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John Boscariol
J. Patrick Briscoe
Abigail Cotterill
Harry Dixon
Geoffrey Goodale

See next page for additional authors

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Export Controls and Economic Sanctions

Authors
John Boscariol, J. Patrick Briscoe, Abigail Cotterill, Harry Dixon, Geoffrey Goodale, Sarah Oliai, Timothy O'Toole, Christopher Stagg, and Lawrence Ward

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Export Controls and Economic Sanctions

JOHN BOSCARIOL, J. PATRICK BRISCOE, ABIGAIL COTTERILL,
HARRY DIXON, GEOFFREY GOODALE, SARAH OLIAI,
TIMOTHY O’TOOLE, CHRISTOPHER STAGG, AND LAWRENCE WARD*

This article discusses the significant legal developments that occurred in the area of export controls and economic sanctions in 2017.

I. Economic Sanctions Developments

A. Russia and Ukraine Related Sanctions

It has been a watershed year in Russian sanctions. Although sanctions against the Russian government had existed in some form since at least 2014,1 the Russian government’s suspected interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, which it allegedly conducted through a hacking and influence campaign,2 resulted in a wave of sanctions against the Russian government and high-profile Russian individuals. While the first wave of sanctions occurred in the aftermath of the election, the U.S. Congress initiated new sanctions against Russia, which President Donald Trump signed into law, though the President expressed reservations about the new sanctions.

The Obama administration suspected that the Russian government was meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election as the election was being conducted. After Republican candidate Donald Trump won a surprise victory in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the Obama administration ejected thirty-five suspected Russian operatives from the United States and imposed sanctions on the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) and the

* Contributing authors include John Boscariol, McCarthy Tétrault LLP; J. Patrick Briscoe, University of Minnesota; Abigail Cotterill, Miller & Chevalier Chartered; Harry Dixon, Taylor English Duma LLP; Geoffrey Goodale, FisherBroyles, LLP; Sarah Oliai, Deloitte; Timothy O’Toole, Miller & Chevalier Chartered; Christopher Stagg, Stagg PC.; and Lawrence Ward, Dorsey & Whitney LLP. Mr. Stagg and Mr. Ward served as editors of this article. This article includes developments occurring between December 1, 2016, and November 30, 2017.

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Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB). The administration also placed sanctions on four intelligence officers and three companies that assisted in the hack and closed down two Russian government compounds in New York and Maryland. The first official Russian sanction of 2017 came on January 4, when the U.S. Department of Commerce added five Russian entities involved in Russia’s election-related cyber operations to the Commerce Department’s Entity List. Through the list, any item subject to the United States’ Export Administration Regulations (EAR) cannot be exported, re-exported, or transferred to the listed entities unless the Commerce Department licenses the transaction.

The next steps toward Russian sanctions occurred days before Donald Trump’s inauguration. On January 11, 2017, a bipartisan group of U.S. Senators introduced the Countering Russian Hostilities Act of 2017. The Countering Russian Hostilities Act of 2017 was designed to target all of Russia’s oil and gas sector and all debt that the Russian government issued, and the Act adopted a “secondary sanctions” approach that would have applied the sanctions to non-U.S. persons.

Although that bill appears to have died in committee, it served as a harbinger for legislative activity on a similar bill in summer 2017. In July, Congress passed the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (the Act), which passed in the U.S. House of Representatives with a 419-3 vote on July 25, and in the U.S. Senate with a 98-2 vote on July 27. The bill codified and strengthened existing sanctions, particularly in the Russian defense, energy, and financial sectors. It also created a Congressional review requirement on the President’s ability to change U.S. sanctions against Russia and Crimea, as well as creating certain reporting requirements upon the executive branch.

