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The Decision-Maker and the Scholar: Who Reads Whom

(A Research Note)†

Scholars in the fields of international law and relations can in part be distinguished by the audiences for whom they write. Some, motivated by a concern for methodological or conceptual sophistication, publish exclusively for their academic colleagues. Others, striving for real world "relevance," act as the conscious and self-chosen critics of governmental decision-makers. Still others, motivated by a cause as much as by scholarship, proselytize on behalf of particular policies. They, too, write for policy-makers, but rather in the form of advocates than as keepers of the national conscience.

The extent to which the governmental official will be receptive to the latter two groups is largely determined by the services these groups can provide. Here the international legal scholar may perhaps have an advantage. As the repository of a unique expertise, he knows that the policy-maker or concerned legal adviser may occasionally require his guidance. In return, his cause will be furthered to the degree that he can make the law relevant to the needs of the practitioner. Hence the potential exists for a recognized reciprocity of interests.¹

Regardless of the extent to which he acknowledges any common bond, however, the policy-maker's interpretation of events will in part be struc-

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¹The writings of legal scholars have generally been listed among the secondary "sources" of international law. (See, for instance, Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.) That decision-makers may look to these writers for justification, if not always guidance, is commonplace. See Anthony D'Amato, *International Law-Content and Function: A Review*, JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION XI, No. 4 (1967), p. 505. Refer also to WILLIAM D. COPLIN, *THE FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966), p. 14. Coplin discusses the tendency of legal scholars to write for the "users" of law.

tured by what others—including scholars—have said about a particular situation or about the international environment in general. Everyone's perception of reality is a product of second-hand learning as well as first-hand experience. What is not so obvious, however, is the degree to which received knowledge acts as an influencing factor. While social psychologists have recently begun to examine the multiple attitudes that motivate decision-makers, little attention has yet been focused on the secondary sources that may help shape those attitudes.² To find out "who reads whom" is only a preliminary exercise, of course, but the implications deriving from data of this sort may prove suggestive for further studies. Such, at least, was the simple rationale behind the inclusion of an "academic-familiarity" question in a recent survey of State Department personnel.

The overall project dealt with the roles of law and the lawyer in the State Department's administration of foreign policy. Approximately sixty interviews were held from among selected members of the Legal Adviser's Office, Foreign Service officers with legal training, and Foreign Service officers without legal training.³ Among the questions asked was one which listed, in alphabetical order, the names of twenty-two scholars in the fields of international law and relations. The respondents were asked to place "a single check (x) next to those with whose writings you are familiar and a double check (xx) next to those that you feel may have influenced your own thoughts on the two subjects."⁴ The concepts "familiar" and "influence" were left undefined and therefore were answered on the basis

²In their classic study of sixteen years ago, Richard Snyder and associates were among the first to analyze the motivational aspects of decision-making. Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics*, reprinted in SNYDER, BRUCK, and SAPIN (eds.), *FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING* (New York: The Free Press, 1962). See especially pp. 137-171. For more recent psychologically-oriented studies, see several of the readings in HERBERT C. KELMAN (ed.), *INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965); and also JOSEPH H. DERIVERA, *THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF FOREIGN POLICY* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Pub. Co., 1968).

³Altogether sixty-one interviews were conducted. Fifty-four of these were formal and complete interviews, with the other seven being *ad hoc* or, for one reason or another, incomplete. Seven people among the fifty-four whose interviews were otherwise complete chose not to answer this particular question. Consequently, the results reported are for a total response group of forty-seven. The members of the Legal Adviser's staff and the FSO-lawyers were chosen on the basis of a random sample stratified according to rank (GS, FSO, FSR). Those interviewed were in general proportion to the number in each rank. The non-legal Foreign Service Officers were chosen in the same fashion, with the exception of four individuals at the Deputy-Assistant-Secretary level, who were specifically recommended because of the representative nature of their contact with the Legal Adviser's Office. This latter fact should not have affected the responses to the particular question which is being considered here.

⁴They were also asked to add to the list anyone not mentioned who they felt had "figured significantly" in their own "conceptualizations" of international law and relations. The names that were added broke down as follows:

of individual subjective judgments. Such judgments, of course, are only roughly comparable, but the intention of the question was simply to get some idea of which scholars were most often identified, and who, among them, were considered "influential."

