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The Bizarre Law & Economics of 'Business Roundtable v. SEC'

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The Bizarre Law and Economics of *Business Roundtable v. SEC*

Grant M. Hayden*

Matthew T. Bodie+

I. INTRODUCTION

Corporate shareholders elect their boards of directors.1 They do not, however, use anything like a conventional ballot. Instead, shareholders fill out a “proxy ballot” delivered to them by the incumbent board. This proxy ballot lists only the incumbent board’s chosen nominees, which are very often the same board members themselves. If a shareholder wants to run for director or propose another nominee for the board, she needs to provide all other shareholders with a separate proxy ballot.2

Throughout the last decade, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has been at work developing a rule for allowing shareholders to have access to the corporate proxy ballot.3 In 2010, the agency finally passed Rule 14a-11, which would have required corporations to put shareholder-nominated candidates on the company’s own proxy ballot (as long as certain conditions were met).4 The 2010 rule was the culmination

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1. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (2006); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.21 (2007).


3. For a discussion of these proposals, see infra Part II.

of a process that included two previous incarnations, as well as legislation that specifically paved the way for the rule’s creation.\textsuperscript{5} Less than a year after its passage, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck down the law, holding that the SEC violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by failing to consider the rule’s costs and benefits adequately.\textsuperscript{6} According to the court, the SEC’s failure was so egregious that the Commission’s decision to promulgate Rule 14a-11 was “arbitrary and capricious.”\textsuperscript{7}

Other commentators have noted that the D.C. Circuit’s opinion rests on an extremely muscular version of judicial review—one that contravenes the traditional deference to administrative authority.\textsuperscript{8} Our concern, however, is with the court’s misapplication of law and economics principles. The court’s reasoning in \textit{Business Roundtable} rests on flawed empirical and theoretical conclusions about proxy access and corporate governance. It ignores the benefits of facilitating shareholder democracy and focuses instead on costs that are routine for any functioning electoral system. As a result, its decision to strike down the regulation rests on a version of law and economics that contravenes the discipline’s traditional principles and exacerbates agency costs.

Rule 14a-11 is open to debate on grounds of policy.\textsuperscript{9} But the \textit{Business Roundtable} decision improperly sides with management by casting one side of the shareholder democracy debate as “arbitrary and capricious.” It is, in fact, the court’s opinion that uses economic and voting-rights principles in a capricious manner. Part II provides a brief overview of Rule 14a-11 and the \textit{Business Roundtable} decision. Part III discusses the basic theory of voting rights and applies them to the shareholder franchise. Part IV explains how the D.C. Circuit misconstrued the dynamics of shareholder voting and the role of Rule 14a-11 in the process. Finally, Part V discusses the larger problem exemplified by the \textit{Business Roundtable} decision—namely, the growing preference amongst some law and economics commentators for a Potemkin–Village version of shareholder democracy, one that undermines the very market principles that they purport to advance.

\textsuperscript{5} See \textit{infra} Part II (discussing the history of the rule).

\textsuperscript{6} \textit{Bus. Roundtable}, 647 F.3d at 1146.

\textsuperscript{7} \textit{Id.} at 1156.


II. THE HISTORY OF PROXY ACCESS, FROM 1942 TO BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE v. SEC

The SEC’s proxy access rule was not a lark; it was not a quick-draw policy change that came out of the darkness. Allowing shareholders direct access to the board’s proxy ballot is, in many ways, an intuitive step. The proxy ballot is designed to look like an actual ballot—an instrument for casting one’s vote in the election of directors. However, the proxy ballot is in fact simply an instruction to the board as to how one’s shares should be voted at the annual meeting.

The board decides the nominees to be placed on its own ballot and oversees its distribution. It is much more akin to a letter or request to the board, made on a form that the board has provided for that purpose, as to how the shareholder’s shares should be voted at the meeting. It is not a ballot. The actual election is conducted at the shareholders’ meeting, and the proxy ballots are used to give the board that shareholder’s proxy votes. If the shareholder was personally appearing at the meeting, she could vote her shares in person and would have no need for a proxy. For those who are absent, the company’s proxy ballot is a way for the incumbent board to facilitate votes—but on the board’s own terms. Thus, in order to run against the incumbent board and/or the board’s designated replacements, an “insurgent” candidate must provide her own proxy ballots for distribution. If the shareholder is voting with the board, she turns in the board’s proxy; if voting for the opposition, either the shareholder must show up and vote directly or she must provide her proxy to the opposition’s designee.

Because we are used to voting using a designated ballot, it is natural to confuse the proxy ballot with an actual one. This confusion is perhaps at the heart of the proxy access debates. Over time, the proxy ballot has been coopted by the government for various purposes. The proxy is generally accompanied by massive disclosures required by federal law; it includes votes over compensation packages and audit providers, and it provides shareholder access for independent referenda on questions relating to a variety of potential subjects. The ballots are generally sent (via mail or the web) to an accounting or proxy firm, which collects and counts the proxies, much like an independent election. Because of these accoutrements, the proxy ballot looks a lot more like a part of an independent electoral process rather than a request to the board to vote for the board’s nominees as provided on a board form.

Less than a decade after the passage of the Securities Act of 1933, the SEC first considered proxy access for shareholders. The proposal—debated internally—provided that “stockholders be permitted to use the management’s proxy statement to canvass stockholders generally for the election of their own nominees for directorships, as well as for the nominees of the management.” Shareholders would have only been permitted to


add an additional nominee for each seat; thus, the company could stop adding nominees once they were twice the number of positions. The Commission did not formally act upon the idea.

Proxy access came up for consideration again in 1977 and 1992. In 1977, the SEC deferred on access in favor of supporting the work of board nominating committees; the Commission intended for these committees to consider shareholder candidates as well. In 1992, the Commission opted to expand Rule 14a-4 to allow shareholders to include board nominees on their “short-slate” proxy ballots. This reform made it easier for shareholders to seek minority representation on the board by targeting certain board nominees out of management’s entire slate.

Over the past decade, however, the SEC has pursued proxy access in earnest. The Commission proposed proxy access rules in 2003 as part of a broader suite of pro-shareholder reforms. Under the 2003 proposal, proxy access hinged on a triggering event: either a vote on a special Rule 14a-8 proposal subjecting the company to proxy access, or a 35% or more “withhold” vote for one of the company’s directors. Once triggered, shareholders with at least five percent of the voting securities, held for at least two years, would be entitled to nominate between one and three director candidates. The proposal


14. Id.

15. See Securities Exchange Commission Release Notice, 7 Fed. Reg. at 10,653 (“A number of the suggestions proposed by the staff were not adopted. They are: . . . 2. The suggestion that minority stockholders be given an opportunity to use the management’s proxy material in support of their own nominees for directorships.”).

16. 2003 SEC PROXY REPORT, supra note 13, at 3. However, there were no formal requirements that the committees actually place dissident candidates on the ballot.


18. 2003 SEC PROXY REPORT, supra note 13, at 4. A “short-slate” is a group of dissident directors that falls short of the number of open seats. Id. The change in Rule 14a-4 allowed shareholders to single out a certain number of board nominees for inclusion on the shareholders’ proxy ballots, even if the nominees did not want to be included. As an example, directors B1, B2, B3, B4, and B5 are running for reelection. If shareholders want to nominate S1 and S2 to run against B1 and B2, the shareholders can submit a proxy with S1, S2, B3, B4, and B5, in order to isolate B1 and B2, even if B3, B4, and B5 do not want to be on the shareholders’ proxies.

19. Id.


21. Id. at 60,794–98. The formula for number of nominees was as follows:

As proposed, a company would be required to include one security holder nominee if the total number of members of the board of directors is eight or fewer, two security holder nominees if the number of members of the board of directors is greater than eight and less than 20 and three security holder nominees if the number of members of the board of directors is 20 or more. The proposal would have a separate standard for companies with classified or “staggered” boards of directors. Where a company has a director (or directors) currently serving on its board of directors who was elected as a security holder nominee, and the term of that director extends past the date of the meeting of security holders for which the company is soliciting proxies, the company would not be required to include on its proxy card more security holder nominees than could result in the total number of directors serving on the board that were elected as security holder nominees being
received numerous comments but, in the end, was never acted upon.  

Three years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8, to create proxy access for shareholder director candidates, was improperly excluded from a company’s proxy materials.  

The SEC had sided with the company, arguing that the proposal related to an election and was therefore excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(8).  

However, the court held that the exclusion only referred to proposals concerning a particular election, not those concerning procedural rules that apply to elections in general.  

The AFSCME decision led to a period of some confusion in the proxy world, as the court had rejected the SEC’s interpretation of its own rule.  

Thus, the SEC either would be stuck with the Second Circuit’s decision or would have to change the rule.  

The Commission, confronted with this legal fork in the road, essentially chose to explore both directions at once. In 2007, it released for comment two alternative proposals: a shareholder access proposal and a status quo proposal. Under the access proposal, the SEC would change Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to allow shareholders to submit proposals amending corporation bylaws that would give proxy access to shareholder nominees.  

Only shareholders owning greater than five percent of a company’s voting securities would be permitted to make proposals in the proxy materials affecting director nomination and election procedures.  

The access proposal would allow such shareholders to offer whatever shareholder nomination procedures they desired in the proxy materials.  

The only substantive limitations on such procedures would be those imposed by state law or the company’s charter and bylaws.  

The status quo proposal was a codification of the SEC’s interpretation prior to the Second Circuit’s overturning.  

The effect of the status quo proposal would be to reverse the Second Circuit’s decision in
AFSCME and continue to permit corporations to exclude from proxy materials shareholder proposals that would affect the director nomination and election procedures. Ultimately, the SEC adopted the status quo proposal in a divided three to two vote.

In 2009, the SEC released yet another iteration of proxy access. This version created a new rule—Rule 14a-11—which would provide for direct access to the ballot for shareholders. The 2009 proposal significantly reduced the requirements for participation. Only one percent ownership was necessary for companies with over $700 million in assets, sliding up to three percent for those with assets between $75 million and $700 million, and five percent for those under $75 million. The period for holding the securities was only one year, and a triggering event was no longer necessary. Most significantly, the proposal would have made this access a mandatory part of the corporate structure rather than merely allowing shareholders to implement it on their own.

The SEC received comments on the proposal up through 2010, when the Dodd–Frank Act specifically gave the Commission the authority to enact proxy access reforms. Soon thereafter, the Commission adopted Rule 14a-11 on a three to two vote. The final rule increased the ownership requirements to three percent but allowed shareholders to pool their holdings to reach that threshold. That three percent had to be held for three years prior to the nominations and up through the actual shareholder meeting. Shareholders were limited to nominating candidates for up to 25% of the seats on the board, and they could not intend a change in control. In addition, the Commission amended Rule 14a-8 to allow shareholders to propose proxy nomination processes within their individual corporations.

32. Id. at 43,493.
33. Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1355.
35. Id. at 29,035.
36. Id. at 29,032, 29,035.
39. Id. at 56,674.
40. Id. at 56,675.
41. Id.
42. Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2012). The revised Rule 14a-8 only excludes proposals that
   (i) [w]ould disqualify a nominee who is standing for election; (ii) [w]ould remove a director from office before his or her term expired; (iii) [q]uestions the competence, business judgment, or character of one or more nominees or directors; (iv) [s]eeks to include a specific individual in the company’s proxy materials for election to the board of directors; or (v) [o]therwise could affect the outcome of the upcoming election of directors.
A little over a month after the rule was adopted, the Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce filed a petition with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit seeking an injunction against the new rule. The SEC stayed the rule pending judicial review.