4. Id.
6. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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President Trump signed the Act into law on August 2, 2017, although he did not do so without reservations. In his signing statement, he described the Act as “encroach[ing] on the executive branch’s authority to negotiate,”13 and could cause China, Russia, and North Korea to work together more frequently.14

While it is unclear if the bill has caused China, Russia, and North Korea to work together more frequently, President Trump’s constitutional objections to the bill may have merit. Daniel Hemel, Assistant Professor at the University of Chicago Law School, wrote in the Yale Journal of Regulation: Notice & Comment that the bill is “unnecessarily unconstitutional.”15 Section 216—which requires the President to submit a report to the House or Senate if he seeks to waive or terminate sanctions against Russia, with Congress having thirty days to respond and the President meanwhile being in limbo—becomes problematic under one scenario.16 If Congress passes a joint resolution denying the President’s proposed action, the President is blocked from taking that action for twelve calendar days after the joint resolution, and if the President vetoes the joint resolution, he cannot conduct the proposed action for an additional ten calendar days.17 This, Hemel argues, violates the presentment clause of the Constitution, because “[i]t allows Congress to alter the legal landscape for 12 days (plus possibly 10 more) with a simple majority vote and without the president’s signature” by allowing Congress to change the law “without presenting a bill to the president and either having him sign it or overriding his veto.”18

B. CUBA

On June 16, 2017, the Trump Administration issued a National Security Presidential Memorandum on Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba (NSPM).19 Seeking to promote greater freedom and democracy and increased free enterprise in Cuba, the NSPM stated that it shall be U.S. policy to:

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14. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.

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(a) End economic practices that disproportionately benefit the Cuban government or its military, intelligence, or security agencies or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people.
(b) Ensure adherence to the statutory ban on tourism to Cuba.
(c) Support the economic embargo of Cuba described in section 4(7) of the [LIBERTAD] Act of 1996 (the embargo).
(d) Amplify the efforts to support the Cuban people through the expansion of Internet services, free press, free enterprise, free association, and lawful travel.
(e) Not reinstate the “Wet Foot, Dry Foot” policy, which encouraged untold thousands of Cuban nationalists to travel unlawfully to the United States.
(f) Ensure that engagement between the United States and Cuba advances the interests of the United States and the Cuban people.20

The NSPM mandated that the Department of State (State Department), the Department of the Treasury (Treasury Department), and the Department of Commerce (Commerce Department) coordinate with each other and take all necessary actions to implement these policy objectives, including making amendments to the applicable regulations.21

Subsequently, on November 9, 2017, in accordance with the NSPM's mandate for it to identify entities and subentities that are under the control of, or act for on behalf of, the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel, the State Department released its List of Restricted Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba (Cuba Restricted List).22 In total, the State Department placed approximately 180 Cuban entities on the Cuba Restricted List, including two Cuban ministries, two tourist agencies, five marinas, five large Cuban holding companies, and dozens of hotels and subentities of the five holding companies.23

On the same date that the State Department issued its Cuba Restricted List, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) also published amendments to its Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR).24 Among other things, these amendments established new CACR provisions that generally prohibit U.S. persons from engaging in certain direct financial transactions with entities and subentities identified on the Cuba Restricted List and made changes to numerous provisions and general licenses throughout the CACR to limit certain pre-existing exemptions to incorporate this new prohibition on financial transactions with entities and subentities on the Cuba Restricted List.25 OFAC also amended the CACR

20. Id. at 48,876.
21. Id. at 48,876-77.
22. The State Department's List of Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba, 82 Fed. Reg. 52,089 (Nov. 9, 2017) [hereinafter Cuba Restricted List].
23. Id. at 52,089-91.
25. Id. at 51,999-52,004.
to place restrictions on certain types of authorized travel to Cuba by U.S. persons (e.g., people-to-people travel, educational travel, and travel related to support for the Cuban people). These new restrictions require, among other things, that people-to-people travel and educational travel must be conducted under the auspices of an organization that is subject to U.S. jurisdiction and that the U.S. person traveling must be accompanied by a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction who is a representative of the sponsoring organization.\footnote{Id.} In addition, OFAC also expanded the CACR’s definition of “prohibited officials of the Government of Cuba” to include certain additional individuals.\footnote{Id.}

