Earth.\textsuperscript{134} The lowest altitude of natural\textsuperscript{135} orbit is called Low Earth Orbit (LEO). This typically extends to 1,000 kilometers, but, like much of outer space law, it lacks any fixed lower definition.\textsuperscript{136} The “lowest known sustained orbital altitude” was held by the Soviet Union’s “Zenit” series satellite at 150 kilometers (approximately 492,100 feet or 93 miles).\textsuperscript{137} However, not all orbits have a consistent eccentricity; that is, they are not perfect circles that maintain the same altitude over Earth throughout an orbital rotation. At their lowest orbital point, or perigee, some satellites have operated at around 100 kilometers (328,000 feet or 62 miles).\textsuperscript{138} Notably, this approximate altitude is also known as the von Kármán line, a popular reference point for air versus space demarcation and the point at which it is believed an aircraft would have to reach orbital velocity to produce enough lift to

\textit{Id.}\textsuperscript{134} For a more substantial discussion of orbits, see \textsc{kleiman et al.}, supra note 73, at 3–11 (with a practical explanation of orbits geared towards legal thinkers); \textsc{Lucy Rogers}, \textit{It’s Only Rocket Science: An Introduction in Plain English} 84–113 (2008) (for a more technical explanation of orbits).\textsuperscript{135} Parenthetically, for purposes of this work, the idea of orbits include only natural orbits, or those driven primarily by physics and limited propulsion. Certainly, one can argue that there is nothing “natural” about terrestrially-bound humans flying anywhere, let alone past where our bodies can survive exposure to the environment. But there must be a distinction between orbits discussed above (which are driven by physics—velocity versus gravity) and the mere capacity to indefinitely circle the Earth in a predictable pattern. For instance, if fuel and thrust capacity were no issue, a vehicle could theoretically circle the Earth at any altitude independent of gravitational forces. Thus, the term “natural orbit” is used for the former category, and the latter is not regarded or discussed as an “orbit.”\textsuperscript{136} See \textsc{kleiman et al.}, supra note 73, at 29 (assigning 160 to 1,000 kilometers as LEO); \textsc{Joint Chiefs of Staff}, supra note 121, at G-6 (defining LEO as no more than 1,000 kilometers); Holli Riebeek, \textit{Catalog of Earth Satellite Orbits}, Earth Observatory (Sept. 9, 2009), http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/OrbitCatalog/ [https://perma.cc/4M9G-75B2] (placing LEO between 180 and 2000 kilometers); \textsc{Rogers}, supra note 134, at 89 (extending LEO down to 100 kilometers).\textsuperscript{137} U.K. \textsc{Ministry of Defence}, supra note 63, at 1–3; see also \textsc{Cheng}, \textit{Studies}, supra note 62, at 38 (“The initial perigees and apogees of the orbits of Sputnik I, Discoverers I, II, V, VII, [and] XI and the Soviet Space Ship are, respectively, 142–588, 99–605, 142–220, 136–450, 100–520, 109–380 and 193–230 miles.”).\textsuperscript{138} See \textsc{Cheng}, \textit{Studies}, supra note 62, at 396.
remain aloft. But like orbit, there is debate as to the exact altitude of this line.

In conclusion, space has been defined to a degree. There are no outer limits of space—the domain extends ad infinitum to cover use and exploration beyond Earth, in outer space, and on the Moon and other celestial bodies. Fine tuning the outward limits or creating exemptions for an age of possible colonization is certainly a future possibility but is beyond the scope of this work. On the lower limits, it can reasonably be argued as accepted that space extends down to 100 kilometers as a matter of broad acceptance. So craft in orbit should fairly comfortably be considered as operating in outer space, from both a scientific perspective and a legal one. Below 100 kilometers, however, whether one has reached space (and is governed by outer space law) would be a matter of significant debate on law and policy.

2. The Legal Nature of Outer Space: Res Communis

Early in the space age, states rejected the assertion of territorial sovereignty in outer space—however defined—in the U.N. General Assembly with Resolution 1962, the Declaration of Le-

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141 See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. I; Lachs, supra note 64, at 55 (“One may safely postulate that the realm of the law of outer space extends to infinity.”). The one exception to this came in 1976, when eight equatorial states asserted territorial claims to the geosynchronous orbit (at approximately 36,000 kilometers, or 118 million feet) in what came to be known as the Bogota Declaration. Declaration of the First Meeting of Equatorial Countries, Dec. 3, 1976, I.T.U. Doc. WARC-BS 81-E (1977) [hereinafter Bogota Declaration], http://www.jaxa.jp/library/space_law/chapter_2/2-2-1-2-e.html [https://perma.cc/92RN-H9BL]. However, this assertion has been overwhelmingly rejected by the international community. See Cheng, Studies, supra note 62, at 455; Oduntan, supra note 139, at 76.

142 Kleiman et al., supra note 73, at 3 (writing for space law practitioners, noting the Karman “line has become the de facto demarcation accepted by most people in the space community.”); Gorove, supra note 131, at 11–12 (“What appears to have emerged as international customary law is that the lowest perigee orbit of artificial Earth satellites (currently, that would be approximately 100–110 kilometers above sea level) lies at a point in outer space . . . .”).
gal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space (Declaration of Legal Principles):

2. Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all States on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law.

3. Outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.\textsuperscript{143}

While this Declaration of Legal Principles was non-binding and aspirational,\textsuperscript{144} its mandates for free use and exploration and non-appropriation were solidified with the Outer Space Treaty, which remains the primary governing document of outer space law relevant to the analysis of territorial sovereignty.\textsuperscript{145}

Two key provisions of the Outer Space Treaty establish outer space as an area free of territorial sovereignty. First, Article I states in relevant part:

The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, . . . shall be the province of all mankind. Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with

\textsuperscript{143} Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space, Dec. 13, 1963, G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/18/1962. These principles were adopted unanimously. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, pmbl.; see also Oduntan, supra note 139, at 64 (stating that "it makes no sense in conventional terms to speak of sovereignty in outer space . . . because \textit{ab intio} international legislation developed to govern outer space has been unequivocal on the prohibition of the application of state sovereignty in outer space.").

\textsuperscript{144} Declaration of Legal Principles, supra note 143, pmbl. ("The General Assembly . . . [s]olemnly declares that in the exploration and use of outer space States should be guided by the following principles."). For greater discussion of the international law of outer space as a regime largely governed by "soft law" (as opposed to conventional or customary dictates of "hard law"), see Ram Jakhu & Steven Freeland, \textit{The Sources of International Space Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAW 2013}, at 461 (Corinne Jorgenson ed., 2014).

international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.146

According to Jakhu, the second paragraph of Article I alone “categorically and unambiguously denied any and all claims of national sovereignty, especially traditional territorial sovereignty, to outer space and celestial bodies.”147

However, Article II continues: “Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”148 This explicitly precludes states from asserting territorial sovereignty in outer space. Demonstrating the breadth of this prohibition, it precludes the traditional means of states under other legal regimes (such as formal claims or actual occupation), and it forecloses assertions “by any other means” as well.

While Article I, and particularly Article II, eliminate assertions of state sovereignty over outer space, the Outer Space Treaty does not establish outer space as a legal vacuum. The treaty institutes guiding principles, and creates obligations for states to govern their own space activities (both state activities and those of their nationals). So outer space law works on two levels—internationally and domestically (applied through states to space actors).149 The lack of sovereignty and ownership (appropriation) is so firm that even commercial ventures in outer space are legally unclear due to concerns of property rights for natural resources mined or otherwise extracted from celestial bodies. This shows the degree to which states regard outer space as both the territory of no one and the property of all humanity.

Thus, outer space cannot be claimed by any state, and all states are free to operate in space—in stark contrast to the sovereignty regime of airspace. In this regard, according to Brownlie, outer space resembles the high seas as a res communis.150 How-

146 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. I.
148 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. II.
149 See Cheng, Studies, supra note 62, at 429 (discussing the division between international space law and municipal space law but noting that “in the matter of boundaries between airspace and outer space[,] it is international law [that] is controlling.”). This is similar to the divide between international and domestic air law noted supra note 71 and infra note 254.
150 Brownlie, supra note 97, at 255 (describing outer space as similar to the high seas due to the free use).
ever, the term *res communis* carries with it no particular legal regime; it is more descriptive (providing a term for outer space’s nature) than proscriptive (which would suggest it provides legal guidance on how outer space is governed).151

This departure from the air regime was established early in the era of space exploration. As Judge Lachs stated:

[T]he first instruments that men sent into outer space traversed the air space of States and circled above them in outer space, yet the launching States sought no permission, nor did the other States protest. This is how the freedom of movement into outer space, and in it, came to be established and recognized as law within a remarkably short period of time.152

It must be noted that this passage is dicta from a discussion of the potential for rapid formation of customary international law, in a case not involving outer space law. However, the aspects relating to freedom of movement in outer space were certainly endorsed with Articles I and II of the Outer Space Treaty and the preceding Declaration of Legal Principles, as discussed above. Further, while the Outer Space Treaty and the Declaration of Legal Principles were agreed upon by consensus within the COPUOS and in the General Assembly, the two key parties were the United States and the Soviet Union—at the time, the world’s two superpowers and the two primary space-faring states. And the drafting history of the Outer Space Treaty demonstrates the close coordination and general agreement of these powers with regard to the free use and exploration (that is, lack of sovereignty) in space.153

151 See id. at 169.


3. The Legal Nature of Outer Space: Civil and State Vehicles

Quite the opposite of the private, civilian efforts of the Wright Brothers, for Santos-Dumont, and other aviation pioneers, space flight and exploration was a state enterprise from its inception. It was the United States and the Soviet Union, through their national space programs that launched the first unmanned and manned missions into space.154 Moreover, it was not just states (specifically the Soviet Union and the United States) but military missions by states—though for peaceful purposes—with military members at the helm.155 One amalgamation of astronaut data found that “[u]ntil 2004, astronauts were sponsored and trained exclusively by governments, either by military agencies or by civilian space agencies.”156 At the dawn of space exploration, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower intended the U.S. space program to be civilian-run and for scientific purposes; but after Sputnik, reaching space became perceived as a matter of exigency for the United States to preserve both prestige and security.157 Unlike the Paris Convention for aircraft, however, the distinction between military and other state operation has no legal bearing on the status of spacecraft.158 In fact, not even the civil versus state distinction from the Chicago Convention was included.

154 See Dempsey, Public International Air Law, supra note 71, at 753 (noting that because the space launches were state craft, ICAO had no basis for jurisdiction over them).

155 StarChild Team, Yuri Gagarin, NASA, http://starchild.gsfc.nasa.gov/docs/StarChild/whos_who_level2/gagarin.html [https://perma.cc/WB8H-SPQY] (noting that Gagarin, the first human in space, was drawn from the Soviet Air Force (where he was a fighter pilot) for cosmonaut training); Information Summaries: Astronaut Fact Book, NASA 1-2 (April 2013), https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/740566main_current.pdf (noting that the entire first cadre of U.S. astronauts were military members); id. at 10-1. (providing basic service data for all U.S. military astronauts).


157 See Houchin, supra note 3, at 81 (“Indeed, the president would not compromise his position on launching a civilian satellite with a civilian (not a military) booster until after Sputnik and the failure of the Vanguard in December 1957. Following these events, he openly conceded the need for studies of military space programs.”). See also Section IV.D.4 infra.

158 Of course, as a matter of fact and perception the line between military and non-military activities in outer space can make a great deal of difference in the context of the debate over the meaning of “peaceful” uses of outer space. See Section IV.D.5.a infra.
The international law of outer space makes no distinction between civil and state vehicles. They are grouped together under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty:

States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty.

Thus, a state is responsible for all activities of its nationals in outer space (state or civil) and for assuring its nationals adhere to the Outer Space Treaty. Such “international responsibility” suggests that states would desire to assert control over national activities, and Article VI goes on to make this obligation explicit: “The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.” Thus, the Outer Space Treaty assigns responsibility to and requires states to provide significant and active oversight (“authorization and continuing supervision”) of civil activities in outer space. This obligatorily close relation-

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159 Article VI also assigns states responsibility for the activities of international organizations of which they are part. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. VI (“When activities are carried on in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, by an international organization, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by the international organization and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in such organization.”).

160 Id. art. VI. The requirement to create controlling domestic legislation was accentuated in the U.N. General Assembly in 2013 with Resolution 68/74, which accentuates the Outer Space Treaty requirements and stresses the importance of state involvement “in view of the increasing participation of non-governmental entities in space activities” and other modern developments and problems with the expanded use of outer space. Recommendations on National Legislation Relevant to the Peaceful Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Dec. 11, 2013, G.A. Res. 68/74, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/74, http://stage.tksc.jaxa.jp/spacelaw/world/1_02/02.E-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/3758-PRAS].

161 Additionally, Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty ensures that jurisdiction and control remains with a state throughout the duration of space activities, through the registration process:

A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body. Ownership of objects launched into outer space, including objects landed or constructed on a celestial body, and of their component parts, is not affected by their presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by their return to the Earth. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. VIII.
ship can largely blur the distinction between state and civil activities.\footnote{This blur is the case, at least, in the view of parties external to the state. Internally, a state may create whatever regime it finds appropriate to manage civil space activities; the requirements can be the same as those for state activities, or more onerous. \textit{See generally Cheng, Studies,} supra note 62, at 429.}

This is “radically different”\footnote{Cheng, \textit{Article VI of the 1967 Space Treaty Revisited,} supra note 126, at 13 (discussing the unique Article VI requirement that states “assure” compliance, saying it “assumes an air of guarantee by the State of such compliance.”).} than general norms of international law, and certainly a departure from the airspace regime. For instance, the commentary to the U.N. International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility notes the requirement of attribution to a state before responsibility can be assigned:

Thus, the general rule is that the only conduct attributed to the State at the international level is that of its organs of government, or of others who have acted under the direction, instigation or control of those organs, i.e. as agents of the State. . . . As a corollary, the conduct of private persons is not as such attributable to the State.\footnote{Int’l Law Comm’n, \textit{supra} note 38, at 39 (commentary); \textit{see also Convention on International Civil Aviation,} \textit{supra} note 49, arts. 4–11.}

Under air law, every aircraft must have a nationality and a flag.\footnote{Convention on International Civil Aviation, \textit{supra} note 49, art. 17.} Through the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft of 1963\footnote{Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 220 [hereinafter Tokyo Convention] (entered into force on Dec. 4, 1969) (addressing jurisdiction for crimes and other acts on board aircraft that prejudice the good order and discipline of aviation).} (Tokyo Convention) and other agreements, a degree of jurisdiction and control flies along with that flag. From this stems a general ability to control (or regulate) one’s citizens and activities. But short of properly demonstrated attribution to a state actor or activities, there is no requirement that a state be responsible for its aircraft such as in the outer space legal regime.\footnote{See Outer Space Treaty, \textit{supra} note 60, arts. VI–VIII.}

This unique relationship between space-faring states and their national actors is particularly significant for non-governmental activities in that Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty mandates that all activities be carried out in conformity with the Treaty. And Article III mandates that states “shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding."  

Reading these two requirements together, they dictate the acceptable limits and legitimate interests of civil (non-governmental) activity, that is "maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding."  

This is a fairly early case of public international law potentially reaching beyond states to govern the actions of individuals (assuming states adhere to their Outer Space Treaty obligations and actually enact rules to adequately authorize and supervise their national actors in space). If states are required to meet this standard and their national activities are expected to adhere to state standards, then the private and civil activities must therefore meet these international standards.  

4. Outer Space: Conclusion

In conclusion, there is a core, black-and-white understanding of outer space: it includes the space and vehicles in natural orbit around Earth and beyond. This limit can be safely read to extend at least down to 150 kilometers (or 492,000 feet) and likely down to 100 kilometers (328,000 feet) in the thoughts of most writers. Further, outer space law establishes that it is the sovereign territory of no state, and instead its use and explora-

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168 Id. art. III.
169 Id.
170 Further, it could be argued that there is no need to distinguish between state and civil craft in outer space because the lack of territorial sovereignty and guarantees of free use and exploration mean any craft (civil or state) may fly freely, or at least without discrimination due to state or civilian status. Also, the Article VI responsibility, supervision, and control mandates create a construct by which everything launched into space can, in effect, be construed as a state (or state-affiliated) craft. The liability regime for space objects similarly ignores any distinction between state and civil craft in the case of damages caused—in either case, the state is obligated to make reparations as required by the relevant conventions. See id. art. VI; Liability Convention, supra note 108, arts. II–III; VALÉRIE KAYSER, Launching Space Objects: Issues of Liability and Future Prospects 40–41 (2001) (discussing liability of non-governmental entities in outer space). Compare Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 38, at Chapter II (discussing the bases for attribution to a state, including actions by, inter alia, an organ of the state (Article 4); those exercising governmental authority (Article 5); and those acting under direction or control of a state (Article 8)).

171 See John Bellflower, The Influence of Law on Command of Space, 65 A.F.L. REV. 107, 141 (2010) (“In fact, there is no controversy that all current satellite orbits transit within the space domain.”).
tion is “the province of all mankind.” Further, outer space law is a unified regime for state and civilian vehicles—there is no legal distinction between the two, at least with regard to international obligations.

C. The Legal Gray Area Between Airspace and Outer Space: Gray Space

Reconciling the widely settled zones of airspace and the outer space leaves question as to what law governs the area between 21 kilometers (70,500 feet) and 100–150 kilometers (328,000–492,000 feet). This zone represents the gray area in the law: the zone of ambiguity at the edges of both airspace and outer space, herein referred to as gray space. Many writers talk of the delimitation problem, and many make proposals on how best to resolve it; but there is no overall consensus. As Lyall and Larsen noted, “there is uncertainty—not that space law exists, but as to the exact location of its application. Needless to say there have been many suggestions.” More importantly, there is similarly no consensus among states.

