At the Crossroads Between Bankruptcy and Aviation: The Proposed Bankruptcy Venue Reform and the Imperilment of Foreign Airlines’ Availment to U.S. Bankruptcy Courts Under Chapter 11

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Recommended Citation
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol87/iss3/9

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The COVID-19 pandemic has wreaked havoc on several of the nation’s industries, aviation being no stranger given the financial difficulties, flight cancellations, and health mandates the sector consequently faced. Despite concerns that a wave of bankruptcy filings would submerge U.S. bankruptcy courts, the domestic need for restructuring did not arise as predicted, the main reason being the federal assistance provided to enterprises in peril. On the contrary, foreign debtor airlines were the ones to avail themselves of the experience and efficiency of magnet districts for restructuring under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Simultaneously, large domestic corporations sought the assistance of New York and Delaware to restructure quite far from their home districts. This phenomenon, known as forum shopping, revived a spirit of congressional reform; proponents sought to condemn forum shopping as undermining the fairness and integrity of the bankruptcy system overall. Thus, Congress introduced a bill to reform bankruptcy venue and ultimately put an end to forum shopping.
This Comment critically analyzes the arguments by proponents of reform—arguing in favor of a “race to the bottom” theory that condemns the practice of forum shopping—as compared with arguments by opponents of reform—perceiving the current status quo and bankruptcy venue as racing debtors to the top by having magnet districts offer expertise, efficiency, and predictability to entities in need of restructuring. In siding with “race to the top” theorists, this Comment further explains the danger reforming bankruptcy venue could have in undermining the United States’ position as the golden standard in Chapter 11 restructuring, forcing foreign debtor airlines to avail themselves of courts in the United Kingdom (U.K.) or Singapore that are progressively becoming restructuring hotspots. Proposed alternatives to bankruptcy venue reform include remedies limiting forum shopping to protect the United States’ reputation in restructuring and preserve the rights of U.S. creditors.

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I. INTRODUCTION

IT WOULD SEEM ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE not to discuss the COVID-19 pandemic because it has drastically altered the course of people’s lives. In addition to the pandemic’s human
impact, the financial uncertainties that emerged from the pandemic have wreaked havoc on several of the world’s industries, one being aviation. Some statistics released by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) reveal the devastating effects the pandemic has had on global air transport, the decline in air passengers for the year 2020 being the largest ever recorded since the 1950s.\(^1\) Aviation experts generally agree that a full recovery ought not to be expected until 2024.\(^2\) With anticipated financial distress comes bankruptcy. Many experts predicted “a tidal wave”\(^3\) of filings and called on Congress to increase the capacity of bankruptcy courts to handle a flood of bankruptcy filings.\(^4\)

Surprisingly, many of the filings that made their way to the United States were not from domestic companies but rather foreign entities availing themselves of the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.\(^5\) This noted decrease in domestic filings\(^6\) and absence of U.S. airlines seeking restructuring assistance can be partially explained by the financial assistance of the federal government from the CARES Act, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of

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\(^1\) Airline Industry Statistics Confirm 2020 Was Worst Year on Record, IATA (Aug. 3, 2021), https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/pr/2021-08-03-01 [https://perma.cc/ZNR6-PQBR]. IATA recorded 1.8 billion passengers flying in 2020, “a decrease of 60.2% compared to the 4.5 billion” passengers flying in 2019. Id. Looking at the industry-wide demand for air travel, IATA recorded a drop by 65.9%, estimating total industry passenger revenues to have fallen by 69% with total net losses of $126.4 billion. Id.


\(^5\) Richard J. Cooper & John H. Veraja, Chapter 11: An Increasingly Popular Tool for Foreign Companies Seeking to Restructure or Liquidate, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (OCT. 2021), https://www.financierworldwide.com/chapter-11-an-increasingly-popular-tool-for-foreign-companies-seeking-to-restructure-or-liquidate#YeSuG-BOUt [https://perma.cc/U7U3-HQYY] (referencing a study published by the Bankruptcy Research Database of the UCLA School of Law demonstrating that the number of large foreign corporations filing for bankruptcy has more than doubled from the previous high).

\(^6\) See Skeel, supra note 4.
2021, and the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, all providing billions of dollars to passenger and cargo air carriers. On the contrary, foreign airlines—especially airlines from Latin America—avidly sought the help of U.S. courts given the limited, if not nonexistent, assistance provided to them by their respective governments. During the course of the pandemic, four airlines have filed in the Southern District of New York to restructure and resume flying operations: Avianca (having first restructured in 2003), LATAM, Aeroméxico, and Philippine Airlines.

Whether coincidental, the increased number of foreign airlines filing for bankruptcy in New York came at an opportune time. In fact, the bankruptcy filings by large U.S. corporations far away from their “home districts,” including Purdue Pharma and several Catholic dioceses, has revived the debate of re-

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10 In re Aerovias Nacionales de Colom. S.A. Avianca, 303 B.R. 1, 1–2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) [hereinafter In re Avianca].


14 See Skeel, supra note 4.
forming bankruptcy venue. Unbeknownst to most, this “populist” reform movement emerged in the 1990s and became a renewed topic of discussion following those filings; proponents of reform accused forum shoppers of threatening the integrity and fairness of the bankruptcy system. However, reforming bankruptcy venue as it stands today could bar foreign entities and airlines from accessing U.S. courts altogether. But why should that be of concern, especially when dealing with actors in aviation?

This Comment attempts to answer the aforementioned question. Part I provides an overview of the Bankruptcy Code and specific provisions of Chapter 11 that have made it a global tool of reference for restructuring. Part II offers a discussion of the bipartisan Bankruptcy Venue Reform Act introduced in Congress in June 2021. It further evaluates the debate by scholars and practitioners on the “race to the bottom” versus “race to the top” dichotomy by rejecting the former approach. Lastly, Part III analyzes how reform could develop a global phenomenon of forum shopping, which would likely make foreign airlines reticent to avail themselves of U.S. courts. By arguing against reform, Part III attempts to demonstrate how the project to reform bankruptcy venue would (a) undermine the United States’ place as the global leader in aviation and (b) weaken the protections U.S. laws afford U.S. creditors.

II. THE TOURISM MAGNET AS THE RESTRUCTURING REFERENCE

A. HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND MOST NOTABLE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER 11

The U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Code), specifically its Chapter 11 restructuring provisions, have been described as “one of the strongest and most well developed business reorganization schemes in the world.” When it first enacted the Code, Con-
gress intended to allow for the rescue and rehabilitation of “the honest but unfortunate debtor,” which also included the business entity experiencing financial distress. This idea of bankruptcy provided a breathing spell—a fresh start to the debtor—which has made the U.S. bankruptcy laws stand out worldwide.

The original 1898 Bankruptcy Act became the subject of reform following the Great Depression, a time when keeping businesses in operation while “restructuring their obligations” became paramount. One could argue that the COVID-19 pandemic has embodied similar concerns. After forty years without reform to the Code, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States was officially established in 1970 to make some changes that both Congress and practitioners alike felt were necessary to meet the economic demands of the time. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 emphasized the legislature’s goal to encourage debtor rehabilitation. This “first comprehensive reform of federal bankruptcy law” since the 1930s focused on protecting both debtor and nondebtor interests and was subsequently followed by multiple amendments. The last significant amendment to the bankruptcy laws came with the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), which was passed into law after practitioners and commentators advocated for reform to address the apparent deficiencies in the law in light of the changing economic environment and inequities among different creditor constituencies.

Presently, air carriers are seeking ways to bolster their liquidity, cure defaults on aircraft leases, and process ticket refunds—all of which can be efficiently accomplished through a Chapter

\textit{tems: The Perils of Legal Transplantation, 28 B.C. Int’l. & Compar. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2005)}.

\textit{Id. (citing Jason J. Kilborn, Bankruptcy Law, in Governing America: Major Decisions of Federal, State, and Local Governments from 1789 to the Present 41–49 (Paul J. Quirk & William Cunion eds., 2011)).}

\textit{Id. (citing Kilborn, supra note 20, at 41–49).}


\textit{Id. at 10.}

\textit{See Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47 B.C. L. Rev. 129, 131 (2005).}

\textit{Id. at 142, 148.}

\textit{See generally ABI Report, supra note 19, at 11.}
11 restructuring. Their principal goal is to stabilize their business through capital infusion, a “breathing spell” that Chapter 11 can grant. The restructuring remedy is often perceived as debtor-friendly in part because of the debtor-in-possession (DIP). The DIP, often a member of the company’s management, remains in control of the assets and runs the company in its ordinary course of business while undergoing reorganization. Chapter 11 has remained the gold standard for business restructuring over time—setting aside the pandemic and its impact on the aviation industry. For example, the Colombian airline Avianca first took advantage of U.S. courts in 2003 by using Chapter 11 to restructure. The broad scope of what constitutes “property” for eligibility purposes has permitted foreign companies to meet a de minimis threshold in getting a “passport” into U.S. courts. Extensive case law from magnet districts—the Southern District of New York and Delaware—supports that proposition by showing how permissive certain judges have been in

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28 Id. at 24.