The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) also published amendments to certain Cuban-related provisions set forth under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) on November 9, 2017.\footnote{Id.} In accordance with the NSPM, BIS amended the EAR to establish a general policy of denial for license applications to export or re-export items for use by entities and subentities on the Cuba Restricted List, unless the transaction is determined by BIS, in consultation with the State Department, to be consistent with the NSPM.\footnote{Id.} In addition, BIS amended License Exceptions Gift Parcels and Humanitarian Donations (GFT), Consumer Communications Devices (CCD), and Support for the Cuban People (SCP) to make clear that those license exceptions do not permit exports or re-exports to any “prohibited officials of the of the Government of Cuba” as that term has now been defined under the CACR by the amendments made by OFAC that are discussed above.\footnote{Id.} Less restrictively, BIS also amended License Exception SCP to create “a single provision authorizing the export and re-export to Cuba of items, without specifying types, for use by the Cuban private sector for private sector economic activities” provided that all applicable requirements can be satisfied (e.g., the items must be “designated as EAR99 or controlled only for anti-terrorism reasons on the Commerce Control List (CCL)” and “may not be used to primarily generate revenue for the state or used to contribute to the operation of the state”).\footnote{Id.}

C. Iran Sanctions

On October 13, 2017, the Trump administration announced it would not be recertifying Iran’s compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the nuclear agreement between the P5+1 and Iran.\footnote{Press Release, Donald Trump, President of the U.S., Remarks by President Trump on the Iran Strategy (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-iran-strategy/. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is an international agreement between Iran and the P5+1 nations (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and the European Union, entered into on July 14, 2015, which imposed economic sanctions on Iran in exchange for Iran’s commitments to curtail its nuclear program.}
administration’s failure to recertify Iranian compliance with the JCPOA—an action required every ninety days under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA)—triggered a sixty-day time period during which Congress can utilize an expedited process to pass legislation on Iran, including sanctions relating to Iran’s nuclear program.\textsuperscript{33} Congress is not required to pass legislation during this sixty-day period—it only enjoys an expedited legislative process.\textsuperscript{34} Congress could still introduce legislation at a later date following the sixty-day period, but such legislation would not benefit from the expedited process. INARA is U.S. domestic legislation; failure to recertify Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA to Congress under INARA is not a U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. International sanctions will not be reimposed under the JCPOA’s “snap back” mechanism unless the U.N. dispute resolution commission finds significant non-performance and the U.N. Security Council fails to adopt a measure continuing sanctions lifting within a certain time period.\textsuperscript{35}

Throughout the past year, OFAC has also sanctioned various individuals and entities in connection with Iran’s ballistic missile program and for human rights violations, actions outside the scope of the JCPOA and nuclear-related sanctions.\textsuperscript{36} The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) became law in August 2017 and imposed additional sanctions on Iranian persons and entities related to Iran’s ballistic

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\textsuperscript{34} See id.

missile program, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) terrorism-related activities, and human rights abuses.37

D. NORTH KOREA SANCTIONS

On September 21, 2017, the United States imposed additional sanctions on North Korea through Executive Order 13810 (E.O. 13810). In addition to expanding primary and secondary sanctions, E.O. 13810 also expanded Specially Designated National (SDN) criteria to include operating in certain industries, ports of entry, engaging in at least one significant import to or export from North Korea, supporting SDNs, and being owned, controlled, or operated on behalf of an SDN.38 The executive order further imposed sanctions on foreign financial institutions for transactions with SDNs or trade with North Korea.39 Prior to E.O. 13810, CAATSA enacted strict measures on North Korea through expansion of SDN criteria in specific industries, targeting vessels, prohibiting certain financial transactions, withholding assistance to governments supplying North Korea with defense articles or services, denying importation of North Korean goods unless it can be proven goods were not produced with forced labor, blocking transactions of foreign persons employing North Korean laborers, and mandating additional Congressional reporting requirements.40

As North Korea becomes more isolated internationally, recent OFAC actions have focused on targeting North Korea’s nuclear program and financial institutions through designating individuals and entities, including Chinese and Russian parties, with ties to North Korea.41

