

RIFLES AND RIVALS: A STUDY OF THE DOMESTIC EFFECTS ON AMERICAN MILITARY POLICY

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I. INTRODUCTION

The term ‘American Exceptionalism’ has long since been a key part of national and international politics. America’s long practice of splendid isolation enabled the country to build an adept military force. However, this pattern changed following World War II. The American military is now seen as a force for change in the world in the modern era, conducting missionary-like military operations around the world. Due to the widespread impact of American military power, this behavior is ripe for academic exploration. To explain the shift in military behavior, many scholars point to President Eisenhower’s warning to “beware the military industrial complex,” a caution that has been echoed by other experts since. This raises further questions, as it reveals a weakness in the American legislative process. As such, it is unlikely that the military industrial complex (MIC) would be the sole ominous factor inflicting undue influence on foreign policy. Due to the impact that military foreign policy has on the status of the United States in the world, it is important to understand why and how existing policy is made. What domestic forces are most responsible for influencing the formation of military foreign policy in the post-cold war era? Though there are contending theories about influence on military policy, I argue that political polarization makes the most significant impact on military foreign policy decisions in the United States.

This essay proceeds as follows. First, I lay the necessary ground work for this essay, including defining relevant terms, unpacking the logic of my argument, discussing the contending perspectives, and discussing my methodology. Second, I test my argument against its rivals by completing a quantitative analysis. Finally, I summarize my findings in the conclusion.

I. GROUNDWORK

It will first be helpful to define terms in the context of this paper to limit the effects of jargon. This research will examine two theories to determine which theory makes the most substantial impact on the formation of military foreign policy. First, this paper will examine political pluralism theory, and will then move to examine polarization theory. Establishing shared knowledge of each theory will help to reveal which one plays the largest role in the policy being examined.

Corporate Political Pluralism Theory

First, the argument asserting the power of the military industrial complex emerges from political pluralism theory, more specifically, from corporate pluralism. This theory operates under the assumption that though “no single party has the ability to monopolize all decisions, certain groups have been able to acquire controlling power within individual policy areas” (Kelso, 1978, 19). In this case, the groups who have acquired controlling power would be the Military Industrial Complex. The Military Industrial Complex is a compilation of private companies awarded contracts by the federal government in order to create goods and services to aid in our nation’s defense. For the purpose of this paper, the Military Industrial Complex will be operationalized by Prime Contractors. Prime Contractors can be defined as the defense companies that individually receive more than \$9 billion in contracts from the federal government. For this paper, Prime Contractors discussed will be the Lockheed Martin Corporation, The Boeing Company, Raytheon Company, General Dynamics Corporation, and Northrop Grumman Corporation (CRS, 2018).

Furthermore, the individual policy area that has been controlled

by the Military Industrial Complex in this case is Foreign Policy. More specifically, the way in which military force is used in conjunction with foreign policy. To better examine foreign defense policy in a tangible manner, this paper will study United States legislative representatives and look at the application of either hawkish and or dovish policy. Hawkish foreign policy can be qualified as supporting and or voting for the use of military force, or for increased defense appropriations. In contrast, dovish foreign policy is measured by not supporting and or voting against the use of military force or against an increase in defense appropriations. As corporate pluralism theory asserts, the Military Industrial Complex has been able to acquire a controlling interest over United States foreign defense policy.

Proponents of corporate pluralism argue that in technical and specific areas, industry experts should play a more decisive role in policy decisions. This world view appreciates cooperative decision making, but fails to recognize the value of competing ideologies for the formulation of democratic decisions. Corporate pluralism no doubt has negative effects on participation, and therefore for the practice of democracy in the United States (Keslo, 1978, 56). However, for the purpose of this research, corporate pluralism encapsulates the argument that through achieving a privatized monopoly, the Military Industrial Complex plays a determining role in the formulation and implementation of foreign defense policy.

Overtime, the Military Industrial Complex has grown and has theoretically established greater influence over the lawmaking entities of the United States, making itself economically and politically invaluable to the national interest of the country. Once an isolationist nation, the United States now has been credited with applying military force in a number of conflicts around the world. Some assert that this relationship is symbiotic. The influential Military Industrial Complex has an interest in frequent military force because contractors grow as more contracts are awarded. Subsequently, the privatization of the defense industry makes the government dependent on the output of these prime contractors. Due to the nature of their work, prime contractors solely produce weapons. Therefore, the United States government has an interest in keeping these prime contractors afloat, which requires the awarding of pertinent contracts.

