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Clay Calvert
University of Florida

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ESCAPING DOCTRINAL LOCKBOXES IN FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE: WORKAROUNDS FOR STRICT SCRUTINY FOR LOW-VALUE SPEECH IN THE FACE OF STEVENS AND REED

Clay Calvert*

ABSTRACT

The United States Supreme Court’s 2010 opinion in the crush-video case of United States v. Stevens made it extremely difficult to declare new varieties of low-value speech unprotected by the First Amendment. Five years later, the Court’s sign-ordinance ruling in Reed v. Town of Gilbert made it exceedingly tough for facially content-based regulations imposed on presumptively protected speech to be analyzed by any standard of judicial review less rigorous than the demanding strict scrutiny test. This Article examines how some courts today, despite being hemmed in by the strictures of both Stevens and Reed, are creatively unearthing novel ways to apply more lenient levels of review to content-based laws targeting varieties of speech—in particular, revenge pornography and conversion therapy—that seemingly carry trifling value for furthering traditional First Amendment ideals. Those time-honored goals addressed in this Article include promoting democratic self-governance and facilitating truth discovery in the metaphorical marketplace of ideas. The Article asserts that rather than resorting to arfiful efforts to dodge both Reed and a rigid categorical approach to First Amendment analysis, lower courts should boldly embrace Justice Breyer’s values-and-interests methodology for proportionate scrutiny in these cases. This, in turn, would tee up for possible Supreme Court reconsideration Reed and, conceivably, even Stevens. Significantly, as the Article explains, Justice Breyer advocated in 2019 for this approach in the low-value speech case of Iancu v. Brunetti involving the trademark “FUCT.” This bolsters the argument for its applicability when it comes to analyzing laws barring the low-value expression of revenge pornography and conversion therapy.

* Professor of Law, Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication and Director of the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of Florida in Gainesville, Florida. B.A., 1987, Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996, Communication, Stanford University. The author thanks student Alexandra Newman for her careful review of a draft of this Article.
I. INTRODUCTION

In October 2019, the Supreme Court of Illinois held in People v. Austin that a state statute criminalizing the nonconsensual dissemination of certain private, sexual images was a content-neutral law subject to constitutional analysis under the intermediate scrutiny standard. This tier of review comports with the notion that, in recent decades, “some version of intermediate scrutiny has been consistently used in cases involving content-neutral time, manner, and place restrictions.”

2. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-23.5(b) (2020).
3. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 43 (“We conclude that section 11-23.5(b) is subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny for two independent reasons. First, the statute is a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction. Second, the statute regulates a purely private matter.”).
In the face of a First Amendment free speech challenge to the statute in
Austin, Illinois’s highest court ultimately upheld the statute under this
generally deferential level of appraisal.\(^5\)

There is, however, a glaring problem with this decision. It is that the
Illinois statute discriminates on its face against a particular type of con-
tent; the Supreme Court of Illinois majority readily acknowledged this
fact.\(^6\) In particular, the law targets only images depicting a person “en-
gaged in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed.”\(^7\) Visuals
showing other subjects or topics, including people who are not participating
in such deeds and whose intimate parts are covered, are not con-
strained by the measure.\(^8\) This discrepancy between what content is and is
not regulated by the statute is highly significant. It means that under the
United States Supreme Court’s 2015 ruling in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,\(^9\)
the Illinois statute is facially content based because it “draws distinctions
based on the message a speaker conveys”\(^10\) and defines “regulated speech
by [a] particular subject matter.”\(^11\)

The ramifications, in turn, of this facial, content-based categorization
are profound for dictating the applicable level of First Amendment scru-
tiny for statutory analysis.\(^12\) Per Reed, the Illinois statute should have

5. See Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 86 (“We hold that section 11-23.5 satisfies interme-
diate scrutiny.”); see also Daniel A. Farber, The First Amendment 194 (4th ed. 2014)
(“[T]he Court’s review of time, place, and manner restrictions normally is not particularly
vigorous.”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Clint A. Carpenter, The Return of Sedition
Libel, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1239, 1260 (2008) (asserting that the intermediate scrutiny test, as
it has evolved over time, “often present[s] the government with only minor impediments—
mere speed bumps along the path to suppression of even core political speech”).

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. Const.
amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated ninety-five years ago
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties applicable
for governing the actions of state and local government entities and officials. See
which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among
the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”).

6. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 46 (“We recognize that section 11-23.5(b) on its face
targets the dissemination of a specific category of speech—sexual images.”).

“sexual penetration, masturbation, or sexual activity.” Id. § 11-23.5(a). It explicates inti-
mate parts as “fully unclothed, partially unclothed or transparently clothed genitals, pubic
area, anus, or if the person is female, a partially or fully exposed nipple, including exposure
through transparent clothing.” Id.

8. As the two-justice dissent in Austin explained, the statute does not make it a crime
“to disseminate a picture of a fully clothed adult man or woman,” no matter how unflatter-
ing the image might be. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 127 (Garman, J., dissenting).


10. Id. at 163.

11. Id.

12. Whether a law is content based or content neutral is critical in First Amendment
jurisprudence in terms of influencing the level of scrutiny to which it will be subjected by a
court. As one professor explains the usual methodology:

After distinguishing content-based from content-neutral laws, the Court
must give each its appropriate level of review. This is the scrutiny analysis.
Content-based laws receive strict scrutiny, which nearly always proves fatal.
been examined under the more rigorous strict scrutiny standard—not intermediate scrutiny—regardless of any benign legislative motive or purpose underlying it. As Justice Thomas bluntly explained in penning the Court’s opinion in *Reed*, “an innocuous justification cannot transform a facially content-based law into one that is content neutral.” In other words, there simply is no need under *Reed* to examine the legislative motive once a statute is determined to be facially content based; facially content-based laws must clear strict scrutiny to be constitutional.

The application of strict scrutiny to content-based laws, in turn, typically tolls the death knell for such legislative handiwork. That is because strict scrutiny represents “the most searching form of judicial review in free speech cases.” It requires the government to prove both that it has a compelling interest to justify the law in question and that the means

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13. *Reed*, 576 U.S. at 165 (“A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech.” (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993))); see also Genevieve Lakier, *Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, and the Rise of the Anticlassificatory First Amendment*, 2016 Sup. Ct. Rev. 233, 233 (“For decades now, the Supreme Court has insisted that content-based laws—laws that restrict speech because of its ideas or messages or subject matter—are presumptively unconstitutional, and will be sustained only if they can satisfy strict scrutiny.”).

14. *Reed*, 576 U.S. at 166; see Enrique Armijo, *Reed v. Town of Gilbert: Relax, Everybody*, 58 B.C. L. Rev. 65, 67 (2017) (examining *Reed’s* analysis of the scrutiny issue and noting that, under it, “[e]ven a benign (or at least non-content-related) purpose cannot save a law that refers to content from the most rigorous constitutional standard of review”).

15. See R. Randall Kelso, *Clarifying Viewpoint Discrimination in Free Speech Doctrine*, 52 Ind. L. Rev. 355, 400 (2019) (“[T]he majority in *Reed* adopted a rigid rule that if a regulation is content-based ‘on its face,’ then strict scrutiny is automatically triggered.” (quoting *Reed*, 576 U.S. at 165)). There are a few exceptions to this general rule, perhaps the most notable of which involves laws targeting commercial speech. Such measures typically are analyzed under a variation of intermediate scrutiny. See Caroline Mala Corbin, *Compelled Disclosures*, 65 Ala. L. Rev. 1277, 1283 (2014) (“[T]he Supreme Court differentiates between commercial speech (such as advertising) and noncommercial speech, and subjects the former to intermediate scrutiny.”); David L. Hudson, Jr., *The Content-Discrimination Principle and the Impact of Reed v. Town of Gilbert*, 70 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 259, 272 (2019) (“[C]ommercial speech receives protection but it is still viewed as a stepchild in the First Amendment family. All regulations of commercial speech—both content-based and content-neutral—are evaluated under the so-called *Central Hudson* test, a variant of intermediate scrutiny developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1980.”).

16. See *Reed*, 576 U.S. at 176 (Breyer, J., concurring) (asserting that strict scrutiny leads “to almost certain legal condemnation”); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 731 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) (declaring that strict scrutiny results in “near-automatic condemnation”); see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, *In Defense of Content Regulation*, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 1427, 1428 (2017) (describing strict scrutiny as “essentially outcome determinative; in only one modern case has a majority of the Court unambiguously upheld a content-based law under strict scrutiny” (footnote omitted)).

serving that interest squelch no more speech than is absolutely necessary. As Justice Souter once tidily encapsulated it, strict scrutiny “leaves few survivors.”

Yet, the Supreme Court of Illinois in Austin ignored Reed’s admonition that a facially content-based law must surmount strict scrutiny irrespective of lawmakers’ noble motives. Instead, Illinois’s highest court took a substantial leap backward in time to 1989, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion from that year in Ward v. Rock Against Racism. The Court there concluded that the legislative intent for adopting a law provided the pivotal key for deciding if it was content based or content neutral. In short, in Austin, the Supreme Court of Illinois followed the outdated Ward ruling, not Reed, thus allowing it to focus on legislative motive even when confronted with a facially content-based statute.

Writing for the five-member Austin majority, Justice Neville quoted Ward verbatim for dual propositions buttressing the position that intent controls whether a law is content based or content neutral: First, “The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.” And second, “A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”

18. See Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (providing that strict scrutiny requires a law to be “justified by a compelling government interest and . . . narrowly drawn to serve that interest,” and dubbing this “a demanding standard”); see also McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014) (providing that to pass strict scrutiny review under the narrow-tailoring prong, a statute “must be the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest” (emphasis added)).


20. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (addressing how the Court in Reed held that a facially content-based statute cannot be converted into a content-neutral one by a good legislative purpose); see also Dan V. Kozlowski & Derigan Silver, Measuring Reed’s Reach: Content Discrimination in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 24 COMM’N L. & POL’Y 191, 192 (2019) (“Justice Thomas’s opinion in Reed held that facial content discrimination cannot be saved with a benign purpose. In previous cases, the Court had stated that an innocuous government purpose could save a facially content-based law from strict scrutiny. Reed, however, changed the calculus, stating that was not the case.” (footnote omitted)).


22. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (“The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. The government’s purpose is the controlling consideration.” (citation omitted)).

23. See Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶¶ 45–46 (citing Ward several times and relying on it for the proposition that a regulation may be content neutral, even if it is facially content based, if the government adopted it to serve a goal that is unrelated to a disagreement with the specific content being regulated).

24. Id. ¶ 45 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).

25. Id. ¶ 46 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).
Justice Neville cited *Reed*, but only for the principle that content-based laws must survive strict scrutiny to be constitutional. He failed to mention *Reed*’s unambiguous holding that “[a] law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, [or] content-neutral justification.” In a nutshell, the *Austin* majority found that a facially content-based law should nonetheless be deemed content neutral and should therefore be subject to intermediate scrutiny review.

As if *sub silentio* sensing that it needed some additional cover for flouting *Reed*, the Supreme Court of Illinois doubled down on veering off the beaten path of scrutiny. Specifically, it articulated a back-up, independent justification for applying intermediate scrutiny beyond content neutrality: the Illinois statute regulates only speech about matters of private concern, not public interest, and thus merits more deferential judicial review. The U.S. Supreme Court certainly has embraced a dichotomy between matters of public and private concern, but it has done so only when addressing the speech rights of government employees, as well as when deciding whether the First Amendment shields speakers from tort liability and safeguards media entities that publish lawfully obtained,

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26. See id. ¶ 40 (“A content-based law is justified only if it survives strict scrutiny, which requires the government to demonstrate that the law is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” (citing *Reed v. Town of Gilbert*, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015))).

27. *Reed*, 576 U.S. at 165 (emphasis added).

28. See *Austin*, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 43 (holding that the statute was “subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny” in part because it was “a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction”).

29. See id. ¶¶ 53–54 (concluding that section 11-23.5(b) is subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny also because the statute regulates a purely private matter,” and asserting that “[F]irst [A]mendment protections are less rigorous where matters of purely private significance are at issue”).

30. See *Garcetti* v. *Ceballos*, 547 U.S. 410, 420 (2006) (“The Court’s decisions . . . have sought both to promote the individual and societal interests that are served when employees speak as citizens on matters of public concern and to respect the needs of government employers attempting to perform their important public functions.” (emphasis added)); *City of San Diego v. Roe*, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (“The Court has recognized the right of employees to speak on matters of public concern, typically matters concerning government policies that are of interest to the public at large, a subject on which public employees are uniquely qualified to comment.” (emphasis added)); see also *Carmen Maye*, *Public-College Student-Athletes and Game-Time Anthem Protests: Is There a Need for a Constitutional-Analytical Audible?, 24 COMM'CNS L. & POL’Y 55, 79 (2019) (“In public-employee speech cases, the primary consideration is whether an employee utters the speech in connection with his or her job—as a public employee—or is speaking ‘as a citizen upon matters of public concern.’” (quoting *Garcetti*, 547 U.S. at 416)).

