Arms Control is not Disarmament†

The greatest deterrent to a real beginning of nuclear or conventional disarmament or even arms control is fear and distrust by each of the world's two great superpowers, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,¹ and now Communist China.

Prominent physical and political scientists of many nations believe that freedom from nuclear war for over twenty-five years has been due only to the existence of a nuclear balance of power. Many also believe that to disturb this balance will tempt one superpower or the other to initiate a World War III to gain social, economic and political domination of the world.

World domination is a stated ecopolitical goal of Chinese Communism and, independently, of Soviet Communism. The free nations of the world do not seek world domination. The Khrushchev shoe-striking on the table at the United Nations, saying "We will bury you" will never be forgotten. Lenin said: "War is a continuation of politics by means of force." Karl Marx' "Manifesto" laid the ecopolitical basis² for Soviet-Communist world domination. Mao's writings have laid the ecopolitical basis for Chinese Communist world domination.

Political scientists know that realistically democracy and government for the free individual never can be reconciled (even by socialism-in-between) with communism and the supremacy of the State.

One time-tested well-known element of deliberate pre-war diplomacy is to get one's military and ecopolitical opponents to relax, disarm, and really

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†This article is presented by the author in his individual capacity, and not as representing the U.S. Government or any agency thereof.

³Louis Menkin, Disarmament Background Papers and Proceedings of the Fourth Ham- marskjöld Forum, The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Oceana Publica-


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believe in paper peace treaties. One step in that direction today is called “peaceful coexistence.” So-called “just” wars of national liberation show the actual Soviet meaning of “peaceful coexistence,” to the whole world. *Then,* as has been the fact so often historically, an irrational leader seeking world domination strikes suddenly and militarily with both fists. Has the nuclear strategic balance of world power stopped the historically-proven cycle? Only future history can answer this.³

Perhaps a clue to the answer is found in the lack of a U.N. space-liability treaty⁴ after seven years of dedicated multi-national efforts; or in continued conventional warfare threats and occupations, as in Hungary or Czechoslovakia; or in competitive communistic subversive warfare, against various forms of government, particularly in developing nations in Africa and South America; or in conventional warfare as in Viet Nam.

“Vietnamization,” which is making rapid progress in 1970, according to computer reports from Viet Nam, is really another successful example of what has protected freedom of man so well in political warfare in Indonesia and many other countries.

Geoeconomics and ecopolitics, plus raising demands for food and clothes and a better standard of living for people of both communist and free democratic nations, drives the two superpowers to the coming strategic arms-limitations discussion. Arms limitation, or arms control, is restraint upon present or future armaments policy. It could involve the use, deployment, force level or kind of arms or weapons systems. Disarmament is the reduction of present arms to any level. It may be on any basis, multi-lateral or bilateral. It involves time-controls, steps and enforcement, inspections and economics. It involves nuclear and conventional, strategic offensive and defensive systems which are not mutually exclusive. Many international treaties historically have combined both arms control and disarmament.⁵ Continuous on-the-ground inspection, even with observation satellites for surveillances, will always be necessary.⁶ Fear and distrust prevail, with the recent history of eighteen solemn treaties since 1917, to which the communists have been parties, now dishonored. The current

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proposed Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties opens further new potential loopholes.

Is the pressure of ecopolitics and geoeconomics from the home front people of the two superpowers great enough for the Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) talks to be mutually beneficial to world peace? In non-professional language, one might cite this as the “pressure” of the home front people’s demand to cut their own nations’ war costs. Such costs exist in many places and phases of every nation’s expenditures and budget.

The recent talks at Helsinki gave a frame to the “talks picture” wherein the two largest nuclear superpowers might see mutual economic benefit in not expanding their strategic “overkill” potential.7 But technological surprise and innovations can quickly put an end to this “pressure” from the home front. How? By finding a “break-through” in strategic nuclear defense or offense—which gives more strategic defense or offense for the dollar—or the ruble.

Next we come to the three other nations who admittedly possess strategic nuclear weapons, and are not included in these SALT talks. It is now predicted that there will be ten nations so armed by 1980. Do the two superpowers dare actually change, even a modicum in favor of “home” front economic demands with three others rapidly expanding their nuclear offensive weapons and delivery systems at their very backs? The Soviets particularly must be concerned with this strategic multilateral war potential because of the Chinese Communists,8 who are already a nuclear strategic threat.