If the military industrial complex were to influence the formation of foreign policy bills, and it is true that monetary

influence is causing a more hawkish United State foreign policy, then representatives of districts with a high percentage of GDP based in the defense industry would be reliably voting for a more hawkish foreign policy. This would include voting to intervene in conflicts, as well as voting to increase defense expenditures in relation to such conflicts. It would also follow that representatives of districts where a lower percentage of GDP is based in defense spending would be voting for a more dovish foreign policy. These representatives may be warier of votes to interfere in international conflicts, or question the budgetary effects of such high defense appropriations. In special cases, such as the vote to interfere in Iraq following the terror attack on domestic soil in September of 2001, these dovish representatives would be expected to vote for the hawkish option, military force, as to not appear unpatriotic. However, in most cases, representatives of districts with a lower amount of Military Industrial Complex influence are expected to vote for more dovish foreign policy decisions.

This theory attempts to explain the buildup of the Military Industrial Complex during and following the cold war era. The literature lays out an impressive argument for how the privatized and dispersed military industrial complex hoped to gain influence in American politics. There is no doubt that the Military Industrial Complex is a powerful special interest group with stake in the military foreign policy of the United States. However, this study will examine the extent to which corporate pluralism theory competes with ulterior domestic factors for foreign policy influence.

Partisan Polarization Theory

At the heart of Washington DC, and in the daily lives of decision makers is partisan politics. Partisan Polarization theory corroborates this story. This theory asserts that politicians will focus heavily on positions that align with their party and their political ideology. As time has gone on there has been increasing polarization between the parties, leading members of congress to vote primarily along party lines. For this case, this partisan divide will be operationalized by two political parties, Republicans and Democrats. Republicans will include policymakers on the right, leaning towards more conservative policies. Democrats are more left leaning, with tendencies towards more progressive policies. For this

case, independent policymakers will not be examined because they do not contribute to measuring the polarization between parties as they are unaffiliated with any party. Ideology is considered to be the general tenets that comprise the platforms of both parties. Democratic ideology falls in line with humanitarian efforts, domestic spending, and more liberal initiatives. Republican ideology is characterized by free market capitalism, strong military spending, and conservative policies towards social initiatives.

Partisan Polarization theory has not always been predictive of American politics. During World War II, many issues of foreign policy were passed with bipartisan support (McCormick and Wittkopf, 1990, 1078). This was also true of the Cold War era. Bipartisan efforts brought forth such initiatives such as the institution of the United Nations, the Truman Doctrine, and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (McCormick and Wittkopf, 1990, 1078). When there is a common goal, such as the defeat of the axis powers in WWII or the containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, it encourages law makers to work across party lines. There is common understanding in American politics that “politics stops at the water’s edge” (Jeong and Quirk, 2017, 60). This supposes that on matters of national security, such as foreign policy and military force, that policymakers should converge their ideologies and come together in support of the national interest. However, the literature disproves this theory. The bipartisan environment of WWII and the Cold War was the last of its kind.

Since the Vietnam War, experts have substantiated a break down in bipartisanship (Jeong and Quirk, 2017, 59). This partisanship has been increasing consistently since this split, and has reached its highest point at the Iraq War (Jeong and Quirk, 2017, 62). This is where Partisan Polarization theory offers an explanation. This theory predicts that policymakers will vote along party lines or by party ideology. Many scholars of this theory argue that politicians are polarized on the basis of ideology. Though the dawn of the Vietnam War was largely bipartisan, the rise of controversy surrounding the war accelerated the partisan divide. The upset caused shifts in ideology and ingrained each party to their own position. The Democrats became neoliberal, antimilitaristic champions of domestic welfare policies (Narizny, 2003, 203). The Republicans doubled their commitment to military activities and a realist world view (Narizny, 2003, 203; Jeong and Quirk, 2017, 62). Jeong and Quirk point out that Republicans

became Hawks and Democrats became Doves. These positions towards military policy represent a solidification of ideology in foreign policy stances. By creating two, well defined poles, each party was able to succinctly define to voters what they stood for. As these policy positions became more entrenched, so too did politicians' desire to bulwark their own ideology. Studies have found that "liberals, conservatives, and moderates within both parties tend to vote similarly' on issues of foreign policy (McCormick and Wittkopf, 1990, 1097).