32 Judge Gropper’s discussion of the appropriateness of bankruptcy venue in the Southern District of New York for the Colombian airline and his response to creditors will be discussed in detail in Part II, infra.


finding in favor of the debtor’s eligibility under § 109(d), deeming “a dollar, a dime or a peppercorn” sufficient.

Some of the Code’s provisions are worth revisiting because they are mainly responsible for the United States’ status as the tourism magnet for restructuring. In addition to a DIP overseeing the whole reorganization process, the global automatic stay is one of the most attractive features of a Chapter 11 reorganization given that the far-reaching provision comes into effect immediately upon filing. By encompassing “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property,” the provision’s reach is immense and prevents any creditor from taking any action that could be detrimental to the filing entity absent court approval. The automatic stay allows for the capture of both tangible and intangible interests of the filing entity and claims against it, regardless of a creditor’s location in the world. Some practitioners note that the mere threat of filing for bankruptcy in the United States and the resulting automatic stay have served as powerful negotiating techniques to encourage out-of-court restructuring. While the automatic stay makes Chapter 11 an op-


36 In re McTague, 198 B.R. 428, 431–32 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that $194 in a bank account was “clearly ‘property’” despite the foreign entity’s operations and assets being mainly located abroad, while noting a bad faith filing could result in a dismissal of the case if property was put in the United States for eligibility purposes).

37 See Clark, supra note 8.


40 See U.S. Cts., supra note 30.


timal choice, one key consideration is whether U.S. court orders will be enforceable against foreign creditors. This is often not of concern because the overwhelming majority of airlines’ credit lenders and bondholders have ties to the United States, making them subject to U.S. jurisdiction and remedies for violating the automatic stay.

Another provision to consider is the plan permitting the debtor to restructure over time. Under Chapter 11, voting for plan approval requires two-thirds in claim amounts and at least 51% in numbers for each class of creditors; in contrast, many foreign countries require a greater percentage of assenting creditors. While plan confirmation must meet certain statutory requirements, Chapter 11 uniquely provides debtors with a major tool against recalcitrant creditors that, until very recently, was only available in U.S. courts. The Code’s cramdown provision permits courts to disregard creditors’ objections by deeming the plan “fair and equitable, with respect to each class [of creditors] . . . [t]hat is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.”

In addition to letting a DIP run the reorganizational effort, DIP financing adds to the appeal of Chapter 11. This provision allows a DIP to seek funds and secure capital deemed essential to a successful restructuring and exiting bankruptcy; both LATAM and Aeroméxico used this feature of the Code. As an
example of how powerful DIP financing can be, Swissport International, a global cargo and aircraft ground handling company operating in forty-seven countries with two hundred legal entities, added a provision to its lending agreement that would have permitted Chapter 11 reorganization. Swissport used DIP financing as a negotiating tool; the leverage of having a possible DIP loan with priming priority was sufficient to convince international creditors to settle—fearing the senior status of DIP financing against their debts in repayment priorities.

While the ability to sell property “free and clear of any interest” and liens may be another appealing provision, the ability to reject executory contracts (not yet fully performed) and unexpired leases might come at the top of the list. Section 1110 is specifically relevant to airlines undergoing restructuring since the debtor must agree to perform its obligations and cure any defaults within sixty days of the petition date. Failing to do so would allow the debtor airline to reject the lease and abandon the leased assets to the lender. This provision may indeed prove invaluable to fleet rationalization in times of financial distress and drastically reduced airline travel. In addition, because Section 365 further permits the rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs), it is a powerful tool even when dealing with foreign workers’ unions.

B. Venue, Once Again up for Debate

Unquestionably, the most controversial provision of the Bankruptcy Code pertaining to Chapter 11 is that of bankruptcy venue, which allows a debtor to file in any district


54 Id.


56 Id. § 365(a).

57 Id. § 1110(a)(2). Avianca, LATAM, and Aeroméxico all rejected aircraft leases. Graulich, Piraino & Masaro, supra note 27, at 24. LATAM specifically rejected nineteen aircraft leases along with some of its Japanese operating leases. Clark, supra note 8.


(1) in which the *domicile*, residence, principal place of business . . . or principal assets in the United States, of the person or entity . . . [has] been located for the one hundred and eighty days immediately preceding such commencement . . . or

(2) in which there is pending a case . . . concerning such person’s affiliate, general partner, or partnership.\(^{60}\)

While this provision leaves the debtor with a wide array of potential districts to choose from, a change of venue may be prompted “in the interest of justice or for the convenience of the parties.”\(^{61}\) This venue issue, revived by the COVID-19 pandemic, unleashed a “populist backlash” similar to the reaction to the 2008 financial crisis.\(^{62}\) Proponents of venue reform denounced bailouts of large financial institutions and corporations that filed for Chapter 11 in venues far from their home districts.\(^{63}\) Reform proponents claimed that these filings ultimately jeopardized the interests of local parties by allowing forum shopping for favorable precedent.\(^{64}\) In this regard, the infamous magnet districts of Delaware and the Southern District of New York\(^ {65}\) have long been criticized for undermining the fairness of the bankruptcy system. Through this practice, not only are debtors picking a specific venue but also the judge that will hear their case.\(^{66}\) One critic of the current system, Professor Lynn LoPucki,\(^ {67}\) went as far as implying that judges in those districts essentially lured companies, ultimately enticing forum shopping and depriving local venues of the opportunity to hear the case where financial distress might be felt the most.\(^{68}\) LoPucki’s fervent accusations against New York and Delaware were repri-

\(^{60}\) 28 U.S.C. § 1408(1)–(2) (emphasis added).

\(^{61}\) Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1014(a) (1)–(2).

\(^{62}\) See Skeel, supra note 4.

\(^{63}\) Id.

\(^{64}\) See id. (referring to the controversial filings by Purdue Pharma and several Catholic dioceses); Levitin, supra note 17, at 150.

\(^{65}\) Jane VanLare & Hugh K. Murtagh, *Chapter 11 Venue—Defending (or Upending) the Debtor’s Choice*, 12 PRATT’S J. BANKR. L. 25, 26–27 n.7 (2016) (suggesting that a majority of large Chapter 11 filings over the past thirty years have been in Delaware and the Southern District of New York); see Trend Tracking, UCLA-LoPucki Bankr. Rschl. Database, https://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/trend_tracking.php [https://perma.cc/988N-7VDE].

\(^{66}\) See Levitin, supra note 17, at 150. Certain districts such as White Plains, New York, only have one sitting bankruptcy judge. Id. at 153.

\(^{67}\) LoPucki is known to be an avid advocate of universalism and bankruptcy venue reform. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, *Courting Failure: How Competition for Big Cases Is Corrupting the Bankruptcy Courts* 123–25 (2005).

\(^{68}\) Id. at 124–25.
manded as an “offensive fantasy” by some. Similar to LoPucki, Judge Rhodes, who oversaw the restructuring of the City of Detroit, described the venue selection process as “the single most significant source of injustice in Chapter 11” and denounced the threat it posed to the integrity of the bankruptcy system given how the alleged “bankruptcy system . . . appear[ed] so easily manipulated.”

One example discussing the venue issue and whether venue would have been proper outside of New York is In re Avianca. Contrary to some of the positions explored above is Judge Gropper’s take when presiding over the first Avianca filing. Though quite unpopular at the time it was released, his opinion discussed some of the key concerns of proponents of bankruptcy venue reform, concerns that are still present today. Judge Gropper took a bold position in upholding a debtor’s venue selection when he found venue in the Southern District of New York as proper for a foreign airline incorporated in Colombia despite having most of its assets, employees, and creditors located abroad. Noting that insolvency laws in Colombia were relatively new and untested, the judge concluded that an American venue would be proper considering the airline’s fleet, its largest creditors and lessors, were all “located or doing business in the United States.” In response to a motion to remove the case to a Colombian venue that many saw as more proper, Judge Gropper explained that cases where such transfer had been allowed were due to an already-existing foreign proceed-

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72 Id. at 8–14.
73 Id. at 3–4, 11.
74 Id. at 10 (noting filing by a parent company headquartered in Colombia rested on its U.S. subsidiary, Avianca, Inc., for proceedings in an American forum).
75 Id. at 3. One of Avianca’s American creditors was the Bank of New York, the issuer of notes held by the airline’s creditors, whose agreement was governed by New York law. Id. at 10. As previously discussed, the ability of an American bankruptcy court’s judgment to bind foreign creditors, lessors, and financial institutions is central to choosing the United States as a restructuring venue. See Elberg, Laukitis & Downing, supra note 42.
ing entitling them to recognition under § 305(a)(2). In such case, filing in the United States would solely be to access certain laws and remedies not available in the foreign home jurisdiction, which would ultimately render U.S. venue improper.