Two primary schools of thought have emerged on the issue of air and space delimitation: spatialism and functionalism. Spatialism essentially argues for a fixed line, at a set altitude, for the division of airspace and outer space. Under a strict spatialist analysis, if a craft, regardless of its nature and capabilities, is below the line, it is in airspace; when it is above the line, it is in outer space. Conversely, functionalism focuses on the nature of the craft in question. If it serves outer space functions, outer space law applies wherever it is operating; if it is an aircraft, airspace law applies to its flight. In effect, this “approach would render it unnecessary to solve the theoretical dispute whether there is a boundary between airspace and outer space and where it should be located.” Of course, even within these broad

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172 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. I; see also The Need for an Integrated Regulatory Regime, supra note 79, at 53 (“Freedom of the use of space is a fundamental principle of the space law regime.”).
173 Francis Lyall & Paul Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise 153 (2009); see also id. at 11–30 (providing a thorough outline of the development of the institutions—academic, governmental, and other—that study and address space law).
174 For discussion of state positions in COPUOS, see Benko & Plescher, supra note 5; Su, supra note 101, at 371; Kaysen, supra note 170, at 45 n.97. For greater development of this issue, see Section IV.C.3.b infra.
175 See, e.g., Dempsey, Public International Air Law, supra note 71, at 746.
176 See, e.g., Lyall & Larsen, supra note 173, at 169–70.
177 Benko & Plescher, supra note 5, at 35.
schools are more particular and inconsistent theories of delimitation.  

178 Further, some thinkers and space-faring states believe there is no need to decide the issue.  

The emergence of hybrid aerospace vehicles challenges these theories and compounds the lack of consensus. Their ability to operate in either airspace or outer space, straddling any line established between the two, can make their control and regulation ambiguous and inconsistent if spatially-based. Further, their function is novel. On any given flight, they may operate both as an aircraft and a space craft. As one description of the functional approach explained, “one way to answer the question as to which regime of law applies is to ask what type of vehicle is being considered—is it an aircraft, or a spacecraft, or an aerospace vehicle?”  

180 But, the extant legal regimes present just a binary option—one only airspace or outer space law can apply; there is presently no established regime for aerospace vehicles. The existing theories provide no definitive or universal guidance for the operation of aerospace vehicles, particularly in the gray area between air and space law.

In the current state of world tensions and provocative actions, there may come a moment where an answer is needed—where, at least in one state, a conclusion will be drawn as to whether an overflight at high-altitude either is or is not a territorial incur-

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178 See Su, supra note 101, at 363 (noting the lack of consensus within spatialism); CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 444–45 (noting inconsistency in the functionalist approaches). Matte and Oduntun provide thorough outlines of many of these more particular schools of thought. See SPACE ACTIVITIES AND EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 73, at 357; Oduntan, supra note 139, at 69–72.

179 For instance, the United States has stated:

With respect to the question of the definition and delimitation of outer space, we have examined this issue carefully and have listened to the various statements delivered at this session. Our position continues to be that defining or delimiting outer space is not necessary. No legal or practical problems have arisen in the absence of such a definition. On the contrary, the differing legal regimes applicable in respect of airspace and outer space have operated well in their respective spheres. The lack of a definition or delimitation of outer space has not impeded the development of activities in either sphere.


180 THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED REGULATORY REGIME, supra note 79, at 50.
sion. And if the decision is that the gray area is sovereign and the foreign craft is a potential threat, the subjacent state might act with force.

This scenario is part of what makes the use of force context unique as a mode of analysis for delimitation. In a liability case, for example, the law follows the facts. That is, the aerospace vehicle would have crashed independent of its legal status or what regime applied to it. It would potentially be for litigators, judges, and insurance companies—years later—to determine whether the space regime or air regime applied. For the use of force, however, the legal status of the craft is likely a determining factor in the decision. Thus, states would benefit from a clear definition of the extent of sovereignty, so it can be incorporated into rules of engagement and operating procedures related to aerospace vehicles.

D. Conclusion

This chapter sought to demonstrate that—despite the lack of clarity as to the edges—there are settled (black-and-white) aspects of the airspace and outer space domains. That is, while there is no clear edge of the airspace or no precise lower border for outer space, these domains are universally acknowledged as both existing and possessing a fairly straightforward legal regime (vis-à-vis sovereignty and state vehicles). This discussion of the more settled law then supplies the context and forms the basis for the later analysis of how vehicles that can transcend these zones, operating in the gray areas, should be treated under the law.

IV. Addressing the Gray Space

Proving a negative is nearly impossible, but this argument asserts (and this chapter demonstrates) that there is inadequate conventional law or state practice to lower the cap on sovereignty, and correspondingly the line between air and space, below orbit. Outer space, like the airspace below it, is not a legal vacuum; something has to (and had to from the dawn of the space age) be the law there.181 The same is true for the gray area at the edges of the two domains. The question, then, is how does

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181 Lachs, supra note 64, at 135 (“Thus it was necessary to agree that outer space never had been a lawless area or legal vacuum, but had been subject to international law, though the matter could never have been put to the test before.”).
one determine the law that applies at a given location? But to ask what is perhaps a natural follow-up question to this—“How do you choose which law applies?”—would be a misstep here. This chapter does not purport to propose a solution for gray space; it seeks to argue that one is already there through the practice of states and their existing legal dispositions toward the assertion of sovereignty. The first part of this chapter addresses this issue and sets the stage for the legal approach taken below with a discussion of the troubles posed by normative and non-binding prescriptions for a legal regime.

Then, in what is termed here a conservative, state-based, approach, this chapter argues that one should look at the status of sovereignty in airspace, and in general, at the time of the dawn of the space age. This establishes the general rule with regard to assertions of sovereignty by states. Then one should examine how space became free for use and exploration, as outlined in the Declaration of Legal Principles and the Outer Space Treaty. This establishes a deviation from, or exception to, the rule. From there, one should narrowly construe the exception to the general rule to find the limits of where the exception applies. When this is done, it reveals that orbit is the lowest clear deviation from the general disposition of sovereignty. As such, the regime shifts at that point—airspace (with sovereignty and limited craft access) below, and outer space (with freedom and non-distinction of craft) in and above orbit. In essence, one should apply the baseline rule (sovereignty) until it is clear that the rule no longer applies—the first place this is true is orbit. Conversely, the matter can be articulated as applying the exceptional rule only so far as its regime allows, at which point it no longer applies—again, the lowest zone in which outer space law clearly applies is orbit. This analysis comprises the second and third parts of the chapter.

Finally, the fourth part of this chapter examines the issue from another perspective—that of a commensurability argument. Operating on the basis that the airspace and outer space regimes are comparable and commensurable, the section seeks to read them in harmony. When this is done, it reveals that national security is an overriding interest of states that unifies the

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182 “Conservative” is not meant in any political sense but as a method of proceeding with legal analysis in a restrained manner with deference to the known, existing law. The approach presupposes a perspective consistent with the ICJ Statute and other sources of interpretive guidance—that states are the primary actors in international law. See Section IV.C.1 infra.
development of the disparate rules affecting the use of force
(sovereignty and the distinction of state and civilian craft) and
that these regimes have a logical separation point at orbit. Thus,
the delineation at orbit makes further sense when examined in
the context of the use of force and aerospace vehicles.

A. **What Is and What Ought to Be**

One legal writer has noted that “[t]he lack of codified defini-
tions of airspace and outer space makes the role of international
scholars necessary, taking into account that a demarcation point
is still an open question within the air and space law branch.”183
Certainly, this approach is, generally speaking, consistent with
international rules of interpretation found in Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute).184
However, the application of an academic solution for the re-
gime applicable to aerospace vehicles fails for two reasons.
First, reference can be made to “the most highly qualified
publicists” only “as a subsidiary means” of interpretation.185
When the law is clear, there is no need to seek out the opinions
of publicists. Instead, the extant conventional or customary in-
ternational law or the accepted general principles of law should
apply.186 Thus, the matter for sovereignty over aerospace comes
down, to a degree, to a framing issue. That is, while there is
ambiguity as to where the precise line (spatial or functional) be-
tween airspace and outer space may lie, that does not mean that
there is no law that applies in this zone. In many ways, the per-
ceived ambiguity in the law applicable to aerospace activities is a
created phenomenon. This is not a critique of the current writ-
ers on delimitation—they point to many problems created by
the fact that there are divergent regimes for airspace and outer
space, and this work itself does the same with its focus on mat-
ters of security and potential use of force. However, just because
the law causes problems for operations does not mean that the

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183 Francesco Gaspari, *Space Transportation and International Air Transportation: The Transition Towards a Common Legal System*, in *Regulation of Emerging Modes of Aerospace Transportation* 141, 147 (Ram Jakhu & Kuan-Wei Chen eds., 2014).

184 See ICJ Statute, *supra* note 62, art. 38(1)(d) (In resolution of cases before it, the ICJ will consider, among other sources, “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”).

185 *Id.*

186 *Id.* art. 38(1)(a)–(c).
law is unclear or nonexistent. A problematic rule of a law is a rule nonetheless.

Second, even if publicists are an appropriate consideration for resolution of this matter, there is no adequate consensus on the issue of what law should be applicable to aerospace operations. There are many ideas circulating through the legal literature, and many are very wise and practical. However, they typically reflect what the law should be; they do not reveal what the law is. Some of the most highly qualified publicists address, and certainly one of the most prolific, Cheng, addresses this issue directly, devoting large sections of his outer space writings to the distinction of *lex lata* (what the law is) and *lex ferenda* (future law, or what the law should be).

Of course, asserting that this work can exclusively and purely articulate what the law is—devoid of perspective, predisposition, or unconscious bias—would be folly; there is inherently some degree of what an author thinks ought to be in the description of what presently is. However, the goal here is to strip down

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187 Of course, this also does not mean that the law should not be rewritten or readdressed to better accommodate the coming reality of aerospace vehicles. However, the question is who has the power to rewrite the law.

188 One may assert that unsatisfactory outcomes militate against such a rule actually being the operative interpretation of an international law. This may be based on a reading of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter VCLT] (entered into force on Jan. 27, 1980) (“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation . . . when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”). But this fails for two reasons here. First, the notion of extensive airspace is not a treaty provision, albeit best articulated in the Paris Convention and the Chicago Convention. Instead, it is an articulation of the customs of international law derived from state practice. This not only undermines the absurdity argument (if absurd, why do states practice maximum sovereignty?), but it also removes it from the VCLT’s purview. Second, and more importantly, the assertion of broad sovereignty is not “absurd” or “unreasonable” at all. Reasonable minds may differ as to the overall best approach to delimitation, but as discussed below, there are numerous practical bases for the broad (though not infinite) assertion of an airspace regime, even beyond the more legalistic ones.

189 See Cheng, Studies, supra note 62, at 191, 677. Lachs commented that “not even of my heroes, could I say: ‘this man made law.’ For teachers are not legislators, nor lawmakers in international relations.” Jakhu & Freeland, supra note 144, at 471 (discussing the limitations, in general and as a practical source of outer space law, of the writings of publicists).

190 In this regard, David Hume noted:

> In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark[ed], that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning . . . ; when of a sudden I am surpri[se]d
the issue of vertical territorial sovereignty to its core and from there expose the essential disposition of states regarding the existing law of how high sovereignty can be (or has been) extended and what limits (if any) have been placed to cap such assertions.

B. The Importance of Context: History of Sovereignty in Airspace and Outer Space

In the state-based approach taken here, it is vital to address the history of the development of the two relevant legal regimes. The legal literature provides no shortage of perspectives on the status of sovereignty at any given time. But, upon review of the publicists and their works, an inescapable context for the discussion of both air law and outer space law is the potential for war and concern over national security—World Wars I and II for airspace and the Cold War for outer space. This concern drives the rights of state vehicles found in the regimes, and particularly the extent to which sovereignty is asserted by states. This section examines assertions of vertical sovereignty in general (in the pre-air and early-air periods), as well as the notions of vertical sovereignty at the dawn of the space age. While there is a degree of fluidity among these categories, it is generally set out in three parts—sovereignty before space, at the dawn of the space age, and after Sputnik. Overall, this section demonstrates that states are predisposed to maximal assertions of territorial sovereignty, up to a limit of where other interests are better served by freedom of use and exploration.

1. Sovereignty Before Space Applications

The concerns over avoiding future wars and the extent of a state’s “right to fly” is evident in the opening of John Cobb Cooper’s The Right to Fly.191 Having examined the early debates

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191 COOPER, THE RIGHT TO FLY, supra note 65. See Section IV.D.4.a. infra (Cooper discussing the overwhelming interest in state security after World War II, advocating the demilitarization of Germany and Japan’s air power capacities).
over airspace sovereignty, including the preclusion of military craft from state airspace, a few years later he concluded:

[I]t is apparent that by the outbreak of World War I the principle of sovereignty in usable space over national lands and waters had been accepted by the international community as a customary rule. None questioned the right of each state to control at its discretion all flight over its surface territories and to prohibit the entry into its usable space of any foreign aircraft.\(^{192}\)

But the operative question for this work is whether this sovereignty notion can be expanded beyond what is exclusively airspace. Above, Cooper speaks broadly of “usable space over national lands” (and not airspace exclusively), but the sentiment he is discussing culminated in the Paris Convention and recognized “that every Power has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory.”\(^{193}\)

Others have stressed that the Paris Convention (and thereby the re-articulation in the Chicago Convention, operative in the space age) focused on “air space” for sovereignty. So, they express a more limited view of sovereignty, tied to what can be construed as “airspace” or “atmospheric space.”\(^{194}\)

This strict limitation should not preclude an expansive disposition towards sovereignty for two reasons. First, there is no formal definition for either airspace or “atmospheric space” (or any of the other terms for the same concept) contained in the Paris Convention, Chicago Convention, or in customary international law. So, capping sovereignty solely on this definition is unavailing. Though a bit of an extreme example, Loftus Becker, as Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department of State, noted in 1958:

I am informed that astronomically the earth’s atmosphere extends 10,000 miles above its surface.

It follows that it would be perfectly rational for us to maintain that under the Chicago Convention the sovereignty of the United States extends 10,000 miles from the surface of the earth, an area which would comprehend the area in which all the satel-

\(^{192}\) John C. Cooper, \textit{State Sovereignty in Space: Developments 1910 to 1914, in Explorations in Aerospace Law: Selected Essays of John Cobb Cooper, 1946-1966, supra} note 93, at 125, 136 (writing in 1954, drawing this conclusion from analysis of United States, British, French, German, and other European state positions); see also Reinhardt, \textit{supra} note 4, at 72–73.

\(^{193}\) Paris Convention, \textit{supra} note 65, art. 1.


Certainly, subsequent international law caps the notion of sovereignty significantly below this level, as Article II of the Outer Space Treaty applies to orbital activities below 10,000 miles (16,000 kilometers, or over 52 million feet).\footnote{See Section III.B.1 supra.} But, such cap on sovereignty does not necessarily correspond to a cap on where states could otherwise assert sovereignty, whether called airspace, atmospheric space, or anything else.

Second, and more importantly, such an expansive presumption against state sovereignty is on the wrong side of history and practice. The Paris Conference of 1910 and subsequent negotiations over the Paris Convention reveal that states are inclined toward assertions of sovereignty.\footnote{The author acknowledges that here, “states” is comprised of Western European states, which by today’s standards are a fairly homogenous block. But they were the relevant powers in the creation of the current construct (found in the Chicago Convention), which has been very broadly adopted.} Even the more restrictive state positions focused more on rights of innocent passage and the number and degree of exceptions to sovereignty in airspace; the underlying premise was that the subjacent state had a right to assert sovereignty into the zone above it.\footnote{Reinhardt, \textit{supra} note 4, at 71–73; John C. Cooper, \textit{United States Participation in Drafting Paris Convention 1919}, in \textit{Explorations in Aerospace Law: Selected Essays of John Cobb Cooper}, 1946-1966, \textit{supra} note 93, at 137, 140–41; Cooper, \textit{State Sovereignty, supra} note 192, at 136; John C. Cooper, \textit{The International Air Navigation Conference, Paris 1910}, in \textit{Explorations in Aerospace Law: Selected Essays of John Cobb Cooper}, 1946-1966, \textit{supra} note 93, at 104; see also Section III.A.2 supra.}

Pepin correctly stressed that the Paris Convention explicitly used the term “air space.” However, as Cooper explained, “the Paris Convention is not to be construed as meaning that in international law States have territorial rights only in this airspace. The airspace was accepted as part of State territory but no international determination was made as to the regions of space
Therefore, the Paris Convention and the Chicago Convention express where sovereignty extended relevant to, respectively, “Aerial Navigation” and “International Civil Aviation,” but should not be read as a constriction or limitation on state capacity to assert sovereignty in general.

Instead, one should recall the Latin articulation of sovereignty, cuius est solum eius est usque ad coelum et ad sidera, and that it extends indefinitely or to the stars. While the sentiment may not be properly Roman, it is certainly old—and tried and true. After an exhaustive study of the phrase and its application, Cooper noted that in the 300 years since the English case of *Bury v. Pope* (1586) and text Coke on Littleton (circa 1628) where the present Latin construct is first found:

>[A] significant change had been made. The words “debet esse” (“ought to be”) of the more important glosses had become “est” (“is”). By this change the statement in the glosses that the landowner ought to have the use or enjoyment of the airspace over his property to an indefinite height had become, in the maxim (particularly as cited by Coke), a statement of the existence of present ownership of space to infinity.

Similarly, Vlasic’s study of state sovereignty assertions led him to conclude that, “[t]hus the State asserted airspace sovereignty many centuries before the age of flight.” So upward and indefinite assertions of sovereignty are not tied to practical appli-

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200 LACHS, *supra* note 64, at 42; see also Section III.A.2 supra, particularly notes 88–90 and accompanying text.


