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The International Court of Justice: A Test of Suggested Reforms

I. Introduction

During most of the twentieth century, international legal scholars have been deeply concerned with the prospects and processes for judicial settlement of international disputes. This preoccupation is neither surprising nor intrinsically undesirable. Our focus here will be on the most ambitious recent manifestation of judicial settlement of disputes, the International Court of Justice (ICJ). For thirty years the ICJ has been available to states for the peaceful settlement of disputes and to organs and specialized agencies of the United Nations for advisory opinions, but fundamental doubts about the practical utility of the Court exist.

There is a marked asymmetry between expectation and performance. At the San Francisco Conference optimism abounded:

> On the basis of the texts proposed for the Charter and for the Statute, the First Committee ventures to foresee a significant role for the new Court in the international relations of the future. The judicial process will have a central place in the plans of the United Nations for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. An adequate tribunal will exist for the exercise of the judicial function, and it will rank as a principal organ of the Organization. It is confidently anticipated that the jurisdiction of this tribunal will be extended as time goes on, and past experience warrants the expectation that its exercise of this jurisdiction will commend a general support.
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> A long road has been traveled in the effort to enthrone law as the guide for the conduct of states in their relations one with another. A new milepost is now to be created along that road. In establishing the International Court of Justice, the United Nations hold before a war-stricken world the beacons of Justice and Law and offer the possibility of substituting orderly judicial processes for the vicissitudes of war and the reign of brutal force.[1]

There is widespread agreement that the Court has not lived up to these early expectations, at least quantitatively and probably qualitatively as well. Not

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[1]Report of the Rapporteur of Committee IV-1, UN Con. on Inter. Org., Doc. 913, vol. 13, 393 (1945).

surprisingly, one finds a significant modification of the early expectations as the Court's actual performance began to unfold. In 1965 Rosenne described the Court as playing "a constructive role in the pacific settlement of international disputes despite the constantly disintegrating international situation."[2] During the last decade expectations have been scaled down still further. Perhaps typical is the view of Arthur Rovine who finds that the Court has few opportunities to act and that, on balance, the Court may take its place as one of the more notable failures in the search for methods of peaceful settlement of international disputes.[3]

Concomitant with the realization that the ICJ was not playing an important enough role have been suggestions for improving prospects for the Court's use. Our purpose here is to examine these normative suggestions and to illustrate how some of them can be tested by a careful macroscopic analysis of the Court's past work. The principal tenet of our approach is that there are clear patterns of Court use and of state relationships with the Court. These patterns are discernible if one is willing to take a broad view of all the Court's activity rather than concentrating on a detailed analysis of a few specific cases. In the balance of this piece we shall review suggestions for improving the utility of the ICJ and then shall test the possible impact of implementing certain of the suggestions.

II. The Reform Proposals[4]

Most of the literature addressing the underuse of the Court shares an underlying assumption that improved organization and procedures are the key to increasing the Court's activity.[5] Consequently, there tends to be a common emphasis on reform of the Court. The reformers want to amend or outflank those parts of the Statute that limit access to the Court. The myriad of proposals are of two main types: those focusing on tightening the commitment to compulsory jurisdiction and those improving the structure and machinery of the Court.[6] In addition, there is another group that concentrates on influencing the attitudes of national decision-makers toward the Court.

The proposals focusing on the level of commitment to adjudication by the Court emphasize the need for creating binding obligations for states to use the

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[2]S. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 19 (1965).

[3]A Rovine, *The National Interest and the World Court*, in L. GROSS (ed.), THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1975).

[4]Portions of this section have been extracted from J. GAMBLE AND D. FISCHER, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1976) especially pp. 11-30 and are presented here with the permission of D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, MA.

[5]C. Dalfen, *The World Court: Reform or Re-Appraisal*, CAN. Y.B INT'L L. 213 (1968). *See also* W. JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 119-20 (1964).

[6]*Id.* (Dalfen) 212-13.