Lastly, Judge Gropper highlighted another key facet of the properness of U.S. venue: the level of contacts the Colombian airline had with American creditors. He stated that the airline’s real assets were its contractual rights such as the aircraft leases, right to use airport facilities, and agreements with travel agents. In his view, the leased aircraft were the most important assets to the airline. Due to their mobility, control over the lessors could amount to “the equivalent of control over the assets [themselves].” Considering that Colombian law did not offer an effective mechanism for rejecting leases the way § 1110 might and that Avianca’s main creditors were in fact aircraft lessors, Judge Gropper rejected the creditors’ motion for change of venue and deemed venue proper in New York.

This 2003 case touches on certain points of controversy that prompted reform to bankruptcy venue, begging the question of why forum shopping should be tolerated especially in favor of foreign entities with mostly foreign creditors and overseas business. While critics and proponents of reform both raise valid points, a closer look at venue and the “race to the bottom” versus “race to the top” dichotomy undeniably reveals why forum shopping is desirable in bankruptcy, more so than in other areas of the law.

III. BANKRUPTCY VENUE REFORM OF 2021

A. REVIVING THE SPIRIT OF REFORM

The revived call to reform bankruptcy venue came as a bipartisan bill first introduced in the Senate by Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and Senator John Cornyn (R-Tex.), both of whom wished to tighten venue rules for corporate debtors.
The key highlights of the proposed reform include eliminating forum shopping by limiting a bankruptcy filing to the debtor’s principal place of business or location of principal assets 180 days prior to filing. Interestingly, this bipartisan effort to reform venue is not the first of its kind. While Congress successfully achieved the goal of eliminating the state of incorporation as an appropriate venue, the reform was abandoned from 1973 to 1978. Congress ultimately restored the state of incorporation with the 1978 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. More recently, the Bankruptcy Venue Reform Act of 2011 had similar bipartisan support, and the 2018 reform effort similarly focused on eliminating the state of incorporation as a venue option, with the latter bipartisan bill having the support of then-Vice President Biden in a historic policy reversal. But ultimately, all prior attempts at reforming bankruptcy venue failed.

The current version of the proposed reform comes at a time of urgent caution with a looming recession and the anticipated “avalanche of mega cases” that will likely arise once federal financial assistance ceases. The Senate and House bills are virtually identical, and both criticize the wide range of permissible bankruptcy venues outside of the debtor’s home district. Forum shopping and the inadvertent “concentration of bankruptcy cases in a limited number of districts,” they argue, prevent stakeholders from “fully participating in bankruptcy cases that have tremendous impacts on their lives, com-

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84 Id. For a publicly traded company, the principal place of business would presumably be the location listed on its SEC filings. Id.
85 Ivan J. Reich, Making the Case for Bankruptcy Venue Reform, 28 COM. L. LEAGUE AM. 7, 8 (2013).
86 Id. at 8, 8 n.14 (2013).
87 Id.
88 Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 467.
89 See Skeel, supra note 4.
91 See generally S. 2827, 117th Cong. (2021). Only the Senate Bill’s provisions will be referenced throughout this discussion for ease of reading.
93 Compare S. 2827, with H.R. 4193.
94 S. 2827 § 2(a)(4).
munities, and local economies.” The drafters of the bills boldly proclaim that this much-needed reform to bankruptcy venue would reduce “forum shopping . . . [and] strengthen the integrity of, and build public confidence and ensure fairness in, the bankruptcy system.” Under the current venue provision, the definition of domicile allows the state of incorporation to be a possible venue for the debtor. The bills, mainly targeting corporate debtors, propose to eliminate the state of incorporation and curtail the use of affiliate filings to confer venue in favor of prescribing venue solely through the principal place of business or location of principal assets. One last proposed modification to the existing text is the substitution of the word “may” in favor of “shall” in mandating the court to dismiss or immediately transfer the case upon finding venue is improper, removing any discretionary power of the court in that regard.

While some of the changes might appear subtle, removing the state of incorporation would, in essence, drastically reshape the bankruptcy landscape and partially bar entry into the courts of Delaware and the Southern District of New York, despite Delaware being the favored place of incorporation for corporate entities nationwide. The National Association of Attorneys General welcomed this reform and showed great support across state lines and political parties. The attorneys similarly denounced “rampant forum shopping” and more specifically, the incorporation of a single subsidiary by a parent company in a favored jurisdiction exclusively for filing purposes. A compelling point they raise, which does not appear in either bill, is that the debtor’s “ability to control the law to be applied to one’s affairs” and the “releases . . . to provide to its officers, insiders, and non-debtor third parties . . . [are] not allowed in any other area of the law.” Nonetheless, while agreeing that judges in other districts are as competent as those in magnet districts, their letter contrasted with comments made by some proponents of reform

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95 Id. § 2(a)(5)(A).
96 Id. § 2(a)(6).
98 See, e.g., S. 2827 §§ 1408(a)–(b).
99 See id. § 1412(b).
101 Id.
102 Id. (emphasis added).
such as LoPucki;\textsuperscript{103} the Attorneys General admitted that judges in New York and Delaware were in fact exposed to “heightened scrutiny and criticism,”\textsuperscript{104} thus undermining the claim of questionable integrity and motives of judges in handling complex cases.

Two schools of thought have emerged on the need to reform bankruptcy venue.\textsuperscript{105} The “race to the bottom” view condemns the current venue statute and denounces its undermining of the bankruptcy system’s overall fairness and integrity.\textsuperscript{106} On the other end of the spectrum are “race to the top” theorists who stress the various advantages that current venue offers forum shoppers seeking efficiency, predictability, and expediency in restructuring.\textsuperscript{107} A closer look at the debate surrounding bankruptcy venue reform highlights some key features of forum shopping that may appear detrimental to local actors affected by the debtor’s choice of venue.\textsuperscript{108} However, this “race to the bottom” theory falls short of the compelling rationale by critics of reform, exemplifying how forum shopping has allowed the United States to acquire expertise and leave a mark on insolvency law worldwide.\textsuperscript{109}

\textbf{B. Race to the Bottom . . .}

The overwhelming concentration of Chapter 11 cases can be found in the magnet districts of Delaware and the Southern District of New York given their ties to corporate law and financial institutions.\textsuperscript{110} It is important to note that other districts, such as the Southern District of Texas and the Eastern District of Virginia, are also slowly emerging as popular venues for restructuring.\textsuperscript{111} Reform proponents wholeheartedly condemn this “bankruptcy à la carte”\textsuperscript{112} phenomenon created by forum shopping, coining the impact on the bankruptcy system as a “race to the bottom.”\textsuperscript{113} The most recurring arguments against forum

\textsuperscript{103} See Casey & Macey, \textit{supra} note 69, at 465.

\textsuperscript{104} See NAAG Letter, \textit{supra} note 100.

\textsuperscript{105} See Casey & Macey, \textit{supra} note 69, at 465, 472.

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Id.} at 465.

\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Id.} at 472.

\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Id.} at 465.

\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Id.} at 506.

\textsuperscript{110} See Skeel, \textit{supra} note 4.

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Id.}


\textsuperscript{113} ABI Report, \textit{supra} note 19, at 311.
shopping are the increased costs of litigating in limited venues, the decrease in competition and the lagging variety in precedent, the “cherry-picking” of judges, and the inability of local parties of interest to participate in the process—overall, critics allege that forum shopping negatively impacts public confidence in the bankruptcy system.\textsuperscript{114} While those arguments are not without merit, a closer look at the scholarly debate in juxtaposition to skeptics of reform will demonstrate why forum shopping is in fact beneficial to the bankruptcy system.\textsuperscript{115}

One of the first facets of the “race to the bottom” theory is the alleged increase in expenses and fees resulting from debtors picking venues far from their home districts.\textsuperscript{116} The increased cost of litigating a Chapter 11 case does not stand on its own, but rather, it is directly tied to the financial cost to local parties of interest.\textsuperscript{117} This due process argument mainly rests upon the idea that bankruptcy is not just a private, contractual matter but involves the public.\textsuperscript{118} Proponents of reform assert that the filing of cases miles away from employees, communities, and key constituencies essentially strips them of a meaningful opportunity to participate in the case, or forces them to do so at a difficult and expensive cost.\textsuperscript{119} While the theory acknowledges that “rocket dockets” in magnet districts permit judges to move through cases quickly, the ability of affected parties to be heard becomes undeniably limited.\textsuperscript{120}

Some proponents of reform acknowledge that the technological advances brought by the pandemic have allowed for more virtual hearings and appearances, thus lessening the negative impact on local constituents wishing to participate in Chapter 11 proceedings.\textsuperscript{121} However, they caution that the due process issues of forum shopping will reemerge when in-person hearings resume even if some adaptations are retained.\textsuperscript{122} While many courts have resumed in-person hearings, the viability of virtual participation by litigants has proven to be efficient over the past two years and could very well be adopted as a new way of practic-

\textsuperscript{114} See Casey & Macey, \textit{supra} note 69, at 470.
\textsuperscript{115} See id. at 506.
\textsuperscript{116} Reich, \textit{supra} note 86, at 9.
\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{118} See \textit{id}.
\textsuperscript{119} ABI Report, \textit{supra} note 19, at 311.
\textsuperscript{120} See Davidoff, Miller & Shechtman, \textit{supra} note 90.
\textsuperscript{121} See NAAG Letter, \textit{supra} note 100.
\textsuperscript{122} See id.
ing law. While criticizing the effect forum shopping has on local parties, some proponents go as far as claiming that the New York–Delaware “duopoly” stands as an attack on the federal system of bankruptcy altogether. As the home to financial institutions and corporate industries, these states’ duopoly is perceived by some as a prominent factor in lessening consideration of other stakeholders, mainly employees, retirees, vendors, and local communities. Furthermore, proponents of reform denounce those magnet districts as depriving local economies of financial benefits, and criticize the resulting sharp increase in administrative costs, claiming that the practice forces certain debtors to liquidate to account for fees.