In addition to those who use ideology to account for polarization, many scholars also present simple partisanship as the divisive factor in this theory. The case for partisanship, or voting along party lines, is encompassed by a few factors. This first is partisan electoral rivalry. Overtime, areas in America have been regionally realigned. For example, the American South, once a Democratic region, became conservative overtime and eliminated the existence of moderate southern Democrats (Jeong and Quirk, 2017, 60). This was caused by population shifts, and the tipping of the scale "reduces the benefit of being moderate" (Jeong and Quirk, 2017, 60). As such, politicians in these realigned regions are forced to become more partisan in order to ensure their own reelection. The "Gingrich affect" can claim some responsibility for increasing polarization. Newt Gingrich's tenure as Speaker of the House ushered in the resurgence of partisan America (Jeong and Quirk, 2017, 73). Gingrich encouraged a tumultuous partisan divide, pitting republicans against Democrats. Though this was primarily focused on domestic policy, its effects spilled over into foreign policy and played a great role in electoral battles.

Along these lines, research also finds that shifting control of the chambers in Congress accounts for partisan polarization. In the game of American politics, the Congressional majority has a strong incentive to oppose the President of the other party. Majority opposition helps prevent his reelection, and instead bolster the majority party's advantage. However, when there is a slim margin between the majority and the minority party in Congress, polarization increases—the minority party makes strides to differentiate itself from the majority party, in an effort to encourage election results that tip the house (Jeong and Quirk, 2017, 74). For example, President Reagan enjoyed bipartisan support when the Republicans held the majority in congress during his term. However, when the Democrats gained control

of Congress, his bipartisan support crumbled, and notably a low number of bipartisan legislature was passed during Reagan's tenure (McCormick and Wittkopf, 1990, 1084). This electoral incentive for opposition shows partisan polarization theory at play: policymakers adhere strictly to party lines in order to either affect their opposition negatively during the election cycle, or to balance their party against the other.

In relation to this work, there is an additional sub theory known as two-presidencies (Wildavsky, 1966, 23). This theory states that the presidency is broken down into two realms, domestic policy and foreign policy. The President achieves the most success in his practice of foreign policy, and as such enjoys presiding over them. This theory lays out that in matters of foreign policy, the President receives great support from Congress, as policymakers theoretically defer to his more senior judgement. Studies back up this theory, acknowledging that on foreign policy issues, "presidential influence is strong," especially when compared to matters of domestic policy (McCormick and Wittkopf, 1990, 1081). However, in conjunction with partisan polarization theory, this support comes largely from the President's own party, and opposition stems from the other. Congress will often defer more to the president on matters of foreign policy, due to his broader authority, access, and capabilities (Jeong and Quirk, 2017, 61). Research reveals that Republican Presidents receive the majority of their support from conservatives in Congress (McCormick and Wittkopf, 1990, 1091). Though this was not always the case "beginning with Nixon, conservatives have generally provided Republican presidents their greatest support and liberals Democratic presidents greatest support" (McCormick and Wittkopf, 1990, 1098). Taken in conjunction, the two-presidencies and partisan polarization theories offer a logical explanation as to why and how partisanship influences the creation of military foreign policy.

If this theory is to be correct, then this study will reveal a sharp contrast in votes on matters of foreign policy from each party. When members of one party vote one way, this theory expects members of the other party to vote the opposite way. This could be observed by a significant negative correlation in Republican and Democrat votes on military foreign policy bills. If the argument for political ideology is to be most valid, then the average votes from each party would be significantly different, with republicans casting hawkish votes and

Democrats casting dovish votes. If polarization occurs primarily from partisanship, then the average votes between the parties are expected to be similar, but a significant negative correlation between party votes will still remain. The two-presidencies hypothesis would be observed by a significant difference between the way each party votes, dependent on White House leadership. With a Republican president in power, Republicans would be observed voting in an overwhelmingly hawkish manner, with Democrats voting in a dovish manner, and vice-versa.

Methodology

In order to measure a connection between influential factors and the use of the force in the United States, it is necessary to investigate the times in which the use of force was employed. This will consist of establishing the impact of the military industrial complex as well as the impact of partisanship on foreign policy decisions of a militaristic nature. This paper will establish the validity of its claims by disproving the ulterior theory in a quantitative research method, creating a T-Test scatterplot to correlate the extent to which military spending drives military foreign policy decisions. The test will compare defense procurement by district against various foreign policy votes by the representatives of each of these districts. The T-Test will sort by district and party to control for ideology.

The data for defense contracting has been selected from an aggregate study that reported the average spending by the military industrial complex in each United States district. This is to keep spending controlled across the study. Votes will be selected from ten bills in which the United States employed military force, such as in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Iraq. This model will also contain the data from votes related to the defense budget, such as budget acts, defense stockpiles, and contracts bills. Therefore, the maximum votes in favor of military force is ten and the minimum is zero. These bills span seven congresses to ensure that the results are holistic and not unique to a certain congress.