Court. One writer distinguishes two groups in this category, which he labels "consolidation" proposals and "gradualist" proposals.[7]

The "consolidation" proposals seek to plug loopholes in the Optional Clause (article 36(2)) as it exists. The frequent use of reservations of increasingly arbitrary character in declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court has been a matter of serious concern.[8] The effect of a state's reservation goes far beyond the claimed right to determine whether its reservation applies in a given case. What the state claims for itself must be conceded to other states on the basis of reciprocity.[9] Other proposals in this category seek to reserve the right to terminate reservations without notice and/or to limit the number and types of reservations.[10]

The "gradualist" proposals go beyond the reservation problem and focus on spreading and strengthening commitment "by directing states towards assuming obligations in certain areas which should become nuclei of agreement around which layers of commitment gradually grow until all possible international disputes are encompassed."[11] Lauterpacht has suggested reversion to the alternate form of the Optional Clause which was proposed and rejected in San Francisco in 1946, i.e., compulsory jurisdiction unless states contract out.[12] Another suggestion is that more compromissory clauses be included in multilateral treaties negotiated under the framework of the United Nations.[13]

The reform proposals dealing with altering the structure and machinery of the Court have many different emphases. Some want to amend the Statute to broaden the class of parties that may come before the Court to include international organizations and/or individuals.[14] Much attention has been paid to streamlining the Court's procedures, e.g., accelerating the process of litigation.[15] Other proposals would expand the types of proceedings available before the Court,[16] e.g., measures that would take the "adversary" out of proceed-

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[7]*Id.* 215-17.

[8]C. Waldock, *The Decline of the Optional Clause,* 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 244-87 (1955-56).

[9]L. Gross, *Bulgaria Invokes the Connally Amendment,* 56 AJIL 357-82 (1962).

[10]H. Briggs, *Reservations to the Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the ICJ,* 93 RECUEIL DES COURS 293 (1958); L. Sohn, *Step-by-Step Acceptance of the Jurisdiction of the ICJ,* 58 AJIL PROC. 131 (1964).

[11]Dalfen, *supra* note 5 at 216.

[12]Cited by GROSS, *supra* note 3 at 314.

[13]E. Warren, *Toward a More Active International Court,* 2 VA. J. INT'L L. 296 (1971).

[14]L. Gross, *International Court of Justice: Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing Its Role in the International Legal Order,* 65 AJIL 302 (1971); JENKS, *supra* note 5 at 209; P. Jessup, *The International Court of Justice Revisited,* 2 VA. J. INT'L L. 306 (1971); J. Fawcett, *The Function of the International Court of Justice in the World Community,* 2 GA. J. OF INT'L AND COM. L. 62-3 (1971); T. FRANCK, THE STRUCTURE OF IMPARTIALITY 212-38 (1968).

[15]L. Gross, *The Time Element in Contentious Proceedings in the ICJ,* 63 AJIL 74-86 (1967); Fawcett, *supra* note 14 at 60-1; Jessup, *supra* note 14 at 304-5; J. Verzijl, *The Present Stagnation of Interstate Adjudication: Causes and Possible Remedies,* 2 INT'L RELATIONS 491 (1963).

[16]JENKS, *supra* note 5 at 119-84, develops a number of possible procedures.

ings.[17] Another major group of reforms deals with the size and composition of the Court. The lack of confidence in the Court's impartiality and objectivity has been widely identified as a crucial factor in its underuse. It is argued that the Court is loaded in favor of the "West" and the forces of "conservatism."[18] Gross has assessed the need for change in a number of aspects of the Court's composition.[19] Finally, there are proposals which deal with clarifying the sources of law applied by the Court as provided by article 38 of the Statute.[20] It is argued that states would have greater confidence in the law the Court applies if that law more explicitly reflected the interests of the entire community of nations.[21] The third group of reform proposals directs attention to the attitudes of statesmen which ultimately determine use or nonuse of the Court.[22]

With few exceptions these reform proposals are derived principally from an examination of the legal bases of the ICJ. It is revealing that most of the reform proposals could have been made thirty years ago when the Statute was being drafted! It seems to us that the reform proposals have paid insufficient attention to the actual practice of the Court. Since we have a wide range of states that have some relationship with the Court, it need not be difficult to anticipate the probable results of implementing some of the suggested reforms.