31. See *Snyder v. Phelps*, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011) (holding that whether the First Amendment shielded members of the Westboro Baptist Church from tort liability based on their offensive speech near a funeral for a U.S. soldier killed in Iraq “turn[ed] largely on whether that speech was of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case” and noting that “where matters of purely private significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are often less rigorous”); see also *Erica Goldberg*, *Competing Free Speech Values in an Age of Protest*, 39 CARDozo L. Rev. 2163, 2169 (2018) (“[T]he public concern test dominates much of First Amendment analysis in the speech-torts context.”).
truthful information. It has never, however, invoked this on–off switch of public-versus-private matters when determining whether intermediate or strict scrutiny applies to analyze a statute. The elephant-in-the-room question that thus arises—the one animating this Article—is why the Supreme Court of Illinois ignored Reed’s bright-line rule and, instead, latched on to Ward, which focused on legislative intent. This Article hypothesizes that the Illinois Supreme Court, like some other courts in 2019 confronting similar issues, might have done so because: (1) the statute at issue regulated decidedly low-value speech, and (2) the court needed to find an escape hatch from the strictures of both Reed and the Court’s 2010 decision in United States v. Stevens in order to increase the odds of the statute passing constitutional muster.

Stevens made it much more challenging for courts to hold that a new variety of speech—known as nonconsensual, or revenge, pornography

32. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533–34 (2001) (holding that enforcement of a federal statute banning the dissemination of the contents of a conversation that was illegally intercepted was not justified on the facts of the case because “enforcement of that provision . . . implicat[ed] the core purposes of the First Amendment because it impose[d] sanctions on the publication of truthful information of public concern” (emphasis added)); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) (“[I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.” (emphasis added)); see also Adam Candeub, Nakedness and Publicity, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1747, 1767 (2019) (“Bartnicki ruled the First Amendment prohibits laws outlawing dissemination of speech—acquired by a third-party wiretapper—if of public concern.”).

33. The Court, instead, focuses on whether the regulation is content neutral or content based. Professor Genevieve Lakier explains that [t]he distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech is one of the most important in First Amendment law. For decades now, the Supreme Court has insisted that content-based laws—laws that restrict speech because of its ideas or messages or subject matter—are presumptively unconstitutional, and will be sustained only if they can satisfy strict scrutiny. In contrast, content-neutral laws—laws that regulate speech for some reason other than its content—are reviewed under a lesser, and often quite deferential, standard. Lakier, supra note 13, at 233 (footnote omitted).

34. See infra Section IV.B (addressing two cases where courts avoided the application of strict scrutiny when confronted with seemingly content-based laws regulating the low-value speech of sexual orientation change efforts).

35. See infra notes 76–86 and accompanying text (addressing the concept of low-value speech and the U.S. Supreme Court’s articulation of that concept in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), as a rationale for holding that the regulation of some types of speech “have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem”).

36. 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010).

37. See People v. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 17 (observing that the Illinois statute “addresses the problem of nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images, which is colloquially referred to as ‘revenge porn’”), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-1029 (U.S. Feb. 14, 2020); see also Mary Anne Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1251, 1258 (2017) (defining nonconsensual pornography as “sexually explicit images and video disclosed without consent and for no legitimate purpose,” and noting that “[m]any victim advocates” prefer to use the term nonconsensual pornography instead of “revenge porn”); Jessica A. Magaldi, Jonathan S. Sales & John Paul, Revenge Porn: The Name Doesn’t Do Nonconsensual Pornography Justice and the Remedies Don’t Offer the Victims Enough Justice, 98 OR. L. REV. 197, 199, 203 (2020) (defining
(this Article uses the terms interchangeably), which was targeted in Austin—falls outside the bounds of First Amendment protection. 38 Specifically, Stevens flatly rejected the government’s position that novel categories of unguarded speech are identifiable “on the basis of a simple cost-benefit analysis” 39 that balances the “relative social costs and benefits” 40 of protecting the speech in question and deems some speech utterly valueless or not worth protecting. 41 Writing for the Stevens majority, Chief Justice Roberts did not, however, slam the door shut on recognizing new varieties of unprotected expression. 42 He determined that a history- and-tradition methodology must be applied in order to identify possible new categories, reasoning that “[m]aybe there are some categories of speech that have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law.” 43

This approach, as former American Civil Liberties Union President Nadine Strossen encapsulates it, “is essentially backward-looking, treating the finite exceptions that had been generally accepted since the First Amendment’s adoption as a closed, fixed set of all such exceptions.” 44 This thwarts “the possibility of carving out from First Amendment protection any expression that had been protected historically.” 45 Similarly, Professor Genevieve Lakier notes that under the accepted view of Stevens, “historical evidence of a ‘long-settled tradition of subjecting that

38. The U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that multiple varieties of speech generally are unprotected by the First Amendment. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (plurality opinion) (listing unprotected brands of expression as including incitement to violence, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, fighting words, child pornography, fraud, true threats and “speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent.”). The Court’s “plurality opinion in Alvarez represents [its] most recent effort to catalog categories of unprotected speech.” G. Edward White, Falsity and the First Amendment, 72 SMU L. Rev. 513, 517 (2019). Before Alvarez, the Court had enumerated unprotected categories of speech in other opinions. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002) (“As a general principle, the First Amendment bars the government from dictating what we see or read or speak or hear. The freedom of speech has its limits: it does not embrace certain categories of speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real children.” (emphasis added)).

39. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471.

40. Id. at 470.

41. See id. (“The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it.”).

42. See id. at 472 (“We need not foreclose the future recognition of such additional categories to reject the Government’s highly manipulable balancing test as a means of identifying them.”).

43. Id.


45. Id. at 82.
speech to regulation’ is required to establish the existence of a novel category of low-value speech.” As applied in Stevens, this approach led the Court to refuse to adopt images of animal cruelty as a new category of unprotected expression.47

The next year, in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,48 the Court applied the same Stevens approach for ferreting out niches of unprotected speech when it considered the constitutionality of a California statute limiting minors’ access to violent video games.49 The Court found that there was no historical tradition in the United States of banning minors’ access to speech describing or depicting violence.50 The California statute thus “impose[d] a restriction on the content of protected speech,” and it had to overcome the strict scrutiny test in order to be constitutional.51 This was a high hurdle that the statute could not clear.52 The Court again reaffirmed the Stevens methodology in 2012 in United States v. Alvarez.53

Viewed collectively, the Stevens, Brown, and Alvarez approach for fashioning new categories of unprotected speech represents what Professor Chad Flanders calls “a sort of ‘back to the future’ in First Amendment law.”54

The Supreme Court of Illinois in Austin, in fact, was hemmed in by both Stevens and Reed. In particular, the Prairie State’s high court cited Stevens when noting that the U.S. Supreme Court “has permitted content-based restrictions where [the restrictions are] confined to the few historic, traditional, and long-familiar categories of expression.”55 It declined, however, “to identify a new categorical [F]irst [A]mendment exception when the United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question” of constitutional protection (or lack thereof) for the nonconsensual dissemination of private, sexual images.56 In doing so, it noted that earlier in 2019, the Supreme Court of Vermont had also refused to carve out a new category of unprotected expression under Stevens for such speech when considering the constitutionality of that state’s statute

47. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472.
49. See id. at 788–89. The Brown majority deemed Stevens controlling precedent. Id. at 792.
50. See id. at 795 (“California’s argument would fare better if there were a longstanding tradition in this country of specially restricting children’s access to depictions of violence, but there is none.”).
51. Id. at 799.
52. See id. (“California cannot meet that standard.”).
53. 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (plurality opinion). The Court in Alvarez cited approvingly Stevens’s history-and-tradition test. See id. at 717 (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010)). It then refused to carve out an unprotected category of expression for false speech. See id. at 722 (rejecting “the notion that false speech should be in a general category that is presumptively unprotected”).
56. Id. ¶ 36.
targeting nonconsensual pornography.\textsuperscript{57}

In short, the Supreme Court of Illinois was reticent under Stevens—and without additional guidance from the nation’s highest court—to fashion a novel class of unprotected expression for nonconsensual pornography. In turn, because such speech was presumptively protected, the court had to apply a standard of review to analyze the constitutional validity of the statute before it and, as noted earlier, the court adopted intermediate scrutiny as the proper test.\textsuperscript{58} This flatly contradicted Reed’s command that facially content-based laws must survive strict scrutiny.\textsuperscript{59}

Pulling the analytical camera back from a tight focus on Austin, the big picture revealed is this: Stevens and Reed pack a profoundly powerful one–two categorical punch in First Amendment jurisprudence. Stevens strikes the first blow, making it difficult for courts to carve out new categories of unprotected expression, especially when the speech only recently—not traditionally and historically—has been targeted by lawmakers for regulation and criminalization. Reed then follows up and lands the second wallop, rendering it tough for courts to apply a standard of review less burdensome than strict scrutiny once a statute is categorized as facially content based. Legislation banishing or restricting low-value speech thus can be knocked out, left lying on the canvas, unless it surmounts strict scrutiny or a wily court invents a way to elude the doctrinal lockboxes of Stevens and Reed.

This Article, focusing on Austin as well as two 2019 opinions addressing the First Amendment implications of laws banning conversion therapy—also called sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE)\textsuperscript{60}—on minors, explores how some courts are shrewdly finding ways to apply standards of

\textsuperscript{57} Id. (citing State v. VanBuren, 2018 VT 95 ¶ 46, 210 Vt. 293, 214 A.3d 791, 807 (2019)). In State v. VanBuren, Vermont’s highest appellate court “left it to the Supreme Court in the first instance to designate nonconsensual pornography as a new category of speech that falls outside the First Amendment’s full protections.” 2018 VT 95, ¶ 46, 210 Vt. 293, 214 A.3d at 807. The Supreme Court of Vermont also cited the test from Stevens, noting that the U.S. Supreme Court there “focused particularly on the absence of any history of regulating such depictions, rather than the policy arguments for and against embracing the proposed new category.” Id. ¶ 30, 210 Vt. 293, 214 A.3d at 802 (citing Stevens, 559 U.S. at 469). Ultimately, it held “that ‘revenge porn’ does not fall within an established categorical exception to full First Amendment protection, and . . . decline[d] to predict that the U.S. Supreme Court would recognize a new category.” Id. ¶ 22, 210 Vt. 293, 214 A.3d at 800.

\textsuperscript{58} See supra note 3 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{59} See supra notes 6–15 and accompanying text (addressing how the law at issue in Austin was content based on its face and how, per Reed, such laws must survive strict scrutiny to pass First Amendment muster).

\textsuperscript{60} As a June 2019 report prepared by the Williams Institute at UCLA Law School encapsulates it:

Conversion therapy, also known as sexual orientation or gender identity change efforts, is a practice grounded in the belief that being LGBT is abnormal. It is intended to change the sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression of LGBT people. Conversion therapy is practiced by some licensed professionals in the context of providing health care and by some clergy or other spiritual advisors in the context of religious practice. Efforts to change someone’s sexual orientation or gender identity are associated with poor mental health, including suicidality. As of June 2019, 18 states, the
review less arduous than strict scrutiny when analyzing statutes targeting such decidedly low-value speech. Indeed, revenge pornography is not only generally low value but also, in fact, often extremely harmful. As Professors Danielle Keats Citron and Mary Anne Franks explain, victims of revenge pornography suffer “grave harms” such as “stalking, loss of professional and educational opportunities, and psychological damage.”61 Furthermore, as Citron recently pointed out, the nonconsensual dissemination of such images “invades sexual privacy by preventing victims from determining for themselves who sees them naked.”62 She asserts that “[n]ude photos, posted for the public to see, reduce people to their genitalia and breasts. When nonconsensual pornography is perpetrated by an ex-intimate, the betrayal of trust is profound.”63

In terms of value, or lack thereof, speech efforts to change the sexual orientation of minors might well be similarly considered. Specifically, and according to some studies and learned organizations, conversion therapy not only lacks any value but also may harm those who undergo it.64 In November 2018, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) “reiterate[d] its long-standing opposition to the practice.”65 In doing so, the APA called conversion therapy a “harmful and discriminatory practice.”66 In a 2019 issue brief, the American Medical Association (AMA) pointed out that conversion therapy may “increase suicidal behaviors in a population where suicide is prevalent,” namely LGBTQ young adults.67 The AMA added that “[a]ll leading professional medical and mental health associations reject ‘conversion therapy’ as a legitimate medical


  61. Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 347 (2014); see also Ari Ezra Waldman, A Breach of Trust: Fighting Nonconsensual Pornography, 102 IOWA L. REV. 709, 710 (2017) (“[Nonconsensual pornography] can have devastating effects: Victims experience severe anxiety and depression and they are often placed in physical danger. They lose their jobs and have difficulty finding new ones.”).


  63. Id.


  66. Id.

Part II of this Article initially reviews the concept of low-value speech and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in *Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire*, which suggested in dictum that such expression falls completely outside the wall of First Amendment protection. It also describes how *United States v. Stevens*, as addressed earlier, revamped the calculus for identifying categories of speech that are unsheltered by the First Amendment. Part III then provides a brief primer on two well-established justifications for protecting free expression—namely, fostering informed, democratic self-governance and discovering (or, at least, testing notions of) the truth in the marketplace of ideas. Additionally, it suggests how—generally speaking—speech in the form of nonconsensual pornography and SOCE do not advance these values.

