Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory Lending, Preemption, and Federally Supported Lenders

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This Article discusses the continuing problem of predatory lending abuses in the subprime home mortgage lending market and federal and state attempts to address the problem. Over the protests of consumer advocates, federal agencies have recently issued regulations preempting state predatory lending statutes as applied to national banks and thrifts. In addition, Congress is considering legislation that would preempt state predatory lending laws for all lenders. The Article considers the preemption debate, particularly in the context of federally supported lenders—banks, thrifts, and the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Banks and thrifts receive support through the federal safety net, which includes deposit insurance. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are federally chartered, privately owned corporations that receive other types of federal support. The Article concludes that preemption is not warranted for national banks and thrifts or for other lenders, and that banks, thrifts, and the GSEs should be part of the solution to the predatory lending problem by originating, purchasing, and/or securitizing subprime loans in compliance with state and federal law.

INTRODUCTION

Citigroup is one of the largest financial services companies in the world.\(^1\) Its retail banking group, operating under the name Citibank, includes a number of national banks with federal charters.\(^2\) Citigroup

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\(^1\) See Hoover's In-Depth Company Records, Citigroup Inc. (June 14, 2006), available at 2006 WLNR 10167212.

\(^2\) See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, National Banks Active as of
and Citibank have been affiliated with a subprime lender that engaged in predatory mortgage lending practices.

Associates First Capital (Associates) was notorious for its predatory lending practices in 2000 when Citigroup purchased the company. Associates was at the time "under investigation by the Federal Trade Commission and the Justice Department as epitomizing 'predatory' tactics that strip away equity in homes of unsophisticated borrowers by making loans with deceptive terms and fees." Associates' practices included: making loans with high interest rates, large upfront fees, balloon payments, and prepayment penalties; aggressively selling single-premium credit insurance; and "flipping" or refinancing loans to generate additional fees without benefit to the borrower. Employees of Associates were under intense pressure to sell credit life insurance, and a subsidiary had collected $900 million in revenue from credit insurance premiums over the five years prior to the Citigroup purchase, in at least one year selling credit insurance on fifty-seven percent of its real estate loans. Consistent with its practice of "flipping" loans, Associates even refinanced zero-interest loans made through Habitat for Humanity.

Citigroup promised reforms, but its consumer finance company, Citifinancial, which would eventually take over the Associates branches, planned to continue charging prepayment penalties, selling single premium credit life insurance, and requiring arbitration clauses in its loans.

In March 2001, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) sued


3. Subprime lenders are lenders who make subprime loans, which are loans to borrowers with a higher credit risk. See infra notes 43-53 and accompanying text for a more extensive discussion of subprime lending.


In 1996, Associates had purchased Fleet Finance, another notorious predatory lender. See Tony Munroe, Fleet Unloads Finance Unit, BOSTON HERALD, July 2, 1996. In 1993 and 1994 Fleet Finance had paid over $100 million in settlement of allegations that it had engaged in predatory lending practices in Georgia. Id.

5. See Citigroup Revamps, supra note 4, at C1.

6. See Citigroup Buying Trouble, supra note 4, at 31. See also infra Part I (describing the practice of predatory lending).

7. See Citigroup Buying Trouble, supra note 4, at 31.

8. See id.

9. See Citigroup Revamps, supra note 4, at C1.
Associates as well as Citigroup and Citifinancial as its successors, alleging that Associates had violated the Federal Trade Commission Act by engaging in deceptive practices to induce consumers to purchase credit insurance and refinance existing home mortgage loans into new high interest rate loans with high fees. At the time, Citigroup stressed its commitment to resolving problems and implementing changes in the former Associates branches. In September 2002, Citigroup reached a settlement with the FTC, agreeing to pay $215 million to customers of Associates who had purchased credit insurance between December 1, 1995, and November 30, 2000, the date on which Citigroup finalized its purchase of Associates. The settlement was made contingent on approval of the settlement of a class action lawsuit in California providing for payment of an additional $25 million to consumers who refinanced with Associates during that same time period. The settlement was the largest ever reached by the FTC.

Through the pendency and after settlement of the FTC suit, Citigroup continued to insist that the problems were with the old Associates and that it was instituting reforms. However, in May 2004, the Federal Reserve ordered Citifinancial to pay a $70 million penalty for lending abuses that occurred in 2000 and 2001. The Federal Reserve asserted that Citifinancial made home equity loans without adequately determining the ability of borrowers to repay the loans. The penalty was the largest ever assessed by the Federal Reserve for violations of consumer lending laws. More recently, Citigroup disclosed that it had made hundreds of high-cost loans even after adopting a policy of no

15. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
longer making such loans.\textsuperscript{20} Associates is still a subsidiary of the holding company, Citigroup,\textsuperscript{21} but Citifinancial absorbed Associates' lending operations into its own.\textsuperscript{22}

Citibank is not the only bank affiliated with a subprime lender accused of predatory lending abuses. In 2002, Household International, an affiliate of HSBC Bank USA,\textsuperscript{23} agreed to pay $484 million to settle allegations by states that it had engaged in predatory lending practices.\textsuperscript{24} In addition, Bank of America, Bank One, J.P. Morgan Chase, Fleet Bank, and Wells Fargo, or affiliates of these banks, have all been sued based on allegations of predatory lending abuses.\textsuperscript{25}

In April 2005, the New York attorney general began investigating Citigroup as well as J.P. Morgan Chase, HSBC, Wells Fargo, and other national banks and their operating subsidiaries to determine whether they made high-cost loans to minority homeowners who could qualify for lower-cost loans.\textsuperscript{26} The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and a coalition of national banks, including those being investigated, filed separate lawsuits to block the investigation.\textsuperscript{27} The

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\item \textsuperscript{26} See 
\item \textsuperscript{27} See 
\end{itemize}
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York concluded that federal regulations give OCC the exclusive right to exercise visitatorial powers over federal banks and their operating subsidiaries, and enjoined the New York attorney general from continuing the investigation.\(^{28}\) That decision is under appeal.\(^{29}\)

Home ownership is still the American dream,\(^{30}\) which more Americans than ever are realizing.\(^{31}\) Predatory lending practices and the foreclosures that result, however, undermine that dream. The federal government has played and continues to play a significant role in promoting home ownership by supporting the home mortgage market, offering tax incentives to homeowners, and attempting to make home mortgage financing more available and less expensive.\(^{32}\) Some of the government's efforts to assist home mortgage lenders and support the mortgage market, however, harm the very homeowners that they are ultimately intended to benefit.\(^{33}\) Recently, the federal government is thwarting efforts of state legislators to protect homeowners in their states by preempting state statutes regulating predatory lending abuses. Regulations preempt state predatory lending statutes applicable to national banks and savings associations (also called thrifts), and proposed legislation would preempt the statutes altogether.

This Article addresses the preemption debate, particularly in the context of federally supported lenders—banks, thrifts, and the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie

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28. See OCC, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 403. See also infra Part IV.A (discussing the new OCC regulations and defining visitatorial powers).


33. Federal law encourages both borrowers and lenders to structure consumer debt as a home equity loan secured by the borrower’s home. Furthermore, federal law preempts state usury laws and laws governing alternative mortgage transactions, thus permitting high interest rates and other unfair terms in home equity loans despite state law to the contrary. Finally, federal bankruptcy law, which otherwise could give some relief to debtors, requires a debtor to pay a home equity loan in full on its original terms to avoid foreclosure. See id. at 432–35.
The Article concludes that preemption is not warranted, even for national banks and thrifts, and argues that banks, thrifts, and the GSEs should be part of the solution to the predatory lending problem by operating in the subprime mortgage market in compliance with both state and federal law.

Part I of this Article discusses the continuing problem of predatory lending. Minority, elderly, and low-income homeowners are still being victimized by unscrupulous lenders, mortgage brokers, and contractors. They pay too much for credit, obtain loans they cannot afford, and in some cases lose their homes.  

Part II explores the efforts of state and federal lawmakers and enforcers to address the predatory lending problem. In 1994, Congress passed the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA or the Act), and many states have since enacted statutes designed to further protect their citizens from predatory lending abuses. Lenders, however, are opposed to state predatory lending statutes and have pressed federal lawmakers to preempt state law.

Part III examines the possible causes of the predatory lending problem. While the issues are complex and the precise causes hard to determine, changes over the last thirty years in the operation of the mortgage market for both prime and subprime loans have been a major contributing factor. While these changes have served the prime market well, they have increased the likelihood that subprime borrowers will be victimized. Investors in home mortgages can purchase predatory loans, turn a blind eye to dishonest originators, and hide under the holder-in due-course doctrine and the securitization process to avoid loss and liability. A major increase in the availability of subprime credit has opened the door to predatory lenders, and market failures have kept honest subprime lenders from driving the dishonest ones out of the market. Finally, federal preemption of state consumer protection measures has prevented states from responding to the full extent possible.

Part IV discusses recent developments in the federal preemption of state predatory lending laws as well as the validity of regulatory attempts at preemption. In January 2004, the Office of the Comptroller

34. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are privately owned government-sponsored entities that support the mortgage market by purchasing and securitizing home mortgage loans. See infra Part V.B for a discussion of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

35. See infra Part I.


37. See infra Part II.B.
of the Currency (OCC) announced that federal banking law preempts state predatory lending statutes as applied to national banks and their operating subsidiaries.\textsuperscript{38} The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) had previously issued a similar determination with respect to federal savings associations.\textsuperscript{39} In addition, a bill currently before Congress would preempt state predatory lending statutes altogether.\textsuperscript{40}

Part V discusses the involvement of federally supported lenders—banks, thrifts, and government-sponsored enterprises—in the subprime and predatory lending markets. Banks, thrifts, and the GSEs have taken vastly different approaches to the subprime mortgage market and the predatory lending problem. Federal banks and thrifts are involved in the subprime mortgage market and in some cases make or profit indirectly from predatory loans. Banks and thrifts have sought and obtained protection from state predatory lending initiatives through federal preemption. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, on the other hand, have become increasingly involved in the purchase and securitization of subprime loans while adhering to guidelines designed to prevent their purchase of predatory loans. Both have successfully operated under the patchwork of state mortgage law for many years and the more recent patchwork of predatory lending laws emerging in an increasing majority of the states.

Part VI argues that the federal government should not preempt state predatory lending law. Both real estate finance and consumer protection have traditionally been areas governed by state rather than federal law. In recent years when the federal government has intervened in these areas, federal statutes and regulations have typically created a minimum standard for consumer protection rather than preemption of the field of regulation. When state governments regulate, they can be more responsive to the needs of their citizens and innovative in trying new solutions. State enforcers are more likely to prosecute small actors in predatory lending that federal enforcers may ignore.

This Article asserts that varying state laws are not as onerous on lenders as they may claim. Since subprime loans tend to be originated by local mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers, the originators can comply with local law, and investors can police their originators and purchase only from those that do comply with local law. The states already have varying laws governing real estate finance; therefore,

\textsuperscript{38} See infra notes 271–92 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{39} See infra notes 262–70 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{40} See infra Part IV.B.
adding additional requirements is only a matter of revising forms and standards that already differ from state to state. Furthermore, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can further their regulatory goals of leading the market in loans to low- and moderate-income families and in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods by participating in the subprime market to a greater extent and setting standards for compliance with each state's law.

Federal attempts to curb the predatory lending problem have thus far been unsuccessful. As a result, state legislatures have reacted to the problem by enacting statutes aimed at protecting consumers in their states. This Article argues that the federal government should not tie the hands of state legislatures and state attorneys general who are trying to combat mortgage lending abuses because predatory lending is still a problem.

I. THE PROBLEM OF PREDATORY LENDING

Predatory lending is alive and well, as the lawyers in the trenches in legal aid offices across the country can attest. Despite federal and state statutory measures aimed directly at curbing the problem, homeowners are still victimized. In fact, the incidence of predatory lending has increased since Congress enacted HOEPA in 1994.

Predatory lending must be distinguished from subprime lending. Subprime loans are loans with a higher risk of default because of the

41. See GAO REPORT, supra note 24, at 23-25; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 22. In March of 2000, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Andrew Cuomo formed the National Task Force on Predatory Lending. Id. at 13-14. Task force members included “representatives of consumer advocacy groups; industry trade associations representing mortgage lenders, brokers, and appraisers; local officials; and academics.” Id. at 14. Recommendations in the HUD/Treasury Joint Report are based in significant part on information gathered by the task force. Id. at 13.

42. See Legislative Solutions to Abusive Mortgage Lending Practices: Hearing Before the Subcomms. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit and Housing and Community Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 109th Cong. 1 (2005), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/ media/pdf/052405me.pdf [hereinafter Hearing on Legislative Solutions] (statement of Martin Eakes, Chief Executive Officer, Self-Help and the Center for Responsible Lending) (“As the subprime mortgage market has boomed, climbing from $35 billion to $530 billion in the decade through last year, so too have abusive loans, which are concentrated in this market.”); Predatory Mortgage Lending: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 398 (2001) [hereinafter Hearing on Predatory Mortgage Lending] (statement of Mike Shea, Executive Director, ACORN Housing Corp.); 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604 (Dec. 20, 2001) (“With this increase in subprime lending there has also been an increase in reports of ‘predatory lending.’”).
credit characteristics of the borrowers.\textsuperscript{43} Borrowers may be a higher credit risk because of their delinquencies, foreclosures, bankruptcies, debt-to-income ratios, or other factors.\textsuperscript{44} Because of the greater risk of default by these borrowers, subprime loans carry higher interest rates than prime loans.\textsuperscript{45} Even within the subprime market, interest rates vary according to risk.\textsuperscript{46} Subprime loans are classified according to risk as A- (lowest risk), B, C, or D (highest risk),\textsuperscript{47} with interest rates varying from about half a point to as much as four points above prime rates.\textsuperscript{48} Most subprime lenders provide a valuable service by giving borrowers access to credit to buy homes, make home improvements, or borrow against the equity in their homes for other purposes.\textsuperscript{49} In the past, almost all subprime loans were either home equity loans or home improvement loans; but in recent years, subprime lenders have also entered the purchase-money loan market.\textsuperscript{50} Most subprime loans, however, are still made for the purposes of refinancing, debt consolidation, or general consumer credit.\textsuperscript{51} Subprime loans used to be primarily second lien loans, but today they are predominantly first lien


\textsuperscript{44} Expanded Guidance, supra note 43, at 2-3.

\textsuperscript{45} See HUD/Treasury Joint Report, supra note 31, at 27.

\textsuperscript{46} See id. at 28.

\textsuperscript{47} Id. at 33.

These grades are not well defined across the industry, but an “A-minus” borrower may have good credit generally but has had some minor payment delinquencies in the past year. A “C” or “D” borrower may have a marginal or poor credit history, including multiple payment delinquencies in the past year or past bankruptcies.

Id. at 33-34. Prime loans are classified as A loans. Id. at 33.

\textsuperscript{48} Id. at 28. Underwriting standards are not uniform among subprime lenders. John C. Weicher, The Home Equity Lending Industry: Refinancing Mortgages for Borrowers with Impaired Credit 13, 34 (Hudson Institute 1997). Weicher’s report states:

In sharp contrast to the prime mortgage market, there are no generally accepted underwriting guidelines for the subprime home equity lenders. Individual firms set their own guidelines. They typically take the same factors into consideration but set different criteria to qualify for a given credit grade. Hence, one firm’s B loans may look like another’s C loans. Underwriting appears to be an art rather than a science . . .

Id. at 13.

\textsuperscript{49} HUD/Treasury Joint Report, supra note 31, at 2-3.

\textsuperscript{50} See id. at 30.

\textsuperscript{51} Id.; Weicher, supra note 48, at 31.
loans. While most subprime loans are not predatory, predatory loans are almost always subprime.

Predatory loans are characterized by high interest rates and points that exceed the amount necessary to cover the lender's risk, excessive fees and closing costs that are usually financed as part of the loan, frequent refinancing or "loan flipping" with additional points and fees, lending based on home equity without regard to the borrower's ability to repay, and outright fraud. Borrowers are often required to refinance...
low interest rate, purchase-money loans as part of the new, higher interest rate, home equity loan. When a borrower has difficulty making payments on the predatory loan, the lender may encourage refinancing of the debt with a larger loan carrying a higher interest rate and requiring higher monthly payments and payment of additional points and closing costs. Borrowers rarely obtain any benefit from a loan flip other than postponing a foreclosure and often end up owing more after having paid additional points and fees to the same or another predatory lender. Predatory loans may also have other unfair terms such as high prepayment fees, balloon payments, exorbitant late charges, and single premium credit insurance.