III. Testing the Reform Proposals

There are two distinct ways in which proposals for reforming the International Court of Justice can be developed and tested. The first is logical. The second is empirical, i.e., looking at exactly what the Court has done in its thirty-year history. For example, one could draw a perfectly reasonable logical inference that if states withdrew their reservations to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, the Court would be more widely used. On the empirical level one can test the same proposition by inquiring if those states having few reservations to the Optional Clause have, in fact, tended to make more use of the Court.

We acknowledge that some suggested reforms are not easy to test. Most conspicuous are those concerning state attitudes towards the Court.[23] However,

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[17]Gross, *supra* note 14 at 279.

[18]Verzijl, *supra* note 15 at 488-89; M. Bartos, *The Statute of the ICJ: Reform Pending*, 25 REV. OF INTER. AFF. 9 (1974).

[19]Gross, *supra* note 14 at 281-99.

[20]*Id.* 317; R. Higgins, *The UN and Lawmaking: The Political Organs*, 64 AJIL PROC. 37-48 (1970).

[21]Gross, *supra* note 14 at 319-20.

[22]Verzijl, *supra* note 15 at 479; Fitzmaurice, *Enlargement of the Contentious Jurisdiction of the Court*, in GROSS, *supra* note 3.

[23]There are no reliable surveys of state attitudes toward the Court although several attempts at assessing these attitudes have been made. Most recently is a questionnaire circulated by the UN Secretary-General—*see* REVIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, UNGA, 26th Session, A/8382, 15 Sept. 1971.

three of the suggested reforms will be examined and compared with the factual record amassed during the Court's history. The first reform that will be tested is the proposition that increasing the level of acceptance of the Optional Clause would result in more use of the Court. Second is the suggestion that if states increased the number of clauses in their treaties calling for submission of disputes to the ICJ, the result would be more Court activity. Third is the idea that if the Court were more broadly based, e.g., if more states had judges on the Court, states would have more confidence in the Court and would be more likely to make use of the Court.

In the discussion that follows we have assumed that actual appearances before the ICJ in contentious cases are the best indicator of states' support for the Court. We have argued elsewhere that support for the Court consists of at least three components, i.e., appearances, degree of acceptance of the Optional Clause, and attitudes.[24] For our purposes here, it seems preferable to concentrate on the least refutable component of support. The history of the Court readily reveals the nature and extent of the relationship between acceptance of the Optional Clause and use of the ICJ for settlement of disputes. The number of times each state has appeared before the Court in contentious cases is a matter of record. Most states have never appeared before the Court; to be exact 116 states have never appeared. Twenty-six states have appeared in exactly one contentious proceeding each. Only eight states have appeared before the Court more than once. The degree of acceptance of the Optional Clause is also a matter of record and is easily determined for each state. In this case, there are five basic possibilities:

1. no acceptance of the ICJ Statute
2. acceptance of the ICJ Statute, but not of the Optional Clause
3. acceptance of the Optional Clause with severe reservations
4. acceptance of the Optional Clause with minor reservations
5. acceptance of the Optional Clause without reservation.

Table I[25] provides a compact way of viewing the relationship between actual appearances before the ICJ and degree of acceptance of the Optional Clause. (See Table I on page 173.) Each state is classified according to both characteristics. For example, the United States is placed in a category with India and the United Kingdom by virtue of the fact that all three have accepted the Optional Clause, albeit with severe reservations, and all three have appeared before the

[24] *See* GAMBLE and FISCHER, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 81-9 (1976).

[25] All tables use six letter abbreviations for state names. In almost all instances the abbreviations are the first six letters of the states' names or some other easily recognized formulation, e.g., GERM.W is the Federal Republic of Germany. In cases of doubt *see* GAMBLE and FISCHER, *supra* note 24 at 131-35.

Court more than once. The most conspicuous thing about the table is the large number of states that have *never* appeared before the Court in contentious proceedings; but this should not be surprising to any student of the Court.