Next, Part IV delves deeper into the Supreme Court of Illinois’s avoidance of strict scrutiny in *Austin* and exposes multiple flaws with that court’s analysis. Part IV also reveals how two courts in 2019 deployed tests less rigorous than strict scrutiny when examining laws barring SOCE on minors. Part V then argues that courts addressing the question of scrutiny in these matters are better off embracing Justice Breyer’s preferred scrutiny analysis of proportionality rather than inventing other, highly suspect workarounds for *Reed*. The level of scrutiny, under Justice Breyer’s approach, fluctuates based on an evaluation of whether protecting the speech in question would further traditional First Amendment values and objectives, including those addressed in Part III of this Article. Finally, Part VI concludes that, in light of the issues raised by the low-value speech of nonconsensual pornography and SOCE, the U.S. Supreme Court should revisit both *Reed* and *Stevens* in order to facilitate the analysis of such expression under Justice Breyer’s methodology.

II. LOW-VALUE SPEECH AND EXCLUSIONS FROM FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION: FROM *CHAPLINSKY* TO * STEVENS*

Despite its unequivocal “no law” terminology that seemingly affords absolute protection to speech from government censorship—“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech”—the U.S. Supreme Court never has interpreted that language literally. As one re-
cent article sums it up, “American jurisprudence has rejected an absolutist interpretation of the Amendment.” Justice Holmes famously suggested this more than a century ago, writing that “[t]he most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.” The Supreme Court today, in fact, has held that multiple varieties of speech generally receive no First Amendment protection.

A momentous Supreme Court ruling affecting when speech falls outside the First Amendment’s coverage is Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. The Court there identified for the first time so-called fighting words as a category of speech that could be punished without raising First Amendment problems. The case, however, did much more than that. As Professor Ronald Turner comments, Chaplinsky deployed a methodology “of extreme categorization, with the Court indicating that certain types of expression, such as fighting words, the lewd and obscene, the profane, and the libelous, are wholly outside the coverage and protection of the First Amendment.”

The Chaplinsky Court embraced this “categorical approach to setting the First Amendment’s boundaries” by engaging in what today is dubbed “famous dictum.” Specifically, Justice Murphy wrote for a
unanimous Court that the above-noted brands of expression serve “no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”81 Dean Rodney Smolla identifies Justice Murphy’s logic as part “of the single most powerful and oft-cited passages in all of American free speech law.”82 That largely is because this dictum, as Professor Jeffrey Shaman asserts, marked the beginning of the low-value theory of free expression.83

Professor Ronald Collins explains that this approach to First Amendment law pivots “on the value of the expression in question,” whereby if it fails to serve “normative values” such as elucidating ideas or furthering the quest for truth, “then it could easily be added to any list of unprotected speech.”84 In other words, categorizing speech as low value under Chaplinsky renders it “removed from the ordinary suite of First Amendment protections.”85 In making this determination, “judges identified unprotected categories of speech by their inclusion or exclusion from core free speech values of self-expression, political participation, or informative content.”86

Nearly seventy years after Chaplinsky, however, the Court severely modified, if not completely abandoned, this approach in United States v. Stevens.87 The Stevens Court explained that “[w]hen we have identified categories of speech as fully outside the protection of the First Amendment, it has not been on the basis of a simple cost-benefit analysis”88 that entails “an ad hoc balancing of [the] relative social costs and benefits”89 of protecting the speech. There must be something in addition to the con-

81. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
86. Alexander Tsesis, Categorizing Student Speech, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1147, 1166 (2018); see also Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 394 (2009) (describing Chaplinsky as involving a balancing methodology that “is informed by First Amendment values” and that produces “a categorical result” by excluding some forms of speech from First Amendment coverage).
87. 559 U.S. 460, 471–72 (2010); see MARC A. FRANKLIN, DAVID A. ANDERSON, LYRISSA C. BARNETT LIDSKY & AMY GAIDA, MEDIA LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 109 (9th ed. 2016) (asserting that the Court in Stevens seemed to reject “the premise articulated by Chaplinsky”).
88. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471.
89. Id. at 470.
sideration of the value of the speech. As described earlier, that additional something is a long history of the speech being considered unprotected in the United States, even if the Supreme Court has not directly considered whether the First Amendment shelters it. For example, the Court in Stevens pointed out that when it held in 1982 that child pornography was not protected by the First Amendment, it “grounded its analysis in a previously recognized, long-established category of unprotected speech.” The Court in Stevens rejected the government’s view “that categories of speech may be exempted from the First Amendment’s protection without any long-settled tradition of subjecting that speech to regulation.”

Putting this in slightly different terms one year later in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the Court stressed that there must be “a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription” of the speech for it to fall outside the ambit of First Amendment coverage.

This test makes it extraordinarily difficult to declare that nonconsensual pornography and speech-based conversion therapy on minors is unprotected by the First Amendment. That is because the regulation of such speech is relatively new. Regarding the former brand of expression, Professor Mary Anne Franks notes that “[b]efore 2003, no law in the United States explicitly criminalized the unauthorized disclosure of sexually explicit images of another adult person.” In fact, she adds that

before 2013 there were few laws in the United States explicitly addressing this invasion of sexual privacy, even as concerns over almost every other form of privacy (financial, medical, data) have captured legal and social imagination. While some existing voyeurism, surveillance, and computer hacking laws may prohibit the nonconsensual observation and recording of individuals in states of undress or engaged in sexual activity, the nonconsensual disclosure of intimate images has been, until very recently, largely unregulated by the law.

90. See id. at 471 (describing the Court’s recognition in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), of child pornography as an unprotected category of speech, and remarking that its Ferber “decision did not rest on this ‘balance of competing interests’ alone” (emphasis added) (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764)).

91. See supra notes 36–47 (addressing Stevens and how it has been interpreted by some scholars). This is not to say, however, that the Court in Chaplinsky found a history of non-protection totally irrelevant. The use of the word “never” in the following statement from Chaplinsky intimates that history is, in fact, a consideration: “There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). Professor Mark Tushnet explains that this language represents a “historical” theme in the Chaplinsky analysis. Mark Tushnet, The Coverage/Protection Distinction in the Law of Freedom of Speech—An Essay on Meta-Doctrine in Constitutional Law, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1073, 1078 (2017).

92. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471.

93. Id. at 469.


95. Franks, supra note 37, at 1255.

96. Id. at 1261.
A similar recency-of-prohibition predicament holds true for statutes targeting speech-based conversion therapy or SOCE on minors. Professor Melissa Ballengee Alexander remarks that in 2012, “California made national headlines as the first state to ban state-licensed mental health providers from engaging minors in conversion therapy. New Jersey followed suit a year later, and the District of Columbia the year after that.” And while by late 2019 eighteen states and dozens of local municipalities had laws restricting conversion therapy in some way, a few of those measures still permit the practice on minors if done within the context of religious counseling.

In a nutshell, there is only an extremely brief history of laws in the United States regulating or banning both nonconsensual pornography and conversion therapy. This, in turn, strongly signals that under the approach for identifying new varieties of unprotected speech embraced in *Stevens*, neither nonconsensual pornography nor speech-based conversion therapy on minors would go without at least some modicum of First Amendment shelter from government censorship were the Supreme Court to face that issue. In other words, despite the apparently toxic nature of both nonconsensual pornography and conversion therapy that might have rendered them outside the ambit of First Amendment protection under Chaplinsky’s low-value approach, they seemingly are covered as protected forms of expression under *Stevens*. This comports with Professor Andrew Koppelman’s observation that, under *Stevens*, the Court “will craft no new exceptions to free speech protection.”

The next Part addresses two traditional rationales for protecting expression under the First Amendment—truth discovery in the public marketplace of ideas and the promotion of democratic self-governance. These rationales are examined both to reveal that neither nonconsensual pornography nor SOCE furthers these interests in any significant way—in other words, they are truly low-value brands of speech under the Chaplinsky approach—and to set the stage for Part V’s call for applying Justice Breyer’s proportionality approach to scrutiny that readily accounts for such First Amendment interests.

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99. See supra notes 61–68 and accompanying text (addressing the low-value, harmful nature of both nonconsensual pornography and conversion therapy on minors).

III. A POWERFUL PAIR OF FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH INTERESTS: DISCOVERING AND TESTING THE TRUTH AND PROMOTING DEMOCRATIC SELF-GOVERNANCE

In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court reasoned that punishing and preventing speech such as fighting words and obscenity has “never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem” because, in key part, such messages “are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” The emphasized portion of that quotation taps directly into the First Amendment principle that a diverse, wide-open marketplace of ideas should be privileged in order to facilitate a search for truth. As Justice Holmes wrote in his 1919 dissent in Abrams v. United States:

[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.

With this “elegant defense,” Justice Holmes ushered into First Amendment law the marketplace of ideas theory of free speech. More than 100 years later, the Justice’s “paean to truth and free speech” has “assumed the status of seminal secular scripture, becoming to First Amendment law what Genesis is to the Bible.” Under this theory, as Professor Frederick Schauer synthesized it, “truth will most likely surface when all opinions may freely be expressed, [and] when there is an open and unregulated market for the trade in ideas” in which opinions are tested. Accepted truths, in turn, must be constantly tested, given that they often turn out to be wrong in the long run. In other words, the

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process of testing opinions is itself both privileged and valuable under the marketplace theory, even if there is no objective, ultimate truth. Indeed, Justice Holmes “displayed an instinctive aversion to assertions of ‘absolute’ truth.” Additionally, the process of testing accepted truths helps to revitalize and reinvigorate their meaning, as well as enhance how people understand them.

As former Yale Law School Dean Robert Post summarized it, the marketplace theory does not require protecting any and all speech that communicates ideas, but only speech that “communicates ideas and that is embedded in the kinds of social practices that produce truth.” Thus, under Chaplinsky’s approach for precluding certain varieties of expression from constitutional protection, speech that is “of such slight social value as a step to truth” can more easily be jettisoned from the fortress of First Amendment shelter, particularly when “the social interest in order and morality” outweighs the speech’s truth-seeking value. And while the Stevens history-and-tradition methodology for establishing unprotected classes of speech may have rejected such a pure, ad hoc balancing approach that percolated through Chaplinsky’s dictum, the Court nonetheless continues to favorably invoke the marketplace of ideas metaphor subsequent to Stevens.

109. Smolla, supra note 73, at 8; see Enrique Armijo, The “Ample Alternative Channels” Flaw in First Amendment Doctrine, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1657, 1696, 1698 (2016) (noting that “[m]arketplace theory defines the First Amendment’s primary function as facilitating a process by which truth can be reached,” and adding that “[a] process-based definition of marketplace theory predominates in First Amendment scholarship” (emphasis added)).


111. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 116 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974) (1859) (contending that “unless [a received opinion] is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds”). Mill often is associated with the marketplace of ideas theory. See, e.g., Matthew D. Bunker, Critiquing Free Speech: First Amendment Theory and the Challenge of Interdisciplinarity 3 (Jennings Bryant & Dolf Zillmann eds., 2001) (“Marketplace theory grew in sophistication as a result of British philosopher John Stuart Mill’s 1859 defense of free speech in ‘On Liberty.’”).


114. Id.

Interestingly, *Austin* actually may be the exceedingly rare case in which the nonconsensual dissemination of sexual imagery was directly intended to serve a truth-proving purpose, albeit on a very small scale. In particular, while defendant Bethany Austin was engaged to be married, a female neighbor—identified in the case as the victim—texted nude photographs of herself to Austin’s fiancé, Matthew. Bethany Austin discovered the images because she and Matthew shared an iCloud account. Bethany Austin and Matthew then cancelled their wedding and broke up. Matthew proceeded to blame Bethany for the breakup, “telling family and friends that their relationship had ended because defendant [Bethany Austin] was crazy and no longer cooked or did household chores.” Engaging in what First Amendment scholars might consider a classic instance of the self-help remedy of counterspeech in order to prove what really transpired in their relationship, Bethany Austin “wrote a letter detailing her version of events. As support, she attached to the letter four of the naked pictures of the victim and copies of the text messages between the victim and Matthew.” As Bethany Austin’s attorneys put it in their unsuccessful petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, she disseminated the photos “to contradict her fiancé’s false account of why their engagement ended” and to “reveal[] the true reason for the breakup.” In other words, Bethany Austin used the images to expose the truth. After Matthew discovered her actions from his cousin, however, he contacted the police and Bethany Austin was subsequently prosecuted under Illinois’s revenge pornography statute.

Of course, the analogy in *Austin* to the marketplace metaphor is somewhat strained. First, the marketplace within which the nude photos circulated was a miniscule one involving only those to whom Bethany Austin...
sent the images. Second, the images themselves were irrefutable facts, not the kind of debatable ideas, opinions, or thoughts that underlie the marketplace of ideas theory.\textsuperscript{125} In brief, the photographs at issue in \textit{Austin} may have exposed the truth about a particular individual’s reason for breaking up with someone else, but there was no larger, societal-level search for truth served by their dissemination.

In addition to referencing the truth-seeking value of speech, the Court in \textit{Chaplinsky} reasoned that messages that serve “no essential part of any exposition of ideas” may also fall outside the scope of First Amendment protection.\textsuperscript{126} Professor James Weinstein asserts that this largely represents “an attempt to draw a line between public discourse and other types of speech . . . that have little or no connection with democratic self-governance.”\textsuperscript{127} To the extent that the “exposition of ideas” the \textit{Chaplinsky} Court privileges and protects are, indeed, political ones that facilitate democratic self-governance, another paramount First Amendment value comes into play when deciding if speech merits constitutional coverage.\textsuperscript{128}

The free speech theory of democratic self-governance is rooted in the principle that free expression is required for the government and democracy to function properly.\textsuperscript{129} The theory holds that “the essential objective of the First Amendment is to promote a rich and valuable public debate.”\textsuperscript{130} A core facet of the theory is that it rests upon the “enlightenment of society and its elected representatives.”\textsuperscript{131}

The democratic self-governance theory often is associated with Alexander Meiklejohn.\textsuperscript{132} He asserted that “[s]elf-government can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express.”\textsuperscript{133} More specifically, Meiklejohn averred that the dual points of ultimate interest in safeguarding political speech are “the

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\textsuperscript{128}. See Han, supra note 4, at 364 (asserting that protecting speech because it “is a necessary component of democratic self-governance” ranks among the leading “rationales [that] have generally dominated debates regarding First Amendment theory”).