Fraudulent practices include falsifying loan applications, forging borrowers’ signatures, changing loan terms at closing, misrepresenting loan terms, physically obscuring key terms, and having borrowers sign documents with key terms left blank. In some cases, lenders make the loans without regard to the borrowers’ ability to repay, relying instead on the borrower’s equity in the home to secure the loan—an underwriting practice that is not appropriate for home mortgage lending.

The targets of predatory lenders are most often minorities, the elderly,
and the inner-city and rural poor. Borrowers from predatory lenders usually have substantial equity in their homes because of rising real estate values or the reduction of purchase-money debt, but are short on cash because of their low or fixed incomes. They may need money to make home repairs or improvements, to pay for necessities such as medical care, or to consolidate household debts. The elderly are particularly vulnerable because they typically have a great deal of equity in homes that they have owned for many years and because they likely operate on fixed incomes.

Perpetrators of predatory lending abuses include lenders, mortgage brokers, and home improvement contractors. These lenders seek out particularly vulnerable homeowners on whom to prey. Upon finding a likely prospect, a lender, broker, or contractor may use high pressure tactics or fraud to induce the homeowner to enter into an abusive loan transaction.

Predatory lending can be tremendously profitable for perpetrators of abuses. Mortgage brokers and lenders who originate loans collect large up-front fees when the loan is made. When the homeowner pays on time, the lender reaps an enormous profit based on the high interest

64. See Hearing on Mortgage Lending Practices, supra note 55, at 12 (statement of Gary Gensler, Undersecretary for Domestic Finance, Department of Treasury), 20 (statement of Donna Tanoue, Chairwoman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 54, at 254 (statement of Scott Harshbarger, Att’y Gen., Commonwealth of Massachusetts), 257 (statement of Kathleen Keest, National Consumer Law Center).


66. See id.; 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 54, at 449 (letter from William E. Morris, Director of Litigation, Southern Arizona Legal Aid, Inc., to Sen. Donald W. Riegle Jr. (Feb. 18, 1993)).


68. See Hearing on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 42, at 444 (statement of Consumer Bankers Association); Hearing on Mortgage Lending Practices, supra note 55, at 12 (statement of Gary Gensler, Undersecretary for Domestic Finance, Department of Treasury).

69. See Hearing on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 42, at 17–18 (statement of Leroy Williams, private citizen). They may check foreclosure notices to find financially troubled homeowners or may cruise certain neighborhoods looking for homes in need of repair. See Mike Hudson, Stealing Home: How the Government and Big Banks Help Second-Mortgage Companies Prey on the Poor, 26 Clearinghouse Rev. 1476, 1479 (1993).

70. See 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 54, at 309 (statement of Scott Harshbarger, Att’y Gen., Commonwealth of Massachusetts).
rates. If the homeowner cannot pay, the lender forecloses and takes any equity in the house.  

Even if the borrower prepays the loan by refinancing, the lender profits if the loan has a prepayment penalty.

The effects of predatory lending are devastating for the individuals who are victims and for their neighborhoods. At best, the victims of predatory lenders end up paying too much in fees and interest for their loans. The worst case scenario is that they lose their homes to foreclosure. A dramatic increase in foreclosures in inner-city neighborhoods has followed the increase in subprime lending in recent years. Foreclosures caused by predatory lending have a negative impact on neighborhoods as well since the impact of foreclosures may be concentrated in low-income areas. Vacant homes caused by foreclosures can cause a decrease in property values and an increase in crime, thereby destabilizing at-risk neighborhoods. Therefore, predatory lending has an impact beyond the homeowners who obtain predatory loans.

Problems caused by predatory lenders first caught the attention of lawmakers more than a decade ago. However, predatory lending has been difficult to regulate, in part because it is difficult to define. Some practices, such as fraud, are clearly illegal. Other predatory lending practices have been perfectly legal, and some individual practices are

71. See Hearing on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 42, at 318 (statement of Irv Ackelsberg, Managing Attorney, Community Legal Services).
72. See id at 346 (statement of David Berenbaum, National Community Reinvestment Coalition). Prepayment penalties are much more common in subprime loans than prime loans.
73. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 24. For example, foreclosures of homes in Baltimore grew from 1,900 in 1995 to more than 5,000 in 1999. Id.
75. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 25.
76. Id. See also 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 54, at 254 (statement of Scott Harshbarger, Att’y Gen., Commonwealth of Massachusetts) (Predatory lending practices targeting low-income neighborhoods may result in “the social fabric of many inner-city urban neighborhoods [being] torn apart and communities destabilized.”).
77. See generally 1993 Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 54.
78. See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 17.
legitimate under certain circumstances. As the frequency of predatory lending has continued to increase, lawmakers have continued to grapple with the problem.

II. GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE TO PREDATORY LENDING

A. Federal Response to Predatory Lending

1. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act and Regulation Z

In 1994, in response to problems stemming from predatory lending, Congress enacted the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act. HOEPA defines certain home mortgage loans as "high-cost" loans and, with respect to high-cost loans, requires particular disclosures and prohibits designated unfair terms. The Act specifically excludes from its application purchase-money mortgages, reverse mortgages, and home equity lines of credit; therefore, it applies to refinance loans and second lien loans that are not lines of credit. HOEPA initially defined high-cost home mortgage loans as those with an annual percentage rate more than ten points above Treasury bill rates or with points and fees exceeding the greater of eight percent of the loan amount or $400, but the Act provided for adjustment by the Federal Reserve Board after two years. HOEPA requires that lenders make the required disclosures to a homeowner three days before the consummation of the loan and prohibits the lender from changing the terms of the loan without making new disclosures. The Act prohibits prepayment penalties under certain circumstances, an increased interest rate on default, balloon payments to be made less than five years after the closing of the loan, and negative amortization in high-cost loans. In addition, HOEPA prohibits lenders from engaging "in a pattern or practice" of making

79. For example, a prepayment penalty could be appropriate in a prime mortgage loan if a borrower makes an informed decision to include this provision in order to obtain a lower interest rate.


82. Id. § 1602(i), (w), (aa), (bb).


84. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a), (b).

85. Id. § 1639(c).

86. Id. § 1639(d).

87. Id. § 1639(e).

88. Id. § 1639(f).
high-cost loans without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay.\textsuperscript{89} HOEPA provides for civil liability for non-compliance\textsuperscript{90} and may be enforced by state attorneys general.\textsuperscript{91}

HOEPA eliminates holder-in-due-course status for purchasers of HOEPA-covered loans.\textsuperscript{92} As a result, assignees of HOEPA loans are subject to all claims and defenses that the homeowner could have asserted against the original lender.\textsuperscript{93} HOEPA does, however, limit the liability of assignees to the total amount of the debt paid and remaining unpaid.\textsuperscript{94} In addition, HOEPA provides a safe harbor for assignees who can demonstrate that "a reasonable person exercising ordinary due diligence, could not determine ... that the mortgage was [a HOEPA-covered loan]."\textsuperscript{95}

Consumer advocates have criticized HOEPA as being ineffective in part because it is not sufficiently inclusive.\textsuperscript{96} First, very few subprime loans exceed the interest rate threshold.\textsuperscript{97} In fact, lenders may keep interest rates just below the HOEPA trigger in order to avoid the Act’s requirements. Second, the fee trigger excludes reasonable fees paid to third parties\textsuperscript{98} as well as fees paid by someone other than the borrower.\textsuperscript{99} As a result, the trigger does not include potentially abusive fees such as single premium credit insurance or yield spread premiums paid to a mortgage broker. Finally, HOEPA does not apply to high-cost purchase-money loans, reverse mortgages, or home equity lines of credit.

In response to criticism, the Federal Reserve Board revised regulations under HOEPA effective October 2002.\textsuperscript{100} The new Regulation Z lowers the trigger for first lien loans to eight points above Treasury bill rates and includes premiums for credit insurance paid at

\textsuperscript{89.} Id. § 1639(h).
\textsuperscript{90.} See id. § 1640.
\textsuperscript{91.} See id. § 1640(e).
\textsuperscript{94.} Id. § 1641(d)(2).
\textsuperscript{95.} Id. § 1641(d)(1).
\textsuperscript{96.} See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 85; Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 42, at 3 (statement of Stella Adams, Board Member, National Community Reinvestment Coalition).
\textsuperscript{97.} See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 85.
\textsuperscript{99.} See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 85.
closing in the fee trigger. In addition, the regulation prohibits a creditor from refinancing a high-cost mortgage within twelve months of closing unless the refinancing is in the "borrower’s best interest." This provision was intended to address the problem of loan flipping. Despite the new regulations, consumer advocates claim that HOEPA is not effective.

2. FTC Enforcement Actions

The FTC has filed enforcement actions against lenders engaged in predatory lending activities under HOEPA and other federal statutes. Between 1998 and 2003, the FTC filed nineteen complaints and reached settlements in most of those cases. Most of the settlements required compensation to consumers and an agreement by the lender to stop certain practices. Two of the most notable settlements are the settlement reached with Citigroup and a $60 million settlement with First Alliance Mortgage Company. The FTC and other federal agencies focus their efforts on "cases that will have the most impact, such as those that may result in large settlements to consumers or that will have some deterrent value by gaining national exposure." Therefore, the FTC’s enforcement actions have been against some of the largest and

102. Id. § 226.32(b)(1)(iv).
104. See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 42, at 2-3 (statement of Stella Adams, Board Member, National Community Reinvestment Coalition); Protecting Homeowners: Preventing Abusive Lending While Preserving Access to Credit: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit and Housing and Community Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 1 (2003), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/110503ms.pdf [hereinafter Hearing on Protecting Homeowners] (testimony of Margot Saunders, Managing Attorney, National Consumer Law Center) ("Unfortunately it is clear that HOEPA has not stopped predatory lending. Indeed, the problem has only grown worse in the eight years since it has become effective.").
107. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
108. See GAO REPORT, supra note 24, at 37-38.
109. Id. at 40.
most egregious offenders.

B. States' Response to Predatory Lending

More than thirty states have adopted statutory or regulatory schemes designed to address the predatory lending problem.\textsuperscript{110} Many of the state statutes are similar to HOEPA in that statutory restrictions are triggered by loans with interest rates or fees in excess of set levels.\textsuperscript{111} Some have statutes with triggers that are lower than HOEPA's,\textsuperscript{112} while others are the same.\textsuperscript{113} Some of the statutes have multiple triggers with more stringent requirements for loans with higher levels of interest rates and fees.\textsuperscript{114} Most of the statutes have additional restrictions or requirements beyond HOEPA for loans that are covered.\textsuperscript{115} Statutes in some states have increased the regulation and licensing requirements of loan originators and brokers.\textsuperscript{116}

North Carolina was the first state to enact a comprehensive predatory


In addition, some local governments have adopted ordinances prohibiting predatory lending practices. See, e.g., OAKLAND, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 5.33 (2001); L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 16 (2003); Cleveland, Ohio, Ordinance 372-02 (Mar. 4, 2002); Dayton, Ohio, Ordinance 29990-01 (July 11, 2001); N.Y., N.Y., LOCAL LAW 36 § 6-128 (2002); Summit County, Ohio, Ordinance 2004-386, 2004-618 (Aug. 16, 2004). However, some of these ordinances have been held to be preempted by state law. See Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813 (Cal. 2005) (holding that the Oakland ordinance is preempted by California’s predatory lending statute); City of Dayton v. State, 813 N.E.2d 707 (Ohio 2004) (holding that the Dayton ordinance by Ohio’s predatory lending statute); Stephen F.J. Ornstein et al., Local Anti-Predatory Lending Litigation Update, 59 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 153 (2005). Other ordinances are subject to ongoing litigation to determine whether they are preempted by state law. \textit{id.} at 156.

\textsuperscript{111} See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 494.0079, 494.00791; GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(17); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.25(D); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 456.503. See also GAO REPORT, supra note 24, at 58.

\textsuperscript{112} See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(17); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(6)(b); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24.

\textsuperscript{113} See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.25(D); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 343.201 (Vernon 2001).


\textsuperscript{115} See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(17); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(6)(b); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-26.

\textsuperscript{116} See GAO REPORT, supra note 24, at 62.
lending statute in 1999. Like HOEPA, the North Carolina statute defines “high-cost” loans, but the trigger is set lower than HOEPA for points and fees. For these high-cost loans, the statute prohibits balloon payments, negative amortization, higher interest rates upon default, call provisions giving a lender discretion to accelerate the loan, financing of any points or fees or charges payable to a third party (which includes yield spread premiums), and making a loan without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay. In addition, the statute prohibits financing insurance premiums and “flipping” for all consumer home loans. Therefore, the statute goes beyond HOEPA in offering protection to North Carolina homeowners because it covers more loans and imposes more stringent restrictions.

Consumer advocates cite the North Carolina statute as a success, and a number of states have followed North Carolina’s lead in adopting statutes with lower triggers and more prohibitions than HOEPA. Despite the additional protection provided by the North Carolina law to subprime borrowers, the subprime market has grown in North Carolina at a rate similar to states without such a statute. Every significant subprime lender that made loans before the statute became effective in 1999 continued to do business in North Carolina after the statute was effective. North Carolina had fifteen percent more than the national

117. Act to Prohibit Predatory Lending, 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 332 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1A - 10.2 (2003)).
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(b)(2).
120. Id. § 24-1.1E(b)(3).
121. Id. § 24-1.1E(b)(4).
122. Id. § 24-1.1E(b)(1).
123. Id. § 24-1.1E(c)(3).
124. Id. § 24-1.1E(c)(2).
125. Id. § 24-1.1E(c)(4).
126. See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 42, at 2 (statement of Martin Eakes, Chief Executive Officer, Self-Help and the Center for Responsible Lending).
128. See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 42, at 2 (statement of Martin Eakes, Chief Executive Officer, Self-Help and the Center for Responsible Lending).
average of subprime loans per capita in 2000.\footnote{130}

On the other hand, the Georgia Fair Lending Act (GFLA)\footnote{131} initially caused concern until it was quickly amended by the Georgia legislature.\footnote{132} The statute, in its original form, was the strongest in the nation. It created three categories of loans: "home loans," "covered home loans," and "high-cost home loans."\footnote{133} While the "home loan" category included most home mortgage loans,\footnote{134} the other two categories were defined based on a loan's annual percentage rate or on points and fees charged.\footnote{135} The GFLA created a different set of restrictions for each of the three categories. Some restrictions, including limits on late fees and a prohibition on financing credit life insurance, applied to all home loans.\footnote{136} A restriction on flipping applied to covered home loans.\footnote{137} Most of the restrictions, including limits on prepayment fees, a prohibition on negative amortization, and credit counseling requirements, applied only to high-cost home loans.\footnote{138} Finally, purchasers of high-cost home loans were made "subject to all affirmative claims and any defenses with respect to the loan that the borrower could assert against the original creditor . . . \"\footnote{139}

After the Georgia legislature enacted the GFLA, rating agencies responded by refusing to rate mortgage-backed securities secured by pools of residential loans containing any loans originated in Georgia after the effective date of the statute.\footnote{140} One of the primary concerns of the rating agencies and lenders was that assignees would have unlimited liability for claims that the borrower could assert against the originator. In response, the Georgia legislature amended the assignee liability provision of the GFLA to add a safe harbor for lenders who exercise

\begin{footnotes}
reasonable due diligence to avoid purchasing high-cost home loans and to limit the liability of those lenders who do not fit within the safe harbor.\textsuperscript{141} The rating agencies subsequently announced that they would again rate pools with Georgia loans.\textsuperscript{142}

Likewise, other states have enacted statutes with assignee liability provisions similar to the one in the amended Georgia statute.\textsuperscript{143} These states also include a safe harbor for lenders who exercise reasonable due diligence to avoid purchasing high-cost home loans.\textsuperscript{144}

Not surprisingly, lender and mortgage broker advocates have been critical of state predatory lending laws.\textsuperscript{145} They claim that state regulations are too burdensome on honest subprime lenders,\textsuperscript{146} that compliance with the patchwork of state laws is too costly,\textsuperscript{147} and that state laws will have a negative effect on the availability of subprime credit.\textsuperscript{148} Lender groups have fought state laws at the state level and have at the federal level proposed that federal law should preempt state laws. Consumer groups, on the other hand, applaud the efforts of state legislatures to combat predatory lending abuses.