The principal reason for constructing the table was to inquire if the degree of acceptance of the Optional Clause has any demonstrable effect on states' actual appearances before the Court. The top row in the table reveals nothing unexpected, i.e., those states that have not accepted the Statute have never appeared before the Court. However, the next four rows indicate considerable variation in appearance propensity. The results can be summarized concisely in this way:

Degree of Acceptance of Optional Clause	*Number (%) Never Appearing Before the Court*	*Number (%) Appearing Before the Court at Least Once*
Acceptance of the Statute but not the Optional Clause	80 (85%)	14 (15%)
Acceptance of the Optional Clause with severe reservations	12 (63%)	7 (37%)
Acceptance of the Optional Clause with minor reservations	6 (35%)	11 (65%)
Acceptance of the Optional Clause without reservation	6 (75%)	2 (25%)

The results here are most revealing. There is no doubt that those states accepting the Optional Clause to any degree are more likely to make use of the Court. But the results are mixed. One might draw the logical inference that as the degree of reservation to the Optional Clause declines, use of the Court would increase. This seems to be the case only at certain levels; when one looks at the "no reservation" category the inferred pattern does not exist. This suggests that most change in favor of the increased use of the Court occurs when one moves from those states with severe reservations to those with only minor reservations. This would imply that most effort at reforming the Court should be directed at convincing states to accept the Optional Clause or to soften their reservations to the clause. For example, in the United States' case the Connally amendment might be replaced with a less debilitating reservation. But this line of reasoning has its limits; the United States is already a frequent user of the Court, at least in comparison to most other states. Thus it seems that encouraging states towards wider acceptance of the optional clause would probably have some tendency to increase use of the Court, but results would likely be unspectacular, even capricious.

Next we shall examine states' treaty clauses providing for use of the ICJ in the event of disputes arising under the terms of the treaties. Recently data have

become available on the totality of post-World War II treaty making.[26] Thus it is possible to note exactly how many treaties with ICJ disputes settlement clause commitments have been concluded by each state. This matter could be approached in two ways. We could calculate what percentage of each state's treaties have ICJ disputes settlement clauses or, alternatively, concern ourselves only with the absolute numbers of ICJ dispute settlement clauses in treaties concluded. Both methods were explored; it was found that only the latter produced significant results.

Table II follows a similar procedure to that employed in Table I, except that appearances before the Court are compared with the number of ICJ dispute settlement treaties to which each state is party. (See Table II on page 175.) The results are quite conclusive and can be summarized as follows:

Number of ICJ Dispute Settlement Clause Treaties	*Number (%) Never Appearing Before the Court*	*Number (%) Appearing Before the Court at Least Once*
More than 15 treaties	6 (30%)	14 (70%)
11 - 15 treaties	13 (65%)	7 (35%)
6 - 10 treaties	32 (84%)	6 (16%)
Fewer than 6 treaties	42 (86%)	7 (14%)

Evidently, concluding treaties with ICJ dispute settlement clauses does result in states making more use of the Court. We see a vast difference in the rate of Court appearances. Seventy percent of those states with more than 15 treaties have appeared before the Court. In contrast, only 14 percent of those states with less than six treaties have appeared before the Court. This provides irrefutable evidence that there is a relationship between the two attributes. But things are not as simple as this first blush examination might suggest.

Few contentious cases have reached the Court because of a treaty clause stipulating use of the Court for dispute settlement. Thus in most cases these clauses have not been a direct cause of the appearances before the Court. How then does one account for the strong relationship? One possible explanation is that concluding treaties with ICJ dispute settlement clauses is reflective of a supportive attitude toward the Court and that it is this attitude that ultimately results in states making use of the Court. Furthermore, since ICJ dispute settlement clauses never specify use of the ICJ if other methods are available,

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[26]We are indebted to the Treaty Research Center at the University of Washington and to its director, Professor Peter H. Rohn, for providing us with much of the needed treaty data. In addition, C. George Reithel's "Dispute Settlement Clauses in Treaties: A Quantitative Analysis" was most helpful.

one might infer that such clauses have a more symbolic, attitudinal importance than resulting directly in use of the Court.

Another aspect of Table II and, to a lesser extent, of Table I concerns the role of developed, Western states. It is well known that Western states, especially Western European, have been the most frequent users of the Court. Perhaps less well known is the fact that these Western states are prolific treaty-makers concluding agreements at many times the rate of most other states. Thus it is possible that the results in Table II are due at least in part to the concurrence of these two attributes, i.e., treaty-making and Court use, within this one group of states. However, it is our feeling that this is not sufficient to explain such strong patterns.