The twenty-two men whose names appeared on the list were chosen subjectively on the basis of several criteria. For present purposes, they can most easily be classified into the following three categories:

CATEGORIES OF PRINCIPAL SCHOLARLY INTEREST

Legal (L)*	Legal-International (L-I)*	International Relations (IR)*
Baxter, Richard	Falk, Richard	Deutsch, Karl
Bishop, William	Fisher, Roger	Hoffmann, Stanley
Brierly, James L.	Henkin, Louis	Kaplann, Morton
Briggs, Herbert	Wright, Quincy	Morgenthau, Hans
Friedmann, Wolfgang		Schelling, Thomas
Jenks, C. Wilfred		Schuman, Frederick
Kelsen, Hans		Snyder, Richard
McDougal, Myres		
McWhinney, Edward		
Sohn, Louis		
Stone, Julius		

*The notations L, L-I and IR will be used hereafter to designate the three categories of legal, legal-international, and international relations scholars.

The first group (L) consists of eleven scholars whose primary focus of intellectual interest (as determined by general research and teaching indices) is clearly international law. Their orientations to the subject differ considerably, however. Some are basically case-book authors (Briggs, Bishop), while others represent theoretical views as diverse as the monism of Hans Kelsen, and the policy science of Myres McDougal. Still others, such as Richard Baxter, were included because of their long-term identification with Harvard—a known source of recruitment for many young members of the Legal Adviser's Office.

ADDED BY:	LEGAL ADVISERS	FSO-LAWYERS	FSO's
Number added:	27	11	18
Those who were mentioned more than once:	Lauterpacht, Hersch (4) Chayes, Abram (3) Whiteman, Marjorie (2) Hackworth, Green (2) O'Connell, D. P. (2)	Kennan, George (3)	Kennan, George (3) Kissinger, Henry (2)

As can be seen, the names added more than once by the legal advisers were all lawyers. Chayes and Hackworth were former legal advisers. Miss Whiteman is still a member of the Office. This tendency to look to fellow practitioners held also in the case of George Kennan's selection by the two groups of FSO's. The individuals who were named only once, however, fell into no discernible pattern. They ranged everywhere from practicing diplomats to sixteenth century philosophers.

The four men listed in the second group (L-I) are not so easily classifiable. They seem to devote about equal attention, in their teaching and research, to international law and to other areas of international relations. Quincy Wright, for example, can be considered both a "traditional" international lawyer and a pioneering student of conflict resolution. Richard Falk, Roger Fisher, and Louis Henkin, while all legally oriented, also seem to be making conscious efforts to diversify their attention—and their audiences—into other areas.

The third group (IR), falling into the general category of international relations scholars, also represent diverse points on the theoretical spectrum. Hans Morgenthau and Frederick Schuman are "traditionalists" of the power politics school. It was anticipated that their textbooks would probably have been the common source of reference for most Foreign Service Officers—at least those over thirty. Kaplan, Schelling, Deutsch, and Snyder are each well-known spokesmen for their particular areas of theoretical interest; namely, systems, bargaining, integration, and decision-making theories respectively. Stanley Hoffmann, in turn, is what might be described as a "meta-theorist"—he theorizes about theory. Also, he writes generally on foreign policy and whatever other subjects seem to attract his attention⁵

Again, the subjective nature of this classificatory scheme should be emphasized. While the names were originally listed only in alphabetical order, it was felt that for purposes of analysis they should be presented under the above three general categories. Based upon this division, Tables 1-3 give an indication of how the overall response was distributed.

TABLE 1
COMPARATIVE OVERALL RESPONSE

Category	Number Answering	Number of x's	Ave. Number of x's	Number of xx's	Ave. Number of xx's	Total Marks x's & xx's	Average
Legal Advisers	18	157	8.7	31	1.7	188	<i>10.4</i>
FSO-Lawyers	13	67	5.2	10	.8	77	<i>5.9</i>
FSO's	16	53	3.3	19	1.2	72	<i>4.5</i>
	47	277	5.9*	60	1.3	337	<i>7.2</i>

*In Tables 1-4, the decimals and/or percentages have been rounded off to the nearest tenth. In all cases, "total" or "overall" results have been figured on the basis of the absolute figures rather than by averaging the other averages.

