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PULL UP A SEAT: BRAZIL SHOULD BE THE NEXT PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

David A. Bailey*

I. INTRODUCTION

SINCE 1946, the United Nations Security Council has expanded only once—by adding four nonpermanent seats—in 1963.1 But beginning in 1993, with the creation of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council, the debate over Security Council reform—especially expansion—has been an active issue at the U.N.2 The general consensus is that it must grow to accommodate the larger body of the U.N., a significant majority of which is continuing to press for further debate and action on reform.3 The vast degree of interest is not surprising: the number of member-states in the General Assembly has nearly quadrupled since its inception.4 The current debate is not over the question of expansion, but rather over three aspects of the presumed eventual growth: (1) the number of members, (2) their type of membership (i.e., permanent or term), and (3) whether the veto power should be extended to new permanent members, if any are added.5 This article primarily addresses the second consideration with respect to Brazil’s membership on the Council. Specifically, if the Security Council is reformed, and if it includes new permanent seats, whether Brazil should join the Council as a permanent member.

Brazil is a significant player in twenty-first century international politics, and the Latin American power is demonstrating exceptional ability in managing two of the most important challenges the planet faces today:

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economic stability and climate change. In addition, Brazil is particularly well situated to participate meaningfully in Middle-Eastern relations with the European/American "West" because it maintains key diplomatic ties with prominent actors on both sides of that division.

Regionally, Brazil is a heavyweight. It is the sixth most populous country in the world with a strong economy and modern defenses. As the largest country in South America, with significant influence across both South and Latin America, Brazil is a counterweight to the United States’ power and influence in the southern half of the Western Hemisphere.

Part One of this article provides background and the leading arguments in the Security Council reform debate, acknowledging that the inevitable consequence seems to be expansion. Two of the most pressing questions are whether a larger Council will include new permanent members and, if so, whether the new permanent members will wield veto power. Part Two argues that Brazil is the ideal choice for a new permanent member on the Council based on its credentials in four critical areas that should be addressed when vetting a new permanent member of the Security Council: (1) economic strength, (2) support of U.N. operations, (3) international leadership, and (4) representational considerations.

**PART ONE**

**II. THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL**

Perhaps the most solemn duty ever taken up by humankind rests with the Security Council: it has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." Originally, the United Nations Security Council was comprised of five permanent members—the victors of World War II: China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and ten nonpermanent members, which were elected by the General Assembly for terms of two years. Membership was highly coveted because of the high degree of power and influence vested in the Council.

**A. THE VETO POWER**

The term "veto" is nowhere in the U.N. Charter. Nevertheless, the

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10. Id. art. 23, para 1 (membership has since increased to ten); see G.A. Res. 48/26, supra note 2, ¶ 1.
most powerful privilege of a permanent member on the Security Council is not the promise of representation or longevity, it is, undeniably, the absolute right to ensure that the Council—and in some cases the entire General Assembly—does not take action that the permanent member-state does not support.\footnote{12} The Charter explicitly requires unanimity among the permanent Council members in two situations: (1) non-procedural Security Council decisions,\footnote{13} and (2) ratification of Charter amendments, upon approval by either a supermajority of the General Assembly\footnote{14} or designated Charter review conference.\footnote{15}

These unanimity requirements allow a single country to render the primary body entrusted with protecting international safety dangerously idle.\footnote{16} Perhaps more striking is that any one of these five countries can stand against the other 190 member-states and prevent a near 100% majority from amending the Charter that unites them.\footnote{17} This latter scenario has never occurred, but is possible under Article 109.\footnote{18} The former scenario, a silenced Security Council, on the other hand, has been effected numerous times: between 1946 and 2004, a total of 179 Security Council decisions were killed by veto.\footnote{19} Some scholars contend that many more Council proposals were vetoed than those officially cited by the U.N.\footnote{20} Given the magnitude of this right, the power is, unsurprisingly, often criticized; some even argue it should be eliminated.\footnote{21}

On the other hand, the veto mechanism could be the primary driver behind any legitimacy the Council enjoys.\footnote{22} When the five permanent members agree to take action, they are highly likely to follow through on the decision, given the diplomatic intricacies of gaining consensus, and because these five nations are responsible for approximately forty percent of the U.N. budget.\footnote{23} Conversely, if one of these financing countries is not interested, the veto provides the power to prevent unfunded man-

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{footnotes}
13. Id. art. 27, paras. 1-2.
14. Id. art. 108.
15. Id. art. 109 para. 2.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. paras. 1-3.
\end{footnotes}
\end{footnotesize}
dates or having to finance a cause to which the state is opposed.\textsuperscript{24} The problem, of course, is that this privilege is vested in only the permanent members.

An important aspect of the veto is that it is only a negative power. A single country can stall or prevent action, but it does not have the power to act unilaterally and affirmatively on the rest of the world or require the General Assembly to carry out its will.\textsuperscript{25} The veto, however, is the most significant component of the powers vested in the permanent members of the Council. This power to handicap the Council is best demonstrated by the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union during the second half of the twentieth century. Interestingly, the use of the veto power did not become controversial until the Council began to operate effectively after the end of the Cold War, when its use actually decreased.\textsuperscript{26}

\section*{B. Security Council Activity}

\subsection*{1. Inception through the Cold War (1946-1991): Insecure Council}

Security Council reform is not a novel issue of the twenty-first century. It wasn't until the fall of the Soviet Union, however, that reform became a serious discussion. From 1946 through 1991, the Council authorized force to address international aggression only twice: to remove North Korea from South Korea in 1950\textsuperscript{27} and to evict Iraq from Kuwait in 1990.\textsuperscript{28} The primary hindrance to an active Council was the requirement that the five permanent members unanimously agree to act.\textsuperscript{29} When a permanent member refuses to agree with the Council, as discussed above, it constitutes a veto.\textsuperscript{30}