Table III examines another type of assumption about the Court, i.e., broader-based participation among ICJ judges would encourage states to make more use of the Court. (See Table III on page 177.) Of course, this was assumed at the time the Statute was drafted and resulted in provisions for judges *ad hoc*. Table III attempts to test a rather simple proposition: do those states that have frequently had nationals as judges on the Court tend to appear more frequently before the Court than do states that have been less well represented on the bench?

Number of Years with National as Judge on ICJ	*No Appearances Before the Court*	*At Least One Appearance Before the Court*
More than 10 years with a national judge	9 (64%)	5 (36%)
1 - 10 years with a judge	9 (56%)	7 (44%)
No judge on Court	98 (82%)	22 (18%)

The picture is a mixed one. While having a judge on the Court appears in overall terms to dispose states towards slightly more use of the Court, there are certain incongruities. The middle group with judges on the Court for 1-10 years has an appearance rate of 44% whereas the group with ICJ judges for more than ten years has a rate of only 30%. Part of this is certainly attributable to the USSR and East European states, several of which have been heavily represented on the Court but, except for Albania and Bulgaria, none has appeared before the Court.

Since many of the proposals for reforming the Court emphasize the necessity of making the Court more compatible with the aspirations of the developing states, it is important to look for any effect that representation among the Court's judges has had on these developing states. Of those developing states that have had some representation among ICJ judges, 19% have appeared before the Court at least once. Among those developing states that have *never*

had nationals as judges on the Court, 11% have had at least one appearance before the Court. This suggests a slightly increased tendency to use the Court because states have nationals as judges on the Court. At the very least these results indicate that changing the Statute so that many more nationals are represented would not have the profound effect envisioned by some. In fact, it is quite possible that the marginal increase in Court activity would be offset by the negative effects of a larger and more cumbersome adjudicative body.

IV. Conclusions

It is evident that suggestions for "reforming" the International Court of Justice have not achieved their desired goal. If there is any trend, it is in the direction of less ICJ activity.[27] This is sufficient in our opinion to suggest that some of the reform proposals have been misdirected. While in each of the three "reforms" that was tested empirically some positive influence was projected, we imagine that the effect is significantly smaller than has been presumed by the reformers themselves.

It is our contention that suggestions for changes and reform of the Court must, if they are to have any chance of success, address themselves more directly to the political realities of the Court's history. The Court is a political phenomenon subject to numerous political pressures, not the least of which is the decision made by national governments to use or not to use the institution of the Court. The tables confirm that certain states have a disposition to use the Court regardless of their stand on the Optional Clause. For example, the United Kingdom, the most frequent user of the Court, has rather severe reservations attached to its acceptance of the Optional Clause. Additionally, of the eight states that have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court without reservation, only two have ever appeared before the Court. Since this group is comprised entirely of developing countries, one questions the impact of many more third world countries accepting the Optional Clause.

The tables demonstrate graphically that the Court is still dominated by Western states. Although developing states now have an overwhelming numerical edge and are asserting themselves in many forums, fully one-half of Court appearances have been made by Western European states and their political/ideological heirs, e.g., the United States and Australia. This lopsidedness in use of the Court should give reformers cause for alarm. Are the reform proposals an attempt to apply Western standards and perceptions to an institution that is intended to be global in nature? We feel that the ineffectiveness of the proposals and continued Western dominance of the Court suggest that this may be the case.

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[27] GAMBLE and FISCHER, *supra* note 24 at 106.

It is clear that any attempt to reform the Court will encounter monumental political restraints, restraints that may be so basic as to preclude any meaningful reform. This may be the case with the Optional Clause; few states seem to be willing to relinquish sovereignty by accepting the Optional Clause with fewer reservations. There is a disturbing tendency to ignore the problems and lessons that should have been learned from the ICJ. For example, the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference seems destined to establish a new dispute settlement tribunal at least in part because of the inadequacies of the ICJ.[28] However, there remains serious doubt whether any new tribunal can avoid all or even some of the problems that have pushed the ICJ to the brink of atrophy.