\section*{III. CAUSES OF PREDATORY LENDING}

To solve the problem of predatory lending, it is necessary to ascertain its causes, which have been examined by a number of commentators.\textsuperscript{149}

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\textsuperscript{141} See GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-6 (2003). The legislature also amended the GFLA to eliminate the "covered home loan" category altogether. See id. § 7-6A-2.
\textsuperscript{142} See Azmy & Reiss, supra note 114, at 712.
\textsuperscript{144} See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-105(a); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24.
\textsuperscript{145} See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 42, at 3–4 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair and Affordable Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, Bond Market Association), 4 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect, National Association of Mortgage Brokers).
\textsuperscript{146} See id. at 3–4 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair and Affordable Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, Bond Market Association), 4 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect, National Association of Mortgage Brokers).
\textsuperscript{147} See id. at 4 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair and Affordable Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, Bond Market Association), 4 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect, National Association of Mortgage Brokers).
\textsuperscript{148} See id. at 3–4 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair and Affordable Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, Bond Market Association), 4 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect, National Association of Mortgage Brokers).
\textsuperscript{149} See, e.g., Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV 503, 507 (2002); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1257–58 (2002); Forrester, supra note 32, at 419; Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime
Certainly multiple factors have contributed to the proliferation of mortgage lending abuse, including those resulting from changes in the mortgage market occurring over the past twenty to thirty years.

A. Changes in the Mortgage Market

Before the mid-1970s, most prime mortgage loans were made by depository institutions using deposits to fund the loans. Home mortgage loans were made primarily by savings and loan associations (also called thrifts) to local borrowers using savings deposits of local depositors. The thrift would handle all aspects of the transaction including the origination of the loan, the funding of the loan from its own capital in the form of deposits, and the servicing of the loan throughout its life. The thrift would hold the loan until it was paid off or until a default resulted in foreclosure. Thus, the thrift had a long-term relationship with the borrower.

The subprime mortgage market was dominated by finance companies that originated loans using funds obtained through commercial paper, bonds, bank lines of credit, and both long-term and short-term debt. The finance companies held the loans they originated in portfolio or used the loans to secure their own debts. The finance company that made a loan thus performed the origination, servicing, and ownership


150. In the late 1970s, savings and loans made half to as much as sixty percent of home mortgage loans. See Mansfield, supra note 149, at 498 n.155 (citing 125 CONG. REC. 29,930 (1979) (statement of Sen. Morgan) (stating that savings and loans made about sixty percent of all home mortgage loans up to 1979) and David F. Seiders, Recent Developments in Mortgage and Housing Markets, 65 FED. RES. BULL. 173, 180 (1979) (finding that in 1978 savings and loans made half of all home mortgage loans)).

151. See, e.g., IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films, Inc. 1946). When depositors threaten a "run on the bank," Jimmy Stewart, as George Bailey, says:

You're thinkin' of this place all wrong as if I had the money back in a safe. The money's not here. Why, your money's in Joe's house, that's right next to yours, and in the Kennedy house and Mrs. Maplin's house and a hundred others. You're lending them the money to build, and then they're going to pay it back to you as best they can.

Id.

152. Origination includes taking a loan application, checking the credit and employment of the borrower, obtaining an appraisal of the property, and seeing that loan documents are prepared and executed. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 892 (6th ed. 2003).

153. Servicing includes collecting payments, holding tax and insurance escrow accounts, paying taxes and insurance premiums from escrow accounts, and handling defaults. Id. at 479.

154. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 40.

155. Id.
functions associated with the loans they made. In the past, subprime loans made up a very small portion of the home mortgage market, and most subprime loans were second lien loans.

Today, both the prime and subprime mortgage markets operate differently with the functions of origination, servicing, and ownership generally being performed by different parties. Capital markets are the source of most mortgage loan funds. Fewer loans are originated by depository institutions, and more are originated by mortgage and finance companies or through mortgage brokers. Mortgage companies are in the business of originating mortgage loans for sale to investors or to be securitized. Mortgage companies do not require a large amount of capital available for investment, since they typically hold mortgages only until a sufficient number of mortgages can be pooled and sold to an investor or securitized. The mortgage company often borrows money to fund the accumulation of loans through a warehouse line of credit, which the company draws down as loans are made and repays when a package of loans is sold or securitized. Sometimes the mortgage company or other originator retains the servicing function, but usually the loans are sold with servicing released, meaning that a company other than the originating lender services the loan.

Often the initial contact with a borrower is not even made by the loan originator but by a mortgage broker. According to the National Association of Mortgage Brokers, mortgage brokers may be involved in more than half of all home mortgage loan originations. Brokers are

156. Home improvement contractors were often involved in the origination of home improvement loans made by finance companies. Sometimes the contractor originated loans and sold them to a finance company, and sometimes the contractor referred loans to the finance company. Abuses in home improvement loans led to the adoption of the FTC’s Holder in Due Course Rule in 1976. See Julia P. Forrester, Constructing a New Theoretical Framework for Home Improvement Financing, 75 OR. L. REV. 1095, 1105–06 (1996).

157. See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 29. In 1983, subprime loans made up only 1.4% of the home mortgage market. See Fred Faust, Acorn Blasts Number of Subpar Loans Being Made in St. Louis Area: One Homebuyer Says She Is Stuck with a 30-year Mortgage at a 12 Percent Rate, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 22, 1999, at C8. Even in 1994, subprime originations accounted for less than five percent of all mortgage originations. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 29.


159. See Mansfield, supra note 149, at 526; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 39.

160. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.

161. See infra notes 372–73 and accompanying text for a discussion of warehouse lines of credit.


163. See Hearing on Mortgage Lending Practices, supra note 55, at 683 (statement of the National Home Equity Mortgage Association); HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 39.
paid a fee by the borrower or the lender and in some cases perform many of the origination functions other than underwriting and the initial funding. Brokers also may be paid a yield spread premium if the broker can induce the borrower to borrow at a rate above the rate offered by the lender for a particular loan.\textsuperscript{164}

Today some investors purchase loan pools on a "whole loan" basis, meaning that the investor buys the loans with the intent to hold them directly, but more frequently the loans are packaged and securitized with investors buying securities backed by the pool of loans. Securitization of home mortgage loans began in the prime mortgage market when Ginnie Mae created the first mortgage pass-through in 1970 by guaranteeing securities backed by mortgage loans.\textsuperscript{165} Freddie Mac followed with a pass-through mortgage backed security (MBS) backed by conventional loans in 1971,\textsuperscript{166} and in 1983 Freddie Mac issued the first Collateralized Mortgage Obligation (CMO), which created multiple classes of bonds all backed by the same mortgage collateral but with each class paid sequentially as principal payments were received from the mortgage collateral.\textsuperscript{167} Although mortgage collateral was seen as being of high credit quality, particularly mortgages guaranteed by government agencies, mortgage-backed securities suffered from the uncertainty associated with mortgage prepayment. CMOs substantially addressed that prepayment risk by creating sequential pay bonds that better allowed investors to predict and price for the expected maturity of their investments.\textsuperscript{168}

\textit{See also} \textit{Weicher, supra} note 48, at 32 (stating that brokers originated thirty-six percent of subprime mortgage loans in 1996).

\textsuperscript{164} HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, \textit{supra} note 31, at 40.


\textsuperscript{166} \textit{See Anthony J. Colletta & Joseph C. Shenker, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1369, 1384–85 (1991).} “In a mortgage pass-through security, the investor purchases a fractional undivided interest in a pool of mortgage loans, and is entitled to share in the interest income and principal payments generated by the underlying mortgages. . . . Income from the mortgage pool passes through to the investors.” \textit{Schwarcz, supra} note 165, § 1:2.

\textsuperscript{167} \textit{See Leland C. Brendsel, Securitization’s Role in Housing Finance, in A Primer on Securitization} 17, 22 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman, eds., 1996); Lewis S. Ranieri, \textit{The Origins of Securitization, Sources of Its Growth, and Its Future Potential, in A Primer on Securitization, supra, at 31, 36–37.} “The CMO concept is very simple. Rather than look at a mortgage pool as a single group of thirty-year mortgages, the CMO concept approaches it as a series of unique cash flows each year for the next thirty years. It recognizes that cash flows are higher in the early years of the pool, and they can be carved up into separate tranches.” Ranieri, \textit{supra, at 36}.

\textsuperscript{168} \textit{See Frank S. Alexander, Mortgage Prepayment: The Trial of Common Sense, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 288, 332 (1987).}
The private sector first became significantly involved in securitization in the late 1970s after rating agencies began rating mortgage-backed securities not expressly or impliedly backed by the federal government. By the 1980s a significant portion of mortgage loans were securitized. Securitization did not take hold in the subprime mortgage market until the 1990s, but is now a major factor in the subprime mortgage market.

A private lender that wants to securitize a pool of mortgage loans will typically create a special purpose corporation, trust, or other entity, called a special purpose vehicle (SPV). The SPV is created to be "bankruptcy remote" from the originator or seller of the loans so that creditors of the originator or seller will not have claims against the SPV. The originator or other owner of the loan pool sells the mortgage loans to the SPV through a "true sale," which is an arms-length sale with limited recourse back to the seller. The SPV issues the securities to raise cash to purchase the loan pool from the lender. Investors in the securities need only be concerned with the cash flowing from the mortgage loans and not with the originating lender's financial condition. In addition, the securities issued by the SPV represent a fractional interest in a large pool of mortgage loans; therefore, the credit risk to the investors is determined, not by the risk of default on any one mortgage loan, but by the probability of a given number of loans within the pool defaulting. Credit risk analysis is now based on macroeconomic factors or an actuarial analysis of the likelihood of aggregate defaults exceeding a given prediction of expected performance. The securities are typically rated by one or more of the rating agencies based on third-party credit enhancement such as a

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170. In 1994, thirty-two percent of subprime loans were securitized. By 1998, the rate was fifty-five percent before it dropped back to thirty-seven percent in 1999. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 41. See also Glenn B. Canner et al., Recent Developments in Home Equity Lending, 84 FED. RES. BULL. 241, 249 (1998) ("Most subprime lenders place heavy reliance on securitization of their loans to fund their operations.").


172. See id. at 135–36; SCHWARCZ, supra note 165, § 1:1, at 4.

173. See Schwarcz, supra note 171, at 142–43.

174. SCHWARCZ, supra note 165, § 1:1.

175. Schwarcz, supra note 171, at 136.


177. Schwarcz, supra note 171, at 136. The most well-known rating agencies are Standard &
MORTGAGING THE AMERICAN DREAM
guaranty, surety bond, or bank letter of credit or credit enhancement provided by the issuance of subordinated securities to investors willing to accept additional repayment risks.

With credit enhancements, securities backed by subprime loans can achieve investment grade status. More importantly, investors are able to purchase securities backed by a highly diversified pool of mortgages with the price of such securities based on an actuarial prediction of aggregate defaults. Securities backed by mortgage pools comprised of subprime loans may have a higher investor yield, but the higher cost of funding is more than made up for by the higher yield on the mortgage assets because they have higher interest rates than prime loans. The higher investor yield has attracted a greater amount of investor money. As a result, securitization has been instrumental in funneling substantial additional funds into the subprime mortgage market.

B. Parties Involved in Origination

Changes in the operation of the mortgage market have contributed to the proliferation of abusive mortgage lending practices. One of the changes exacerbating the problem is the type of parties involved in the mortgage origination process. Today, loans are originated by mortgage companies and mortgage brokers whose sole purpose is the origination function. Mortgage companies may fund a mortgage loan initially with borrowed funds, but will sell the loan as soon as the company has accumulated enough loans for a pool. Therefore, a mortgage company does not have to be highly capitalized. Mortgage brokers require even

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178. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 165, § 1:2 n.13.
179. Id. §2:4; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 42. Senior securities have less risk and a lower interest rate, while subordinate securities have greater risk and a higher interest rate. See Schwarcz, supra note 171, at 143.
180. See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 42.
181. See supra notes 159–64 and accompanying text. Subprime lenders rely more on brokers and “correspondents”—lenders who make loans using funds borrowed through a warehouse line of credit—than do prime lenders. See WEICHER, supra note 48, at 32–33. In 1996, forty-seven percent of subprime loans were originated by correspondents and thirty-six percent by brokers. Id. at 32. In the prime market in the same year, correspondents accounted for thirty-five percent of originations and brokers for twenty-two percent. Id.
182. See Brendsel, supra note 167, at 24 (“Although it is a stretch to suggest that anyone with a modem and a fax machine can be a lender today, relatively little capital is required to start a mortgage banking operation in the 1990s, and even less to become a mortgage broker.”), quoted in Eggert, supra note 149, at 556. Yesterday’s lenders had to be more highly capitalized because they generally retained ownership of the loans they originated for the life of the loans.
less capital since they typically do not fund loans, but rather make a fee for putting borrower and lender together, taking the borrower's loan application, checking the borrower's credit, and otherwise participating in the origination process. As a result, when a borrower has a claim against a mortgage company or broker for predatory lending practices, the culpable party may be judgment proof.

Also contributing to the predatory lending problem is the lack of regulation of parties involved in the origination process. The HUD-Treasury National Predatory Lending Task Force identified mortgage brokers and home improvement contractors, both intermediaries in the origination of mortgage loans, as being significantly involved in predatory lending practices. Both are significantly less regulated than the depository institutions that originated many mortgage loans in the past. Home improvement contractors are subject to regulation under the law of some states, but not under federal law. Regulation of mortgage brokers is primarily state law and is modest compared to regulation of the other types of institutions involved in home mortgage lending. The lack of regulation makes it easier to get into the mortgage brokering business, easier to perpetrate abusive practices, and easier to close up shop before victims of abuse can be compensated.

The low capitalization necessary for mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers, as well as their lack of regulation, has led to the proliferation of mortgage lending abuses by fly-by-night operators. Mortgage bankers and brokers can originate loans using predatory practices, then shut down and move to another state. When originators sell loans on the secondary market shortly after origination, the new lender is left to deal with any defenses to payment or may be immune under the holder-in-due-course doctrine. When intermediaries like home improvement contractors and mortgage brokers are involved in originating a loan, they may be more concerned with generating fees than with the loan's ultimate repayment. But when the homeowner seeks a remedy, the intermediary may be judgment proof, may have moved to another state, or may be out of business. The homeowner may thus be left without a

183. Id.; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 39.
184. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 39.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 40. In response to the predatory lending problem, some states have recently adopted more stringent regulation and licensing requirements for mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers, including new bonding and educational requirements. See GAO REPORT, supra note 24, at 62.
187. See infra Part III.D.
188. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 40.
remedy.

C. Separation of Investors from the Problems

The new horizontal segmentation of the mortgage lending market is also a factor in the increase in predatory lending. Because of the separation of the mortgage lending functions, the party who deals directly with the borrower in brokering or originating the loan may not have any contact with the borrower after origination. Although originating lenders sometimes retain the servicing function, where a broker is involved, the originating lender may not even have an office in the same community or state as the borrower. The parties who broker, originate, and service loans rarely own the loans they broker, originate, and service.

Thus, investors in mortgage loans can separate themselves from any abusive practices. They do not suffer harm to their reputations that might come about by being involved in abusive practices. In addition, as discussed below, purchasers of abusive loans are often protected by the holder-in-due-course doctrine against many of a borrower’s claims or defenses that might arise from the abusive practices. Purchasers of securities backed by predatory loans are further separated from involvement in the origination or terms of individual loans and are further insulated from loss. Therefore, investors may provide the funding for predatory loans while turning a blind eye to the abusive practices involved in their origination.

