Since its conclusion in 1997, the World Trade Organization (WTO) Basic Telecom Agreement has unleashed a torrent of cross-border investment and fueled rapid growth in international telecommunications markets. These business developments, along with the ever-increasing frenzy of technological development—particularly the proliferation of Internet-protocol-based networks—left national regulators and international organizations struggling to keep up. These developments also left many international carriers with the equivalent of an investment hangover, groaning under enormous debt loads, and reconsidering various cross-border investments and alliances.

In 2000, telecommunications services and investment disputes effectively became a sub-discipline of the WTO’s dispute settlement process. The long-simmering dispute between the United States and Mexico over Mexico’s rules for international traffic and anticompetitive practices and interconnection arrangements of incumbent Telmex finally boiled over into the WTO, with the United States seeking consultations and filing panel request—subsequently blocked by Mexico—with the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body alleging violation of Mexico’s WTO commitments. It remains to be seen in 2001 whether the United States will pursue a second panel request, which Mexico cannot block.

The year 2000 saw the WTO and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) vying for primacy in overseeing the Internet. The ITU took up the issue of Internet trans-
port charges—first raised in the Asia-Pacific region—to consider whether or not to impose a settlement-rate-type regime in Internet protocol (IP)-based traffic. In essence, the fairness issues raised by developing countries against the *Benchmarks Order* of the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the late 1990s have morphed into arguments about the fairness of charges for reaching and transporting content over a U.S.-centric Internet. The WTO, for its part, continues to take a more market-oriented approach, partly out of necessity, as it grapples with issues such as how to rationalize taxes and customs duties between the traditional and e-commerce segments of cross-border trade. In some ways, the competition among international organizations for primacy in Internet regulation—characterized alternately as a natural extension of the organizations’ expertise or a bureaucratic land-grab—does not bode well for a hands-off deregulatory approach to the Internet, as each tries to outdo the other with more complex, bureaucratic, and intrusive regulatory proposals. It remains to be seen if technology will outpace the regulators’ best efforts, or if the regulators will succeed to a degree that inhibits technological innovation.

In 2000, competition regulators took a harder look at proposed cross-border mergers of telecoms and media companies. The European Commission scuttled the merger of U.S. carriers WorldCom and Sprint (although U.S. regulators also fretted that it would reduce competition in U.S. long-distance and Internet backbone markets), and altered the eventual merger between America Online and Time Warner. By year-end, U.S. regulators were still considering the acquisition of U.S. wireless carriers Voicestream and Powertel by Deutsche Telekom (DT). The deal attracted the scrutiny of U.S. regulators and the U.S. Congress due to the German Government’s sizeable stake in Deutsche Telekom, and threatened to become a WTO dispute. The issue of market access for government owned or controlled carriers is likely to remain a contentious one.

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5. See *Singapore Declaration, Third Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Ministerial Meeting on the Telecommunications and Information Industry (TELMIN 3), Program for Action, § 11(c) (June 1998).*


9. See, e.g., *Agreement Between the International Telecommunications Union and the World Trade Organization, WTO Doc. S/C/11, Annex I (Sept. 21, 2000)* (granting, following protracted negotiations, a technical consultative role and observer status in some WTO meetings).

10. See *European Commission Decision of 28 June 2000 (COMP/M.1741 – MCI WorldCom/Sprint).*


While international expansion continued unabated, international joint ventures and alliances remained precarious vehicles for doing so. Most notably, France Telecom opted to buy out the shares of its partners DT and Sprint in the troubled Global One alliance, brought to the brink of collapse when DT made an ultimately unsuccessful bid for Telecom Italia. Global One now joins a long list of failed joint ventures and alliances, including Unisource (AT&T's loosely knit venture with a number of European carriers) and the original Concert (envisioned at one time as an MCI-BT-Telefonica venture). Concert has since been revived as a joint venture between AT&T and British Telecom (BT).

The year 2000 was also the year in which the debt load of global carriers grew exponentially. AT&T, BT, and other carriers struggled to revamp and restructure their operations in the face of enormous debt loads as they sought to diversify into new platforms, including cable and wireless services. After paying top dollar for third-generation wireless licenses in Britain and Germany, many carriers retreated to consider whether they had overpaid, dash- ing the hopes of many governments that saw further auctions of such licenses as a revenue bonanza.