⁵A related, though as yet unpublished, "who-reads-whom" study has been done recently by Bruce Russett at Yale. By factor-analyzing the text and footnote citations of sixty-eight "prominent and productive" international relations scholars, Russett has identified twelve

TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSE PER CATEGORY

SCHOLAR CATEGORY	LEGAL ADVISERS				FSO-LAWYERS				FSO'S			
	x's		xx's		x's		xx's		x's		xx's	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Legal (L)	102	54	17	9	34	44	4	5	11	15	5	7
Legal-Inter'l (L-I)	40	21	9	5	13	17	3	4	8	11	3	4
Inter'l Rel. (IR)	15	8	5	3	20	26	3	4	34	47	11	15
Total	157	83%	31	17%	67	87%	10	13%	53	74%	19	26%

As can be seen from Table 1, the average member of the Legal Adviser's Office considered himself familiar with the writings of almost half of the twenty-two men listed. His comparative rate of response was considerably higher than either the FSO-lawyer or the regular Foreign Service officer. This, of course, was to be expected, due to the heavy predominance of legally-oriented scholars on the overall list. In terms of "double checking," or attributing influence to any of the scholars, the legal adviser also responded on a higher absolute basis. But as can be seen by the division of response according to categories in Table 2, the legal adviser did not distribute his double checks on as high a comparative basis as did the Foreign Service officer. The latter, in effect, cited one out of every four authors checked (26 per cent) as having an "influence" on his own thoughts regarding international law and relations.

Table 2 also reflects a rather interesting factor in that the combined percentage of checks and double checks apportioned by the legal advisers to L scholars (63 per cent) is virtually the same as that given by the Foreign Service officers to IR scholars (62 per cent). The degree of *identification* with the most proximate discipline, therefore, was remarkably similar. It should nevertheless not be interpreted from this that the relative *familiarity* with scholars in one's own field was the same. A better measure

major methodological and theoretical "schools" of international politics. Five of the groupings are headed by individuals listed on our "IR" roster (Deutsch, Hoffmann, Kaplan, Morgenthau, and Schelling). For comparative purposes, it would have been interesting to include Russett's other seven "group leaders" (Haas, North, Guetzkow, Liska, Singer, Halperin, Rosenau) on the questionnaire that was prepared for State Department personnel. Unfortunately, however, the author was unaware of the Russett study at the time the interview schedule was being prepared and administered. (Winter, 1968-69). It is also unfortunate that Russett did not include the field of international law in his survey (Richard Falk being the only person on our "L" and "L-I" lists who was included). There is, consequently, no basis for determining whether the same legal scholars who are cited by State Department personnel are also recognized as "leaders" among their academic colleagues. For the other comparisons, however, see Bruce M. Russett, *Methodological and Theoretical Schools in International Relations*, (unpublished paper, Yale University).

of this latter characteristic is the comparative *rate* of response indicated by Table 3. Here checks and double checks were added together to give a single figure for each category. That figure was then divided by the total possible checks per category that could have been received (number of scholars times number of respondents). The resulting percentages indicate the "proportionate recognition rates" (e.g., the average legal adviser checked 60 per cent of the eleven legal scholars—roughly six—while the average FSO checked 9 per cent—roughly one).

TABLE 3
PROPORTIONATE RECOGNITION RATES

Scholars	Legal Advisers	FSO-Lawyers	FSO's	Overall Average
Legal (L)	60%	27%	9%	33%
Legal-Inter'l (L-I)	68	30	17	40
Inter'l Rel. (IR)	16	25	40	27
Overall Average	47%	27%	20%	33%

Perhaps the most obvious result reflected by Table 3 is the relative lack of familiarity across disciplinary lines. The 9 per cent recognition rate for L scholars given by the nonlegally trained Foreign Service officers is particularly apparent. The 16 per cent recognition by legal advisers of the listed IR scholars is also low. Overall, the average familiarity with the IR people (27 per cent) is not very impressive. This will become especially obvious when we note, further on, the dominance of Hans Morgenthau. Without Morgenthau, the overall recognition rate for the other six IR scholars falls to 20 per cent—an average response of one out of five.