On July 22, 2011, the D.C. Circuit struck down the regulation under the Administrative Procedure Act for failing "adequately to consider the new rule’s effect upon efficiency, competition, and capital formation." The court based its ruling on three failures on the part of the Commission. First, the court found that the SEC failed to calculate the costs and the benefits of the new rule properly, specifically with respect to the incumbent board’s costs of opposing a shareholder nominee. According to the court, “the Commission failed to appreciate the intensity with which issuers would oppose nominees and arbitrarily dismissed the probability that directors would conclude their fiduciary duties required them to support their own nominees.”

The court also criticized the Commission’s “mixed empirical evidence” on the benefits of proxy access and claimed that the agency had misapplied state law as an excuse for ignoring certain costs. Second, the court noted that the SEC neglected to pay attention to strategic uses of the rule by union and state pension fund shareholders. The court found “good reason to believe institutional investors with special interests will be able to use the rule” to advance their “self-interested objectives rather than the goal of maximizing shareholder value.”

Finally, as to the third failure, the court accused the Commission of emphasizing the infrequency of elections when assessing the costs, but not when assessing the benefits. According to the court, “the Commission’s discussion of the estimated frequency of nominations under Rule 14a-11 is internally inconsistent and therefore arbitrary.”

The D.C. Circuit’s decision striking down Rule 14a-11 surprised many observers, including opponents of the rule. In fact, it seems fair to say that most academic

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46. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also id. at 1148 (“The petitioners argue the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously here because it neglected its statutory responsibility to determine the likely economic consequences of Rule 14a-11 and to connect those consequences to efficiency, competition, and capital formation . . . . We agree with the petitioners and hold the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously for having failed once again . . . adequately to assess the economic effects of a new rule.”).
47. Id. at 1149.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1151 (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1152.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1153.
53. Id.
54. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Proxy Access Invalidated on APA Grounds, J.L. POL. & CULTURE (July 22, 2011), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2011/07/proxy-access-invalidated-on-apa-grounds.html (“Candidly, while I’m pleased, I’m also surprised. I had thought—and said publicly—that this suit was a long shot.”).
commentators were quite critical of the opinion. Much of the commentary focused on the level of review called for under the statute—"arbitrary and capricious"—compared with the regulation's actual flaws as found by the court. This Article, however, does not focus on the application of the Administrative Procedure Act to the SEC's proxy access regulation. Instead, it concerns the court's economic and voting-rights analysis supporting its decision to strike the regulation down. Before turning to that critique, though, we provide a brief overview of shareholder democracy, in theory and practice.

III. SHAREHOLDERS, DEMOCRACY, AND CORPORATE LAW

All institutions, including business corporations, must make decisions. These decisions often involve judgments about the needs and desires of a wide variety of constituents. There are many ways to move from these individual preferences to institutional choices, and most of the institutions that comprise modern market economies—from governments to small businesses—employ a range of decision-making structures designed to take account of their constituents' preferences. They sometimes rely upon contracts, which are thought to ensure the preference satisfaction of everyone involved. But once institutions reach a certain size and complexity, contracts alone cannot do the job. At that point, the institutions resort to some sort of voting mechanism to translate individual preferences into institutional choices.

A. Governments

Democratic political institutions, of course, rely heavily on voting mechanisms to translate preferences into social choices; indeed, the ability of its constituents to cast a meaningful vote is what makes a government "democratic." But when political institutions settle on voting as the preferred method of preference aggregation, they still

55. Recent Case, supra note 8, at 1093 (stating that the opinion "made missteps similar to those for which [it] scolded the SEC," and called it "troubling"); Davidoff, supra note 8 (noting that "the opinion appears to create an almost insurmountable barrier for the S.E.C. by requiring that it provide empirical support amounting to proof that its rules would be effective"); Brett McDonnell, Dodd-Frank @ 1: An Overall Assessment, CONGLOMERATE BLOG (July 22, 2011), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/07/dodd-frank-1-an-overall-assessment.html ("This opinion is little more than the judges ignoring the proper judicial rule of deference to an agency involved in notice-and-comment rulemaking and asserting their own naked political preferences. Talk about judicial activism."); Gordon Smith, Comment to Business Roundtable v. SEC, CONGLOMERATE BLOG (July 22, 2011), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/07/business-roundtable-v-sec.html#comment-261374058 ("I had told my students that I thought the lawsuit was not well-founded, so I was surprised by the opinion. I understand why people would oppose proxy access, but 'arbitrary and capricious'? The process hardly seems to qualify for that characterization. . . . I am not enamored with the result here."); David Zaring, More on the DC Circuit's Proxy Access Decision, CONGLOMERATE BLOG (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/08/the-dc-circuit-s-proxy-access-decision-keeps-getting-attention-see-here-for-a-roundup-and-here-from-elliott-spitzer-seem.html (stating that the court’s analysis is "probably best characterized as fly-specking, and the kind of searching inquiry no agency could survive," and that "the opinion isn’t very good").

56. See, e.g., Anthony W. Mongone, Note, Business Roundtable: A New Level of Judicial Scrutiny and Its Implications in a Post-Dodd-Frank World, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 746, 793 (concluding that the court used an improperly onerous standard and that it should have upheld the regulation using a more deferential standard).

have many decisions to make about how to structure the process. Those decisions are embodied in a set of legal entitlements, or voting rights, which collectively sketch the contours of polity. Voting rights, though, are not one-dimensional; instead, there are many distinct facets to the rights to vote, each of which is necessary to ensure full democratic participation.58

The first aspect of the right involves access—the ability to cast a ballot.59 This is voting rights at its most fundamental. At the beginning of this country’s history, most states only extended the franchise to property-holding white men over the age of 21.60 That, of course, has changed, and many more groups now have access to the ballot.61 There are, however, some restrictions that remain—most jurisdictions restrict voting by felons or ex-felons,62 noncitizens,63 and nonresidents.64 Minors and people with certain

58. Pam Karlan sets up a taxonomy of three aspects of the right to vote in Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 176 (1989). Other ways of parsing out the right to vote, see, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, What Kind of Right Is “The Right to Vote”?, 93 VA. L. REV. 43, 45–52 (2007); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1709–20 (1993), are not inconsistent with this conception. Here, we take Karlan’s taxonomy as a starting point and add the slating process into the mix. See also Grant M. Hayden, Resolving the Dilemma of Minority Representation, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1589, 1594–1602 (2004) (giving a brief account of the history of each aspect of the right).


60. See KEYSSAR, supra note 59, at 306–15 (listing property and taxpaying requirements in the colonies and states between 1776 and 1855).


64. See Glenn P. Smith, Note, Interest Exceptions to One-Resident, One-Vote: Better Results from the Voting Rights Act?, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1159 (1996).
mental impairments are also not allowed to vote. But, although we are far from universal suffrage, a greater proportion of the population can vote now than could at the country's founding.

In a sense, the question of "who" should have a right to vote is relatively straightforward. The debate is essentially over which groups should be considered members of the polity whose preferences should be reflected in electoral outcomes. The issue becomes more complicated once we move from "who" votes to "how" they vote. It does so because the mechanics of most election procedures—things like registration requirements, voting methods, and vote counting—may themselves restrict the right to vote, but in subtle ways that depend upon whether the procedures have a disproportionate effect on some voter-relevant group. For example, if a state requires voters to produce photographic identification in order to vote, and large numbers of, say, poor people lack such identification, then that may skew the outcome of the election. In a sense, then, both who has a right to vote and how they vote can affect access to the electoral system.

Mere access to the polls, though, guarantees very little, especially in a representative democracy. To begin with, votes may end up carrying different numerical weights. Sometimes, as in weighted voting systems, this is part of the design. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, assigns different numbers of votes to each member country. In other cases, votes are weighted differently as a result of deliberate indifference to underlying demographic changes. In the first half of the 20th century, many states refused to redraw district lines in the face of tremendous demographic changes. This had the effect of diluting the numerical voting power of those in more populous (largely urban) districts and concentrating it in the less populous (rural) districts, a situation remedied by the Supreme Court in its one person, one vote

66. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (noting that "[e]ach provision of these [state election codes], whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects—at least to some degree—the individual's right to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends"); Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics: Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 314–36 (2007) (explaining the sliding scale of scrutiny applied to election codes).
69. For background on this aspect of the right to vote, see generally Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., The End of Inequality: One Person, One Vote and the Transformation of American Politics (2008); Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Democratic Representation: Reapportionment in Law and Politics (1968); Representation and Misrepresentation: Legislative Reapportionment in Theory and Practice (Robert A. Goldwin ed., 1968); Gordon E. Baker, The Reapportionment Revolution: Representation, Political Power, and the Supreme Court (1966); Robert B. McKay, Reapportionment: The Law and Politics of Equal Representation (1965); Hayden, supra note 58; Grant M. Hayden, The False Promise of One Person, One Vote, 102 MICH. L. REV. 213 (2003) [hereinafter Hayden, One Person].
71. See Hayden, One Person, supra note 69, at 219.
72. See id.
decisions in the 1960s. The ability to cast a meaningful vote, though, can clearly be inhibited by either denying access to the polls or by numerically diluting one’s vote.

Democratic political entities take many factors into consideration when making decisions about voting access and weight. Chief among these, though, is some assessment of a voter’s interest in the political entity—what they have at stake in the outcome of the election. Those with a strong interest in the outcome are obvious candidates for the franchise; those with little riding on it are rarely extended voting rights. Given that voting mechanisms are primarily a method of aggregating individual preferences, it makes some sense to start with those who actually have strong feelings on the matters at issue. They may also make better informed decisions and help ensure that the election outcome is viewed as legitimate.

Because political entities have no way of directly measuring the strength of one’s preferences, they usually rely upon proxies for voter interest. In the past, states claimed that their property-holding and taxpaying requirements were put in place to ensure that those voting had a sufficient economic stake in the outcome of an election. While such restrictions appear antiquated, and even discriminatory, the underlying assumption that voting should be tied to interest persists. We just think we have better proxies. Residency requirements, for example, allow us to target people living within the borders of a government whose power is, to a great degree, geographically circumscribed: those people within the borders are those with a greater stake in the outcome of elections. And this connection between voter access and voter interest has been endorsed by the Supreme Court.

