

WITHER JAPAN?

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 2015, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the United States to promote greater US-Japan defense ties. What followed from Abe's visit was the creation of the new 2015 Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation that indicated closer US-Japanese cooperation in the maritime, cyber and space realms. Compared to the 1997 Guidelines, the 2015 Guidelines also indicated a far more proactive Japan in the security realm. To many analysts, the guidelines signaled that Japan is stepping out of its passive role within the alliance and is beginning to work towards a mutual partnership with the United States in Asia-Pacific security.¹ Of course, greater assertion in security policy by a nation rooted in a strong sense of pacifism is not without controversy. The Abe administration's push on security reform continues to meet strong public backlash and the passage of the 2015 Security Legislation in September drew incredible ire from not only rival parties within the Diet but also China and South Korea.

Under the stipulations of the 2015 Security Legislation, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) could be deployed into foreign wars for "collective self-defense" purposes and this new ability of the SDF is widely condemned as overstepping the pacifist clause of the Japanese constitution. Groups of Japanese academics, opposition parties within

1. Abe, Shinzo. "Toward an Alliance of Hope." Joint Session of the US Congress. United States Congress, Washington DC. 29 April 2015. Address to a Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress.

the Diet, and student groups argue the bill is a violation of Article 9 and press that the bill is a right-ward shift towards nationalism.² Japan, since the end of World War II, maintained a strongly rooted sense of pacifism that renounces the use of armed force and the passage of the legislation is viewed as challenging these long-established norms. China blasted the legislation as an attempt by the Abe administration to crush Japan's pacifism while South Korea urged Japan to remain committed to said pacifism and urged reconsideration of its direction.³

However, while a large percentage of Japanese view the 2015 Security Legislation as a violation of long-established pacifism, an alternate explanation argues Japan is not pacifist, but rather uses pacifism as a check while modifying its security arrangements when needed. Post-World War II, Japan used pacifism as a means to let the US cover the bulk of its defense arrangements while Japan focused on economic reconstruction.⁴ The Cold War environment provided Japan the umbrella of US security but in the new era of post-Cold War uncertainty, Japan is gradually adjusting its security arrangements to meet new challenges. As Jennifer Lind of the Cato Institute writes, "Japan's increased military participation...conforms to a pattern in which uncertainty about its U.S. ally encourages greater Japanese activism."⁵ Japan faces new security challenges from the rise of China and a nuclear North Korea and since the US cannot solely guarantee Japan's security, Japan pragmatically adjusts.

The new security legislation, while controversial, is a part of Japan's pragmatic adjustments to its security arrangements. These adjustments are motivated primarily through two factors. First, pacifism, while certainly rooted in domestic Japanese politics, is flexible and it serves as more as an elastic system of checks-and-balances on security reform. Japan's pacifist identity underwent numerous challenges and adjustments

2. "Protesters to Continue Fighting Security Laws; Lawsuit Planned - AJW by The Asahi Shimbun." *The Asahi Shimbun*. The Asahi Shimbun Company, 21 Sept. 2015. Web. 19 Mar. 2016.

3. "China, South Korea Warn Japan to Hold Fast to Pacifist Principles - AJW by The Asahi Shimbun." *The Asahi Shimbun*. The Asahi Shimbun Company, 19 Sept. 2015. Web. 27 Mar. 2016.

4. Lind, Jennifer. "Japan's Security Evolution." *Cato Institute*. Cato Institute, 25 Feb. 2016. Web. 3 Mar. 2016.

5. Lind, Jennifer. "Japan's Security Evolution." *Cato Institute*. Cato Institute, 25 Feb. 2016. Web. 3 Mar. 2016.

over the decades and the new 2015 Security Legislation is just the latest. Second, changes in Japan's international environment, via the rise of China, the US pivot to Asia and the situation on the Korean Peninsula, act as an external force motivating Japan's security calculus. Japan, just as it rapidly industrialized during the Meiji Restoration under pressure from the Western imperial powers, responds to external pressures. An additional factor contributing to the passage of the security legislation is the strengthening of the Prime Minister's *Kantei* (cabinet). Reforms ushered in the 1990s strengthened the ability of the *Kantei* to coordinate and propose policy, and the Koizumi and Abe administrations utilized this ability to great effect in reforming security institutions

The culminating result of these factors is that the Self-Defense Forces incrementally increased its role. Originally envisioned as a police reserves unit in the beginning of the Cold War, the SDF continues to move across the spectrum towards a normal military. Key pieces of legislation passed under the Koizumi administration shifted the SDF from its traditional peace-keeping only role towards a support role in the Iraq War. The 2015 Security Legislation merely shifts this support role to a collective self-defense role. While the 2015 Security Legislation will come under challenge, it is likely to be accepted and incorporated into Japan's security identity and the reform process will move forward.