\textsuperscript{130}. \textit{Id.}


\textsuperscript{132}. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., \textit{The Chrysanthemum, the Sword, and the First Amendment: Disentangling Culture, Community, and Freedom of Expression}, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 905, 916 (“Alexander Meiklejohn forcefully articulated the primary alternative account of the First Amendment. In his view, the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment exists principally to facilitate democratic self-governance.” (footnote omitted)).

\textsuperscript{133}. Alexander Meiklejohn, \textit{The First Amendment is an Absolute}, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 255.
\end{footnotesize}
minds of the hearers”\textsuperscript{134} and “the voting of wise decisions.”\textsuperscript{135} Meiklejohn’s view, as summed up by Professor Joseph Russomanno, is that “[t]he Constitution’s commitment to freedom of speech is a commitment to the concept of self-government.”\textsuperscript{136}

The theory is deeply engrained in First Amendment jurisprudence. As Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat notes, “the Supreme Court has repeatedly taken the position that the primary—albeit not necessarily the only—reason why the First Amendment protects freedom of speech is to advance democratic self-governance.”\textsuperscript{137} As described immediately below, the Court has tapped into the theory on multiple occasions.

For example, the Court has emphasized “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”\textsuperscript{138} and that “[s]peech by citizens on matters of public concern lies at the heart of the First Amendment.”\textsuperscript{139} Additionally, the Justices have explained that “[t]he protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”\textsuperscript{140} Furthermore, as Justice Kennedy reasoned for the majority a decade ago, “political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence.”\textsuperscript{141} He added, as if channeling his inner Meiklejohn, that “[t]he right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”\textsuperscript{142}

It is hard to fathom how either the nonconsensual dissemination of sexual images or the speech-based practice of conversion therapy on minors serves societal-level goals of truth discovery in the marketplace of ideas (\textit{Austin}, as noted above, perhaps being a rare exception for revenge pornography and, even then, within a miniature marketplace of ideas) or promotes democratic self-governance.\textsuperscript{143} In fact, as addressed earlier,

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\begin{enumerate}
\item Alexander Meiklejohn, \textit{Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government} 25 (1948).
\item Id.
\item Ashutosh Bhagwat, \textit{The Democratic First Amendment}, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1098 (2016).
\item Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 235 (2014).
\item Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”).
\item Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
\item Id. at 339.
\item Whether or not it is true, as it were, that conversion therapy harms minors is a different issue from the one here of whether conversion helps society discover some larger truth in the marketplace of ideas. \textit{Cf.} Clay Calvert, Kara Carnley, Brittany Link & Linda Riedemann, \textit{Conversion Therapy and Free Speech: A Doctrinal and Theoretical First Amendment Analysis}, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 525, 562 (2014) (querying whether it is “the truth that SOCE not only do not work, but also cause harm to minors? What is the truth about SOCE?”).
\end{enumerate}
both forms of speech may be quite harmful to individuals.144

There are, of course, other theories and rationales for protecting free expression beyond seeking or testing truth in the marketplace of ideas and facilitating democratic self-governance.145 The two identified here, however, both relate, as explained above, to Chaplinsky’s logic regarding when speech may be precluded from First Amendment protection—namely, when its value in serving truth and elucidating ideas that assist democratic self-governance are de minimis in comparison to the harm they wreak to society’s interests in order and morality.146 The Article returns to the marketplace of ideas theory in Part IV’s discussion of the federal district court’s 2019 ruling in the conversion therapy case of Otto v. City of Boca Raton.147 Additionally, the Article circles back to the First Amendment interests in both truth-seeking and democratic self-governance in Part V when addressing Justice Breyer’s proportionality approach to scrutiny.

IV. CHARTING COURSES AROUND STRICT SCRUTINY WHEN CONFRONTED WITH CONTENT-BASED LAWS: SOME LESSONS FROM AUSTIN AND RECENT ANTI-SOE LAW LITIGATION

This Part examines how some courts, despite Reed’s admonition that facially content-based statutes generally must overcome strict scrutiny, are finding methods to circumvent that mandate and apply a less stringent level of analysis. Initially, Section A delves more deeply into the Supreme Court of Illinois’s efforts to sidestep strict scrutiny when confronted with a law targeting the low-value speech of nonconsensual pornography in People v. Austin.148 Section B then addresses a federal district court’s decision in September 2019 in Doyle v. Hogan to apply intermediate scrutiny when faced with a free speech claim targeting a Maryland statute banning conversion therapy on minors.150 After examining Doyle, Section B then turns to U.S. District Judge Rosenberg’s decision in Otto v. City of Boca Raton in February 2019 considering a free speech challenge to two local ordinances banning conversion therapy on

144. See supra notes 61–68 and accompanying text (addressing the harms purportedly caused by these two varieties of speech).

145. See generally Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877, 878–79 (1963) (identifying other rationales for protecting free speech, including “assuring individual self-fulfillment” and “maintaining the balance between stability and change in the society”).


150. See Md. Code Ann., Health Occup., § 1-212.1(b) (LexisNexis 2020) (“A mental health or child care practitioner may not engage in conversion therapy with an individual who is a minor.”).

151. 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1270.
Judge Rosenberg found that intermediate scrutiny was most likely the correct standard of review to apply to such measures, although she ultimately noted that it was unclear what test should be used.

A. People v. Austin

As described in the Introduction, in Austin, the Supreme Court of Illinois readily admitted that the nonconsensual pornography statute under consideration was facially content based, yet it nonetheless applied intermediate scrutiny to measure its validity and to uphold it in the face of First Amendment speech concerns. How it reached that scrutiny determination—how it finagled its way around Reed's reach—is the focus of this Section.

Before analyzing how the Supreme Court of Illinois sidestepped Reed and strict scrutiny, however, it is essential to examine key provisions of the statute at issue in Austin. In particular, the law provides that:

A person commits non-consensual dissemination of private sexual images when he or she:

1. intentionally disseminates an image of another person:
   - (A) who is at least 18 years of age; and
   - (B) who is identifiable from the image itself or information displayed in connection with the image; and
   - (C) who is engaged in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed, in whole or in part; and

2. obtains the image under circumstances in which a reasonable person would know or understand that the image was to remain private; and

3. knows or should have known that the person in the image has not consented to the dissemination.

152. See Boca Raton, Fla., Code of Ordinances § 9-106 (2020) (“It shall be unlawful for any provider to practice conversion therapy on any individual who is a minor regardless of whether the provider receives monetary compensation in exchange for such services.”); Palm Beach County, Fla., Code of Ordinances § 18-125 (2020) (“It shall be unlawful for any Provider to engage in conversion therapy on any minor regardless of whether the Provider receives monetary compensation in exchange for such services.”).

153. See Otto, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1256 (“[A]pplying intermediate scrutiny to medical treatments that are effectuated through speech would strike the appropriate balance between recognizing that doctors maintain some freedom of speech within their offices, and acknowledging that treatments may be subject to significant regulation under the government’s police powers.”).

154. See id. at 1258 (“The Court concludes that it is unclear what standard of review should apply to this case. It seems likely that the ordinances are subject to more than rational basis review, but beyond that determination, it is unclear whether intermediate or strict scrutiny should apply.”).

155. 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 43, petition for cert. filed, No. 19-1029 (U.S. Feb. 14, 2020) (“We conclude that section 11-23.5(b) is subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny for two independent reasons. First, the statute is a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction. Second, the statute regulates a purely private matter.”); id. ¶ 46 (“We recognize that section 11-23.5(b) on its face targets the dissemination of a specific category of speech—sexual images.”).

156. 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-23.5(b) (2020).
Unpacking this language, there are two distinct sets of terms: (1) terms that focus on the content involved—namely, images in which a person is “engaged in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed”\(^\text{157}\) and (2) terms that address the defendant’s understanding (knowledge or what reasonably should be known) regarding the privacy expectations of the individual pictured and that individual’s desire not to have the image disseminated.\(^\text{158}\) It was the Supreme Court of Illinois’s focus on the latter set of terms—those addressing what a defendant knew or reasonably should have known regarding the images obtained and disseminated—that partially paved the path for it to decide that the law was a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation.\(^\text{159}\) That is because, at least in the court’s view and as described immediately below, it is “[t]he *manner* of the image’s acquisition and publication” by the defendant that determines criminal liability.\(^\text{160}\) In other words, there is no criminal culpability under the statute for a defendant who disseminates the exact same content if the defendant either would not have reasonably known that the person depicted expected the image to remain private or if the defendant did not know or should not have known that individual did not want it to be disseminated.\(^\text{161}\)

The five-justice majority of Illinois’s highest appellate court ultimately offered two independent reasons for applying intermediate scrutiny.\(^\text{162}\) Those grounds are addressed separately in the subsections below.

1. **Interpreting the Statute as a Content-Neutral Time, Place, and Manner Regulation**

The Illinois Supreme Court first held the statute was subject to intermediate scrutiny because it deemed the law content neutral. The court reached this conclusion by reasoning that the statute’s underlying purpose is to protect privacy—not to censor speech—and that, when it comes to serving the government’s interest in privacy, criminal liability (as noted above) hinges squarely on the manner in which a sexual image is both obtained and disseminated, not on the content itself.\(^\text{163}\) As such, it

\(^{157}\) Id. § 11-23.5(b)(1)(C).

\(^{158}\) Id. § 11-23.5(b)(2)-(3).

\(^{159}\) See generally Judith Welch Wegner & Matthew Norchi, *Regulating Panhandling: Reed and Beyond*, 63 S.D. L. Rev. 579, 596 (2019) (describing how content-neutral content, place, and manner regulations affecting speech in public forums typically are subject to “an intermediate level of review” rather than the “strict scrutiny [standard that is] applicable to content-based speech” regulations); Timothy Zick, *Arming Public Protests*, 104 Iowa L. Rev. 223, 231 (2018) (observing that in both traditional and designated public forums, “the government can impose content-neutral restrictions on the time, place, and manner of expression so long as those restrictions suppress no more speech than is necessary to serve its significant interests”).

\(^{160}\) *Austin*, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 49.

\(^{161}\) See *id.* (“There is no criminal liability for the dissemination of the very same image obtained and distributed with consent. The *manner* of the image’s acquisition and publication, and not its *content*, is thus crucial to the illegality of its dissemination.”).

\(^{162}\) *Id.* ¶ 43.

\(^{163}\) *Id.* ¶ 49.
found the law “[was] a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction.”

To support this line of logic, the court made multiple maneuvers. Initially, it relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s pre-Reed decision in Ward v. Rock Against Racism\(^{165}\) for the proposition that the government’s rationale or reason for adopting a statute dictates whether it is content neutral or content based.\(^{166}\) In particular, the Court in Ward held that “[t]he government’s purpose is the controlling consideration. A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”\(^{167}\) The Ward Court added that justifying a law with a reason that is unrelated to legislative disagreement with the content in question renders the law content neutral.\(^{168}\)

Conspicuous in its absence from the Supreme Court of Illinois’s opinion in Austin, however, is any mention whatsoever of the superseding admonition in Reed that “[a] law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech.”\(^{169}\) Reinforcing this principle in even simpler and starker terms, Justice Thomas added for the Reed majority that “an innocuous justification cannot transform a facially content-based law into one that is content neutral.”\(^{170}\) Yet these key aspects of Reed simply went missing, as it were, in Austin.

With Reed ignored—or, put more charitably, overlooked—Ward thus ostensibly gave the greenlight to the Supreme Court of Illinois to focus on the purpose of Illinois’s nonconsensual pornography statute. The court, in turn, had no problem concluding that the statute’s purpose was to protect privacy, not to squelch all distribution of the sexual imagery in question.\(^{171}\) In particular, the same images are freely distributable if the depicted individual authorizes or consents to such transmission.\(^{172}\) In other words, the law does not completely ban dissemination of a particular type of content; it merely regulates the manner of dissemination—in particular, nonconsensual dissemination—in the name of privacy.\(^{173}\) That, at least, is the heart of the logic of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Austin.