Unquestionably the pacific settlement of international disputes remains one of the principal goals of international law. But the International Court of Justice has been shown to be infrequently and incompletely effective in achieving this goal. This situation has created pressures for reform in the nature and functioning of the Court. But it is vital that suggested reforms be cast in terms of what is politically possible and that the possible results of implementing reforms be examined in light of the complete past record of the Court.

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[28]For excellent discussions of the dispute settlement problems at the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference *see* L. Sohn, *Settlement of Disputes Arising out of the Law of the Sea Convention*, 12 SAN DIEGO L. R. 495-517 (1975); A. Adede, *Settlement of Disputes Arising Under the Law of the Sea Convention*, 69 AJIL 798-818 (1975).

TABLE I
Appearances Before Court and Acceptance of Optional Clause

	No Appearances Before Court				One Appearance Before Court		More Than One Appearance Before Court	
No Acceptance of Statute	ANDORA	BHUTAN	KORE.N					
	KORE.S	MONACO	NAURU					
	SANMAR	TONGA	VATCIT					
	VIET.N	VIET.S	WSAMOA					
Acceptance of Statute But not of Optional Clause	AFGHAN	ALGERI	ARGENT	BAHAMA				
	BAHRAI	BANGLA	BARBDO	BOLIVI				
	BRAZIL	BURMA	BURUND	C.A.R.				
	CHAD	CHILE	CHINA	CONGO				
	COSTA	CUBA	CYPRUS	CZECHK				
	DAHOME	ECUADR	EQGUIN	FIJI				
	GABON	GERM.E	GHANA	GRENAD				
	GUINEA	GU-BIS	GUYANA	HUNGAR	ALBANI	BULGAR		
	ICELAN	INDONS	IRAQ	IRELAN	CAMRON	ETHIOP		
	IVORYC	JAMAIC	JORDAN	KUWAIT	GREECE	GUATEM	GERM.W	FRANCE
	LAOS	LEBNON	LESOTH	LIBYA	IRAN	ITALY		
	MALAGS	MALAYS	MALDIV	MALI	PERU	S.AFRIC		
	MAURIA	MONGOL	MOROCO	NEPAL	SPAIN	THAILD		
	NIGER	OMAN	PARAGU	POLAND				
	QATAR	RHODSA	ROMANI	RWANDA				
	SAUDIA	SENEGL	SIERRA	SINGAP				
	SYEMEN	SRLNKA	SYRIA	TANZAN				
	TOGO	TRIN.T	TUNISA	TURKEY				
	U.A.E.	UPVOLT	USSR	VENEZU				
	YEMEN	YUGOSL	ZAIRE	ZAMBIA				

TABLE I (*continued*)

	No Appearances Before Court				One Appearance Before Court		More Than One Appearance Before Court
Acceptance of Optional Clause with Severe Reservations	BOTSWA MALAWI PHILIP	CANADA MALTA SOMALI	ELSALV MAURIT SUDAN	KENYA MEXICO SWAZIL	AUSTRA LIBERI	ISRAEL PORTGL	INDIA U.K. U.S.A.
Acceptance of Optional Clause with Minor Reservations	AUSTRI	JAPAN	FINLAN LUXEMB	GAMBIA	CAMBOD DENMRK NEWZEA SWEDEN	COLOMB LIECHT PAKIST SWITZD	BELGIM NETHER NORWAY
Acceptance of Optional Clause without Reservations	DOMREP	HAITI UGANDA	NIGERI URUGUA	PANAMA	HONDUR	NICARA	

TABLE II
Appearances Before Court and Number of ICJ Dispute Settlement Clause Treaties