To measure the extent to which partisan polarization impacts votes on military foreign policy, these vote tallies, split up by either party, will be correlated against each other. This will test the differences in how members of each party vote on matters of foreign

policy. In keeping with the two-presidencies theory, this study then breaks up these votes into groups based on which party occupied the White House at the time of the vote. Votes, split by party, under Republican Presidents, are tested against votes under Democratic Presidents. This will demonstrate the effect that presidential leadership and partisan loyalty has on foreign policy votes.

It should be noted that such method takes into account the best factors available to examine influence on policy. However, votes on matters of military force are often tainted by patriotism. In the aftermath of violence, lawmakers are often willing to vote against military action, for fears that it will appear they are unpatriotic and unwilling to defend American values. Additionally, lawmakers are also wary of voting against increases in defense appropriations once American boots are on the ground. Such applications of public opinion create inevitable noise when examining votes related to military force. Furthermore, the bills studied have varying levels of military force. Though “aye” votes for every bill indicate support for aggressive military policy, the level of aggression varies, as does the relevance for each district. It should be understood that though each district analyzed harbors spending for the military industrial complex, not all spending is the same or directed towards the same aspect of the military, and therefore different bills will have different relevance in each district. This noise however cannot be remedied with the data available to the public at this point in time. Human judgement will always take into account public opinion, and this paper has created the best possible standard for balance across various bills. Though data is difficult to account for, study into this subject matter is necessary due to its importance and relevance to the American people.

II. **EMPIRICS**

This study looks to predict what domestic factors account for influence in military foreign policy. Though two competing theories are at play, the literature suggests that partisan polarization greatly influences the way policymakers vote on matters of foreign policy. To examine this effect however, it is necessary to first debunk the theory that the military industrial complex exerts the largest influence on foreign policy decisions. President Eisenhower and Secretary of

State George Keenan, both publicized fears that the growing military industrial complex exerted a dangerous level of influence on the American government. It is useful to examine this fear in the context of the Cold War.

Historical Overview of Containment

George Kennan was an adept statesman, and as such, was the father of a tactful foreign policy approach to Containment. In his mind, the safety of the United States depended on “our ability to establish a balance among the hostile or undependable forces of the world” (Gaddis, 2005, 28). The Soviet Union represented both a hostile and a capable nation, and therefore, a strategy to contain its power required insightful diplomacy. Kennan recognized that communism in the Soviet Union was not so much a physical threat as it was a psychological threat, and thus required a psychological solution. If the United States truly hoped to beat the Soviet Union, it was necessary to eradicate the disease of communism, not merely attack the symptoms of it. Kennan recognized the merits of psychological warfare, that “weapons are useful for destroying an adversary, not changing his attitude” (Gaddis, 2005, 47). It is not surprising then, that Kennan felt so strongly opposed to the influence of the military industrial complex.

In his “American Diplomacy,” Kennan discusses the fateful weapons race (Kennan, 1984). As he observed it, the United States’ reliance on spending a huge chunk of the national economy on producing and maintaining arms constituted a “genuine natural addition” (Kennan, 1984, 172). This source of budgetary deficit was also engrained into labor communities, with districts made to depend on it. The effect of such a militarized economy, argues Kennan, is that this industry then requires justification, and results in the over militarization against potential enemies. This necessary justification could then theoretically impact policy change.

Kennan foresaw that the ramification of such a system will eventually undermine the role of diplomacy. As displayed in his policy of Containment, Kennan operates under the belief that we do not need an extensive budget to make the influence of America felt (Kennan, 1984, 179). However, the same cannot be said of Kennan’s successor, Paul Nitze. Nitze’s policy of containment takes the shape of a document, NSC-68. In this document, one can recognize the dangers

Kennan warned of.

Though some similarities remain on an ideological level, NSC-68 is a wholly different animal than Kennan's Containment upon deeper analysis. Though Kennan's balance of power argument utilized the necessity of keeping the "center of industrial military capability out of hostile hands," NSC-68 placed a new emphasis on perimeter defense around the Soviet Union. For Nitze, one could only change the balance of power through "intimidation, humiliation, and the loss of credibility" (Gaddis, 2005, 90). As a means to accomplish such a strategy, Nitze and his team heavily argued for increased defense expenditures. Though the administration had been vocally against this due to budget deficits, a coalition formed to argue that the economy could operate at full capacity by increasing the capacity of the defense industry. Propelled by reports that "our military strength [was] becoming dangerously inadequate" in the face of assertions that the Soviet Union would risk warfare, an increase in defense expenditures took hold. The result was an appropriation of \$50 billion annually to the defense budget (Gaddis, 2005, 98).