D. Holder-in-Due-Course Doctrine

One factor that insulates investors in predatory loans from liability is the holder-in-due-course doctrine. The holder of a negotiable promissory note becomes a holder in due course if the note is not

189. See Eggert, supra note 149, at 613; Forrester, supra note 32, at 422. See infra Part III.D.
190. See infra Part III.E.
191. A holder is a person who obtains an instrument by negotiation. See U.C.C. § 3-201(a) (2000). Negotiation requires transfer of possession and indorsement for an instrument payable to the order of a particular party. Id. § 3-201(b).
192. A negotiable instrument is:

an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it:
(1) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder;
(2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and
obviously forged, altered, irregular, or incomplete, and the holder takes it for value, in good faith, and without notice of certain problems.\textsuperscript{193} A holder in due course holds a note free from personal defenses of the maker and claims in recoupment of the maker against the original payee.\textsuperscript{194} Personal defenses avoided by a holder in due course include fraud in the inducement, misrepresentation, mistake, lack or failure of consideration, and breach of warranty.\textsuperscript{195}

The problems that give rise to personal defenses are exactly the types of problems that often exist in predatory mortgage loans. Therefore, an assignee who is a holder in due course can avoid these defenses to payment and require the borrower to pay the note despite valid defenses.\textsuperscript{196} The borrower’s only recourse then is to sue the originator or broker who committed the fraud or engaged in other conduct giving rise to a defense. However, these parties may no longer be in business or may be judgment proof.\textsuperscript{197} Thus, the borrower may have to continue paying on the note to avoid foreclosure, but may have no meaningful recourse against the culpable party—the broker or originator.

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\textsuperscript{193} U.C.C. § 3-104(a).

\textsuperscript{194} A holder in due course is the holder of an instrument if:

1. the instrument when issued or negotiated to the holder does not bear such apparent evidence of forgery or alteration or is not otherwise so irregular or incomplete as to call into question its authenticity; and
2. the holder took the instrument (i) for value, (ii) in good faith, (iii) without notice that the instrument is overdue or has been dishonored or that there is an uncured default with respect to the payment of another instrument issued as part of the same series, (iv) without notice that the instrument contains an unauthorized signature or has been altered, (v) without notice of any claim to the instrument described in Section 3-306, and (vi) without notice that any party has a defense or claim in recoupment described in Section 3-305(a).

\textsuperscript{195} U.C.C. § 3-302(a).

Good faith requires both “honesty in fact” and “the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.” U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4). In determining if a holder has observed reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing, the test is not whether the holder exercised care in the purchase of a note, but considers rather the fairness of the holder’s conduct. U.C.C. § 3-103 cmt. 4.

\textsuperscript{196} U.C.C. § 3-305.

\textsuperscript{197} U.C.C. § 3-305 cmt. 2.

\textsuperscript{197} See, e.g., Wilson v. Toussie, 260 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that current lenders who acquired mortgage loans at closing or on the secondary market were holders in due course and thus claims based on predatory lending practices of original lenders were dismissed against current lenders); Stuckey v. Provident Bank, 912 So. 2d 859 (Miss. 2005) (holding that the assignee of home mortgage loan, as a holder in due course, was immune from claims that the original lender had engaged in predatory lending practices).

\textsuperscript{198} See supra notes 182–83 and accompanying text.
The holder-in-due-course doctrine has a history of creating problems for consumers. Prior to 1976, sellers of goods and services to consumers could separate the consumer’s obligation to pay from the seller’s obligation to perform by selling the consumer’s note to a holder in due course. The transferee of the note, as a holder in due course free of personal defenses, could insist on payment even if the goods or services were not delivered or performed, or were defective. The FTC found that sellers used this ability to transfer a note free from contract defenses as a means to effectuate unethical sales practices in consumer transactions.

In response to these abuses in consumer sales, the FTC promulgated a trade regulation rule, the Holder in Due Course Rule, which eliminates the holder-in-due-course doctrine for certain transactions. The rule operates by requiring a notice in consumer credit contracts that makes the holder of the contract subject to claims and defenses that the debtor could assert against the seller. Affirmative recovery by a consumer against the holder of a consumer credit contract is limited to the amount the consumer has already paid; therefore, the holder’s loss is limited to the amount to be paid under the consumer credit contract. The FTC Holder in Due Course Rule applies only to sales of goods or services for personal, family, or household use. Therefore, it applies to home improvement loans, but not to other home mortgage loans.

At the time the FTC rule was adopted, lenders predicted dire consequences that did not materialize. The FTC Holder in Due Course Rule caused only a small reduction in the availability of consumer credit. In 1988, the FTC reviewed the regulation to determine the economic impact on small businesses and, in particular,
on the availability of credit. The FTC, receiving few comments, concluded that the rule had "not had a significant economic impact on small businesses," and it retained the rule as written. Honest merchants and lenders were able to adapt to the FTC rule, so only the dishonest were greatly affected.

HOEPA has a provision that operates in a manner similar to the FTC Holder in Due Course Rule for home mortgage loans covered by HOEPA. Like the FTC rule, HOEPA limits the liability of the assignee of a loan to the amount to be paid and remaining to be paid under the loan. In addition, many state predatory lending statutes provide for assignee liability to varying degrees.

E. Further Insulation by Securitization

Investors in mortgaged-backed securities are protected against losses caused by predatory lending practices of the originators of the loans in the pool backing the securities. Investors hold securities representing an interest in a pool of loans, not direct interests in individual loans. Therefore, the risk of loss to the investor is determined by the performance of the entire pool of loans rather than by any individual loan. Several factors reduce the risk of loss to investors. First, the SPV that holds the mortgage pool typically has some contractual recourse against the originator or other seller of the loans and may require the seller to repurchase loans that do not conform to certain standards. Second, when the holder in due course rule applies without limitations created by HOEPA or state law, the only recourse that victims of predatory lending have is to the mortgage broker or originator of the loan. If the holder in due course doctrine does not apply or if HOEPA or state law abrogates some of its protection, the victim may assert a claim or defense against the current holder of the loan. If a pool of loans has been securitized, however, an SPV is typically the holder of the

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207. Id.
209. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 139, 141, and 143–44 and accompanying text.
212. See Eggert, supra note 149, at 548.
213. These parties may be judgment proof as discussed in subpart B above.
loans.\textsuperscript{214} In most securitization transactions, the SPV is created for the particular transaction and its only assets are the loans making up the pool that is the subject of the securitization.\textsuperscript{215} If a borrower successfully asserts a claim or a defense to payment of a particular loan against the SPV,\textsuperscript{216} the loss is spread among the holders of the securities. Finally, the borrowers have no recourse against the holders of the securities who are the ultimate investors in and funders of the loans.

Some investors in mortgage-backed securities have additional protection based on credit enhancements. Investors in mortgage-backed securities price their investments based on credit ratings from the rating agencies and the investors' own perceptions of the likelihood of a given number of defaults occurring in the pool of mortgages.\textsuperscript{217} The senior investors are generally well protected by the SPV's issuance of subordinated securities, which bear more of the risk of loss than the holders of the senior securities.\textsuperscript{218} Additionally, the SPV may purchase third-party credit enhancement such as third-party insurance, guarantees, surety bonds, or letters of credit whereby "a creditworthy party ensures payment of all or a portion of the securities issued by the SPV."\textsuperscript{219} In the event that the SPV is subject to losses or liabilities as a result of predatory lending practices of the originator, the subordinated securities or third-party credit enhancement providers may suffer unexpected losses, but it is unlikely that such liabilities will impact the senior security holders. Because the subordinated securities bear most of the risk of loss, senior investors in mortgage-backed securities are generally isolated from losses caused by predatory lending practices of the originator even beyond the protection that the holder in due course doctrine and the securitization process give to investors.

\textbf{F. Increased Availability of Subprime Credit}

Securitization of mortgage loans also contributes to the predatory lending problem because of the greatly increased amount of capital now available for investment in mortgage loans. When most home mortgage

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{214} See supra notes 171–74 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{215} See Schwarcz, supra note 171, at 138.
\item \textsuperscript{216} The borrower may be able to assert a defense because it is a real rather than a personal defense, or because the SPV is subject to defenses under HOEPA or a state predatory lending statute.
\item \textsuperscript{217} See Leon T. Kendall, Securitization: A New Era in American Finance, A Primer on Securitization, supra note 167, at 4.
\item \textsuperscript{218} See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Impact of Bankruptcy Reform on "True Sale" Determination in Securitization Transaction, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 353, 364 (2002).
\item \textsuperscript{219} SCHWARCZ, supra note 165, § 2:3, at 16.
\end{itemize}
loans were made by depository institutions, the limited available credit went to prime borrowers. The tremendous increase in the size of the market for subprime loans is a result of securitization. Since the 1990s when securitization of subprime loans proliferated, the volume of subprime lending has increased drastically from $35 billion in 1994 to $160 billion in 1999 and $529 billion in 2004. In addition, as securitization of subprime loans has become more common, prime lenders, Wall Street investment firms, and the GSEs have become involved as additional players in the subprime market.

With the increase in the size of the subprime market has come an increase in predatory lending abuses. Notably, the increase in subprime lending and the related increase in predatory lending occurred after the enactment of HOEPA. The availability of legitimate subprime loans to borrowers who do not qualify for prime loans should theoretically reduce the amount of predatory lending because borrowers should have more options. However, most victims of predatory lenders do not shop around for the best deal. In fact, many homeowners with predatory loans did not seek out credit but were approached by the lender, a home improvement contractor, or a mortgage broker. These homeowners may not understand the terms of their loans, may not realize they could get credit on better terms, or may have been fraudulently induced into the loan with promises of better terms than they ultimately receive. As a result, predatory lending continues


221. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 2, 42. See also Hearing on Predatory Mortgage Lending, supra note 42, at 398 (statement of Mike Shea, Executive Director, ACORN Housing Corp.) (increasing 900% between 1993 and 1999), 345 (statement of David Berenbaum, National Community Reinvestment Coalition) (“increased almost 1000 percent from 1993-1998”).


223. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 45-46. GSE involvement has been primarily with subprime borrowers with A- credit ratings. Id. at 46.

224. See 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604 (Dec. 20, 2001) (“With this increase in subprime lending there has also been an increase in reports of "predatory lending.".”). A consumer advocacy group estimated in 2001 that predatory lending cost affected borrowers to the extent of $9.1 billion annually. See ERIC STEIN, COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COST OF PREDATORY LENDING 3 (2001), http://responsiblelending.org/pdfs/Quant10-01.pdf.

225. See Forrester, supra note 32, at 389-90.
despite the availability of reputable subprime lending options. The increased availability of funds created by securitization of subprime loans has made more funds available to predatory lenders as well.

G. Market Failure

Professors Engel and McCoy make a compelling argument that market failures have been a key factor in the proliferation of predatory loans. They classify the mortgage market into three segments: the prime market, the legitimate subprime market, and the predatory loan market. Borrowers in the predatory loan market are disconnected from the credit market "because of historical credit rationing, discrimination, and other social and economic forces." Some borrowers in the predatory market could qualify for prime loans, but for some reason do not have access to the prime market. Others are properly classified as subprime borrowers, but do not have access to the legitimate subprime market. Finally, some simply cannot afford credit and should not have access to any type of loan.

People who are disconnected from the credit market are those who for some reason cannot or do not shop for the best credit deal. They tend to be borrowers who do not shop for credit at all because they may not realize it is available. They are targeted by contractors, brokers, and predatory lenders who take advantage of information asymmetries to induce borrowers to take out a loan on disadvantageous terms because they are not aware that better terms are available. Predatory lenders have different marketing strategies from legitimate lenders who advertise then wait for borrowers to approach them. Predatory lenders shop for and approach the borrowers and thus reach borrowers who would not otherwise apply for a loan. Therefore, the existence of legitimate subprime lenders does not drive predatory lenders out of the

226. Engel & McCoy, supra note 149, at 1277–97. See also Forrester, supra note 32, at 419–21 (discussing market failure in home equity loan market).
227. Engel & McCoy, supra note 149, at 1278.
228. Id. at 1279.
229. Id.; Freddie Mac, Automated Underwriting: Making Mortgage Lending Simpler and Fairer for America’s Families Ch. 5 nn.5–6 (Sept. 1996) available at http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/reports/Moseley/mosehome.ntm. One Freddie Mac study determined that between ten and thirty-five percent of subprime borrowers qualified for a prime loan and a poll of subprime lenders found that half of subprime mortgages could qualify as investment grade mortgagees. Id.
230. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 149, at 1279.
231. Id. at 1281.
232. See Forrester, supra note 32, at 389, 420.
233. See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
market. Because the market cannot eliminate predatory lending, government intervention is necessary.

H. Federal Preemption of State Consumer Protection Legislation

Another factor in the growth of predatory lending has been the federal preemption of state consumer protection measures. In 1980, Congress enacted the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA), which preempts state usury ceilings on any "federally related mortgage loan" secured by a first lien on residential real estate. Because of DIDMCA's broad definition of "federally related mortgage loan," the preemption applies to virtually any first lien home mortgage made by an institutional lender. DIDMCA provides that states could opt out of the usury preemption during a specified time period, but only sixteen states did so. Although DIDMCA is limited in its application to first lien loans, lenders can require a borrower to refinance existing liens in order to fit within the preemption. Most

234. See Forrester, supra note 32, at 388, 419; Mansfield, supra note 149, at 476.
236. 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a(a)(1) (2000). The reasons for Congress' preemption of state usury laws were:

(i) to promote the stability and viability of financial institutions by allowing them to charge and collect realistic market interest on mortgage loans, and (ii) to promote the national housing policy and the American dream of homeownership by legislatively opening a spigot which would insure an increased and evenly-spread flow of available mortgage money.


237. See Forrester, supra note 32, at 399. A federally related mortgage loan is any loan that is (1) made by a lender whose deposits or accounts are federally insured; (2) made by a federally regulated lender; (3) made, insured, guaranteed, or otherwise assisted by HUD or any other federal agency; (4) eligible for purchase by FNMA, GNMA, or FHLMC, or from any financial institution from which it could be purchased by FHLMC; or (5) made by any creditor subject to the Truth in Lending Act who makes or invests in residential real estate loans totaling more than $1 million per year. 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-5(b)(2). For purposes of the usury law preemption, the term is expanded to include loans made by any lender approved by HUD for participation in a federal mortgage insurance program and loans made by an individual providing financing for the sale of the individual's residence. See id. § 1735f-7a(a)(1)(C)(v).

239. See Forrester, supra note 32, at 417-18.
courts that have addressed the issue have held that the DIDMCA preemption applies to non-purchase-money loans as long as the lender has a first lien. The issue now appears to be settled.

Because of DIDMCA, subprime lenders can legally charge whatever rate of interest a particular borrower will pay by requiring a first lien on the borrower’s home. Because of the market failures discussed above, some borrowers will pay interest at a rate higher than the rate reflecting the lender’s risk of making the loan. One of the characteristics of a predatory loan is an interest rate exceeding the amount necessary to compensate the lender for the associated risk. Some borrowers who could obtain prime loans are steered to the subprime market. Other borrowers are subprime borrowers but pay more interest in the predatory loan market than they would pay in the legitimate subprime market. DIDMCA is one of the causes of the predatory lending problem because states could regulate the rates that lenders charge on first lien home mortgage loans absent DIDMCA.

Another federal statute, the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act (Parity Act) preempts state laws that restrict alternative mortgage transactions, which include variable interest rate loans, loans with balloon payments, and shared appreciation mortgages. The Parity Act applies to any “loan or credit sale secured by an interest in residential real property”; therefore, it is not limited to purchase-money loans or.

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241. See supra note 149, at 520.

242. See supra Part III.G.

243. See Engels & McCoy, supra note 149, at 1279 (discussing subprime borrowers who would qualify for a prime loan); see also Mansfield, supra note 149, at 542 (“[I]t does not appear that pricing is closely tied to actual risk or any other objective factors.”). As evidence, Professor Mansfield cites, inter alia, the profitability of subprime lenders and their lack of uniformity in underwriting and pricing. Id. at 540-41.

244. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.