39. See id.

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E. Sudan Sanctions

On October 12, 2017, sanctions on the government of Sudan were revoked in response to the Sudanese government’s actions taken to maintain a cessation of hostilities, improve humanitarian access, and address regional conflicts and the threat of terrorism. But the Darfur sanctions program remains in effect, certain Sudanese individuals continue to be listed as SDNs pursuant to other authorities, and Sudan remains designated by the State Department as one of four state sponsors of terrorism. Because other authorities remain in effect sanctioning Sudan, OFAC issued a General License A to authorize the export and re-export of certain Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA) items to Sudan.44

F. Venezuela

Much of the sanctions activity on Venezuela in 2017 has focused on targeting certain individuals designated as SDNs, including narcotics traffickers, and prohibiting transactions with the government of Venezuela and entities under its control.45 Significantly, Venezuelan President Nicolás
Maduro and members of the Constituent Assembly were designated as SDNs for seeking to rewrite the Venezuelan constitution, dissolve state institutions, and undermine democratic processes.\textsuperscript{46} Eight Venezuelan Supreme Court of Justice members were also designated as SDNs for rulings over the past year that have undermined the democratically-elected legislature and allowed President Maduro to rule through emergency decree.\textsuperscript{47}

II. Export Control Developments

The U.S. Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) undertook a significant amount of working group activity and interagency review in 2017. While these efforts resulted in some finalized regulatory revisions, they largely set the stage for important revisions to both the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) in 2018.

\textit{USML Revisions and Category Transitions}. DDTC made progress with amendments to the ITAR in 2017, including revisions to U.S. Munitions List (USML) Category XV (Spacecraft and Related Articles) and amendments to the ITAR to facilitate U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)'s final efforts to launch the new Automated Commercial Environment Portal (ACE Portal). Most notably, the highly-anticipated transition of USML Category I (Firearms, Close Assault Weapons, and Combat Shotguns), Category II (Guns and Armament), and Category III (Ammunition/Ordnance) to the Commerce Control List (CCL) remained


delayed because, unlike DDTC, BIS is not exempt from Executive Order 13771 of January 30, 2017, which mandates the elimination of two existing regulations for every new regulation published. That said, DDTC and BIS submitted for final White House interagency review proposed rules for eventual publication.48

Manufacturing and ITAR Registration. At its Plenary Meeting of September 8, 2017, the DDTC-sponsored Defense Trade Advisory Group (DTAG) received a report from its Manufacturing Definition Working Group (MDWG), a group of industry and U.S. Government representatives undertaking a reconsideration of the ITAR definition of “manufacturing.” The MDWG’s mandate from DDTC included consideration of how to accurately and effectively define manufacturing under the ITAR, which currently lacks a definition of the term. The MDWG’s September 2017 presentation to DTAG suggested consideration of the policy implications of a broad definition of manufacturing, and whether it is in DDTC’s interest that certain low-level manufacturing activities, such as those that fall below certain dollar thresholds, that do not involve substantial transformation of defense articles, or that only involve manufacturing of components, trigger the ITAR requirements for registration.49 Such conversations suggest the potential for a definition of manufacturing, and related changes to registration requirements, may be on the horizon in 2018.

Deemed Exports and Defense Services. The DTAG Plenary Meeting also suggested that DDTC may be considering revisions to the definitions that drive the deemed export rules in 2018. In September 2017, DTAG’s Exports, Re-export, and Foreign Citizenship/Permanent Residence Working Group noted the compliance challenges associated with current restrictions on the release of technical data to foreign nationals working in U.S. companies, and suggested that DDTC consider regulatory revisions of the concepts of citizenship, nationality, and permanent residence when those terms are not all clearly defined in the regulations or uniformly defined and applied internationally.50 Privacy and anti-discrimination concerns related to the deemed export rules likewise appears to be under DDTC consideration. The debate over redefinition of ITAR-controlled “defense services” also continued in 2017, with a large DTAG working group considering the significance of the use of ITAR-controlled data in an activity, actions involving primarily commercial products with military


50. Id.
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systems installed in them, and when maintenance rises to a level that it implicates U.S. national security concerns.51