The past year also saw a boom in bandwidth on international routes—so much so that analysts and carriers alike began to consider whether a bandwidth glut was on the horizon. Such fears, however, have not dampened investor enthusiasm for submarine cables, which are increasingly built by carriers such as TyCom, Global Crossing, and Level 3, rather than by carrier consortia. The year 2000 also saw the deployment of new cross-border networks in Europe, with both submarine and terrestrial fiber-optic cables serving an increasingly integrated communications market in Europe.

The year 2000 was one of commercial woe for non-geostationary satellite systems. Big LEOs Iridium and ICO filed for bankruptcy, and Loral indicated that it was no longer willing to fund huge losses at Globalstar. While Globalstar continues to operate, Iridium ceased commercial service. While many expect that the U.S. Department of Defense will not allow Iridium to fail, the ultimate fate of Iridium's 66-satellite constellation remains unclear. Meanwhile, ICO has retrenched following the unsuccessful launch of its first satellite and a retooling of its business plan following ICO's acquisition by satellite pioneer and Teledesic backer Craig McCaw.

There is a growing realization that many of these non-geostationary satellite systems were based on a voice-traffic paradigm, when in fact the high-growth segment of the world's international communications traffic is data, which can easily be carried by geostationary satellites, as the half-second delay in transmission matters less for users. As a result, there is a renewed focus among the non-geostationary satellite operators in having a solid ter-

15. Even the revamped Concert has fallen on hard times, with speculation that it will be reabsorbed into AT&T and/or BT. See Investors Start Calling for Changes at British Telecom, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2001).
18. This investor enthusiasm would later cool considerably in 2001 with respect to many of these international network companies. See, e.g., Once-Bright Future of Optical Fiber Dims, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2001).
19. Iridium's assets have since been bought by other investors, who intend to resume a scaled-back commercial service. See Iridium Satellite System Is About to Be Revived, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2001).
20. See Can Craig McCaw Keep His Satellites From Crashing?, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2000).
restrial network component to their systems. In any event, the commercial failure of the Big LEOs has made it much more difficult for all satellite ventures to obtain financing.

The satellite operators' difficulties have also presented regulators with a challenge, as demand for commercial radio spectrum remains very strong. Terrestrial wireless operators continue to clamor for the spectrum sought or held by satellite interests, much of which is not yet in commercial use due to long design cycles and a souring investment climate for commercial satellite systems. This phenomenon was evidenced by the focus of the ITU 2000 World Radio Communications Conference on terrestrial wireless issues.\(^2\) After previous conferences in 1995 and 1997, which focused on allocation of swaths of spectrum for satellite systems, the 2000 conference focused largely on allocations for next-generation wireless systems, IMT-2000, and satellite-terrestrial sharing.\(^2\)

In spite of the Big LEOs' woes, the outlook for the commercial satellite industry remains relatively strong—strong enough that Intelsat's 144 member governments were willing to approve the privatization of Intelsat,\(^2\) an organization created to share the risks and costs of a global satellite network whose commercial viability was in doubt in the 1960s when it was established by treaty.\(^2\) In 2001, these governments will become initial investors in Bermuda-based Intelsat Ltd., which is contemplating an initial public offering in the near future. (The satellites, satellite applications themselves, and the licenses will be divided between Delaware and U.K. subsidiaries.) The privatization of Intelsat was forced in some respects by the passage of the Open-Market Reorganization for the Betterment of International Telecommunications (ORBIT) Act by the U.S. Congress.\(^6\) The ORBIT Act also sought to ensure the pro-competitive privatization of Inmarsat (which had already commenced),\(^2\) and permitted Lockheed Martin to buy control of Comsat, the U.S. signatory to Intelsat.\(^8\) While displeased with the ORBIT Act, Intelsat did not make good on its threats to move its headquarters from Washington, D.C. or to kick the United States out of Intelsat altogether. Pursuant to the ORBIT Act, the FCC concluded that U.S. users and service providers lacked adequate access to space segment capacity on Intelsat satellites, and threatened to impose a regulatory solution in the event that negotiations between Comsat and other users and service providers did not produce a commercial solution.\(^2\)

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22. See Council of the International Telecommunications Union, Resolution 1130 (setting forth the agenda for the World Radiocommunication Conference 2000 (WRC-2000)).

23. See id.


25. See In the Matter of the Applications of INTELSAT LLC for Authority to Operate, and to Further Construct, Launch, and Operate C-band and Ku-band Satellites That Form a Global Communications System in Geostationary Orbit, 15 FCC Rcd. 15,460 (2000).


27. See id.

28. See id.