245. See supra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.


247. Id. § 3802(1).

248. Id. Congress enacted the statute because “alternative mortgage transactions are essential to the provision of an adequate supply of credit secured by residential property.” Id. § 3801(a)(2).
loans secured by a first lien. Various federal agencies have adopted regulations permitting federally chartered financial institutions to provide alternative mortgage financing, and the Parity Act extended preemption of state law in this area to apply to other residential mortgage lenders. Under the Parity Act, these other lenders may make alternative mortgage loans that comply with federal regulations rather than state law. As with the federal preemption of state usury law under DIDMCA, states were permitted to opt out of the preemption, and several states did.

Under the Parity Act, predatory lenders have been able to require certain onerous terms in home mortgage loans because the Parity Act preempts state regulation of those terms. For example, states may not prohibit balloon payments in home mortgage loans because of the Parity Act. Therefore, a predatory loan may be amortized over thirty years, but with a large balloon payment due after only three years. When a balloon payment becomes due, the borrower must find the funds to pay off the loan or refinance, which means additional fees and closing costs. Until recently, predatory lenders could also impose large prepayment penalties and onerous late charges without regard to state regulation because of the Parity Act. Balloon payments, large prepayment penalties, and onerous late charges are all common features of a predatory loan.

In 2003, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) removed both prepayment rules and late fee rules from the list of its regulations that preempt state law under the Parity Act. The OTS had determined that

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249. See Forrester, supra note 32, at 419.
251. Id. § 3803(c).
252. Id. § 3801(b), 3803(a). Congress gave authority to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (for banks), the National Credit Union Administration (for credit unions), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (for other housing creditors) to “identify, describe, and publish those portions or provisions of their respective regulations that are inappropriate for (and thus inapplicable to) or that need to be conformed for the use of, nonfederally chartered housing creditors ....” Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 807(b), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 3801 note.
254. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 1-110 (West Supp. 1993); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-g (McKinney 1990).
257. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. DIDMCA and the Parity Act allow high interest rates and unfair loan terms that might otherwise be prohibited by state law. Bankruptcy law prevents the loan terms from being changed. See Forrester, supra note 32, at 427–35.
"the application of its late fee and prepayment penalty regulations to housing creditors might be contributing to predatory lending practices in the subprime mortgage market." The change was backed by state attorneys general as a means to combat predatory lending. In response to a challenge by the National Home Equity Mortgage Association, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the right of the OTS to determine the types of loan terms covered by the Parity Act. Therefore, states may now regulate prepayment premiums and late fees for non-federally chartered lenders. For federal banks and thrifts, however, state consumer protection measures aimed at combating the predatory lending problem are preempted.

IV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE PREDATORY LENDING LAWS

A. Recent Regulatory Developments

In 1996, pursuant to the Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) issued regulations that preempt state laws "affecting the operations of federal savings associations ... to enable federal savings associations to conduct their operations in accordance with the best practices of thrift institutions." The regulation specifically provides that it "occupies the entire field of lending regulation for federal savings associations." More specifically, the regulation preempts state laws that impose requirements regarding licensing, credit terms, loan fees, disclosure requirements, origination, and interest rate ceilings. Recently, the OTS has issued letters announcing preemption of predatory lending statutes in Georgia, New York, New Jersey, and New Mexico. In

260. Id. at 1361–62.
261. Id. at 1356.
263. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2005).
264. Id.
265. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b). The regulation provides that it does not preempt state laws that "only incidentally affect the lending operations of Federal savings associations" such as contract and commercial law, real property law, tort law and criminal law. Id. § 560.2(c).
268. Chief Counsel of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), P-2003-5, Preemption of New
addition, the OTS has concluded that operating subsidiaries of federal savings associations enjoy the same preemption as the associations themselves.270

In January 2004, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued a regulation preempting state laws governing mortgage lending as applied to national banks and their operating subsidiaries.271 The regulation preempts “state laws that obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank’s ability to fully exercise its Federally authorized real estate lending powers.”272 Specifically, the regulation preempts state law limitations on licensing and registration, insurance requirements, loan-to-value ratios, amortization, payments, terms, escrow accounts, disclosures, due-on-sale clauses, and other matters.273 Therefore, the regulation would preempt state predatory lending statutes.274

In another rule finalized on the same day, the OCC amended its regulation on visitorial powers.275 Visitation means “the act of examining into the affairs of a corporation,”276 and includes “inspection; superintendence; direction; [and] regulation.”277 The OCC has defined visitorial power as “(i) examination of a bank; (ii) inspection of a bank’s books and records; (iii) regulation and supervision of activities authorized or permitted pursuant to federal banking law; and (iv) enforcing compliance with any applicable federal or state laws concerning those activities.”278 The amended regulation provides that “the OCC has exclusive visitorial authority with respect to the content

270. Preemption of Georgia Fair Lending Act, supra note 266 at 2.
272. 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 (a).
273. Id.
277. Id. at 401 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Youngstown v. Hughes, 6 F. 737, 740 (6th Cir. 1881)).
278. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(2).
and the conduct of activities authorized for national banks under Federal law.\textsuperscript{279} The OCC claims that, pursuant to its regulations, state authorities do not have any visitorial powers over national banks or their operating subsidiaries.\textsuperscript{280} The rule provides that the OCC has exclusive authority to initiate either administrative or judicial proceedings enforcing state law against national banks and their operating subsidiaries.\textsuperscript{281} This amendment goes hand-in-hand with the real estate lending regulation by making clear the OCC’s position that states do not have visitorial powers to enforce state laws.

The OCC preemption regulation is similar in its scope to the OTS regulation preempting state lending requirements as related to federal savings associations. Although the OCC has not formally adopted a rule of field preemption as did the OTS, the OCC has described its regulations as having the same preemptive effect as the OTS regulations.\textsuperscript{282} Thus, according to the regulation, virtually all provisions of every state predatory lending statute would be preempted.

In an attempt to militate against the effects of preempting state laws aimed at curbing mortgage lending abuses, the regulation adds certain limits. The regulation prohibits national banks from making loans “based predominantly on the bank’s realization of the foreclosure or liquidation value of the borrower’s collateral, without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay the loan.”\textsuperscript{283} In addition, the regulation prohibits practices that would be unfair or deceptive under the Federal Trade Commission Act.\textsuperscript{284} However, because banks were already subject to FTC trade regulations, the OCC regulation adds very little. The OCC has also issued guidelines to assist banks in avoiding predatory and abusive lending practices.\textsuperscript{285}

The OCC regulation on real estate lending applies to the operating subsidiaries of national banks as well as national banks themselves.\textsuperscript{286} A
national bank may apply to the OCC to acquire or establish an operating subsidiary and may conduct in an operating subsidiary the same activities permissible for a national bank. The permitted activities of an operating subsidiary include “[m]aking loans” and “[p]urchasing, selling, servicing, or warehousing loans or other extensions of credit, or interests therein.” Therefore, the activities of a subprime mortgage lender may be conducted in an operating subsidiary of a national bank. In fact, a number of mortgage companies are operating subsidiaries of national banks.

In promulgating the new regulations, the OCC stated that operating subsidiaries of national banks had not been involved in predatory lending. However, banks can now transfer mortgage operations to operating subsidiaries in order to avoid the operation of state predatory lending statutes and to engage in predatory lending practices. Further, one concern expressed about the new regulation is the lack of oversight that the OCC will be able to provide. So even with the OCC’s prohibitions against predatory lending practices, the question arises as to the OCC’s ability to police operating subsidiaries of national banks as well as the banks themselves.

B. Recent Developments in Congress

In March 2005, Representative Bob Ney introduced a bill in Congress that would amend HOEPA to preempt state predatory lending laws and would otherwise weaken some HOEPA provisions. The Ney bill would ostensibly provide additional protection under HOEPA, but the protection lost by preemption of state law exceeds any protection added by the bill. The bill would lower the points and fees trigger for defining a high-cost mortgage. The bill adds

288. Id. § 5.34(e)(1).
289. Id. § 5.34(e)(5)(v)(C), (D).
292. See infra notes 486–92 and accompanying text.
295. The preamble to the bill states that its purpose is to “protect consumers against unfair and deceptive practices in connection with higher cost mortgage transactions . . . .” Id.
296. Id. § 102(b)
prepayment penalties to the calculation of points and fees, but eliminates the current HOEPA restriction on prepayment penalties. It prohibits an extension of credit without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay, but creates a presumption that a borrower is able to repay the loan. The bill prohibits single premium credit insurance. It prohibits loan flipping, but provides extensive safe harbor provisions and exceptions to the prohibition. The bill would weaken HOEPA provisions for assignee liability by creating safe harbors for lenders who exercise due diligence as defined in the bill. Most significantly, the bill expressly provides that it preempts all state predatory lending laws.

Other members of Congress have introduced competing bills, including a bill introduced by Representatives Brad Miller, Mel Watt, and Barney Frank. The Miller-Watt bill would amend HOEPA along the lines of the North Carolina predatory lending law, offering additional protection to homeowners without preempting state law. The bill lowers the points and fees trigger for defining a high-cost mortgage, and it includes yield spread premiums and prepayment penalties in the definition of points and fees. For high-cost loans, the bill prohibits balloon payments, lending without regard to the borrower’s ability to pay, late fees in excess of four percent, call provisions giving a lender discretion to accelerate without default, and financing of points and fees. For all home mortgage loans, the bill prohibits flipping, single premium credit insurance, and mandatory arbitration provisions.

The various bills are currently under consideration in the House Committee on Financial Services. Lending groups support the Ney

297. Id.
298. Id. § 103(a).
299. Id. § 103(g).
300. Id. § 103(h).
301. Id. § 103(i).
302. Id. § 105(e)(2).
303. Id. § 106.
306. H.R. 1182, § 2(a).
307. Id. § 2(c).
308. Id. § 3.
309. Id. § 6.
310. See States Shelter Risky Borrowers, supra note 29, at A4.
bill, particularly provisions preempting state predatory lending laws. Consumer advocates support the Miller-Watt bill instead.

C. The Law of Preemption

Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Congress has the power to preempt state law as long as it is acting within the scope of its constitutionally delegated powers. Determining whether Congress has preempted state law is a matter of determining congressional intent. Courts may find express or implied congressional intent to preempt state law. The Supreme Court, however, has created a presumption that areas of the law traditionally left to the states are not preempted by federal law "unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."

Express preemption occurs when Congress includes a preemption clause in a federal statute explicitly stating its intent to preempt state law. An example is DIDMCA, which expressly preempts state usury statutes unless a state has exercised its opt-out right. Another example is the Ney bill currently before Congress that would expressly preempt state predatory lending statutes.

If a statute does not contain explicit preemption language, courts must

311. See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 42, at 3–4 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair and Affordable Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, Bond Market Association), 4 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect, National Association of Mortgage Brokers).

312. See id. at 3 (statement of Stella Adams, Board Member, National Community Reinvestment), 4 (statement of Martin Eakes, Chief Executive Officer, Self-Help and the Center for Responsible Lending).

313. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause provides that "the laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme law of the land; . . . any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." Id.


317. See Barnett, 517 U.S. at 31; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) ("Congress’ intent may be ‘explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.’" (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977))).


319. Barnett, 517 U.S. at 31; Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516; Jones, 430 U.S. at 525.


determine "whether the federal statute's 'structure and purpose,' or nonspecific statutory language, nonetheless reveal a clear, but implicit, pre-emptive intent."\textsuperscript{322} The courts have identified two types of implied preemption, labeled conflict preemption and field preemption.\textsuperscript{323}

Conflict preemption occurs when an actual conflict between state and federal law exists.\textsuperscript{324} A conflict exists when compliance with both state and federal law would be a "physical impossibility"\textsuperscript{325} or when state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."\textsuperscript{326} The Supreme Court in \textit{Barnett Bank v. Nelson} found a conflict where federal law gave national banks in small towns the authority to sell insurance and a Florida statute prohibited national banks from selling insurance.\textsuperscript{327} The Court did not find a direct conflict because the federal statute did not require banks to sell insurance, but did find the Florida statute was an obstacle to the accomplishment of the federal statute's objectives.\textsuperscript{328} HOEPA preempts state law to the extent that state law is more tolerant than the federal requirements for loans covered by HOEPA.\textsuperscript{329} For example, if state law permits a lender to charge a higher interest rate on default in a home mortgage loan regardless of the loan's interest rate, HOEPA's prohibition against a higher interest rate on default in a HOEPA high-cost loan\textsuperscript{330} would preempt state law.

Field preemption occurs when a federal statute completely occupies a particular field, which implies that Congress has withdrawn the power of states to legislate in that field.\textsuperscript{331} Courts find field preemption when the scheme of federal regulation is "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it" or

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{322} \textit{Barnett}, 517 U.S. at 31 (citing \textit{Jones}, 430 U.S. at 525 and Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152–53 (1982)).
\item \textsuperscript{326} \textit{Hines v. Davidowitz}, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), \textit{quoted in Barnett}, 517 U.S. at 31.
\item \textsuperscript{327} \textit{Barnett}, 517 U.S. at 31, 37.
\item \textsuperscript{328} \textit{Id.} at 31.
\item \textsuperscript{329} \textit{See Ill. Ass'n of Mortgage Brokers v. Office of Banks & Real Estate}, 308 F.3d 762, 766 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[HOEPA] does not itself preempt any state law—except that state laws about the mortgage transactions defined in § 1602(aa) may not be more tolerant than the federal floor adopted in § 1639.").
\item \textsuperscript{330} 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c) (2000).
\item \textsuperscript{331} See Nelson, \textit{supra} note 323, at 227.
\end{itemize}
the field is one "in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject."332

Federal regulations can preempt state law to the same extent as federal statutes.333 The Supreme Court has held that "a federal agency acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority may pre-empt state regulation' and hence render unenforceable state or local laws that are otherwise not inconsistent with federal law."334 Congress can expressly delegate to an agency the power to preempt state law. For example, the Parity Act gives authority to the OCC and OTS to designate which of its regulations preempt state law.335

The power of an agency to preempt state law does not require express congressional authorization.336 If Congress has not expressed its intent that the agency preempt state law, the question becomes whether the agency intended to preempt state law, and if so, whether the agency is acting within the scope of its delegated authority.337 If regulatory preemption of state law "represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute, [the court] should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned."338

When a regulation expressly states its intent to preempt state law,339 a question arises as to the deference given to the agency's interpretation. This inquiry is complicated by the sometimes conflicting mandates of Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.340 and Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council.341 In Rice, the Supreme Court adopted a presumption
against preemption of state law.\textsuperscript{342} In \textit{Chevron}, which was not a preemption case, the Court held that courts should defer to agency interpretations of statutes.\textsuperscript{343} Therefore, when an agency preempts state law, the question is whether the presumption against preemption trumps deference to the agency interpretation or vice versa. The law is not clear as to how the mandates of these two cases should be reconciled.\textsuperscript{344} Some commentators have suggested that \textit{Chevron} deference should yield to the \textit{Rice} presumption in preemption cases.\textsuperscript{345} The issue arises in the context of the OCC and OTS regulations that preempt state law.

\section*{D. Authority of the OTS and OCC to Preempt State Predatory Lending Laws}

The question arises as to the authority of the OCC and OTS to preempt state lending laws including laws regulating predatory lending practices. While OTS authority to issue broad regulations preempting state law is settled,\textsuperscript{346} the law regarding OCC authority under its new regulations is being tested.