Another noticeable feature about Table 3 is the straddling position of two groups, the L-I scholar and the FSO-lawyer. The former, though admittedly only four in number, were given the highest overall rate of recognition—(40 per cent). The latter considered himself familiar with all three groups of scholars at approximately the same rate—(27 per cent, 30 per cent, 25 per cent). Conceivably, the FSO-lawyer represents that "generalist-specialist" who Burton Sapin has suggested is necessary to work and think effectively across departmental and professional boundaries.⁶ Before discussing this and other possible implications, however, some attention should be devoted to the number and kind of responses given to the most prominent individuals.

⁶See BURTON M. SAPIN, *THE MAKING OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 354.

TABLE 4
OVERALL ORDER OF RANK

Rank	Name	x's	xx's	Total	% of 47 possible
1	Morgenthau, Hans	25	8	33	70
2	Wright, Quincy	23	3	26	55
3	Sohn, Louis	20	4	24	51
4	McDougal, Myres	15	5	20	43
5	Henkin, Louis	12	7	19	40
5	Baxter, Richard	16	3	19	40
5	Brierly, James L.	16	3	19	40
5	Kelsen, Hans	18	1	19	40
9	Falk, Richard	16	2	18	38
10	Bishop, William	15	2	17	36
11	Schelling, Thomas	10	5	15	32
11	Friedmann, Wolfgang	15	0	15	32
13	Briggs, Herbert	11	3	14	30
13	Deutsch, Karl	13	1	14	30
15	Fisher, Roger	10	3	13	28
15	Stone, Julius	10	3	13	28
17	Kaplan, Morton	10	0	10	21
18	Hoffmann, Stanley	4	4	8	17
18	Jenks, C. Wilfred	6	2	8	17
20	Schuman, Frederick	6	0	6	13
21	McWhinney, Edward	5	0	5	11
22	Snyder, Richard	1	1	2	4

TABLE 5
RANK WITHIN CATEGORY

LEGAL (L)			LEGAL-INTER'L (L-I)			INTER'L REL. (IR)		
Rank	Name	%	Rank	Name	%	Rank	Name	%
1	Sohn, Louis	51	1	Wright, Quincy	55	1	Morgenthau, Hans	70
2	McDougal, Myres	43	2	Henkin, Louis	40	2	Schelling, Thomas	32
3	Baxter, Richard	40	3	Falk, Richard	38	3	Deutsch, Karl	30
3	Brierly, James L.	40	4	Fisher, Roger	28	4	Kaplan, Morton	21
3	Kelsen, Hans	40				5	Hoffmann, Stanley	17
6	Bishop, William	36				6	Schuman, Frederick	13
7	Friedmann, Wolfgang	32				7	Snyder, Richard	4
8	Briggs, Herbert	30						
9	Stone, Julius	28						
10	Jenks, C. Wilfred	17						
11	McWhinney, Edward	11						

In discussing the response in terms of its breakdown according to individual scholar, some allowance must be made for the bias caused by both the nature and the number of the respondents. Had there been the same number of non-legal FSO's as legal advisers (two more), for instance, some of the IR people would probably have advanced a notch or two. Even so, Hans Morgenthau effectively cuts across disciplinary lines (Table 6) to receive by far both the highest total vote and the most number of double checks. The next two men, Quincy Wright and Louis Sohn, assure that all three categories of scholars are represented in the top three. Sohn, as can

TABLE 6
RANK ORDER BREAKDOWN

SCHOLARS:	LEGAL ADVISERS				FSO-LAWYERS		FSO's		TOTALS	
	x's	xx's	x's	xx's	x's	xx's	x's	xx's	Grand	
Legal (L)										
Sohn, Louis	11	3	5	1	4	0	20	4	24	
McDougal, Myres	11	4	4	0	0	1	15	5	20	
Baxter, Richard	15	1	0	2	1	0	16	3	19	
Brierly, James L.	11	1	4	0	1	2	16	3	19	
Kelsen, Hans	11	0	5	1	2	0	18	1	19	
Bishop, William	8	2	7	0	0	0	15	2	17	
Friedmann, Wolfgang	10	0	4	0	1	0	15	0	15	
Briggs, Herbert	10	2	1	0	0	1	11	3	14	
Stone, Julius	6	3	2	0	2	0	10	3	13	
Jenks, C. Wilfred	5	1	1	0	0	1	6	2	8	
McWhinney, Edward	4	0	1	0	0	0	5	0	5	
Total	102	17	34	4	11	5	147	26	173	
Legal-Inter'l (L-I)										
Wright, Quincy	14	1	6	1	3	1	23	3	26	
Henkin, Louis	7	4	3	1	2	2	12	7	19	
Falk, Richard	11	2	3	0	2	0	16	2	18	
Fisher, Roger	8	2	1	1	1	0	10	3	13	
Total	40	9	13	3	8	3	61	15	76	
Inter'l. Rel. (IR)										
Morgenthau, Hans	9	2	6	2	10	4	25	8	33	
Schelling, Thomas	0	1	5	1	5	3	10	5	15	
Deutsch, Karl	3	1	2	0	8	0	13	1	14	
Kaplan, Morton	1	0	3	0	6	0	10	0	10	
Hoffmann, Stanley	1	1	2	0	1	3	4	4	8	
Schuman, Frederick	1	0	2	0	3	0	6	0	6	
Snyder, Richard	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	2	
Total	15	5	20	3	34	11	69	19	88	
Grand Total	157	31	67	10	53	19	277	60	337	