II. PACIFISM'S PERVASIVENESS: THE KEY CHALLENGE TO REFORM

As the mass public outrage at the 2015 security legislation indicates, initiating and implementing security reform in Japan is a severe challenge. Despite the changing threat environment for Japan, pacifist ideals remain strong in Japanese law, policymakers and the public, but why? The answer, when viewed from a normative lens, indicates that pacifism is heavily rooted within Japanese security politics. Japan's post-World War II government did not simply implement a ban on the use of force through Article 9, but rather, *tempered* a non-militarist security identity into the very heart of security politics. This identity, while malleable, pervades the security debate and influences policymakers and the public.

Japan's security identity influences security policy through a variety of methods and through its key tenants. The identity's framework enables political actors to unite under similar beliefs, identify focal points for public opinion regarding foreign policy, and the institutionalize the

identity into foreign policy to create incentives for following the identity. These methods are tied to the three central tenants of “no traditional armed forces, no use of force...except in self-defense, [and] no Japanese participation in foreign wars.”⁶ Pacifism became the new normal under the guidance of the economically-focused Yoshida Doctrine as Japan sought to rebuild its economy and avoid entanglement in Cold War security conflicts. However, while the identity appears to be seemingly narrowed on pacifism, it was in fact a *compromise* viewpoint that took the considerations of multiple factions into account in the post-war period.⁷ Japan’s politically left and right, pacifist and militarist, and pro-US and pro-Soviet all shaped the identity through the contestation of competing values. Contest, rather than consensus, played a pivotal role in shaping Japan’s security identity.

For reform advocates, overcoming the pacifist security identity will be the primary challenge, as all opposition, both public and private, stems from the ever-permeating norms. As the constructivist Andrew Oros states, “identity shift cannot take place without the presence of an alternative set of unifying principles and respected political actors to advocate for them.”⁸ While Abe’s LDP has pushed through legislation that appears to break from the identity’s orthodoxy, in actuality, the changes constituted to Japan’s security politics have yet to completely break free from the confines of the identity. The 2015 Security Legislation focused on enabling “*collective self-defense*” to assist allies with Japanese forces rather than the legalization of interventionist military action as such reform is impossible in the environment. Previous reform attempts, rather than break from the identity, have largely focused on operating within the context of the identity’s tenants and the 2015 legislation is no different. For instance, Prime Minister Koizumi’s 2001 Anti-Terror Legislation and SDF deployment in the Iraq War focused on a humanitarian mission rather than combative as Diet approval would have been impossible otherwise.⁹ Koizumi possessed the legal

6. Oros, Andrew L. *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2008. Print.

7. Oros, Andrew L. *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2008. Print.

8. Oros, Andrew L. *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2008. Print.

9. Oros, Andrew L. *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2008. Print.

framework to deploy the SDF but the security identity shaped the Diet's demeanor in approaching the Iraq War to oppose combative operations.

Additionally, the security identity influences the public's will for security reform, and substantial changes are needed in order to truly change the pacifist identity. Public opinion still opposes the expansion of military capabilities and Shinzo Abe does not enjoy the popularity ratings that Prime Ministers like Jun'ichiro Koizumi enjoyed that would assist him in pushing further reform.¹⁰ The LDP enjoys majority rule of the Diet again after reclaiming their position from the rival DPJ, but their control over the Diet does not grant them the ability to push reform too far from the identity's tenants. Electoral politics continue to play a role as politicians will cater to pacifist viewpoints to secure an advantage in general elections.¹¹ As Oros identifies, either substantial changes in Japan's international environment, the US-Japan relationship or the level of populism within Japan are necessary as triggers to undue the tenants of the security identity and create a new identity.¹² Were Japan to become immediately threatened by China or North Korea, break from its long-standing alliance with the US, or undergo a major political realignment in the Diet, then Japan's pacifism could be replaced a new normal.

III. ON THE EXTERNAL SIDE: JAPAN'S CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Japanese security politics are heavily influenced by its external environment. As a middle power, Japan finds itself between a rising China and a Pacific-looking United States and in the wake of the post-Cold War Era, Japan finds itself in a balancing act. On one hand, China's military modernization, ventures into the South China Sea and its growing economic power provides the largest threat to Japanese interests that threatens to change the regional balance of power. On the other hand, the United States, while Japan's chief ally, runs the risk of entangling Japan in its conflicts while also stoking fears of abandonment should Japan vary too far from US policy interests. Japanese grand strategy

10. Oros, Andrew L. *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2008. Print.

11. Oros, Andrew L. *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2008. Print.

12. Oros, Andrew L. *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2008. Print.

is built upon pragmatic hedging, and in order to ensure its security, Japan will hedge in the direction, whether west or east, that will suit its interests. Understanding the international environment that surrounds Japan is critical for understanding what factors are influencing security reform as well as to what extent the reforms will reach in their levels of change.