Both OCC and OTS regulations include express statements of preemption.\textsuperscript{347} Therefore, both agencies clearly intend to preempt state predatory lending statutes. The question then becomes whether the agencies are acting within the scope of their delegated authority. However, the analysis of OTS regulations issued under HOLA and OCC regulations issued under the National Banking Act (NBA)\textsuperscript{348} are not the same.\textsuperscript{349}

The Supreme Court has held that section 5(a) of HOLA gave OTS’s predecessor agency “plenary authority to issue regulations governing federal savings and loans.”\textsuperscript{350} The National Banking Act, however, does not give the OCC comparable authority.\textsuperscript{351} One court stated the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{342} 331 U.S. at 230.
  \item \textsuperscript{343} 467 U.S. at 866.
  \item \textsuperscript{344} See Mendelson, \textit{supra} note 318, at 739; McGreal, \textit{supra} note 318, at 887.
  \item \textsuperscript{345} Mendelson, \textit{supra} note 318, at 799–800.
  \item \textsuperscript{346} See infra note 350 and accompanying text.
  \item \textsuperscript{347} See 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2005) (providing that the regulation “occupies the entire field of lending for regulation for federal savings associations”); 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) (providing that “state laws that obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank’s ability to fully exercise its Federally authorized real estate lending powers do not apply to national banks.”).
  \item \textsuperscript{349} See \textit{Wilmarth}, \textit{supra} note 25, at 321–24.
  \item \textsuperscript{350} Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 160 (1982), \textit{quoted in} \textit{Wilmarth}, \textit{supra} note 25, at 322.
  \item \textsuperscript{351} See \textit{Wilmarth}, \textit{supra} note 25, at 322. \textit{But see} Howard N. Cayne & Nancy L. Perkins,
difference as follows: “As to national banks, Congress expressly left open a field for state regulation and the application of state laws; but as to federal savings and loan associations, Congress made plenary, preemptive delegation ... leaving no field for state supervision.”

Other federal courts have distinguished the “broad preemptive authority of the OTS and the much more circumscribed power of the OCC.”

Commentators differ on whether the new OCC regulations are within the scope of congressionally delegated power. Federal courts have not addressed the OCC’s authority to preempt state predatory lending statutes under the new regulations on real estate lending. However, several federal circuit courts of appeals have upheld the OCC’s preemption of state visitorial power over operating subsidiaries of national banks as being within the OCC’s authority under the National Banking Act. These cases also found that OCC regulations preempt state licensing requirements as applied to operating subsidiaries of national banks. Even if state predatory lending statutes were held not to be preempted, states would have difficulty enforcing them without visitorial powers over banks and their operating subsidiaries.

The focus of this Article, however, is not on whether the OCC is

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352. People v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 319 (S.D. Cal. 1951). Although only a district court case, other courts including the Supreme Court have cited Coast Federal for its holding as to the expansive authority of the OTS and its predecessor. See Wilmarth, supra note 25, at 323 n.393 (citing Fid. Fed., 458 U.S. at 145; Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1979), aff’d mem., 445 U.S. 921 (1980); Bank of Am. v. San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 558–59 (9th Cir. 2002)).


354. See Cayne & Perkins, supra note 351, at 391–96 (arguing that the OCC does have authority to preempt state law); Wilmarth, supra note 25, at 287–316 (arguing that the regulations are not within OCC’s authority); Nicholas Bagley, Note, The Unwarranted Regulatory Preemption of Predatory Lending Laws, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2274, 2274 (arguing that “the OCC overstepped its congressionally delegated authority when it promulgated the regulation”).

355. See Wachovia Bank v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556, 557 (6th Cir. 2005); Wells Fargo Bank v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2005); Wachovia Bank v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 309 (2d Cir. 2005). The most recent of these cases, Watters, is typical of their reasoning. In Watters, the court performed its analysis under Chevron, concluding that the OCC has “authority to preempt state law concerning operating subsidiaries to the same extent that those laws would be preempted with respect to the parent national bank,” 431 F.3d at 561 (quoting Burke, 414 F.3d at 318), and that the “regulations reflect a consistent and well-reasoned approach to preempting state regulation of operating subsidiaries,” id. at 563 (quoting Burke, 414 F.3d at 321).

356. See Watters, 431 F.3d at 557; Wells Fargo Bank, 419 F.3d at 967; Burke, 414 F.3d at 310, 321.
authorized to preempt state predatory lending statutes, but rather on the normative issue as to whether the OCC should preempt state predatory lending laws. Part of the answer lies in the involvement of banks in predatory lending abuses. The OCC claims that banks have not been involved in predatory lending except to a very minor extent—but evidence to the contrary exists.

V. INVOLVEMENT OF FEDERALLY SUPPORTED LENDERS IN THE SUBPRIME AND PREDATORY LENDING MARKETS

A. Banks and Thrifts

Banks and thrifts are, in fact, involved in predatory lending in a number of ways. Some banks and thrifts or their subsidiaries and affiliates do originate predatory loans. Furthermore, banks and thrifts can profit from predatory lending by purchasing predatory loans or securities backed by predatory loans, lending to predatory lenders and thus financing their predatory lending practices, providing securitization services to predatory lenders, and steering customers who could qualify for prime loans to subprime loans.

Some banks and thrifts are subprime lenders, and some have practiced predatory lending abuses. Banks and thrifts are increasingly involved in the subprime mortgage market through subsidiaries and affiliates, and some of these subsidiaries and affiliates engage in predatory lending.


358. See NCLC COMMENTS, supra note 25; Engel & McCoy, supra note 357, at 1577-78. See also HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 45 (discussing bank and thrift involvement in the subprime market).

359. At the time of HUD/Treasury Joint Report, one percent of FDIC insured institutions were subprime lenders, defined as lenders with more than twenty-five percent of their equity capital in subprime loans. HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 44.


361. See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 45. Banks, savings associations, and their affiliates originated approximately one quarter of all subprime loans in 1998, id., and eight of the ten largest subprime lenders in 2000 were affiliated with banks, Engel & McCoy, supra note 357, at 1585 (citing Robert Julavits, Subprime Risks Extending Beyond Borrowers, AM. BANKER, Mar. 27, 2000, at 9).
predatory lending practices.\textsuperscript{362} Bank affiliates, including Citigroup and Household, have paid huge sums to settle complaints of predatory lending practices.\textsuperscript{363} Borrowers have sued national banks, their operating subsidiaries, or their affiliates for practices including fraud and misrepresentation, loan flipping, and violations of HOEPA, the Truth in Lending Act, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and state consumer protection laws.\textsuperscript{364}

When banks or their affiliates make subprime loans, they can steer customers who would qualify for a prime loan to a subprime loan or to their subprime affiliate.\textsuperscript{365} Citibank and other banks and their subsidiaries were under investigation by the New York attorney general for steering customers to subprime loans until the OCC intervened and the investigation was enjoined.\textsuperscript{366} Banks profit when borrowers pay more for credit than they should have to pay based on their credit histories.

Banks and thrifts also purchase predatory loans to hold or securitize or purchase securities backed by predatory loans.\textsuperscript{367} When banks purchase predatory loans, they can generally take advantage of the holder-in-due-course doctrine unless the loans are high-cost mortgages as defined by HOEPA. When they purchase mortgage-backed securities, they are further insulated from liability.\textsuperscript{368} Thus, banks and thrifts can profit from purchasing predatory loans or securities backed by predatory loans without concern for liability.

Banks have recently played an important role in securitizing subprime loans “because of their access to credit markets and their expertise in securitizing mortgages.”\textsuperscript{369} Banks may “serve as underwriters, trustees, registrars and paying agents for securitizations of subprime loans, some of which may be predatory.”\textsuperscript{370} National banks have served as trustees for notorious predatory lenders including Associates, Household Finance, Delta Funding, and First Alliance.\textsuperscript{371}

Finally, banks may finance predatory lenders through warehouse lines

\textsuperscript{362} See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{363} See supra notes 12, 17, and 24 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{364} See NCLC COMMENTS, supra note 25, at 4–6.
\textsuperscript{365} See Engel & McCoy, supra note 357, at 1578–80.
\textsuperscript{366} See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{367} See NCLC COMMENTS, supra note 25; Engel & McCoy, supra note 357, at 1577.
\textsuperscript{368} See supra Part IV.E.
\textsuperscript{369} HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 45.
\textsuperscript{370} Engel & McCoy, supra note 357, at 1577.
\textsuperscript{371} See NCLC COMMENTS, supra note 25.
of credit secured by the predatory loans.\textsuperscript{372} With a warehouse line of credit, a mortgage company uses borrowed funds to originate mortgage loans that will eventually be packaged and sold on the secondary market or securitized.\textsuperscript{373} Therefore, banks can facilitate the practices of predatory lenders by lending them the funds they use to make predatory loans. When banks hold predatory loans as security for a line of credit, they can again take advantage of the holder-in due-course doctrine unless the loans are high-cost mortgages as defined by HOEPA.

Banks and thrifts receive a number of federal benefits not available to others involved in the business of home mortgage lending. Banks and thrifts receive a gross federal subsidy from the federal safety net, which includes federal deposit insurance as well as access to the Federal Reserve's discount window and payment system.\textsuperscript{374} First, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insures deposits of member institutions up to $100,000,\textsuperscript{375} and deposit insurance is backed by the full faith and credit of the federal government.\textsuperscript{376} As a result, banks and thrifts can attract deposits for lower interest rates than uninsured institutions because the deposits are insured by the federal government. Even uninsured deposits have protection through the federal government's bank resolution practices.\textsuperscript{377} In addition, banks and thrifts have access to the Federal Reserve system. The Federal Reserve's

\textsuperscript{372} See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, \textit{supra} note 31, at 45; Engel \& McCoy, \textit{supra} note 357, at 1577.

\textsuperscript{373} See NELSON \& WHITMAN, \textit{supra} note 152, at 487. After each mortgage loan is made, the note and deed of trust are temporarily pledged to the bank as collateral for the line of credit. It is called a warehouse line of credit because "the mortgage loans are 'parked' in the bank's 'warehouse' for a short period (perhaps 30 to 90 days) until the mortgage company is ready to sell them to secondary market investors or securitize them." \textit{Id.}


\textsuperscript{375} See PATRICIA A. MCCOY, \textit{BANKING LAW MANUAL: FEDERAL REGULATION OF FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES, BANKS AND THRIFTS} § 8.03 [1][b][ii] (2d ed. 2001 \& cum. supps.). Bank deposits are insured by the Bank Insurance Fund and thrift deposits by the Savings Association Insurance Fund, both of which are administered by the FDIC and are funded with premiums paid by banks and thrifts, respectively. Jones \& Kolatch, \textit{supra} note 374, at 3 n.3.

\textsuperscript{376} Jones \& Kolatch, \textit{supra} note 374, at 3. Resort to the full faith and credit of the U.S. Treasury was necessary to resolve the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. \textit{See id.}

\textsuperscript{377} See Engel \& McCoy, \textit{supra} note 357, at 1586.
discount window provides a backup source of credit to banks, and the Federal Reserve’s payment system includes overdraft protection for interbank transfers on Fedwire. In addition to the federal safety net, banks’ and thrifts’ charters give them a quasi-oligopoly because entry by new competitors is controlled by government regulators.

In exchange for the benefits they receive, banks and thrifts are highly regulated. National banks are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. A primary aim of bank regulation is “to ensure the safe and sound practices and operations of individual banking institutions” and, therefore, to protect taxpayers and depositors. “[Banks have] high regulatory compliance costs, including examination and reporting requirements, reserve requirements, and risk-adjusted deposit insurance premiums (although risk-adjusted premiums have been essentially toothless in recent years because most banks pay zero premiums).” Thrift institutions also are heavily regulated by the Office of Thrift Supervision.

Whether federal banks and thrifts receive a net federal subsidy or, in other words, whether federal benefits that banks and thrifts receive outweigh regulatory costs, is the subject of debate. Some commentators have concluded that a net subsidy exists in bad economic times and that the subsidy is zero or slightly negative in good economic times. The fact that banks choose to retain their charters provides some evidence that they at least believe the federal subsidy outweighs the regulatory cost. The same evidence exists with respect to thrifts.

Recent federal preemption of state law changes the balance in determining the existence of a net federal subsidy because federal

378. See Jones & Kolatch, supra note 374, at 3.
379. See id.
380. See MCCOY, supra note 375, § 3.01; Engel & McCoy, supra note 357, at 1586.
381. See MCCOY, supra note 375, § 2.02[2][a]. State chartered banks are regulated by their state’s banking agency as well as the Federal Reserve, in the case of state member banks, or the FDIC, in the case of state nonmember banks. Id.
382. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 152, at 900 (quoting U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BANK OVERSIGHT STRUCTURE: U.S. AND FOREIGN EXPERIENCE MAY OFFER LESSONS FOR MODERNIZING U.S. STRUCTURE (1996)).
383. Engel & McCoy, supra note 357, at 1587.
384. See MCCOY, supra note 375, § 2.02[2][b].
385. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 357, at 1586–88; Furlong, supra note 374; Jones & Kolatch, supra note 374, at 9–10; Longstreth & Mattei, supra note 374, at 1918–19; Walter, supra note 374, at 9.
386. See MCCOY, supra note 375, § 4.02; Engel & McCoy, supra note 357, at 1587; Shull & White, supra note 374, at 466–67. In addition, banks engaging in riskier activities receive a larger subsidy than do safer banks. Jones & Kolatch, supra note 374, at 9.
387. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 357, at 1587; Furlong, supra note 374.
preemption reduces regulatory costs for national banks and for thrifts. In fact, some predatory lenders have sought federal charters because of the benefits of federal preemption of state law.\textsuperscript{388} "Associates and Commercial Credit applied for thrift charters in late 1997 and early 1998. Both companies stated that federal preemption of individual state regulations accorded federal savings associations was one reason for their application."\textsuperscript{389} The OTS preemption of state lending laws for thrifts used to be an advantage of choosing a thrift charter over a bank charter.\textsuperscript{390} But now the OCC has evened the playing field by similarly preempting state laws for the benefit of banks that will reduce their regulatory compliance costs. The visitorial powers preemption also reduces regulatory compliance costs. Thus, the reduction in regulatory costs increases the likelihood that a net federal subsidy does exist.

What is the relationship between any net federal subsidy and bank involvement in predatory lending? Certainly when banks or thrifts make predatory loans, purchase predatory loans, purchase securities backed by predatory loans, or finance predatory lenders with warehouse lines of credit, they are profiting to the detriment of affected homeowners. In addition, bank affiliates involved in predatory lending activities may enjoy a spillover of any net federal subsidy.\textsuperscript{391} A spillover may occur when a bank lends money to its affiliate or shifts riskier activities from an affiliate to the bank.\textsuperscript{392}

Regardless of whether predatory lenders receive a benefit from any federal subsidy, banks and thrifts should avoid direct or indirect involvement in predatory lending activities. Banks enjoy a special status of trust in the minds of the public, which is perpetuated by the gross federal subsidy. Banks should not betray that trust by engaging in predatory lending activities or advancing the interests of predatory lenders. Furthermore, thrifts and national banks should not be exempt from state consumer protection laws aimed at stemming the tide of predatory lending activities.

Banks are not the only entities involved in residential mortgage lending that receive special federal benefits. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also receive federal benefits and are subject to more federal regulation than purely private entities involved in mortgage lending.

\textsuperscript{388} HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 45 n.54.
\textsuperscript{389} Id.
\textsuperscript{390} See MCCOY, supra note 375, § 3.02.
\textsuperscript{391} See id. § 4.02; Walter, supra note 374, at 9–10.
\textsuperscript{392} See MCCOY, supra note 375, § 4.02; Engel & McCoy, supra note 357, at 1587–88; Walter, supra note 374, at 9–10.
But Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have taken an entirely different approach to the problem of predatory lending.

B. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises—privately owned corporations operating under federal charters that impose restrictions on their activities and grant benefits that other private corporations do not enjoy. The President appoints five of the eighteen directors of both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, while the rest are elected by shareholders. Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are regulated by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The benefits they receive as GSEs include exemption from state taxes, except for real property taxes, and exemption from federal securities laws. Since Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not government agencies, their guarantees are not backed by the full faith and credit of the federal government; however, an assumption has existed that the federal government would honor their obligations in the event of financial trouble. Whether the federal government would in fact rescue the GSEs is debatable.