A member's abstention on a particular matter, however, does not operate as a veto.\textsuperscript{31} During the Korean War, for example, the Security Council passed Resolution 84 against North Korea—its first authorization of international force.\textsuperscript{32} The measure passed only because the U.S.S.R. had been boycotting the Council for seven months and was not present to impede the resolve of the remaining four permanent members.\textsuperscript{33} Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union reclaimed its place at the table and became an active blockade once again.\textsuperscript{34}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{24} See id.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} See Report of the OEWG, supra note 19, at 13-17.
  \item \textsuperscript{27} S.C. Res. 84, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1588 (June 27, 1950).
  \item \textsuperscript{29} See U.N. Charter art. 108.
  \item \textsuperscript{30} See id.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} PETER MALANCUK & MICHAEL B. AKEHURST, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 375-76 (7th ed., 1997).
  \item \textsuperscript{32} S.C. Res. 84, supra note 27, ¶ 5.
  \item \textsuperscript{33} See MALANCUK, supra note 31, at 375-76.
  \item \textsuperscript{34} See Report of the OEWG, supra note 19, at 16.
\end{itemize}
In fact, the Soviet Union's dominance on the Council with its veto-based obstructions gravely concerned the General Assembly, motivating that body to take up the sword of international defense in November 1950 when it passed Resolution 377 (V): Uniting for Peace.\textsuperscript{35} This procedure recognized that while the Security Council has "primary responsibility" for international security, it was not exclusive authority.\textsuperscript{36} The Uniting for Peace procedure allowed the larger body to take action when the Council was deadlocked by Soviet vetoes.\textsuperscript{37} Some authorities question whether this shifting of authority procedure is legal under the Charter.\textsuperscript{38} It has never been contested or adjudicated, but has received general approval in an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice.\textsuperscript{39}

Even after the Korean War ended in 1953, the Council remained stagnant. The U.S.S.R.'s use of the veto significantly diminished after 1965, but then other permanent members began to exercise their veto powers more frequently.\textsuperscript{40} Most notably, the United States began heavy use of its veto.\textsuperscript{41} With the tension between the United States and U.S.S.R., accomplishing much on the Council was challenging.

The U.S.S.R. officially dissolved on December 26, 1991, ending the Cold War and its effective freeze on the Security Council.\textsuperscript{42} Since the fall of the Soviet Union, veto use diminished significantly, and the Council began to function more as it was originally intended.\textsuperscript{43} This brought new challenges and new criticism.

2. \textit{The Gulf War and Beyond (1991-2010): Council Activism}

During 1991 and 1992, no permanent member vetoed any Security Council decision.\textsuperscript{44} It was the first time in over a decade that the Council went a complete year without a veto, and the first time in history without a veto in two consecutive years.\textsuperscript{45} It appeared as though the essentially dormant Security Council had finally awoken, and the members were working together to manage threats to international security.\textsuperscript{46} Soon, the public concern over the newly reenergized Council was not vetoes, but

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{35} G.A. Res. 377 (V), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/377 (Nov. 3, 1950).
  \item \textsuperscript{36} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{37} See id.
  \item \textsuperscript{38} \textit{E.g.}, \textit{Bailey}, \textit{supra} note 20, at 209.
  \item \textsuperscript{40} \textit{Report of the OEWG, supra} note 19, at 13-15.
  \item \textsuperscript{41} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{43} \textit{See Report of the OEWG, supra} note 19, at 13-14.
  \item \textsuperscript{44} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{45} Id.
\end{itemize}
The Council promulgated a significant number of resolutions as it became active. As its decisions became more abundant and affected more states, calls to rein in the Council became more frequent, from both governments and academia.49

The General Assembly created the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation and an Increase of the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council in 1993.50 The Working Group has published annual reports for the General Assembly since 1994, focusing on the different issues that permeate Security Council reform, most notably: expansion, categories of membership, the veto power, and geographical representation.51 Each Secretary-General since 1994 has made a priority of reorganizing the Security Council to reflect a more democratic and representative constitution of power.52 And while the consensus has shifted toward reform, including a respectable degree of support for expansion of permanent membership, no single plan has emerged that is able to satisfy the requisite supermajority in the General Assembly and the five permanent members of the Security Council.53

III. SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

There is one nearly insurmountable obstacle to reform: the Security Council. Because permanent membership in the Council is determined by the Charter, amending Article 23 is the only way to modify the Council.54 But amending the Charter requires unanimous agreement among the Council's permanent members.55 The United States, United Kingdom, China, Russia, and France, collectively and individually, hold the keys to the only door that permits reform.56 Clearly then, it is not sur-

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50. G.A. Res. 48/26, supra note 2, ¶ 1.


52. The Secretary-General, Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, 2, 10 ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/51/950 (July 14, 1997).

53. See OEWG Report on Equitable Representation, supra note 51, at 1, ¶¶ 3-5.

54. U.N. Charter art. 23.

55. U.N. Charter art. 108.

prising that the Council has been changed only once.\textsuperscript{57} The challenge is
to design a reinvented Security Council that satisfies the requirements of
each permanent member, and then work from there to garner support for
the required two-thirds of the General Assembly. Even then, assuming
the permanent members can come to agree on a single design, amassing
the requisite supermajority in the General Assembly poses significant
difficulties.

A. GROWTH IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Since its adoption in 1945, the U.N. Charter has been amended on only
three occasions.\textsuperscript{58} In each instance, the change was perceived as a necessary one to accommodate growth of the General Assembly.\textsuperscript{59} By 1963,
U.N. membership had more than doubled.\textsuperscript{60} In December of that year,
the General Assembly passed the first amendment to the Charter, which
enlarged the Security Council from eleven to fifteen members and re-
quired a supermajority of nine votes to pass a resolution.\textsuperscript{61} There were
still only five permanent members, but they were outnumbered two-to-
one with ten nonpermanent members accounting for the remainder of the
Council, which provided a sufficient number of nonpermanent members
to block action desired by a unanimous panel of the permanent mem-
bers.\textsuperscript{62} The first amendment also enlarged the Economic and Social Council, another subsidiary U.N. body, from eighteen members to twenty-seven.\textsuperscript{63} Almost immediately following these changes, to accom-
modate for the larger Security Council and reinstitute internal consist-
tency with Article 27, Article 109 was amended to require the agreement
of nine Council members to call for a General Conference to review the
Charter, a requisite step in the amendment process.\textsuperscript{64} Finally, in 1971,
Article 61 was amended again to double the size of the Economic and
Social Council to fifty-four members.\textsuperscript{65}

Thus, after twenty-five years, the proportionate representation of
members on the Economic and Social Council had grown (from thirty-
five to forty percent of members directly represented), but membership
on the Security Council—arguably the most important international
group in modern history—had diminished to just over eleven percent of

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{57} G.A. Res. 1991 A, \textit{supra} note 1, ¶ 1.
\bibitem{58} G.A. Res. 1991 A & B (XVIII), A ¶ 1, B ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (Dec. 17, 1963);
2847, \textit{supra} note 58.
\bibitem{60} See United Nations, \textit{supra} note 4.
\bibitem{61} G.A. Res. 1991 A, \textit{supra} note 1, ¶ 1.
\bibitem{62} See W. Michael Reisman, \textit{Redesigning the United Nations}, 1 SING. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1, 14 (1997) (this structure gives rise to what has been coined the "non-
aligned veto").
\bibitem{63} G.A. Res. 1991 B, \textit{supra} note 58, ¶¶ 1, 3.
\bibitem{64} G.A. Res. 2101, \textit{supra} note 58, ¶ 1.
\bibitem{65} G.A. Res. 2847, \textit{supra} note 58, ¶¶ 1, 3.
\end{thebibliography}
nations in the General Assembly. In 2010, membership is at less than eight percent, with a mere three percent of nations in the Assembly that have permanent representation. And because the Council can be modified only through amending the Charter, this three percent has control over the mechanisms to change the status quo, thereby ensuring their several interests are protected in any eventual reform.

