American Bar Association
Section of International Law and Practice
Report to the House of Delegates
Fast Track Negotiating Authority*

RECOMMENDATION

BE IT RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association supports the renewal of legislation providing for the President's fast track negotiating authority, as introduced in the Trade Act of 1974 and later extended.

REPORT

1. The United States, as a founder of the liberalized world trading system established by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), as a signatory to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), the North American Free Trade Agreement (the NAFTA) and other important international trade agreements, and as a participant in ongoing discussions toward the development of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), has an important national interest in maintaining the integrity of these international agreements and in pursuing the further liberalization of international trade. For these reasons, the American Bar Association continues to support efforts of the Government of the United States to liberalize international trade, consistent with the objectives as stated in the preamble to the WTO agreements of raising standards of living and allowing for optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so.¹

2. Since the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Congress has periodi-

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¹See Preamble to Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
cally delegated authority to the President to negotiate trade agreements with other nations, subject to approval by Congress. However, this system of Presidential negotiation and ordinary Congressional approval did not always function to the satisfaction of the United States or its trading partners. In fact, disagreements between Congress and the President, which both play important roles in U.S. trade policy, have resulted in the United States' failure to implement changes to U.S. laws arising from agreements negotiated by the President. For example, following the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations, Congress specifically rejected agreements on certain non-tariff barriers, and several trading parties withdrew equivalent concessions made to the United States during the negotiations. The House Committee on Ways and Means later explained that this episode "convincing our major trading partners that previous negotiating procedures were futile if U.S. negotiators could not make commitments they were sure the U.S. would both accept and implement in terms of domestic laws." 3

3. Tensions between Congress and the President arising from each branch's claim to Constitutional authority to shape international trade agreements have revealed a problem to which the United States' trading partners are sensitive: without a structural vehicle for power-sharing between the two branches, the United States cannot effectively negotiate trade agreements requiring Congressional approval. 4 Fortunately, Congress was able to address the power-sharing problem, while preserving its Constitutional authority, in the Trade Act of 1974, which authorized the President to negotiate and implement tariff reductions subject to approval by Congress through a special "fast-track" procedure. Fast-track means that an agreement will be voted on without amendments and within a fixed period of time: Members simply vote for or against a measure on the fast track, and are not permitted to offer amendments to it. As part of this procedure, the Trade Act of 1974 provided a detailed consultative mechanism to keep Congress informed, to ensure opportunities for Congressional advice to negotiators during

2. As stated by Professor C. O'Neal Taylor:
Trade negotiating authority, in its current form, provokes a great deal of attention and concern because the negotiation of international trade agreements requires the combined efforts of two branches of the federal government. By its terms, the Constitution gives Congress authority over U.S. international trade issues because it has the power to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises" and to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations." On the other hand, the President is empowered to make treaties and has been described as the representative of the United States in foreign affairs matters. Thus, if the United States is going to enter into an international agreement concerning trade matters, the two branches must act together."


4. The balance struck between Congress and the President for constitutional authority over trade policy and negotiations must result in a process for trade negotiation that is both accountable to public interests, and efficient and effective to preserve U.S. leadership.
trade negotiations, and to enhance Congressional involvement in the drafting of implementing legislation.

4. Fast track’s procedures encourage interaction and cooperation between Congress and the President as the two branches develop an agenda for the President to pursue during negotiations which may result in the need for Congress to pass related domestic legislation. Referring to the cooperation required between Congress and the President under the Trade Act of 1974 and subsequent legislative improvements of fast track, Professors Ackerman and Glove posit that [a]lthough the Constitution requires the senators to give their “advice” as well as their “consent” to treaties, this text lapsed into desuetude over the centuries. Today’s Senate often confronts completed agreements that it can reject or revise only on pain of international embarrassment. In contrast, the Trade Act provides a dynamic framework through which Congress can give effective advice before the President signs on the dotted line.