This fluctuating practice of foreign policy is the basis for the argument that external factors exert influence on the creation of military foreign policy. As President Eisenhower's farewell address suggests, many believe that this influence arises from the increased economic influence of the military industrial complex. The literature backs up the assertion that in the 1940's the United States began a dramatic shift towards a privatized commercial defense industry. Friedberg examines the case of the Navy's privatization. At the offset of World War II, the number of private shipyards was triple that of the navy. Following the war, procurement continued, as a means to keep the nation ready for potential war and to keep the builders practicing their "design and production talents" (Friedberg, 1997, 256). These desires perpetuated the existence and operation of the private shipyards.

However, as the system became more privatized, private corporations realized that the existing procurement policy in the early 1960's, which favored "nuclear over conventional force," made for little business (Friedberg, 1997, 261). This situation gave birth to the quest for influence. The private ship building began ad campaigns and created policy debate centering on defense privatization. The literature points out that the dispersal of defense facilities gave these private

corporations a “raw political advantage” and that “the representatives of these states tended to be among the strongest supporters of privatization” (Friedberg, 1997, 262).

Corporate Pluralism theory provides a basis for examining the relationship between the military industrial complex and its influence on congressional representatives. In *The American Warfare State* Rebecca Thorpe lays out the argument that the privatization of the defense industry has led to congressional support for defense spending. Since the initial push to privatize this industry, an increasing number of districts benefit from defense dollars, a result of the cold war movement to disperse defense production in the face of a menacing threat (Thorpe, 2014, 67). Such dispersal has created a defense industry that is responsible for a good amount of jobs in many different districts. The impact on GDP that this dispersal had could have created a relationship between congressional representative and their desire to increase military spending (Thorpe, 2014, 113).

However, when testing to see if higher spending is correlated with more aggressive votes for foreign policy, this theory is not corroborated. To test the ramifications of corporate pluralism in the American legislative system, this study attempted to establish a relationship between the military industrial complex and policymakers, where higher spending drove a more aggressive defense policy. In her case study on the Navy, Friedberg establishes that the privatized and dispersed nature of defense contractors resulted in greater production and support from the members of the areas that housed these facilities. Yet, when the levels of supposed influence are compared to actual decisions on foreign policy from each party, this theory does not hold up.

In the case of Democratic votes, there is no significant correlation between the level of spending in each district and the votes placed by those congressional representatives, ($r = 0.02$, $p = 0.80$). Effectively, the data establishes the absence of a causal relationship between the economic influence of the military industrial complex, and the way Democrat congressional representatives vote on military foreign policy. When conducting the same test for correlation on Republican congressional representatives, the data produced somewhat similar results. Once again, the data suggests no significant relationship between the level of spending in each district and the votes placed by those congressional representatives, ($r = -0.12$, p

=0.06). In the case of the Republicans, the relationship was close to significance, however, must still be called insignificant. Moreover, the effect size of votes that would have been influenced by spending was not only incredibly small, but was also negative. This reveals that even if spending in these districts to were to have been significant, it would have resulted in a vote against aggressive military foreign policy. This reveals that regardless of ideology or home district, the military industrial complex fails to influence the formation of military foreign policy.

These findings certainly do not corroborate President Eisenhower and George Keenan’s theory about the dangerous impact of Military Industrial Complex on the foreign policy of the United States. It can be established that the process of privatizing and dispersing production centers for the military industrial complex was done with the intention of incurring more influence for the military industrial complex. This vested interest hoped to create an impact in the GDP’s of districts around the country, so that representatives would need to vote for more hawkish military endeavors in order to feed their district’s economy. However, this effort clearly failed. It could be inferred that the military industrial complex dispersed strategically. Perhaps they placed greater stake in districts that are not innately prone to vote for aggressive military foreign policy. Strongly Republican districts are prone to vote aggressively for military force even without great influence from the military industrial complex, perhaps from the veteran voters, and the staunchly patriotic ideology that permeating their districts and campaigns. If this is the case, it could explain a lack

Correlations

		Democrat	Spending
Democrat	Pearson Correlation	1	.016
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.798
	N	260	260
Spending	Pearson Correlation	.016	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.798	
	N	260	359

of correlation because these hawkish districts may have less Military Industrial Complex spending on account of their ideology.