	No Appearances Before Court	One Appearance Before Court	More Than One Appearance Before Court
More Than 15 Treaties	JAPAN LEBNON LUXEMB MEXICO PHILIP YUGOSL	AUSTRA DENMRK GREECE ISRAEL ITALY PAKIST SWEDEN	BELGIM FRANCE GERM.W NETHER NORWAY U.K. U.S.A.
11-15 Treaties	ARGENT AUSTRI BRAZIL CANADA CZECHK ECUADR FINLAN HAITI POLAND SRLNKA TURKEY USSR U.A.R.	CAMBOD GUATEM IRAN LIBERI NEWZEA SPAIN SWITZD	
6-10 Treaties	AFGHAN ALGERI BURMA CHILE COSTA CUBA CYPRUS DOMREP ELSALV GHANA GUINEA HUNGAR ICELAN INDONS IRAQ IRELAN JAMAIC JORDAN KORE.S LAOS MALAWI MALI MALTA MONACO NIGER NIGERI PANAMA PARAGU ROMANI SIERRA TANZAN VENEZU	ALBANI NICARA PERU PORTGL S.AFRIC THAILD	

TABLE II (*continued*)

	No Appearances Before Court			One Appearance Before Court		More Than One Appearance Before Court
Fewer Than 6 Treaties	BOLIVI C.A.R. GABON GUYANA KOREN LIBYA MOROCO SAUDIA SOMALI TOGO UGANDA VIET.N YEMEN	CHAD CONGO GAMBIA IVORYC KUWAIT MAURIA NEPAL SENEGL SUDAN TRIN.T URUGUA VIET.S ZAIRE	BURUND CHINA DAHOME GERM.E KENYA LESOTH MONGOL RWANDA SINGAP SYRIA TUNISA UPVOLT WSAMOA ZAMBIA	BULGAR COLOMB HONDUR	CAMRON ETHIOP LIECHT	INDIA

TABLE III
Appearances Before Court and Number of Years with National as Judge on Court

	No Appearances Before Court			One Appearance Before Court		More Than One Appearance Before Court	
More than 10 Years with Judge	ARGENT MEXICO USSR	CANADA POLAND U.A.R.	ELSALV URUGUA YUGOSL	PAKIST		FRANCE U.K.	NORWAY U.S.A.
1-10 Years with Judge	BRAZIL JAPAN PANAMA	CHILE LEBNON PHILIP	DAHOME NIGERI SENEGL	AUSTRL ITALY SPAIN	GREECE PERU	BELGIM	INDIA

TABLE III (*continued*)

	No Appearances Before Court				One Appearance Before Court		More Than One Appearance Before Court	
No Years with Judge	AFGHAN	ALGERI	ANDORA	AUSTRI	ALBANI	BULGAR	GERM.W	NETHER
	BAHAMA	BANGLA	BARBDO	BHUTAN	CAMBOD	CAMRON		
	BOLIVI	BOTSWA	BURMA	BURUND	COLOMB	DENMRK		
	C.A.R.	CHAD	CHINA	CYPRUS	ETHIOP	GUATEM		
	CONGO	COSTA	CUBA	EQGUIN	HONDUR	IRAN		
	CZECHK	DOMREP	ECUADR	GAMBIA	ISRAEL	LIBERI		
	FIJI	FINLAN	GABON	GUINEA	LIECHT	NEWZEA		
	GERM.E	GHANA	GRENAD	HUNGAR	NICARA	PORTGL		
	GU-BIS	GUYANA	HAITI	IRELAN	S.AFRIC	SWEDEN		
	ICELAN	INDONS	IRAQ	KENYA	SWITZD	THAILD		
	IVORYC	JAMAIC	JORDAN	LAOS				
	KORE.N	KORE.S	KUWAIT	MALAGS				
	LESOTH	LIBYA	LUXEMB	MALI				
	MALAWI	MALAYS	MALDIV	MONACO				
	MALTA	MAURIA	MAURIT	NEPAL				
	MONGOL	MOROCO	NAURU	QATAR				
	NIGER	OMAN	PARAGU	SANMAR				
	RHODSA	ROMANI	RWANDA	SOMALI				
	SAUDIA	SIERRA	SINGAP	SWAZIL				
	SYEMEN	SRLNKA	SUDAN	TONGA				
	SYRIA	TANZAN	TOGO	UGANDA				
	TRIN.T	TUNISIA	TURKEY	VENEZU				
	U.A.E.	UPVOLT	VATCIT	YEMEN				
	VIET.N	VIET.S	WSAMOA					
		ZAIRE	ZAMBIA					