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Book Reviews

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BOOK REVIEWS

AIRPORT OPERATION AND MANAGEMENT, by Charles A. Zweng (North Hollywood, California: Pan American Navigation Service. 1947, pp. 312 \$4.50)

This volume is the third contribution during the past year to a field in which previously the book-literature was practically non-existent. The two preceding volumes, "Terminal Airport Financing and Management" by Bollinger, Passen and McElfresh, and "Airports: Design, Construction, and Management" by Glidden, Law and Cowles are, however, somewhat different in scope, emphasis, and approach from this later work but add much to the airport manager's professional library. The announced purpose of Zweng's book is "for the use of universities, colleges, aeronautical schools, airport operators, instructors, and those who wish to be informed on the subject of airport operation and management". Its distinguishing characteristic is the emphasis placed on the managerial problems and responsibilities in airport operation.

The author uses the first chapter as an introduction to his subject. In it he emphasizes the relationship of the airport to the community, to the nation, and to other airports. In the second chapter he outlines background material concerning the planning and building of an airport. This chapter is an excellent summary of information taken largely from a wide number of Civil Aeronautics Administration sources.

Chapters three, four, and five make up the bulk of the text material. They have to do with airport operation, management, and sources of revenues. In them is brought together for the first time much previously available, but widely scattered, source material. Since much of the information is directly from the past experience of a number of airports, anyone interested in airport management should profit from reading these chapters. All three emphasize the practical side of running an airport. In addition they give an excellent handbook-type of picture of current practices with regard to concession charges, rentals, and fees.

Approximately one third of the total pages of the book are taken up by the final chapter and the appendices. They are mainly reprints of, and form a handy compilation of such material as the Civil Aeronautics Act and of bulletin information issued by the CAA and other bodies. Mr. Zweng has done a good job of bringing this material together.

The book is primarily a reporting job. As such it is an excellent contribution, well illustrated, and well balanced. An index would have made the volume more valuable as a book of reference, and a bibliography would have been helpful to the teacher and to the student studying the subject of airport management and operation.

LESLIE A. BRYAN*

THE RIGHT TO FLY — A STUDY IN AIR POWER, by John C. Cooper (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1947, pp. 380. \$5.00.)

The proponents of civil air transport as an integral and indivisible part of air power who may have found it difficult to sustain their thesis need look no further for arguments. Those who have attempted to separate military air power from civil air power now cannot fail to see the fallacy of their position and its tragic consequences if adopted. The appearance of "*The Right to Fly*" at a time when treaties of peace are under consideration, when the Security Council of the United Nations is engaged in the formulation of

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"practical measures for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces," and when atomic control is a consuming problem of our national leadership is but a further evidence of the intellectual acumen of its author.

In *"The Right to Fly"*, John C. Cooper, recently appointed consultant to the President's Air Policy Commission, presents a critical analysis of air power. For this task he is peculiarly qualified, and he frequently draws upon his wealth of experience as a representative of the United States Government at international aviation conferences and as a former executive of one of the world's largest international air transport enterprises. Mr. Cooper combines these unique qualifications with the results of his original research to produce the most thought-provoking book yet published in the field of aviation. It is a "must" for our representatives at international conferences considering the future status of ex-enemy nations and at the United Nations, for those charged with responsibility for our national defense and, in fact, for all those interested in any phase of aviation.

World War II established the important role of air power in national power. It stimulated international air transport. It posed with new emphasis the question of extending the right of nations to fly, and focused attention upon the universally accepted principle of a nation's exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory. It revived consideration of "freedom of the air". But until the publication of *"The Right to Fly"*, no attempt was made either to analyze the nature of air power and its constituent elements or to appraise the significance of a nation's control of its airspace.

Mr. Cooper employs a simple but a comprehensive definition of air power — "the ability of a nation to fly". This ability he finds to be composed of two elements, the political right to fly and the capacity to fly. The primary use of air power, in peace or war, according to the author, is transport through the airspace — transport of passengers, cargo, mail, parachute troops, bombs or machine guns. Though its transport uses are both military and civil, air power is indivisible. The sole effect of prohibiting a nation from manufacturing, possessing or using aircraft designed for military purposes is to limit the military striking force at a particular time. Mr. Cooper therefore concludes that the nation's potential air power remains and will continue so long as it retains the political right to fly, — to control the airspace over its own territory and to use that airspace for such purposes as it may determine.

No doubt many, including some of our most able military leaders, will challenge these hypotheses by arguing that if a nation is denied an armed air force, if it is prohibited from manufacturing or importing aircraft, from establishing or operating airports for military purposes, or from training operating personnel, the nation's air power will be destroyed. Such apparently was the thinking of those who drafted the proposed treaties on the "Disarmament and Demilitarization" of Germany and Japan. But the logic of Mr. Cooper's analysis, together with the historical facts gathered from original sources which are marshalled in support of his premises, place an almost unsustainable burden of proof upon the challenger.

"The real difficulty in appreciating the value of air power is the fact," as Mr. Cooper points out, "that it provides transport *in the airspace*". Whereas the right freely to navigate in territorial waters and on the high seas and to enter the ports of the world to pick up or discharge cargo has long been established, the right of an aircraft freely to fly over or land on foreign territory does not exist, except by international agreement or specific authorization. Hence, in any analysis of air power, the political right of each nation to control the airspace over its own territory must always be considered.