Political entities also attend to voter interest when assigning weights to votes. In weighted voting systems, the weight is often assigned in proportion to the voter’s perceived stake in the enterprise. In the IMF, a member’s voting power is largely determined by the resources that the member contributes to the fund. Other types of voting systems follow suit, though sometimes in ways that are not as obvious. Take, for example, the one person, one vote requirement. The U.S. Constitution requires that districting for the House of Representatives, both houses of state legislatures, and local governmental entities be done in a way that assigns equal numerical weight to votes. The requirement may involve a positive judgment that all are equally interested in the

74. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 68, at 452–60.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 453.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 454.
79. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 68, at 454.
80. Id. at 454–55, 460.
81. See Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69 (1978) (noting that in the context of special interest elections, the state may disenfranchise those who lack certain interests); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 n.15 (1969) (noting that a person residing in a certain district may participate in an election because he has an interest); Hayden & Bodie, supra note 68, at 455–56.
82. IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors, supra note 70.
outcome of an election; more likely, it reflects our inability to make such finely tuned assessments of the strength of people's preferences.\textsuperscript{84} In any case, though, an exception to the one person, one vote requirements—special purpose districts—may help demonstrate the relationship between voter interest and voting weight. The governing boards of special purpose districts are allowed to restrict the franchise to those most affected by its decisions and then further fine-tune voting weight with that interest.\textsuperscript{85} Water boards, for example, are allowed to restrict voting to landowners and, further, weight the votes according to how much land each voter owns.\textsuperscript{86} This one acre, one vote system is thought to more accurately tailor voter interest with voting weight.

The ability to cast an equally weighted vote, however, does not guarantee an equal opportunity to participate. There are a variety of other ways to keep like-minded voters from electing candidates of their choice. Some of these manipulate the ways in which votes are combined. At-large elections, anti-single-shot laws, and gerrymanders are all used to dilute the voting power of certain groups.\textsuperscript{87} Gerrymandering district boundaries, for example, can take groups that could constitute an effective majority in one district and split them into two districts so they are a majority in neither.\textsuperscript{88} The legal status of attempts to dilute a group's voting power depends upon the type of group being targeted. Racial groups are afforded greater legal protection than, say, members of a political party.\textsuperscript{89}

The other way to keep groups from electing their preferred candidates is to interfere with the slating process. This may be done from the top down, such as by prohibiting certain candidates from running for or holding office. In the aftermath of the Civil War, the federal government forced states to allow blacks to vote; the state of Georgia immediately responded by passing a law that prohibited blacks from holding office.\textsuperscript{90} One may also interfere with group voting power from the bottom up by limiting group members' access to earlier stages of the slating process. In the first half of the 20th century, southern states used the white primary as a means of keeping black voters out of the primary elections, eliminating their preferred candidates at that stage and leaving them to choose between unpalatable alternatives in the general election.\textsuperscript{91} The group in control of the slating process can effectively control electoral outcomes.\textsuperscript{92}

\begin{itemize}
  \item 84. See Hayden, \textit{One Person}, supra note 69, at 251–52.
  \item 85. See id. at 252–55 (discussing special-purpose districts as a method of weighting votes).
  \item 86. For examples of decisions concluding that a water district is not subject to the usual one person, one vote requirements, see generally Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973); Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
  \item 88. See Frank R. Parker, \textit{Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Redistricting}, in \textit{Minority Vote Dilution} 85, 86–99 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (discussing techniques used in racial gerrymandering). These strategies of "cracking" and "packing" voters are discussed in several Supreme Court opinions as well. See, e.g., Thornburg, Attorney Gen. of N.C. v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 n.11 (1986).
  \item 90. See KEYSSAR, supra note 59, at 86.
  \item 91. See generally Darlene Clark Hine, \textit{Black Victory: The Rise and Fall of the White Primary in Texas} (2003).
  \item 92. This is also true for the less obvious reason that a group with agenda control can take advantage of
\end{itemize}
In the United States, the slating processes for federal, state, and local offices, as well as those for state initiatives, are largely controlled by the states. And, in addition to the historical attempts to control black voting rights, states have used a variety of techniques to limit ballot access. Most states have relied upon filing fees and signature requirements, or some combination of the two, to qualify for placement on the ballot. The filing fees typically vary by office, are based upon some percentage of the yearly salary for that office, and may sometimes be waived, in whole or in part, with the submission of a certain number of signatures. The signature requirements may be stated either in absolute terms or calculated as a percentage of the voter turnout in some recent election, usually a gubernatorial election. The barriers to entry are often designed in a way to be particularly onerous for minority party and independent candidates.

Ballot access restrictions are typically justified on two main grounds. First by limiting the number of candidates or alternatives on the ballot, the restrictions are said to prevent voter confusion. Second, ballot access laws are claimed to promote electoral stability by keeping frivolous candidates off the ballot or, more to the point, preserving the two-party system. Other purported goals include more tangential benefits, such as the government's interest in the revenue raised through filing fees.

Restricting ballot access, however, comes at a real democratic cost. As discussed above, elections are first and foremost about preference aggregation. People's preferences about all sorts of things—from food to books to political candidates—range widely, and any respectable system of preference aggregation needs to account for that variation. People's preferences are not meaningfully reflected in electoral outcomes if too many options are taken off the table before voting even begins. To put it in more market-oriented terms: ballot access laws are government regulations that stifle electoral competition.

For these reasons, the Supreme Court has analyzed ballot access as an integral component of the right to vote. In order to be more than a procedural formality, the right to vote effectively must be "understood as the right to vote freely for the candidate of one's own choosing." This initially led the Court to view all ballot access laws with great suspicion, subjecting them to strict scrutiny, which required the state to justify any
restriction as a necessary means to a compelling governmental end. The Court devised and applied that standard in the 1968 decision *Williams v. Rhodes*, striking down an Ohio requirement that new party candidates had to submit over 400,000 signatures by February of an election year.

Since *Williams*, however, the Court has been less critical of ballot access laws because, upon reflection, it turns out that the mechanics of most state election procedures—including ballot access and other things such as registration requirements, voting methods, and vote counting—may, in some sense, restrict the right to vote. And subjecting every one of these state requirements to strict scrutiny seemed excessive. The Supreme Court avoided such a result by fashioning a new method of analyzing constitutional challenges to the mechanics of registration and voting. In *Burdick v. Takushi*, the Court established a sliding scale where the degree of judicial scrutiny given to a state requirement depends upon the "character and magnitude" of its burden on voting rights. Where the voting rights are subject to "severe" restrictions, something akin to ordinary strict scrutiny is applied where the regulation must be "narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance." But in cases where the regulation imposes only "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions" upon voting rights, "the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions." Thus, the one-dimensional application of strict scrutiny is moderated in recognition of the fact that all election regulations have some effect on the right to vote.

Ballot access laws, then, are supposed to strike an appropriate balance between maintaining electoral stability and preserving meaningful choice. In effect, however, the move away from strict scrutiny has given states quite a bit of leeway when it comes to restricting access to the ballot. Minor party and independent candidates oftentimes have a difficult time making it onto the ballots, diminishing the range of options available to voters, and leading some scholars to argue that ballot access laws are the most anti-competitive feature of the American electoral system.

Democratic voting systems, then, should be designed to produce group decisions that accurately reflect the underlying individual preferences. They should begin by identifying people with an interest in the polity and ensuring that they have equal access to the voting system. Those votes are weighted equally unless there's some strong reason to suspect that people's levels of interest are unequal in a way that can be accurately measured (as with special purpose districts). Once these individual voting rights are secure, care must be taken to ensure that groups of like-minded individuals have an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice, something that can be frustrated in a variety of ways in either the slating process or the vote aggregation process. In the end, democratic political systems should be designed to translate individual preferences into group choices without skewing the result in any particular direction.

103. Id. at 23, 31–34; Hall, supra note 96, at 424–25.
105. Id. (quoting *Norman v. Reed*, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
106. Id. (quoting *Anderson v. Celebrezze*, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)).
107. E.g., Hall, supra note 96, at 414–15.
B. Corporations

While business corporations are very different from political entities, they too confront the issue of translating individual preferences into group choices. When we think of a corporation, we generally picture a collection of people and assets with some common commercial goal. The corporation itself is a fiction—a government-created organizational entity with only legal—not actual—personhood. Thus, perhaps it’s more useful to conceive of a corporation as a legal structure designed to allocate rights and duties among a group of people devoted to some shared enterprise. The group itself is a rather diverse set of constituents, and may be said to include the many types of people with an interest in the enterprise, including directors, officers, shareholders, employees, bondholders, suppliers, and even customers.

While there are a number of features considered essential to the legal structure of a corporation, the keys to its decision-making structure (and thus this Article) are shared ownership interests by investors and delegated management. The three players within this governance structure are the shareholders, the board of directors, and the officers. The shareholders, sometimes called the “owners” of the firm, have the right to receive residual profits as well as the right to elect the board of directors. The directors are, in turn, the locus of authority within the corporation; like a legislature, they act as the firm when its ordinary representatives—its employees—lack authority. The board of directors, though, does not generally run the business; directors usually delegate this power to the officers of the corporation. These officers in turn select the remaining employees. The structure is hierarchical, in that shareholders can vote out directors, directors can fire the officers, and officers can fire the remaining employees.

When looking at this structure in the context of political institutions, we are immediately struck by the fact that it is only shareholders who are having their

108. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 68, at 460.
109. Corporations are not, of course, the only form of business organization—there are sole proprietorships, partnerships, trusts, and an assortment of variations of them. Corporations, though, are generally viewed as the most complex business entities, and the ones that currently dominate the economic activity in the United States.
110. Scholars have isolated five factors that they consider essential to the corporate form: (1) full legal personality, including the ability to bind the firm to contracts; (2) limited liability for owners and managers; (3) shared ownership by investors of capital; (4) delegated management under a board structure; and (5) transferable shares. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439–40 (2000); cf. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 2 (1986) (listing four characteristics of the corporation: (1) limited liability for investors; (2) free transferability of investor interests; (3) legal personality; and (4) centralized management).
111. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 110, at 440–41.
112. CLARK, supra note 110, at 93.
113. Commentators have objected to this characterization. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 604 (2006) (calling this view “deeply erroneous”); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2002) (“From both a legal and an economic perspective, the claim that shareholders own the public corporation simply is empirically incorrect.”).
114. This designation is something of a misnomer. See text accompanying infra notes 116–17.
115. CLARK, supra note 110, at 21.
preferences aggregated through a formal voting system. The corporation encompasses the daily activities of a variety of different players: directors, officers, executives, management, and employees. Moreover, there are a variety of outside stakeholders who have interests in the activities of the corporation, akin to shareholders: bondholders, suppliers, customers, even the community at large. However, when it comes to aggregating the preferences of the polity in order to determine the leadership of the corporation, only shareholders are invited to participate in the franchise.

This structure looks like it runs against the basic prescription in politics that all those with an interest in the enterprise should be accorded voting rights. But according to the traditional law and economics theory of corporate law, the corporate structure aggregates constituents' preferences in the most efficient manner.117 This efficient aggregation works, according to its proponents, because most corporate constituents, both inside and outside the corporation, have their preferences captured by contract.118 Employees, for example, receive a certain wage for their labor; consumers buy the company's products at a certain price. These contracts are thought to be the most straightforward way to capture the preferences since all parties consenting to a contract must prefer the state of affairs under the contract to their status ex ante.119 Thus, each contract is posited to be a Pareto improvement.120 The law and economics approach argues that shareholders have their entitlements fixed by contract too, but among their entitlements is the right to elect the board of directors and, ultimately, control the firm.121

The primary justification for limiting voting rights to shareholders is the theory of shareholder primacy.122 Shareholder primacy is the theoretical driver not only for the vote, but also for such key concepts as the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.123 Shareholder primacy essentially means that corporations exist to serve the interests of shareholders.124 Put more specifically, the theory mandates that the corporation be run with the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth. Shareholder primacy could simply be a democratic legitimacy argument: the corporation has to keep shareholder interests at the forefront, because shareholders are the voting polity. But this leaves a critical question unanswered: who made the shareholders the voting polity? The choice of this group as the voting "citizens" of the polity is what needs justifying.125 A variant of this justification is that shareholders are the corporation's "owners" and thus are entitled to

118. Bainbridge, supra note 116, at 553.
119. Id. at 583.
120. Id. at 583–84.
121. Id. at 548.
122. Id. at 568–71.
125. Id. at 278–79.
the ownership rights of profits and control. However, the ownership justification is also doomed by its circularity: who made the shareholders the owners? Labeling shareholders "owners" is no more of a justification for the vote than is labeling them "voters."

Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel provided a justification for shareholder primacy beyond simple labels. In looking to ground shareholder primacy in economic theory, they looked to the traditional economic utility rationale of creating the highest level of efficiency or overall social utility. Shareholder primacy theory argues that maximizing shareholder wealth will generate the highest amount of surplus and thus will result in the greatest overall social utility. Instead of being the "owners" of the corporation, shareholders were one group of many whose contracts with one another jointly created the fictional corporate "entity." However, shareholders were the sole "residual claimants": that is, their returns were not payable until the other contractual participants—creditors, employees, customers, suppliers—had been fully satisfied. Because shareholders are not paid until these set contractual payments have been made, Easterbrook and Fischel argue, all other claimants received their contractual entitlements, and the shareholders benefited from the maximization of the residual.

Thus, the law and economics theory of the corporation requires that control of corporate decision making is, ultimately, concentrated in the hands of the shareholders in order to maximize the preference satisfaction of all involved. Shareholders, as the residual claimants, are assigned what is left after all fixed claims on corporate proceeds have been paid. Managers and directors are assigned, by contract or statute, a fiduciary duty to shareholders in order to make the residual attractive. And other parties can be offered enough to keep them involved in the corporate enterprise. Total proceeds should be higher, according to law and economic theory, if the residual claims are assigned to one group. Easterbrook and Fischel give the nod to shareholders over other stakeholders in lieu of contractual claims because that is the best way to induce them to put their money at risk while also relinquishing any real control over how it is used. Again, the result is a combination of managerial control (as expressed by the business judgment rule) and shareholder interest (expressed by charging the managers with maximizing shareholder wealth) that is supposed to be a Pareto improvement over both direct shareholder control and a system that tries to look out for all stakeholder

127. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 113, at 1199–92 ("[T]he claim that shareholders own the public corporation simply is empirically incorrect.").
129. Id.
130. Id. at 36.
131. Id. at 36–37. This perspective assumes that all other claimants have rigidly set contractual entitlements, such that paying them more would be akin to a gift.
132. Id. at 67–70.
133. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 117, at 90–93.
134. Id. at 22–25.
135. Id. at 35–39.
136. Id. at 67–70.
interests.\(^\text{137}\)

This is why, under law and economics theory, the “one share, one vote” rule is a “logical consequence” of the theory of shareholder primacy.\(^\text{138}\) The “one share, one vote” rule requires that each share of stock have equal voting weight with all other shares. In this way, the voting interest is equal to the interest in the residual. Shares with disproportionate voting power create skewed incentives. As Easterbrook and Fischel argue, “[t]hose with disproportionate voting power will not receive shares of the residual gains or losses from new endeavors and arrangements commensurate with their control; as a result, they will not make optimal decisions.”\(^\text{139}\) As a result, those with control will have the incentive to seek disproportionate gains that do not directly inure to the owners of the residual.\(^\text{140}\) The residual will no longer be maximized, discouraging equity investment and leading to a decline in societal efficiency.

Thus, the law and economics theory of shareholder primacy rests on the notion that shareholders will improve social welfare by focusing on increasing the corporation’s residual profits. Shareholder primacy is enforced through shareholder voting and the market for corporate control, which uses the shareholder vote to effectuate changes in management. Essential to the theory is the notion of shareholder homogeneity: namely, that shareholders all have a common, homogeneous interest in increasing residual profits, and therefore all will use their voting rights in furtherance of this goal.

Over the last several years, however, it has become clear that shareholders are not, in fact, the homogeneous wealth maximizers posited by the law and economics model. Instead, their interests diverge along a number of dimensions.\(^\text{141}\) Shaun Martin and Frank Partnoy have recently focused attention upon the problems caused by equity derivatives, which carve up various shareholder rights into discrete financial securities.\(^\text{142}\) But there are many other ways in which shareholders fail to share common interests. For example, some shareholders may be in a control group and others may not.\(^\text{143}\) Employee and pension-holding shareholders have different interests from non-employee


\(^{138}\) EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 117, at 73 (“Votes follow the residual interest in the firm, and unless each element of the residual interest carries an equal voting right, there will be a needless agency cost of management.”).

\(^{139}\) Id.; see also Bernard Black & Reiner Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HArv. L. REV. 1911, 1945–46 (1996) (“The case for the one share, one vote rule turns primarily on its ability to match economic incentives with voting power and to preserve the market for corporate control as a check on bad management.”).


\(^{142}\) Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 778–81 (2005); see also Hu & Black, supra note 140, at 815.

\(^{143}\) See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 68, at 477–80.
shareholders.\textsuperscript{144} Traditional shareholders may have different time horizons for wealth maximization that cannot be costlessly equalized through existing financial instruments.\textsuperscript{145} And even when shareholder interests line up and they agree on a definition of wealth maximization, they may differ as to the best way to achieve that goal.\textsuperscript{146} Ultimately, the notion that shareholders have homogeneous preferences is a simplifying assumption that is increasingly under strain.\textsuperscript{147}

The lack of shareholder homogeneity carries two consequences. First, the principal law and economics arguments for exclusive shareholder voting are less persuasive than once believed.\textsuperscript{148} Second, the lack of homogeneity puts pressure on the way the voting mechanism is structured. Of course, all social choice procedures are intended to work with diverse preferences. The entire point of most voting systems is to take a set of individual preference profiles and aggregate them into a group choice (indeed, if preferences were completely homogeneous, we could just poll one member of the electorate and skip the rest of the process). We do, however, need to ensure that the voting structure doesn’t skew in any particular direction.

In the relatively simplified world of corporate elections, taking care of such a problem is not that difficult. We should not, for example, be that concerned about skewing a result toward a minority interest—simple majority votes on the largely binary sets of alternatives will take care of that. More worrisome is that a tyrannical majority, temporary or otherwise, will exploit a minority interest. Most political democracies attempt to blunt the effects of what the founders called "faction" by making a system of government less responsive to the electorate and providing substantive protections to minorities.\textsuperscript{149} The same approach is taken in corporate law, where there are many layers between shareholders and most corporate decision making and various protections for minority shareholders.\textsuperscript{150}

One thing that is typically off the table is limiting the voting rights of a particular group of voters because of the content of their preferences. It is a fundamental principal of democratic fairness that people should not be ineligible to vote because of their opinions.\textsuperscript{151} This is also consistent with the demands of standard economics that you take

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\textsuperscript{144} See id. at 486–88.

\textsuperscript{145} See id. at 492–94.

\textsuperscript{146} See Grant Hayden & Matthew Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem and the Exclusive Shareholder Franchise, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1217, 1230–32 (2009).

\textsuperscript{147} See Martin & Partnoy, supra note 142, at 778 ("It is simply not true that the "preferences of [shareholders] are likely to be similar if not identical." (quoting EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 117, at 405)); see also Hayden & Bodie, supra note 68, at 477–99 (discussing various ways in which shareholders' interests differ); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1052 (1996) ("For fictional shareholders, whatever else the people behind them may want, all want to maximize the value of their shares.").

\textsuperscript{148} Haydon & Bodie, supra note 68, at 499–504.

\textsuperscript{149} In the United States, this meant, among other things, dividing the government into three branches with checks on each other, dividing the federal legislature into two chambers, and making one of those chambers (the Senate) less responsive to the people. The substantive protections are embodied in the Bill of Rights and some of the subsequent amendments to the Constitution.

\textsuperscript{150} For a discussion of protections for corporate minority shareholders, see generally Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119 (2003).

\textsuperscript{151} U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV, XV, XIX.
preferences as they come. People's preferences are supposed to determine market outcomes and be reflected in institutional decision making rather than the other way around. The function of a voting procedure, for political and corporate entities, is to aggregate those preferences.

IV. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE AND THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF SHAREHOLDER VOTING

Critics have assailed the Business Roundtable decision as a "troubling" effort aimed at "asserting [the judges'] own naked political preferences." The court imposed a far tougher standard on the Commission than the APA's "arbitrary and capricious" standard would seemingly require. However, at the root of the court's analysis is a skewed view of the economics underlying the proposed Rule 14a-11. It is the court's law and economics analysis, rather than its application of administrative law, that we intend to explore. The Business Roundtable opinion demonstrates both bad empirical analysis of the underlying costs and benefits, as well as bad theory about the effect of the Rule on the company and shareholder behavior. These two failings are discussed in more depth below.

A. Bad Empirics

According to the D.C. Circuit, the SEC had an obligation to "determine the likely economic consequences of Rule 14a-11 and to connect those consequences to efficiency, competition, and capital formation." One of the court's primary criticisms of the SEC's rulemaking on Rule 14a-11 was its supposed failure to demonstrate that the rule was justified by empirical evidence. According to the court, the Commission had "not sufficiently supported its conclusion" that the new rule would improve company performance and shareholder value "[i]n view of the admittedly (and at best) 'mixed' empirical evidence." Commentators have pointed out that this view of the evidence flips the standard of review on its head, by requiring an agency to demonstrate conclusively that its regulation will provide more benefits than costs. But on a more fundamental level, the court misperceives its ability to judge the regulation's support in the empirical literature.

152. See Stephen E. Ellis, Market Hegemony and Economic Theory, 38 PHIL. SOC. SCI. 513, 516 (2008) ("It is a foundational principle of standard economics that people act to satisfy their preferences, whatever they are.").
153. See id. at 525 ("Standard consumer theory starts with overall preferences.").
154. Recent Case, supra note 8, at 1093–95 (saying that the opinion "made missteps similar to those for which [it] scolded the SEC," and called it "troubling"); McDonnell, supra note 55 ("This opinion is little more than the judges ignoring the proper judicial rule of deference to an agency involved in notice-and-comment rulemaking and asserting their own naked political preferences. Talk about judicial activism.").
155. See, e.g., Davidoff, supra note 8 ("[T]he opinion appears to create an almost insurmountable barrier for the S.E.C. by requiring that it provide empirical support amounting to proof that its rules would be effective.").
157. Id. at 1151.
158. Recent Case, supra note 8, at 1093–95 (arguing that the court's opinion established "unattainable standards" using arbitrary and capricious levels of review); Zaring, supra note 55 (calling the court's analysis "the kind of searching inquiry no agency could survive").
According to the court’s analysis, the SEC “relied upon insufficient empirical data when it concluded that Rule 14a-11 will improve board performance and increase shareholder value by facilitating the election of dissident shareholder nominees.”