be seen from Table 6, achieves his high score because he too was able to cut across disciplinary lines.

Sohn also, of course, ranks number one within the separate category of L scholars (Table 5). Myres McDougal is close behind, however, and from the legal advisory people he received the highest number of double checks. Either because of his prolific writing, or due to his "policy-oriented" approach (or both), McDougal seems to have made an impression. Richard Baxter, as expected, received a high total from among the lawyers, but, somewhat unexpectedly, only one of the legal advisers considered him "influential." The "functionalists"—Friedmann, Stone, and Jenks—were generally ranked rather low.⁷ Edward McWhinney, McDougal's sociologically-oriented disciple, was the least familiar to the interviewed personnel.

⁷These three individuals were so labeled by Richard Falk in his recent article on *New Approaches to the Study of International Law*, *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL*

Louis Henkin, as noted earlier, was one of the four men most difficult to classify. His relatively high personal influence (seven xx's) is probably due to his recent book, *HOW NATIONS BEHAVE*, in which he attempts to explain the multiple effects of law on the conduct of foreign policy.⁸ Richard Falk and Roger Fisher, the two other members of this L-I group (along with Wright), were less well known than had been expected. But here the age factor is probably explanatory, since the writings of both Falk and Fisher are comparatively recent. Of the younger writers (e.g. under 45), Falk is actually the most widely known (Table 4).

Among the IR scholars, Hans Morgenthau received more than double the percentage vote of his closest runner-up, Thomas Schelling.⁹ Morgenthau was the only member of the group to obtain any substantial recognition from the legal advisory personnel. Schelling quite possibly received much of his vote because of his recent *ARMS AND INFLUENCE* book in which he discusses the "diplomacy of violence" and attempts to make relevant many of the ideas previously developed in his discussions of strategy and game theory.¹⁰

Among the other IR scholars listed, Karl Deutsch received the highest total vote and Stanley Hoffmann the most number of double checks. This situation can perhaps be explained by the fact that it is hard not to have at least heard of Deutsch if one's interest is in international relations, but that his formal work probably appears less policy oriented to the decision-maker than does that of Hoffmann.¹¹

This question of relevance must be held in abeyance, however, since

LAW, LXII (April, 1967), pp. 477-495. Falk intends the label to imply a "jurisprudential orientation . . . (that) concentrates upon certain sorts of legal developments"—namely, those at the periphery of the system where political conflict is minimal. See pp. 492-493. The functionalist approach originally derives from the work of DAVID MITRANY (e.g. *A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946).

⁸LOUIS HENKIN, *How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968). Two of the members of the Legal Adviser's staff specifically referred me to this book during the interviews.

⁹In the Russett study, Schelling was runner-up to Deutsch in terms of overall "influential scores" (as determined by summing the percentage frequency of citations for each of the sixty-eight scholars analyzed). Morgenthau was sixth on the list. Two other members of our "IR" roster—Kaplan and Hoffmann—ranked seventh and eighth on the Russett list. The three men in Russett's top eight who were not included on the State Department questionnaire were Russett himself, Ernst Haas, and J. David Singer. They ranked third, fourth and fifth respectively. (See Russett, *op. cit.*, Table 2).

¹⁰THOMAS SCHELLING, *ARMS AND INFLUENCE* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). See also *THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT* (New York: Galaxy Book, Oxford University Press, 1963); and, with MORTON H. HALPERIN, *STRATEGY AND ARMS CONTROL* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961).