As evidence of the fatal effects which inevitably result from a failure to understand the nature of air power, Mr. Cooper examines the decisions made at the Peace Conference in 1919 and reviews the factors which influenced their making. Although the question of the control of the airspace had been the subject of discussion by legal scholars for a good many years prior to World War I, the question had become of prime political importance by the time the Allied Supreme War Council met at Versailles. The experiences of the war and considerations of national security were convincing arguments against acceptance of a legal theory of "freedom of the air." The result is characterized by Mr. Cooper as "a perfectly cold-blooded political de-

cision" that every nation has "complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory." This principle having been accepted, in light of events which followed, the position of President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing on the various issues is revealed as a tragedy of errors. At the same time that they demanded the destruction of German military air power, the American leaders insisted that there should be no interference with civil aviation, that "commercial" aviation should be free to develop as an aid to rebuilding Germany's economy, and that Germany should have exclusive control of its airspace, subject to the right of Allied aircraft to operate into and over Germany until January 1, 1923. The attempt to draw a line of demarcation between military and civil aviation proved impossible and a continuing source of dispute. Rules that on the one hand prevented the development of military aviation, on the other stultified the growth of commercial aviation. Germany's advantageous geographic position and its control of its airspace gave the ex-enemy nation an advantageous bargaining position. In the absence of Allied control of the German airspace, and continued prohibition against the manufacture or importation of aircraft, the plan was unenforceable. In short, the demilitarization of Germany in the air was a tragic failure and in less than twenty years German air power menaced the world. Mr. Cooper concludes, "The plan of the Treaty of Versailles for the demilitarization of Germany was unsound in theory. It proved unworkable in practice."

One of the outstanding contributions of Mr. Cooper's study of air power is his definition of the elements of this phase of national power. The author recognizes that the political problems arising from the right of a nation to control its airspace prevent any direct analogy with sea power. Nevertheless, employing the methodology used by Admiral Mahan in his famous study of *"The Influence of Sea Power upon History,"* Mr. Cooper approaches the problem of the *capacity to fly* by endeavoring to identify the tangible and intangible evidences of air power; the visible or short-range factors and the long-range factors which measure potential air power. In the first group, Mr. Cooper places 1) Aeronautical Industry, 2) Aeronautical Facilities, 3) Civil Air Establishment and 4) Military Air Establishment. These short-range factors determine the usable national air power at a given time but the absence of one or more of these elements does not destroy potential air power. The long-range factors, the intangibles, are identified by Mr. Cooper as 1) Geographic Conditions, 2) Resources, 3) Population, 4) Industrial Development and 5) Political Conditions. The presence and the extent and character of these criteria determine a nation's air power potential over a long period. It is the long-range factors which measure the capacity to fly.

In the last three chapters of his book, Mr. Cooper applies these elements to the U.S.S.R., the British Commonwealth and the United States for the purpose of measuring their potential air power. The discussion is emphasized and made more graphic by twelve maps prepared on the azimuthal equidistant projection produced by Mr. H. Lester Cooke, Jr., under the general direction of Professor John Q. Stewart of the Department of Astronomy of Princeton University. Four key locations in the territory of each of the three countries illustrate their relative geographic potential. Those of the Soviet Union are unrivaled. The other basic elements of air power are also present in Russia to make it a potential rival of United States' air power. Only in the character, education and accomplishments of the American people and our industrial development do we have an advantage. Mr. Cooper asserts that to maintain our dominant position and to realize our full air power potential we must have a sound national plan which will assure the continued existence of our aeronautical industry. The recent action of the President and of Congress in appointing committees to study and make recommendations with respect to our national air policy may indicate a government determination to retain our air power leadership.

In the judgement of Mr. Cooper, three problems of air power control confront the world today. They are:

1. The air power future of the principal ex-enemy nations, Germany and Japan. Draft treaties now under consideration leave with these nations their airspace sovereignty. If air disarmament of these ex-

enemy states is to be effective, they must surrender to the United Nations control of the airspace over their respective territories and must also surrender their right to fly over the high seas.

2. The regulation and reduction of armaments in aid of world peace. The solution of this problem is not easy. Past attempts to distinguish between military and civil aviation have not been successful and, in modern warfare, every type of aircraft is potentially an instrument of war. None of the basic elements of a nation's capacity to fly can be effectively controlled as part of a program of partial disarmament. Control would require total air disarmament and a decision of this character would mean the abolition of air transport.

3. The international control required to assure that air transport does not become an instrument of unfair nationalistic competition or aggression and, thus, the sources of international misunderstanding. This question cannot be answered until the United Nations have determined the place of air transport in the disarmament program.

Mr. Cooper's application of the elements of air power to pressing current international problems is new and refreshing. He sounds a warning lest we repeat some of the mistakes which he believes so materially contributed to the rebuilding of the German air force between 1919 and 1939.

The appendices include valuable documents hitherto not readily available, and his bibliography of source materials will be useful to all students of air power.

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