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164. Id. ¶ 43.
166. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 46.
167. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
168. Id.
170. Id. at 166.
171. See Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 49 (“In the case at bar, section 11-23.5(b) is justified on the grounds of protecting privacy.”).
173. See Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 50 (“Section 11-23.5 does not prohibit but, rather, regulates the dissemination of a certain type of private information.”).
The court’s understanding of “manner” here, when considering content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions, is itself novel and troubling. In particular, First Amendment scholars Russell Weaver and Donald Lively note that “[a] primary example of manner governance is a noise restriction that may protect environmental and privacy interests.” 174 Indeed, the Ward case, upon which the Supreme Court of Illinois leaned heavily, readily provides such an instance of a manner regulation. The local ordinance at issue in Ward required musical acts and other performers at the Naumberg Acoustic Bandshell in New York City’s Central Park “to use sound-amplification equipment and a sound technician provided by the city.” 175 This measure was adopted to control the volume of music. 176 It simply allowed the government to dictate the manner through which sound was conveyed at the bandshell—namely, via government equipment operated by government-selected individuals. This manner-of-sound-amplification regulation was content neutral, even under Reed’s approach to content neutrality, because it applied evenhandedly on its face to “all performances at the bandshell” 177 and had “no effect on the quantity or content of [the] expression beyond regulating the extent of amplification.” 178

Similarly, the Court held in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence 179 that a ban on sleeping in certain public parks implicated only the manner in which a symbolic-speech protest regarding homelessness could occur. 180 This manner regulation was constitutional, in part, because it served “a substantial Government interest in conserving park property”—an interest the Court deemed content neutral, as it was “unrelated to suppression of expression.” 181

Another example of a manner regulation is the Los Angeles municipal ordinance that banned posting signs on public property; this regulation

176. See id. at 792 (“The principal justification for the sound-amplification guideline is the city’s desire to control noise levels at bandshell events, in order to retain the character of the Sheep Meadow and its more sedate activities, and to avoid undue intrusion into residential areas and other areas of the park.”). New York City rejected a fixed-decibel measure to serve this same interest “because the impact on listeners of a single decibel level is not constant, but varies in response to changes in air temperature, foliage, audience size, and like factors.” Id. at 786.
177. Id. at 787.
178. Id. at 802.
180. Id. at 294. The Court explained in Clark:
If the Government has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the National Parks are adequately protected . . . and if the parks would be more exposed to harm without the sleeping prohibition than with it, the ban is safe from invalidation under the First Amendment as a reasonable regulation of the manner in which a demonstration may be carried out.
Id. at 297 (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 299.
was declared constitutional by the Court in *Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent*.182 Adopted to serve Los Angeles’s esthetic interest “in eliminating visual clutter,”183 the ordinance simply regulated one “tangible medium of expressing [a] message.”184 Other methods for conveying messages on public property, such as speaking to individuals or handing them literature, were not restricted.185 In other words, only the medium through which speech could permissibly occur was affected by the ordinance.

Under this conception of manner, a law that bans leafleting in a particular location but not other methods of communicating in that same venue, is also a manner regulation.186 Similarly, a manner regulation exists when a law “bars sound trucks from broadcasting in a loud and rau-
cous manner on the streets” but does not impede speech on those same streets when conveyed “by the human voice, by newspapers, by pamphlets, [or] by dodgers.”187

In brief, the manner regulations in cases such as *Ward*, *Clark*, and *Taxpayers for Vincent* target the physical methods or mediums through which speech is conveyed.188 In *Ward*, the permissible method for conveying bandshell sound was by government-controlled and government-oper-
ated equipment. In *Clark*, the banned method for protesting homelessness in a park was sleeping, while in *Taxpayers for Vincent* the barred medium for communicating ideas was signs.

The Supreme Court of Illinois’s interpretation of a “manner” restriction in *Austin*, however, is far afield from the understanding of manner as a method, vehicle, or medium for transmitting messages. The Illinois court’s interpretation of manner instead relates to what a disseminator of a sexual image knew or should have known about the wants and desires of the person depicted in that image regarding his or her privacy expectations and consent to its distribution.189 In *Austin*, the manner of obtaining

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183. Id. at 808.
184. Id. at 810.
185. See id. at 812 (“The Los Angeles ordinance does not affect any individual’s freedom to exercise the right to speak and to distribute literature in the same place where the posting of signs on public property is prohibited.”).
186. See Zanna v. Mohave County, No. CV-10-8149-PCT-GMS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126602, at *15 (D. Ariz. Sept. 6, 2012) (“In short, the County restricted a particular manner of speech at the meeting—namely leafleting—but did not target Plaintiffs’ particular viewpoint. A manner regulation, without more, does not constitute viewpoint discrimination.”).
189. The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned here that the statute at issue distinguishes the dissemination of a sexual image not based on the content of the image itself but, rather, based on whether the disseminator obtained the image under circumstances in which a reasonable person would know that the image was to remain private and knows or should have known that the person in the image has not consented to the dissemination. There is no criminal liability for the dissemination of the very same image obtained and dis-
an image therefore had nothing to do with whether the image was received by a method or medium such as hand delivery, in hardcopy form (an old-school Polaroid photo, for instance), or by an electronic method (such as texting in a digital format). Manner, in the Supreme Court of Illinois’s view, instead focuses on what a defendant’s state of mind should have been upon receiving an image—should the defendant have known or understood it “was to remain private”?\(^{190}\) and whether the defendant knew “or should have known that the person in the image ha[d] not consented to the dissemination”\(^{191}\) by the defendant. Manner, in short, is a matter of a defendant’s understanding (or what the defendant’s understanding reasonably should have been) about the depicted person’s privacy and dissemination expectations.

The only support that the Supreme Court of Illinois in \textit{Austin} could muster for this odd understanding of a manner restriction was to cite parts of two sentences from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in \textit{Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC}.\(^{192}\) Specifically, the Supreme Court of Illinois wrote that the Court in \textit{Turner} “acknowledge[d] that the statutory ‘provisions [at issue in \textit{Turner}] distinguish between speakers in the television programming market. But they do so based only upon the \textit{manner} in which speakers transmit their messages to viewers, and not upon the messages they carry.’”\(^{193}\)

This analogy to \textit{Turner}, however, is decidedly dubious. That is because the manner distinction to which the U.S. Supreme Court referred had nothing to do with a defendant’s state of mind about another person’s privacy expectations regarding an image. Instead, \textit{Turner} involved a classic manner distinction: one based upon physical differences in the nature of the mediums for transmitting speech. In particular, \textit{Turner} hinged on the division between whether speech was transmitted by broadcast-medium stations, on the one hand, or by cable-medium channels or cable system operators, on the other. As the \textit{Turner} Court explained regarding the obligations imposed by the must-carry statute at issue there, “Broadcasters, which transmit over the airwaves, are favored, while cable programmers, which do not, are disfavored. Cable operators, too, are burdened by the carriage obligations, but only because they control access to the cable conduit.”\(^{194}\) In other words, it was the physical manner of transmitting speech—by broadcast or by cable—that was pivotal in \textit{Turner}.

\(^{190}\) \text{720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-23.5(b)(2) (2020).}
\(^{191}\) \text{Id. § 11-23.5(b)(3).}
\(^{192}\) \text{512 U.S. 622 (1994).}
\(^{193}\) \text{\textit{Austin}, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 49 (emphasis added) (quoting \textit{Turner}, 512 U.S. at 645).}
\(^{194}\) \text{\textit{Turner}, 512 U.S. at 645. The must-carry statute at issue in \textit{Turner} “require[d] cable television systems to devote a portion of their channels to the transmission of local broadcast television stations.” \textit{Id.} at 626.}
The Supreme Court of Illinois’s second maneuver to escape Reed was to turn to another older U.S. Supreme Court ruling—namely, its 1986 decision in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.195 The Court in Renton held that a municipal zoning ordinance targeting the location of adult movie theaters was content neutral and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny because the government’s primary justification for the measure—ameliorating the negative “secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community,”196 such as an increase in crime and a decrease in property values197—was not aimed at the content of the movies themselves.198 The secondary effects doctrine that animates Renton provides a mechanism for turning what seemingly are content-based laws into content-neutral ones and, in turn, subjecting them to intermediate analysis rather than strict scrutiny.199 As Professor Leslie Gielow Jacobs encapsulates it, “The determination that a regulation is aimed at reducing the negative secondary effects of erotic entertainment is crucial to moving a facially content-based regulation out of strict scrutiny.”200

To the extent that the secondary effects doctrine might survive Reed v. Town of Gilbert201 and, in turn, might be broadly interpreted, as one scholar recently alleged, to have “subsumed traditional strict scrutiny

195. 475 U.S. 41 (1986); see Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 47 (calling Renton “instructive”).
196. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47.
197. Id. at 48; see City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434 (2002) (“[T]he Renton ordinance was aimed not at the content of the films shown at adult theaters, but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community, namely, at crime rates, property values, and the quality of the city's neighborhoods.”).
198. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (“In short, the Renton ordinance is completely consistent with our definition of 'content-neutral' speech regulations as those that 'are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.'” (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976))); see also Ned Snow, Denying Trademark for Scandalous Speech, 51 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 2331, 2359 (2018) (noting that in Renton, “because the ordinance targeted secondary effects of the content, rather than the content itself, the Court held that the restriction should be treated as though it were content neutral”).
201. Whether, in fact, the secondary effects doctrine endures after Reed is unclear. The U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings in its secondary effects line of cases “raise unmistakable tensions with Reed” and, in particular, Reed’s admonition that a benign justification for an otherwise content-based law cannot transform it into a content-neutral one. Dan T. Coenen, Freedom of Speech and the Criminal Law, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 1533, 1566 (2017); see also Hudson, Jr., supra note 15, at 276 (“Reed v. Town of Gilbert’s emphasis on content-discrimination . . . appears to call into question the continued validity of the secondary-effects doctrine, a disturbing legal fiction of sorts which allows for content-based restrictions on businesses conveying ‘adult’ expression to be classified as content-neutral.”); Kyle Langvardt, Remarks on 3D Printing, Free Speech, and Lochner, 17 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 779, 800 (2016) (“The secondary effects idea is generally regarded as a corner-cutting measure to be applied only in cases involving marginal sexual expression such as nude dancing, and in 2015’s Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the Supreme Court signaled clearly that it is no longer good law.”).
analysis for content-based laws in the realm of sexual expression,” 202 the Supreme Court of Illinois was indeed wise to analogize to it. That is because it lowers the bar for a statute passing constitutional muster.

On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has applied the secondary effects doctrine only to the zoning of sexually oriented businesses and to the regulation of the speech-based conduct—namely, nude or nearly nude dancing203—that may go on inside them. 204 In other words, deployment of the doctrine has been closely cabined and confined by the Court; it is used only when regulating places of public accommodation that trade in sexual content, either by zoning them or restricting what occurs within them.205

Furthermore, the secondary effects doctrine is dubbed illegitimate by some scholars. 206 It is criticized, among other reasons, for “provid[ing] the mechanism by which government officials receive judicial approval for running roughshod over the First Amendment rights of those who provide adult-oriented expression for consenting adults” 207 by “lower[ing] the level of applicable judicial scrutiny for regulations that appear to target unfavorable expression.” 208 In Austin, the Supreme Court of Illinois essentially hijacked this disputed doctrine and took it for a ride well beyond the regulation of sexually oriented businesses and the activities they afford consenting adults.

203. The Supreme Court has held that nude dancing constitutes symbolic expression and thus falls within the coverage of the First Amendment. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 285, 289 (2000) (observing that nude dancing “is expressive conduct that is entitled to some quantum of protection under the First Amendment,” and adding that it “falls only within the outer ambit of the First Amendment’s protection”); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (concluding that nude dancing “is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so”).
204. See Daniel R. Aaronson, Gary S. Edinger & James S. Benjamin, The First Amendment in Chaos: How the Law of Secondary Effects Is Applied and Misapplied by the Circuit Courts, 63 U. MIA. L. REV. 741, 743–44 (2009) (observing that “prohibitions against nude dancing have been upheld by some Justices on several occasions based on a perceived or potential link to secondary effects,” and noting that those cases are Barnes and City of Erie).
206. See John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. REV. 291, 337–38 (2009) (noting that some scholars “see the doctrine as illegitimate, as it appears on the surface to conflict with basic First Amendment principles disfavoring content discrimination”).
208. Id. at 19.
In summary, both Ward and Renton played pivotal roles for the Austin court in reaching its conclusion that Illinois’s revenge pornography statute was a content-neutral measure subject to intermediate scrutiny. First, Ward permitted the court to focus on legislative intent to determine whether the law was content neutral. Second, Renton provided an example, within the realm of regulating sexual expression, where a content-neutral legislative motive—reducing the deleterious secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses—was sufficient to transform a facially content-based law into a content-neutral one. As the next subsection illustrates, however, the Supreme Court of Illinois added a second justification for applying intermediate scrutiny.

2. **The Public vs. Private Speech Dichotomy**

As noted in the Introduction, Illinois’s highest court held that the state’s revenge pornography statute was subject to intermediate scrutiny because the speech it regulates is of a purely private nature, rather than of a kind that addresses a matter of public concern. Put bluntly, the court created a private-speech exception or carveout from Reed’s guiding rule that facially content-based laws undergo strict scrutiny review. As the Supreme Court of Illinois would have it, a facially content-based law evades strict scrutiny and instead faces only intermediate inspection if the speech it regulates is of private—not public—concern.

From where did the court in Austin draw support for its new rule? It cited and relied heavily upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Snyder v. Phelps and Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders. Neither of those cases, however, involved judicial analysis of a statute under a tier of review such as strict or intermediate scrutiny. Instead, Snyder was a speech-based tort case. The Court there tackled the question of whether the First Amendment shielded members of the Westboro Baptist Church (WBC), including its leader Reverend Fred Phelps, from liability to plaintiff Albert Snyder under theories including intentional infliction of emotional distress and intrusion into seclusion. The case arose after WBC members hoisted signs with messages such as “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Pope in Hell,” and “God Hates Fags” while standing about 1,000 feet away from a church where a funeral was being held for Albert Snyder’s son Matthew, a U.S. Marine killed while on duty in

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209. See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text (addressing the Illinois Supreme Court’s invocation of this private-versus-public dichotomy, as well as when the U.S. Supreme Court has deployed it).