Fortunately, the Security Council is not so imperialistic. Each permanent member has publicly agreed on the need for reform. But that is as far as the agreement extends. The United States has supported both Japan and Germany as new permanent members on the Council, with significantly more emphasis on Japan’s ascension in recent years. France and the United Kingdom have endorsed granting permanent seats to Germany, Brazil, India, and Japan. China has spoken favorably of Brazil and India taking permanent seats, but is not open to Japan joining the group as a permanent member. Russia has not publicly named any country it would support, but claims to be open to “any reasonable option” that does not reduce the effectiveness of the Council. So while the consensus is that the Council should grow, by how many seats and with which countries remain significant hurdles.

B. Competing Considerations for Reform

Setting aside the proclivities of the individual nations and their respective motivations for entrenching the status quo and assuming real change is necessary and forthcoming, there are two fundamental concerns that must be addressed and resolved in a redesigned Security Council. Fortunately, they are directly opposed to each other. First is the political problem of legitimacy, or alternatively, representation. If the Security Council comes to be perceived as an embodiment of a power-hungry minority, the remainder of the world population will not give the Council’s

68. U.N. Charter art. 23
70. See Patterson, supra note 69.
73. U.N. GAOR, supra note 69, at 7.
resolutions and directives due respect, thereby rendering the Council ineffective.

The first sixty-five years of the U.N. have brought enormous growth. A fraction of the membership has a place at the Security Council, and an even smaller group carries the privileges and power of permanency. The push for democracy around the world demands a larger group that provides wider participation. This issue is even more critical when considered in terms of population.

Over half of the world’s population resides in six countries. Two of them have permanent seats on the Council: China and the United States. Russia is in the top ten. France and the United Kingdom rank twenty-first and twenty-second, respectively, and those twenty-two countries together contain nearly three-quarters of the people on Earth. Perhaps more surprising, the combined population of the five permanent members is only twenty-eight percent of the total planet population. Thus, only about a quarter of the world population is represented by permanent members on the Security Council.

The second fundamental concern is that the Council must be effective to execute its duties. Effectiveness of a group has a strong relationship with its size. Research suggests that small groups of five to nine members perform better than larger or smaller groups. But “the addition of each additional person also contributes to an ever increasing information sharing and coordination burden...[and eventually] adding more people becomes counterproductive to achieving team goals within a reasonable amount of time.” When the Council has been effective, it has probably been so because it is a small manageable group. Thus, an increase in membership—to raise representational legitimacy—may counteract the Council’s effectiveness.

Unfortunately, there is no perfect resolution to ensure that the small group does what the larger population wants accomplished, even if the small group believes it is working toward the best interests of the larger population. It seems as though no degree of transparency can compensate for outright exclusion. With the structure as it is, only the five per-

74. See United Nations, supra note 4.
77. CIA World Fact Book, supra note 8.
78. Id.
79. Id.; World Population Summary: Population Clocks, supra note 76.
80. CIA World Fact Book, supra note 8; World Population Summary: Population Clocks, supra note 76.
82. Id. at 45-56.
83. Id. at 47.
manent Security Council members are guaranteed a basic expectation of participation. The trade-off is that the Council is enabled to act quickly and decisively. To what degree the permanent members will be willing to sacrifice the Council's effectiveness is likely what will determine any new Security Council constituency.

C. Leading Proposals for Reform

Myriad proposals for a modern Security Council have emerged since the effort took root in 1993, and they generally fall into four designs: (1) increase the number of permanent seats, (2) increase the number of elected term seats, (3) increase the number of both permanent and term seats, or (4) create a third type of membership to join the existing Council.84

Little progress was made through the process of member-states submitting proposal after proposal. Even when countries agreed on a design, they disagreed on the constituent makeup of the envisioned Council.85 Finally, in 2003, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan established the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to assess the international threats of the twenty-first century to evaluate how the U.N. is addressing threats to security, and to recommend steps to take to enhance and strengthen the U.N. and its response to global threats.86 In December 2004, the Panel submitted its comprehensive report on world security, “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,” which included two models for Security Council expansion.87 These steps encouraged blocs of states to organize and develop draft resolutions for modifying the Security Council, as opposed to individual states' recommendations.88

The following year, four competing proposals seemed to lead the debate: (1) the G-4 plan from Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan;89 (2) the United for Consensus proposal, from a large group of states including prominent regional competitors of the G-4 nations, notably Argentina, Italy, Pakistan, and South Korea;90 (3) the African Union proposal;91 and

85. Compare Patterson, supra note 69 with Bezlova, supra note 72 (regarding the United States and China's divergent positions on Japan as a potential permanent member).
88. See generally id.
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(4) Secretary-General’s endorsement of the High-level Panel’s models.\textsuperscript{92} In each case, all of the permanent members would have to sign on, along with two-thirds of the General Assembly, because each proposal requires amending the Charter.\textsuperscript{93}

1. The G-4 Proposal

Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan, as part of a larger group of nations, submitted their draft resolution to the General Assembly on July 6, 2005.\textsuperscript{94} These four nations became the front-runners of the group and are now collectively known as the “G-4,” and have submitted subsequent draft resolutions as the smaller bloc.\textsuperscript{95} As recently as February 2010, the four nations continue to reassert the reform plan outlined in the original July 2005 proposal.\textsuperscript{96}

The G-4 design adds permanent membership seats on the Council, and argues that expansion is needed “to better reflect contemporary world realities.”\textsuperscript{97} In this envisioned Council, they increase the total number of seats by ten: six permanent and four nonpermanent seats elected for two-year terms.\textsuperscript{98} Of the permanent seats, the group calls for two from African States, two from Asian states, one from Latin American or Caribbean states, and one from Western European or other states.\textsuperscript{99} The new nonpermanent seats are similarly geographically distributed.\textsuperscript{100} Interestingly, this proposal requires a majority of fourteen out of twenty-five members, which is a slight reduction from the current majority requirement of three-fifths.\textsuperscript{101} Perhaps the most contentious point in the resolution is the issue of how many of the ten permanent members would have to concur to effect a Council decision.