The above basic economic and political contest between the United States and the Soviet and Chinese Communists is being widened by technology, and by the increased competition in a fast shrinking world of high-speed transport and communications. Dr. Conrad Longmire of Los Alamos, in his great proposal, suggested that the United States use radiation from one of our warheads to knock out all the enemy warheads in thousands of cubic miles of space. Magnetic flux high-large-burst nuclear defense, MIRV, MOBS, FOBS, SLBMS and US and Soviet ABM Systems are presently bringing much stability to the world nuclear balance of power.9

Professor John Wheeler of Princeton says: “Is ABM effective? The Soviet System is! Without firing a single shot it has forced us into making a twenty per cent cut in effectiveness of our Minute-Man missiles. (Their

7Id.

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anti-ballistic network had already forced us to subdivide our warheads.) Is
ABM provocative? The Soviet ABM System is not. Why should we
deprive the free world of a system that is effective and nonprovocative?"
We have not. Scientists on both sides of the Iron Curtain have said in
substance that there is "no surer way to bring about World War III than to
fall behind in weapons technology."
Due to advancing technology, secrecy of defense and of international
security positions are today more uncovered than heretofore. This must
not be viewed too optimistically. The basic overriding peacekeeping force
today is the US-USSR strategic nuclear balance relationship. This over-
riding nuclear strategic balance is "on the table" to some extent in bilateral
strategic-arms-limitation talks. Hence key importance of the SALT talks
to world peace. Hence President Nixon has rightly given them the highest
priority consideration, as he stated prior to their commencement in Hel-
sinki.

The United Nations views these delicate relationships of the two su-
perpowers as overriding in keeping nuclear peace in the 1970s. The U.N.
believes that neither superpower can afford to see any small power
conflicts escalate into superpower involvement. This basic world nuclear
peace factor must be maintained by keeping the two superpowers' nuclear
strategic balance. Prominent professors and scientists in the US and the
USSR have both seen the proven value of twenty-five years of world
nuclear peace by this balance. Can the balance be kept and the ecomilitary
load on each side of the balance be equally reduced?
The think-tank experts, and the aerospace law institutes, in countries
around the world today are giving continuous study to arms control and
outer-space peace. The 1967 U.N. Outer Space Treaty expressly prohib-
ted the full orbiting of weapons of mass destruction. This was an enormous
step for peace. It is today observed by over forty-two signatory nations.
Communist China must soon join this mutually beneficial treaty, or be in
bad faith in the eyes of all nations of the world.

Think-tank institutes have indicated surprise-free projections for the
arms-limitation talks of the 1970s. They also have presented conventional
warfare alternatives, based on the highly air mobile forces of the two
superpowers, available to protect US and USSR respective world-wide
interests. A crisis escalation—not a nuclear "mistake" or deliberate at-
tack—is the most probable cause of strategic nuclear World War III. Crisis
escalations and crisis deescalations are well postulated by such think-tanks
both in geographic and future time-frame sequences.

Mix alternatives, of small controllable nuclear warfare, plus large and
small conventional warfare, are also postulated. All are related to vast

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increases in national and world GNP, as well as the vast increase in world population. The think-tanks often show basic weakness in two areas: (1) no "proposition" can evaluate fast-changing national willpower of its people; and (2) no "proposition" can cover all ecopolitical alternatives as well as military-mix in future warfare.

By political doctrinal "proposition" the Soviet Communists (contrary to the Chinese Communists) have stated that large-scale strategic nuclear global warfare is not necessary to achieve Soviet Communist world domination; unless one of the other projected future ten, or present five, strategic nuclear powers commences it against the USSR. In such case, they might opt for fast "world domination." Why have both the Soviet, and now the Chinese Communists, gone all out for nuclear air raid shelters? The answer is fear and distrust of each other and of any other nation's strategic nuclear power.

Bilateral negotiations in the strategic arms race have begun. The ameliorating influence of multi-lateral discussions under the UN aegis galvanizes world public opinion. In bilateral secretive discussion it is not present. Perhaps more progress can be made in bilateral secret talks. But what good is a paper treaty, without world public opinion to enforce it, when semantics in treaties have so often left loopholes, whether deliberately or not?

President Nixon is one who wants all options equally presented to him in evaluating international security. All nations want permanent world peace. Thus, more annual money for domestic programs and more food and clothes and shelter for each nation's homefront people would be available, and more money to aid developing nations. The decisions on the options in the 1970s' strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) will determine mankind's future world.