¹¹It is quite possible that Deutsch himself would consider the policy community to be the most appropriate audience for much of his recent work. It seems doubtful, however, that State Department decision-makers would interpret his efforts the same way—especially in comparison with a "popular-press" type of article such as Hoffmann's recent *Policy for the 70's*, LIFE MAGAZINE, VOL. 66, No. 2 (March 21, 1969), pp. 68-78.

Richard Snyder, whose name is most closely associated with the “decision-making approach” was virtually ignored in our sample. The Snyder situation seems particularly unusual, since many of those interviewed – including lawyers – indicated that one of their principle reasons for joining the Department was because of interest in the “foreign policy decision-making process.”¹² Apparently the concept of “decision-making” has been assimilated into the language of foreign policy, though one of its original formulators may have been forgotten.¹³

Summary and Evaluation

To summarize generally the findings of Tables 1–6 requires that some personal judgments be made on the part of the observer. Nevertheless, particular conclusions seem to stand out. Among them, for instance, would be the apparent prevalence of decision-making elites for theorists who, in academic circles, might be considered somewhat unfashionable.¹⁴ The fact that Hans Morgenthau, Quincy Wright and Louis Sohn were the three most cited scholars indicates that exposure to a writer (*e.g.*, as determined in part by how long he has been writing), is a more important variable of recognition than the reliability of his ideas. Such a statement is a virtual truism, of course, but it takes on meaning when its possible consequences are reviewed. While Morgenthau, Wright and Sohn can still be classified as intellectual giants, it does seem doubtful that any of these men are now looked to for theoretical inspiration by the younger generation of academic scholars.¹⁵ That they are most often recognized by policy practitioners, however, may well give “real world relevance” to their ideas.

¹²It should also be noted that a joint survey of a few years ago indicated that more teachers of international law and organization cited the decision-making approach as having influenced their thinking than they did any of the other forms of contemporary theory. See *A SURVEY OF THE TEACHING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENTS*, (AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW and the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, 1963), p. 61

¹³For a brief discussion of the history and usage of the term “decision-making,” see James N. Rosenau, *The Premises and Promises of Decision-Making Analysis*, in JAMES C. CHARLESWORTH (ed.), *CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ANALYSIS* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp 189-211 (esp. p. 203).

¹⁴The anthropologist Ralph Linton once commented that “the ghosts of defunct theories have a way of haunting the halls of other disciplines for at least a generation after they have been given decent burial in their original homes.” Linton, *Psychology and Anthropology*, *Journal of Social Philosophy*, (January, 1940), p. 116.

¹⁵This statement might have to be modified somewhat in Morgenthau’s case, since he does appear sixth on Russett’s list of overall influentials. Also, he emerges clearly as the most frequently cited member of the “National-Interest” school, though, as Russett points out, that group as a whole “is rather ignored by others.” (Russett, *op. cit.*, p. 15). It is possible that the repeated references to Morgenthau illustrate what Russett terms “negative influence” – *e.g.*, one who is cited as a bad example. Kenneth Thompson has noted, for instance, that “much of the literature of international politics is a dialogue, explicit or not, between Morgenthau and

A factor which no doubt contributes to this popularity of "unfashionable theorists" is the tendency among decision-makers toward "reinforcement" in their reading habits. As exhibited by the lack of cross-disciplinary familiarity in Table 3, lawyers read legal scholars and Foreign Service officers read international relationists. When the two professions are combined, however, as in the case of the FSO-lawyer, there seems to be a higher degree of intellectual cross-fertilization. This would suggest that the State Department—if, in fact, it is interested in new and imaginative ideas—should recruit its officers more actively from sources that have previously been neglected.¹⁶ Limitations in perspective can be overcome by personnel diversification as well as by personal development.

That there is also room for expanding the perceptual frameworks of existing personnel, is indicated by the fact that only three of the twenty-two scholars listed were recognized on a "familiarity basis" by 50 per cent of the individuals interviewed. This finding lends empirical evidence to the overall conclusion that there is a greater need for State Department decision-makers, regardless of specialty, to keep in closer contact with the literature of the social sciences.¹⁷ Occasional book reviews of area studies or tracts on foreign policy—as published by the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL—are not enough. What seems more essential is that there be an increased awareness of the theoretical, quantitative and cross-disciplinary efforts now so prevalent among sophisticated scholars.¹⁸

his critics . . ." Thompson, *American Approaches to International Politics*, YEARBOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS (1959), p. 222; as cited in CHARLES A. McCLELLAND, *THEORY AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966) p. 63 (with McClelland serving as a good example of one of Morgenthau's critics).