Paragraph 5, entitled “Veto,” is one of the shortest in the draft resolution, but it certainly carries the most radical change.\textsuperscript{102} The G-4 asserts “[t]hat the new permanent members should have the same responsibilities and obligations as the current permanent members.”\textsuperscript{103} The challenge they face is daunting; persuading the current permanent members to relinquish any of that privilege is nearly a lost cause. The United


\textsuperscript{93} See U.N. Charter art. 108; U.N. Charter art. 109, para. 2.

\textsuperscript{94} G.A. Res. 59/L.64, \textit{supra} note 89, ¶ 1.

\textsuperscript{95} Letter from Permanent Representatives of Braz., F.R.G., India, & Japan, to Ambassador Zahir Tanin, Chairman, Intergov’t Negotiations Group (Feb. 25, 2010) (on file with author).

\textsuperscript{96} Id.

\textsuperscript{97} G.A. Res. 59/L.64, \textit{supra} note 89, ¶ 2.

\textsuperscript{98} Id. ¶ 1(a).

\textsuperscript{99} Id. ¶ 1(b).

\textsuperscript{100} See generally id. 3 ¶ 1(c).

\textsuperscript{101} Compare U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1 and art. 27, para. 3, \textit{with} G.A. Res. 59/L.64, \textit{supra} note 89, ¶ 6(b).

\textsuperscript{102} G.A. Res. 59/L.64, \textit{supra} note 89, ¶ 5(a).

\textsuperscript{103} Id.
States, for example, has explicitly refused to consider any proposal that extends the veto. Even more striking than the extension of the veto to new members is the G-4 plan to create a majority of new permanent members—six to the original five—all having veto power. Working together, these two elements of the proposal almost guarantee failure. In an attempt to assuage the concern, the draft included an introductory phase of permanent membership, during which no new permanent member could exercise the veto. After fifteen years, the General Assembly and Security Council would be forced to review extending the veto to the new permanent members. It appears to be a courtship period for the old power to warm up to the new.

2. The Uniting for Consensus Proposal

Approximately two weeks after the G-4 submitted and circulated its draft resolution, a competing group proposed an alternative that has been well received. A large group of countries, which became known by the title of one of their joint statements: Uniting for Consensus (UFC), echoed the G-4’s suggestion that the Council be expanded to twenty-five members. This group, however, did not propose adding any permanent member seats, just ten additional members elected for two-year terms to render the Council “more democratic, more equitably representative, more transparent, more effective and more accountable.” The draft also proposed multiple modifications to the Council’s working methods. The first item harked back to the days of an inactive Security Council, calling for “[r]estraint on the use of the veto.” And it urged the Council to establish formalized procedural rules to increase transparency and democratic participation.

The proposal was innovative in the way it envisioned the term seats. The UFC group distributed the twenty elected seats among “geographical groups” with “six from African States; five from Asian States; four from Latin American and Caribbean States; three from Western European and other States; two from Eastern European States,” and modifies Article 23(2) to allow immediate reelection “subject to the decision of their respective geographical groups.” By dividing the seats specifically to regions and allowing for successive terms, this proposal allows regional...
blocs of countries to have de facto permanent members, albeit without
veto power. Yet, actual election would still be governed by the entire
Assembly: the geographical groups only determine eligibility to run for
reelection, so the larger body would have a mechanism to prevent a par-
ticular nation from becoming a de facto permanent member on the
Council.

While the UFC proposal may not be a direct response to the G-4 draft
resolution, the small group of prominent UFC leaders is comprised of
regional competitors with the G-4 nations. Many Latin and South
American nations aligned with UFC—and thereby against Brazil’s efforts
in the G-4—most notably Argentina and Mexico. Italy’s UFC involve-
ment appears to be a counterbalance to Germany’s G-4 participation.
Likewise, Pakistan and South Korea’s UFC memberships are almost
surely messages to India and Japan, respectively.

The complete UFC lineup accounts for more than one quarter of the
members of the General Assembly, and is the G-4’s most significant com-
petition. Because it does not call for new permanent members or ex-
tend the veto beyond its current scope, this design seems to garner more
support among the permanent members of the Council. But the United
States and Russia have both expressed concerns over the Council grow-
ing too large, seeming to agree that twenty should be the limit.

3. African Union Proposal

In December 2005, the African Union (AU) published its draft resolu-
tion for Security Council reform. This proposal increased the Council
to twenty-six members, including seven seats to be held by African member-states: two permanent and five nonpermanent. Like the G-4 pro-
posal, the AU added permanent seats wielding veto power equal to that
of current permanent members. The AU model, however, did not in-
clude any limitation on the veto power for existing or new permanent
members.

The AU draft resolution is markedly different from the G-4 and UFC
drafts in that there appears to be an aura of centrism that is not present in
the other two proposals. Indeed, the AU incorporates “the undeniable
fact that in 1945, when the United Nations was being formed, most of
Africa was not represented and that, as a result, Africa remains to this

114. Id. ¶ 3-6.
115. Id. ¶ 3(1), 5.
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. See U.N. GAOR, supra note 69, at 8; Patterson, supra note 69.
122. G.A. Res. 60/L.41, supra note 91.
123. Id. ¶ (c).
124. Compare id. 24(b), with G.A. Res. 59/L.64, supra note 89, 3 ¶ 5(a).
125. See U.N. GAOR, supra note 69, at 8.
day the only continent without a permanent seat in the Council."126 Four African nations are founding members of the U.N.127 Granted, it is "undeniable" that four does not constitute "most," but given that the growth in membership is nearly four-fold over the last sixty-five years, many areas were not represented in 1945.128 Moreover, South America does not have a permanent seat on the Council, nor does Oceania.129 With that said, African states certainly need more robust representation on the Council. Professor A. Peter Mutharika observed that many concerns of the Security Council are in Africa, and soundly argues that a strong African presence on the Council is essential.130

Nevertheless, the AU proposal is a clear lobbying effort for permanent seats for specific countries, and while it is not unlike the G-4 plan in that regard, it has not been as widely accepted. The G-4 proposal, in turn, does not garner as much public favor as the UFC approach, which is the most inclusive and does not have an obvious group of countries it aims to benefit.


The catalyst for these draft resolutions, which have helped frame the reform debate, was the December 2004 report from the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.131 The Panel proposed two models for a new Security Council and provided guidance.132 In March 2005, the Secretary-General published his report “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All,” in which he endorsed the Panel’s guidance and recommendations and called for member-states to consider and build upon its models.133 To that end, it seems that the G-4 is loosely based on Model A, where the UFC position is more in line with Model B.