In the New York Times of December 18, 1969, it was stated:
Top officials here—including Secretary of State William P. Rogers, the standard-bearer of the new approach to China—take the view that a policy simply aimed at seeking advantage in the Soviet-Chinese dispute would be shortsighted, and in the end, self-defeating. For one thing, they say, neither Moscow nor Peking would seriously respond to American initiatives deriving from such a simplistic attitude. Instead, the Administration is thinking pragmatically of a comprehensive worldwide policy for the 1970s and this policy, to make sense, must take into account the realities of both Soviet and Chinese power.

In conclusion it is noted that President Nixon's message to U.S. Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, at the opening of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) at Helsinki, Finland on November 17, 1969 stated: "You are embarking upon one of the most momentous negotiations even en-

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10*Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Week Ending Saturday, November 22, 1969, page 1616.*
trusted to an American delegation. I do not mean to belittle the past. The Antarctic Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and most recently, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which we hope will soon enter into force, were all important steps along the road to international security. Other tasks remain on the agenda of the United Nations and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Today, however, you will begin what all of your fellow citizens in the United States and, I believe, all people throughout the world, profoundly hope will be a sustained effort not only to limit the build-up of strategic forces but to reverse it.

"I do not underestimate the difficulty of your task; the nature of modern weapons makes their control an exceedingly complex endeavor. But this very fact increases the importance of your effort.

"Nor do I underestimate the suspicion and distrust that must be dispelled if you are to succeed in your assignment. I am also conscious of the historical fact that wars and crises between nations can arise, not simply from the existence of arms but from clashing interests, or the ambitious pursuit of unilateral interests. That is why we seek progress toward the solution of the dangerous political issues of our day.

"I am nevertheless hopeful that your negotiations with representatives from the Soviet Union will serve to increase mutual security. Such a result is possible if we approach these negotiations recognizing the legitimate security interests on each side.

"I have stated that for our part we will be guided by the concept of maintaining 'sufficiency' in the forces required to protect ourselves and our allies. I recognize that the leaders of the Soviet Union bear similar defense responsibilities under a mutually acceptable limitation and eventual reduction of our strategic arsenals.

"We are prepared to discuss limitations on all offensive and defensive systems, and to reach agreements in which both sides can have confidence. As I stated in my address to the United Nations, we are prepared to deal with the issues seriously, carefully and purposefully. We seek no unilateral advantage. Nor do we seek arrangements which could be prejudicial to the interests of third parties. We are prepared to engage in bona fide negotiations on concrete issues, avoiding polemics and extraneous matters.

"No one can foresee what the outcome of your work will be. I believe your approach to these talks (SALT) will demonstrate the seriousness of the United States in pursuing a path of equitable accommodation. I am convinced that the limitation of strategic arms is in the mutual interest of our country and the Soviet Union."

Realistically, the ecopolitical scientists predict for the late 1970s a world configuration of two super-power nations, ten strategic nuclear armed na-
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Arms, and over a hundred nations, with non-nuclear or only some strategic nuclear arms capability. Therefore, in the present time frame, bilateral superpower SALT talks do make practical sense. It is now, if ever, the time to find a safe workable bilateral basis for mutual strategic arms limitations, which other nations may adopt later in the 1970s, within the United Nations, or otherwise.

It is the people of both super-power nations who have much to gain in homefront economics and in mutual security; provided that the essential strategic nuclear balance of power is always maintained, and provided that such strategic arms limitations do not prevent full accomplishment and discharge of vital defense responsibilities for itself and its allies, which each of the two super-powers clearly must do. Within this full strategic nuclear sufficiency and balance of power, there is room for "a mutually acceptable limitation and eventual reduction of our strategic arsenals," as President Nixon has so well stated.

Even if the bilateral SALT talks in 1970 accomplish nothing due to multi-national fear and distrust, internal nationalistic economic pressure from the people of each nation for domestic needs in their national spending may limit strategic arms, to some extent. Internal nationalistic economic pressure from the people of each nation for domestic needs in their national spending also accelerates research and technology in each nation to produce and maintain more efficient strategic arms at less cost. For twenty-five years we have had world peace from World War III by the strategic nuclear balance of power. It is to be hoped that the strategic arms balance scale will always remain nearly equal, and hopefully lighter, in the 1970s and forever, for all mankind.

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