1. CHINA

Japan's international environment is critical to understanding Japanese security arrangements and there is no more influential environmental factor than the rise of China. China and Japan share a history of mistrust due to World War II and the Cold War. Historical issues continue to mar the Sino-Japanese relationship and the two states increasingly view each other as rivals for leading an East Asian order. To Japanese policymakers, China represents not only a security threat but also an economic threat. The rise of China means that "greater proximity, economic dependency, and a new emerging *regional* balance of power" create an array of "competing choices" for dealing with China that Japan must balance.¹³ Several factors characterize the Sino-Japanese relationship, and understanding these factors are critical to analyzing the impact China unleashes on Japanese domestic security arrangements.

First, the rapid growth of the Chinese economy threatens Japanese domestic industries and there is a deep concern over economic dependency. China eclipsed Japan in 2010 for the second largest economy in the world and the Chinese economy effectively outperformed the Japanese on the global market.¹⁴ This shift in economic power represented the changing Sino-Japanese dynamic and marked the departure from the economic relationship established during Deng Xiaoping's tenure as the paramount leader of China. Previously, Japan saw an open-market China as an opportunity "to advance Japanese economic interests through investment in infrastructure projects" to create trade and further openness to investment.¹⁵ China received 10-15% of Japanese ODA as Japanese policymakers and business leaders increasingly viewed economic interdependence as a method of improving Sino-Japanese

13. Smith, Sheila A. *Intimate Rivals*. New York: Columbia UP, 2014. Print.

14. Smith, Sheila A. *Intimate Rivals*. New York: Columbia UP, 2014. Print.

15. Pyle, Kenneth B. *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose*. New York: Public Affairs, 2007. Print.

relations.¹⁶ This belief however, soon faced challenges.

Economic interdependence with China led to fears of a “hollowing” of the Japanese workforce as China’s economy grew, while on the international stage, China’s aggressive pursuit of economic ties challenged Japanese influence. During the 1990s, the term “hollowing” emerged to describe Japanese economic security concerns over low-wage Chinese workers harming Japanese jobs and small-to-mid-size firms as Sino-Japanese trade continued.¹⁷ The contraction of Japan’s manufacturing sector alongside China’s elevation to the number one destination for U.S. investment underscored domestic fears over Chinese economic primacy.¹⁸ While fears of “hollowing” largely subsided in the 2000s, China’s expansion of bilateral trade with the rest of Asia marked the beginning of new fears. The establishment of the ASEAN+3 in 2004 placed China on equal economic footing with Japan in the region and Japanese leaders grew frustrated with the growing influence of China.¹⁹

Second, the rise of China comprises a new direct security threat as China continues its military modernization program and expands its influence into disputed maritime territories. Alongside China’s economic modernization came an expansive military modernization program that coincides with China’s goal to “safeguard its national unification, territorial integrity and development interests.”²⁰ As China’s 2015 Defense White-Paper outlines, China seeks to shift the focus of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) from “offshore waters defense” to include “open seas protection.”²¹ Maritime interests have become a new priority for China on its path to becoming a regional power. Emphasis is placed on the need to transition from a focus on land-power to a focus on sea-power within China’s white paper in

16. Smith, Sheila A. *Intimate Rivals*. New York: Columbia UP, 2014. Print.

17. Samuels, Richard J. *Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2007. Print.

18. Samuels, Richard J. *Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2007. Print.

19. Samuels, Richard J. *Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2007. Print.

20. People’s Republic of China. The State Council Information Office. *China’s Military Strategy*. Beijing: State Council Information Office, 2015. Print.

21. People’s Republic of China. The State Council Information Office. *China’s Military Strategy*. Beijing: State Council Information Office, 2015. Print.

order to safeguard its maritime interests.²² China and Japan share a long maritime boundary and naturally, with their history of mistrust and mutual desire for regional influence, conflicts would arise. However, a closer examination of China and Japan's shared maritime boundary and territorial disputes is required to explain the emerging maritime security contest between the two powers.

Regarding China and Japan's shared maritime boundary, differences over their exclusive economic zone (EEZ) boundaries and ownership claims over disputed island territories are an on-going source of tension. Originally, territorial disputes between China and Japan were handled based on Deng Xiaoping's advice to "leave the sensitive territorial dispute for future generations" in order to avoid contention.²³ However, Beijing and Tokyo have shifted from this method and are both vying for recognition of their claimed EEZ's and island territories via the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with difficulty.²⁴ Officially, bilateral negotiations are to determine ownership under the UNCLOS but they have not produced a settlement and Tokyo and Beijing continue to probe one another.²⁵ Repeated incursions into the Japanese EEZ prompted Tokyo's attention and by 2005, the Japanese Coast Guard's modernization program was underway.²⁶ Maritime Self-Defense Force planners now acknowledge the potential for Chinese seizure of disputed islands as well as the development of a gas-field near the EEZ boundary and are responding.²⁷ Now more than ever, Chinese and Japanese maritime forces are coming into contact with each other, and this increases the potential for conflict.²⁸

Likewise, tensions over the disputed Senkaku Islands are marred in nationalist activism and raise fundamental questions about the abilities of Japan to manage its maritime relations with China. The 2010 Fishing

22. People's Republic of China. The State Council Information Office. *China's Military Strategy*. Beijing: State Council Information Office, 2015. Print.