EAR Policy Updates. Revisions to the EAR were limited in 2017 due to Executive Order 13771’s mandate to remove two regulations for each new regulation published. BIS did, however, implement several notable policy changes, including changes with regard to licensing policy for exports and re-exports to Sudan, India, and Cuba. On January 17, 2017, BIS published a final rule establishing a new, favorable licensing policy for certain exports of items intended to improve the safety of civil aviation and modernize Sudanese railways.52 On January 19, 2017, BIS amended the EAR to implement an additional phase of export control cooperation with India.53 This cooperation included establishment of a new BIS licensing policy of general approval for certain categories of exports, re-exports, and transfers for items subject to the EAR, including for some military items previously controlled under the ITAR, and for some exports to the Government of India.54 On November 9, 2017, BIS adopted a stricter licensing policy of denial for three license exceptions specific to exports to Cuba, namely Gift Parcels and Humanitarian Donations, Consumer Communications Devices, and Support for the Cuban People.55 Throughout 2017, BIS also frequently revised its Entity List, adding a number of Russian entities, and making changes in conjunction with the historic, multi-agency enforcement action against ZTE Corporation.

III. Enforcement Developments

A. Significant ITAR Enforcement Activity

Bright Lights USA, Inc. (BLU) agreed to pay a fine of $400,000 as part of a civil consent agreement with DDTC concluded on September 11, 2017.56 The eleven alleged ITAR violations fell into three categories.57 First, DDTC stated that BLU, a manufacturer and supplier primarily of minor spare parts (e.g., robber stoppers, seals, and grommets), exported ITAR-controlled technical drawings and related data that had been “redacted” to

51. Id.
54. Id.

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eliminate military end-use details to vendors in China and India. Second, BLU allegedly assigned the incorrect export jurisdiction (EAR) to certain ITAR-controlled Phalanx missile system spare parts, which it then exported to entities in the U.K., the U.A.E., Turkey, Spain, and Portugal without DDTC authorization. And third, DDTC faulted BLU for failing to keep and provide records in accordance with the ITAR.

B. Significant EAR Enforcement Cases

On January 19, 2017, Milwaukee Electric Tool Corporation (MET) agreed to a civil fine of $301,000 to settle charges that it committed twenty-five violations of the EAR. BIS alleged that MET unlawfully shipped EAR-controlled thermal imaging cameras to several foreign destinations, such as Hong Kong, Columbia, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Mexico, from April 2012 to May 2014.

BIS imposed a $27 million penalty on Access USA Shipping, LLC (Access) on February 9, 2017, in connection with an agreement to settle charges that Access committed 150 violations of the EAR. Access was alleged to have operated as a sort of front for foreign buyers wishing to conceal information about the actual end-use, end-user, or destination from U.S. sellers; crafted and manipulated shipping documentation to avoid scrutiny from federal authorities; failed to retain required documents; unlawfully exported items subject to Crime Control restrictions to Argentina, Austria, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Libya, South Africa, and Sweden; and exported items subject to the EAR to a Finnish company identified on the restricted Entity List without the required BIS authorization.

On March 7, 2017, following an extensive, five-year investigation, the U.S. government announced settlement and plea agreements with the China-based Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) organization for both civil and criminal violations of U.S. export control and economic sanctions laws, occurring from 2010 to 2016. As part of the multi-agency arrangement, ZTE agreed to pay civil fines of $661 million to

58. Id. at 4.
59. Id. at 5.
60. Id. at 4.
62. Id. at 2.
64. Id. at 2-6.

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BIS (with $300 million of that suspended)\textsuperscript{66} and $101 million to OFAC,\textsuperscript{67} a criminal fine of $287 million, and a criminal forfeiture of $143 million.\textsuperscript{68} Authorities accused ZTE of operating and attempting to conceal a vast, intricate scheme to supply customers in Iran with telecommunications networking equipment and infrastructure—the backbone of which was U.S.-origin commodities and software subject to the EAR—without the necessary licenses from BIS or OFAC.\textsuperscript{69} Moreover, ZTE was charged with incorporating U.S.-origin parts and components into telecommunications end-items in China that were destined for North Korea.\textsuperscript{70}