It may also be the case that representatives are concerned

with their reputation and standing in Washington DC. Though these military industrial production facilities provides an economic benefit to these districts, this economic gain is not the sole concern of the representative. In the modern political climate, representatives must constantly consider reelection. Though military foreign policy is of extreme importance to the wellbeing of the nation, aside from those who have a vigorous interest in politics, many constituents may pay more attention to domestic matters such as taxation, education, health, and other aspects of policy creation that exert a greater effect on their daily lives. The partisan climate also makes it beneficial for

Correlations

		Spending	Republican
Spending	Pearson Correlation	1	-.120
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.057
	N	359	251
Republican	Pearson Correlation	-.120	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.057	
	N	251	251

representatives to remain within party lines. Favorable status within the party and leaders within the party is of extreme importance during the election cycles. These factors could have all played into limiting the significance of the impact of the military industrial complex on the creation of military foreign policy. Regardless of explanation, the numbers disprove a relationship between the Military Industrial Complex and American military foreign policy.

The failure of corporate pluralism theory to establish causality makes way for Partisan Polarization theory. This theory establishes an increasingly polarized relationship between members of congress on matters of foreign policy. Many experts in the field claim that “national security concerns should give policymakers the excuse to come together in support of the national interest” (Jeong and Quirk, 2017, 61). However, the findings of this study hold that politics do not in fact stop at the water’s edge.

To examine the effect of partisan polarization on foreign policy, this study establishes a relationship between Republican and Democrat votes on the same span of military foreign policy bills as before. The results are highly significant ($r = -0.73$, $p < 0.001$). This highly

significant, large negative relationship reveals that partisan polarization can in fact establish causality for votes on matters of foreign policy. Whereas the economic impact of the military industrial complex exerts insignificant influence on foreign policy, the party affiliation of policymakers is a highly significant influencer. At a consistent level, politicians of either party are voting in the opposite direction from the other. This correlation is consistent with Partisan Polarization theory, finding that the votes by either party are increasing polarized and rarely overlap.

This finding corroborates Jeong and Quirk's assertion that "parties may disagree for merely partisan reasons" (Jeong and Quirk, 2017, 61). This polarization in military policy is charted to have taken place during and following the war in Vietnam. Research charting ideology suggests that this time period is when Republicans became entrenched as the aggressively militaristic party and the Democrats as the idealistic anti-interventionist domestic party. The Vietnam War was brought to American living rooms. As one of the first wars in which pictures were broadcasted by the mass media, there is no surprise that it was also a catalyst for political polarization. The Democrats, to account for the horrors of the war, doubled down as proponents of domestic spending and social welfare programs to distract from the horrors abroad. Meanwhile, Republicans felt compelled to justify the war effort by strengthening their policies on defense. Ever since, the partisan myth has been that each party is bound by these ideological beliefs. However, the findings reveal that this myth is just that.

An analysis into the average supportive votes in favor of a more aggressive foreign policy reveals that each party is more moderate than the partisan myth allows for. On average, the votes placed, by a near equal amount of congressional representatives, are very similar. The Democrats, ($M = 4.53$, $SD = 2.29$) are slightly less hawkish than the Republicans, ($M = 5.00$, $SD = 2.40$). The story these numbers tell is twofold. First, this reveals that Republicans fall dead center on matters of foreign policy, leading them to be less hawkish than many assume. The Democrats likewise, are close to center, and are therefore less dovish than the partisan myth suggests. Secondly, the central nature of these means says that Democrat and Republican policymakers voted on all levels of the hawkish-dovish spectrum. When paired with the negative relationship established above, it is clear that policy makers from each party voted at different levels on different bills. When

Correlations

		Democrat	Republican
Democrat	Pearson Correlation	1	-.725**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	260	173
Republican	Pearson Correlation	-.725**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	173	251

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

the Republicans were dovish, the Democrats were hawkish. These numbers don't suggest moderate ideology, they suggest a fluctuating understanding of ideology. Earlier studies have found that "parties' rhetoric on militarism and preparedness is not always a reliable indicator of the strategies they adopt in response to foreign threats" (Narizny, 204). This data reveals that pure partisanship is a better explanation for partisan polarization theory than is ideology.

The Regression Model corroborates this, as the R square value reveals that 52.6% of Democrat votes can be explained by, or driven by, Republican votes. Essentially, more than half of votes on matters of foreign policy can be predicted by party lines. This reveals a highly significant relationship between political party and votes on military foreign policy. This negative linear relationship constitutes oppositional voting. The model clearly indicates that Democratic policymakers move, significantly, in the opposite direction of Republican policymakers votes. On average, every republican vote in favor of a military foreign policy bill leads to between a .6 - .8 negative democratic vote. Essentially, this regression model reveals a highly significant linear relationship in which it is clear that on matters of military foreign policy, lawmakers are voting in opposition to each other. Paired with the earlier findings, that partisanship is

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Democrat	260	1	10	4.53	2.294
Republican	251	1	10	5.00	2.401

more explanatory than ideology, the regression model predicts that policymakers will vote in such a manner to counter the votes of their opposing party.