However, the court’s own analysis of the empirical data is extremely cursory, particularly in contrast to that of the Commission. In its Final Rule, the SEC spends significant time reviewing a variety of empirical studies that have been conducted on the issue. Indeed, the court itself notes that the Commission “acknowledged the numerous studies submitted by commenters that reached the opposite result.”

However, the court cites to only one of those studies. It then attacks two of the studies that the Commission did rely on. It again cited to the Commission’s own acknowledgment, this time that one of the supporting studies has long-term findings that are “difficult to interpret.”

Other than that, the court simply called the two studies “unpersuasive” and the overall evidence “( ... at best) mixed,” and concluded that the SEC had “not sufficiently supported its conclusion.”

The court’s cursory analysis of the empirical debate fails on many levels. First, it is completely unpersuasive in its attempt to show that the empirical literature stacked up in opposition to the rule. The court’s only citation to this opposing literature is to a report authored by NERA Economic Consulting, on behalf of the Business Roundtable, in support of the Roundtable’s opposition to the Rule.

The report is a commissioned document—akin to a legal brief—submitted to the SEC in support of the Roundtable’s comments. The court’s sole piece of evidence taken from this commissioned report is the following claim: “One commenter, for example, submitted an empirical study showing that ‘when dissident directors win board seats, those firms underperform peers by 19% to 40% over the two years following the proxy contest.’”

The court misstates the evidence. Buckberg and Macey, the authors of the purported empirical study, did not submit an empirical study of their own. Instead, they simply summarized the results of three other studies. Moreover, these three studies are far
from conclusive about the effects of proxy access on firm performance. First, all the data from the three studies come from proxy contests that occurred prior to 1990.\textsuperscript{170} The market's perspective on proxy activity has changed significantly over time, and data from the 1960s and 1970s may well not be representative of activity 25, 30, or 40 years later.\textsuperscript{171} Second, these studies vary in terms of their empirical results. Ikenberry and Lakonishok do find significant negative returns at 24 months when dissidents are successful; however, the negative results are strongest when dissidents capture a majority of the board,\textsuperscript{172} which cannot happen through Rule 14a-11.\textsuperscript{173} Borstadt and Zwirlein, in contrast, find a 28\% drop in cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for dissident victories,\textsuperscript{174} but the statistical significance is low, given the relatively small sample size.\textsuperscript{175} In addition, the 24-month point is the nadir; the CAR result improves to -16\% at 36 months.\textsuperscript{176} Fleming's results are significantly more negative if the dissidents are appointed to their board seats (-24.72\%) than if the dissidents are elected to their seats (-13.95\%).\textsuperscript{177} Fleming also notes that "the removal of a few observations would be enough to eliminate [the] statistical significance in the observed decline."\textsuperscript{178} Finally, all three studies do not see their empirical results as conclusive evidence that proxy contests destroy firm value. Ikenberry and Lakonishok note that proxy contests follow a period of deteriorating firm value: the five-year growth in these firms' operating income is 75\% below that of the control firms.\textsuperscript{179} They find the post-proxy results to be "unexpected and puzzling," and note that the evidence "suggests that shareholders are not rational when

\begin{quote}
Ms. Buckberg and Mr. Macey merely state in their letter that they are summarizing the aggregate results of three other studies from the early 1990s that examine companies from the 1960s to 1988. In this light, it is hard to see what the D.C. Circuit's complaint is since it does not appear that the judges even looked at these underlying studies to assess their relevance.
\end{quote}

Davidoff, supra note 8.

170. See Borstadt & Zwirlein, supra note 169, at 24 (examining proxy contests from 1962 through 1986); Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 169, at 408 (examining contests between 1968 and 1988); Fleming, supra note 169, at 4 (examining contests from 1977 through 1988).

171. Cf. Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342, 342 (2005) ("The revolution in corporate law has been so thorough and profound that those working in the field today would have considerable difficulty recognizing what it was twenty-five to thirty years ago.").

172. Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 169, at 421 (finding cumulative abnormal return of -28.8\% when dissidents gain at least one seat, versus -41.6\% when dissidents gain control).


175. Id. at 29 ("Although the magnitude of the CAR is large at the annual intervals, the statistical significance is low.").

176. Id.

177. Fleming, supra note 169, at 17.

178. Id. at 18.

179. Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 169, at 432.
they cast their proxies.”180 In the alternative, Ikenberry and Lakonishok hypothesize that proxy contests may create overoptimism by investors and analysts, leading to disappointing returns.181 If the firm is worse off than expected, dissidents may not be able to solve the firm’s significant problems. This theory is seconded by Borstadt and Zwirlein, who suggest that “[i]t may be that dissidents are more likely to win control of firms that are in very bad operating shape,” and that after they succeed at the ballot box, dissidents may have “little hope of saving an already sinking ship.”182 Moreover, these results do not prevent Borstadt and Zwirlein from being overall sanguine about proxy contests; they found “positive and significant abnormal returns realized over the proxy contest period for firms that were not later taken over.”183 These abnormal gains were not lost in the post-contest period.184

The foregoing discussion is meant to demonstrate the complexities in using this group of empirical studies to enjoin the SEC’s proxy-access rule. There are questions as to the sample size of dissident victories; issues of the relevance of proxy battles from the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s; and disagreement as to the meaning of the results that were found. And these are the studies that Buckberg and Macey relied upon in making the case against proxy access’s positive impact on firm performance. Other studies, published in a prestigious peer-review financial journal, have found that proxy contests increase firm value.185 And regardless of how these studies shake out, they are all examining

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180. Id. at 433.
181. Id.
183. Id. at 31. In fact, the Borstadt and Zwirlein article is cited in a number of articles as evidence for the positive effects of proxy contests. See Lucian Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 712 n.68 (2007) (citing Borstadt and Zwirlein for the proposition that “empirical studies consistently found that proxy fights are associated with accompanying increase in shareholder wealth”); Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism for Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 182 n.20 (2001) (citing Borstadt and Zwirlein for the proposition that “proxy fights are not typically waged over marginal matters, and the empirical literature has consistently identified significant positive wealth effects from this activity”).
184. Borstadt & Zwirlein, supra note 169, at 31. Fleming similarly found that the threat of a proxy contest was associated with significant increases in firm value when the contest had not been announced. Fleming, supra note 169, at 10–11 tbl.4.
185. Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Proxy Contests and the Governance of Publicly Held Corporations, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 29, 30 (1989); Peter Dodd & Jerold B. Warner, On Corporate Governance: A Study of Proxy Contests, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 402 (1983); J. Harold Mulherin & Annette B. Poulsen, Proxy Contests and Corporate Change: Implications for Shareholder Wealth, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 279, 280 (1998). Neither the SEC nor the Business Roundtable court discussed a set of empirical studies designed to test whether the market thought that the SEC’s proposal was a good idea. Two studies found that markets reacted negatively to the proposal. See Ali C. Akyol et al., Shareholders in the Boardroom: Wealth Effects of the SEC’s Proposal to Facilitate Nominations, 46 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1526081; David F. Larcker et al., The Regulation of Corporate Governance (May 3, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://rockcenter.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/The-Regulation-of-Corporate-Governance_Larcker.pdf. However, the methodologies of these studies have been criticized. See Fisch, supra note 9, at 477 n.254 (“A combination of problematic coding decisions and confounding events raises serious doubts about the studies’ empirical claims.”). In addition, another study that came out after the regulation was enacted but before Business Roundtable found that firms that would have been most affected by the proxy access rule lost shareholder value when the SEC decided to delay implementation of the rule. See Bo Becker et al., Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable Challenge 33 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 11-052, Jan. 19,
something that, while similar, is not identical to what the SEC is proposing in this rule. Any study of shareholder-self-funded proxy challenges is not directly comparable to Rule 14a-11. So, no empirical research of those proxy contests can be definitive. Moreover, studies that go beyond proxy contests in the prior century may also be instructive—what role should they play? Proponents of Rule 14a-11 marshaled empirical support for increasing shareholder power as a way to unlock greater share value. This body of empirical research is voluminous compared to the proxy contest studies discussed by the court, and its findings are arguably more relevant to Rule 14a-11 than the limited proxy contest research.

Respected legal academics have criticized Rule 14a-11 largely for its ineffectuality. Using empirical evidence about participation and share holdings, they have recounted the limitations on proxy access through Rule 11—three-percent ownership for three years—and noted the shallowness of this pool of potential proxy-access users. Moreover, the assumptions upon which the limitations are based—for example, that longer term shareholders have a better sense of the company’s interests over time—have themselves been challenged empirically. But the SEC recognized the limitations of its rule and provided a justification for the rule’s particular balancing of competing considerations. These normative choices are endemic. For example, while the three-year rule may seem arbitrary, so would any rule drawing some line based on the length of the holding. But the notion that the 2008 financial crisis was caused in part by short-term profit maximization has received enough academic and popular support to support policies based on this justification.

Thus, the fundamental error in the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Business Roundtable is the presumption that the Commission must have more than “mixed” empirical research in

2012), available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/11-052.pdf. The study was discussed in late 2010. See Steven M. Davidoff, The Heated Debate over Proxy Access, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 2, 2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/02/the-heated-debate-over-proxy-access/. There is a meta-analysis question about these studies, even assuming that one or the other side is correct: namely, why should we accord special significance to the market’s views at any particular time about the effects of the rule? Given the timing of these studies and their focus, we do not fault the SEC for failing to consider them. But see Fisch, supra note 9, at 477–78 (attributing the failure to consider these studies as a potential “sandbagging” by the SEC of its economic analysis).


187. Fisch, supra note 9, at 482 (finding that the SEC chose to enact a rule with “no consequences”); Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1431–33.

188. Fisch, supra note 9, at 458–66; Kahan & Rock, supra note 9, at 1420–25.


191. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, The Puzzle of Short-Termism, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 629 (2011) (“Among the competing theories on the cause of the financial collapse—the over-dependence on derivatives, the overuse of leverage, the culture of greed and entitlement in the finance industry, just to name a few—a focus on the short term is an omnipresent narrative thread.”).
order to justify its rule. \(^{192}\) Without the rule being enacted in a parallel universe to our own, there will never be empirical evidence that is more than “mixed” on this issue. \(^{193}\) Academics, of course, should delve into the weeds to determine whether a particular study chose the proper sample size, controlled for the appropriate variables, and reached the right conclusions based on the data. But when academics using proper research methods have come to conflicting conclusions about empirical results, it is quixotic for agencies and courts to endeavor to find one true answer. The SEC sorted through the research to make a case for proxy access while acknowledging the limitations of that research. \(^{194}\) The D.C. Circuit, by contrast, found the rule “not sufficiently supported” by the empirical data based on its own cursory review of a commissioned summary. \(^{195}\) The contrast is striking. The Business Roundtable opinion demonstrates not only a failure to analyze the relevant research, but also a failure to understand the limits of applying that research to the question at hand.

\subsection*{B. Bad Theory}

The SEC’s justification for Rule 14a-11 is based partially on empirics, but mostly on theory. The empirical case, discussed above, \(^{196}\) is that shareholders’ holdings improve when shareholders bring proxy challenges against underperforming boards. The law and economics theory behind this empirical evidence is that the board (and its appointed officers), despite being the elected representatives of the shareholders, may fail to serve shareholder interests effectively. Shareholders suffer agency costs from having a group with potentially differing concerns, as well as variable levels of competency, make decisions on their behalf. The ability of shareholders to choose their representatives is thus critical in mitigating agency costs and ensuring that the corporation is run in the interests of the shareholders. \(^{197}\)

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\(^{192}\) See Davidoff, supra note 8 (“In truth, there is no definitive empirical evidence on this issue and it is likely [there] will not be any. The issue of how and when director nominations influence boards is probably impossible to empirically prove without doubt. But the D.C. Circuit opinion seems to require such empirical proof.”).