¹⁶One such source would seem to be the nation's law schools. Though there has long been a controversy over the various approaches to legal education (e.g., the utility of case study, of policy orientation, etc.), there seems little question that the young lawyer receives a training in "problem solving" that equips him with a functional skill of great value to the decision-maker. Of all the FSO-lawyers who were interviewed, however, none had been recruited while in law school. For a brief discussion of the arguments for and against the legal perspective in policy-making, see GENE M. LYONS and LOUIS MORTON, *SCHOOLS FOR STRATEGY* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 88-90. For some helpful suggestions on how the State Department's recruitment procedure might be improved, see Frances Fielder and Godfrey Harris, *The Quest for Foreign Affairs Officers—Their Recruitment and Selection*, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1966), esp. pp 26-34, 60-61.

¹⁷The courses offered by the Foreign Service Institute in the various areas of international relations, e.g., those on international law and contemporary theory, are definitely steps in the right direction. So too, of course, is the mid-career university training concept. (For a recent suggestion on how the latter should be expanded, see Frederick A. Gerlack and Mark Beach, *Academic Details: A New Concept in Foreign Service—University Relations*, FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, 46, No. 1 (Jan. 1969), pp. 22, 27). Nothing, however, can adequately substitute for the simple expansion and diversification of reading habits by working-level personnel.

¹⁸Andrew Scott has noted that "the Department of State operates in a field that is crying out for the development of theory and broad insight, yet many of its people are not aware that foreign affairs can have a theoretical dimension." Scott, *The Department of State: Formal*

The thrust of such recent work is positive and value free, and an intellectual acquaintance with its techniques and content can extend and enliven the decision-maker's "capacity for judgment." As Max Millikan has perceptively pointed out, social science cannot replace intuition and experience, but by enriching, clarifying, and making them more general, it "can enormously strengthen the validity of the intuitive process."¹⁹

If the policy officer is properly to appreciate the contemporary trends in social science, however, he needs to have the literature explained, evaluated and put into perspective. Here the responsibility falls on the academician. That the State Department may "cry out" for theory and insight is as much a reflection of the scholar's failure as it is of the decision maker's. The former must keep his language free of jargon and his criticisms constructive. He must point out the inadequacies of a power-oriented theory (e.g., Morgenthau's) while also examining the utility of contenders (e.g., such as those of Kaplan, Deutsch, and Snyder). Most of all, the academician must make his own research understandable, and communicable to others. His work must pass the test of comprehension if not of relevance. Potentially, at least, his audience must include the decision-maker.

Organization and Informal Culture, INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, XIII, No. 1 (March 1969), p. 14. Scott is concerned primarily with the State Department's lack of interest in what he terms "basic research." The blame, he contends, lies with the sub-cultural ideology of the Department which is short-term oriented, and replete with defense mechanisms against "outside" policy assessments. For a similar, though more chronological, criticism of the State Department's research activities, see JOHN ENSOR HARR, *THE PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMAT* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 124-27, 324-25. E. Raymond Platig comes to the defense of the Department somewhat in his *Foreign Affairs Analysis: Some Thoughts on Expanding Competence*, INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, XIII, No. 1 (March 1969) pp. 19-30.

¹⁹Specifically, Millikan notes that problem-oriented research in social science "can illuminate the variety of forces at work, can place limits on the range of possible outcomes, can force implicit, partial judgments into explicit form in which they can be systematically examined and their applicability tested, and can explore the internal consistency of a variety of intuitive expectations." Max Millikan, *Inquiry and Policy: The Relation of Knowledge to Action*, in RICHARD A. FALK and SAUL MENDLOVITZ (eds), *THE STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER*, Vol. II, *International Law* (New York: World Law Fund, 1966), p. 102; reprinted from DANIEL LERNER (ed.), *THE HUMAN MEANING OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES* (Cleveland: World Publishing Co. 1959; A Meridian Book, 1965), pp. 158-180.