Due to the significance of these findings, and the strong indication that partisan politics strongly accounts for military foreign policy, this study then attempts to understand the driver of partisan polarization, through examining the validity of the two-presidencies hypothesis. When votes on military foreign policy are split into groups based on which party occupied the White House at the time of the vote, it is possible to see the levels of overall support the President received on matters of foreign policy. For the purposes of this study, presidential support is used to determine the source and the extent of partisan polarization in foreign policy. First, an analysis of the means again reveals that both parties have are voting in the middle on foreign policy. Each party, under each President, votes close to the median. The greatest deviation from this trend is seen with Democratic lawmakers under a Republican President ($M = 2.68$). A look at the correlation statistics reveals more about this point. The data reveals that voting patterns based on presidential leadership differs between each party. For Democrats, there is no significant correlation

Regression

Variables Entered/Removed^a

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	Republican ^b	.	Enter

a. Dependent Variable: Democrat

b. All requested variables entered.

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.725 ^a	.526	.523	1.359

a. Predictors: (Constant), Republican

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig. ^b
1	Regression	348.891 ^a	1	348.891	189.876	.001 ^b
	Residual	311.774	171	1.823		
	Total	657.873	172			


a. Dependent Variable: Democrat

b. Predictors: (Constant), Republican

		Coefficients ^a						
		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		95.0% Confidence Interval for B		
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	6.472	.210		30.787	.000	6.057	6.887
	Democrat	-.696	.051	-.725	-13.778	.000	-.796	-.596

a. Dependent Variable: Republican

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between military foreign policy votes based on the President’s party ($r = -0.02$, $p = 0.82$). This shows that Democratic policymakers are voting opposite ways based on the President’s party affiliation. But, this difference is not significant, and therefore does not show that the President is a driving factor in the way Democratic lawmakers vote on foreign policy.

However, Republican votes do significantly correlate with the President ($r = 0.19$, $p = 0.01$). Though the effect size is small, it can be observed that Republican policymakers do correlate their voting patterns with the President regardless of party. Republicans are slightly more likely to vote in support of military foreign policy regardless of the President’s party. It must be acknowledged that due to the scope of the study, all bills taken from Democratic Presidents were passed under President Bill Clinton. President Clinton has been playfully deemed “The Best Republican President.” He had conservative tendencies, and

was skillfully adept at navigating his Republican Congress. This could be indicative of the significant support he received from republicans during his tenure. This data set also corroborates the two-presidencies hypothesis. As we see the President supported on matters of foreign policy, it can be deduced that members of Congress felt it appropriate the defer to the leadership of the President.

However, the story unfolds deeper as the data is correlated between opposing parties under the leadership of a Republican, then

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
R under RPOTUS	238	1.00	6.00	3.2395	1.52524
D under RPOTUS	243	1.00	6.00	2.6631	1.36757
R under DPOTUS	192	1.00	4.00	2.5052	.84381
D under DPOTUS	197	1.00	4.00	2.6602	1.12679
Valid N (listwise)	42				

a Democratic President. First, in looking at how Democrats and Republicans voted under a Republican President, this study revealed highly statistically significant results that point to great partisan polarization, ($r = -0.57$, $p < 0.001$). Not only do these findings have extremely high significance, but the effect size is large, meaning that this finding has generalizable validity. What this data shows is that Democratic lawmakers are incredibly divergent from Republican Presidents. They often vote in opposition to Republican lawmakers and the President when a Republican occupies the Oval Office. This

Correlations

		Democrat Lawmaker under Republican President	Democrat Lawmaker under Democrat President
Democrat Lawmaker under Republican President	Pearson Correlation	1	-.017
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.819
	N	243	180
Democrat Lawmaker under Democrat President	Pearson Correlation	-.017	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.819	
	N	180	197

is not in line with the two – presidencies hypothesis, however, it is a clear example of partisan polarization affecting votes on military

foreign policy.

As significant as this finding is, when lawmakers under Democratic Presidents are examined, the results are different. The voting patterns of lawmakers under Democratic Presidents fails to be significant ($r = -0.22$, $p = 0.09$). This reveals greater party polarization on the part of the Democrats. This could be explained by ideology, two – presidencies, and partisan polarization theory. It could be assumed that Republicans may be more supportive of a hawkish Presidential requests due in part to ideology and the two-presidencies hypothesis.