\(^{193}\) One professor supported the rule, insomuch as it would provide data going forward as to its efficiency. Eric Talley, Proxy Access Forum, CONGLOMERATE BLOG (Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/08/viewed-through-the-lens-of-editorial-pages-wednesdays-rule-change-was-a-watershed-event-shareholder-activists-have-been-c.html (“Some rule changes—and particularly non-voluntary rule changes such as the new Rule 14a-11—have the potential merit of creating natural experiments that add to the stock of information for future researchers, policy makers, regulators and investors. That dynamic value may justify their adoption in close cases, even if one’s knee-jerk judgment—based exclusively on currently available static information—would tilt ambivalently towards preserving the status quo. At the very least, if we’re genuinely interested in maximizing ‘long term shareholder value’ (a topic that may be ripe for another debate, another time), the benefit of modest regulatory experimentation deserves a seat at the prescriptive table.”).

\(^{194}\) See, e.g., Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,760 n.911 (noting the empirical evidence suggesting that “companies with dissidents on their boards perform better than their peers over a one-year period,” but also noting the lack of standard errors and the weak predictive power of such studies over a longer timeline).


\(^{196}\) See supra Part III.A.

\(^{197}\) The Delaware Chancery has characterized the right to vote more in terms of legitimacy than economic efficiency:
In theory, shareholders would enforce their will on their representatives as most electorates do: through elections. Shareholders generally vote every year for the entire board. If the directors were acting out of self-interest or doing a poor job running the company, the shareholders could simply elect a different set of candidates who would, hopefully, do a better job. However, it has proven difficult to turn this relatively straightforward theory into reality. The foundational work of modern corporate law established the paradigm of separation of ownership from control: namely, the separation of shareholders from managers. And the basic work of corporate law and economics further develops these ideas through the concept of the nexus of contracts and the difficulty of agency costs. The important developments in corporate law theory and practice have almost all concerned efforts to resolve this tension between shareholder primacy and managerial control.

Shareholders face several critical challenges in proposing candidates outside of those nominated by the incumbent board. First, shareholders face the problem of the commons: any time, money, or initiative they expend in improving the company will redound to the benefit of the whole. If the shareholder owns 100% of the company, she will capture 100% of the fruits of her labor. However, if she only owns one percent—a huge sum for most public companies—she will carry all the costs but only capture one percent of the benefits. Unless she expects to earn back those costs, it is economically irrational for the one-percent shareholder to expend any time or money on improving the company, even if the overall gains would dwarf the individual costs. Second, shareholders under the current system face much higher costs in nominating candidates than do the incumbent board members. In order to run for a director position, any candidate outside of the board’s official proxy process must essentially create her own ballots and then provide them to shareholders to use in the voting process. There is no uniform ballot; instead, “outside” candidates provide their own proxies and disclose the information required by federal securities regulation. These proxies must then be sent to

The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests . . . . It has, for a long time, been conventional to dismiss the stockholder vote as a vestige or ritual of little practical importance . . . . [W]hether the vote is seen functionally as an unimportant formalism, or as an important tool of discipline, it is clear that it is critical to the theory that legitimized the exercise of power by some (directors and officers) over vast aggregations of property that they do not own.


198. Staggered boards are an exception; directors on staggered boards have two or three year terms, and generally are up for reelection on a rotating basis.


200. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 137; see also ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW, at xi (1993) (asserting that, “[e]ver since Berle and Means, the central issue of corporate law has been how to create a legal structure that monitors management”).

201. To illustrate this: shareholder X owns one percent of Company Y Inc., a company worth $100 million. If X runs for the board of directors and implements reforms to the business, Y Inc. will increase in value by 20% to $120 million. However, X would only capture $20 thousand of those gains. If X’s costs to secure the seat are more than $200 thousand, X will not pursue those reforms, even though the company would increase in value by $20 million.
all shareholders who are eligible to vote. These substantial costs mean that most shareholders never nominate candidates, even if those candidates would be superior directors. The math is simple: the board gets its proxy ballot paid for by the corporation, but board opponents do not. That is why proxy ballot access for shareholders has been on the SEC’s radar screen for most of its existence. Proxy access reduces the costs of participation, which makes it more likely that shareholders will participate more actively in governance. The theory is fairly straightforward.

How does the D.C. Circuit’s Business Roundtable v. SEC opinion refute this basic economic theory? The court made two counterarguments. First, it found that the Commission had underappreciated the costs that incumbent boards would incur in trying to defeat the “dissident” shareholder nominees. Second, the court argued that Rule 14a-11 would cater to union and state pension funds who would use the process to badger for reforms unrelated to overall shareholder value.

Regarding the incumbent board’s campaign costs, the Commission recognized that “it can reasonably be expected that the boards of some companies likely would oppose the election of shareholder director nominees.” It also cited to commenters who suggested that the costs of proxy contests ranged from $800,000 to $14 million. However, the Commission noted that these costs were not required under Rule 14a-11, and that boards might very well choose to expend fewer resources. This contention drew the ire of the court, which found that “the Commission’s prediction directors might choose not to oppose shareholder nominees had no basis beyond mere speculation.”

The court recognized that, under economic theory, a rational board will forgo an expensive proxy campaign “if it believes the cost of opposition would exceed the cost to the company of the board’s preferred candidate losing the election, discounted by the probability of that happening.” But the court acceded to the logic of the American Bar Association Committee of Federal Regulation of Securities, which essentially argued that boards will always have a fiduciary duty to fiercely oppose shareholder nominees. How so? Well, the committee argued that if the board determines that the shareholder nominee is not as good as the board’s nominee, then the board “will be compelled by its

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202. Establishing the eligible voters require assistance from the corporation, as the electorate is determined based on the record date for the particular election.

203. Lee Harris has argued that the results of corporate elections are based not on the directors’ ability to enhance shareholder value, but rather on the amount they spend on the campaign. Lee Harris, The Politics of Shareholder Voting, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1761, 1782–87 (2011). He maintains that true reform would require some system of subsidizing campaign expenses for challengers, akin to public financing for political elections. Id. at 1807; see also Lee Harris, Shareholder Campaign Funds: A Campaign Subsidy Scheme for Corporate Elections, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 167, 167 (2010) (arguing that “incumbents always have the upper hand” and that the corporate election system is “in need of significant reform”). In addition, Yair Listokin has found an abnormal number of incumbent board victories in his study of close elections, suggesting some form of advantage for incumbents. Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, 10 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 159, 161–62 (2008).


205. Id.


207. Id.

208. Id.
fiduciary duty to make an appropriate effort to oppose the nominee." But—of course—in every instance, the shareholder nominee will be someone who was not chosen by the board as its nominee. So according to the court, the incumbent board has a fiduciary duty to campaign vigorously against any and all "dissident" nominees, because the incumbent nominees will always be better for the corporation.

At this point it is helpful to take a step back and remind ourselves of the underlying enterprise. Rule 14a-11 allows shareholders to save the costs in buying their own proxy materials by using the company’s proxy materials instead. It thus may facilitate such nominees and thereby increase their number. But Rule 14a-11 does not change the underlying fact of the elections themselves; shareholders have always been free to run proxy contests against the board’s nominees, and the board has always been free to use the corporate coffers for its campaign—within the limits proscribed by fiduciary duty. To that extent, the Commission is correct when it characterizes the costs of campaign as inherent in the underlying elections required by state corporate law.

In fact, by making it easier for shareholders to participate in elections, Rule 14a-11 may, somewhat counter-intuitively, decrease the number of contested elections. Corporate boards never have to wait for disgruntled shareholders to challenge them in an election in order to address shareholder concerns. They can, instead, mollify potential rivals by being more alert and responsive to shareholder concerns that might prompt a fight. Or boards might even opt to include shareholder nominees on their own slates. Making the corporate governance system more responsive could very well encourage self-interested corporate board members—as it has for generations of politicians—to pay a little closer attention to the desires of the electorate. And while there might be dangers to an overresponsive system of governance, that really isn’t of any concern here with the limitations built into Rule 14a-11 challenges.

And even if corporate management ends up having to deal with more contested elections under Rule 14a-11, that alone should not have troubled the court. Focusing on the costs of the election for the incumbents is like focusing on the costs of political campaigns to incumbents in assessing whether we want to facilitate challenges to the incumbents. Electoral campaigns allow for competition between rival candidates to choose the best possible nominee. Yes, it would be less costly if we just declared the incumbent the winner—but that would defeat the point of having an election in the first place.


210. According to Delaware law, "where reasonable expenditures are in the interest of an intelligent exercise of judgment on the part of the stockholders upon policies to be pursued, the expenditures are proper; but where the expenditures are solely in the personal interest of the directors to maintain themselves in office, expenditures made in their campaign for proxies are not proper." Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 171 A. 226, 228 (Del. Ch. 1934). As the court acknowledged in that case, "difficulty is often bound to arise when it is sought in such cases as this to draw the line between what is proper and what is improper." \textit{Id.}; see also Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (N.Y. 1955) (finding improper moneys spent on personal power, individual gain, or private advantage and on expenditures not believed to be in the best interests of the shareholders and the corporation).

Unlike the Commission, the court does not endeavor to take into account the overall costs and benefits of the rule. It instead simply claims that the Commission failed to take sufficient account of the costs that incumbent boards would incur in fighting for their nominees. But the court never mentions the much larger potential benefits that shareholders would get from having more competitive elections. Shareholders elect directors. It is the key structural element of shareholder primacy, which is the theoretical foundation for the law and economics of corporate law. Yet Business Roundtable v. SEC treats a contested election as a cost to be borne by the incumbent board, rather than a critical component of corporate governance.

Let us say it again—shareholder elections have been a cornerstone not only of corporate law doctrine, but in fact of the law and economics perspective on corporate law doctrine. In order for the board to align its interests with those of the shareholders, the electoral process needs to work. Shareholder preferences need to be meaningfully reflected in electoral outcomes. Law and economics scholars have worked at designing ways for shareholders to have a stronger voice in the process in order to facilitate shareholder wealth maximization. The need for the incumbent board to protect itself against shareholder insurgents has never been high on the agenda. The fact that an incumbent board can reimburse itself at all for its campaign expenses is a somewhat controversial one. Rather than noting that Rule 14a-11 would reduce costs for shareholders in exercising their right to nominate candidates, the Business Roundtable court emphasizes the costs boards will have to expend in fighting them off.

Why does the court reject basic economic theory in favor of supporting incumbent boards? Perhaps because the court is predisposed to think that the shareholder nominees who will take advantage of Rule 14a-11 deserve to be defeated. In our view, the crux of the court’s opinion is its section on “Shareholders with Special Interests”—namely, “unions and state and local governments whose interests in jobs may well be greater than their interest in share value.” Because of their “special” interests, the court fears that such shareholders will use Rule 14a-11 to “pursue self-interested objectives rather than the goal of maximizing shareholder value, and will likely cause companies to incur costs even when their nominee is unlikely to be elected.” The court accused the Commission of acting arbitrarily by “ducking serious evaluation of the costs that could be imposed . . . by shareholders representing special interests.”