Axis Communications, Inc. (Axis) and BIS concluded a civil settlement agreement involving a $700,000 fine on June 9, 2017.\textsuperscript{71} BIS alleged that Axis exported EAR-controlled thermal imaging cameras to Mexico thirteen times from March 2011 to July 2013 without the necessary authorization, and that Axis failed to comply with regulatory recordkeeping requirements.\textsuperscript{72}

As part of a settlement agreement announced on September 25, 2017, BIS issued a civil penalty of $230,000 to Millitech, Inc.\textsuperscript{73} The company was charged with eighteen violations of the EAR for exporting from October 2011 through July 2014 controlled active multiplier chains—components often used in communication and radar systems—without authorization to consignees in China and Russia.\textsuperscript{74}

C. SIGNIFICANT OFAC ENFORCEMENT CASES

OFAC announced on January 13, 2017, that Canada-based Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD) agreed to pay $516,105 to settle allegations that it and its subsidiaries committed 3,491 apparent violations of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (C A C R)\textsuperscript{75} and Iranian Transactions and Sanctions

\begin{itemize}
\item 68. Id. The financial penalties totaled about $1.2 billion.
\item 69. Id.
\item 72. Id. at 2.
\item 74. Id. at 2.
\item 75. 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (2018).
\end{itemize}
Regulations (ITSR). The TD group of companies was alleged to have held accounts, processed money transfers, and engaged in securities-related transactions involving the U.S. financial system for the benefit of persons in Cuba and Iran, without the required OFAC authorization.

On February 28, 2017, OFAC stated that United Medical Instruments Inc. (UMI) was settling its potential liability arising from fifty-six alleged violations of the ITSR, with a civil penalty of $515,400 (most of which was suspended on the condition that UMI comply with the terms of a 2013 agreement with BIS). The exports in question consisted of unlicensed shipments of medical imaging equipment to countries from December 2007 to April 2009 that UMI knew or should have known were destined ultimately for Iran.

As noted previously, OFAC was one of the agencies involved in the global settlement with ZTE announced on March 7, 2017. ZTE agreed to pay $101 million to OFAC in connection with 251 violations of the ITSR arising from its scheme to “surreptitiously supply Iran with a substantial volume of U.S.-origin goods” without the appropriate licenses.

On July 20, 2017, OFAC stated it was assessing a penalty of $2,000,000 against ExxonMobil Corporation. Officers of ExxonMobil subsidiaries were alleged to have violated OFAC’s Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations by executing legal documents relating to oil and gas projects in Russia with Igor Sechin, the president of Rosneft OAO and an individual identified on OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons. OFAC took the position that countersigning the documents constituted unlawful “deal[ing] in services” for the benefit of a sanctioned person, and demonstrated a “reckless disregard” of the relevant U.S. sanctions laws and policy objectives.

In response, ExxonMobil filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas challenging OFAC’s penalty.

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78. Id.
80. Id.
85. Id.
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Singapore-based telecommunications companies CSE Global Limited and CSE TransTel Pte. Ltd. (collectively, CSE) agreed to pay a $12 million penalty in a civil settlement announced on July 27, 2017.\footnote{Enforcement Information for July 27, 2017, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (July 27, 2017), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/20170727_transtel.pdf.} OFAC stated that CSE committed 104 apparent violations of the IITSR by “willfully and recklessly” initiating U.S. dollar-denominated banking transactions directly relating to multiple business relationships with Iranian entities, even after assuring CSE’s Singaporean bank in writing that such transactions would not occur.\footnote{Id.}


IV. CANADIAN DEVELOPMENTS

During 2017, Canada made significant changes to its export control and economic sanctions regimes. The most important of these are summarized below.

Canada Adopts Magnitsky Law and Promises to Improve its Sanctions Regime. On October 18, 2017, Canada adopted the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (JVCFOA), which, along with amendments to the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA), expands the scope under which sanctions can be enacted against states, entities, or individuals, including in cases of gross human rights violations and significant corruption.\footnote{Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law), S.C. 2017, c 21 (Can.), http://laws.justice.gc.ca/PDF/F-2.3.pdf; Special Economic Measures Act, S.C. 1992, c 17 (Can.), http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/S-14.5.pdf.} This legislation is known as Canada’s “Magnitsky Law,” named after anti-corruption lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky, who discovered Russian officials’ embezzlement of state funds amounting to $230 million USD and soon after was arrested, tortured, and died in a Russian prison.