23. Smith, Sheila A. *Intimate Rivals*. New York: Columbia UP, 2014. Print.

24. Smith, Sheila A. *Intimate Rivals*. New York: Columbia UP, 2014. Print.

25. Smith, Sheila A. *Intimate Rivals*. New York: Columbia UP, 2014. Print.

26. Samuels, Richard J. *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2007. Print.

27. Samuels, Richard J. *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2007. Print.

28. Smith, Sheila A. *Intimate Rivals*. New York: Columbia UP, 2014. Print.

Trawler Incident resulted in one of the most contentious bilateral disputes between Tokyo and Beijing, and the incident provoked strong nationalist responses on both sides. Beijing countered the arrest of the Chinese trawler captain by carrying out the arrest of four Japanese citizens and ordered an embargo of rare-earth metals against Japan.²⁹ The Senkaku incident demonstrated that Japan was ill-prepared to cope with China diplomatically, as China had the upper-hand in negotiations and civilian activists were damaging Tokyo's ability to respond.³⁰ Conservative politicians utilized the Senkaku Incident as a rallying cry for a stronger Japanese military and the DPJ government of Japan faced heavy opposition in trying to coordinate coherent policy.³¹ The purchase of the Senkakus in 2012 by Japan resulted in further intrusions into the disputed territories by China, but this time, by military vessels.³²

China and Japan remain in an inconclusive stalemate over the Senkaku Islands, but the increasing frequency of military vessels within the territories signals the growing tensions between the two governments. Whether China and Japan can return to Deng Xiaoping's policy of "[leaving] the sensitive territorial dispute for future generations" remains to be seen but looks to be unlikely.³³ The increasing presence of the Japanese Coast Guard and Chinese State Oceanic Administration vessels, combined with the expansion of China's ADIZ to include the Senkaku islands signals the issue will not be resolved in the near future. Japanese policymakers indicate the maritime security of the South China Sea remains the top priority for the Maritime Self Defense Forces.

2. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Japan and the United States share a long, complex history that impacts their relationship on the international stage. From Commodore Matthew Perry's opening of Japan in the 19th find its security guarantees gone³⁴

29. Smith, Sheila A. *Intimate Rivals*. New York: Columbia UP, 2014. Print.

30. Smith, Sheila A. *Intimate Rivals*. New York: Columbia UP, 2014. Print.

31. Smith, Sheila A. *Intimate Rivals*. New York: Columbia UP, 2014. Print.

32. Smith, Sheila A. *Intimate Rivals*. New York: Columbia UP, 2014. Print.

33. Smith, Sheila A. *Intimate Rivals*. New York: Columbia UP, 2014. Print.

34. Samuels, Richard J. *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2007. Print.

Additionally, while conservatives fear US abandonment, pacifists and automists are in an unlikely alliance over a fear of entanglement with the US's conflicts. Japanese involvement with the US risks pulling Japan into conflicts within Asia and abroad that would oppose its economic interests and its potential security. During the Cold War, this concern mainly manifested itself as a concern that Japan could be pulled into a potential nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union or China.³⁵ As for the present day, many fear being drawn into US conflicts in the Middle East. Japan relied on middle eastern oil for 90% of its fuel needs in 2005, and 15% of this oil came from Iran.³⁶ Pressures on Japan by the US over Iran's nuclear program have led to Japan hedging its economic security in a direction counter to US interests as energy security occupies a vital interest for Tokyo.³⁷ Entanglement in the US's conflicts in the middle east would threaten Japan's energy sector, and in this regard, Japan diverts from US policy in treating the Iran nuclear issue as separate from its on-going trade.

Thus, in order to balance autonomy and keep the US close enough for security purposes, Japan frequently hedges towards and against US interests. As Samuels aptly states, "the irony of the Japan-U.S. alliance is that the United States poses as great a threat to Japan as any neighbor."³⁸ Japan's security alliance with the US runs the risk of entangling Japan in the US's conflicts worldwide or face the risk of potential abandonment of Japanese security should they not meet US demands. While Samuels notes that the US and Japan share many strategic goals, Japan risks isolation within Asia should it follow US policy too closely. Japan's historically different interactions with China resulted in a divergence in policy between Japan and the US in dealing with Beijing that frustrated US policymakers. Balancing US and Asian interests remains as Japan's pragmatic grand strategy, and closer Japanese-US security cooperation in the wake of China's rise is a necessity for Japan.