212. Id. at 56,754–71.
213. It is not really clear from the opinion what the court actually wanted from the Commission here. The court “agree[d] with the petitioners that the Commission’s prediction directors might choose not to oppose shareholder nominees had no basis beyond mere speculation.” Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1150. However, the Commission suggested this was a mitigating possibility; it did not suggest that incumbent boards would forego proxy campaigns. Instead, the Commission only argued that the costs might be limited. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,770. Although the court cited the petitioners’ claim that the failure to estimate the exact costs of such campaigns was arbitrary, the court did not specifically endorse this claim. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149–50.
214. See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 186 (2d ed. 2007) (“[A]uthorizing the board to expend corporate funds on its own re-election seems to permit a kind of self-dealing.”).
216. Id. at 1152.
217. Id.
For a court that had earlier been so concerned with empirical support, the claim that union and pension fund shareholders will use their shares to pursue special interests is laughably lacking such support. As its authority, the court cites to the comments from the Business Roundtable itself, which provided the following quote: "[S]tate governments and labor unions . . . often appear to be driven by concerns other than a desire to increase the economic performance of the companies in which they invest."218 The quote is taken from an article by the Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery.219 The article does not provide a footnote for this statement, and the Chancellor cites no authority in support of the proposition. The claim itself is rather couched, qualified by "often appear to be." In fact, the Chancellor wrote the entire article not from his own perspective, but rather as a missive based upon the fictionalized perspective of an "open-minded corporate law 'traditionalist.'"220 As Chancellor Strine emphasized, "[t]hat viewpoint should not be confused as representing my own."221 Regardless of whether this is meant to present an unreliable narrator,222 it certainly makes the article an exercise in rhetoric. It seems fairer to say that Chancellor Strine’s statement is something that the traditionalist would believe—not necessarily something grounded in demonstrated reality.223 The phrase "appear to be" echoes this notion.

The bogeyman of unions and pension funds running amok is popular in a certain segment of corporate law literature.224 However, it is similarly unsubstantiated there. The most common example of “special” shareholders using their power to affect firm


219. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1765 (2006). At the time of the article’s publication, Chancellor Strine was a vice chancellor.

220. Id. at 1759.

221. Id.


224. See, e.g., STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 229 (2008) ("Public employee pension funds are vulnerable to being used as a vehicle for advancing political/social goals of the fund trustees that are unrelated to shareholder interests generally."); Joseph A. Grundfest, The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Economics, and the Law, 65 BUS. LAW. 361, 378–83 (2010) (singling out labor unions and public pension funds as special-interest shareholders); Romano, supra note 183, at 231–32 (arguing that union and public pension fund managers use shareholder proposals to accrue "private benefits"); Larry Ribstein, The "Shareholder Democracy" Scam, IDEOBLOG (Oct. 27, 2006), http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/10/the_shareholder.html ("It should be obvious to anybody who cares to look past the rhetoric that the unions are seeking bargaining leverage on behalf of their members, and to ensure their own survival. They are not seeking to represent the interests of investors generally."); Mark J. Roe, The Corporate Shareholder’s Vote and Its Political Economy, in Delaware and Washington 30 (Harvard Law Sch., Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2011-94, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1884110 (referring to “agenda-driven activists, such as CalPERS and other state pension funds, as having pernicious and costly side-agendas” apart from those of "financial" shareholders).
governance—in a way that harms other shareholders—is the campaign by CalPERS and the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) to withhold shareholder support for certain Safeway directors.\(^{225}\) The campaign allegedly targeted these directors because of Safeway’s hard-line negotiations with the UFCW. In the end, however, only 17% of the shares voted against the targeted directors.\(^{226}\)

The CalPERS–Safeway example has been used over and over to demonstrate the potential for unions and pension funds to pressure boards into caving to labor demands.\(^{227}\) But the example itself demonstrates the lack of such potential. CalPERS and the other pension funds involved had legitimate corporate governance concerns to raise along with their union-oriented concerns; they did not nakedly assert nonshareholder interests.\(^{228}\) Indeed, why would they?—they were also shareholders. Their exercise of power netted only 17% of the total shareholder vote, and also led to the ouster of the CalPERS chair who had orchestrated the campaign.\(^{229}\) The situation was, in fact, a total catastrophe for CalPERS. It is hardly evidence that unions and pension funds will exercise their ballot box power to crush their fellow shareholders. Moreover, beyond this anecdote, the evidence is that union and pension fund shareholders have been aligned with their fellow shareholders in seeking corporate governance reforms.\(^{230}\)

225. See Grundfest, supra note 224, at 382–83.

226. Id. at 383. Moreover, the directors would have still been reelected, even if a majority had voted to withhold their votes.


228. Marc Lifsher, CalPERS to Withhold Votes on Safeway CEO, L.A. Times, Apr. 8, 2004, http://articles.latimes.com/2004/apr/08/business/fo-calpers8 (“CalPERS said it would withhold its votes for Safeway Chairman and Chief Executive Steven Burd because of a 60% drop in Safeway’s stock since early 2001 that the pension fund said wiped out $20 billion in market value. CalPERS officials also cited what they described as conflicts of interest and a lack of responsiveness to shareholder concerns.”).


230. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1018, 1019–20 (1998) (“In most cases, it is hard to find a socialist or proletarian plot in what unions are doing with their shares. Rather, labor activism is a model for any large institutional investor attempting to maximize return on capital.”). However, an empirical study did find that AFL-CIO affiliated shareholders are more likely to support director nominees by the incumbent board once the AFL-CIO no longer represents workers at a given firm. See Ashwini K. Agrawal, Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting, 25 Rev. Fin. Stud. 187 (2012). Agrawal argues that this divergence represents governance objectives that are “motivated by union labor interests rather than equity value maximization alone.” Id. at 188. The study focused on the time at which the Change to Win coalition of unions split off from the AFL–CIO, and examined the behavior of AFL–CIO funds with respect to directors at Change to Win companies. Id. Overall, Agrawal found that the AFL–CIO funds voted for director nominees 65% of the time and a Change to Win union (the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (UBCJA)) voted for director nominees 55% of the time, while three different index funds supported the director nominees between 89% to 98% of the time. Id. at 195 tbl.1. Agrawal assumes, however, that the index funds’ votes reflect a policy of shareholder wealth maximization. He does not
There is a reason why "special interest" shareholders have supported reforms that support overall shareholder value rather than their special interests: the reforms would not otherwise be enacted. Efforts by one group of shareholders to elect a director that would cater to their unique interests would be met with indifference or hostility from their fellow shareholders. The Business Roundtable court fails to explain how union and pension fund shareholders could ever use Rule 14a-11 to elect special-interest directors without majority support. The numbers do not add up. There are only two alternatives: (1) shareholders will irrationally vote against their interests, or (2) special-interest candidates will consistently lose. The court presents no theory as to an irrational electorate, but does contend that a corporation may incur costs even without shareholder victories. It raises the specter of a board "succumbing to the demands, unrelated to increasing value, of a special interest shareholder threatening to nominate a director." However, it cites no instances of such a power play, nor does it explain why in theory a board would cave. The court also notes that special-interest shareholders "will likely cause companies to incur costs even when their nominee is unlikely to be elected." However, the court does not explain why shareholders would send up nominees unlikely to be elected, other than to impose costs (which is, of course, against all shareholder interests, including their own). Although Rule 14a-11 reduces the costs of nominating director candidates, it does not eliminate them entirely, and it would be economically irrational for special-interest shareholders to incur repeated nomination costs if the result is consistent electoral defeat.

Thus, the court's decision in Business Roundtable rests on economic theory that: (a) discounts the importance of the shareholder vote in corporate governance; (b) looks only at the campaign costs to incumbents when calculating the overall efficiency of the shareholder franchise; (c) assumes directors will act irrationally in the face of challenges; demonstrate why a vote for incumbent directors equals a vote for shareholder wealth maximization beyond their support from index funds.

232. Id.
233. Joseph Grundfest has provided a theory (unmentioned by the Business Roundtable court) arguing that union and pension fund shareholders could use Rule 14a-11 as a "megaphone" to get across their message and, in some cases, secure concessions from sensitive boards. Grundfest, supra note 224. Grundfest asserts that these shareholders can use the nomination process to gain additional publicity "at very little cost" and "need not even come close to winning." Id. at 379. He cites to the "significant press coverage" that the first proxy access candidates will get, or that will accrue to those candidates touting "controversial or novel proposals." Id. We think that this concern is overstated and, at best, short-term. It would eventually be self-defeating. However, it is instructive (and perhaps eye-opening) to see the parade of horribles that Grundfest trots out:

Consider a board candidate who wants to limit the export of jobs to foreign factories, or to close down foreign factories in order to bring manufacturing jobs back to America. Consider a candidate who wants to cap all executive salaries at a multiple of the average hourly wage of the rank and file. Consider a candidate who wants the company voluntarily to comply with emissions standards that reduce global warming but that place the corporation at a competitive disadvantage in the marketplace.

Id. at 381. Grundfest also alludes to the possibility that "eggshell directors" will collapse under the pressure of a dissident campaign and offer meaningful concessions to make the campaign go away. Id. at 382–83. His only example is Safeway—a failure—and his theory requires that directors will act irrationally to stave off some level of PR discomfort. Grundfest, supra note 224, at 382–83. Perhaps such eggshells should not be on the board to begin with.
and (d) assumes “special-interest” shareholders will irrationally waste their own and the corporation’s money in pursuit of fruitless campaigns. This collection of theories departs dramatically from the standard law and economics of corporate law, which assumes that shareholders and directors will act rationally, that agency costs are a natural byproduct of the separation of ownership and control, and that the shareholder franchise will increase overall efficiency.234 Why does the Business Roundtable court—a court that ostensibly seeks to vindicate law and economics principles in its decision—depart so dramatically from law and economics foundations? Part V offers our theory.

V. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE AND THE PURPOSE OF DEMOCRACY

Business Roundtable reveals just how far some law and economics adherents have drifted from their own basic precepts. They actually distrust a more robust corporate democracy because the electoral outcomes are more likely to reflect underlying shareholder preferences. In a world of stifled democracy, theoreticians can make judgments about what the people would “really” want if they were freely able to express those preferences. So it was with the law and economics of corporate law: the “nexus of contract” theory was used to justify the existence of certain contractual features in the corporate landscape, while the “hypothetical contract” was used to justify the mandatory, non-contractual foundations.235 Similarly, the notion of “shareholder homogeneity” enabled corporate law theorists to speak broadly about what shareholders (as a whole) would want.236 If all shareholders are the same—or, at least, want the same things out of their shares—then the vote itself becomes almost secondary.