202 *Id.* at 85. Regarding the extent of the sovereignty, Katzenbach somewhat skeptically notes that *ad coelum* can be translated to mean both “to the sky” or “to the heavens,” making an assertion beyond the sky (and strictly “airspace”) more dubious. Katzenbach, *supra* note 64, at 221. However, it should be recalled that in many articulations of the Latin *ad coelum* is juxtaposed with *ad inferos* (“to hell”). See Abramovitch, *supra* note 97, at 247; MILDE, *supra* note 68, at 5. This suggests that, despite the lack of certainty as to a particular altitude or even finite plane of existence, “to the heavens” may be a more appropriate read.

203 COOPER, *Roman Law*, supra note 97, at 55 (“this author’s research convinced him that such a rule had long existed and that its beginnings went far back into history.”); see also Reinhardt, *supra* note 4, at 71 (quoting Dr. J. F. Lycklama à Nijeholt in 1910: “We therefore conclude that state sovereignty reaches quite as high as the state’s interest can reach, the possibility of which but ends at the uttermost limit of the atmosphere.”).
cations or extant technology—they reflect a baseline disposition of states towards the space above them.

2. Sovereignty at the Dawn of the Space Age

From the baseline of airspace sovereignty, and the notion that it may not be limited just there, states and scholars began considering how high sovereignty extended upwards—to what degree and to what limit. The prior disposition of broad sovereignty held strong.

a. State Positions

For instance, the Soviet position, typically pre-Sputnik but even after, was for an ad infinitum application of sovereignty.\(^\text{204}\) Soviet authors stated that the issue was well-settled and cited the 1913 thoughts of French jurist Clunet:

The right of the sovereignty of each country to its territorial atmosphere must theoretically [it was not a practical question at the time] extend usque ad coelum [right to the skies, that is to infinity], as they used to say in olden times. Contemporary British lawyers interpreting the expression “complete and exclusive sovereignty of the state over airspace”, point out that “complete” signifies “without limit”, that is, there is “no limit of height.”\(^\text{205}\)

Official Soviet legal textbooks contained similar assertions until at least 1958.\(^\text{206}\) This position was not long-lived, however; it changed for the Soviets with greater contemplation of the effects of the launch and orbit of Sputnik. Initially, they advocated a low ceiling for sovereignty (generally based on the then-existing capacity of plane flight) to allow for free flight of satellites but that proved problematic from a security perspective.\(^\text{207}\)

Similarly, in 1958, there was evidence of doubts about the limits, ad infinitum, of sovereignty in the U.S. Senate. The U.S. Senate’s Special Committee on Space and Astronautics, chaired by then-Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, compiled a substantial collection of literature and testimony on the emerging issues of outer

\(^{204}\) L Y A L L & L A R S E N, supra note 173, at 6 (discussing E. Korovin’s conference presentation of “Conquest of the Stratosphere and International Law” in 1933).


\(^{206}\) Id. at 345.

\(^{207}\) Id. at 346; see also Section IV.D.4.b infra.
space, with particular emphasis on the delimitation question.  

The bulk of the writings were from United States or allied positions, or at least unaffiliated writers from such states, but Soviet and other international positions and thinkers were considered as well. While there was no clear consensus as to the upward bounds of state sovereignty, almost all of the asserted or proposed limits were quite high. On the lower range, thinkers capped sovereignty at the highest extent of airspace. But the overall thrust was that sovereignty could be asserted well into what is now considered as clearly outer space.

b. Effective Control Theories

Effective control theories were popular early in the assessment of outer space legal regimes. Essentially, they assert that states can claim sovereignty as high as they can exert control over the area. The first installment of the 1958 U.S. Senate symposium was a 1951 article by Cooper arguing that effective control should determine delimitation of air and space. It was similarly popular for a short time among Soviet writers.

However, the proposition was short lived in the space age for two reasons, both relating to technology. First, as Cooper even recognized as he proffered it, the doctrine lent itself to inequity among states; the more wealthy and powerful (and technologically advanced), the more control a state could assert vertically. This would leave less advanced states with significant territorial disadvantage. This, among other problems, led Cooper to conclude that even he was not convinced by the effective control theory for delimitation he proffered. This problem, however, is not the most compelling argument against an effective control theory. It can be fairly easily reconciled with a
universal view of where technology stands; so the line in outer space would not be set where one particular state can assert control—it should be set where any state can assert control.

A more critical difficulty with the effective control theory, though, is that it could not address advancements in technology (universal or particular to one state). Fauchille, the early freedom of the air advocate before the Paris Convention, essentially employed an effective control basis for his position. He argued, among other bases, that the air should be free because states “could not exercise any powers over the atmosphere, neither modifying nor transforming it.” Further, he advocated a sovereignty limit of 300 meters, corresponding to the height of the Eiffel Tower, to allow for buildings (an indicator of where states could control space above the earth). This shows the limited capacity of a strict control-based line of thought in the face of new technology (architectural, as well as aeronautical).

Now, there is no reasonable limit for the geographic extent of effective control. It is believed that the Chinese military possesses ASAT technology capable of reaching geosynchronous orbit (GEO), which essentially expands the scope of potential control toward the furthest reaches of useful satellite space (nearly 36,000 kilometers or 22,300 miles). This is certainly broader than the closer reaches of orbit at 150 kilometers or at nearest 100 kilometers (93 miles or 62 miles). And, of course, for other nearer-space control issues, the U.S. X-37B orbital spaceplane is suspected to have offensive capacity, and the Russians are suspected to have a craft capable of maneuvering in outer space and intercepting satellites. Regardless of whether the suspicions of these capabilities are accurate, they are all in

214 See supra Section III.A.2.
215 SPACE ACTIVITIES AND EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 73, at 162.
216 Id. at 162 n.26.
addition to the more conventional and extant electronic and kinetic force options (including shorter range ASATs) more readily available to “negate (deceive, disrupt, degrade, deny, or destroy) an adversary’s efforts to interfere with or attack” space systems.\(^\text{219}\) Further, the premise of this article assumes the existence in the near future of vehicles that can bridge any gaps between clear air and clear space—so effective control is effectively limitless.

In 1957, Wassenbergh commented on this phenomenon in the context of the law of the sea while addressing air law.\(^\text{220}\) In his time, thanks to technology, the high seas could be controlled well past any reasonable limits of territorial sovereignty; and he believed that airspace similarly had expansive bounds of potential control.\(^\text{221}\) So we are left with a legal limitations approach; the practical limits of effective control are no longer reasonable guideposts. Employing the high seas analogy: “[T]he sea is no longer ‘free by nature.’”\(^\text{222}\) That is, the seas are made free by states—by agreement—notwithstanding state capacity to control them. So “[s]overeignty can no longer be based on the effective power of a State, but ‘only’ on law.”\(^\text{223}\) In that context, states’ interests in maximizing territory for both economic and strategic ends must be considered.\(^\text{224}\) The same is true today (or will be in the near future) with aerospace and outer space capacities for control.

Overall, the effective control theory was well-founded in historical assertions from the law of the sea’s “cannon-shot rule” as well as various early aviation sovereignty positions. But, like those regimes, its utility is limited by technological advancements. Nonetheless, its underpinnings and its enduring popularity underlines and highlights the going disposition—that


\(^{221}\) Id.

\(^{222}\) Id. at 102.

\(^{223}\) Id. at 152.

\(^{224}\) Id. at 104.
states get to claim as sovereign that which they can control (up to any otherwise imposed limits).

c. The 1956 “Weather” Balloon Incident: Sovereignty Above Effective Control

Like the U-2 incident of 1960, a 1956 balloon incident between the United States and the Soviet Union helps illustrate state positions on sovereignty, particularly with regard to incursion by the aerial objects of other states.

In the mid-1950s, the United States, through the U.S. Air Force and in conjunction with Western European allies, organized a large meteorological survey involving large helium-filled balloons carrying survey equipment. Some of the balloons were expected to reach up to 90,000 feet (over 27 kilometers or 17 miles). More recent documents show that at least a portion of this was named project GENETRIX, a U.S. Air Force operation to use high-altitude balloons as a mechanism for intelligence photography over the Soviet Union, the Eastern Block, and China from December 1955 to February 1956. In that short time, 516 balloons were launched as part of the project, but only 46 were ever recovered (and only 34 of those had “useful photographs”). However, regardless of what the Soviets actually knew or just suspected about the project, they protested the overflight of these balloons even at this high altitude. Amid these protests, the program was cancelled even though the United States maintained they were merely “weather research” balloons. The United States never asserted that the overflight was appropriate or legal, even under the purported weather-survey circumstances. The United States agreed to stop the pro-

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226 PEDLOW & WELZENBACH, supra note 89, at 84–85.
227 Id. at 85.
228 See CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 14–15; PEDLOW & WELZENBACH, supra note 89, at 86. By late 1956, the Soviets were also protesting the more controlled, but potentially lower-altitude, flights of the U-2. PEDLOW & WELZENBACH, supra note 89, at 126; see also Section III.A.2 supra.
229 PEDLOW & WELZENBACH, supra note 89, at 86. Ironically, despite that the weather balloon designation was subterfuge for terrestrial photography, part of the limited value derived from the program (at expense to the United States’ reputation and some degree of embarrassment over the incursion) was indeed meteorological. The United States and NATO tracked the balloons via radar, and the “data provided the most accurate record to date of high-altitude wind currents, knowledge that meteorologists were later able to put to use to determine optimum flightpaths for U-2 flights.” Id. at 87.
gram but did not acknowledge that it was illegal. At the time, “Soviet writers had not, however, been slow in pointing out that, in its official communications, the United States has not asserted any strict right of one State to fly such balloons into the airspace of another State.”

Overall, this case demonstrates that there can be assertions of sovereignty (that go essentially uncontested) with no shoot-down or other kinetic assertion of control—even without a known capacity to shoot the balloons down at that altitude with any accuracy. Even without all of these potential criteria, it is still regarded as a territorial violation. Thus, the case demonstrates that sovereignty can, and does, potentially extend beyond any bounds of effective control.

d. Overall View: Broad Assertions of Upward Sovereignty

Regardless of the bases, legal or practical, the general disposition at the dawn of the space age was toward expansive assertions of upward state territorial sovereignty. Even Cooper, who abandoned his effective control argument from 1951, by 1956 argued for sovereignty up to 300 miles, though advocating for a convention or treaty (like the Chicago Convention) to this effect that would also cement a transit passage regime for non-military vehicles. This proposal (and the underlying premise that the assumption should be toward state sovereignty) became the baseline for the discussion amassed in the U.S. Senate symposium—most authors either explicitly or tacitly commented on or critiqued Cooper’s position.

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230 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 15.
231 JOHN C. COOPER, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF UPPER SPACE, in EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS OF JOHN COBB COOPER, 1946-1966, supra note 95, at 268, 276 (writing in 1956 before the Sputnik launch). Cooper’s proposed convention would include three essential parts:
a) Reaffirm Article I of the Chicago Convention, giving the subjacent state full sovereignty in the areas of atmospheric space above it, up the height where “aircraft” as now defined, may be operated, such areas to be designated “territorial space.”
b) Extend the sovereignty of the subjacent state upward to 300 miles above the [Earth’s] surface, designating this second area as “contiguous space,” and provide for a right to transit through this zone for all non-military flight instrumentalities when ascending or descending.
c) Accept the principle that all space above “contiguous space” is free for the passage of all instrumentalities.

Id.
232 See generally S. SPECIAL COMM. ON SPACE AND ASTRONAUTICS, supra note 208.
Similarly, writing in 1960, Cheng presumed state sovereignty up to 300–500 miles (400–805 kilometers):

So far there has been little opposition to the passage of foreign artificial [E]arth satellites over national territories. The initial perigees and apogees of the orbits of Sputnik I, Discoverers I, II, V, VII, [and] XI and the Soviet Space Ship are, respectively, 142–588, 99–605, 142–220, 136–450, 100–520, 109–380 and 193–230 miles. These are all wholly or partly in the Earth’s atmosphere—at least the upper regions thereof—and, assuming that the sovereignty of States skyward is conterminous with the terrestrial atmosphere and, therefore, extends to approximately 300–500 miles, within the national airspace of the countries over which they pass.233

While Cheng moved away from this position over the years, it shows the inclination toward upward sovereignty at the dawn of the space age (here, up to 300–500 miles above Earth). It is useful as historical knowledge, showing the position of a qualified publicist frozen in time.

3. Sovereignty, the Satellite (Sputnik), and Beyond: The Innocent Passage Exception

The preeminence of the disposition toward sovereignty is further illustrated in how it was curtailed for uses of outer space. Examining early state positions on overflight and sovereignty, it was the innocent passage concept for “mere overflights by artificial satellites”234 that was the breakthrough. Even this exception, though, was not automatically seen as assured initially. As Cheng warned:

The lack of protest about these satellites up to now hardly affects the principle of airspace sovereignty; for those States which directly or indirectly took part in the International Geophysical Year, and those now taking part in the work of COSPAR (the Committee on Space Research of the International Council of Scientific Unions), can be said to have given their implied consent. For the rest, the passage of such satellites through national airspace depends on the tacit acquiescence of the States over which their orbits pass. It would be erroneous otherwise to conclude that a legal right of innocent passage has already arisen in favor of artificial satellites, similar to the right of innocent passage of merchant ships through foreign territorial seas.235

233 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 38.
234 Id. at 678.
235 Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
As was the case with the air in the debates of 1910 and before the Paris Convention and the Chicago Convention, an innocent passage regime could have been considered and explicitly rejected by states as they passed through this “national airspace” in orbit.\(^{236}\)

However, the overflight of satellites in orbit was allowed by states—they neither protested overflight nor sought permission to overfly other states over the years of satellite flight.\(^{237}\) As one early U.S. adviser put it, “the Russians having been the first with their Satellite to overfly all countries, they have thereby established the international characteristic of orbital space.”\(^{238}\) So this rule for overflight was “established,” or created, contrary to the norm of sovereignty.

Some states advocated for free overflight while others passively permitted it.\(^{239}\) Still, the freedom was not without limits or reservations, demonstrating the vestiges of sovereign assertions. For instance, the Soviet Union, after Sputnik, strongly advocated a freedom of orbit theory, but they distinguished simple passage from different types of use, particularly satellite surveillance and reconnaissance. While the United States’ position was that reconnaissance from orbit was permissible, the Soviets placed it in a class with other aerial spying, such as the U-2 incursions and the meteorological balloon incident over Russian airspace.\(^{240}\) In both instances, the Soviets objected to the overflight, and in the U.N., the General Assembly protested such a use of orbit.\(^{241}\) So the location was not objectionable, but the function was (and would be regardless of where it occurred), taking the objection beyond an orbital (or spatial) context. Even the United States, an advocate for the free use of orbit, made only a qualified asser-

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\(^{236}\) See Cooper, The International Air Navigation Conference, supra note 198, at 123.


\(^{239}\) See, e.g., McMahon, supra note 205, at 351–52 (collecting numerous statements at the U.N. General Assembly in favor of free use of outer space, including those from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, France, Great Britain, Iran, Italy, Japan, Peru, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and Yugoslavia).

\(^{240}\) Id. at 371–73.

\(^{241}\) Id.
tion about the free use of orbit, protecting the potential sovereign interests against any activities not regarded as peaceful:

Although the [United States] has not to date recognized any upper limit to its sovereignty, a principle of freedom of outer space, such as that expressed by the [U.N.] Ad Hoc Committee, suggests that at least in so far as peaceful exploration and use of outer space are concerned, the right of states to exclude persons and objects may not obtain. However, the full implications of a principle of freedom of outer space, in contrast with a principle of national sovereignty over outer space, remain to be fully assessed.\footnote{242 Doc. 479. Report by the National Aeronautics and Space Council, in 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1958–1960, UNITED NATIONS AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL MATTERS para. 24 (1960), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v02/d479 [https://perma.cc/ABA9-NH6W].}

But over time, the free use and travel in orbit became cemented as the law—first as a custom,\footnote{243 See, e.g., McMahon, supra note 205, at 356 (“[N]o matter where the boundary line is drawn, a customary rule of international law has now been established, giving a State the right to place a satellite in orbit for peaceful and scientific purposes.”).} then in the Declaration of Legal Principles, and finally with the Outer Space Treaty.\footnote{244 See Section III.B.2 supra. This broad assertion regarding the universality of freedom of orbit comes from a sovereignty perspective; there is still debate as to the potential effect of “free” use of outer space (and especially advantageous orbits) by states that reach it first with regard to the protections of the Outer Space Treaty. This may particularly include Article I (“free for exploration and use by all states without discrimination of any kind”) and Article II (“Outer space . . . is not subject to appropriation . . . by means of use or occupation, or by any other means”), which could preclude de facto discrimination based on lesser technology and capacity to reach space (thereby precluding use of the orbits by prior occupation by advanced states). See, e.g., Bogota Declaration, supra note 141 (asserting sovereignty over equatorial GEO); Jakhu, supra note 147, at 40; Oduntan, supra note 139, at 75.}

As thousands of satellites have circled the Earth since, the principle has remained consistent.

4. Conclusions: The Disposition is Sovereignty; the Exception is Res Communis

The history of aerial sovereignty demonstrates its broad application traveling to great altitudes. Further, there must be a political expectation that states will make such assertions. As such, the general, or baseline, position should be that states can claim or have claimed territorial sovereignty over an area.
However, this default rule—particularly regarding vertical limits of sovereignty—can be curbed, as with the Outer Space Treaty and its reflection of the agreement that outer space “shall be free for exploration and use by all States.”245 But the limitations and reservations in this freedom further enforce that the underlying position is always a right of sovereignty.

C. A Conservative (Positivist) Approach

The approach taken here gives deference to the clear and established law and regimes, asserting that clarity trumps ambiguity. In essence, states typically assert the most sovereignty possible. The cap on this reach must come from a clear limit on the ability of a state to claim sovereignty. Otherwise, states are free to assert their natural disposition. The lowest that one can argue that state power has been capped, as a matter of law, is with the beginning of the outer space regime. Thus, under the approach offered here, sovereignty must be read to reach as high as the clear beginnings of the outer space regime. And the lowest point at which there is consensus as to a lack of sovereignty (that is, the beginning of the outer space regime) is in satellite orbit. So this should be regarded as the line between airspace and outer space, considering sovereignty as the determining factor.