While the overcrowding of those magnet courts may be raised as an additional concern of forum shopping, a debtor’s particular selection, not just of venue but also of judges, is most heavily criticized due to the unfairness it allegedly creates. Some suggest an implicit distrust emanating from parties of interest, who often feel “victimized;” this feeling is only exacerbated when rulings are issued by a judge who is cautiously picked by the forum-shopping debtor. In addition, proponents rightfully argue that the fairness of restructuring is further undermined when a debtor’s choice of venue mainly rests on locating favorable precedent on a particular issue. While predictability sought by the DIP in handling restructuring cases may not be as nefarious as described by reform proponents, one counterargument stresses that judges in magnet districts possess less knowledge on other states’ laws regarding property rights, energy-related issues, or mechanics’ liens. This further demonstrates how locality is central to resolving many of the issues emerging in a Chapter 11 restructuring, which forum shopping jeopardizes. In addition, the expertise acquired by magnet judges is interpreted by some as increased receptiveness to legal arguments advanced

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123 See Reich, supra note 86, at 10–11.
124 Id. at 10.
125 Id. at 11 (estimating that Wilmington, Delaware, receives a $100 million economic boost each year from bankruptcy cases).
126 Id.
127 NAAG Letter, supra note 100.
128 See id.
130 See id.
by sophisticated parties, further undermining the fairness of the bankruptcy process. The lack of meaningful ties to the debtor’s business or operations, as well as to the areas where financial distress might be felt the hardest, can be partially supported by empirical data showing an increasing trend in filings outside of the principal place of business in favor of New York and Delaware. Some proponents of the “race to the bottom” theory reject critics’ view that New York and Delaware are picked as venues for efficiency and convenience; rather, they suggest that debtors seek to avail themselves of the expertise of bankruptcy judges and avoid the debtor’s local bankruptcy judges. While this remark might be partly sustained, it appears difficult to discern a real issue because picking a more neutral forum that is free of local political considerations often would seem to be a more suitable alternative in favor of forum shopping.

A more cynical approach to forum shopping comes from scholar Lynn LoPucki, who infamously questioned the integrity of justices in magnet districts. Despite having been coined an “offensive fantasy” by a few, his criticism partly denounces larger restructurings being filed in locations solely for the benefit of a debtor corporation’s officers and stakeholders. As a proponent of the notion that forum shopping poses a threat to the integrity of the bankruptcy system, he further suggests that a liberal construction of venue fosters competition for high-profile cases, leading to the creation of elitist firms. While not

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131 See Davidoff, Miller & Shechtman, supra note 90.
132 See Matthews, supra note 129 (showing that 70% of public companies during 2009–2014 filed in districts other than the district where their principal place of business or principal assets were located, and 80% of these cases were filed in either the Southern District of New York or the District of Delaware).
133 ABI Report, supra note 19, at 311 n.1084 (citing Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 1001–02 (1999) (supporting this view with empirical research)).
134 See Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 465 n.5 (citing Randles, supra note 69 (quoting LoPucki: “The leading bankruptcy lawyers tell the judges what to do . . . [t]hey’re not asking, they’re telling.”)).
135 See id. at 466 n.11 (citing Randles, supra note 69 (quoting LoPucki: “The leading bankruptcy lawyers tell the judges what to do . . . [t]hey’re not asking, they’re telling.”)).
136 See Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 465; Mark Pfeiffer, Let’s Talk About Chapter 11 Venue Again, ABI J., May 2020, at 20 (citing ABI Report, supra note 19, at 312) (stating that creditors filing in New York or Delaware receive 25% less than those filing outside those locations).
137 See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 133, at 1001–02.
substantially unfounded, LoPucki’s claim would call into question the integrity of bankruptcy judges and the prestige of the federal bench that subjects judges to high moral and ethical principles, but nothing suggests that bankruptcy judges’ behavior could reasonably be called into question. Lastly, LoPucki’s suggested manipulation of the place of filing to evade one’s creditors was strictly rejected by Judge Gropper in his 2003 decision, noting that improper venue could always be fixed by dismissing the case or transferring it in the interest of justice.\footnote{See id.; In re Avianca, 303 B.R. 1, 13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).}

One of the most sensible arguments made by “race to the bottom” theorists is the limited diversity in judicial opinions since “complex and novel issues of law” tend to be decided in the same magnet districts.\footnote{See Mark A. Salzberg & Kyle F. Arendsen, Bankruptcy Venue “Reform” – What Are the Odds This Time?, Nat’l L. Rev. (Oct. 5, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/bankruptcy-venue-reform-what-are-odds-this-time [https://perma.cc/3LW8-KJ35].} Some comments further support the congressional findings calling for restoring the bankruptcy system’s integrity and the public confidence in it.\footnote{See S. 2827, 117th Cong. § 2(a)(4)–(6) (2021).} Reform advocates insist on the inability to assess differing views on appeal as a result of cases being concentrated in the same magnet districts, with debtors picking “the initial . . . [and] the final arbiter of their fate.”\footnote{See NAAG Letter, supra note 100.} Nonetheless, in contrast, proponents of the “race to the top” put forward a list of factors that demonstrate how forum shopping remains vital to maintaining the attractiveness of Chapter 11, especially when making the case for foreign airlines availing themselves of U.S. courts.

C. . . . Or the Top?

Supporters of forum shopping often describe the flexibility in venue selection as facilitating the “most effective and value-maximizing reorganization” to the debtor, arguably the most important objective when assisting a business experiencing financial distress.\footnote{See ABI Report, supra note 19, at 312 (citing Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1357, 1359 (2000)).} In addition, the geographic diversity of corporate entities, spread across the country and even the world, makes places like New York and Delaware the obvious choices for restructuring because they are hubs for financial institutions and
corporations. Overall, those magnet districts offer expediency of cases, strong precedents that coincide with increasing predictability, and judges with expertise. These advantages paired with a lack of national uniformity on key legal bankruptcy issues make the perfect case in favor of forum shopping.

Magnet districts undeniably excel in their efficient administration of complex cases. While rejecting the argument that judges in other districts are not as competent, opponents of reform acknowledge that judges in New York and Delaware are exposed to “heightened scrutiny and criticism.” Most importantly, they sharply condemn the idea that those same judges might be corrupt or improperly influenced when picking cases to make their district more attractive. Despite the apparent bias that an editorial by the New York City Bar Committee might hold, it does validly support the argument that venue does not play a role in higher professional fees, as LoPucki suggested, by stressing the role of both the U.S. Department of Transportation and the Department of Justice in tracking abuses of power. In addition, the expediency of prepackaged restructuring plans (prepared in cooperation with the debtor’s creditors prior to filing) in Delaware positively contributes to an “economic and efficient administration of the estate,” identified as a key factor by several courts. While an efficient economic administration may be

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146 N.Y.C. Bar, supra note 145, at 6.

147 See id. (rejecting the competition argument as unfounded and citing to significant safeguards in the Bankruptcy Code shielding restructuring processes from abuse by unscrupulous judges, if there are any); see also NAAG Letter, supra note 100.

148 See, e.g., VanLare & Murtagh, supra note 65, at 28–29 (quoting Puerto Rico v. Commonwealth Oil Refin. Co. (In re Commonwealth Oil Refin. Co.), 596 F.2d 1239, 1247 (5th Cir. 1979) (discussing how “[t]he economic administration of the estate” is one the most important factors in considering the appropriateness of venue, even when going counter to the overwhelming majority of stakeholders)).
important when choosing a venue, it can be subject to transfer “in the interest of justice,” especially in cases of “manufactured venue.” In contrast, proponents of reform suggest that the speed with which complex cases are handled in magnet districts leads to less consideration of junior claimants. In the absence of priming liens, junior lenders would end up financing senior lenders—who already have a monopoly—and make it less desirable for junior lenders to try to enter the not-so-competitive market of restructuring financing. Nonetheless, counterarguments make the latter claim bear not as much weight. For example, opponents of reform have advised against the risk of increasing unpredictability and inconsistency by reforming venue as it stands today. The fear of losing good precedent may force creditors to charge higher interest rates and make lenders bear additional costs, which could undermine an efficient restructuring and jeopardize securing DIP financing.