Both of the Panel’s models added nine seats, enlarging the Council to twenty-four members, organized by six-seat clusters across four regional areas: Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe, and the Americas.134 Model A seems to be a simple expansion of what already exists. It increases the permanent membership to eleven, with thirteen non-renewable, two-year term seats (three more than currently exist).135 The six new permanent

126. G.A. Res. 60/L.41, supra note 91, ¶ 2.
127. See United Nations, supra note 4 (Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and the Union of South Africa were the four founding African states).
128. Compare id., with G.A. Res. 60/L.41, supra note 91, ¶ 2.
132. Id.
133. In Larger Freedom, supra note 92, ¶ 170.
135. Id. ¶ 252.
seats, however, do not come with veto power—the veto still rests exclusively with the five original permanent members. The six new permanent seats, however, do not come with veto power—the veto still rests exclusively with the five original permanent members.\textsuperscript{136} Model B does not add any new permanent seats, but increases the number of two-year, non-renewable seats from ten to eleven, and creates a third category: eight four-year renewable seats.\textsuperscript{137}

Other than structural guidelines, intended to facilitate the debate, the Panel did not endeavor to suggest which states should comprise the envisioned future Council.\textsuperscript{138} It did, however, provide guidance on criteria for new membership, specifically calling attention to nations that “contribute most to the United Nations financially, militarily, and diplomatically.”\textsuperscript{139} And it encouraged inclusion of viewpoints “more representative of the broader membership, especially of the developing world.”\textsuperscript{140} Finally, the Panel implored the Assembly not to hinder the effectiveness of the Council, but to render it more accountable under democratic principles.\textsuperscript{141} Language reflecting these considerations is present in each of the leading proposals.

D. Eventual Reform

The basic concerns espoused in the Panel’s report clearly underlie the various approaches, namely widespread representation on an effective and decisive Council, comprised of powerful nations that contribute to the greater good through funding the U.N. and providing actual resources for the missions upon which the organization embarks. Security Council reform is not without critics: there exists opposition to significant reform, including against any expansion of the Council.\textsuperscript{142} But the overarching theme seems to be that reform—including expansion—is inevitable. Whether the larger Council will have additional permanent members is certainly an open question. And whether the veto power would be extended is even more difficult to say. Nonetheless, assuming that the eventual expansion does include additional permanent members, at least one—and probably only one—will be reserved for a nation in the Americas. The clear choice for that permanent seat on the Security Council is The Federative Republic of Brazil.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{136} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{137} Id. \textsection 253.
\item \textsuperscript{138} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{139} Id. \textsection 249(a).
\item \textsuperscript{140} Id. \textsection 249(b).
\item \textsuperscript{141} Id. \textsection 249(c)-(d).
\item \textsuperscript{142} E.g., Nile Gardiner & Brett D. Schaefer, \textit{U.N. Security Council Expansion is Not in the U.S. Interest}, BACKGROUNDER, Aug. 18, 2005 at 1.
\end{itemize}
PART TWO

IV. SOUTH AMERICAN ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER

A. Economic Strength

Brazil is the best choice for a second permanent Security Council seat from the Americas partly because it is perfectly poised as strong regionally, competitive globally, and yet retains the aura of “developing nation” or “emerging economy.” This combination permits the country to be a useful contributor with the current powers and maintain credibility among the many nations that perceive themselves as excluded.

Brazil commands the eighth largest economy on the globe, and is a significant contributor to the U.N. Budget for 2010 and 2011.143 Notably, over the next budget cycle, the South American power is already expected to contribute more than one permanent member: Russia.144 Its economic strength comes from hard lessons and aggressive management by Brazilian leaders over the last 100 years, representing precisely the type of financially sound nation the U.N. should want as a new permanent Council member.

The country has been open for international business realistically since 1991, growing more attractive each year until 1995 when the international markets pressed Brazil to retreat a bit toward its protectionist history.145 That same turmoil led to the creation of the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (“G20”) in 1999, of which Brazil is a founding member.146 Now in the twenty-first century, Brazil is one of the most trade-friendly international economies in South America, doubling its exports from 2000 levels to $118 billion USD in 2005.147 It is a rare example of success in the economically challenged Naught Decade. With consistent growth trends in the 2000s, Brazil, along with the other BRIC nations (i.e., Russia, India, and China), is setting the economic management bar.148

As Chair of the G20 when the financial crisis erupted in the United States, Brazil led by example, limiting its own economy’s retraction to

144. G.A. Res. 64/248, supra note 23, ¶ 6.
147. Pedro Da Motta Veiga, Brazil’s Trade Policy: Moving Away from Old Paradigms?, in BRAZIL AS AN ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER? UNDERSTANDING BRAZIL’S CHANGING ROLE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 113, 125 (Lael Brainard & Leonardo Martinez-Diaz eds., 2009).
only two quarters and emerging early from recession. In fact, in the midst of the financial turmoil up north, but before the crisis reached its critical stage, Brazil’s national debt received investment grade status from Standard & Poor’s. Riding that wave of success while Brazil was hosting the 2008 G20 Summit in São Paulo, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (“Lula”) heavily criticized the United States and other prominent economic leaders for failing to mitigate the damage, and demanded a role in resolving the crisis. The host nation had credibility and an attentive global audience: as an “emerging economy,” Brazil can be a shining part of the “us” in the developing world to the United States and European Union’s “them.” And this is a key representational element when considering a new permanent member on the Security Council.

On the other hand, Professor Michael Reisman contends that Brazil (and India for that matter) is too powerful and would neither represent nor increase the legitimacy of the Security Council in the developing world because it “could hardly reflect [a Third World] perspective in an authentic manner.” True, half of the BRIC countries are already permanent members on the Council, and yet there are continual calls for developing-world representation. The challenge with adding an ‘authentic’ representative nation is the near impossibility that it would satisfy the demanding criteria expected for any new permanent member. The High-level Panel’s requirements referencing contributions to U.N. financing and human resources—which seem to be minimum qualifications—are not likely to allow many developing nations to join the Council in a permanent capacity.

But Brazil provides a middle ground of sorts. First, as an emerging economy, the international community recognizes its contributions in the global marketplace. Much of the economic success Brazil enjoys today grew from the foundation laid by Minister of Economy (1993-94) and, later, President Fernando Cardoso (1995-2002) with his Plano Real. Since taking office in 2003, Lula has also been a driving force. The new President Lula continued some core fiscal policies of Cardoso’s Administration, and went even further in other areas, including his efforts in lead-

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ing regional economic integration. Lula was the first Brazilian president to realize regional integration success, particularly with the Common Market of the South ("Mercosur" or "Mercosul"), a trade agreement between Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and associate members Chile and Bolivia. Mercosur was just short of a continuous disaster until 2004 when Brazil and Argentina began cooperating under the agreement, thirteen years after its creation and nine years in operation. Now, however, it is the fourth largest trade bloc in the world.