212. See Snyder, 562 U.S. at 450 (“A jury found for Snyder on the intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy claims, and held Westboro liable for $2.9 million in compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive damages.”).
Iraq. The WBC members held the signs to express their belief “that God hates and punishes the United States for its tolerance of homosexuality, particularly in America’s military.”

Writing for the eight-Justice majority, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that “[w]hether the First Amendment prohibits holding Westboro liable for its speech in this case turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case.” In other words, if WBC’s messages dealt with matters of public concern, then tort liability would be precluded. The Snyder Court fashioned a two-part test for determining whether speech is about a matter of public concern. It then concluded that WBC’s signs addressed “matters of public import,” such as “the political and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy.” The Court thus ruled in WBC’s favor. Lower tribunals have since followed in Snyder’s footsteps, embracing a public-versus-private speech dichotomy to determine if the First Amendment thwarts tort liability when speech allegedly causes harm. Again, however, Snyder was not in any way a case in which the Court had to either adopt or deploy a level of scrutiny to ana-

213. Id. at 448–49.
214. Id. at 448.
215. Id. at 451.
216. See Joseph Russomanno, “Freedom for the Thought That We Hate”: Why Westboro Had to Win, 17 COMM’N L. & POL’Y 133, 148 (2012) (“[T]he Court took it upon itself to determine whether the speech at issue in Snyder v. Phelps was on matters of public concern. If so, First Amendment protection would be more likely to overcome a tort liability claim.”).
217. Under this test, speech regards a matter of public concern either “when it can ‘be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community’ or when it ‘is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.’” Snyder, 562 U.S. at 453 (citation omitted) (first quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); then quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004)). The Court noted that three variables—the content, form, and context of speech—must be examined in the public-concern determination. Id. It added that “[i]n considering content, form, and context, no factor is dispositive, and it is necessary to evaluate all the circumstances of the speech, including what was said, where it was said, and how it was said.” Id. at 454.
218. Id. at 454.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 461 (“As a Nation we have chosen . . . to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate. That choice requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in this case.”).
221. For example, a federal appellate court recently held that whether negative commentary by a radio sports program and its employees about the performance of a college basketball referee was presumptively protected by the First Amendment from tort liability for seven causes of action, including theories such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy and negligence, “turn[ed] on whether the speech involve[d] a ‘public or private concern.’” Higgins v. Ky. Sports Radio, LLC, 951 F.3d 728, 734 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Snyder, 562 U.S. at 451); see also Gersh v. Anglin, 353 F. Supp. 3d 958, 964 (D. Mont. 2018) (“[I]n cases brought under state tort law, where the cause of action is not itself subject to a facial challenge, the first question is ‘whether [the] speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Snyder, 562 U.S. at 451)).
lyze the constitutionality of a statute barring or otherwise limiting speech. It was a tort case.

The court in Austin, as noted above, also relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Dun & Bradstreet to support its conclusion that intermediate scrutiny applied because the speech barred by Illinois’s revenge pornography statute was of private concern.222 Dun & Bradstreet, however, was a defamation action—not a statutory analysis—that examined the standard of fault a plaintiff must prove in order to recover presumed and punitive damages when the defamatory speech is about a matter of private concern.223 The Court concluded that “permitting recovery of presumed and punitive damages in defamation cases absent a showing of ‘actual malice’ does not violate the First Amendment when the defamatory statements do not involve matters of public concern.”224

In brief, both Snyder and Dun & Bradstreet were tort cases in which the Supreme Court drew distinctions between speech about matters of public concern and speech about matters of private concern. The Court also made it clear in this pair of opinions that restricting or punishing speech about matters of public concern is more problematic, at least from a First Amendment perspective, than is restricting or punishing speech regarding a purely private matter.225 For instance, the Court in Snyder opined that “where matters of purely private significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are often less rigorous.”226 Neither case, however, involved the Court venturing a decision about the level of scrutiny to apply to examine the validity of a statute under the First Amendment.

Nonetheless, the Illinois Supreme Court used the two cases for precisely that scrutiny-determining purpose. It concluded that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate because “the nonconsensual dissemination of the victim’s private sexual images was not an issue of public concern.”227


223. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (“In light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public concern, we hold that the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages—even absent a showing of ‘actual malice.’” (emphasis added)). In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964), the Court held that public officials suing for libel based upon speech regarding their official conduct must prove that the defamatory statement at issue “was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”

224. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 763.

225. See Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458 (“Given that Westboro’s speech was at a public place on a matter of public concern, that speech is entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First Amendment. Such speech cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.” (emphasis added)); Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 758–59 (“We have long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance. It is speech on ‘matters of public concern’ that is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.’” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978))).

226. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 452.

227. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 56.
The court reasoned, in key part, that the sexual images Bethany Austin forwarded to prove what happened to her relationship with Matthew did “not relate to any broad issue of interest to society at large” and that “the public has no legitimate interest in the private sexual activities of the victim or in the embarrassing facts revealed about her life.”228 Intermediate scrutiny, not strict scrutiny, was thus appropriate.229 The Supreme Court of Illinois, in turn, upheld the revenge pornography statute under that level of review.230

In summary, when confronted with a facially content-based statute criminalizing the low-value yet—in light of United States v. Stevens—likely First Amendment-protected speech known as revenge pornography, the Supreme Court of Illinois cleverly found two workarounds for Reed v. Town of Gilbert’s admonition that strict scrutiny should apply to test the measure’s validity. First, the court turned to Ward v. Rock Against Racism for the pre-Reed rule that the government’s purpose controls whether a law is content based or content neutral. It then leaned on City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.—particularly its contested secondary effects doctrine—for an example of a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that a law affecting sexual expression was deemed content neutral and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny because the predominate legislative concern underlying the law was not censoring speech, but rather reducing the adverse secondary effects that businesses that traffic in sexual content ostensibly cause. Next, the Supreme Court of Illinois invented a new rule that statutes regulating speech about private matters are subject to review under intermediate scrutiny. It did so citing only the tort cases of Snyder v. Phelps and Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., neither of which involved a statutory analysis under a tier of First Amendment scrutiny.

These innovative and dubious efforts to avoid strict scrutiny under Reed are, of course, controversial. In February 2020, Bethany Austin filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.231 The brief asked the Court to “settle what level of scrutiny should govern review of such [revenge pornography] laws to ensure they are consistent with the First Amendment.”232 Among other items, the brief slammed the Supreme Court of Illinois’s decision to declare the law content neutral and to apply intermediate scrutiny, contending that decision “flatly contradicts the holding in Reed and a host of other decisions by this Court.”233

Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case in

228. Id.
229. Id. ¶ 57.
230. See id. ¶ 86 (“We hold that section 11-23.5 satisfies intermediate scrutiny.”).
232. Id. at 3.
233. Id. at 14.
October 2020, thus leaving intact the Supreme Court of Illinois’s rather inventive ruling.\(^\text{234}\)

The next Section examines how two other courts in 2019 also found workarounds for the lockboxes of Stevens and Reed when faced with statutes regulating another variety of low-value speech—namely, SOCE on minors.

B. EVADING STRICT SCRUTINY WHEN ANALYZING LAWS BANNING SOCE ON MINORS

This Section features two subsections, each of which examines a different 2019 ruling regarding the level of scrutiny that applies when analyzing the validity of a statute banning SOCE on minors. Specifically, Subsection 1 addresses U.S. District Judge Chasanow’s decision considering Maryland’s anti-SOCE statute in the face of a First Amendment free speech challenge in *Doyle v. Hogan*.\(^\text{235}\) Subsection 2 then reviews U.S. District Judge Rosenberg’s opinion evaluating the constitutionality of two local South Florida ordinances banning SOCE on minors in *Otto v. City of Boca Raton*.\(^\text{236}\)

1. Doyle v. Hogan

In September 2019, Judge Chasanow concluded that a Maryland statute banning mental-health and childcare practitioners from performing SOCE on minors was subject to review under intermediate scrutiny when determining if it violated the First Amendment speech rights of such practitioners.\(^\text{237}\) The judge then upheld the statute under this relaxed form of review and dismissed plaintiff Christopher Doyle’s free speech claim in the process.\(^\text{238}\)

Doyle’s free speech theory hinged on the logic that, “because he primarily uses speech to provide counseling to his minor clients, the act of counseling must be construed as speech for purposes of First Amendment review.”\(^\text{239}\) He argued that the statute was a content-based regulation subject to strict scrutiny.\(^\text{240}\)

Judge Chasanow readily acknowledged that Maryland’s anti-SOCE statute “regulates speech by prohibiting the use of language employed in

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\(^{237}\) See Doyle, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 346 (concluding that “intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review”); see also Md. Code Ann., Health Occ. § 1-212.1(b) (LexisNexis 2020) (“A mental health or child care practitioner may not engage in conversion therapy with an individual who is a minor.”).

\(^{238}\) See Doyle, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 348 (“[Doyle] failed to state a free speech claim upon which relief can be granted because [the statute] would survive a constitutional challenge under intermediate scrutiny.”).

\(^{239}\) Id. at 344.

\(^{240}\) See id. at 343–44.
the process of conducting conversion therapy on minor clients.”

Yet, for Judge Chasanow, conversion therapy—at least as Maryland regulates it—is much more akin to conduct than to speech. That seems to be the case for Judge Chasanow largely due to two reasons. First, practitioners such as Christopher Doyle remain completely free to espouse their own views and beliefs about SOCE and its merits. Second, the statute regulates only speech that is part of a course of therapy and is thus “inherently not expressive because the speech involved does not seek to communicate Plaintiff’s views.”

This latter observation is critical. It suggests that only when an individual is attempting to deliver his or her own personal opinions, beliefs, or ideas on a particular topic are the full panoply of First Amendment protections for speech triggered to shield such expression from government censorship. In contrast, as in Doyle, when the speech merely follows a therapeutic script and is implemented as a form of treatment, then First Amendment concerns are dramatically diminished, thereby making possible the application of a lower standard of judicial review such as intermediate scrutiny. As Judge Chasanow put it, Christopher Doyle’s “free speech claim turns on ‘whether verbal communications become “conduct” when they are used as a vehicle for mental health treatment.’”

In brief, Judge Chasanow exploited the traditional dichotomy between speech and conduct in First Amendment jurisprudence. Under this distinction, regulations of conduct generally do not trigger First Amendment concerns unless the conduct is deemed symbolic expression, such as burning the American flag as a form of political protest. Judge Chasanow took advantage of this dichotomy by moving Christopher Doyle’s SOCE

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241. Id. at 345.
242. See id. at 344–45 (stating that “[d]etermining the proper level of review first requires distinguishing whether [the statute] regulates speech, conduct, or something in between,” and then later concluding that the statute “lands on the conduct end of the sliding scale”).
243. See id. at 345 (“Most importantly, [the statute] does not prohibit practitioners from engaging in any form of personal expression; they remain free to discuss, endorse, criticize, or recommend conversion therapy to their minor clients.”).
244. Id.
246. For example, Justice Thomas recently explained that “[w]hile drawing the line between speech and conduct can be difficult, this Court’s precedents have long drawn it.” Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2373; see also Diahann Dasilva, Note, Playing a “Labeling Game”: Classifying Expression as Conduct as a Means of Circumventing First Amendment Analysis, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 767, 769–70 (2015) (noting “the speech versus conduct dichotomy” and examining the “distinction between speech and conduct, the implications of that distinction, and how courts have classified various activities as speech or conduct”).
247. See R. Randall Kelso, Clarifying Viewpoint Discrimination in Free Speech Doctrine, 52 IND. L. Rev. 355, 356 (2019) (noting that “[g]overnmental regulations of conduct . . . are outside of the ambit of the First Amendment,” but pointing out that “the Court has noted that ‘symbolic speech’ is fully protected by the First Amendment,” such as “burning a draft card or cross . . . to convey a particular message”); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399, 404–06 (1989) (concluding that Gregory Lee Johnson’s burning of the American flag outside of the Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas, in 1984 constituted expressive conduct and thus implicated First Amendment coverage).
speech (as regulated by the statute) closer to the conduct end of the continuum. The lynchpin logic for this maneuver was the judge’s assertion that “conduct is not confined merely to physical action.” If conduct is not limited to physical action, then this opens the door for conduct to expansively encompass the spoken word.

Judge Chasanow, however, is not alone in exploiting the speech-versus-conduct dichotomy in order to apply a deferential level of judicial review to a law barring speech-based SOCE on minors. Perhaps most notably, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in 2014 that California’s anti-SOCE statute “regulates conduct. It bans a form of treatment for minors; it does nothing to prevent licensed therapists from discussing the pros and cons of SOCE with their patients.” In other words, the therapists can talk about SOCE with patients, but they just cannot use speech as the vehicle for treatment. Thus, the Ninth Circuit in *Pickup v. Brown* was able to find that “the First Amendment does not prevent a state from regulating treatment even when that treatment is performed through speech alone.”

California’s anti-SOCE statute, therefore, was “subject to only rational basis review and must be upheld if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.” The Ninth Circuit concluded that California’s statute passed muster under this test.

Rational basis review is a very deferential level of scrutiny. It does not, in fact, generally apply in First Amendment cases, but rather applies in disputes involving non-fundamental rights where the government adopts social and economic regulations.