Judges’ expertise is another factor strongly tipping the balance in favor of maintaining the status quo and opposing venue reform. For instance, the complexity and volume of cases in magnet districts allow for partial experimentation with the law and the building of strong precedent, both of which are desirable to DIPs and creditors. A proponent of the bill, although not advocating for strict venue reform, did stress that forcing debtors into districts lacking the experience or resources to efficiently preside over sophisticated reorganizations would completely go against the proposition the Code stands for—to allow for an efficient reorganization accommodating the needs of both debtors and nondebtors. Another practitioner testified that forcing debtors to forgo the “benefits of those sophisticated courts and the investor confidence they bring, in favor of jurisdictions with less predictable and potentially conflicting laws”

150 See VanLare & Murtagh, supra note 65, at 32.
151 See Skeel, supra note 4.
152 See id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 4.
156 Id. at 5–6.
157 See Pfeiffer, supra note 136, at 20.
would truly undermine the status and notoriety of Chapter 11.\textsuperscript{158}

Another benefit of the current rules of bankruptcy venue is the ultimate fairness of debtor choice, notwithstanding the argument that local constituencies might be undermined by forum shopping. In fact, Chapter 11 has been described as having “enduring value as a transparent and neutral multiparty forum,” used in its most efficient way to resolve issues of parties with diametrically opposed interests.\textsuperscript{159} That alone ought to stand as an illustration that today, Chapter 11 is a system through which fairness can be achieved. Another important aspect that opponents of reform advocate for is the limitation of local bias.\textsuperscript{160} By not having local judges who are more receptive to economic disruptions and local political pressures weigh in on those restructuring cases, magnet districts offer a neutral forum in favor of forum shopping.\textsuperscript{161} To further undermine the importance that reform proponents give to bankruptcy’s “public” purpose, one must note that the proximity of the debtor to its local constituents lessens insofar as parties of interest support the debtor’s choice of venue or have professional representation.\textsuperscript{162} While the due process rights of employees and retirees cannot be ignored, the complexity of entities’ restructuring often warrants their representation by union representatives, especially in larger cases seeking to reject CBAs.\textsuperscript{163}

Moreover, the Supreme Court’s failure to address many of the local inconsistencies in applying federal bankruptcy principles exacerbates the lack of nationwide uniformity, further enticing debtors to avail themselves of districts they perceive more predictable and receptive to their needs.\textsuperscript{164} One example where disparity among circuits persists is in the adoption or rejection of critical contracts under Section 365. For example, some courts disagree over what a debtor might do when lacking counterparty consent; some courts dispense the debtor of such formality by showing it does not wish to assign the contract to a

\textsuperscript{158} Mathews, \textit{supra} note 129, at n.9 (citing to comments made by Michael Luskin for the New York City Bar Association’s Committee on Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization).

\textsuperscript{159} Miller & Waisman, \textit{supra} note 24, at 169.

\textsuperscript{160} See Casey & Macey, \textit{supra} note 69, at 475.

\textsuperscript{161} See \textit{id}.

\textsuperscript{162} See VanLare & Murtagh, \textit{supra} note 65, at 30.

\textsuperscript{163} \textit{Id}.

third party, whereas other courts render the contract nonassignable without counterparty consent. This major difference in interpretation can lead to a massive loss of revenue for the debtor experiencing financial distress, putting critical contracts at risk and preventing the introduction of prepackaged plans shown to contribute to the efficiency of the bankruptcy system overall.

Another point of disagreement among circuits shows how forum shopping might be the best alternative absent national consensus. As proponents of reform agree, local constituencies and employees are entitled to due process, and their interest in preserving their employment is key. Nonetheless, circuits rule differently on whether priority should be granted to workers’ severance pay. Often, severance becomes an unsecured claim and thus lacks priority in repayment, which might encourage layoffs by enticing certain debtors and secured creditors to favor Delaware as a venue to benefit from this “window of opportunity.” In comparison, New York includes severance as a cost of reorganization, making it a key difference between the two magnet districts.

Lastly, two substantive issues further illustrate the absence of uniformity in applying bankruptcy provisions nationwide: sales “free and clear” and third-party releases. A split in authority on the meaning of “greater than the aggregate value of all liens on the property” may impair the ability to buy a debtor’s assets or property when a lien remains. While some courts understand the provision as meaning the proposed purchase price must be less than all liens combined, others interpret it as the value of the business needing to be lower than the amount of secured claims. Furthermore, third-party releases are a system through which parties not having undertaken the burden of bankruptcy are being sheltered from liability by using releases from the

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166 See Dietderich, supra note 164, at 28–29.

167 See id. at 29.

168 See id. at 29–30, 52.

169 See id. at 52.

170 See id.


172 See Bernard, Gautier & Slusher, supra note 165.
debtor’s senior creditors to fund mass tort settlements. This very controversial tool has led to heated debates and discrepancies among courts on how inclined they are to enforce third-party releases. While some unfavorable forums choose not to enforce those releases, others do by considering the value third parties bring to the reorganization and whether such releases may be essential to the restructuring effort.

While not devoid of any bias, the discussion of forum shopping and venue reform by the Governor of Delaware and the New York City Bar perfectly concludes the case in favor of the “race to the top” theory. For the proposed Bankruptcy Venue Reform of 2018, Governor Carney cautioned against barring access to Delaware courts, a “world-class bench and bar with exceptional expertise in corporate legal issues and bankruptcy.” He argued that the reform would restrict optional venues to businesses and hurt the U.S. economy, considering that over two-thirds of American businesses in the Fortune 500 are incorporated in Delaware. In addition, bearing the importance of local constituencies in mind, the “blow” to the Delaware economy and the impact on businesses and people serving restructuring would be considerable according to Governor Carney’s statement. Similarly, the New York City Bar emphasized that the Bill represented a “radical departure from longstanding [venue] practice” that would “impair corporate debtors’ ability to maximize their creditors’ recoveries,” and would not act in furtherance of advancing the interests of employees, who are often far from the debtor’s principal place of business or assets. Further.
ther arguing on behalf of bankruptcy’s public purpose, the statement stressed local constituents’ ample ability to participate in restructuring proceedings through virtual court appearances and case information accessible online.181 This very sharp remark further discredits “race to the bottom” theorists’ view that forum shopping undermines the public purpose of the bankruptcy system.182

Bankruptcy may not be perceived solely as having a private purpose; in fact, the public facets of restructuring become key to an efficient administration of the debtor’s estate. Nonetheless, the “race to the top” theory is directly correlated to the attractiveness of the U.S. system offering predictability, efficiency, and expertise to both domestic and foreign entities seeking restructuring assistance.183 Further, an attempt at reforming bankruptcy venue could jeopardize the country’s place on the global insolvency stage.184 The risk of removing the state of incorporation as a proper venue would ultimately bar many foreign entities from accessing U.S. courts. It would present foreign airlines like Avianca or Philippine Airlines with a single alternative—to forum shop globally—harming U.S. creditors and hurting the United States’ dominance in aviation.

IV. RISK OF GLOBAL FORUM SHOPPING

As the debate on venue shopping reform myopically rages in the United States, its impact could be felt on a global scale. Not only would a reform of bankruptcy venue impact which courts domestic debtors could avail themselves of, but it would risk prompting a phenomenon of global forum shopping. As the field becomes more level and foreign jurisdictions emerge as insolvency hubs, one may wonder not if but rather when companies will start restructuring somewhere outside the United States.185 Note that for the first time in bankruptcy history, a

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181 See id. at 2.
182 See Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 465 (citing Randles, supra note 69 (quoting LoPucki: “The leading bankruptcy lawyers tell the judges what to do . . . [t]hey’re not asking, they’re telling”)).
183 Id. at 466.
184 Id. at 467–68.
U.S.-headquartered company selected the United Kingdom’s (U.K.’s) model for restructuring in 2019.186

A. Domestic Venue Reform Posing a Threat to Foreign Entities

I. The Rise of Global Forum Shopping

The proposed bankruptcy venue reform would bar foreign debtors from accessing U.S. courts; those debtors may no longer qualify absent tangible assets in the United States, or they may be forced into unusual and inconvenient districts outside of Delaware and New York.187 Senator Warren described Chapter 11 as belonging in “the pantheon of extraordinary laws that have shaped the American economy and society [that] then echoed throughout the world . . . [exemplifying the] myth [of] the pioneer making a fresh start on the boundless prairie.”188 It begs the question of why risk the United States’ position as a major force in corporate restructuring and change a system that has worked for decades at a moment of critical uncertainty worldwide. While it may not seem problematic at first, global forum shopping would undermine the position of the United States as the benchmark in restructuring matters, ultimately running the risk of both hurting U.S. creditors and undermining the country’s role in the spheres of insolvency and aviation.