This section first seeks to justify the propriety of this conservative approach and its focus on positive law in the context of outer space law. Then it provides analysis of how the approach demonstrates that the line between air and space should be drawn to maximize the state disposition toward sovereignty. Finally, it develops why satellite orbit should form that line.

1. In Defense of a Positivist Approach

This argument is written from a generally positivist perspective.246 That is, it assumes that states are the drivers of international law, are the primary actors (and creators, by their

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245 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. I, para. 2.

246 An opposing view to this positivist, state-focused view may be that of legal pluralism:

The force of the law must be explained in some way beyond a reference to state sovereignty. Legal pluralism offers a number of insights in this context, finding law to exist in parallel and intersecting spheres beyond the state. Legal norms arise whenever communities of practices can be found, linking actors on the basis of shared interests or practices.
consent), and are generally free to act in the absence of prohibitive rules of international law.  

a. The Approach is Consistent with State Behavior and International Law Norms

Created by states in 1945, the ICJ Statute cements the primacy of states in international law with Article 38. Often regarded as outlining the acceptable sources of international law, it demonstrates that states, through their consent and practice, create binding international law.

State consensus also drives the creation of law in the air and space context. For instance, the COPUOS operates with a consensus-based approach. It is not a legislative body but a mechanism by which states can express their views, and law can be derived from the intersection of those positions. This reflects a recognition that the consent of all affected states is key—not just as a matter of law or procedure, but also for practical effect.

René Provost, *The Move to Substantive Equality in International Humanitarian Law: A Rejoinder to Marco Sassoli and Yuval Shany*, 92 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 437, 441 (2011). But Provost is addressing how to (effectively) ensure application and compliance of IHL to non-state actors, particularly in armed conflicts not of an international nature. Here, though, the essential matter in question involves states and their activities—so the pluralist argument does not terribly undermine this positivist approach toward states’ uses of force based on state territorial sovereignty.

250 Article 38 states:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
   a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
   b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
   c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;

ICJ Statute, *supra* note 62, art. 38(1) (the article also outlines subsidiary means of determining the existence of such laws, including “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists”). Of these three sources, even the most potentially far-leaning away from open consent by a state is the general principles of law; but even those principles must be “recognized” by states to become binding.

252 See CHENG, STUDIES, *supra* note 62, at 184–85. Cheng quotes the Soviet delegate to COPUOS, addressing the necessity of uniform agreement (at least among the space-faring nations) for creation of outer space law:
Also, ICAO is a globalized forum for discussion of relevant issues, but the power remains in the hands of states that ultimately have to approve the ICAO regime through the representative Council\textsuperscript{253} and then domestically implement what the ICAO regime dictates.\textsuperscript{254} Similarly, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) may have numerous non-state sector members, but the essential power is held by states.\textsuperscript{255}

The primacy of states is also evident in the substance of outer space law. For example, Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty’s placement of states squarely into a position of responsibility (hence approval and control) for space activities only adds to the involvement of states in the creation of laws (municipal or international) affecting matters of outer space.\textsuperscript{256}

\begin{flushright}
Twenty-six signatures on this document would have no value; there must be twenty-eight signatures [the entirety of COPUOS membership at the time]. Even if all of us, including the Soviet Union, the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America—which are in principle in favor of signing the declaration, sign, if there is no signature of the United States, the whole endeavour would have no result. It is clear that without agreement of the United States it is impossible to resolve such a problem.
\end{flushright}

\textit{Id. at 185} (citing U.N. G\textsc{a}or, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 18th Sess., 15th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.15 (Feb. 21, 1963), http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/transcripts/copuos/AC105_PV015E.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3BN-QBCX]). This deference to the practical necessity of affected states being particularly accounted for in determinations of applicable law was noted by the ICJ in the \textit{North Sea Continental Shelf Cases}. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den., Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 43 (Feb. 20) (“an indispensable requirement would be that within the period in question, short though it might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked”).

\textsuperscript{253} Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, arts. 50–55; Dempsey, \textit{Public International Air Law}, supra note 71, at 50.

\textsuperscript{254} See Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, art. 37; Dempsey, \textit{Public International Air Law}, supra note 71, at 53 (“Annexes are not self-executing[ ] and depend upon the willingness of member States to promulgate national laws and regulations and implement and enforce them vigilantly.”). The exception to this is the ICAO regime over the high seas, which applies without subsequent promulgation. Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, art. 12.


\textsuperscript{256} Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. VI; see also Cheng, \textit{Article VI of the 1967 Space Treaty Revisited}, supra note 126.
Also, the context in which this issue is examined—the law of war—is largely a positivist one in its roots and construction. Provost discusses reciprocity among equal, sovereign states as a basis for the current system of IHL, and this reciprocity notion ties directly into the importance of the consent of states as the creators of international law:

It reflects the fact that most agents will agree to be bound by a norm on the basis that they thereby obtain a benefit. In the context of public international law, states will indeed usually demand a quid pro quo in the exchange of rights and obligations created by a treaty or under customary law.

The same positivist construct that holds true for the development of air law, space law, and the law of war should apply to the analysis of the use of force in aerospace. Overall, states are in the driver’s seat of international regimes, and they recognize that control.

b. The Approach is Consistent with Other Examinations of International Law

The deference to states and concern not to overstep the bounds to which states have consented is present throughout the writings of relevant publicists. However, major institu-


258 Id. at 18. However, this is not an endorsement of strict positivism in IHL. Instead, he concludes that to bring non-state (asymmetrical) actors into the purview and control of IHL, “[t]he solution is to expose the hollowness of a state monopoly on the power to create rules . . . [which] then paves the way for a pluralization of the norm creation process to attract, from all classes of agents, normative commitments on the basis of understandings shared in a community of practice.” Id. at 37.


260 For instance, Lachs, in the context of discussing an innocent passage regime for reaching outer space, admonished:

It should not therefore be lightly presumed, especially where it does not result from any express declaration of will. Thus while acquiescence may create a presumption of acceptance, it precludes the assumption that States have renounced, once and for all, the right to any activity connected with outer space that may be carried on in their airspace.
tional examinations of the law also endorse this positivist approach.

For instance, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) produced a study on customary international law that took a similarly state-driven, conservative approach to its examination of the law pertaining to armed conflicts. Some commentators dispute the ICRC’s adherence to the method in practice (that is, in finding more law or prohibitions on state activity than may actually exist). Nonetheless, the conservative, state-driven method, if applied, appears to be sound and in line with one of the most credible institutions involved in the relevant issues.

Also, the ILC study on Fragmentation of International Law can be read consistent with this approach. That expansive study examines the interplay of legal regimes and, in particular, the relationship between lex specialis and “general international law.” It shows a preference for reading laws in harmony but recognizes that there may be conflict in the application of norms. If the two notions of law cannot be harmonized, they must be prioritized.

Lachs, supra note 64, at 57–58. This demonstrates aversion to overstepping the bounds of state acceptance of new norms of law.

261 Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law xxxvii (Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross ed., 2005) (providing a detailed explanation of the method employed in the ICRC study of customary international law with the central focus on state practice to defend the development of rules).

262 See Claude Emanuelli, International Humanitarian Law 37–41 (2009) (critiquing the ICRC study on three bases by essentially declaring the findings self-serving and criticizing the breadth of what is considered “state practice” and the lack of definition of opinio juris).


264 See ILC Fragmentation Report Analysis, supra note 263, at 25.

265 See id., at 24–25 (“legal reasoning will either have to seek to harmonize the apparently conflicting standards through interpretation or, if that seems implausible, to establish definite relationships of priority between them”).
The ILC endorses the maxim *lex specialis derogat legi generali*, but this application is limited to the appropriate scope of the *lex specialis*. Overall, the study sanctions a narrow construction of deviations to general rules: “The scope of special laws is by definition narrower than that of general laws. It will thus frequently be the case that a matter not regulated by special law will arise in the institutions charged to administer it. In such cases, the relevant general law will apply.”

That is, in the prioritization of laws, *lex specialis* should not be read beyond its intended, inherently limited, bounds. What makes *lex specialis* so powerful—its specificity—is also arguably its greatest weakness when it comes to breadth of application.

c. Addressing the *Lotus* Issue

The *Lotus* case is emblematic of this conservative, positivist approach. In 1927, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) decided the *Lotus* case, which generally involved the assertion of national criminal jurisdiction at sea. It is perhaps best known, though, for the assertion that “[r]estrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.”

Essentially, this means that which is not prohibited by law is allowed by states: “all that can be required of a State is that it should not overstep the limits which international law places upon [it].” While this work does not directly cite to the *Lotus* case as a legal basis for the assertion of a conservative or positivist approach to regime selection, the conservative genesis is certainly the same. Therefore, attacks on the *Lotus* principle could be construed as an attack on the notion put forth here.

And, the *Lotus* assertion has its critics in the legal literature, particularly the analysis of outer space law. One especially cogent attack on use of the *Lotus* principle (and the idea of freedom of state actions) in the context of space law comes from *Lotus* case, which generally involved the assertion of national criminal jurisdiction at sea. It is perhaps best known, though, for the assertion that “[r]estrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.”

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268 *Id.* at 18 (before this conclusion, stating that “rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims.”). *But see ICJ Statute, supra* note 62, art. 38(1).

269 Fr. v. Turk., 1927 P.C.I.J. at 19 (directly addressing the discretion to assert jurisdiction).
Jakhu.270 He noted that “[a]s early as 1962, Christol wrote that ‘[t]he Lotus Case does not constitute a precedent in favor of unrestricted national uses and activities in outer space.’” Instead of the *Lotus* principle, he argued that state uses and applications of space must be guided (and limited) by the global public interest.271 The use of force is arguably contrary to this notion.272 So the use of force and security-based construct articulated here would run into problems in this context.

However, the concern over the application of the *Lotus* case (or requirement of state consent to any limitations on their capacity to act) does not preclude the present analysis. First, as discussed above, general international law and air and space law reveal that states are the key actors. In discussing who creates international law, Cheng noted the truism that solely “international persons” have “the capacity to bear rights and duties under international law.”273 In addressing “international persons” he stated:

> The truth is that present-day international persons are, with at most only one or two exceptions, primarily States, i.e., territorially organized political entities recognized as sovereign and independent (i.e., subject to no other [E]arthly authority), together with a number of inter-State organizations to which international

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270 Jakhu, *supra* note 147, at 41 (“In space law, the ‘general presumption in favor of freedom of action’ is not applicable.”); see also Jakhu & Freeland, *supra* note 144, at 470 (citing Brownlie and noting that the *Lotus* case was a narrow, bare majority decision); see generally Jakhu, *supra* note 147, at 41–43.

271 Jakhu, *supra* note 147, at 37 (the global public interest contains many (thirteen named) facets, including: space activities must be for the benefit and in the interests of all countries (and space activities are the “province of all mankind”); there is freedom of use and exploration; there can be no national appropriation; and states will exhibit mutual respect, cooperation, and assistance where required.). The global public interest in the use and exploration of outer space is also referred to as the “common interest principle.” See id. at 34; see also Outer Space Treaty, *supra* note 60, art. I.

272 See Jakhu, *supra* note 147, at 97. According to Jakhu:

> It seems that, perhaps relying on the *obiter dictum* of the *Lotus* case, the U.S. Government believes that “[t]here is no blanket prohibition in international law on placing or using weapons in space, applying force from space to Earth or conducting military operations in and through space.” However, the fallacy of this position from the international law perspective is evident, not only because of inapplicability of the *Lotus* decision to outer space activities, but also in view of almost unanimous rejection by the international community of this position, expressed most recently in the December 2004 U.N. General Assembly Resolution.

Id. at 98 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).

legal personality has been granted. Since membership of these organizations is normally limited to States, the basic unit of international society remains, therefore, the sovereign and independent State.274

Thus, the principle articulated in the Lotus case, that states are bound by rules only upon which they have agreed, is generally operative today.275 Cheng reiterated that “[i]n international law, as the Permanent Court of International Justice in the above passage quoted from the judgment in the case of The Lotus said, rules of international law emanate from the free will of States.”276

Moreover, Jakhu’s argument need not preclude state action and control (and the general requirement of state consent for binding law). To the contrary, his thesis is that states have agreed to certain general principles of law for the use of outer space, largely through the Outer Space Treaty and subsequent widely accepted space treaties. So the argument is really that states should be held to these general principles to which they have already agreed (more of a pacta sunt servanda argument). These are not norms created by third parties or arbitrarily imposed on space-faring actors; they are in the properly constituted corpus juris spatialis itself—albeit not in great deal of operative detail.

Also, it must be noted that the common interest principle applies in space but not in the air—that is explicitly sovereign territory, and the defense of this sovereignty is acceptable (within the limits of the law of war or other controlling laws such as Article 3bis of the Chicago Convention). In this context, perhaps for the assessment of aerospace vehicles and applications, the law of war makes more sense than an outer space law that arguably restricts all force as an affront to free use and exploration.277 There is an issue as to which regime applies. It is conceded that if space law applies to this gray area, so too would the common

274 Id. at 173.
275 See Ramey, supra note 22, at 65–66.
276 Cheng, Studies, supra note 62, at 178.
277 While the laws of war may apply, that does not necessarily mean they are well-suited to or even adequate for outer space applications. See Freel, supra note 22, at 83 (“although the laws of war do (in theory) appear to apply to activities in outer space, the principles may not be specific enough to provide appropriate regulation for the increasingly diverse ways in which outer space could be used during the course of armed conflict.”); see also Bourbonnière & Lee, Jus ad Bellum, supra note 22; Bourbonnière & Lee, Legality of the Deployment, supra note 22; Ramey, supra note 22.
interest principles govern aerospace vehicles operating therein. But space law (and deference toward its common principles) should not govern the issue of whether space law applies at all in the zone. Of course, if the Outer Space Treaty articulated where the space regime began it would be clear how it applied to delimitation, but it does not. Therefore, one should not assume that space law with its unique modalities applies in the first place—particularly, one should not assert that the deviation from more terrestrial procedures (such as the freedom of action for sovereign states absent a clear prohibition, as captured in the Lotus case) would apply.

2. Analysis: Sovereignty is the Rule; Free Movement the Exception

Section B of this chapter demonstrated that there is a law, or at least a general disposition of states, regarding their vertical territorial claims: it is toward sovereignty _ad coelum_, or to the heavens. This baseline disposition should be respected until it is formally capped by those with the authority to do so: the states.

This argument (or description of the state of the law) is proffered to suggest that sovereign airspace is the default, but that position need not be considered automatic to serve as the baseline. Though the analysis here dates back to the Chicago Convention, and before that the Paris Convention and the general disposition of Roman law, it is not necessarily a natural law—a way that things inherently are or must be. It can be considered as a construct as well. But, surely, it is a construct long-accepted and time-tested, particularly relative to outer space law. As such, it serves as a baseline or default for measuring the legal status quo when confronting a new or conflicting regime.

Of course, states must recognize that their territorial claims cannot go to infinity (as a practical matter, at least); there are limits. Regarding an _usque ad infinitum_ theory of sovereignty, McMahon noted that “[s]uch a view may be more accurately characterized as _usque ad absurdum._” Oduntan expanded on this

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278 See discussion at Sections III.A.2 and IV.B.1 supra.

279 This preference for the baseline is not inconsistent with the construction norms outlined in the ILC Fragmentation Report Conclusions, supra note 263. A central premise of this argument is that, regarding the relevant criteria, airspace and outer space constitute distinct regimes and apply exclusively in a given area. As such, a hierarchical approach to comparing them (that is, which one trumps the other in a situation where both apply) is unnecessary.

280 McMahon, supra note 205, at 342.
sentiment, similarly critiquing an overly-expansive assertion of sovereignty into outer space. While it is reasonable to note the absurdity of an overly broad view of sovereignty (well into outer space), this critique is inapplicable here. This work concedes that once outer space is reached, outer space law (with free movement) would be the governing regime; so there is no projection of sovereignty into outer space. The question is where outer space begins—the theory Oduntan addressed and dismissed is really not one of delimitation at all; it is better construed as a denial of the application of the Outer Space Treaty in general, which is not advocated here.

So where is the cap on assertions of sovereignty (and the airspace regime)? The clear point is at the beginning of outer space. As an early position of the United States on air and space delimitation stated, “space is divided into two regions: ‘air space’ and ‘outer space.’ ‘Outer space’ is considered as contiguous to ‘air space,’ with the lower limit of ‘outer space’ being the upper limit of ‘air space.’” Where one ends, the other, with its unique regime for sovereignty and state craft, begins.

Outer space law was not a nascent law to be discovered—it was carved out and created in a process in the mid-1960s through the mid-to-late-1970s. The process was controlled and deliberate, largely through the mechanism of the COPUOS. Also, the numerous documents available from the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian reveal the ef-

281 In discounting what he refers to as the “Usque Ad Infinitum Theory” of delimitation, he stated:

It is agreed that any projection of territorial sovereignty into space infinitum will not only violate international law, but will be inconsistent with basic astronomical facts. The revolution of the Earth requires that its position in relation to space and celestial bodies is never constant for the slightest conceivable fraction of time. Such a projection into Space would give us a series of adjacent irregularly shaped cones of jurisdiction, continuously moving into themselves; with celestial bodies moving into and out of these cones ceaselessly. In these circumstances the concept of a space cone of sovereignty is both meaningless and a dangerous abstraction.

Oduntan, supra note 139, at 78.


283 The Moon Agreement was signed in 1979, but its status as a controlling space document is dubious as it has only sixteen ratifications (and an additional four signatures). See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 145, at 10.