Second, Brazil has not forgotten the challenges a developing nation faces. Indeed, the country still struggles with providing adequate infrastructure in some regions. Nor does it appear to want to be the only prominent emerging power in the business of making important international decisions. India, the other BRIC nation that is not on the Security Council, is a key partner in the G-4 push for Council seats. Both Brazil and India embody a degree of credibility among the underrepresented developing world that neither China nor Russia is perceived to have. And, illustratively, Brazil is using this international political capital on more projects than just seeking permanent Council membership. During the 2009 G8 Summit in L’Aquila, Italy, President Lula called for its dissolution arguing that “[t]he G8 no longer has a reason to exist,” and demanded a more inclusive group to address the planet’s problems.

Whether Brazil will continue to be a voice of the developing world is a question of international politics and perception. Indeed, if Brazil’s Security Council desires are realized, it could be the impetus that pushes the country to full peer status with the developed world. But Brazil’s tendency to lead by example indicates that the Brazilian government is not one to join the other team, and leave its persona or developing allies behind. The nation is uniquely situated to maintain credibility with the many developing countries, whose support it needs to surpass the two-thirds requirement in the General Assembly, and work peer-to-peer with developed nations.

The recent economic struggles of the United States and other dominant economies provided Brazil with a prime opportunity to demonstrate that developing nations and emerging economies are important in our modern, globalized economy, especially in times of crisis. Brazil navigated

155. Id.
156. ALFREDO P. MONTERO, BRAZILIAN POLITICS REFORMING A DEMOCRATIC STATE IN A CHANGING WORLD 124 (2005).
157. See id.
the economic storm better than most and is now poised as a dominant force in its own right. The source of this economic strength comes primarily from two sources: energy and agriculture.

B. Energy

1. Ethanol

As a world leader in renewable energy production and use, Brazil sets a strong example in the Western Hemisphere. Following the petroleum market crises and volatility in the 1970s and 80s, Brazil established alternative energy policies to reduce its dependence on foreign oil.\textsuperscript{162} Stemming from these domestic clean-energy policies, nearly fifty percent of Brazil's energy consumption in recent years is from renewable sources.\textsuperscript{163} The most notable source is ethanol derived from sugar, which is plentiful because sugarcane has been a staple of the nation's crops since colonization.\textsuperscript{164}

Today, Brazil is the global leader in ethanol production.\textsuperscript{165} Domestic use of ethanol increased thirty-four percent from 2006 to 2007 while the use of gasoline decreased nearly four percent during that same period.\textsuperscript{166} In fact, while Brazil's total energy use from 1977 to 2007 increased 234\%, dependence on petroleum products for energy has dropped from over half of all energy use in 1977 to barely forty percent in 2007.\textsuperscript{167} In large part, the country's bountiful sugarcane industry is driving down dependence on oil and increasing use of ethanol, and this rising ethanol use is not limited to Brazil's borders.\textsuperscript{168} With vast fertile agricultural regions in a primarily tropical climate, Brazil is the world's number one exporter of sugarcane and ethanol, spreading renewable energy sources across the world.\textsuperscript{169}

2. Oil

Petrobrás, Brazil's state-controlled oil company, is a leading source of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{162} Francisco Vidal Luna & Herbert S. Klein, Brazil Since 1980 156 (2006).
\item \textsuperscript{163} Ricardo Ubiraci Sennes & Thais Narciso, Brazil as an International Energy Player, in Brazil as an Economic Superpower? Understanding Brazil's Changing Role in the Global Economy 17, 30 (Lael Brainard & Leonardo Martinez-Diaz eds., 2009).
\item \textsuperscript{164} Luna & Klein, supra note 162, at 101.
\item \textsuperscript{165} Andre Meloni Nassar, Brazil as an Agricultural and Agroenergy Superpower, in Brazil as an Economic Superpower? Understanding Brazil's Changing Role in the Global Economy 55, 65 (Lael Brainard & Leonardo Martinez-Diaz eds., 2009).
\item \textsuperscript{167} Id. at 34-37.
\item \textsuperscript{168} Nassar, supra note 165, at 65.
\item \textsuperscript{169} Id.
\end{itemize}
The company produced an average of over 2.5 million barrels of oil per day in 2009 and exported nearly a quarter of what it produced, netting a trade surplus of $2.87 billion U.S. dollars. Rendering Brazil essentially independent in terms of petroleum, Petrobrás is overwhelmingly successful.

In April 2008, the oil giant rocked the international community when it announced a new oilfield in the ultra deep waters off Brazil's coast. Reported to be the third-largest reserve in the world, Petrobrás domination of pre-salt oil drilling technology has helped to set Brazil up to be a major international energy provider. Additional discoveries followed in 2009 with an estimated fifty billion barrels worth of untapped oil resting just off Brazil's coast. To celebrate the discoveries, President Lula called for legislation that would instantly render the extracted oil a state asset and direct half of all oil recovered from the offshore fields — by anyone — to Brazil's reserves.

Brazil's popularity as the newest oil powerhouse is sweeping the planet, providing the nation with benefits beyond mere economic prowess. Brazil has the ears of world leaders that do not often listen to each other, a situational strength demonstrating Brazil's potential as an exceptionally valuable permanent member on the U.N. Security Council. For example, both the United States and Israel have reached out to Brazil regarding Iran's nuclear ambitions. For its part, Brazil has defended Iran's development of nuclear technology for non-militaristic purposes while pointing to its own use of nuclear energy. That is not to say that Brazil is in

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league with Iran, as is the perception of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, the United States' most notorious South American antagonist.\(^\text{179}\) Brazil, it seems, is able to maintain public diplomatic relations with Iran without aligning with Tehran to the extent of alienating the United States and other key nations.

It is undeniable that Iran is establishing closer ties with Latin and South America.\(^\text{180}\) A clear sign of Iran's presence in the region is the eleven new Iranian embassies opened since 2005, including one in Brazil.\(^\text{181}\) Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Brazil during a trip around South America in November 2009, prompting international scrutiny over his intentions in the United States' "backyard."\(^\text{182}\) While Venezuela may be courting Iran, Brazil has no trouble maintaining its composure and independence. Declining an invitation from Iran to join OPEC in August 2008, Brazil has sought to stand out on its own.\(^\text{183}\)

By keeping these countries at arm's length, Brazil is in a unique position of popularity without apparent enemies. This configuration would serve the South American power well as a permanent member on the Security Council. With a permanent seat, Brazil could be a direct route from the Council to both Iran and Venezuela. Because Brazil is a significant oil-exporting country, it has connections with nations that are otherwise unavailable and has the ability to bridge sizable communication gaps, even those beyond the current relations with Chávez and Ahmadinejad.