35. Lind, Jennifer. "Japan's Security Evolution." *Cato Institute*. Cato Institute, 25 Feb. 2016. Web. 3 Mar. 2016.

36. Samuels, Richard J. *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2007. Print.

37. Samuels, Richard J. *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2007. Print.

38. Samuels, Richard J. *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2007. Print.

3. THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Like with China, Japan shares an old, controversial relationship with both the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) due to historical grievances. The issue of "comfort women" still mars the Japan-ROK relationship while the belligerent nature of the DPRK regime and its pursuit of nuclear weapons provides an existential threat to Japan. While technically Japan and the ROK could be considered allies via their bilateral defense treaties with the US, attempts to foster closer security relations soured over the comfort women issue until the recent agreement between Prime Minister Abe and President Park. As for the DPRK, the regime's pursuit of nuclear weapons has provided a catalyst for increased security reform within Japan alongside closer US-Japanese security relations. The DPRK's frequent "saber rattling" and threats to destroy Japan empowers security reformists to pursue greater defense capabilities to create a bulwark against DPRK aggression.

Regarding the Japan-ROK relationship, the two states are enjoying improved relations from the Abe-Park agreement over comfort women, Japanese-Korean relations should be viewed with some pessimism. While the two states share close economic interdependence, the historical issues still hold a significant amount of weight in their relations. Visits to Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese, where several war criminals are enshrined, still provokes outrage in ROK domestic politics against Japan.³⁹ Though the comfort women deal seeks to resolve the issue, there is still strong domestic opposition within the ROK against what is perceived as attempts at revisionism by Japanese policymakers. In the past, tensions over Yasukuni Shrine and comfort women led to the cancellation of an intelligence sharing agreement over North Korea's nuclear program.⁴⁰ Though the agreement was eventually signed, ROK domestic outrage delayed the signing and observers should be cautious regarding the notion of closer Japan-ROK security cooperation.

As for the DPRK, their belligerent nature and desire to achieve a nuclear weapon provides a direct threat to Japanese domestic security.

39. Samuels, Richard J. *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2007. Print.

40. Cossa, Ralph A. "Japan-South Korea Relations: Time to Open Both Eyes." *Council on Foreign Relations*. Council on Foreign Relations, Jan. 2012. Web. 14 Mar. 2016.

As Richard Samuels noted, Japan is directly threatened by a nuclear DPRK while the matter remains one of proliferation for the US.⁴¹ Japan's alliance with the United States naturally places Japan in a position of opposition to the DPRK, and the DPRK's spy-ship intrusions into Japanese waters and abduction of Japanese citizens in the 1970s has earned it incredible ire within the public sphere of Japan.⁴² Nevertheless, in the context of Japanese security reform, the public ire for the DPRK fueled the LDP's drive for modernizing Japan's defense forces.⁴³ While pacifism remains entrenched within Japanese security arrangements, the DPRK provides additional pressure towards reform alongside China and the US.

IV. ON THE DOMESTIC SIDE: SECURITY INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR EVOLUTION

In addition to understanding Japan's external environment, understanding the domestic institutions that shape Japanese security policy is critical to understanding the nature of reform within Japan. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and the pacifist security identity that pervades Japanese politics not only roots itself within the minds of policymakers and the public, but also within the institutional frameworks governing Japan's security practices. The Prime Minister and the *Kantei*, or cabinet office, are incrementally increasing their powers over security politics and enabling reform while the Self-Defense Forces are undergoing an evolution. Compared to its origins as the National Police Reserves, the Self-Defense Forces as an institution have evolved to meet Japan's strategic challenges in the land, sea and air realms. While the Prime Minister, *Kantei*, and Self-Defense Forces have evolved, there are still institutional and legal challenges present that prevent Japan from decisively managing new security challenges.

1. THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE KANTEI

While the majority of Japan security analysts focus on the Diet's internal debate over reforming the SDF and the changing international climate as the primary factors driving security reform, the importance

41. Samuels, Richard J. *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2007. Print.

42. Samuels, Richard J. *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2007. Print.

43. Samuels, Richard J. *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2007. Print.

of the Prime Minister and the *Kantei* is often overlooked. The *Kantei*, or the cabinet of the Prime Minister, while traditionally an informal and weak institution, grew in power and importance in the previous decade to transform into a key driver of reform. The Hashimoto administration spearheaded the structural reforms of the *Kantei* and under the leadership of the later Koizumi administration, the *Kantei* became paramount to reform. Understanding the nature of the *Kantei*'s evolution and its new abilities provides insight to the toolset available to the Prime Minister in pushing security reform.