Fannie Mae was the first GSE, originating during the Great Depression under the New Deal leadership of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In response to problems of widespread foreclosures during the Depression and wide variation across the country in interest rates and availability of mortgages, President Roosevelt’s National Emergency Council recommended the establishment of a program for long-term, federally insured mortgages and the creation of national mortgage associations to purchase these mortgages. Congress

394. Id. § 1452(a)(2)(A).
395. Id. § 1433.
396. Id. § 1455(g), 1723(c).
397. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOUSING ENTERPRISES: POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF SEVERAL GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP 17 (1996). See also Edmund L. Andrews, Fed Chief Urges Cutback in Scale of 2 Big Lenders, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2005, at Cl (“Mr. Greenspan, who has long criticized both companies, said they had been able to borrow almost unlimited amounts of money at below-market rates by virtue of the widespread but false impression among investors that the federal government would ride to their rescue if necessary.”).
398. Regulations Implementing Authority of HUD over Conduct of Secondary Market Operations of FNMA, 43 Fed. Reg. 36,200, 36,200 (Sept. 14, 1978). Until the 1930s, the typical home mortgage loan was for only a three- to five-year term. Id. Homeowners were required to refinance their homes frequently, and during the Great Depression when refinancing was not available, many lost their homes
responded by creating the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to
insure home mortgage loans and authorizing the charter of mortgage
associations to purchase the insured mortgages. In 1938, Congress
chartered the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA, now
called Fannie Mae). FNMA was initially a government agency that
issued bonds to raise funds for the purchase of FHA-insured mortgages
and, beginning in 1944, Veteran's Administration (VA)-guaranteed
mortgages as well. In 1968, Congress divided the functions of Fannie
Mae between two entities—Fannie Mae, which became a GSE and was
allocated the secondary market operations of the former entity, and the
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), which
remained a division of HUD and was given the special assistance and
the management and liquidation functions of the former Fannie Mae.

In 1970, the Emergency Home Finance Act created a new GSE, the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and also
authorized Fannie Mae to purchase conventional mortgages. Freddie
Mac started the trend towards mortgage securitization in the 1970s,
while Fannie Mae continued to purchase mortgage loans to be held in its
portfolio. Fannie Mae became involved in securitization in the 1980s.
Today, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are almost identical in their
charters and functions. They both purchase home loans to hold in their
portfolios but securitize even more loans.

Through their purchases and securitization of residential mortgage
loans, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together provide the largest source
of home mortgage financing in the nation. For example, in 2001 Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac together purchased or securitized forty percent of
all conventional mortgages originated that year.

399. See id. at 36,200–01 (citing National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 479, 48 Stat. 1252
(1934)).
400. See id. at 36,201. The association was originally named the National Mortgage Association
of Washington, but was renamed the Federal National Mortgage Association later the same year. Id.
401. See id.
402. See id. at 36,202 (citing Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448,
§ 1717 (2000)).
404. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
405. See Colletta & Shenker, supra note 166, at 1385; Andrew R. Berman, Once a Mortgage,
Always a Mortgage—The Use (and Misuse) of Mezzanine Loans and Preferred Equity Investments, 11
406. VALERIE L. SMITH ET AL., OFFICE OF FED. HOUS. ENTER. OVERSIGHT, MORTGAGE MARKETS
purchased $568 billion of residential mortgage loans and issued $515 billion of mortgage-backed securities in 2001, while Freddie Mac purchased $393 billion of residential mortgage loans and issued $387 billion of mortgage-backed securities in the same year. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac thus facilitate the flow of money into the residential mortgage market in accordance with the purposes set out in their charters.

In the late 1980s, housing advocates believed that the underwriting guidelines used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac favored white suburban homebuyers. In response, Congress enacted the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 (FHEFSSA) to give Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac incentives to increase their purchase of loans to low- and moderate-income families and in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. FHEFSSA required HUD to set affordable housing goals for loans purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with the intention that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac "lead the industry in affordable lending." It also prohibited them from discriminating on the basis of certain proscribed factors. Finally, FHEFSSA established the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight as an office of HUD to monitor both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

A recent HUD-sponsored study considered the impact of the affordable housing goals required by the FHEFSSA on low- and moderate-income families. The study found that the goals helped make homeownership more attainable for these families. In response to FHEFSSA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac adopted more flexible

407. Id. at 13, 17.
410. Id. § 1331(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4561(a) (2000)). HUD set goals for loans secured by homes of low- and moderate-income homeowners/renters at 50% and loans located in underserved areas at 31%. See AMBROSE & THIBODEAU, supra note 408, at vii.
411. See AMBROSE & THIBODEAU, supra note 408, at vii. See also HUD's Housing Goals for the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) for the Years 2005-2008 and Amendments to HUD's Regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 69 Fed. Reg. 63,580, 63,741 (Nov. 2, 2004) (discussing factors indicating "the GSEs' ability to lead the industry in affordable lending").
413. Id. § 1311 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4511).
414. AMBROSE & THIBODEAU, supra note 408, at vii.
415. Id. at ix.
underwriting standards and introduced automated underwriting systems which reduced underwriting costs. As a result, lenders that sell loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac began using more flexible underwriting standards that permitted more borrowers to qualify for the loans.\footnote{Id. at vii–ix.} In addition, purchases by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac of loans to lower-income borrowers and in target neighborhoods increased liquidity and allowed additional lending activity to these borrowers and in these neighborhoods.\footnote{Id. at ix.} The study suggests that the affordable housing goals have thus helped make homeownership more attainable to low- and moderate-income families.

In the late 1990s, both GSEs were accused of being involved in the predatory lending problem by purchasing and securitizing subprime loans that could be characterized as predatory. Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac responded immediately with initiatives to avoid purchasing or securitizing predatory loans.\footnote{See News Release, Fannie Mae, Fannie Mae Chairman Announces New Loan Guidelines to Combat Predatory Lending Practices (Apr. 11, 2000), http://www.fanniemae.com/newsreleases/2000/0710.jhtml [hereinafter Fannie Mae News Release] (citing Lender Letter LL03-00, Eligibility of Mortgages to Borrowers with Blemished Credit Histories, 4/11/00); News Release, Freddie Mac, Freddie Mac Announces Steps to Protect Borrowers from Predatory Lending Practices (Mar. 24, 2000), http://www.freddiemac.com/news/ archives2000/predatory.htm.} Fannie Mae will not purchase or securitize loans with points and fees in excess of five percent, loans identified as “high-cost” mortgages under HOEPA, loans with prepaid single premium credit insurance, or loans with prepayment premiums unless the borrower has received a benefit.\footnote{See Fannie Mae News Release, supra note 418.} Fannie Mae requires its lenders to determine the borrower’s ability to repay, avoid steering borrowers to higher-cost loans if they qualify for a lower-cost loan, report a borrower’s entire payment history to credit repositories (to improve the borrower’s credit history), and maintain escrow deposit accounts.\footnote{See id.} Freddie Mac will not purchase HOEPA loans, loans with single premium credit insurance, loans with prepayment penalties that continue for more than three years, or loans with mandatory arbitration clauses.\footnote{See Freddie Mac, COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING, FREDDIE MAC’S EFFORTS TO PROTECT AMERICA’S CONSUMERS (2005), http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/anti-predatory.html.} Freddie Mac requires its lenders to report a borrower’s entire payment history to credit repositories and refuses to purchase loans from lenders that engage in predatory lending practices.\footnote{See id.}
More recently, the GSEs have been criticized on the basis that they fail to "lead the industry in affordable housing." While the GSEs have become involved in the subprime market, their involvement has been primarily limited to purchasing loans to A- borrowers. They have not purchased or securitized loans to B, C, and D rated borrowers. HUD has encouraged both GSEs to become involved in subprime mortgage lending to a greater extent.

Several states exempted the GSEs from the application of their predatory lending statutes or limited the application of the statutes to the GSEs. The GSEs sought exemption from Georgia's statute before it was enacted, but received negative publicity for doing so. As a result, they withdrew their proposal and have since avoided seeking additional exemptions or limitations. Thus, the GSEs have continued to purchase and securitize loans in all fifty states in compliance with state predatory lending statutes in those states that have such statutes and have not exempted the GSEs.

The GSEs, therefore, have taken a very different approach to the problem of predatory lending from that of banks and thrifts. The GSEs have become involved in the purchase and securitization of subprime loans, have adopted policies designed to avoid the purchase of loans with predatory terms, and have remained for the most part subject to compliance with state laws. National banks and thrifts, on the other hand, claim their hands are clean and have now avoided the requirement of complying with state law. In the defense of banks, they have been involved in the subprime market beyond the A- credit level. However, by avoiding compliance with state law, some banks can remain a part of the problem.

423. David S. Hilzenrath, HUD Chief Criticized Fannie Mae, Minority Loans Called Inadequate, WASH. POST, July 2, 2004, at E02. In recent years, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been criticized on numerous fronts. They have been criticized on the basis that they have an unfair competitive advantage over wholly private mortgage investors, based on concerns about their financial stability and the feared effects of their failure on the national economy, and because of misleading financial disclosures. See Andrews, supra note 397, at C1; Stephen Labaton, Limits Urged in Mortgage Portfolios, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2005, at C1.

424. See GAO REPORT, supra note 24, at 74; HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 46. The GSEs also purchase loans to "Alt-A" borrowers, "prime borrowers who desire low down payments or do not want to provide full documentation for loans." Id. at 46 n.56.

425. See Hilzenrath, supra note 423, at E02.


428. See Lampe, supra note 426, at 84.
VI. FEDERAL LAW SHOULD NOT PREEMPT
STATE PREDATORY LENDING STATUTES

Although some commentators question the validity of the OCC's preemption of state lending laws for national banks, no doubt exists that Congress may if it chooses preempt state predatory lending statutes altogether or may expressly grant to federal agencies the power to preempt the statutes as applied to banks and thrifts. The issue then is the normative case for federal preemption of state predatory lending laws—that is, whether Congress should preempt state predatory lending laws for all lenders, as would the bill currently before it, and whether federal agencies should preempt the laws for thrifts, banks, and their operating subsidiaries.

A. States' Traditional Role in Real Estate Finance
and Consumer Protection

Real estate finance law was traditionally an area governed by the states. Although the federal government became involved in creating housing policies and housing programs during the New Deal, it was only in the 1960s that the federal government first became involved in direct regulation of real estate finance. Most of the early statutes were disclosure laws that created a minimum standard. Congress made clear that these statutes were only to preempt state law to the extent of a conflict. Although Congress has acted in several areas to expressly preempt state law, the bulk of law governing real estate finance remains state law.

Consumer protection has also traditionally been primarily a state responsibility. While the federal government has been involved in specific areas of consumer protection, particularly through the FTC,

429. See supra Part IV.D.
430. See Alexander, supra note 238, at 311–13.
432. See Alexander, supra note 238, at 315.
these measures have traditionally been in addition to state consumer protection laws and treated as creating a minimum standard rather than preempting the field.\footnote{Sometimes federal law is more protective than state law. See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (2000) (restricting disclaimers of implied warranties in consumer transactions).} HOEPA creates a minimum standard but does not otherwise preempt state law.\footnote{See Ill. Ass'n of Mortgage Brokers v. Office of Banks & Real Estate, 308 F.3d 762, 766 (7th Cir. 2002), quoted in supra note 329.}

Because of the tradition of state governance of real estate finance and consumer protection laws, advocates of federal preemption of state law bear the burden to support a change in policy and show that federal regulation would be superior. While there are advantages to uniformity, they are not outweighed by the benefits of letting each state choose its approach to the problem of predatory lending.

\textit{B. The Role of State and Federal Government}

\textbf{1. Our Federal System}

Numerous advantages exist to a system of varying state laws, and the Supreme Court outlined those advantages in \textit{Gregory v. Ashcroft}:

This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people numerous advantages. It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogenous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.\footnote{See Michael H. Schill, \textit{Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law in the 1900s and the Implications of Changing Financial Markets}, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1301 (1991).}

The fact that different states have reacted differently to the problem of predatory lending indicates a need for various solutions. The fifty states vary along racial, religious, and cultural lines,\footnote{See Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law in the 1900s and the Implications of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1301 (1991).} and the differences among the states have resulted in varying political climates and differing approaches to societal issues.\footnote{501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (citing Michael W. McConnell, \textit{Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design}, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987); Deborah Jones Merritt, \textit{The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century}, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1988)).} The differences are apparent in the types of consumer protection measures a state may adopt for home mortgage borrowers. Some states take an activist approach to protecting
consumers with statutory rights of redemption,\textsuperscript{439} one-action rules,\textsuperscript{440} stringent limitations on deficiency judgments,\textsuperscript{441} and strong predatory lending laws.\textsuperscript{442} Other states take a more “hands off” approach favoring business interests.

State legislatures can respond to their citizens in a way that the federal government cannot. Congress may enact laws that are responsive to the needs of most Americans but that may not be responsive to the needs of the particular state’s citizens. Two empirical studies suggest that state legislators are responsive to public opinion in their states.\textsuperscript{443} Not surprisingly, the studies conclude that laws of more liberal states reflect liberal policies while the laws of conservative states reflect more conservative policies.\textsuperscript{444} Therefore, legislatures in more liberal states may enact tougher consumer protection measures, while legislatures in more conservative states may regulate subprime lenders to a lesser degree.

Another advantage of state regulation is that it allows for experimentation.\textsuperscript{445} When one state finds an effective solution, others may follow.\textsuperscript{446} When a state chooses an ineffective approach, it affects fewer people than would a federal law.\textsuperscript{447} Additionally, states can learn from the mistakes made in other states.

Critics of state predatory lending statutes say that state legislatures


\textsuperscript{440} See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 726(a); NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.430 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-37-1 (2002).

\textsuperscript{441} See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 726(b); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.36 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-32 (Supp. 2005).

\textsuperscript{442} See supra notes Part II.B.

\textsuperscript{443} Schill, supra note 437, at 1311–12. One study used the percentage of votes for George McGovern in the 1972 presidential election to indicate the liberal or conservative nature of a state compared with liberal state policies. David C. Nice, Representation in the States: Policymaking and Ideology, 64 SOC. SCI. Q. 404, 405–06 (1983). The other study used a survey which asked residents of different states whether they considered themselves to be liberal, conservative or moderate and compared the results with state policies. Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Robert S. Erikson & John P. McIver, Public Opinion and Policy Liberalism in the American States, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 980, 985 (1987).

\textsuperscript{444} See Nice, supra note 443, at 408; Wright et al., supra note 443, at 989.

\textsuperscript{445} See generally Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as Laboratories of Experimentation, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295 (2005).

\textsuperscript{446} For example, North Carolina’s predatory lending statute has been emulated, and the assignee liability provisions of Georgia’s law have been copied. See supra notes 127 and 143 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{447} Georgia legislators obviously felt that they had made a mistake in the original statute, but only the people of Georgia were affected and only for a short time. See supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text.
cannot react quickly enough to remedy ineffective attempts at stemming predatory lending practices and may, therefore, cut off the flow of legitimate credit to their states. However, experience has shown that state legislatures are able to react quickly. For example, when state law threatened to restrict the availability of credit in Georgia, the legislature quickly revised the law.448

Today, state legislatures are more able to react quickly and responsively to state concerns. New or amended constitutions in many states now permit annual sessions of the legislature and have removed limits on the length of sessions.449 Lawmakers have higher salaries and professional staffs available to assist them,450 providing legislatures with more adequate resources to react to state needs and constituents' desires.

2. Law Enforcement

Federal law enforcement has been very successful in prosecuting the largest predatory lending offenders,451 but states are more effective in prosecuting local and smaller actors.452 The FTC and Federal Reserve Board are unlikely to prosecute small, localized mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers. They are simply too small to attract the attention of these large federal actors who generally allocate their resources to the larger offenders. Yet, very often the local mortgage bankers, mortgage brokers, and contractors are at the root of the predatory lending problem.453 State attorneys general and local officials, on the other hand, are equipped to prosecute the small actors. Also, state and federal governments can more effectively work together if the hands of state and local officials are not tied.

3. Federal Law as a Minimum Standard

The tradition of federal law in the areas of real estate finance and consumer protection has been to set the minimum standard.454 HOEPA

448. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
452. See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 83.
453. See supra notes 184–88 and accompanying text.
454. See supra Part VI.A.
was enacted in this tradition, and states have been free to set higher standards. Thus, some state legislatures have felt a need to protect their residents by enacting additional, stronger measures. Other state legislatures have enacted state laws with the same level of protection as HOEPA, while still others have not acted at all.455

A stronger federal law as minimum standard would eliminate the need for individual states to act. However, a significantly stronger federal law is unlikely in today’s political climate.456 The Ney bill before Congress would weaken HOEPA, while at the same time expressly preempting state predatory lending laws.457 If Congress continues to set a low minimum standard, then states should be free to act. If Congress wants uniformity, then it needs to set a higher bar.