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252. Id. at 1231; see also Marc Jonathan Blitz, *Free Speech, Occupational Speech, and Psychotherapy*, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 681, 683 (2016) (“In the view of the Ninth Circuit, California’s talk therapy restriction did not violate the First Amendment because talk therapy is not protected by the First Amendment. In short, the Ninth Circuit held in *Pickup v. Brown* that such therapy is conduct not speech.” (footnote omitted)).
253. See *Pickup*, 740 F.3d at 1232 (“[W]e hold that [California’s anti-SOCE law] is rationally related to the legitimate government interest of protecting the well-being of minors.”).
254. See Brandon L. Garrett, *Constitutional Reasonableness*, 102 MINN. L. REV. 61, 64 (2017) (“[R]ational basis review ostensibly asks judges to deferentially review reasonable government decisions . . . .”).
255. Nearly eighty years ago, the Supreme Court explained the principle that rational basis review generally does not apply in First Amendment cases, writing: The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a ‘rational basis’ for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943); see R. Randall Kelso, *The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny, Intermediate Review, and “Reasonableness” Balancing*, 8 EURON L. REV. 291, 291 (2016) (“Because free speech doctrine involves the ‘fundamental’ right of speech, modern free speech doctrine does not use mini-
wrote, rational basis review constitutes a “form of minimal scrutiny [that] is foreign to our free-speech jurisprudence.”256 Only “[l]ow-value speech triggers rational basis review,”257 with a “strong presumption of constitutional validity”258 for such regulation.

Ultimately, Judge Chasanow’s 2019 decision to adopt intermediate scrutiny in Doyle illustrates another workaround for applying strict scrutiny when a statute seemingly is content based on its face—namely, by contending that the law primarily regulates conduct, with speech being swept up only incidentally.259 Her decision, however, is highly problematic to the extent that she partly relied on the fact that the statute regulated the speech of professionals speaking in their professional capacities.260 In the 2018 decision of National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra,261 a five-Justice majority of the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the notion that the speech of professionals—what the Court called “professional speech”262—is generally exempt from Reed’s “rule that content-based regulations of speech are subject to strict scrutiny.”263 In writing for the majority, Justice Thomas cited the Ninth Cir-

258. Id.
260. See id. at 344 (contending that “government regulations of professional practices that entail and incidentally burden speech receive deferential review,” and pointing out that Maryland’s anti-SOCE statute “obviously regulates professionals”).
262. Id. at 2371.
263. Id. In Becerra, the majority cited Reed for the principle that content-based laws, “[a]s a general matter,” are subject to the “stringent standard” that is strict scrutiny. Id. Justice Thomas concluded for the majority that “neither California nor the Ninth Circuit has identified a persuasive reason for treating professional speech as a unique category that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles.” Id. at 2375.

Justice Thomas, however, indicated that there are two narrow situations where the speech of professionals is subject to lesser review than strict scrutiny. The first is where professionals, in their advertising or commercial speech, are required to disclose purely factual, noncontroversial information related to the services they provide. Id. at 2372. These situations, Justice Thomas noted, are controlled by the Court’s ruling in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985). Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372. The second situation is when the government regulates professional conduct and such “conduct incidentally involves speech.” Id. The primary example of this situation cited by Justice Thomas was the informed-consent mandate imposed on doctors before they could perform abortions in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
cuit’s decision in *Pickup v. Brown*, the California anti-SOCE statute case of *Pickup v. Brown*, which was addressed earlier in this Subsection, as an example of a court that “recognized ‘professional speech’ as a separate category of speech that is subject to different rules.”264 Indeed, as Robert McNamara and Paul Sherman, senior attorneys at the Institute for Justice point out, the Ninth Circuit in *Pickup* had relied on this conception of professional speech to hold that the statute there only regulated conduct, not speech.265 *Becerra* thus casts considerable doubt on the continued viability of *Pickup*’s professional-speech workaround for strict scrutiny in anti-SOCE law cases.266 As Dean Rodney Smolla bluntly puts it, “[t]he professional speech doctrine crashed and burned in” in *Becerra*.267

This is not to say that anti-SOCE statutes would fail to survive strict scrutiny were it to be applied; indeed, these laws might well pass muster under that test.268 Rather, it is to say that the court’s ruling in *Doyle v. Hogan* represents another workaround—one pivoting on the distinction between speech and conduct, and deeming speech to be regulated only incidental to conduct—from strict scrutiny in the face of *Reed* that greatly enhances the likelihood such regulations of low-value speech will pass constitutional muster.


265. See Robert McNamara & Paul Sherman, NIFLA v. Becerra: A Seismic Decision Protecting Occupational Speech, 2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 197, 210 (“The panel in *Pickup*, applying the professional-speech doctrine, had concluded that talk therapy was simply a form of professional conduct, entitled to no First Amendment protection.”).

266. See Calvert, supra note 64, at 29–30 (contending that “[t]he Supreme Court’s 2018 ruling in *Becerra*, with its attack on a nascent professional speech doctrine, casts serious doubt on whether any lesser standard [than strict scrutiny] should apply” when reviewing anti-SOCE statutes).

267. Rodney A. Smolla, *The Tensions Between Regulation of the Legal Profession and Protection of the First Amendment Rights of Lawyers and Judges: A Tribute to Ronald Rotunda*, 22 CHAP. L. REV. 285, 291 (2019). Dean Smolla’s assertion might be viewed as somewhat of an overstatement, at least to the extent that the Court did not completely preclude the prospect that professional speech might, under some situations, be subject to different rules as its own category of expression. See *Becerra*, 138 S. Ct. at 2375 (“In sum, neither California nor the Ninth Circuit has identified a persuasive reason for treating professional speech as a unique category that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles. We do not foreclose the possibility that some such reason exists.”).

268. Professor Mark Strasser recently contended that anti-SOCE statutes at issue in cases such as *Pickup* might have been deemed constitutional “even had a higher level of scrutiny been employed. States have a compelling interest in protecting the health of the populace, and prohibitions on treatments that are not only ineffective but also pose a risk of significant harm are closely tailored to promoting that state interest.” Mark Strasser, *Deception, Professional Speech, and CPCs: On Becerra, Abortion, and the First Amendment*, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 311, 336–37 (2019) (footnote omitted).
2. Otto v. City of Boca Raton

In Otto v. City of Boca Raton, Judge Rosenberg considered a First Amendment free speech attack on ordinances in the City of Boca Raton and Palm Beach County, Florida, banning SOCE on minors. She reviewed the challenge in February 2019 within the context of a motion for a preliminary injunction to block the ordinances’ enforcement against two licensed therapists who sought to perform SOCE via talk therapy.

In determining the applicable degree of First Amendment scrutiny—which directly affected the likelihood of success of the therapists’ case on its merits and, therefore, their ability to garner injunctive relief—Judge Rosenberg observed that the Supreme Court’s decisions in both Reed and Becerra “raise[d] questions as to the validity of the” Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Pickup, described above in Subsection 1. This, however, was not the only problem she faced in fathoming the relevant standard of review. In fact, she deemed it “unsettled” whether strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review should apply, and she pointed out that the parties “vigorously contest[ed]” the scrutiny issue. Indeed, the judge flatly rejected the notion that following a categorical methodology or formula for classifying the anti-SOCE ordinances as either content based or content neutral would necessarily resolve the scrutiny determination.

Disappointingly, however, for legal scholars and practitioners seeking exactitude, Judge Rosenberg ultimately hedged her bets on scrutiny at the preliminary injunction stage. Specifically, she concluded it was “unclear what standard of review should apply to this case” and “decline[d] to announce a standard of review.” Instead of picking one standard, she analyzed the two ordinances through the prisms of all three tests, holding that they would pass constitutional muster under both rational basis review and intermediate scrutiny. While the judge dubbed it a “closer call” as to whether the measures would survive strict scrutiny,

270. See BOCA RATON, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9-106 (2020) (“It shall be unlawful for any provider to practice conversion therapy on any individual who is a minor regardless of whether the provider receives monetary compensation in exchange for such services.”); PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 18-125 (2020) (“It shall be unlawful for any Provider to engage in conversion therapy on any minor regardless of whether the Provider receives monetary compensation in exchange for such services.”).
272. To obtain a preliminary injunction, one factor Judge Rosenberg considered was whether the plaintiffs had “demonstrate[d] that they have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.” Id.
273. Id. at 1249.
274. Id. at 1242.
275. Id. at 1248.
276. See id. at 1256 (“[T]his case demonstrates why an unbending, categorical approach to the First Amendment proves unwieldy to the point of unworkable.”).
277. Id. at 1258.
278. Id. at 1270.
279. Id.
she nonetheless ruled against the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary in-
junction because, under all three tiers of analysis, she was not persuaded
that the plaintiffs had a substantial likelihood of winning on the merits. 280

Most importantly for purposes of this Article, however, Judge Rosen-
berg offered a possible workaround for Reed’s mandate that facially con-
tent-based laws must presumptively surmount strict scrutiny. Unpacking
Rosenberg’s analysis on a step-by-step basis reveals why she personally
believed—albeit without definitively adopting it—that “intermediate re-
view may be the correct standard to apply.” 281

Initially, Judge Rosenberg rejected the notion that the ordinances
merely regulated conduct (i.e., therapy) or affected speech only incident-
tially to such conduct. 282 Because she found that speech was at issue—
unlike the Ninth Circuit when considering California’s anti-SOCE statute
in Pickup—Rosenberg concluded that rational basis review was likely in-
appropriate and that, instead, the pair of South Florida ordinances “must
be reviewed under intermediate or strict scrutiny.” 283

Second, she acknowledged that, under Reed, the ordinances seemingly
were content-based measures that would need to face strict scrutiny. 284
Yet, she pushed back against Reed’s presumption that strict scrutiny
should apply. Specifically, she reasoned that the case before her did not
implicate what she called “a heartland content-based speech regula-
tion.” 285 By that, she apparently meant that the ordinances:

1. did not regulate or otherwise discriminate against the content of
speech occurring in a public forum, such as a park or a street, where
it would have been especially problematic under the First Amend-
ment; 286 and
2. only barred the content of speech within the narrow context of
therapy, not outside of it, thus leaving SOCE advocates and adver-
saries free to hold either private or public conversations about its mer-
its or drawbacks. 287

280. Id.
281. Id. at 1258.
282. Id. at 1251–52.
283. Id. at 1252.
284. See id. at 1253 (“The ordinances identify certain speech—speech aimed at chang-
ing minor patients’ sexual orientation—for prohibition because the speech constitutes con-
version therapy. The ordinances target what Plaintiffs say to their minor patients.”); see
also id. at 1242 (“The ordinances also arguably are content-based, as they apply ‘to particu-
lar speech because of the topics discussed or the idea or message expressed.’”).
285. Id. at 1242.
286. See id. (“No public forum restrictions exist in the ordinances.”); see also McCullen
v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 477 (2014) (“In particular, the guiding First Amendment principle
that the ‘government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content’ applies with full force in a traditional public forum.”
(quoting Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972))).
287. See Otto, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1242 (noting that “[t]he ordinances define the reach of
their prohibitions by topic or subject matter, but they do so only to identify the type of
therapy covered, not the content of communications outside of the therapy itself,” and
adding that they “do not prohibit or limit proponents or opponents of conversion therapy
to speak about gender or sexual orientation conversion publicly and privately, including to
their minor clients in forms other than therapy”).
Closely tied to this second reason for Judge Rosenberg in suggesting that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate were the dual facts that the speakers who were regulated under the ordinances were “licensed medical professional[s]”\(^{288}\) and that their speech was regulated only to the extent that it is the actual method for delivering medical treatment.\(^{289}\) Citing *Becerra*, however, she was careful not to rely on the notion that professional speech constitutes a separate category of expression subject to something less rigorous than strict scrutiny when it is regulated.\(^{290}\) Instead, she leaned on the Supreme Court’s 1992 ruling in *Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey*.\(^{291}\) The Court there held that physicians, as licensed professionals, could be compelled by the government to provide information to patients about the risks of abortion without violating the physicians’ First Amendment freedom of speech—in particular, an unenumerated right not to speak—because that right was implicated “only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State.”\(^{292}\) This use of “reasonable” in upholding this informed-consent requirement suggests a standard far less rigorous than strict scrutiny was applied in *Casey*.\(^{293}\) Importantly, the Supreme Court in *Becerra* cited *Casey* approvingly in holding that “regulations of professional conduct that incidentally burden speech”\(^{294}\) constitute one of two narrow circumstances where the “Court has afforded less protection for professional speech.”\(^{295}\) Judge Rosenberg reasoned in *Otto* that the treatment regulated by the two anti-SOCE ordinances was “both speech and conduct—directed at minors—administered by a licensed medical professional, as part of ‘the practice of

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288. *Id.* at 1256.
289. *See id.* (“The speech not only is directly related to the treatment, it is the manner of delivering the treatment. Plaintiffs are essentially writing a prescription for a treatment that will be carried out verbally.”).
290. *See id.* (noting that *Becerra* “disparaged the use of ‘professional speech’ as a separate category of speech” and concluding that “[i]t is not clear that a separate category for professional speech is required to recognize this case’s unique features”).
292. *Id.* at 884 (plurality opinion). The Court in *Casey* concluded that the compelled-speech mandate imposed on physicians was “a reasonable means to ensure that the woman’s consent is informed.” *Id.* at 885.

The Supreme Court long has recognized the existence of a First Amendment right not to be forced by the government to speak. *See Wooley v. Maynard*, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.” (emphasis added)).