Despite the United States remaining the preferred forum for corporate restructuring thus far, practitioners have noted the rise of foreign forums becoming increasingly competitive.189 One explanation for this trend towards a globalization of the bankruptcy industry comes from those that dictate venue issues globally—not legislatures but jurisdictions controlling “large

187 See, e.g., Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 468; Berthiaume, supra note 185, at 25.
189 See generally Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, Good Old Chapter 11 in a Pre-Insolvency World: The Growth of Global Reorganization Options, 46 N.C. J. INT’L L. 253, 366–74 (2021) (discussing the rise of global alternatives to Chapter 11 emerging as viable alternatives to the English scheme of arrangement, including the systems in Spain, the Netherlands, and Germany).
pools of capital waiting to be deployed in the service of distressed investing.”

Certain locations have started to attract a disproportionate share of restructuring cases; larger cities located near large financial centers and capital pools perceived as business friendly have emerged in direct competition with the United States. Those larger restructuring cases have progressively parted from an optic towards reorganizing for one of finding a “vehicle for ‘financial play,’” ultimately encouraging a war over venue location. The winner of this forum war is predicted to be the country that (1) controls capital pools and (2) offers a bankruptcy venue with ease of access and predictability, the second point being undeniably undermined by the U.S. bipartisan bill.

A few examples showcase how many foreign jurisdictions are making a good faith effort in entering the corporate restructuring stage. Under the Canada Business Corporations Act, corporate debtors may get third-party releases, which remains a highly contested issue in the United States and a factor incentivizing domestic forum shopping absent uniformity among circuits. In the Netherlands, the Dutch Act on Court Confirmation of Extrajudicial Restructuring Plans mimics, in many ways, Chapter 11; in addition to a DIP, it offers a stay against certain creditors, permits the invalidation of certain ipso facto clauses, authorizes the sale of unencumbered assets, and allows for a cramdown plan of reorganization. Germany, Australia, India, and Italy have also demonstrated their appeal in insolvency matters. Another prominent world player, the European Union (EU), is worth mentioning. Despite not yet catching up to the United States or its direct competitors, the EU’s issuance of its 2019 Restructuring Directive attempts to harmonize insolvency laws between its member states by, for example, (a) introducing a DIP, (b) banning ipso facto clauses, and (c) allowing for a cross-

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190 See Bill Brandt, Forum Shopping on a Global Scale, COM. L. WORLD, July–Sept. 2019, at 20. Brandt was an advisor to Congress on insolvency policy and the principal author to the Bankruptcy Code’s amendment that allows for the election of trustees in Chapter 11 cases. Id. He also served on the American Bankruptcy Institute’s Commission to reform Chapter 11. Id. His active involvement in Singaporean courts provides him with a unique perspective on the topic. See id.

191 See id. at 21.

192 See id. at 20.

193 See id. at 22.

194 Berthiaume, supra note 185, at 26.

195 See id. at 26–27.

196 See id.
class cramdown mechanism enforceable against dissenting creditors even when they are in separate classes.  

While certain of the aforementioned reforms might seem attractive to foreign debtors experiencing financial distress, they nonetheless lack the substantial appeal of DIP financing, the automatic stay, and the expertise that an American forum would traditionally provide.

This global forum shopping phenomenon is well at our doorstep and may even be deemed to threaten the prominence of the United States at a time when many nations are evolving in the competitive insolvency marketplace. While domestic districts are limited in their ability to change bankruptcy precedents emanating from federal law, foreign forums are not similarly constrained. Three main localities are on the rise as direct competitors to the United States: the U.K., Hong Kong, and Singapore, with the latter already “stealing” bankruptcy judges from our magnet districts for the benefit of the Singapore International Commercial Court.

2. The United Kingdom and Singapore: The Two Rising Stars

The first forum presenting a competitive risk to our magnet districts is the U.K., offering to the debtor both liquidation and administrative restructuring alternatives, and keeping the rescue of the company as an ongoing concern. Up until 2020, the U.K. solely offered a scheme of arrangement to the distressed debtor; this insolvency proceeding allowed for the modification of creditors’ rights upon approval by (1) a majority in number of each class of creditors and (2) at least 75% in value of the debt held by the creditors at voting (a form of DIP restructuring) irrespective of the debtor’s solvency or creditors’ unanimity in assenting to secured interests being written off. In other words, a debtor not yet experiencing financial distress, but hop-
ing to avoid such unfortunate event, could avail itself of the U.K.
scheme, making it a powerful restructuring tool despite the lack
of a cramdown provision.201 The high degree of public disclosure,
limited judicial oversight, and speedy resolution made the
scheme a popular alternative, with the court merely acting as a
monitoring body and giving vast flexibility to the negotiating
debtor.202 The likelihood that the scheme of arrangement will
be recognized and enforced by foreign jurisdictions, including
the United States, made it a useful tool to resolve mostly in-
traclass holdout problems involving labor contracts or discharg-
ing environmental obligations.203 In other words, the U.K.
scheme was not a true adversary to the magnet districts, but re-
mained a decent restructuring tool.204

However, the most significant change to British insolvency law
unquestionably came in 2020, with the amendment of Part 26A
of the U.K. Companies Act of 2006.205 This innovation to the
U.K.’s new restructuring plan adds a cross-class cramdown
mechanism, vastly mimicking features of Chapter 11’s own
cramdown provision.206 While a court retains oversight power
over the restructuring plan and process through two court hear-
ings pending approval, the new U.K. model bears heavy resem-
blance to Chapter 11.207 The U.K. DIP is similar to the United
States one because directors of the company proposing the plan
remain in control during the restructuring process.208 While the
United States retains exclusivity in having an automatic stay ef-
effective immediately upon filing, the U.K. model offers a morato-
rium preventing the enforcement of certain legal proceedings,
securities, and forfeiture of leases.209

While the new U.K. model offers undeniable benefits, it none-
theless falls short of Chapter 11’s superiority. Despite the intro-

201 See id. at 489.
202 See Thomas & Steel, supra note 186.
203 See Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 490.
204 See id.
206 Id.
207 See id. at 100–01.
208 See id. at 101.
209 See id.
duction of a cross-class cramdown provision, a British court retains incredible discretionary power in approving the plan in comparison to its American counterpart.\textsuperscript{210} Whereas Chapter 11 would not permit a junior class of creditors to recover unless all senior claims were satisfied in full, a U.K. plan is not subject to the same absolute priority rule.\textsuperscript{211} While the British court must consider principles of equity and fairness, such discretionary power undermines the reliability upon which a foreign debtor may expect confirmation of its plan.\textsuperscript{212} Despite less expensive filing fees, the major flaw of the U.K. restructuring plan rests on its lack of DIP financing alternatives, which has made the United States an attractive venue to foreign entities.\textsuperscript{213} American bankruptcy courts remain the standard when DIP financing is required because the U.K. model neither provides higher priority to restructuring financing nor imposes new obligations on creditors to advance money.\textsuperscript{214} While subtle differences persist between the new U.K. insolvency cramdown model and the infamous Chapter 11, the U.K. cramdown model’s success has already been demonstrated. For example, DeepOcean Group, a popular provider of subsea services in the oil and gas and renewable industries, successfully completed the first reorganization effort using the U.K. cramdown restructuring tool in January 2021, firmly establishing the tool’s presence on the international restructuring scene.\textsuperscript{215}

The second actor attempting to mimic Chapter 11 and establish its presence as the restructuring hub in the Asia–Pacific region is Singapore, which has strong and efficient insolvency processes.\textsuperscript{216} In its attempt to surpass Hong Kong, which has allegedly lagged in joining modern insolvency trends and parting

\textsuperscript{210} See id. at 103.
\textsuperscript{211} See id. at 103; 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2).
\textsuperscript{212} Frogel et al., supra note 205, at 103–04.
\textsuperscript{214} See id.; see also Frogel et al., supra note 205, at 103–04.
from a common law framework, 217 Singapore has attracted worldwide business and legal communities, making it one of the top destinations for corporate restructurings. 218 For the first time, Singaporean law authorizes the protection of new capital in an effort to “prime existing creditors,” creating in effect a lending arrangement unequivocally resembling DIP financing. 219 Singapore further enhanced its attractiveness as a primary destination for the flow of foreign capital in 2017 by adopting the Model Law, which seeks to permit the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings, the ability to take control of assets of foreign companies located in Model Law jurisdictions, and the pursuit of investigations and recovery proceedings per local insolvency laws of a member jurisdiction.220

In conclusion, the similarities Singaporean insolvency laws bear to Chapter 11’s automatic stay, cramdown mechanism, and procedures for approving prepackaged plans 221 allow only one conclusion: Singapore is threatening the United States’ place as the golden standard in restructuring. It appears almost impossible to think of a reorganization scheme that would mimic Chapter 11 more, with the exception of Chapter 11 itself. A closer look at the U.K.’s new insolvency law and the Singaporean model of restructuring leaves one wondering what remedies might be available to prevent corporate debtors from fleeing to foreign forums and preserve the United States’ expertise and reputation.

B. SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES TO VENUE REFORM

As demonstrated, the threat of global forum shopping is well-established because the U.K., Singapore, and (to a certain extent) Hong Kong are progressively emerging as strong alternatives to a Chapter 11 restructuring. 222 Reforming bankruptcy venue could alter the course of restructuring as we know it today. As previously demonstrated, magnet districts offer exper-

217 See id. at 14; see also Scott Atkins, Camille Jojo, Kai Luck & Daniel Ng, Hong Kong Advances Its Restructuring Credentials in Its New Cross Border Insolvency Framework with Mainland China, in INT’L RESTRUC. NEWSWIRE 12, 12 (2021) (discussing Hong Kong increasing its ties to China by starting to recognize their insolvency proceedings by, for instance, staying garnishment by a creditor against a Hong Kong debtor after a liquidation process had been started in China).
218 See Brandt, supra note 190, at 21.
219 See id.
220 See Atkins & Luck, supra note 216, at 11, 13.
221 Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 490.
222 See Brandt, supra note 190, at 21.
At the crossroads between tese, predictability, and expediency in the administration of complex cases—all desirable to a debtor experiencing financial distress. Other factors strongly suggest that bankruptcy venue might not be an issue at all. First, venue can be changed, and a case can be dismissed to another jurisdiction in the interest of justice or, in some cases, of the parties of interest. Second, the complex corporate structure of large debtors includes subsidiaries in various locations and a wide array of contracts subject to different forum clauses, making it more practical to handle those cases in districts home to corporations and financial institutions. And third, bankruptcy venue does not usually involve a typical two-party adversarial proceedings where traditional nonbankruptcy venue rules would make sense.

Given the ramifications that this bankruptcy venue reform would have on global forum shopping, it is wise to consider other alternatives that would remedy some of the issues that “race to the bottom” theorists have identified while also safeguarding the reputation and desirability of American bankruptcy courts. One proposition would be rather simple: resolve the circuit splits on material issues such as critical contracts and third-party releases. Forum shopping often occurs when a debtor is seeking favorable legal precedent on a particular issue, a practice that proponents of reform have condemned over time. By letting the legislature amend the Code or having the Supreme Court grant certiorari on those particularly contentious issues, debtors would have less incentives to avail themselves of Delaware or New York courts and could keep their restructuring more local. It is important to note that, contrary to venue, third-party releases and severance pay have been subject to less scrutiny and have not particularly garnered the atten-

223. See supra Section III.C.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See, e.g., Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 496–98; Bernard, Gautier & Slusher, supra note 165; Dietderich, supra note 164, at 29, 52.
228. See Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 496 (citing Karen M. Gebbia, Certiorari and the Bankruptcy Code: The Statutory Interpretation Cases, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 503, 510 (2016)).
229. See id.
tion of politicians or voters, making it more likely that a successful amendment of the Code would prevail.

Another remedy that has been suggested for decades is the notion of *ex ante* commitment: having debtors and creditors agree to a proper restructuring venue prior to the onset of financial distress. Rasmussen and Thomas were the first to suggest that this approach would incentivize parties of interest “to select the venue which promises to maximize the value of the firm as a whole.” Timing is absolutely critical to picking a restructuring venue, since the interest of a corporation’s managers and stakeholders will likely shift as the case progresses and insolvency looms. Having them commit to a bankruptcy venue before the company becomes financially distressed would shift optics and have them look beyond mere short-term survival. It has been suggested that forward planning might also benefit the company in negotiating with its creditors; lenders would likely be encouraged to charge lower interest rates upon picking a restructuring venue favorable to the interests of all, adding more securities and predictability once financial distress does occur.

Objectively speaking, making bankruptcy venue the product of contractual negotiations would be a perfectly acceptable way to fight forum shopping, let parties exercise their right to contract, and allow parties to weigh their interests while doing so. In fact, some practitioners have supported this view and similarly stress the importance of timing by suggesting the incorporation of insolvency forum clauses. While not dispositive, those clauses stand for the proposition that courts would take into consideration the parties’ original intent and expectations “regarding an appropriate forum for insolvency.”

The case of *In re Northshore Mainland Services, Inc.* illustrates this point and suggests that the structure of modern-day corporations and parallel insolvency proceedings increase the interconnectedness and complexity of restructuring cases, making

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230 See id. at 496–98.
231 See, e.g., Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 142, at 1359.
232 See id. at 1397.
233 See id. at 1396–97.
234 See id. at 1399.
235 See id. at 1400.
237 See id. at 108.
The case involved parties located in numerous countries spanning the globe, with different choice of forum clauses for construction contracts, credit agreements, and security interests. Despite finding that the case was filed in good faith by a debtor “on the edge of a financial precipice,” the ultimate dismissal of the case rested solely on the legitimate expectations of the creditor base, pointing at the Bahamas as the only appropriate restructuring venue. The bankruptcy judge exemplified the importance that prenegotiated insolvency clauses could offer while remaining dispositive, stating that the “[e]xpectations of various factors—including the expectations surrounding the question of where ultimately disputes will be resolved—are important, should be respected, and [should] not [be] disrupted unless a greater good is to be accomplished.” Adding insolvency forum clauses would account for the importance of timing and could discourage courts from hearing cases in unexpected forums, simultaneously incentivizing the dismissal of any case to a “proper” forum agreed to by the parties of interest. Nonetheless, as the In re Northshore case shows, those clauses are not dispositive; a court retains discretionary power in removing the case, which could still lead to unpredictability.

Another proposal emanating from Rasmussen and Thomas’s ex ante commitment idea is that of Casey and Macey, who suggest the addition of a mechanism for choosing and later amending, when necessary, venue as a pre-insolvency commitment. One contentious aspect of agreeing to a forum pre-insolvency is its rigidity. Several explanations account for this and a corporate debtor’s desire to amend the originally agreed upon venue: new precedent might emerge and make another venue more attractive; judges’ expertise might wane as they retire; and backlog

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239 See id. at 195–96.
240 Id. at 195–96.
241 Id. at 203.
242 See id. at 204–07 (holding the case brought by the Delaware LLC could be heard by the Delaware bankruptcy judge despite removal to the Bahamas on the real estate issue following the Bahamian Supreme Court’s refusal to recognize the petitions or enforce the automatic stay).
243 See id. at 206 (second emphasis added).
244 See Levin & Wedoff, supra note 236, at 108.
245 See id. at 108, 110.
246 See Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 498.
247 Id. at 499.
may arise.248 Adopting a contractual approach to this problem and creating a mechanism to amend that ex ante commitment with a majority of creditors and stakeholders would make it as critical as picking an original venue to guarantee a successful restructuring.249 While this approach is sensible, some have rightfully suggested that no corporation contemplates restructuring in its early stages, and as a result, the corporate debtor is unlikely to know what venue will be best until deciding what the business venture will fully entail.250 In addition, once insolvency does become an issue, it might prove beyond difficult to get creditors and stakeholders alike to elect a new venue.251 The concern that such clauses might be deemed unenforceable would seriously undermine their reliability, further increasing unpredictability.252 It is worth noting that, just like insolvency forum clauses, this mechanism could provide guidance to bankruptcy judges and weigh heavily in favor of upholding the parties’ expectations pre-insolvency insofar as they do not go against the interests of justice.253

Lastly, another suggested alternative to reforming bankruptcy venue is the creation of regional bankruptcy centers in each circuit,254 arguably the least appealing remedy presented thus far. As debtors seek magnet districts to handle complex cases for the expediency and expertise of judges, one option to counter forum shopping would be to remove the notion of venue having to be assigned to a particular district.255 While not prescribed to a specific district, those regional bankruptcy centers would include judges who are known and recommended for their expertise to assist the centers in adopting efficient rules and ensuring sufficient staffing.256 Thus, cases would be assigned to a judge of the regional bankruptcy center rather than one from a particular district, with appeals being redirected to the district court where the original filing was made.257 While this suggestion does attempt to reduce forum shopping, it begs the question of whether it would ultimately undermine the efficiency of the

248 See id.
249 See id. at 499.
250 See Dietderich, supra note 164, at 52 n.7.
251 See Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 499–500.
252 See id. at 503 n.150.
253 See id. at 503.
254 See Pfeiffer, supra note 136, at 55.
255 See id. at 21.
256 See id. at 55.
257 See id.
bankruptcy system. But most importantly, it seems as if this idea stands for the proposition that only judges deemed experienced enough would be qualified to be appointed to regional centers and, in a sense, to “train” other judges for efficiency and expertise purposes. One might see this proposal as suggesting certain bankruptcy judges outside magnet districts might not be as competent, giving credence to reform proponents and contradicting “race to the top” theorists and their rejection of this unfounded myth.