As has become increasingly clear, however, shareholders are not homogenous.237 A variety of different shareholder “types”—majority shareholders, shareholders with disproportionate voting rights, members of voting trusts, bribed shareholders, hedged shareholders, government shareholders, employee and management shareholders—have unique interests apart from their shareholder compadres.238 Moreover, shareholders differ with respect to their definition of wealth maximization. A hedge fund looking for a quick return is different than an index fund looking to stay in the stock as long as it is listed. A deeply invested shareholder seeking to maximize the value of this individual stock is different than a portfolio investor.239 Shareholders might have conflicting opinions as to

234. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 117, at 66–72 (defending the shareholder franchise); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 110, at 441 (finding that “as a consequence of both logic and experience, there is convergence on a consensus that the best means to this end (that is, the pursuit of aggregate social welfare) is to make corporate managers strongly accountable to shareholder interests and, at least in direct terms, only to those interests”).


236. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 117, at 70 (emphasizing that shareholders are likely to have “similar if not identical” interests because “the shareholders of a given firm at a given time are a reasonably homogenous group”).


238. Id. at 477–92.

239. Some commentators have suggested a normative system of portfolio wealth maximization, rather than share wealth maximization. Robert G. Hansen & John R. Lott, Jr., Externalities and Corporate Objectives in a World with Diversified Shareholders/Consumers, 31 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 43, 44 (1996); see also
business and strategic decisions that shape the corporation's present and future.\footnote{240} And the notion that shareholders have a shared interest in wealth maximization is a simplifying assumption. Shareholders are heterogeneous with respect to their utility preferences in that these preferences do not match up directly with wealth. Shareholders—when assessed as individual people—all have individual utility preferences that go beyond maximization of one's wealth.\footnote{241}

When scholars contend that special interest shareholders may advance goals that are unrelated to “shareholder interests generally,” they put the cart before the horse. The concept itself—“shareholder interests generally”—has no meaning until the preferences of actual shareholders are aggregated through some electoral process. It’s a mistake to think that any one version of shareholder wealth maximization has priority over all the others. It’s a bigger mistake for a court to adopt that singular version and enforce it. And it’s simply bad economics to ignore large swaths of individual preferences when they don’t comply with a particular vision of the corporation. Standard economics instructs us to take preferences as they come. In almost every other situation, law and economics scholars positively fetishize individual preferences; here, they run away from them. Simple reflection should reveal that, when it comes down to it, shareholders—like all voters—do not simply vote for those who seek to advance “shareholder interests generally.” That, after all, is the board’s job, and the way to keep it on task is to ensure that the election process is at least somewhat responsive to actual shareholders.\footnote{242}

Of course, if there is no avenue for expressing these diverse preferences, there is no evidence of them on display. In closely held corporations, shareholders’ preferences conflict on a variety of levels: dividends, mergers, director seats, employment positions, and business plans. And these preferences play out in shareholder votes and board meetings. But the separation of ownership from control in public corporations has meant that the shareholder franchise has failed to serve its governance functions.\footnote{243} If

Greenwood, supra note 147, at 1056–58 (discussing the differences between the “corporate law” fictional shareholder and the “portfolio investor” shareholder).

\footnote{240} For example, Hewlett-Packard shareholders recently battled over the wisdom of the merger between Hewlett-Packard and Compaq. Steve Lohr & Michael Brick, Hewlett-Packard Claims a Victory in Hewlett–Compaq Proxy Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/20/business/technology-hewlett-packard-claims-a-victory.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. Hewlett-Packard director Walter Hewlett battled the rest of the company’s board and management over the merger, ultimately losing in a close election. Id. Both sides agreed that the merger should be judged on its impact to Hewlett-Packard’s success, but they disagreed about whether the merger would help accomplish that goal. Id. Hewlett and the company spent an estimated $100 million in their efforts to persuade shareholders. Id.

\footnote{241} For an in-depth discussion of the role of efficiency in the law and economics of corporate law, see generally Ellis & Hayden, supra note 57.

\footnote{242} We have argued that the heterogeneity of shareholder preferences provides support for the notion that the corporate franchise should expand to include corporate constituents beyond shareholders. See, e.g., Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2120 (2010) (arguing that shareholder heterogeneity arguably supports expansion of the franchise to nonshareholder constituents). Our argument here is not that nonshareholder constituents should be excluded; rather, we are arguing that shareholders of all stripes and sizes should have their preferences taken into account, even if some of these shareholders share common preferences with nonshareholder constituents. The Business Roundtable court’s rejection of Rule 14a-11 was not an effort to include other stakeholders; it was rather an effort to exclude what it considered to be nonshareholders in shareholders’ clothing.

\footnote{243} Bebchuk, supra note 183, at 682–94 (describing the lack of effective shareholder voting power).
shareholders cannot efficiently mount opposition campaigns for director positions, these elections become exercises in rubber stamping. Rule 14a-11 was an attempt to break out of this dysfunctional pattern. It endeavored to reduce the costs of competing for directorships, and thereby encourage more candidates to enter the race.

We know from our basic review of preference aggregation that there are many ways in which a voting system can fall short of its goal of producing outcomes that meaningfully reflect the desires of relevant constituents. Sometimes there are barriers, both subtle and obvious, that prevent interested parties from voting. Sometimes the system assigns weight to votes in a way that skews outcomes in a particular direction. Sometimes votes are combined in ways that thwart the ability of certain groups of voters to have an equal opportunity to elect representatives of their choice. And, in some cases, voters are hindered in their ability to get their preferred candidates on the ballot during the slating process. A defect in any aspect of a voting system has the ability to distort the preference aggregating function of an election.

Even if contemporary corporate governance gets some things right (perhaps, for example, "one share, one vote" properly captures both the identity and proper weighting of corporate votes), it may still fall short when it comes to the slating process. A slating process that unduly restricts the ability of candidates to make it onto a ballot is, generally, a problem. And when one of the principal justifications for that restriction is based on the content of voter preferences, as it is in the case of "special interest" shareholders, we can be certain that the results will be skewed in a particular direction, distorting the preference aggregating function of the electoral process. In the political realm, we saw that the Supreme Court sometimes viewed political stability in the form of preserving the two-party system as an acceptable (though not uncontroversial) goal of state ballot access laws. But, the existing scheme of corporate governance—the one that Rule 14a-11 was designed to modify—is nowhere close to suffering from the kind of unsteadiness that might justify more restrictive access to the corporate ballot. Indeed, the current system has all the stability (and democratic fairness) of a one-party state.

Which brings us to a little secret about those law and economics adherents who believe in shareholder homogeneity: they do not want real shareholder democracy. Shareholder wealth maximization is a fictional placeholder developed to replace the actual interests of the shareholders. If shareholders truly expressed their preferences through their votes, there would be no need for the norm of residual maximization. Instead, the board and management would be expected to follow the actual preferences of shareholders, rather than simply a presumed wealth maximization preference. Thus, we see the strange cycle that justifies the current stasis in shareholder democracy. Shareholders, we are told, will single-mindedly focus on increasing the residual as their sole preference for corporate policy. Because it is in the interests of all corporate stakeholders that the residual be maximized, we should give power to those who have a single-minded focus on such an outcome. However, actual shareholders may not all

244. See supra Part II.
245. See generally Hall, supra note 96.
246. See supra Part III.
247. Greenwood, supra note 147 ("For fictional shareholders, whatever else the people behind them may want, all want to maximize the value of their shares.").
248. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 117, at 85–86.
agree on one homogenized goal. If let loose to express their actual preferences, shareholders might express their preferences for a variety of interests beyond shareholder wealth maximization. Because shareholder preferences are irrelevant to shareholder primacy, true shareholder democracy is actually a threat to the fictional shareholder wealth maximization norm.

The Business Roundtable decision neatly illustrates this hostility. In its review of the Commission’s cost-benefit analysis, the court agreed that Rule 14a-11 “will mitigate collective action and free rider concerns, which can discourage a shareholder from exercising his right to nominate a director in a traditional proxy contest, and has the potential of creating the benefit of improved shareholder value.” But the opinion never returned to these notions. Instead, it turned to the concrete costs of democracy for the incumbent board: namely, the costs of engaging in a meaningful board election, and the potential for “special” shareholders to abuse their right to enter elections. From the court’s perspective, democracy is a messy, expensive process in which outsiders may crash the party and ruin the whole thing. The Commission’s failure to recognize this was, in the court’s view, arbitrary and capricious.

But, of course, democracy is messy. Most, if not all, of us have been disappointed by its results at various points in our lives. Some corporate law scholars have argued that democracy should have only a minimal role to play in corporate governance, and that directors should have the authority of Platonic guardians over their shareholder subjects. However, mainstream law and economics has long defended the critical role of shareholder democracy within the overall framework of corporate governance. Shareholders need to hold directors accountable for failing to pursue shareholder interests. Otherwise, the corporation will be riven with agency costs.

249. Greenwood, supra note 147, at 1052–53 (“If the corporation were run by and for real people, it would be a hotbed of political controversy . . . . If the real people disagree with the fictional representation, the real people may simply be disregarded as not real shareholders.”).


251. Id. at 1149–52.

252. Id. at 1152.

253. Bainbridge, supra note 116, at 560. Bainbridge supports the goal of shareholder wealth maximization but argues against greater shareholder input. See id.; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1749 (2006). He bases his argument primarily on the need for centralized and largely unreviewable discretion in order to maximize efficient business operations. Id.

Active investor involvement in corporate decisionmaking seems likely to disrupt the very mechanism that makes the widely held public corporation practicable: namely, the centralization of essentially nonreviewable decisionmaking authority in the board of directors. The chief economic virtue of the public corporation is . . . that it provides a hierarchical decisionmaking structure well-suited to the problem of operating a large business enterprise with numerous employees, managers, shareholders, creditors, and other constituencies.

Id.

See also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 280 (1999) (discussing their “mediating hierarchs” approach to board leadership).

254. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 117, at 63 (arguing that “the structure of voting—who votes, using what institutions—is contractual, and efficient, too”).
The split between the ideas of shareholder wealth maximization and shareholder preference aggregation has led to the current split in the law and economics academy. One camp maintains its faith that facilitating shareholder democracy will increase corporate efficiency and reduce overall agency costs. The other side now trusts the hypothetical shareholder more than actual shareholders when it comes to pursuing shareholder wealth maximization. Private equity funds which seek to buy out shareholders at a premium are to be encouraged, but shareholders within the company who want to exercise their democratic privileges are simply troublemakers. The D.C. Circuit has placed itself firmly in the second camp—and, we believe, inappropriately so.

VI. CONCLUSION

Corporate law and economics scholarship has become adept at containing and eliding certain contradictions as to its basic principles. Corporations are contracts, except when they’re not. Shareholders all have the same interests, except when they don’t. And shareholder voting maximizes utility, except when it doesn’t. The analysis in Business Roundtable provides a shoddy and simplified reflection of these principles; it should perhaps not be surprising that the contradictions therefore appear a bit more obvious.

It is one thing for scholars to debate contested issues using rival theories and indeterminate empirical data. It is quite another for the judiciary to strike down a regulation—one specifically endorsed by statute—based on one side’s version of the theory and data. The Business Roundtable decision has ensconced a bad version of corporate law and economics into the Federal Reporters. And we fear that, unless it is corrected over time, this bad law and economics will cow regulatory agencies, particularly the SEC, into adhering to a crabbed and inchoate vision of corporate governance. Hopefully, criticism of the opinion will demonstrate that the court’s errors need not be replicated by others.

255. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 183, at 712.
258. Ellis & Hayden, supra note 57, at 244.