Beginning in the late 1990s under the direction of Hashimoto's Administrative Reform Council, the *Kantei* underwent several key changes designed to strengthen its authority in coordinating policy under the Prime Minister's authority. These changes, while initially thought of as insignificant to the larger defense debate going on within the Diet, played a pivotal role in the grand scheme of Japan's security arrangements. The increased power for the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the ability to create Ad Hoc policy offices, and the improved coordination abilities shifted foreign-policy power from the bureaucratic Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the *Kantei*.⁴⁴ Each of these changes facilitated this power-shift within Japanese security politics.

First, in regards to the increased power of the Chief Cabinet Secretaries, the rise in prominence of the Chief Cabinet Secretary (CCS) combined with Hashimoto's reforms transformed a once unimportant role into a pivotal one for launching and coordinating policy. Until the 1980s, the CCS was considered a role of little significance until Prime Minister Nakasone's appointment of a political heavy-weight to the position in 1982.⁴⁵ Since then, the CCS has increasingly increased its prominence in policy-making and in a sense, becoming a "shadow prime minister" role.⁴⁶ The CCS's functions include coordinating policy, handling issues at cabinet meetings, chairing sub-cabinet meetings, screening high appointment official candidates and advising administrative vice

44. Shinoda, Tomohito. *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan's Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs*. Seattle: U of Washington, 2007. Print.

45. Shinoda, Tomohito. *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan's Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs*. Seattle: U of Washington, 2007. Print.

46. Shinoda, Tomohito. *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan's Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs*. Seattle: U of Washington, 2007. Print.

ministers.⁴⁷ Hashimoto's reforms in 2001 required new appointments to be approved by the cabinet and the screening process became a method for the Prime Minister to assert more leadership over the bureaucracy.⁴⁸ Likewise, the 2001 reforms reorganized the Vice Ministries and the CCS became a chief advisor in consulting the Vice-Ministers on their institutions which granted the Kantei more sway over the bureaucracy.⁴⁹

Second, the ability to create Ad Hoc policy-offices dramatically improved the policy coordination and initiation abilities of the Prime Minister. Hashimoto's reforms permitted the Prime Minister to create flexible, more responsive policy-offices that do not fall within one institution's framework.⁵⁰ The framework for creating these policy-offices remains flexible and the Prime Minister can frequently create new ones or dissolve them when necessary.⁵¹ More than fifteen ad-hoc offices had been established following May 2006, and some lacked no legal basis for their existence other than the Prime Minister ordering their creation.⁵² Such offices greatly expanded the size of the Kantei and granted greater institutional power to the Prime Minister's office in spearheading policy creation.

Third, the expansion of policy coordination abilities for the *Kantei* facilitated the shift in the foreign policy dynamic towards the Prime Minister and away from the bureaucracies. Under the old laws governing the *Kantei's* behavior, the *Kantei* could only act on policy coordination after other ministries requested their assistance.⁵³ The new laws under Hashimoto's reforms "allows the *Kantei* to initiate policies by clearly providing the authority to plan and draft concrete proposals under the

47. Shinoda, Tomohito. *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan's Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs*. Seattle: U of Washington, 2007. Print.

48. Shinoda, Tomohito. *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan's Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs*. Seattle: U of Washington, 2007. Print.

49. Shinoda, Tomohito. *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan's Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs*. Seattle: U of Washington, 2007. Print.

50. Shinoda, Tomohito. *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan's Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs*. Seattle: U of Washington, 2007. Print.

51. Shinoda, Tomohito. *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan's Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs*. Seattle: U of Washington, 2007. Print.

52. Shinoda, Tomohito. *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan's Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs*. Seattle: U of Washington, 2007. Print.

53. Shinoda, Tomohito. *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan's Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs*. Seattle: U of Washington, 2007. Print.

direction of the cabinet and the prime minister” to great effect.⁵⁴ These new laws essentially transferred the policy-initiation ability away from the bureaucracy and transferred it to the Prime Minister and his cabinet. Hashimoto’s administration, and later Koizumi’s would greatly use this new ability to lead the LDP and security reform in the direction they so desired.

Indeed, as in examination of Koizumi’s security reforms, the effects of the Hashimoto’s reforms are apparent in how Koizumi utilized the *Kantei*’s new abilities to achieve reform. Koizumi’s administration undertook notable, and at times, politically risky moves that faced entrenched opposition within the LDP that he bypassed through the *Kantei*’s strengthened abilities like the 2001 Anti-Terror Legislation and the deployment of the SDF to Iraq.⁵⁵ Through the new top-down decision making model made possible by the strengthened Kantei, Koizumi repeatedly bypassed the LDP and the bureaucracies by appealing directly to opposition parties, interest groups and the electorate.⁵⁶ The DPJ, in its desire to become a viable opposition party to the LDP, generally supported Koizumi’s reforms after negotiation while high-public support prevented LDP *zoku* policy-members from blocking reform.⁵⁷ Notably, Koizumi stayed within the constitutional framework of Japan and did not challenge the established security norms too directly, with actions like the SDF deployment being a peacekeeping mission, as a direct challenge would dissolve the needed coalition for support.⁵⁸

2. THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES

It would be impossible to discuss the evolution of Japan’s defense structure without delving into the Self-Defense Forces themselves. From their origins as the National Police Reserves to their present status, the Self-Defense Forces have undergone numerous changes as Japan adapted to new security challenges. Many of these changes

54. Shinoda, Tomohito. *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs*. Seattle: U of Washington, 2007. Print.

55. Shinoda, Tomohito. *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs*. Seattle: U of Washington, 2007. Print.

56. Shinoda, Tomohito. *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs*. Seattle: U of Washington, 2007. Print.

57. Shinoda, Tomohito. *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs*. Seattle: U of Washington, 2007. Print.

58. Shinoda, Tomohito. *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs*. Seattle: U of Washington, 2007. Print.

play into Japan's dual-hedging strategy as Japanese policymakers expand the SDF's role as necessary to maintain US-Japanese security ties. The desire for an expansion of the SDF's collective self-defense abilities largely stemmed from Japan's participation, or lack thereof, during the Gulf War. Japan's dollar diplomacy drew heavy criticism as the Japanese contributed no physical presence, whether humanitarian, combat or logistics during the war due to constitutional constraints.⁵⁹ The humiliation Japan suffered on the international stage from the Gulf War debacle influenced the Diet's passage of the 1992 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Cooperation Bill.⁶⁰ The UNPOC lifted the decades old ban on the deployment of the SDF abroad for peacekeeping and this lift marked the first significant challenge to pacifist security identity.⁶¹ Additional reforms throughout the 2000s came as Japan faced new security challenges and this section will explore their significance to Japanese security arrangements.

First, the 2001 Anti-Terror Special Measures Law enabled the deployment of the SDF abroad for logistical support for the US alliance without compromising the pacifist identity. Koizumi's administration, following the 9/11 attacks, sought to ensure that Japan would play a more active role in the US-Japan alliance and pursued reform measures within the confines of the pacifist security identity.⁶² The Anti-Terror Special Measures expanded the SDF's role beyond humanitarian assistance into logistical support with little controversy as Japan flew C-130s to provide relief supplies, but also expanded the pacifist security identity via new restrictions on supplying arms.⁶³ The law included stipulations prohibiting the SDF from resupplying ammunition or refueling combat vehicles within foreign territory which would later

59. Samuels, Richard J. *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2007. Print.

60. Pyle, Kenneth B. *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose*. New York: Public Affairs, 2007. Print.

61. Pyle, Kenneth B. *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose*. New York: Public Affairs, 2007. Print.

62. Shinoda, Tomohito. *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan's Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs*. Seattle: U of Washington, 2007. Print.

63. Oros, Andrew L. *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2008. Print.

become an issue during the 2003 Iraq Legislation fight.⁶⁴ The Anti-Terror law also included provisions long-desired by US policymakers enabling the SDF to defend US bases within Japan should they come under attack.⁶⁵ While not breaking from the security identity, the new Anti-Terror Special Measures Law enabled a more active role for the SDF in the US-Japan alliance and incrementally moved the SDF more towards a “normal” military.

Second, the Koizumi administration passed the 2003 Emergency Legislation which provided a “permanent legal framework for allowing the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to use force” should Japan come under attack.⁶⁶ Against the backdrop of the 9/11 attacks and the intrusion of a DPRK ship into Japanese waters, Koizumi’s administration sought to improve the responsiveness of the SDF in the event of a domestic crisis. The Emergency Law revised the Security Council Establishment Law to give the Prime Minister and the Security Council of Japan greater coordination powers while undoing bureaucratic hurdles like the Road Law which required approval for the SDF to modify roads for troop transportation.⁶⁷ Controversially, the legislation attempted to grant the same degree of legal exemptions from prior laws to the US military, but this provision failed under heavy LDP opposition.⁶⁸ Here, Japan normalized its protocols for the event of an attack on domestic Japanese soil. The bill largely did not deviate from the pacifist identity with the exception of the US legal exemption provision which was removed due to heavy opposition.

Third, 2003 saw the passage of the Iraq Special Measures Legislation. While the Anti-Terror Legislation created a framework for SDF deployment abroad, the physical deployment of Ground Self-Defense

64. Oros, Andrew L. *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2008. Print.

65. Oros, Andrew L. *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2008. Print.

66. Shinoda, Tomohito. *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs*. Seattle: U of Washington, 2007. Print.

67. Shinoda, Tomohito. *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs*. Seattle: U of Washington, 2007. Print.

68. Shinoda, Tomohito. *Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs*. Seattle: U of Washington, 2007. Print.

Force (GSDF) personnel into the region drew incredible opposition.⁶⁹ This opposition largely stemmed from the perception of the GSDF actively integrating with US military personnel and engaging in the use of force, while in actuality, the SDF continued its humanitarian role.⁷⁰ GSDF troops concentrated on humanitarian and logistical assistance and completed their mission by 2006 without firing a single shot or suffering a single casualty.⁷¹ The SDF exercised extreme caution in its role and upheld Japan's pacifist identity in its operations.