Correlations

		Republican Lawmakers under Republican President	Republican Lawmaker under Democrat President
Republican Lawmakers under Republican President	Pearson Correlation	1	.191*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.011
	N	228	177
Republican Lawmaker under Democrat President	Pearson Correlation	.191*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.011	
	N	177	192

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

However, the rhetoric of ideology is primarily measurable in times of low to moderate threat (Narizny, 217). Additionally, earlier findings point the failure of ideology to explain votes on foreign policy. When it comes to the ideology of the President, it is also crucial to understand that President’s rarely govern across merely partisan lines. To underscore the fluctuating ideology of the President, “Democrat Al Gore proposed higher defense spending and a more actively interventionist foreign policy than the Republic George W. Bush (Narizny, 204). Earlier the study found that partisan polarization was a valid driver of military foreign policy votes, the examination into the President’s party reveals that the party affiliation of the President is a driving factor in partisan polarization. In sum, these results assert that military foreign policy is passed on a polarized partisan basis, without great regard to ideology, and that the party of the President influences the extent of polarization as well.

III. CONCLUSION

As the internationally recognized world power, the United

Correlations

		Democrat Lawmaker under Republican President	Republican Lawmakers under Republican President
Democrat Lawmaker under Republican President	Pearson Correlation	1	-.570**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	243	146
Republican Lawmakers under Republican President	Pearson Correlation	-.570**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	146	238

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

States' military policy is of utmost importance for American and World citizens. One of the strongest in the world, the United States military is often studied and watched closely. Responsible for invasions, regime changes, and peacekeeping efforts in the modern era, the military is a frequent player on the world stage. Once an isolationist power, the increasing exportation of American exceptionalism following World War II has caused many to wonder about the factors influencing the use of military force in the United States. At the time, foreign policy experts, such as George Keenan, supposed that this shift in military behavior stemmed from the cupidity of forces like the Military Industrial Complex in the United States. Such undue influence would

Correlations

		Republican Lawmaker under Democrat President	Democrat Lawmaker under Democrat President
Republican Lawmaker under Democrat President	Pearson Correlation	1	-.223
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.009
	N	192	59
Democrat Lawmaker under Democrat President	Pearson Correlation	-.223	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.009	
	N	59	197

certainly have ramifications on the illusion of democratic policy creation in the United States.

Due to the implications, this study asserts that ulterior factors are responsible for military behavior. Using the tenets of Partisan Polarization Theory, this study contends that the political climate,

more specifically polarization, is responsible for military foreign policy in the United States. Around the Vietnam War, the political climate in the United States became increasingly polarized, and has continued in a positive linear fashion since. The findings of the study back up this theory, and exhibits that polarization of the basis of pure partisanship is predictive of how members of Congress will vote on matters of foreign policy.

So, politics does not stop at the water's edge. The findings of this study reinforce the validity of partisan polarization theory as the most explanatory theory for how military foreign policy is created in the United States. More so than voting alongside the party platform and the ideology associated with it, Congressional representatives are making decisions of foreign policy based on their opposing party. This study does not determine what the motivation behind such polarization is, however, the literature suggests that policymakers would act in a partisan fashion to aid in their reelection.

These findings have significant implications for American government and politics. The domestic political climate in the United States has become increasingly polarized since the 1960's. As such, it could be deemed beneficial for lawmakers to reside in a place of strong partisan support. The splitting of both parties into two poles of ideology made policymakers bolster their stances, in order to act in conjunction with the political climate. Congressional cycles also play a role in increasing polarization; the minority party can be seen making an effort to differentiate themselves from the majority party. These tactics exist to aid in reelection. It can be understood that policymakers who act as strong representatives of the party will earn the party's, and the president's support in their reelection campaign. In the current political climate, this seems to be strongest incentive for voting alongside one's own party, and in opposition to the other.

Though this paper demonstrates the special interests are not in fact responsible for influencing military foreign policy, the results of this study unearth a different, but equally important finding about the state of democracy in the United States. The American political system is designed specifically to promote democracy, to facilitate the representation of its' citizens. Military Foreign Policy has monumental severity on the wellbeing of a nation, and as such should be made with great care and concern. The ability to predict the creation of foreign policy merely by partisan rivalry has dubious implications for the

internal health of the nation.

A Nation that allows itself to be divided, even on such serious matters, is not one in control of its course. Policymakers should be aware of this, and consider the effects of their actions on the long term sustainability of the United States. Though this pattern at present poses no immediate implications, it is not wise to chart a nation's course primarily on personal objectives. Those in Government must make an effort to remedy to environment of partisan polarization in the United States of America. Then, policymakers must once again to create foreign policy to benefit the national interest of the United States of America. It is time for politics to stop at the water's edge.

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