Adoption of the JVCFOA was one of the recommendations in the report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (the Committee), entitled “A Coherent and Effective Approach to Canada’s Sanctions Regimes: Sergei Magnitsky and Beyond”
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dated April 6, 2017 (the Report).92 The Report is a result of a year-long comprehensive parliamentary review of Canada’s sanctions legislation, required under the Freezing Assets of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (FACFOA).93 The Report’s other core recommendations include that the Government of Canada should (i) ensure coherence across Canada’s sanctions legislation; (ii) narrow the scope of restrictions to avoid the need for over-compliance; (iii) allow targeted persons to defend themselves against imposed measures on procedural fairness grounds; (iv) provide comprehensive, publicly available, written guidance to the public and private sectors regarding interpretation of sanctions; and (v) provide clear rationale for listing and delisting of persons under SEMA.94 The FACFOA now allows Canadian officials to deny visas for and freeze assets of foreign nationals that are involved in gross violations of internationally recognized human rights or are public officials or associates who are responsible for or complicit in acts of significant corruption. The federal government has already adopted regulations under the FACFOA to place asset freezes on fifty-two officials from Russia, Venezuela, and South Sudan, including Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro Moros.

Canada Publishes Consolidated SEMA Sanctions List. Following another recommendation of the Committee, on October 13, 2017, Global Affairs Canada published an online tool, known as the “Consolidated SEMA Sanctions List,” which can be used by members of the public to search for individuals and entities named in the schedules of sanctions regulations made under SEMA.95 The recommendation for Canada to maintain a Consolidated SEMA Sanctions List was primarily driven by the Committee’s desire to make Canada’s sanction regime more streamlined and accessible. The Committee found that vagueness as to the scope of the restrictions and their exemptions has led to over-compliance, which not only increases the cost of regulatory compliance, but also can have the effect of a quasi-blanket embargo for certain regions and entities. The Committee suggested that a consolidated list would lessen compliance costs and reduce over-compliance.

Changes to Canada’s Sanctions Lists. On April 14, 2017, Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chrystia Freeland, announced amendments to the Special Economic Measures (Syria) Regulations to list twenty-seven additional

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94. A Coherent and Effective Approach to Canada’s Sanctions Regimes: Sergei Magnitsky and Beyond, supra note 92.

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individuals who are now subject to an asset freeze and dealings prohibition.\(^9\) The persons listed are high-ranking officials in the Assad regime. On September 22, 2017, Minister Freeland announced sanctions against forty Venezuelan officials and individuals who have played a key role in undermining the security, stability, and integrity of democratic institutions of Venezuela in the Special Economic Measures (Venezuela) Regulations\(^9\) (Venezuela Regulations), enacted under SEMA. The Venezuela Regulations impose asset freezes and dealings prohibitions with or for the benefit of listed persons, although certain exemptions apply.

**Canada Prepares to Join Arms Trade Treaty.** On April 13, 2017, the Canadian government announced its commitment to accede to the Arms Trade Treaty and introduced Bill C-47, an Act to amend the Export and Import Permits Act and the Criminal Code (amendments permitting the accession to the Arms Trade Treaty and other amendments (Bill C-47)).\(^9\) The Arms Trade Treaty is a multilateral treaty that regulates the international trade in conventional weapons that entered into force on December 24, 2014. Most significantly, Bill C-47 proposes the creation of a Brokering Control List (BCL) comprised of Export Control List goods and technology the brokering of which is prohibited unless authorized by a permit.

**Updated Guide to Canada’s Export Controls.** On August 11, 2017, a new version of the Guide to Canada’s Export Control List (the Guide) came into effect.\(^9\) The new version of the Guide, still referred to as the “December 2015 version,” brings Canada’s export control regime into compliance with its international obligations as of December 31, 2015.\(^1\) The Guide lists the goods and technology subject to export and technology transfer controls and reflects many new additions, deletions, and clarifications.

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