284 See CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 151 (writing in 1985 about the process, “in the development of space law in the United Nations one witnesses in
forts made to craft outer space law, both by the United States and other countries.\(^{285}\) While the assessments are from a U.S. point of view, they also contain assessments of other states’ (particularly the Soviet Union or key U.S. allies) positions and efforts at and motivations for creating outer space law. The overall conclusion is that outer space law was no accident—it was based on a series of conscious decisions made by states to create it. This supports a perspective of outer space law as a carve out from the disposition; an exception to the rule and a cap on the sovereignty regime of airspace.

3. *Orbit as the Line*

That airspace is sovereign is well-accepted among states and scholars alike.\(^{286}\) The question, then, is at what line does the law deviate from the baseline (sovereignty) to the exceptional regime (freedom of use and exploration)? From the development of outer space freedom, it appears that the line is at orbit.

a. *Affirmative Evidence of Orbit as the Line*

The academic and political debate of passage of satellites dominated the discussion of outer space freedom of navigation—satellites were the breakthrough innovation that precipitated the development of the outer space regime. So absent any further guidance from the Outer Space Treaty or other source of law, satellites (and their flight path) must be the guide point for the differentiation between the two regimes.

Recalling the oft-quoted passage from Judge Lachs:

[T]he first instruments that men sent into outer space traversed the air space of States and circled above them in outer space, yet the launching States sought no permission, nor did the other States protest. This is how the freedom of movement into outer space, and in it, came to be established and recognized as law within a remarkably short period of time.\(^{287}\)}


\(^{286}\) See Section III.A.2 supra; see also COOPER, Roman Law, supra note 97, at 55.

He also later stated, “[i]t seemed therefore justified to interpret their acquiescence as consent.”\textsuperscript{288} If sovereignty did not otherwise exist where the orbital activities were taking place, consent or acquiescence would be irrelevant. To use a law of the sea analogy, states do not have to “permit” foreign vessels to operate on the high seas (or even in exclusive economic zones)—they are free to do so because the area of operation has been determined to be free. So through this practice of orbit, states recognized that there should be (and, therefore, after no protests, was) freedom of orbit.

Others have a slightly different articulation of the meaning of the lack of protest from states over which Sputnik circled. According to Freeland, “[t]his international (in)action confirmed that this new frontier of human activity did not possess the elements of sovereignty that had already been well[-]established under the international law principles regulating land, sea, and air[ ]space on Earth.”\textsuperscript{289} Under this view, the lack of protest did not carve out a new area or exception to the rule; instead, it revealed that outer space, inherently, was not subject to state sovereignty. This may be a subtle distinction, but it could make a difference in the analysis as to the default regime (and whether they can be regarded along a spectrum or divided by a line). However, even if this view is more accurate, it must be noted that Sputnik only revealed that there is no state sovereignty down to orbit. Below orbit, there was no such revelation of freedom, and the Outer Space Treaty ten years later did nothing to expand on that position. Thus, the analysis ends up in the same place; that is, orbit is the lowest known position of non-sovereignty—be it by its inherent nature or as an accepted exception to the rule.

From a practical perspective, the U.K. Military Space Primer analogizes orbital paths to the law of the sea and international straits passage. By their nature, satellites cannot (reasonably) maneuver out of their path, so they require a passage regime to operate.\textsuperscript{290} While this is a recent articulation, it was true at the dawn of the space age as well.

\textsuperscript{288} Lachs, \textit{supra} note 64, at 126. But Lachs is not entirely clear overall that the passage exception is a deviation from airspace law as opposed to the discovery of a new law. \textit{See id.}, at 125 (describing the overflight, without consent or objection, “like ‘a path across the common.’”). So the “common” notion could suggest a preexisting \textit{res communis} and not a forged one.

\textsuperscript{289} Freeland, \textit{supra} note 22, at 88.

\textsuperscript{290} U.K. Ministry of Defence, \textit{supra} note 63, at 2-2.
Also, it is important that passage (whether considered “innocent” or “transit,” to use the law of the sea nomenclature) must be just that: passage. Many articulations of the orbital exception that underlies the outer space regime refer to it as “innocent passage.” Under the law of the sea, this would preclude offensive maneuvers as well as espionage and a host of other activities conducted by satellites since the early years of the space age. And it should be recalled that such passage for state craft (such as warships) is unique to the sea entirely—it does not generally apply to aircraft. Even if the regime is construed as more akin to “transit passage,” there are still degrees of restrictions. And, inherently, there still must be passage (not loitering or operations)—thus, the overflight would be fleeting.

In orbit, states can generally be assured that satellites or orbital vehicles are conducting passive passage; that is, they are generally powered by natural forces and will only last for a short, fleeting period (depending on the size of the subjacent state and the relative speed of the craft). Regardless of whether states endorse the additional activities (remote sensing, communications, etc.) conducted while passing over, it is not controlled flight based on conscious maneuvering of the craft (aside from being placed in orbit initially). Below orbit, however, is a zone of controlled flight and purposeful, active operation. And many of the future aerospace applications contemplated herein would involve more than mere passage. Particularly with regard to state (and especially military) craft, this is a freedom beyond what states accepted with the first overflights, and it was no further defined in the Outer Space Treaty or subsequent agreements.

Aside from just being less offensive to subjacent states, the distinction between passive and controlled flight also makes an important difference in the application of force. Even assuming

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291 See UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 18(2) (regarding innocent passage, “Passage shall be continuous and expeditious.”); id. art. 38(2) (“Transit passage means the exercise . . . of the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit”).

292 See id. arts. 18–19; John Oliver, National Security and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea: U.S. Coast Guard Perspectives, 15 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 573, 585 (2009); Su, supra note 101, at 376; see also Rolph, supra note 18, at 160. Rolph addresses whether passage must be navigationally “necessary” to be innocent. In the context of provocative overflights by Russia, and the United States’ drive to test territorial boundaries (in the sea), the issue could be ripe for friction in aerospace.

293 See Sections III.A.2 and III.A.3 supra.

294 UNCLOS, supra note 59, arts. 38–39.
that shooting down an encroaching state craft (in sovereign space) would be legal under a targeting (that is, *jus in bello*) analysis in a particular circumstance, a state may have difficulty justifying force against a satellite or mere passage incursion from a *jus ad bellum* perspective (which, of course, must come first in times of peace). While operations in the gray area could constitute a threat or a sustained violation of sovereignty tantamount to force or a threat thereof, mere fleeting passage is not likely to be reasonably construed as an “armed attack” under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter or as a case where a “necessity of self-defense is instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” Thus, the distinction between that which is in orbit (creating the orbital line) and that which operates below is of prudential significance.

Finally, it should be noted that it is not just “natural” movement (like orbit) that triggers the peak of sovereign territory. Recall the 1956 balloon incident between the United States and the Soviet Union. There, the high-altitude balloons were set adrift to travel where the winds took them. In this regard, this is like “orbit” in that it is not really a controlled flight; it is at the beck and call of natural forces—winds, physics, and gravity. In some ways, balloons are even more so at the whim of natural forces than orbits (as there are occasional corrections by satellites to ensure maintenance of a particular orbit). But just being subject to nature did not save the balloons from being regarded (and accepted by the silence of the United States) as violating sovereignty. Despite the changes in technology and world politics since this 1956 incident (or the 1960 U-2 shoot-down), practically little has changed in the law. A 2005 U.S. Air Force analysis of high-altitude balloons (operating in near space), as com-

295 This particularly could be the case from the perspective of a state asserting a preemptive self-defense right. See Section II.B.1 supra.

296 See Miller, supra note 25; see also Murphy, supra note 22, at 711 (discussing the Caroline incident in the context of anticipatory self-defense). But see Turkey’s Downing of Russian Warplane—What We Know, supra note 46 (even by Turkish accounts, the incursion by two Russian jets resulting in a shoot-down by Turkish forces was at most “2.19 [kilometers] (1.36 miles) and 1.85 [kilometers] (1.15 miles) into Turkey for 17 seconds” over a small peninsula of Turkish sovereignty jutting into Syria.). This may reveal that some states are less inclined toward deference to fleeting passage, at least in the context of heightened concerns (and sensitivity) over respect for borders. See Letter from Y. Halit Cevik, supra note 47 (noting six prior complaints by Turkey at the U.N. Security Council for violations of its territorial integrity).
pared to satellites, supports the idea of an expansive upward extent of sovereignty, particularly from incursion by military craft:

So, if satellites are so expensive and so nonresponsive and if they are physically unable to provide persistence, why, then, do we buy them at all? The answer today is the same as it has been since the 1950s—freedom of overflight. The importance of freedom of overflight cannot be overemphasized as a positive aspect of orbital operations. Satellites are the only legal means by which overhead ISR can be performed deep inside the territory of sovereign nations during peacetime.297

So only when hostilities commence (and the territorial integrity of an enemy belligerent is no longer respected) would near-space usage be appropriate under this analysis. The 1956 incident and this more recent analysis demonstrate that states are not willing to allow just any high-altitude incursion due to natural paths—the allowance is unique to orbit, making it a distinction in practice; that is, a line.

b. The Lack of Contrary Evidence

There is a dearth of evidence to contradict the assertion of orbit as the line of demarcation between airspace and outer space as it pertains to sovereignty. There is no conventional law on point.298 Regarding state practice, there is a similar lack of


298 In fact, a recent attempt at conventional law demonstrates the lack of consensus as to a fixed definition of outer space and actually bolsters the notion of an orbital definition as a more widely acceptable one. The 2008 draft of the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), explicitly defined “outer space” as “the space above the Earth in excess of 100 [kilometers] above sea level.” Draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects, Feb. 29, 2008, http://www.cfr.org/space/treaty-prevention-placement-weapons-outer-space-threat-use-force-against-outer-space-objects/ppwt/p26678 [https://perma.cc/25MS-99JB] [hereinafter 2008 Draft PPWT]. However, the 2014 draft PPWT removed this provision, or any reference to a specific definition of “outer space.” Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects, June 10, 2014, http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/2014/documents/PPWT2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9VX-9BEX] [hereinafter 2014 Draft PPWT]. This omission was made to address “some of the criticism and concerns” with the 2008 version and to make it more widely acceptable. Id.; see SPACE SECURITY INDEX 2015, at 109 (Anna Jaikaran ed., 2015). Still, in this attempt at making the 2014 PPWT more palatable, it added an orbit-based definition of “placed in outer space” at Article I(c): “a device is considered as ‘placed in outer space’
activity to contradict the idea that states are entitled to sovereignty up to the point of orbit, both in international pronouncements and in state domestic laws.

Many have argued for a right of passage to and from outer space through airspace. This could form the seeds of a functionalist mode of operation below orbit for outer space craft. According to Lachs, the “right of innocent passage should on principle be attributed to all States without discrimination.” However, this is still an assertion of what should be versus what is. Instead, it is at best unclear whether transit passage is allowed in airspace to reach outer space.

This is because the matter has not been tested in reality—there is no state practice. The United States and European Space Agency launches generally take place in locations that do not require overflight of sovereign territory (just the launching state, or the high seas). Further, discussing Kazakhstan (home of the primary Russian launch site) and in general, Benkő and Plescher stated:

[W]e would like to emphasize that passage through foreign territory for the purpose of reaching orbit is not necessary . . . and has never been practiced without consultation of foreign States potentially affected. As to the passage of re-entering spacecraft no current practice is known either in this respect, since the U.S. Space Shuttle, which has been the only operational system for decades, which could have affected passage, does not have to pass through foreign airspace under regular (non-accident) conditions. As to the Shuttle’s emergency landing sites on foreign territory, agreements have been concluded . . . so that these cases are not relevant for international practice or customary law.

While these are typically state vehicles, making them more offensive from an airspace perspective, the rights of civilian craft remain unclear as well. In the 1990s, Russia passed a law al-

when it orbits the Earth at least once, or follows a section of such an orbit before leaving orbit, or is placed at any location in outer space or on any celestial body other than Earth.” 2014 Draft PPWT, supra, art. I.

299 LACHS, supra note 64, at 57.


301 BENKÓ & PLESCHER, supra note 5, at 34 (emphasis in original).

302 For instance, the Google Loon project, a commercial endeavor to provide high-altitude balloon-based internet service, is seeking clearances and approvals from states to operate at around 20 kilometers (12 miles). See What is Project Loon, supra note 10; Zacks Equity Res., Google’s Project Loon to Beam 3G Across Sri Lanka?,
allowing for a foreign craft to “execute a single inoffensive flight through the airspace of the Russian Federation for the purpose of” reaching or returning from outer space.303 However, if Russia is empowered to limit it to one such flight, that is a clear indicator that they retain sovereignty over the zone vis-à-vis such space-bound craft in subsequent flights. As such, it is a one-time exception that further proves the rule. So, overall, there has been no practice from which a customary norm either lowering the spatial ceiling on sovereignty or creating a functionalist exception thereto could have emerged.

Similarly, there is little in the way of consistency of state positions to demonstrate an *inchoate opinio juris* (which may be an indicator of how states will or would act to formulate a custom of international law). This is best demonstrated by the COPUOS questionnaires on the matter and the responses thereto.304 For delimitation in general, states were asked:

(i) Does your Government consider it necessary to define outer space and/or to delimit airspace and outer space, given the current level of space and aviation activities and technological development in space and aviation technologies?
(ii) Does your Government consider another approach to solving this issue?
(iii) Does your Government give consideration to the possibility of defining a lower limit of outer space and/or an upper limit of airspace, recognizing at the same time the possibility of enacting special international or national legislation relating to a mission carried out by an object in both airspace and outer space?305

Regarding the “possible legal issues with regard to aerospace objects,” states were asked:

Question 1. Can an aerospace object be defined as an object which is capable both of travelling through outer space and of

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303 BENKÓ & PLESCHER, supra note 5, at 33–34; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 174, at 172–73, n.82.
using its aerodynamic properties to remain in airspace for a certain period of time?

Question 2. Does the regime applicable to the flight of aerospace objects differ according to whether it is located in airspace or outer space?

Question 3. Are there special procedures for aerospace objects, considering the diversity of their functional characteristics, the aerodynamic properties and space technologies used and their design features, or should a single or unified regime be developed for such objects?

Question 4. Are aerospace objects while in airspace considered as aircraft, and while in outer space as spacecraft, with all the legal consequences that follow therefrom, or does either air law or space law prevail during the flight of an aerospace craft, depending on the destination of such a flight?

Question 5. Are the take-off and landing phases specially distinguished in the regime for an aerospace object as involving a different degree of regulation from entry into airspace from outer space orbit and subsequent return to that orbit?

Question 6. Are the norms of national and international air law applicable to an aerospace object of one State while it is in the airspace of another State?

Question 7. Are there precedents with respect to the passage of aerospace objects during take-off and/or re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere, and does customary international law exist with respect to such passage?

Question 8. Are there any national and/or international legal norms with respect to the passage of aerospace objects during take-off and/or re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere?

Question 9. Are the rules concerning the registration of objects launched into outer space applicable to aerospace objects?

Question 10. What are the differences between the legal regimes of airspace and outer space? 


(i) Is there a relationship between suborbital flights for scientific missions and/or for human transportation and the definition and delimitation of outer space?

(ii) Will the legal definition of suborbital flights for scientific missions and/or for human transportation be practically useful for States and other actors with regard to space activities?
A survey of state responses to each of these questionnaires reveals that states accept the distinction of airspace and outer space and the importance of respect for sovereignty, but it also shows a great lack of consistency in substantive answers to the question of the international law with regard to delimitation.\textsuperscript{307} With the wide-ranging responses, the only real consensus reached in each report on delimitation and aerospace vehicles was that the COPUOS would continue to address the issues.

State responses regarding domestic laws defining outer space are equally unavailing as to state consistency.\textsuperscript{308} The U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) posts relevant legislation online; however, only twenty-two states provide national legislation at all, and few of those elect to define or delimit the meaning or scope of “outer space.”\textsuperscript{309} One oft-cited domestic determination of “outer space” comes from Australia, which in various definitions of terms for its Space Activities Act of 1998 refers to 100 kilometers as a line of demarcation.\textsuperscript{310} But Australia explicitly denied that this was a definition of “outer space” and asserted that there is no international law as to delimitation; instead, the Space Activities Act is said to be designed merely to provide the intended scope of domestic regulation (without ex-

(iii) How will the legal definition of suborbital flights for scientific missions and/or for human transportation impact the progressive development of space law?

(iv) Please propose other questions to be considered in the framework of the legal definition of suborbital flights for scientific missions and/or for human transportation.

\textsuperscript{307} See Su, supra note 101, at 371 (discussing lack of consensus in COPUOS on innocent passage of aerospace vehicles); see also BENKO & PLESCHER, supra note 5; KAYSER, supra note 171, at 45 n.97.

\textsuperscript{308} See Su, supra note 101, at 361–63.


\textsuperscript{310} Space Activities Act 1998 (Cth) pt 2 sch 8 (Austl.), https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2013C00462 [https://perma.cc/5F29-P95L] (using above 100 kilometers as the threshold for space in definitions of “launch,” “launch vehicle,” “return,” and “space object”). Similarly, European Union Regulation No. 388/2012, in the context of export controls, defined “space-qualified” products as those “designed, manufactured and tested to meet the special electrical, mechanical or environmental requirements for use in the launch and deployment of satellites or high-altitude flight systems operating at altitudes of 100 km or higher.” Council Regulation 388/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 129) 31 (EC); see Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 305, at 39.
ternal effect).\footnote{311} Other states, such as South Africa\footnote{312} and Belgium,\footnote{313} focus on orbit as the trigger for outer space and outer space activities. However, while these domestic assertions bolster the validity of orbit as the line (as offered as a default, or “safe,” position here), there are simply too few for them, alone, to provide evidence of an emerging norm.