[T]he Trade Act insists that the President consult with all relevant committees, include members of Congress in American negotiating delegations, and provide ninety day notice of an intention to sign any agreement. In discharging these functions, the executive must generate reams of paper explaining how its evolving proposals satisfy the Act’s detailed statement of objectives. More important than the paper trail is the genuine discussion and serious horse-trading that go[es] on during the advisory period. Thus, this modern statute has redeemed the promise of “advice and consent” in a way that eluded the constitution-writers of 1787.5

5. The no-amendment process is a vital component that demands Congressional-Executive cooperation in order to remain effective. It provides both branches with incentives to complete most of the intra-governmental negotiating prior to the commencement of, and certainly prior to the conclusion of, the negotiations themselves. The predictability of the government’s process is essential to foreign trading partners negotiating agreements with a president operating under fast track authority.6 The importance of the fast track’s time-frame and of congressional-executive cooperation in the pre-negotiation development of international trade policy was highlighted by the Senate Committee on Finance during consideration of the initial fast track provision in 1974:

Our negotiators cannot be expected to accomplish the negotiating goals of Title I [tariff and non-tariff authority] if there are no reasonable assurances that the negotiated agreements would be voted up or down on their merits. Our trading partners have expressed an unwillingness to negotiate without some assurances that the Congress will consider the agreements within a definite time-frame.7

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6. The expedited, no-amendment legislative process under fast track also avoids the effective renegotiation of agreements after they are presented to Congress through the president through the addition of “reservations,” amounting to unilateral conditions, which trading partners must accept if the agreement ever is to become effective. See Ackerman & Glove, *supra* at 905.

6. Since its introduction, fast track has been a useful tool that has been renewed and refined over time. In this process, fast track has played a significant role in expanding U.S. exports, reducing prices of imported goods, and improving the quality of life in the United States. As observed by the House committee during the 1979 extension of fast-track authority for an additional eight years (until January 3, 1988):

[Extension of this authority provides the President with an essential tool to reduce barriers to U.S. exports, a necessary element of export expansion, vital to U.S. economic well-being in the future.]

Prior to the most recent expiration of fast track authority in April 1994, the procedure had enabled the United States to negotiate and implement the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the Uruguay Round GATT negotiation), the NAFTA, the U.S-Canada Free Trade Agreement, and the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement.

7. Other countries will not enter into a bargain with the United States that Congress could try to "reopen" through selective amendments. Thus, an up or down vote on the entire bargain is critical. This is why the European Union and Canada emphasized the importance of fast track to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the NAFTA, respectively. Similarly, discussions with Mexico, Canada and Chile concerning Chile’s accession to the NAFTA were suspended by Chile in 1995 when it was evident that fast track would not be renewed that year. Mexico and Canada now await renewal of fast track prior to engagement in further NAFTA negotiations.

8. Without fast-track authority, it appears there will be no meaningful negotiations to provide for the inclusion of additional countries within the NAFTA pursuant to its provisions for accession. In addition, without fast-track authority, it will be impossible for the United States to engage its trading partners in more advanced FTAA negotiations or to remain effective in advancing current talks toward a binding FTAA agreement. Similarly, without fast-track authority the other member nations of the WTO will be unwilling to negotiate new or revised multilateral trade agreements with the United States. If the United States is not equipped with its most useful tool for advancing its trade agenda, it jeopardizes its leadership role within the shifting global economic community.

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8. For example, Congress's ability to monitor and contribute to the process of developing negotiating policy was expanded in the late 1980s through the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Pub. L. No. 100-418). This Act provided additional provisions on consultations with Congress, requiring the USTR to submit an annual statement to the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Committee setting forth trade policy objectives and priorities, actions and legislation to achieve them, and progress toward their accomplishment. It also required the USTR to seek advice from congressional advisors and provided for Members of Congress to be accredited as official advisers to U.S. delegations to trade conferences, meetings and delegations.

9. In summary, the American Bar Association views fast track legislation as essential to the liberalization of trade because it provides a necessary structure for power-sharing between Congress and the President in the process of negotiating and implementing international trade agreements. Because fast track has been successful and other nations are unwilling to negotiate important trade agreements without it, the American Bar Association continues to view fast track as a necessary component of the United States' regime for international trade negotiation and policy development. Approval of this resolution is consistent with a similar resolution approved by the Board of Governors on May 9, 1991, supporting an earlier extension of fast track authority.

Conclusion

Through this Resolution, the American Bar Association supports the renewal of fast-track negotiating authority, without judging the merits of any agreement that might be submitted to Congress under such authority. In so doing, the American Bar Association expresses its support for continued negotiation in pursuit of a system of rules that has the potential to provide the basis for increased trade, sustainable development, and prosperity.

Respectfully submitted,
Lucinda A. Low
Chair

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