While these legal measures were largely incremental changes to Japan's established security identity, the most significant recent changes occurred from the issuing of the new 2015 US-Japan Defense guidelines. The 2015 Defense Guidelines accompanied Abe's new 2015 Security Legislation by updating the previous protocols to reflect the more modern, more proactive SDF. Notably, the guidelines provide a framework for closer cooperation on intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, maritime security, logistics and so forth in the event of an attack on Japan.⁷² Two new features of the 2015 guidelines compared to their 1997 counterpart is the emphasis on the global nature of the US-Japan alliance and the emphasis on space and cyberspace.

Regarding the former, the guidelines state that "the two governments will reinforce efforts and seek additional opportunities to cooperate with regional [partners]...as well as international organizations," indicating a larger Asia-Pacific oriented alliance.⁷³ With the ASEAN countries playing an increasingly important role in the Asia-Pacific and maritime boundaries becoming increasingly contentious, the guidelines indicate the US-Japanese alliance will seek to promote stability within the region. This role indicates a shift from the US-Japanese alliance solely focusing on the defense of Japan to one where Japan and the US are mutual partners seeking to promote a mutually beneficial East Asian order.

69. Oros, Andrew L. *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2008. Print.

70. Samuels, Richard J. *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2007. Print.

71. Samuels, Richard J. *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2007. Print.

72. Lind, Jennifer. "Japan's Security Evolution." *Cato Institute*. Cato Institute, 25 Feb. 2016. Web. 3 Mar. 2016.

73. Japan. Ministry of Defense. *The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation*. Ministry of Defense, 27 Apr. 2015. Web. 21 Mar. 2016.

As for the emphasis on space and cyber as new realms of cooperation, China's involvement in these areas challenges US hegemony and US-Japanese cooperation is an effort to contest them. Chinese cyberattacks pose an economic threat to US corporations and a security threat to the US government as Chinese cyberattacks resulted in the theft of classified files from the Defense Department's network and Office of Personnel Management.⁷⁴ Japan likewise, reported over 24 million cyberattacks in 2014, 40% of which were traced back to China. Closer US-Japanese cyber-security ties will enable the two states to coordinate strategy and policy options to deter Chinese economic espionage and safeguard military secrets against the People's Liberation Army's cyber division. As for space, the agreement signals closer US-Japanese intelligence sharing as the SDF and US will "pursue opportunities for cooperation in maritime domain awareness"⁷⁵ security and closer intelligence sharing will foster greater cooperation and responsiveness between the US and Japanese governments against China's maritime forces.

V. CONCLUSION

Is military reform dead in Japan? Are Japan's security institutions withering? The answer is not clear-cut but current literature on the subject indicates that reform is still alive in Japan. While normal-nationalists and pro-security reform policymakers desire to expand Japan's security arrangements, pacifism continues to act as the metaphorical speed-bump in the process. Security reform, while attractive to many like a brand new Audi, must proceed at an acceptable pace otherwise pacifism will throttle-stop it. Article 9 will remain the ultimate barrier to full remilitarization of Japan and Japanese policymakers are content with this reality. The 2015 Defense Guidelines between the US and Japan indicates that Japan, while still relying on US security arrangements, seeks to become a more proactive player in the Asia-Pacific. Enabling collective self-defense finally allows Japan to come to the aid of the US, and with China's continued aggression and expansion of influence in the region, Japan is branching outward.

Pragmatism continues to guide Japanese foreign policy. In the past,

74. Barrett, Devlin, Danny Yadron, and Damian Paletta. "U.S. Suspects Hackers in China Breached About 4 Million People's Records, Officials Say." *Wall Street Journal*. Dow Jones & Company, 5 Jan. 2015. Web. 27 Mar. 2016.

75. Japan. Ministry of Defense. *The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation*. Ministry of Defense, 27 Apr. 2015. Web. 21 Mar. 2016.

Japan could rely on the US's shield while it reconstructed its economy but today it can no longer be passive. Chinese activity in the South China Sea provides the most direct security threat to Japanese interests, and as Sheila Smith's analysis highlighted, Japan was underequipped to manage crises in the region. Security reform is a necessity to manage the challenges the Asia-Pacific will throw at Japan and Japan will do whatever is necessary to overcome these challenges. Full normalization of the military is unlikely as long as Article 9 remains in place and as pacifism remains prevalent in the Japanese public. It will take a larger punctuated equilibrium to gain the necessary political support to attempt to repeal Article 9 and pursue full normalization of the military, but such an equilibrium would be indicative of a much larger problem in the Asia-Pacific.

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