C. Agriculture

Brazil ranks third in independent countries that export agricultural goods, behind only the United States and Canada, and is the leading exporter in key staples, such as chicken and beef.\(^\text{184}\) Like many of the advantages Brazil enjoys today, this status is rooted in a history of long-term strategies employed during financial crises of the twentieth century, beginning with the global financial crisis of 1929.\(^\text{185}\) Brazil's economic

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181. Id.


184. Nassar, supra note 165, at 65.

strength is deeply entrenched in its history and has grown into a driver of many parts of the world.¹⁸⁶

When the nation fell victim to dramatic effects of global economic turmoil, a Brazilian revolutionary leader, Getúlio Vargas, led a successful takeover in the Revolution of 1930 and became the 14th President of Brazil.¹⁸⁷ Under Vargas, Brazil became a bureaucratic-authoritarian capitalist state.¹⁸⁸ Initially, the new president continued the liberal economic policies of the prior administrations, but he also launched a strong effort toward industrialization and away from the agrarian-based economy.¹⁸⁹ The heavy toll of the global economy soon began to challenge the traditional economy-management practices of many nations including Brazil, which turned to import-substitution strategies designed to isolate the national economy from the dangers of the global economic swings.¹⁹⁰

At the beginning of the twentieth century, coffee was the primary export and crucial source of income for the large but fragile nation, accounting for nearly seventy percent of incoming foreign capital.¹⁹¹ International demand for Brazilian coffee plummeted in the 1930s and the diminished income stream from international sources threatened to cripple the Brazilian economy.¹⁹² The Vargas Administration's initial response was to institute protectionist programs to favor domestic goods over imports with high tariffs on external sources and meet the people's demand with homegrown supply.¹⁹³ Like many other national leaders at the time, Vargas began managing the national economy with a heavier hand.¹⁹⁴

Still heading toward industrialization, but reeling from the sting of the global import/export markets, Vargas intervened in nearly every aspect of domestic production and distribution with aims to grow more self-sufficient and less susceptible to the whims of international consumers.¹⁹⁵ Beginning with the nation's prized cash crop, in 1932, he created the National Coffee Council that regulated coffee production, distribution, farmer subsidies, permissible quantities of plants, and even surplus destruction.¹⁹⁶ Throughout the decade, additional product-specific public institutions followed, leading to a highly-regulated agricultural sector de-

¹⁸⁶. See generally id.
¹⁸⁸. Luis Carlos Bresser Pereira, From the Patrimonial State to the Managerial State, in BRAZIL: A CENTURY OF CHANGE 141, 150 (Ignacy Sachs et al., eds., 2009).
¹⁸⁹. Id.
¹⁹⁰. Barros, supra note 185, at 83.
¹⁹¹. Id.
¹⁹². See id.
¹⁹³. See id.
¹⁹⁵. See id. at 69.
¹⁹⁶. Id.
signed to reduce—and when practical, eliminate—reliance on imports.\textsuperscript{197}

Agricultural exporting remained a foreign money stream, especially coffee, rubber, and sugar.\textsuperscript{198} But it was not until the industrialization efforts began to take hold that the government made significant investment in agrarian areas.\textsuperscript{199} In 1953, it developed the Superintendency for the Amazonia Economic Valorization Plan, a strategy to increase Amazonian agricultural production considerably to support the growing industrial centers in urban areas.\textsuperscript{200}

Now Brazil is a well insulated and reliable economic environment. After years of import-substitution practices, and as a current leader in agricultural exports, Brazil has the requisite independence a permanent Security Council member needs. Like an independent judiciary is critical to effective justice, Brazil has the luxury of an objective perspective of a stand-alone provider of essential needs, not encumbered by political restrictions. Such posture would not be possible without robust economic strength and independence. As demonstrated during the first decade of this century, its economy is clearly strong enough to rival the economies of the most prominent global powers.

V. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP

A. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

Second only to the United States, Brazil is perhaps the most influential nation in the Western Hemisphere with respect to international affairs and diplomatic relations, and certainly the preeminent country of Latin and South America. It was an original nonpermanent member of the U.N. Security Council and has been elected to a seat more than any other country besides Japan, with which it is tied at ten.\textsuperscript{201} This history significantly supports Brazil as a leading contender for a permanent seat on an expanded Security Council.\textsuperscript{202} Moreover, Brazil has played major roles in U.N. peacekeeping operations, a key criterion identified by the High-level Panel for permanent membership.\textsuperscript{203}

On January 12, 2010, a magnitude seven earthquake struck Port-au-
Prince, Haiti, crippling the Caribbean island-nation. Ten foreign soldiers stationed on the island as part the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) died in the disaster. These foreign troops were Brazilian. Since MINUSTAH was established by the Security Council in 2004 in response to a coup d’état, Brazil has lead the military arm of the peacekeeping effort in Haiti. The mission has been Brazil’s largest military operation in over forty years, and the second of two significant instances of challenging the United States in terms of international influence during the first decade of the twenty-first century.

The first instance came during the Honduras Constitutional Crisis in June 2009. Brazil was the primary power to support the deposed Honduran President Manuel Zelaya, establishing a safe-haven in its embassy in Tegucigalpa. Even after significant efforts to press for negotiations that would reinstate the ousted president failed, Brazil refused to recognize the legitimacy of the new government. When the United States came out willing to recognize the Honduran elections, Brazil threatened action aimed to isolate the North American superpower from much of Latin America, and Brazil appears to have stronger support in the Organization of American States for its efforts. Brazil has significant influence in South and Latin America, and this makes it a key ally for access to the region.

In addition to flexing its national strength to enforce peace, Brazil has also been a key actor in establishing international organizations to solidify the South American community. In an attempt to balance the powers of the United States to the north, and the E.U. to the east, Brazil led twelve South American nations to form their own union: South American Union of Nations (“UNASUR” or “UNASUL”). The requisite num-

206. Id.
ber of nations has not ratified the international union in their respective national legislatures, but the national leaders have continued to work toward developing the union since the Cusco Declaration in 2004, including military and economic cooperation.\[213\] As a leader in the South American community, Brazil, in effect, would bring the entire continent to the Security Council table. And in doing so, it would provide a certain degree of balance that is absent.