Most alternatives to reforming bankruptcy venue emphasize the need for a contractual approach to resolve the issue of forum shopping, absent uniformity in bankruptcy precedents. While “race to the top” theorists rightfully claim that forum shopping is beneficial to the bankruptcy system overall, the revived push for reform calls for other means to accommodate the private and public purposes of restructuring. Given that timing is key to an efficient plan, a pre-insolvency remedy that might prove a viable option is an insolvency forum clause paired with a mechanism for amendment based on shifts in precedents and stakeholders’ objectives. Regardless of the means elected, opposing the bankruptcy venue reform becomes critical to retain foreign debtors in U.S. bankruptcy courts.

C. BUT ULTIMATELY, WHY SHOULD WE CARE?

The need to limit venue reform domestically is paramount because leaving the problem unattended would most likely make the issue grow globally. It would risk leaving non-U.S. forums as (1) the sole alternative to foreign debtors lacking assets in the United States and (2) a more attractive venue for domestic debtors with an international presence. As such, this undesirable outcome would endanger the United States’ place in the world of corporate bankruptcy law because foreign debtors would be forced to avail themselves of less reputable districts for purposes of efficiency, expertise, and expediency. As to the risks it would pose to the United States, the answer is quite simple: it would jeopardize the country’s global presence in the aviation industry and undermine the due process rights of U.S. creditors.

258 See, e.g., Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 142, at 1359 n.7.
259 See id. at 1382.
261 See id. at 482–84.
262 See id. at 493–94.
Beyond any doubt, the United States plays a big role in the aviation industry and the several international agencies regulating it by (a) the location of said agencies, (b) the language requirements imposed on pilots flying internationally, and (c) the Cape Town Treaty and its regulation of aircraft leases. For instance, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) works in partnership with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the latter agency based both in Washington, D.C., and Montreal, Canada, further demonstrating the geographical importance played by the United States.\textsuperscript{263} ICAO, a United Nations (U.N.) specialized agency, was founded under the Chicago Convention of 1944 and has been central in implementing “global standards and recommended practices applicable to international aviation [on issues of] safety, security, air traffic management, and environmental standards, among others.”\textsuperscript{264} As a member of the governing council of ICAO, the United States has weighed heavily on policies and guidance issued to both governments and industry operators to restart the international air transport sector during the pandemic.\textsuperscript{265} While the U.S. Department of Transportation requires any holder of a FAA certification to “be able to communicate in English in a discernible and understandable manner with air traffic control . . . [and] pilots,”\textsuperscript{266} ICAO has also imposed similar language requirements, making English the “all pilots” language.\textsuperscript{267}

The United States does not fall short of being the golden standard at the crossroads between insolvency and aviation. For instance, the Cape Town Treaty of 2001 and the immense deference it gives Chapter 11 in matters of aircraft leases further demonstrate the need to preserve the United States’ global presence in the industry.\textsuperscript{268} A particular article references the phe-

\textsuperscript{264} Id.
\textsuperscript{265} See id.
\textsuperscript{266} FAA, ADVISORY CIRCULAR NO. 60-28B, FAA ENGLISH LANGUAGE STANDARD FOR AN FAA CERTIFICATE ISSUED UNDER 14 CFR PARTS 61, 63, 65, and 107 (2017); see also 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.65(2), 63.33(b), 65.33(c), 107.61(b) (2022).
nomenon of global forum shopping and comments that “the United States has not yet lost its crown as the preferred [insolvency] safe harbor . . . within the aviation industry.” The Treaty introduced the registration of international interests over aircraft to facilitate the financing and leasing of mobile equipment of high value while providing creditors with a uniform, international regime of enforcement. The most noteworthy provision from this Treaty is Article XI, listing a creditor’s remedies when facing an insolvent debtor. While two alternative regimes are made available, Alternative A is substantially the equivalent of Section 1110 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which governs aircraft equipment and vessels. The provision offers similar protections and gives the debtor airline the opportunity to either cure all defaults or give possession of the aircraft to the creditor within a sixty-day period to either accept or reject its leasing agreement. However, the provision requires creditors’ consent and does not offer a cramdown provision.

In addition to the impact that reforming bankruptcy venue could have on the United States and its input in regulating aviation, U.S. creditors and protection of their interests under the Bankruptcy Code could be jeopardized. Indeed, forcing foreign debtors to avail themselves of foreign forums would imperil the enforcement of U.S. court orders and could greatly undermine the applicability of “adequate protection” to U.S. creditors’ collateral. While many financial institutions and lenders have ties to American jurisdictions (often New York or Delaware), mobile assets, such as airplanes, pose a great risk to creditors. Absent an automatic stay, the planes’ ability to move across jurisdictions could lead a debtor airline to face an ineffective reorganization. Attempts by foreign creditors to recapture U.S. aircraft would leave U.S. creditors without the protection of domestic courts to favorably intervene against such practice.

269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1110.
274 See McMaster, Andrews & Cameron, supra note 268.
276 See Couwenberg & Lubben, supra note 189, at 375–77.
277 See id.
278 See, e.g., id. at 379.
While a U.S. court order would be binding on those financial institutions and lenders having some contact with the United States, wholly foreign-owned creditors would not be bound by a reorganization plan or discharge, which could present another risk to U.S. creditors.  

Despite the importance of ensuring U.S. creditors are adequately protected, a case for American imperialism should not be advocated for when recognizing foreign insolvency proceedings. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code created Chapter 15, a separate mechanism allowing for the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings and court orders. This process permits a non-U.S. court to serve as the main forum to a debtor’s restructuring efforts while encouraging courts in other countries, including the United States, to defer to and coordinate implementation. This principle of comity remains paramount to a nation as greatly involved in world affairs as the United States. In fact, the country has a national interest in facilitating international restructuring, which strengthens cross-border financial markets and encourages cross-border investment. It nonetheless remains of concern that, absent local recognition by the foreign court supervising the debtor’s restructuring, non-U.S. creditors with few to no ties to the United States could escape from the reach of U.S. courts. In fact, comity would bar U.S. courts from overseeing a case affecting purely local creditors if local courts from the debtor’s home country did not actively try to protect the interest of U.S. creditors.

While the likelihood that a foreign creditor would completely escape from the reach of U.S. courts is slim given the spread of Wall Street financial products and balance sheets abroad, Chapter 11 remains highly predictable to international creditors. As it stands today, bankruptcy venue permits U.S. creditors to directly seek help from U.S. domestic courts to secure their

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279 See id. at 361.
283 Id. at 61.
284 Id. (suggesting U.S. courts give deference to foreign jurisdictions in a very federalist fashion, similar to the way they would in respect to states of the union).
285 See id.
highly valued mobile aircraft. In addition, the prominent role the United States plays in the aviation sphere further strengthens the case in favor of abandoning this reform project.

V. CONCLUSION

The COVID-19 pandemic wreaked havoc on the aviation industry and with it brought the cyclical return of bankruptcy venue reform. The recent Chapter 11 filings by Purdue Pharma and Catholic dioceses provoked the return of a populist backlash, seemingly recurring before each new introduction of reform. Nonetheless, some of the support for reform by officials in Congress and practitioners should not disillusion proponents of the bill. They should anticipate strong resistance that could result in the proposal’s ultimate demise, similar to other failed attempts on record. Amongst those likely to oppose reform is current U.S. President Biden, a former Senator from Delaware, who has traditionally been a strong proponent of the current venue rules.

While the likelihood of venue reform’s success is debatable, the paradigm at issue remains the same: reforming debtors’ venue selection and foreclosing their use of the state of incorporation would imperil foreign entities’ ability to avail themselves of U.S. bankruptcy courts, ultimately damaging the global prowess occupied by the United States in restructuring and undermining the rights and remedies available to U.S. creditors. While “race to the bottom” proponents allege that current venue might undermine the fairness and integrity of the bankruptcy system, “race to the top” theorists make the case in favor of expediency of cases, precedents increasing predictability, and judicial expertise absent uniformity on key legal bankruptcy issues. Furthermore, several remedies have been suggested to address forum shopping (such as ex ante agreements, insolvency forum clauses, etc.) that should be submitted to Congress before further amending the Code more drastically.

Beyond the local impact that reforming venue could have, the proposed legislation would endanger the United States’ place as

\[286 \text{ See Skeel, supra note } 4.\]
\[287 \text{ Salzberg & Arendsen, supra note at 62.}\]
\[289 \text{ Rosen & Gross, supra note 224.}\]
\[290 \text{ See Casey & Macey, supra note 69, at 471–72.}\]
\[291 \text{ See, e.g., id. at 469.}\]
the global leader in aviation and weaken the protections U.S. laws afford U.S. creditors and aircraft lessors. While an argument for American imperialism is undesirable, maintaining the status quo is of the utmost importance. Cases where a foreign venue remains the best alternative naturally limit foreign debtors’ use of U.S. courts in the name of comity but allow the U.S. magnet districts to maintain their reputation, especially when facing increasing competition from the U.K. and Singapore.292

292 Graulich, Piraino & Masaro, supra note 27, at 23 (discussing Virgin Atlantic’s recent Chapter 11 filing in the U.K., paired with a Chapter 15 filing in the Southern District of New York).