Though only signed by eight states, the Declaration of the First Meeting of Equatorial Countries of 1976 (Bogota Declaration) presents an interesting potential counterpoint to the idea that orbit is the line as a matter of \textit{opinio juris}.\footnote{314} The assertion of sovereignty at such a high altitude may seem odd at first, especially in the context of what is settled in the delimitation debate. But the Bogota Declaration actually reveals a kernel of difficulty in the orbital-based analysis of the system. GEO is definitely an orbit by any scientific definition. But, it is unlike an orbit in a sovereignty context. That is, a satellite moving in a geostationary orbit (a GEO with zero eccentricity along the equator) appears to be stationary vis-à-vis a particular point on Earth because the speed of orbit matches the relative rotational speed of the Earth along its axis.\footnote{315} In effect, it seems like an object at any other altitude that is able to loiter in a given position.\footnote{316} This flies contrary to the disposition of orbits that steered the acceptance of

\footnote{311} U.N. Secretariat, National Legislation and Practice Relating to Definition and Delimitation of Outer Space, Note by the Secretariat, para. 2, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/865/Add.1 (Mar. 20, 2006), http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/reports/ac105/AC105_865Add1E.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SMC-UT7F] (“There is no definition of ‘outer space’ in domestic Australian law and Australia recognizes that there is no internationally accepted definition or delimitation of the term . . . .”); \textit{id.} para. 6. (“The 100-[kilometer] altitude represents a practical clarification of where the Act applies. The 100-[kilometer] altitude was not an attempt on Australia’s part to define or delimit ‘outer space.’”).

\footnote{312} Space Affairs Act of 1993 art. 1 (S. Afr.) (“‘outer space’ means the space above the surface of the earth from a height at which it is in practice possible to operate an object in an orbit around the earth”).


\footnote{314} See Bogota Declaration, \textit{supra} note 141.


\footnote{316} See Pelton, \textit{Geosynchronous}, \textit{supra} note 10.
the orbital exception to sovereignty, namely the inevitability of their crossing borders by their nature. From an upward projection of state borders, a satellite in GEO would not appear to be crossing any horizontal boundaries in its flight. Based on this “link” to an equatorial point on Earth, the eight equatorial states declared GEO as part of their territory and not outer space.317

The Bogota Declaration supports the notion that state sovereignty could, in theory and absent contrary agreement, extend fairly deep into outer space, a major premise of this work. But it also undermines the notion that states have actually conceded claims of sovereignty at orbit. If this was a dominant view of states, it would be problematic for the argument. However, the assertion of the Bogota Declaration has been rejected by most all other states, so it does not form any contrary or clear law.318 Also, even if accepted, its premise is not controlling on the gray area discussion here—geographically, it falls well within the settled area of outer space law, so its application would not illuminate a line between air and space so much as undermine the entire outer space regime in general. And that is beyond the intended argument made here.

4. Conclusion: Orbit is the Division Point

Overall, orbital passage is the exception to the rule of sovereignty; it is the starting point for the new regime, which allows free movement above sovereign airspace. In the absence of clear rules or modifications to the baseline regime of sovereignty, airspace law should be assumed as the governing law. There is no known, clear exception for loitering or operating in upper airspace. The U.S. Space Shuttle sought permission; Google Loon is seeking permission; and the U.S. Air Force near-space balloon program is awaiting a time when sovereignty is not respected. Along these lines, emerging aerospace vehicles should seek permission to operate.

317 Bogota Declaration, supra note 141 (“Equatorial countries declare that the geostationary synchronous orbit is a physical fact linked to the reality of our planet because its existence depends exclusively on its relation to gravitational phenomena generated by the earth, and that is why it must not be considered part of the outer space. Therefore, the segments of geostationary synchronous orbit are part of the territory over which Equatorial states exercise their national sovereignty.”).

318 See Cheng, Studies, supra note 62, at 455; Oduntan, supra note 139, at 76; Section III.B.1 supra.
D. COMMENSURABILITY AND THE SECURITY SPECTRUM

Despite the argument above, it is possible that there simply is not a positivist solution to the problem; perhaps there is no line between air and space—both regimes coexist in aerospace and both must be respected. The domains could be incommensurable—that is, they cannot be compared and may both exist at the same time in the same zone of operations. Thus, there would be no clear solution for states considering the use of force to defend sovereign territory (absent creating a *sui generis* regime that contains a solution).

While this may be a legal possibility, it poses grave practical challenges. For the reasons discussed previously as to why sovereignty matters and the potential stakes of territorial overflight by state vehicles, states require clarity on which law applies. In the mind of a decision maker with a binary choice (attack or not attack), there must be a definitive answer—either an overflight is or is not a violation of sovereignty; it cannot be both legal and illegal at the same time.319

This section explores a commensurability argument for the delimitation of airspace and outer space, employing state security as the common metric by which the regimes are measured and integrated for assessment. This security interest is evident around the operation and applications of satellites and their orbit; so as with the above analysis, orbit is the pivot point in the security nexus between air and space. Anything below orbit is a potential threat, and free operation is contrary to security interests. Anything in or above orbit could be a threat, but states determined that for security, anything operating there is better off as free. Essentially, this commensurability continuum examines the means and the ends to state goals in airspace and outer space: security is the end, and the regime in a particular area is the means.

This section first discusses commensurability in general and how its use here is an analytical method. Then it explores how law and politics intersect to create legal regimes that affect na-

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319 Certainly, one could argue that—if both regimes applied at the same time—the proper answer would be not to use force if there was question as to the actual nature of a threat or incursion; the laws of war should be read to presume that force is not appropriate in the absence of a clear armed attack or threat that is “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” Miller, *supra* note 25. However, the counter to this is the argument articulated above—that in the absence of clarity as to the one ruling regime, the default position is one of state sovereignty.
tional interests (here, security). Then it establishes the prominence of the security interest in the development of both air and space law. From there, it compares the two regimes to reveal that the break in the security interest (and hence the break in the legal order in the regimes) falls at orbit. As such, orbit should be considered the effective line between airspace and outer space.

1. Commensurability as an Analytical Method

Two items are incommensurable when they cannot be assessed under a common metric. If two notions are incommensurable, “you cannot conclude anything about their respective merits” and you cannot make a normative judgement as to which is preferable or better. As such, commensurability can provide the normative guidance on an issue that the strict positivist approach explained above may not. However, if the regimes cannot be valued properly, it may suggest that they actually coexist along separate metrics in the same place. That is, the gray area between air and space is so because it is both black and white at the same time.

This work could be viewed as an improper analysis of commensurability—it assumes that there is a conventional (not an incommensurable) answer. In particular, it assumes that there is a line between airspace and outer space to provide greater explanation of where that line is. This is fair critique, which the author will not dispute. Indeed, the commensurability concept is used as a tool to find harmony in the seemingly disparate (or incompatible) regimes.

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320 Ruth Chang, *Value Incomparability and Incommensurability*, in *The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory* 205, 206 (2015) (“If two values cannot be measured by a cardinal unit, they are incommensurable”); Cass Sunstein, *Incommensurability and Valuation in Law*, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 779, 796 (1994) (“Incommensurability occurs when the relevant goods cannot be aligned along a single metric without doing violence to our considered judgments about how these goods are best characterized.”).


322 This dichotomy (this or that) is what Glenn refers to as “bivalent thought,” or an issue that “involves an initial dichotomy or bivalence but is univalent in the end result.” *Id.* at 368. While he critiques this type of thought, he also notes that it “is behind much of the construction of the western world (and is ferociously defended).” *Id.* at 370.

323 But see Sunstein, supra note 320, at 803–04, 860 (warning against oversimplification of the metric or the ends of the valuation). Also, as Endicott warns, “[i]dentifying a single criterion does not eliminate incommensurability if the ap-
However, two points are relevant. First, as discussed below, an argument can be made that the regimes are indeed actually commensurable (that is, the assumption is valid). When two values are commensurable, the analysis provides guidance as to the normative framework for that compatible end. Second, even if some may find that they are incommensurable in a legal laboratory, practical concerns dictate that there be some fairly clear delimitation between airspace and outer space. That is because in the context of the use of force and establishing sovereignty, states (and operational or tactical level actors) need some degree of certainty as to what actions are appropriate or authorized. Simply put, having no answer is not adequate. Sunstein and Endicott accept this practical consideration in their expressions of incommensurability and its uses. Even if two values are incommensurable, a decision maker must step in to reconcile them. In so doing, that decision maker can use a balance of competing values that best suits the people for whom he or she is deciding. So whether the airspace and outer space regimes are commensurable, the analysis will provide guidance as to how they should interrelate.

In this context it is useful to assume that the two regimes are commensurable as the idea that they were formed with a unifying purpose may shed light on where the divergence between notions of sovereignty and state versus civil craft may lie. In assessing the interaction and interpretation between a regime of *lex specialis* and general law, or among potentially applicable *leges speciales*, the ILC concluded: “The principle of harmonization. It is a generally accepted principle that when several norms bear on a single issue they should, to the extent possible, be interpreted so as to give rise to a single set of compatible obligation. The criterion depends on considerations that are themselves incommensurable.” Timothy Endicott, *Proportionality and Incommensurability, in Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning* 311–342, 318 (Grant Huscroft et. al., eds., 2014).

324 See Section III.C supra. Of course, while “ground level” individuals merely execute policy, their rules of engagement and authorizations for the use of force will be governed by state-level determinations as to the status of the law of delimitation. But the importance of not just the policy but also how it is executed should not be overlooked.

325 Endicott, *supra* note 323, at 324–25 (discussing how judges must make decisions between incommensurable values and how that is part of the rule of law and not a departure therefrom); Sunstein, *supra* note 320, at 857.

326 Sunstein, *supra* note 320, at 857 (“choice among incommensurables is an act of interpretation, one that involves a dimension of fidelity to the past, but that is also constructive.”).
In sum, this analysis seeks out the “single set of compatible obligations” that can unify the regimes into a common interest or metric.

2. The Intersection of Politics and Law: Deriving Order from Chaos

A brief discussion of the nexus of law and politics is appropriate for the assessment of the development of the outer space regime out of the airspace regime. This explains how the commensurability assessment contained herein is generally consistent with the conservative, positivist approach taken above, despite the idea that an overarching regime may suggest states have ceded some degree of power for a larger (and collective) goal.

Fawcett said that “law is at best a servant of power and at worst a mere whitewashing of policy.” He continued, “‘Foreign policy like all politics is in its essence a struggle for power, waged by sovereign nations for material advantage.’ Conflict must then be seen in terms of relative power, and not ‘conceived in absolute terms of peace, law and order versus aggression, crime and anarchy.’” This notion, particularly the view of law as an extension of political struggle among states, bears resemblance in principal to the often-quoted Clausewitz assertion that war is merely an extension of politics. Also, it makes for interesting comparison to the concept of “lawfare,” where the perception of adherence to (or deviation from) laws of war can be employed by belligerents in a conflict—essentially, law as an extension of war by other means.

Thus, as discussed above, the view of political realism, realpolitik, legal positivism, or any other term for a focus on the pri-

327 ILC Fragmentation Report Conclusions, supra note 263, at 8.
328 See Arthur Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 115, 140 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (“The existence of regimes is fully consistent with a realist view of international politics in which states are seen as sovereign and self-reliant. Yet it is the very autonomy of states and their self-interests that lead them to create regimes confronting dilemmas.”).
329 JAMES FAWCETT, LAW AND POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 35 (1982).
330 Id. (quoting HANS MORGENTHAU, IN DEFENSE OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 101 (1951)).
331 See Clausewitz, supra note 32.
macy of states (and their self-interest) in international law seems apt for discerning the regime governing gray space as the meeting point of airspace and outer space law. Where one can find consensus, one can draw a line. As Fawcett stated, the international law with true potency is that which:

[E]mbraces rules and obligations, recognized in long practice or specific agreements, and codes of conduct or harmonization of policies serving common interests. There are particular common interests both in predictability of behaviour in international relations and in the observance of at least minimum standards; no national interest can be secured without them. . . . In sum, law cannot itself create order in international relations, but emerges as a fact of life where there are minimum degrees of order, which it may serve to rationalize and extend.333

Law (such as the regime for outer space) derives from state consensus on substantive issues of order. As outer space law emerged (or was created—both concepts could be argued), it should be read only to have done so to the degree that it serves the common interests of states.334 To read more into the law would go beyond the consensus that drove its creation in the first place.

Schwarzenberger also reflects the need for order as a precursor to the creation of law. In writing about the law of war particularly, he stated:

In the present equilibrium between the requirements of the standard of civilisation and the destructive potentialities of war, what is needed above all is a thorough readjustment of priorities of self-interest, especially among the super-Powers. This calls, in the first place, for a measure of agreement on the identification of the chief enemies of civilisation, and two of these are surely violence and chaos on any major scale anywhere in the world.335

So as there is an established legal order for both airspace and outer space, it must have derived from space-faring states (or all states) agreeing on what was needed—at least to prevent “vio-

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333 Fawcett, supra note 329, at 119.
334 While Fawcett did not discuss space, the ITU and ICAO are relevant examples of this phenomenon, both substantively and topically. They create regulatory regimes in their respective areas but only do what they have to do to meet their goals of the regulation of the necessities. To the degree that they reach beyond their conservative pillars (essentially safety and providing an organizational structure for regulation) and into contentious zones, the less likely they will be regarded as binding on states with other options.
ence and chaos” above the world. From those roots, perhaps greater order may grow; and from that order more consensus (and law) will reveal itself through agreement or practice. As Fawcett submits, from that order there can emerge law to “rationalize and extend” it.

Schwarzenberger cautioned that international law “is an instrument of social control” and not “a self-executing system which operates in a social vacuum. Whether it serves civilizing processes or trends in the opposite direction depends on its subjects in the double meaning of the term.” This is somewhat more pessimistic than simply assuming the broader international order is for good purposes. It is assumed that the common interest discussed below, security, is a positive development. However, for purposes of the analysis based on what it is (and not whether it is a good or bad thing), the net effect of the shared concern is largely irrelevant.

3. A Unified Metric

Given the great focus over the years (and in this work) on the vital differences between airspace and outer space law and the push in the legal literature to divide air and space, it may seem difficult to imagine that they may fall under one common metric or regime. However, viewing air and space law with consistency and fluidity is not a new phenomenon. Cooper advocated for a unified approach to air and space law in the early 1960s, well before the Outer Space Treaty established space as its own legal domain. These positions were not inconsistent with ac-

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336 This may be evidenced in the rolling progress of the COPUOS through the 1960s and mid-1970s with the production of the 1968 Rescue Agreement, the 1972 Liability Convention, and the 1975 Registration Convention; the lack of progress since—with the dearth of “hard law” since and the emergence of “soft law” and guidelines as the dominant mechanisms for space governance—may also be evidence of a lack of consensus and international order. See Jakhu & Freeland, supra note 144, at 466, 472.

337 FAWCETT, supra note 329, at 119.

338 SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 335, at 90.

339 Though the Institute over which he presided is called the Institute of Air and Space Law, Cooper advocated for a single, unified legal regime of Aerospace Law, “which would govern and regulate:

First:

a) Aerospace, being the earth’s envelope of air and the space above it, the two considered as a single realm for activity in the flight of air vehicles and in the launching, guidance, and control of ballistic missiles, earth satellites, dirigible space vehicles, and the like;
ceptance that airspace and outer space should be treated differently in some ways (or even delineated), as evidenced by the numerous contemporaneous writings of Cooper. Similarly, early in the space age, the U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff advocated for a unified regime of aerospace: “Since there is no dividing line, no natural barrier separating these two areas (air and space), there can be no operational boundary between them. Thus air and space comprise a single continuous operational field in which the Air Force must continue to function. The area is aerospace.” With the emergence of aerospace vehicles, which effectively eliminate any operational lines between air and space, the statement remains apt today.

The prevention of use of weapons of mass destruction is an example of a unified or transcendent approach as evidenced in the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty). This Treaty broadly precludes nuclear explosions, for tests or otherwise, in Article I:

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\begin{align*}
&b) \text{ Its relationship to land and water areas on the surface of the earth;} \\
&c) \text{ The extent and character of the rights of individuals and States to use or control such space, or parts thereof, or celestial bodies therein, for flight or other purposes;} \\
&\text{Second:} \\
&a) \text{ Flight;} \\
&b) \text{ The instrumentalities with which flight is effected, including their nationality, ownership, use or control;} \\
&c) \text{ The surface facilities used in connexion with flight, such as airports, other launching or landing areas, navigation facilities and airways;} \\
&\text{Third:} \\
&a) \text{ The relationships of every kind affecting or between individuals, communities or States arising from the existence or use of the area of flight (aerospace), or the instrumentalities or facilities used in connexion therewith or to make flight effective.}
\end{align*}
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JOHN C. COOPER, Aerospace Law and Power, in EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS OF JOHN COBB COOPER, 1946-1966, supra note 93, at 51. While this was written before the Outer Space Treaty cemented the differences in the concepts of sovereignty in airspace and outer space, the utility of such an approach remains today as we address vehicles that only blur the purported lines between the zones.

340 See generally EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS OF JOHN COBB COOPER, 1946-1966, supra note 93.


Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:
in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. . . .343

Thus, in the interest of the object of the Treaty, states apply it to the air and space as a continuous zone—there is a unified regime that transcends any demarcation between air and space. Here, states elected to impose a complete ban on nuclear explosions in all relevant zones to this end. This makes sense, as the effects of nuclear explosions in airspace or outer space (as well as “under water” or “any place under [a state’s] jurisdiction or control”) would broadly affect states; that is, like national security, it does not only affect a state’s air or space (or sea) interests.

The unified approach does not just apply to use of force issues. Other aspects of air and space law demonstrate this fluidity. For instance, consider discussions of traffic management344 (seeking uniformity and fluidity between air and space, and in aerospace—because, from a safety standpoint, it does not really matter where a craft is heading if it collides with another) and

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343 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, supra note 342, art. I.
344 See generally Regulation of Emerging Modes of Aerospace Transportation (Ram Jakhu & Kuan-Wei Chen eds., 2014); The Need for an Integrated Regulatory Regime for Aviation and Space, supra note 79.
criminal jurisdiction (the flag of the vessel concept dominates both regimes). Surface damage liability may be an outlier as a divided, different area, but even those regimes can be assessed and compared in a context of insurance law. The idea of diverse aspects or even different legal regimes within one broader framework is not foreign to other areas of the law either. The Law of the Sea is one regime, but it has disparate rules for territorial seas (with additional rules for straits and archipelagic states), contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, and the high seas. Air and space law are no exception; there are and can be lines within one system or construct.