**B. Climate Change**

The year of 2009 marked what many believed would be aggressive targeting of global climate change.\[214\] The 2009 U.N. Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark was expected to be a significant step in the battle against climate change and a substantial amount of public interest for the conference permeated the year.\[215\] In June, the U.N. partnered with I.A.A. Global to launch an unprecedented advertising campaign for the conference.\[216\] For the first time, people around the globe could receive real-time updates as the history was unfolding via Twitter.\[217\]

Brazil set an important example of identifying and addressing nontraditional threats to international peace and security, specifically with its approach to climate change. Brazilian President Lula believes "[c]limate change is the most challenging issue we face today," and has kept the environment in the forefront of his agenda.\[218\] Brazil—labeled as "one of the top world greenhouse gas ("GHG") emitters"—can attribute most of its emissions to Amazonian deforestation, which is unique as most countries’ GHG emissions stem from fossil fuel consumption.\[219\] This reality is a two-fold problem for the country: deforestation of the world’s most famous rainforest and air pollution. On the other hand, it can be seen as an opportunity to kill two birds with one stone: reduce deforestation to preserve the Amazon and, in so doing, lower GHG emissions. And this is Brazil’s approach.

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215. Id.


1. Amazonian Deforestation

In 2009, the Brazilian government set its first domestic goal to reduce GHG emissions: a reduction of forty percent by 2020. Brazil expects to meet this goal primarily through reducing Amazonian deforestation by eighty percent over the same period. Last year was a significant step. With deforestation down forty-six percent from 2008 to 2009, Brazil Environment Minister Carlos Minc explained the nation would enjoy "the lowest deforestation in 21 years." The trend has been an annual decline since deforestation rates peaked at a shocking 27,772 square kilometers of lost Amazon rainforest in 2004. In contrast, only 7,008 square kilometers were harvested in 2009, and the Ministry of Environment attributes much of the recent success to increased surveillance and enforcement of the existing deforestation laws.

It should be noted, however, that this aggressive policy is a seeming change that came after a long history of blaming industrialized nations for GHG emissions and insisting it was their responsibility to correct, or at least take the first steps. Even as recently as June 2009, President Lula had told the "rich countries" that they had to act first. But it was Brazil that set the example with the resounding success addressing deforestation and collateral GHG emissions over 2009. This step is essential, as the world now sees the South American nation as a leader in the climate change movement. In fact, without Brazil's initiative to take these unprecedented steps, a global response to climate change would surely continue to be kicked down the road as other matters distract the so-called "developed" countries. Brazil is demonstrating a rare phenomenon on the climate change front: real leadership.

2. Copenhagen

Brazil is already stepping into that role of global leadership, evidenced by its willingness to set and reach environmental goals domestically and through its commanding displays in the international community leading up to and at Copenhagen in December 2009. In establishing a strategic partnership with the E.U. in 2007, President Lula appears to be answering the call of duty for the Western Hemisphere when other nations, most
notably the United States, are unable or unwilling to come to the table.\textsuperscript{227} Together, the E.U. and Brazil worked diligently in the months before Copenhagen to design a sufficient framework, in which a robust and legally binding multinational agreement would be able to arise at the December Climate Change meeting and thrive thereafter as a successor to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.\textsuperscript{228}

President Lula also teamed up with French President Nicolas Sarkozy last fall, bringing their nations’ resources together in a “diplomatic offensive” to attract more multinational pragmatic support for dealing with environmental challenges.\textsuperscript{229} The offensive’s primary targets were the top two GHG emitters: China and the United States.\textsuperscript{230} Both countries have been butting heads over GHG emissions, refusing to give unilateral concessions, and were looking for some degree of reconciliation in the weeks approaching Copenhagen.\textsuperscript{231} In anticipation of the meeting between President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao, Lula, joined by Sarkozy at a joint press conference, refused to take a back seat, demanding more than just Chinese and U.S. situations be taken into account in any resolutions.\textsuperscript{232}

At Copenhagen, the world saw the excitement and effort designed to make historic progress climax with the lackluster, non-binding “Copenhagen Accord.”\textsuperscript{233} The Accord, written by Brazil with South Africa, China, India, and the United States, has a clear Brazilian influence. Paragraph 3, for example, specifically requires financial and technological assistance for developing countries, an issue Lula has raised repeatedly.\textsuperscript{234} Granted, the Accord was merely “noted” officially at the conclusion of Copenhagen, has been heavily criticized, dismissed as “meaningless spin” by some, and left unsigned by many nations.\textsuperscript{235}

On the other hand, it signifies some accomplishment. The United States, for example, pledged to reduce GHG emissions attributable to the U.S. government by twenty-eight percent by 2020.\textsuperscript{236} At least one author

\textsuperscript{227} Id.
\textsuperscript{228} Id.
\textsuperscript{230} Id.
\textsuperscript{231} Id.
\textsuperscript{232} Id.
\textsuperscript{234} Id. ¶ 3.
sees the promises as progress in key areas: (1) it proposes “real cuts” in GHG from the world’s worst offenders, (2) it provides for a “transparent framework for evaluating countries’ performance,” and (3) it provides resources to developing nations.237 This third category supports Brazil’s maintaining allegiance to representing developing nations’ interests, an important piece of Brazil’s foreign policy résumé during its efforts for permanent membership on the Security Council.

VI. CONCLUSION

Brazil is a key supporter of the United Nations, both in financing and in providing boots on the ground. Its national strength is rooted in a well-developed economy, based on a combination of bountiful natural resources, significant population size, and well-regulated domestic and foreign capital markets. It is a clear rival to world powers in terms of influence in South America, and may hold keys to other areas, notably the oil-rich and traditionally unstable Middle East. These factors heavily favor Brazil as the next permanent member of the Security Council, assuming that when the Council expands it includes new permanent seats.

The South American behemoth is already more dominant regionally than the United States in many respects. As Brazil becomes more influential in world politics—especially if it can continue to lead in two of the most important areas facing international leaders: energy and climate change—it becomes ever more evident how important Brazil is to international policy making bodies and actors, such as the Security Council. Further, Brazil has developed diplomatic relationships that may permit it to be a significant contributor in resolving serious issues in the Middle East, much of which is attributable to its role in the international petroleum markets.

Brazil’s leadership on the climate change front, most notably marked by its participation at Copenhagen and its role in the resulting Accord, would add additional credibility to the Council as that issue grows in importance. Climate change may become more devastating to international security than any human threat of violence. Brazil’s fight provides the experience necessary to win the climate change battle.

Finally, Brazil would bring over 200 million people to the table, representing just one more significant reason—in addition to a long list of economic, political, and environmental reasons—to bring Brazil onto the Security Council as a permanent member.