C. "Onerous" Provisions of State Statutes

One of the objections that proponents of preemption have to state predatory lending statutes is that their terms are too burdensome for lenders.458 Advocates for the subprime lending industry argue that borrowers should have the option to choose a prepayment penalty provision in order to get a lower interest rate459 and that yield spread premiums should not be included in the trigger for determining a high-cost loan because the fees benefit homeowners.460 They argue that homeowners should have more choices while ignoring the reality that the unsophisticated homeowners who fall victim to predatory lenders do not have the bargaining power or the understanding to make meaningful choices.

Critics of state regulation of predatory lending are particularly opposed to the extension of liability to assignees of predatory loans.461

455. See supra Part II.B.
457. See supra notes 293–303 and accompanying text.
458. See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 42, at 3–4 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair and Affordable Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, Bond Market Association), 4 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect, National Association of Mortgage Brokers).
459. See id. at 4 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair and Affordable Lending).
460. See id. at 6 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair and Affordable Lending), 3 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect, National Association of Mortgage Brokers).
461. See id. at 8 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair and Affordable Lending), 4 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, Bond Market Association).
Regarding the issue of assignee liability, the experiences of Georgia and New Jersey are illuminating. When liability for assignees went too far, the rating agencies would not rate securities, so lenders would not lend. But under Georgia's current regime of assignee liability, as well as in New Jersey, the rating agencies have continued to rate securities, and lenders have continued to lend.

Creation of assignee liability is one of the most effective means of dealing with predatory lenders. The parties that buy and securitize mortgage loans are involved in multiple transactions, while consumers are not. Consumers cannot simply go to another lender after a bad experience with the first, but the parties who purchase loans to securitize them or hold them in portfolio can. Also, investors can and do protect themselves with buyback provisions. As a result, purchasers of mortgage loans on the secondary market are the parties best equipped to police the originators.

Assertions of the need for uniformity may be a smoke screen for those who simply want lower standards of consumer protection. The conservative lawmakers pushing for federal preemption are the same lawmakers who would usually champion states rights and favor state law over federal law. The current Republican-dominated Congress has shown itself more likely to adopt measures that are less consumer-friendly than some states. Preemption of state law is, therefore, one way to support lending interests and ensure a low level of consumer protection. The result, of course, is that predatory lending practices continue with little effective curtailment.

462. See Eggert, supra note 149, at 548.

If uniformity in predatory lending laws is desirable, then another approach is through uniform state law. Through the uniform law adoption process, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws can consider the views of the various interest groups. They can also consider the success and failure of various state approaches. With a uniform act available, state legislatures are still be flexible and responsive to the needs of their constituents by making changes to the uniform act or by not adopting it at all.

Attempts to promulgate broad uniform statutes covering real estate finance have not been effective. No state adopted either the Uniform Land Transactions Act adopted by NCCUSL in 1974 or the Uniform Land Security Interest Act adopted by NCCUSL in 1985. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 152, at 670. In 2002, the NCCUSL promulgated the Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act. It has yet to be adopted by any state. More limited attempts at reform have been effective, however, with states adopting uniform acts relating to condominiums and risk of loss in real estate contracts. See id. at 91. A uniform act regulating predatory lending practices might be an effective means for making the law more uniform while preserving the ability of states to be responsive to their citizens. A disadvantage would be the lengthy time frame that drafting and adoption would require.
Critics of state predatory lending statutes say that they will reduce the amount of available subprime credit. Measures addressing predatory lending do, indeed, keep some loans from being made. Some loans, however, simply should not be made because their terms are too onerous or unfair. In some cases, the borrower could obtain a loan on better terms from a legitimate subprime lender. If the borrower cannot repay the loan, however, the borrower should not be extended credit. In the legitimate subprime lending market, A- borrowers typically pay interest rates that are about one-half of a percent higher than prime borrowers. C and D borrowers pay interest rates as much as four percent above prime rates. Lenders who charge much higher interest rates on fully secured home mortgage loans are simply taking advantage of borrowers.

Furthermore, critics of state predatory lending statutes have not provided evidence that the statutes have reduced the availability of legitimate subprime credit. In fact, North Carolina proves otherwise. Since the North Carolina statute became effective in 2000, subprime loans have remained available, while the incidence of predatory loans and loans with unfair terms has decreased. Certainly, the proponents of federal preemption who seek to remove state control over local predatory lending problems have the burden to prove that the state statutes do in fact affect the availability of subprime credit.

E. Efficiency Concerns

Proponents of federal preemption assert that the mortgage market cannot operate efficiently with a patchwork of state requirements. Lenders argue that it is too burdensome to comply with different requirements in each state. They argue that the cost of compliance will increase the cost or limit the availability of credit.

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464. See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 42, at 3–4 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair and Affordable Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, Bond Market Association), 4 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect, National Association of Mortgage Brokers).

465. See HUD/TREASURY JOINT REPORT, supra note 31, at 28.

466. See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 42, at 2 (statement of Martin Eakes, Chief Executive Officer, Self-Help and the Center for Responsible Lending). See also notes 121–25 and accompanying text.

467. See Hearing on Legislative Solutions, supra note 42, at 3–4 (statement of Steve Nadon, Chairman, Coalition for Fair and Affordable Lending), 3 (statement of Micah S. Green, President, Bond Market Association), 4 (statement of Jim Nabors, President-Elect, National Association of Mortgage Brokers).
These concerns are not valid for two reasons. First, because origination is primarily a local function, the originator can and should be responsible for compliance with local law. Second, originators and investors in mortgage loans are already required to comply with a patchwork of state laws; therefore, the cost of additional state law restrictions will not become prohibitive.

1. Horizontal Segmentation of the Mortgage Market Makes Compliance with State Law More Practical

Unlike earlier times, when mortgage markets were local, today's mortgage market is a national, or even international market. Today, the market is not segmented by locale, but rather by function, with the ownership and investment functions existing separately from origination and servicing. While capital comes into the mortgage market at a national level, origination is still primarily a local function. Most mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers have offices in the markets in which they operate, particularly in the subprime market.

An investor in mortgages or mortgage-backed securities does not have to know how to comply with local law, but may leave that function to the originator. Because most predatory lending issues arise at origination, the originator, typically with a local office, should appropriately be charged with state law compliance. Purchasers of mortgages can and do protect themselves with buy-back requirements—requirements that the originator buy back any loans that do not meet certain standards. Therefore, losses related to non-compliance with state law occur only when the originator is judgment proof or bankrupt. Ultimately, purchasers of mortgages can protect themselves by carefully selecting the originators with whom they do business.

2. Lenders Already Comply with Varying State Requirements

Because real estate finance law has primarily been state law, a patchwork of state law already exists. States differ in their mortgage theories, in the availability of and requirements for pre-foreclosure

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468. Servicers also must comply with local law, but at a different stage of the process. Most predatory lending issues arise at origination.

469. This is one approach that Freddie Mac has used in its efforts to combat predatory lending. See supra note 422 and accompanying text.

470. Three theories of mortgages exist in the United States—title theory, lien theory, and intermediate theory. See Robert Kratovil, Mortgages—Problems in Possession, Rents, and Mortgage
remedies, in the type of foreclosure permitted, in the logistics of power of sale foreclosure where it is permitted, in the availability of a deficiency, and in the availability and means of statutory redemption after foreclosure. As a result, loan documents vary greatly from state to state. Closing practices also vary from state to state with loan closings typically handled by title companies in some states, by lenders in other states, and by attorneys in still other states.

Since lenders must already deal with this patchwork of laws and practices in the various states, adding requirements under a predatory lending statute is not as onerous is it would seem. Lenders must already have separate loan documents, disclosure documents, closing requirements, and closing practices for each state in which they do business. Therefore, adding an additional state law variable should not increase the cost to the extent that proponents of preemption claim.

Evidence exists that interest rates are relatively insensitive to the

\[\text{Liability, 11 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1961).} \]

In title theory states, a mortgage lender is treated as having title, in a sense, to the mortgaged property. \(\text{Id.}\) In lien theory states, a mortgage lender is treated as having only a security interest in the mortgaged property and may not take possession until after foreclosure. \(\text{Id.}\) In intermediate theory states, a mortgage lender has a hybrid interest, which gives the lender the right to possession of the property after a default under the mortgage. \(\text{Id.}\) The majority of states are lien theory states. See Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law § 4.2 (West Publishing Co. 2002) (1951).

471. In title theory states, the lender has the right, in theory, to possess the property at the time the borrower executes the mortgage. As a practical matter, however, borrowers retain possession until default by agreement with the lender. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 470, § 4.1; see also Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 183, § 26 (2003) (giving the borrower a statutory right to possession until default in the absence of an agreement to the contrary). In intermediate theory states, the lender has the right to possession of the property after a default. Kratovil, supra note 470, at 4–5. In lien theory states, the lender may only take possession after foreclosure. \(\text{Id.}\) at 5–6. However, many lien theory states permit the lender to take possession of the property after default by agreement with the borrower. See, e.g., Kinnison v. Guar. Liquidating Corp., 115 P.2d 450, 452 (Cal. 1941); Topeka Sav. Ass’n v. Beck, 428 P.2d 779, 782 (Kan. 1967); Cent. Sav. Bank v. First Cadco Corp., 181 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Neb. 1970); Carlquist v. Coltharp, 248 P. 481, 483 (Utah 1926).


472. About thirty states permit power of sale foreclosure, while the rest permit only judicial foreclosure. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 470, § 7.19.

473. See id. States vary greatly in their requirements for notice of a foreclosure sale, with variations including the method of notice, the notice period, and the parties who must be given notice. See id.

474. See id. § 8.1. Some states prohibit a deficiency judgment under certain circumstances, while others limiting the amount of the deficiency. See id. § 8.3.

475. More than half of the jurisdictions have statutory redemption, but the specifics of the various statutes vary greatly. \(\text{Id.}\) § 8.4.

476. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 152, at 244.
variation in state mortgage law. Additional protection for mortgagors under state law does not increase interest rates to the extent that critics have proposed. Therefore, considering the longstanding tradition of state law in the areas of real estate and consumer protection, and considering the advantages offered by giving states autonomy over protecting their residents, preemption of state law is difficult to support.

F. The Role of Federally Supported Lenders

1. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac currently operate within the patchwork of state laws for real estate finance and the new predatory lending laws, the GSEs have been criticized for their failure to "lead the industry" in loans to low-income families and in low-income neighborhoods. Indeed, the GSEs should expand their role in leading the industry by purchasing more than just A- subprime loans. Most subprime borrowers fall into the A-category anyway, substantially fewer into the B category, and fewer still in the C and D categories. Therefore, a small presence in supporting loans in these lower categories will have a larger impact on the markets for these loans.

In addition, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can lead the industry by creating standards for subprime loans. One of the roles of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in promoting the smooth operation of the housing finance market has been to create sets of forms for home mortgage lenders to use in the various states. In the prime market, even lenders who do not intend to sell their loans to the GSEs tend to use these forms because uniformity makes their loans more marketable on the secondary market. In addition, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have created automated underwriting systems for the prime market and, more

478. See id.
479. See supra notes 423–25 and accompanying text.
480. The National Home Equity Mortgage Association reports that the "A-minus" segment makes up 60 percent, the "B" segment 30 percent, the "C" segment 9 percent, and the "D" segment 1 percent of the market. Inside B&C Lending reports that the "A-minus" segment makes up 73 percent, the "B" segment 13 percent, the "C" segment 9 percent, and the "D" segment 5 percent of the market.
recently, for A- subprime loans. The GSEs can further their goal of leading the industry by producing forms for subprime loans that comply with the patchwork of predatory lending laws and by creating underwriting standards for subprime lending.

2. Federally Chartered Banks and Thrifts

Banks and thrifts argue that they have not been part of the predatory lending problem and should, therefore, be exempt from state laws. While few banks may have been directly involved in originating predatory loans, they have been involved through affiliates, by purchasing predatory loans and securities backed by predatory loans, and by financing predatory lenders. Further, current federal regulations exempting banks and their operating subsidiaries from the operation of state predatory lending laws likely will make it easier for banks to be involved in predatory lending. Banks can now move their subprime lending operations into operating subsidiaries to avoid the operation of state law, and banks themselves can purchase or take security interests in predatory loans without fear of the assignee liability provisions of state law. In fact, many bank-owned mortgage companies are now organized as operating subsidiaries exempt from state law.

Theoretically, the OCC will be monitoring banks to prevent predatory lending abuses, but the OCC may not have the resources to monitor activities of national banks and their operating subsidiaries. The OCC’s primary responsibility is to monitor the safety and soundness of national banks and their affiliates. The agency is responsible for more than 1,900 national banks and, in 2003, could not provide a list of their operating subsidiaries because “the number and names of the operating subsidiaries were constantly changing.” Today, the OCC maintains a list on its website of “many of the national bank operating subsidiaries

484. See supra notes 357–73 and accompanying text.
that do business directly with consumers.\textsuperscript{489} In June 2006, the list included the names of more than 300 companies,\textsuperscript{490} but it is constantly changing because bank holding companies reorganize their holdings on a relatively frequent basis.\textsuperscript{491} Furthermore, the agency may not have the motivation to find and prosecute predatory lending abuses in the ranks of the institutions it regulates because its funding comes primarily from the assessments on the banks it regulates rather than from Congress.\textsuperscript{492}

The OCC's preemption of state law is truly a "race to the bottom."\textsuperscript{493} By providing the most lenient regime for regulating predatory lending practices, the OCC can encourage national banks to keep their federal charters and state banks to switch to federal charters.\textsuperscript{494} Because the OCC's budget is funded primarily by large national banks whose interests are served by the preemption rule, the OCC can ensure the preeminence of the national banking system.\textsuperscript{495} This is further evidence that the OCC will have little incentive to prosecute predatory lending abuses among these institutions.

Banks and thrifts should be a part of the solution rather than being part of the problem. They should be subject to state consumer protection laws as the GSEs have been. Because banks and thrifts receive the benefit of the federal safety net, they have a special obligation to the public. They and their affiliates should be subject to the same standards as other lenders.

\section*{VII. CONCLUSION}

The federal government should not preempt state predatory lending laws either through regulations applicable only to federally chartered banks and thrifts or through legislation applicable to all lenders. Real estate finance and consumer protection have traditionally been areas

\textsuperscript{490} See id.
\textsuperscript{492} See About the OCC, supra note 486.
\textsuperscript{493} William Cary's classic article describes Delaware's lenient corporation law as the result of its success in a "race for the bottom." William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663, 666 (1974). Delaware created a favorable climate for corporate management in order to attract new business to the state. Id.
\textsuperscript{494} See Wilmarth, supra note 25, at 275.
\textsuperscript{495} See id. at 276–79.
governed by state law, and where the federal government has intervened in these areas, federal statutes and regulations have typically created a minimum standard for consumer protection rather than preempting the field of regulation. When state governments regulate, they can be more responsive to the needs of their citizens and innovative in trying new solutions. Further, state enforcers are more likely to prosecute small actors in predatory lending that federal enforcers may ignore.

Varying state laws are not as onerous on lenders as they may claim. Since subprime loans tend to be originated by local mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers, they can comply with local law, and investors can police their originators and purchase only from those that comply with local law. The states already have varying requirements for real estate finance; therefore, adding additional requirements is only a matter of revising forms and standards that already vary from state to state. Furthermore, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can further their regulatory goals of leading the industry in loans to low-income families and in low-income neighborhoods by creating standards that originators can use to comply with each state’s law and by purchasing more subprime loans, including loans to subprime borrowers with less than A- credit.

Banks, thrifts, and their affiliates have not earned the special treatment they receive under new regulations. Furthermore, the OCC does not have the resources or motivation to regulate national banks and their operating subsidiaries to the extent they should be regulated. Congress should override the OCC and OTS determinations that their regulations preempt state predatory lending laws.

Federal attempts to curb the predatory lending problem have thus far been inadequate and unsuccessful. The federal government should not make the problem worse by tying the hands of state legislatures and attorneys general who are trying to combat the problem. Federal preemption, where state laws are more restrictive, simply adds fuel to the fire by insulating predatory lenders from effective oversight and sanctions. The federal government must stop mortgaging the American dream.