The key aspect of a regime is that it has principles, and as long as those are consistent as to the fundamentals, the regime is strong. The regime’s rules or outcomes may change, but it remains true to itself as long as the underlying principles remain. However, there is a weakening (or elimination) of the regime if there is waffling in the principles and fundamentals.

Certainly, airspace and outer space law are strikingly different with regard to sovereignty (in their current constructs) and with regard to concern for state versus civil craft. But that does not mean they must be opposed or regarded as different or incomparable on every axis. A broader context—beyond just air law or space law as niche categories—exposes that a broader interest that has guided the development of both regimes is an interest in security. And this interest remains consistent in both. So the issue is one of context and framing, making the commen-

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345 See Tokyo Convention, supra note 166; Stephen Gorove, Criminal Jurisdiction in Outer Space, 6 INT’L LAWYER 313 (1972); Hans P. Sinha, Criminal Jurisdiction on the International Space Station, 30 J. SPACE L. 86 (2004); Cheng, Studies, supra note 62, at 478.


348 Id. at 5 (“If the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of a regime become less coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly inconsistent with principles, norms, rules, and procedures, then a regime has weakened.”).
surability based on the common security interest illustrative of the line between air and space.

4. The Common Metric: Security

Freedom of movement (through free use and exploration) and sovereignty can be looked at as opposing values and may always be such in many contexts. But the outer space experience demonstrates that there may be a common motivation behind the divergent airspace and outer space regimes: state security. The sovereignty and state craft rules within the regimes are the means by which states have reached (or sought to reach) the common end of security (actual or perceived). From this common motivation, security, one can better derive the division point. This sub-section examines the evidence of a state interest in the law of each regime.

In general, it must be recalled that air and space law are merely forms of international law, just with air and space application. And a foundation of international law is the interest of states in their own security. This is enshrined in the preamble of the U.N. Charter’s “international peace and security” mechanism, as well as the broad practice of states.  The security interest is borne out more specifically in the underpinnings of both the airspace and outer space regimes.

a. The Security Interest in Airspace Law

While the seeds of security may be sewn through globalization and interconnectedness, security through firm boundaries in their airspace has also been a consistent concern for states. Despite the debate over possible freedom of the air (absolute or

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349 See, e.g., Gunnar Beck, Legitimation Crisis, Reifying Human Rights and the Norm-Creating Power of the Factual: Reply to “Reifying Law: Let them be Lions”, 26 PENN. STATE INT’L L. REV. 565, 599 (2008) (“Judicial trade-offs between incommensurable values thus remain unconstrained by rational choice because it cannot be demonstrated that the loss of liberty required by some measures is either greater or more limited than the correlative gains in security. No one can say how much security is enough and how many ‘x’ units of liberty should be sacrificed for ‘y’ gains in security.”).

350 See Jakhu & Freeland, supra note 144, at 461 (“International space law neither possesses an identity independent of general international law, nor does it come into being outside the law-making processes established by the latter. Therefore, the sources of international space law are principally the same as those of general international law.”); BROWNLIE, supra note 97, at 255; Ramey, supra note 22, at 66.

351 U.N. Charter pmbl.
qualified), the unflappable status of territorial sovereignty took over airspace law early in the age of aviation. And “[t]he main reason for this was one of security.”352 One author, writing in 1933, lamented the post-World War I context in which the Paris Convention was created, noting that, “[t]he influence of war mentality is specially evident in the text of the Convention.”353 He proposed a modified regime that escaped this security context, as the perceived over-focus on sovereignty precluded international harmonization of air rules. However, the strict sovereignty regime of the Chicago Convention showed that states disagreed with this position. As Lachs stated:

> With the advent of aircraft, States became anxious to protect themselves against whatever threat to their security these new flying objects might entail. This is clearly reflected in the principles and rules of aerial navigation. A State’s rights over the air above its territory, as indicated earlier, were reasserted. How jealously they have been guarded and applied is illustrated by the practice of the last half-century.354

Cooper wrote *The Right to Fly* in the wake of World War II, “[f]acing as we do a future that contains atomic bombs, rocket missiles of unknown range, jet-propelled fighters of incredible speed and fire power, and enormous transports capable of carrying large numbers of air-borne troops and military equipment.”355 He opined:

> Air power is today the most dynamic force in the life of nations. Properly used, it can be the means to better understanding

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352 SPACE ACTIVITIES AND EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW, *supra* note 73, at 162.

353 FRANCESCO COSENTINI, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF AVIATION 4 (1933). He additionally noted that:

> The giving of an exact account of the scope, spirit and tendencies of the orientation to be accorded air law has been prevented, on the one hand, by the persistency of a certain war mentality that has sometimes influenced the legislators and the “High Contracting Parties” in the period immediately after the war [World War I]—a period that marked the greatest development of air law; and on the other hand, by the scientific tendency to analogize air law to maritime law, and to give to all the juridical acts and facts connected therewith the same solutions that have been adopted for maritime navigation and trade.

*Id.* at 3–4. So air law resembles the law of the sea, with its fixed zones, but maintains the security interest with its bar on state vehicle passage and automatic rights of overflight.

354 LACHS, *supra* note 64, at 55.

355 COOPER, *THE RIGHT TO FLY*, *supra* note 65, at 2 (advocating the demilitarization of Germany and Japan—particularly their skies and air forces).
among the peoples of the world. Improperly used, it can be a threat to the general security, even in time of peace. If war comes again, air power can transport the armed forces and missiles fated to destroy our civilization.356

So the interest in state security pervaded the development of the airspace regime, due in no small part to concerns over major wars.

An attempt to balance free movement and openness with security is reflected in the preamble of the Chicago Convention. It states that international civil aviation’s “abuse can become a threat to the general security; and ... it is desirable to avoid friction and to promote cooperation between nations and peoples upon which the peace of the world depends.”357 The potential for “friction” as a threat to general security has been evidenced by numerous plane shoot-downs, both civil and military (and civil mistaken for military), over the course of aviation history.358 This friction is even more present in the current age of terrorism, unpredictability, and weapons of mass destruction.359 While the details of these matters are beyond the scope of this work, they demonstrate a prudential reason for states to assert maximum control over airspace.360

b. The Security Interest in Outer Space Law

Terrestrial security was an equally important concern for the development of outer space law. It can be said that cooperation among powers (particularly the United States and the Soviet Union) can lead to peaceful outcomes. So states finding common interests in the regulation of outer space was an important step toward systemic predictability and stability, and hence

356 Id. at 1.
357 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, pmbl.
358 See generally Donahue, supra note 45, at 54; see also Sections III.B.3 and III.B.4 supra.
359 See The White House (George W. Bush), supra note 27, at 15 (“The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather.”); Murphy, supra note 22; Yoo, supra note 26.
360 But see Reinhardt, supra note 4, at 129–30 (arguing that a 12 nautical mile security zone would be comparable to land and air buffers and adequate for state security).
peace and security. The mechanisms of the creation of outer space law through the COPUOS and the substance of some of the law reflect an interest in security through cooperation. However, the outer space regime more directly relates to state security interests through the prohibitions it imposes on potential aggression in or from outer space.

The historical context for the creation of outer space law is important in this regard. The Declaration of Legal Principles came less than twenty years after the close of World War II and in the middle of the Cold War—with its accompanying nuclear arms race, fears of the “domino theory” of communist spread, and anti-communist proxy wars. Even before the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev openly noted his country’s capacity to strike into the U.S. heartland, and “according to the Soviet newspaper Red Star, by 1970 the main weapon in the [Soviet Union’s] aerospace arsenal [would]
be a nuclear-armed satellite.” Of course, the threat was not one-sided; as one writer noted in 1962: “For some time now U.S. military planners have been freely discussing the possibility of using the Moon as an early-warning station and, eventually as a bombardment site.” And the United States was working towards the Dyna-Soar X-20 spaceplane, which was intended to have numerous applications, to include use as a hypersonic bomber. In this context, states (in particular the United States and the Soviet Union) came to shape outer space law into a regime to secure their perceived security benefits (or advantages) and mitigate perceived security disadvantages.

In the United States, Soviet Union weapons (terrestrial and space-based) were perceived as a major threat. Thus, the United States had interest in curbing their development and deployment. One way to do this was to create prohibitions on the employment of space weapons through the “peaceful purposes” language found throughout outer space law and the limitations on weaponization found in the Outer Space Treaty. In particular, Article IV states:

States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the [E]arth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.  
The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.

Also, beginning in the Eisenhower administration and continuing onward, the United States showed great interest in reconnaissance and transparency mechanisms as a means for security

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366 Id. at 106.
367 See Houchin, supra note 3.
369 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. IV.
and arms control.\textsuperscript{370} Eisenhower championed an “Open Skies” program, wherein both the United States and Soviet Union (by mutual agreement) would allow overflight and reconnaissance to ensure compliance with arms control (particularly nuclear) agreements.\textsuperscript{371} The “open” nature of the skies was very narrowly tailored to this specific purpose, but it would include overflight by any craft—in air or, as the capability developed, in outer space. While this program did not come to fruition at the time, the United States maintained interest in reconnaissance overflight (sometimes with poor results, as demonstrated by the 1956 balloon incident and the 1960 U-2 shoot-down). This led to a focus on outer space as a vehicle for reconnaissance, maximizing a perceived strategic advantage: “The most urgent and immediate use of space systems for military purposes is for surveillance and target reconnaissance over the land masses of the world with particular emphasis on the Sino-Soviet bloc of nations.”\textsuperscript{372} In lauding the possibility that Sputnik had paved the way for an assertion of a free passage regime for satellites, one U.S. adviser stated, “[w]e believe that we can get a great deal more information out of free use of orbital space than they can.”\textsuperscript{373}

So at least from the U.S. perspective, the Outer Space Treaty was a useful tool—it precluded the primary Soviet threat (orbi-

\textsuperscript{370} See Doc. 356. \textit{Report by the Ad Hoc Committee on Space to President-Elect Kennedy}, in \textit{25 Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1961–1963, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters} (1961), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v25/d356 [https://perma.cc/MJN5-DJGB] (“There are important and unique uses of space for national security and in support of our treaty alliances throughout the world. There are also important uses of space systems for arms-control purposes.”).


\textsuperscript{372} Doc. 356., supra note 370.

\textsuperscript{373} Doc. 347., supra note 238, para. 5.
tal bombs) and allowed the perceived U.S. advantage (surveillance and communications capacity). 374

Security was also an explicit interest of the Soviet Union in the early space era. In 1963, McMahon surveyed recent Soviet positions on delimitation, finding “national security” as a primary interest. 375 For instance, in 1959, the Soviet author Osnitskaya stated that “all proposals whose adoption would restrict the sovereignty rights of a state to safeguard its own security must be rejected.” 376 The Soviet Union’s initial mechanism to achieve this security was an effective control theory of sovereignty, largely with no limits. However, after Sputnik, they required a policy that would provide perceived security but still allow the flight of Sputnik, a point of great state pride. Thus, the policy evolved into “deference to the realization that State security can only be guaranteed an international agreement prohibiting certain activities in space, wherever they occur, and not by an unlimited extension of State sovereignty.” 377 This fits with Wassenbergh’s assertion that it is law, and not effective control, that secures sovereignty. 378 Conversely, it is the law (and not a lack of capacity) that can ensure security interests in a zone such as outer space where rival powers all have the capacity to assert force (or effective control). In this vein, the Soviets supported satellite overflight but objected (initially) to the use of satellites for reconnaissance in international fora. 379

For all states, according to Lachs:

The value and interest of the frontier are linked in their turn with the basic motivation by which States have been guided in their claims to sovereignty over the area bordering with outer space. There can be little doubt that this has been, and remains, national security.

...  


375 McMahon, supra note 205, at 346–47.

376 Id. at 346.

377 Id. at 347.

378 Wassenbergh, supra note 220, at 152 (“Sovereignty can no longer be based on the effective power of a State, but ‘only’ on law.”); see Section IV.B.2 supra.

379 See Section IV.B.3 supra.
Now, new objects have made their appearance in space. Though much further away, circling in their orbits or shooting upwards and coming down, do they constitute a new factor affecting the security of the States below? The developments during the last few years offer an unequivocal reply. The issue of security has not only retained its decisive importance: it has acquired an even greater emphasis.380

Cooper also explicitly cited a desire to ensure state security in his early proposal for a 300-mile sovereignty zone with a transit passage regime for non-military vehicles: “These solutions would aid future peaceful use of rockets and satellites and would seem to provide reasonable security for the subjacent state.”381 Overall, security was an essential element of the development of outer space law.

5. Application of the Security Metric: Orbit is the Division Point

If the law of airspace and outer space must be divided, and they can be assessed or valuated along a single metric of security, the question becomes: where did states find the tipping point at which national security is better served by territorial sovereignty than by freedom of movement? Or, conversely, where does freedom of movement trump assertions of sovereignty in securing a state? Similarly, the question of where the change occurs between the advantages and disadvantages of distinction between state and civilian craft comes into play. If there is a common intersection for these points of departure, that means the security metric suggests a line of demarcation. Here, that line is at orbit.

The bulk of this chapter and its prior sections have been devoted to establishing states’ interest in sovereignty—a mechanism for state security—and their inclination to maximize territorial sovereignty. So, as a starting point, the security interest suggests that the line between air and space should be at a high altitude. However, examination of the Outer Space Treaty’s peaceful uses and de-weaponization of space provisions, the state interest in transparency, and the practical aspects of

380 LACHS, supra note 64, at 55. Lachs further noted that this security interest drives states’ “desire[s] to take into account the nature of any activity carried out in the new dimension, to consider it on its merits, to judge it by its objectives and the consequences it produces within the areas of the sovereign rights of States.” Id. This further accentuates the importance of the broadest airspace regime for states, to maximize this interest in examining threats on a case-by-case basis.

381 COOPER, Legal Problems, supra note 231, at 276.
the use of force provide further guidance on where the line should fall.

a. Peaceful Uses and De-Weaponization

Before even the first satellite launch, “in January 1957, Ambassador John Cabot Lodge, addressing the U.N. General Assembly on behalf of the United States, expressed the hope of his government that ‘future developments in outer space would be devoted exclusively to peaceful and scientific purposes.’”382 Peaceful uses strongly supports the idea that security was at interest—if one outlaws war or military activity in space, certainly there is a strong suggestion that peace will prevail; and where there is peace there should be security. But the issue of exactly what “peaceful uses” of outer space means is still unclear. Generally, there are two schools of thought on the matter—it can either mean non-military or it can mean non-aggressive (while still allowing military activity).383

If space must be entirely non-militarized (and de-weaponized), it is more difficult to derive a line of demarcation between air and space from a security perspective. Essentially, space would be an extension of the airspace prohibition on state vehicles, though more like a Paris Convention construct wherein state craft were further divided into military and non-military craft (with more flight allowances for non-military).384

However, space has always been considered in a context of military activities.385 From the beginning of outer space applications, the U.S. policy was that military does not mean non-peaceful (instead, the focus was on non-aggression).386 Further, the military use of outer space is shown through state practice as

382 Ivan Vlasic, The Legal Aspects of Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, in PEACEFUL AND NON-PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION FOR THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE, supra note 219, at 37, 38.
383 See id. at 37; Bourbonnière & Lee, Legality of the Deployment, supra note 22, at 877, 889; Freeland, supra note 22, at 95.
384 See Section IIIA supra; see also Paris Convention, supra note 65, arts. 30–31.
385 See Freeland, supra note 22, at 83 (“With the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that space has been utilized for military activities almost from the time of the very infancy of space activities.”); Doc. 479, supra note 242 (assessing both the United States and the Soviet projections for the military applications of space); see also PEACEFUL AND NON-PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION FOR THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE, supra note 219; see generally Terrill, Jr., supra note 341.
386 Paul Nitze et al., Doc. 421, Report by the Committee on Satellite Reconnaissance Policy, in 25 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963, ORGANIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY; INFORMATION POLICY; UNITED NATIONS; SCIENTIFIC MAT-
well. As noted previously, the first astronauts and craft in space were all part of the military. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty explicitly contemplated military members in space (though participating in space use and exploration for peaceful purposes). Also, the prohibitions on weapons in Article IV are very specific and do not generally outlaw the use or stationing of weapons in space. This state practice and the text of the Treaty led Vlasic to conclude:

Given the ambiguity of the term “peaceful” as used in the [Outer Space Treaty], as well as the overt and covert practice of the two state actors in outer space, the conclusion is inescapable that all military uses of space other than those prohibited by treaty were—since the beginning of space exploration and are still today—lawful as long as they do not violate any of the principles and rules of general international law (e.g., uses that represent the threat or employment of force).

As military uses of space are generally permissible, this creates a distinction from the airspace where state and military operations are strictly prohibited, absent permission, over sovereign territory. It must be assumed that there need be no particular rules governing military actions or weaponization in foreign airspace—they are generally precluded anyway, or when allowed it is either in a time of conflict where sovereignty is not respected by the parties or under the strict agreement of involved states (presumably with specific allowances). But the specific preclusions of military activities in outer space are telling of the reach

387 See Section III.B.3 supra.
388 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. IV, para. 2 (“The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited.”).
389 Vlasic, supra note 382, at 45; see also Bourbonnière & Lee, Legality of the Deployment, supra note 22, at 888; U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 63, at 2-3. But see Jakhu, supra note 147, at 99 (arguing that military uses and weapons in space constitute a threat to security, and therefore are broadly prohibited).
390 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 4500.54E, FOREIGN CLEARANCE PROGRAM para. 4.a (2009) (“[Department of Defense] aircraft shall obtain aircraft diplomatic clearance to overfly the territory of, or land in, a foreign country from that foreign country’s government.”). Absent stricter guidance, in general state craft must operate with “due regard” for civilian craft. Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, art. 3(d); see also Bourbonnière & Haeck, supra note 115, at 926–31 (discussing the application of the due regard standard); U.S. Air Force Instruction 11-202, vol. 3, General Flight Rules para. 1.4 (Nov. 7, 2014) (generally establishing the ICAO rules as the baseline guidance for Air Force operations, with the “due regard” standard as the exception).
of the outer space regime. That is, outer space law can only pre-
clude activities that occur in outer space—so to read the extent
of its prohibitions is to read the extent of the law.

Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty contains spatially broad
prohibitions against outer space weaponization.391 It precludes
military maneuvers on the Moon, and bans bases, installations,
fortifications, military maneuvers, and weapons testing on all ce-
lestial bodies.392 Vlasic also compiled other outer space military
and weapons prohibitions under international law and none
provided greater particularity as to their applicable location.393
While these cement that the Moon and other celestial bodies
indeed fall within outer space, they do no illuminate the air-
space and outer space line.

The one clause that does, however, requires states “not to
place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear
weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.”394
This clause further precludes stationing such weapons “in outer
space in any other manner.” This latter blanket prohibition
would have covered orbital weapons, but the Outer Space Treaty
draws particular attention to “orbit around the Earth” with the
former clause’s explicit mention of it.

As the lowest altitude of space applications explicitly named
in the Outer Space Treaty or in arms control for space gener-
ally, orbit appears as the limit to which states feel compelled to
ban strategic level security-threatening weapons of mass destruc-
tion. Given the automatic preclusion of such weapons in sover-
eign airspace, this suggests that the shift in state security needs
occurs at orbit.

b. Transparency

As discussed in the previous section, one of the primary meth-
ods for ensuring terrestrial peace was through transparency.
This allows states to monitor each other’s actions as well as en-
sure compliance with disarmament agreements such as the 1963
Partial Test Ban Treaty.395 At the dawn of the space age, United

391 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. IV.
392 Id. art. IV, para. 2.
393 Vlasic, supra note 382, at 47–48.
394 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. IV, para. 1.
395 See Vlasic, supra note 382, at 51 (discussing monitoring and verification of
outer space uses); see also Bhupendra Jasani, Dep’t of War Studies, King’s College
London, Presentation in Montreal: Commercial Systems for Military (Mar. 16–17,
2015) (on file with author) (addressing space applications for monitoring both
States’ efforts to overfly the Soviet Union for remote sensing and aerial photography had failed below orbit. But, based largely on the Soviet interest in securing legal flight paths for Sputnik and its progeny, the United States was able to secure overflight rights and the use of remote sensing satellites. So while the freedom of overflight—a mechanism for security (particularly for the United States, which perceived its capacity in this regard as an advantage)—was denied in airspace, it is allowed in outer space. And the line in the use of this mechanism is orbit.

c. Practical Use of Force Considerations

Practical considerations in the application of force also suggest that orbit is a dividing line in state security interests. The concept of effective control has been discussed throughout this work. While it is no longer the driving force behind assertions of sovereignty rights (as the potential for effective control extends beyond what is accepted as the outer space cap on state sovereignty), it still informs where states can feel most secure with the greatest ease. Assuming states are rational actors and would perform a cost-benefit analysis prior to employing force in gray space, both the costs and benefits pivot at orbit. As to cost, while some states can project power into outer space, many more can assert control up to or near orbit through more conventional weapons and means. Even compared to suborbital or high-altitude applications, outer space activities are difficult and expensive. The likely perceived benefit also shifts at orbit, whether taken from a generalized pragmatic perspective or a “necessity” under the jus ad bellum view. While both United States’ and Chinese ASAT tests suggest that there is some perceived benefit to super-orbital strikes, it is limited. As discussed above, objects in orbit are inherently passive. They may be conducting opera-

396 See Kleiman et al., supra note 73, at 51 (“achieving orbital space flight is many times more energy-intensive, and therefore much more difficult and expensive, than achieving suborbital spaceflight.”); Pelton, Geosynchronous, supra note 10, at 12 (comparing the lower costs of atmospheric applications versus orbital satellites).

397 See Sections IV.C.3.a and IV.C.3.b supra (discussing “innocent” and continuous passage of satellites versus offensive and conscious incursions below orbit). Of course, vehicles may be able to engage in controlled flight in a pattern to simulate orbit, notwithstanding the extraordinarily high fuel costs when compared to passively operating in orbit. See Section III.B.1 supra. As future technologies develop, simulated orbital paths may become a more reasonable and,
tions to which a state may object, but they typically do so in a regularized, circular, inert, and generally inoffensive manner. Aerospace vehicles operating below orbit, however, are engaged in controlled flight. This is far more offensive, purposeful, and likely more threatening to a subjacent state—making the security interest much greater in addressing such vehicles with force.\footnote{\footnote{\footnote{\footnote{See Section III.B.4 supra.}}}}\footnote{\footnote{\footnote{\footnote{See, e.g., Bourbonnière & Lee, \textit{Jus ad Bellum}, supra note 22, at 188 (“On this point, while ASAT weapons are not by their own nature indiscriminate, for an extraordinarily high degree of precision is required to destroy a satellite in orbit, yet it has been argued that the extensive field of space debris that results from the collision of a kinetic ASAT weapon and a satellite would render kinetic ASAT weapons indiscriminate and thus illegal.”).}}}}\footnote{See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, \textit{Air War and the Law of War}, 32 A.F.L. REV. 1, 178 (1990).}\footnote{See \textit{Space Security Index 2011}, supra note 20, at 27 (noting that “[s]pace debris, which predominantly consists of objects generated by human activity in space, represents a growing and indiscriminate threat to all spacecraft” and describing major debris-causing events in recent history); see also \textit{Space Sustainability}, \textit{Secure World Found.}, http://swfound.org/our-focus/space-sustainability/ [https://perma.cc/FM3U-5VWV].}

So, from a practical standpoint, it makes sense to assert sovereignty only as far as it can efficiently be enforced. Beyond that (beyond orbit), it makes more sense to create a legal regime that ensures peace.

\textit{Jus in bello} considerations also help draw a line at orbit for targeting reasons, though this is a more modern development. In particular, the creation of orbital debris is a major concern in the use of force against objects in orbit.\footnote{See, e.g., \textit{Jus ad Bellum}, supra note 22, at 188 (“On this point, while ASAT weapons are not by their own nature indiscriminate, for an extraordinarily high degree of precision is required to destroy a satellite in orbit, yet it has been argued that the extensive field of space debris that results from the collision of a kinetic ASAT weapon and a satellite would render kinetic ASAT weapons indiscriminate and thus illegal.”).}\footnote{See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, \textit{Air War and the Law of War}, 32 A.F.L. REV. 1, 178 (1990).}\footnote{See \textit{Space Security Index 2011}, supra note 20, at 27 (noting that “[s]pace debris, which predominantly consists of objects generated by human activity in space, represents a growing and indiscriminate threat to all spacecraft” and describing major debris-causing events in recent history); see also \textit{Space Sustainability}, \textit{Secure World Found.}, http://swfound.org/our-focus/space-sustainability/ [https://perma.cc/FM3U-5VWV].} If a craft is targeted below orbit, there will certainly be debris created from its destruction. But that is substantively no different than an attack on an airplane in airspace or even a vehicle on the ground. And the analysis for such attacks falls squarely in the current regime for the laws of war.\footnote{See, e.g., \textit{Jus ad Bellum}, supra note 22, at 188 (“On this point, while ASAT weapons are not by their own nature indiscriminate, for an extraordinarily high degree of precision is required to destroy a satellite in orbit, yet it has been argued that the extensive field of space debris that results from the collision of a kinetic ASAT weapon and a satellite would render kinetic ASAT weapons indiscriminate and thus illegal.”).} The law of armed conflict, particularly the principles of distinction and proportionality, must be examined to ensure the propriety of the selected target; but the effects are likely to be nominal.

In orbit, however, the debris will persist for an extended duration.\footnote{See \textit{Space Security Index 2011}, supra note 20, at 27 (noting that “[s]pace debris, which predominantly consists of objects generated by human activity in space, represents a growing and indiscriminate threat to all spacecraft” and describing major debris-causing events in recent history); see also \textit{Space Sustainability}, \textit{Secure World Found.}, http://swfound.org/our-focus/space-sustainability/ [https://perma.cc/FM3U-5VWV].} Due to the nature of satellites in orbit, they will have great difficulty avoiding any debris in outer space—exacerbating
the collateral damage caused by the attack. Further, the debris will continue to destroy or otherwise affect all satellites with which it comes into contact; the persistent debris cannot discriminate between lawful or unlawful targets. So the collateral effects of the use of force in orbit and beyond can be disproportionate to a similar strike below orbit. When states assess the potential for the use of force to ensure security, this fact significantly limits a state’s ability to act (with force). When the ability to act (as a matter of self-help) is curtailed, it follows that states should seek alternative means to ensure their security such as a regime of free use and exploration for peaceful purposes. So orbit and its inherent limitations on the legal use of force help for a line between the regimes.

6. Conclusion

Consider the airspace and outer space regimes, though opposite in two key matters for the use of force, to be two sides of the same coin. When the coin is flipped in the air, and it rotates with great speed along its axis, and the edges are almost a blur; it even appears as though it is a small ball or spherical object. But it is not—when it falls, that coin is either heads or tails; it is one or the other. So too is the case with airspace and outer space; gray space is merely the illusion of some other zone when the coin is flipped.

Seeking out the unifying theme underlying the development of air and space law reveals that state interests in security are persistent and essential in both regimes. The seemingly gray area between what is clearly air law and what is clearly outer space law can really be read as one side or the other of a line. And the division point in the security interest, and hence the regimes, is at orbit.

E. Drawing Conclusions from These Modes of Analysis

There can be no doubt that the freedom of action of states in outer space or on celestial bodies is neither unlimited, absolute, nor unqualified, but is determined by the right and interest of other states. It can therefore be exercised only to the extent to which as indicated it does not conflict with those rights and interests.402

402 LACHS, supra note 64, at 108.
Lachs stated this in the context of safeguarding the rights of less powerful or scientifically advanced states, and it has been subsequently cited to bolster the depth of the Outer Space Treaty’s Article IX due regard requirement\(^{403}\) and the general necessity of furthering global public interests (particularly peaceful uses, cooperation, and equality) in outer space.\(^{404}\)

The assertion is equally true if Lachs’s “freedom of action of States” is also considered to include free movement through space without regard to terrestrial notions of sovereignty or limitations on the flight of state craft. Here, his second sentence is key—freedom of movement and action in outer space exists “only to the extent to which as indicated it does not conflict with those rights and interests [of other states].” Such rights and interests would include territorial sovereignty and security.\(^{405}\)

States have spoken over time on these matters. This section has demonstrated that they assert their interests in sovereignty, generally, as high as possible. Such assertions are legally capped only by the start of the outer space regime. And as discussed in Chapter III, that regime can only be confidently said to reach as low as artificial satellite orbit of Earth.

The other interest is security; on this matter, states have spoken as well. With security in mind, states again drew limits on activity in space—to enhance their perceived security. And, again, the lowest reach of this is captured in Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, which precludes weapons of mass destruction in orbit.

As both of these analyses point to orbit as the line of demarcation, it is worth addressing what “orbit” means in greater detail. Much like aerospace or near space, orbit can be viewed in spa-

\(^{403}\) Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. IX (“In the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty.”).

\(^{404}\) Jakhu, supra note 147, at 47.

\(^{405}\) Evidence of the legitimacy of a state’s interest in its national security is found throughout international law, but it certainly is found in the right of self-defense (be it under customary or conventional international law) or as articulated by the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. See Green, supra note 32, at 52; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, 263, para. 96 (July 8) (even in the grave context of using nuclear weapons, “the Court cannot lose sight of the fundamental right of every State to survival, and thus its right to resort to self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter when its survival is at stake.”).
tial or functional terms. It is spatial in that it refers to a generally fixed location. As discussed in Chapter III, the exact height of the LEO is not settled among scientists (or legal thinkers). However, the general estimates range from 96 to 150 kilometers (60 to 93 miles) for the lowest orbiting satellite. Also, though, and apart from the exact geographic line, orbit can be viewed as an activity or a function. When a craft orbits Earth, it is engaging in a particular, and unique, form of operation; it cannot be duplicated (with thrust or other powered flight) for any extended period of time. This is what makes orbit so desirable to those looking to take advantage of its attributes (and particularly those of GEO, which also allows for persistence over a desired location). So orbit is not just a place; it is an end or a function in itself (albeit an intermediary one, toward a final goal of communications, scientific experimentation, remote sensing, or a host of other applications).

While orbit may be critiqued as an imprecise line of demarcation, it is not a fatal flaw. States may have to accept some degree of arbitrariness in how this line is drawn. But that is no different than the assessment of a state’s baseline in the law of the sea, or even where the edges of free speech or other civil liberties lie in other legal analyses. If one embraces the conservative approach to the law advocated here, states should view sovereignty as extending upward as far as it is not clearly contradicted; the dispute over the proper altitude of orbit, then (if a state desires to put a number on it), should be construed as 150 kilometers—the lowest known orbit, as found in the U.K. Military Space Primer. However, even if there is still a range of state positions (potentially down to 96 kilometers), it will be a much more limited one; the debate has at least been narrowed to a degree that aerospace activities (particularly suborbital applications) should have an understanding of where they fit in a state sovereignty analysis. And, from this narrowing of the issue, perhaps a fixed and settled resolution can be worked out among states. It is far easier to decide on a line at 100 kilometers (or some other number) when the starting point is a range of 96 to 150 kilometers and not 25 to 36,000 kilometers.

V. CONCLUSION

There is an answer to the delimitation debate in the lex lata: sovereignty, and therefore the airspace regime, extends as high

406 See Oduntan, supra note 139, at 80.
as possible until it is clearly capped. That cap comes with the lowest definitive reach of the outer space regime: orbit. Overall, where there is doubt as to state sovereignty, it should be presumed that such sovereignty exists. As put by the Canadian band Rush, “If you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice.”  In not deciding clearly that the outer space regime reaches into aerospace and leaving that zone as a gray area, states have effectively elected the default: airspace sovereignty.

This work has pulled airspace and outer space apart to assess them independently, to include their nature and their accompanying legal regimes. Then it attempted to put them back together to demonstrate that a broader view—through the particular lens of the potential for the use of force against aerospace vehicles—can help demonstrate how the regimes fit together. The resulting conclusion is that the line of demarcation between air and space is at orbit.

This is not a normative prescription for what regime is best for aerospace; it is merely an argument for what is. Therefore, it does not prejudice any arguments for creating a different line, or even a unique sui generis aerospace zone. It is also not meant to suggest that there are not difficulties with the present regulation of the zone, particularly the potential inapplicability of ICAO rules to aerospace vehicles (particularly state vehicles).  

The conclusion here should generally be regarded as a spatialist position on delimitation. But spatial and functional lines are blurred in both orbit and in aerospace, so this is not a distinction dealt with in great detail here. In this author’s view, though, a line in space provides the greatest degree of clarity. Function ties into uses and intended uses of a craft or activity; intentions can be naturally blurry, purposefully obfuscated, or simply a matter of opinion and debate in world politics. Spatial altitude may have some difficulties in calculation, but it is much more fixed and reliable; both the aerospace vehicle and the subjacent state can know where the vehicle is relative to a line. In the context of the potential use of force, clear and mutually understood lines are beneficial. Thus, considering the need for clarity and giving deference to an expansive read of state sovereignty, it is manifest that a fixed line is the appropriate method. If an operator deciding whether to fire on an aerospace vehicle

407 RUSH, Freewill, on PERMANENT WAVES (Anthem 1980).
408 See generally THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED REGULATORY REGIME FOR AVIATION AND SPACE, supra note 79.
has to guess whether sovereignty applies, the craft is operating in an area of no consensus. If a mission planner is contemplating a flight path through an area that may (legitimately) be considered sovereign, this similarly is an area of no consensus. And without consensus, the cautious planner defers to the baseline. If in genuine doubt, the craft should be construed as being in sovereign territory. The functional approach leaves doubt, so it is a lesser approach in the context employed here.

Finally, just because these aerospace vehicles and usages are relatively new does not mean they are without precedent. For instance, consider submarines—they introduced new concerns for the application of force in the law of the sea but were eventually fit into the existing self-defense and security rubric. While the law of the sea cannot be directly imported into outer space law, it demonstrates that new capabilities that blur old lines and have the potential to transcend boundaries can be integrated into an ordered regime. Submarines were free to operate in their unique fashion—underwater and out of sight—on the high seas. But when this capability interfaced with state concerns of sovereignty near their coasts, states essentially negated the unique attributes of a submarine in favor of deference to the territorial sovereignty of the littoral state.

Here, too, aerospace vehicles present a unique new problem for the assertion of sovereignty. But just because there is a new threat to territorial integrity does not mean that such sovereignty is (or will be) diminished. Certainly, a convention or treaty could resolve the issue. Perhaps a formal passage regime for aerospace vehicles could be created by states. But it is also possible that, like with the submarine and airplanes, states will favor their sovereignty over free use of a new(er) application. And until that happens states must operate under the extant law and its present line, created by the disposition of states towards sovereignty and checked only by their interest in allowing freedom of motion in orbit and beyond.

409 See Walker, supra note 51, at 345–47; Wolff von Heinegg, The Law of Armed Conflict at Sea, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 22, at 475, 535–36 (noting the early efforts of some states to outlaw submarine warfare entirely, before submarines became part of the law of the sea).

410 See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone art. 14(6), Apr. 29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force on Sept. 10, 1964) (requiring submarines to surface and show their flag during innocent passage in territorial seas); UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 20 (echoing the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone’s Article 14(6)).