293. *See Carl H. Coleman, Regulating Physician Speech*, 97 N.C.L. REV. 843, 851 (2019) (“[The Court’s] use of the word ‘reasonable’ might mean that such laws are permissible as long as they have a rational basis, given that the word ‘reasonable’ is often used as a synonym for ‘rational.’”); *B. Jessie Hill, Sex, Lies, and Ultrasound*, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 421, 432 (2018) (“The Court’s language of reasonableness, along with its dismissive treatment of the claim, suggest something like rational basis review was applied to the physician’s free speech claim.”).
295. *Id.* at 2372.
medicine,’ as in Casey.”296 This allowed her to conclude that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate.297 In brief, the judge both recognized that Becerra cast serious doubt upon the professional speech doctrine and attempted to chart a way around that obstacle by turning to Casey, which the Court in Becerra had reaffirmed.

Judge Rosenberg, however, did not stop her scrutiny-selection analysis there. Citing Justice Breyer298 and taking a page out of his playbook (addressed later in Part V), she delved into what she called “the historic understandings of the First Amendment and its purpose.”299 At the top of the list for Judge Rosenberg was the goal—one described earlier in Part III of this Article300—of safeguarding an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in order to produce and test conceptions of the truth.301 She also cited the principle that individual self-expression should be free from government control, as well as the notion that political speech is “highly protected,” especially when it arises “in the metaphoric or literal ‘public square.’”302

Judge Rosenberg concluded that deploying intermediate scrutiny in the case before her was “entirely consistent” with these core First Amendment goals and policies.303 That was the situation, she reasoned, largely because the anti-SOCE statutes neither restricted the public marketplace of ideas about SOCE nor targeted political speech about it in public venues.304 The only function served by the restricted speech, in turn, was simply as a means of individual therapy, while the only context in which it was restricted was within the confines of a private therapist–patient relationship.305 In other words, the ordinances in Otto did not in any way stifle public debate about SOCE or hinder a marketplace-like quest for the truth about whether SOCE are effective or harmful. As Judge Rosenberg bluntly put it, “In the context of the relationship between a minor and his or her therapist, there is no competitive marketplace of ideas to infringe upon.”306 Proponents of SOCE remain free under the ordinances to lobby and advocate in various marketplaces of ideas, including in the political-idea marketplaces that are state and local legislative bodies, for

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297. See id. (“Accordingly, applying intermediate scrutiny to medical treatments that are effectuated through speech would strike the appropriate balance between recognizing that doctors maintain some freedom of speech within their offices, and acknowledging that treatments may be subject to significant regulation under the government’s police powers.”).
298. Id. at 1256–57.
299. Id. at 1257.
300. See supra notes 101–115 and accompanying text (addressing the marketplace of ideas and its truth-seeking goal).
301. Otto, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1257.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1257–58.
306. Id. at 1258.
laws permitting the adoption and use of SOCE.307

Judge Rosenberg’s decision to consider traditional First Amendment interests and principles—most significantly, the marketplace of ideas—readily distinguishes her workaround for strict scrutiny in Otto from Judge Chasanow’s workaround in her September 2019 decision in Doyle addressed in Subsection 1. Judge Chasanow, as noted above, focused almost exclusively in her scrutiny determination on where speech-based SOCE, uttered by professionals, is situated on a continuum between speech, on one end, and conduct, on the other.308 Rosenberg’s evaluation of the historical rationales for protecting speech not only gave her additional legal cover in suggesting that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate in the face of Reed but also echoed Justice Breyer’s logic in applying his proportionality framework for scrutiny, which is examined immediately below.

V. A BETTER WORKAROUND FOR REED IN LOW-VALUE SPEECH CASES INVOLVING REVENGE PORNOGRAPHY AND CONVERSION THERAPY? EVALUATING THE FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES AND INTERESTS AT STAKE TO DETERMINE THE LEVEL OF SCRUTINY

In 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court in Iancu v. Brunetti held that part of a federal statute granting the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) authority to deny registration for immoral or scandalous trademarks violated the First Amendment.309 The majority concluded that both facets of this provision—the term “immoral,” as well as the term “scandalous”—were unconstitutional because they authorized the government to engage in impermissible viewpoint-based discrimination against speech.310 That conclusion, in turn, allowed Erik Brunetti, who challenged the immoral or scandalous provision, to register the trademark “FUCT” with the USPTO for branding a line of clothing.311 The USPTO earlier had used

307. See id. at 1257 (“The ordinances do not limit or change in any way advocacy for SOCE. Plaintiffs retain their right and prerogative to seek greater acceptance of SOCE, to lobby Defendants to repeal the ordinances, and to lobby the State of Florida to explicitly preempt the ordinances.”).
308. See supra notes 237–248 and accompanying text.
309. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019); see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (allowing the PTO to deny registration for a trademark that “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral . . . or scandalous matter”).
310. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2299; see also Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, Toward a More Explicit, Independent, Consistent and Nuanced Compelled Speech Doctrine, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (“Viewpoint-discriminatory laws are uniquely violative of the First Amendment because they directly empower one side of a debate with weapons that are denied to the proponents of the other side. This distorts the ability of the participants to fairly compete on the merits of their ideas.” (quoting Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of Engagement for Cultural Wars: Regulating Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and Protected Expression in Anti-Abortion Protests, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 553, 591 (1996))).
311. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2297 (“Respondent Erik Brunetti is an artist and entrepreneur who founded a clothing line that uses the trademark FUCT. According to Brunetti, the mark (which functions as the clothing’s brand name) is pronounced as four letters, one after the other: F-U-C-T.”).
the measure to block his registration, finding that “FUCT”: (1) had sexual connotations, (2) was offensive and vulgar, and (3) was used by Brunetti in marketing contexts that were violent, nihilistic, and misogynistic.312

Several Justices, however, fretted that the outcome in Brunetti would give the greenlight for registering all types of offensive marks that are seemingly of low value—perhaps, even no value—when it comes to serving traditional First Amendment interests and goals. For instance, Justice Alito urged Congress to craft a more carefully focused statute that precludes the registration of marks containing vulgar terms that play no real part in the expression of ideas. The particular mark in question in this case could be denied registration under such a statute. The term suggested by that mark is not needed to express any idea and, in fact, as commonly used today, generally signifies nothing except emotion and a severely limited vocabulary.313

A close reading of this passage reveals that it parallels the Court’s language from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,314 the seminal low-value speech case addressed earlier in Part III, explaining when speech can be restricted without raising any First Amendment concerns.315 Specifically, the Court in Chaplinsky reasoned that unprotected speech plays “no essential part of any exposition of ideas.” 316 Justice Alito in Brunetti neatly paraphrased this sentiment in the italicized part of his quotation above, as he simply substituted “real” for “essential” and “expression” for “exposition.”

Justice Breyer also agreed the speech regulated in Brunetti was of low value and, indeed, might even be harmful.317 Justice Breyer, in fact, took Justice Alito’s focus on the low-value nature of the speech to another level, as it were, by arguing that the “scandalous” provision (although not the “immoral” terminology) did not violate the First Amendment.318 In reaching this conclusion, he rejected the application of an inflexible categorical approach to First Amendment review under which categorizing a

312. Id. at 2298.
313. Id. at 2303 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
314. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
315. See id. at 571–72.
316. Id. at 572.
317. As Justice Breyer explained, highly vulgar trademarks do not typically convey any viewpoints, but instead traffic only in emotions. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2306 (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). He pointed to harms that protecting them through federal registration might cause, reasoning: These attention-grabbing words, though financially valuable to some businesses that seek to attract interest in their products, threaten to distract consumers and disrupt commerce. And they may lead to the creation of public spaces that many will find repellant, perhaps on occasion creating the risk of verbal altercations or even physical confrontations.

Id. at 2307. He also noted the harm to children that might occur from being exposed to them. See id.
318. Id. at 2308.
statute as discriminating against content would necessarily lead to the application of strict scrutiny. 319 Instead of following that formula, Justice Breyer averred that the Court should resolve First Amendment questions by “appealing more often and more directly to the values the First Amendment seeks to protect” 320 and, in particular, asking whether the harm worked to those values by a statute is disproportionate to the justifications underlying the statute. 321 This, in a nutshell, is what Justice Breyer calls a “proportionality analysis.” 322

It was not the first time he promoted this methodology. 323 For example, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Justice Breyer advocated for a proportionality approach to scrutiny, pushing back directly against the Court’s conclusion that, as described in this Article’s Introduction, facially content-based laws are subject to strict scrutiny. 324 Justice Breyer reasoned in Reed that “content discrimination, while helping courts to identify unconstitutional suppression of expression, cannot and should not always trigger strict scrutiny.” 325 Instead, focus must be directed to “the [First] Amendment’s expressive objectives,” 326 and determining a statute’s validity requires analysis of “the seriousness of the harm to speech, the importance of the countervailing objectives, the extent to which the law will achieve those objectives, and whether there are other, less restrictive

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319. Id. at 2304–05; see also Kent Greenfield, Trademarks, Hate Speech, and Solving a Puzzle of Viewpoint Bias, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 215 (noting that in Brunetti, Justice Breyer “set out his broader critique of the Court’s free speech jurisprudence as too formalistic and categorically rigid”). Justice Breyer reinforced his stance against a rigid categorical approach to scrutiny in 2020. See Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2359 (2020) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment regarding severability and dissenting in part) (“To reflexively treat all content-based distinctions as subject to strict scrutiny regardless of context or practical effect is to engage in an analysis untethered from the First Amendment’s objectives.”).

320. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2305 (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

321. See id. Justice Breyer reiterated this point later in Brunetti, writing that “[r]ather than puzzling over categorization, I believe we should focus on the interests the First Amendment protects and ask a more basic proportionality question: Does the regulation at issue work harm to First Amendment interests that is disproportionate in light of the relevant regulatory objectives?” Id. at 2306 (alteration in original) (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 179 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring)).

322. Id. at 2306.

323. See Jamal Greene, Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 55 (2018) (“Proportionality and balancing approaches to rights have long found favor with Justice Breyer.”).

324. See supra notes 9–15 and accompanying text (addressing Reed’s principle that facially content-based laws trigger strict scrutiny, regardless of legislative motive).

325. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 176 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer emphasized in Reed his stance that “the category ‘content discrimination’ is better considered in many contexts, including here, as a rule of thumb, rather than as an automatic ‘strict scrutiny’ trigger, leading to almost certain legal condemnation.” Id.

326. Id. at 175.
ways of doing so.”327 This, ultimately, is a balancing approach.328 It is widely embraced in Europe, but not in the United States.329

Focusing on values is critical for Justice Breyer in this balancing approach because values constitute “the constitutional analogue of statutory purposes.”330 Put differently, constitutional purposes (i.e., First Amendment values) for protecting speech are weighed against legislative (i.e., statutory) purposes for restricting speech, with courts asking “whether the restriction on speech is proportionate to, or properly balances, the need.”331

Under this methodology for scrutiny, Justice Breyer has made it clear that “interests close to the First Amendment’s protective core”—the values that necessitate analyzing a statute “with great care” when they are placed in jeopardy—are “the processes through which political discourse or public opinion is formed or expressed.”332 In brief, as Justice Breyer put it, “[T]he First Amendment imposes tight constraints upon government efforts to restrict . . . ‘core’ political speech.”333 For Justice Breyer, “the constitutional importance of maintaining a free marketplace of ideas” rests on the ability of the public to have access to a wide variety of ideas that allow it to “freely choose a government pledged to implement policies that reflect the people’s informed will.”334 Justice Breyer’s proportionality approach thus involves, as it did in United States v. Alvarez,335 consideration of whether the regulation in question risks suppressing ideas that may “make a valuable contribution to the marketplace of ideas.”336

327. Id. at 179. Justice Breyer reiterated this analytical framework in 2020. See Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2362 (2020) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment regarding severability and dissenting in part) (“A proper inquiry should examine the seriousness of the speech-related harm, the importance of countervailing objectives, the likelihood that the restriction will achieve those objectives, and whether there are other, less restrictive ways of doing so.”).
331. Id. at 164.
332. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017) (Breyer, J., concurring); see Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2358 (2020) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment regarding severability and dissenting in part) (“For our government to remain a democratic republic, the people must be free to generate, debate, and discuss both general and specific ideas, hopes, and experiences.”).
334. Id. at 583.
336. Id. at 732 (Breyer, J., concurring).
This, of course, ties directly back to Part III of this Article and the two core First Amendment values addressed there—promoting a diverse public marketplace of ideas, with truth-seeking and truth-testing goals, and facilitating wise and informed decision-making and participation by citizens in democratic self-governance. 337 When such objectives are threatened by a law, Justice Breyer’s approach would call for, as noted above, analyzing a statute “with great care.” 338 This seemingly means strict scrutiny.

When such core constitutional values and interests do not rest in the balance, however, lesser standards of scrutiny should apply. For example, Justice Breyer noted that regulations of commercial speech are subject to review under intermediate scrutiny—what he called a “‘lesser’ (but still elevated) form of scrutiny”—as compared to laws targeting political speech and speech that either forms or expresses public opinion. 339 Furthermore, when ordinary economic and social legislation that only incidentally involves speech is under review, any form of heightened scrutiny—strict or intermediate—is generally inappropriate, and instead, a version of rational basis review is warranted. 340 As Justice Breyer explained in his dissent on behalf of the four liberal-leaning Justices in Becerra, “suggesting that heightened scrutiny applies to much economic and social legislation” does a “serious disservice” to core First Amendment values such as protecting an unfettered marketplace of ideas and its truth-seeking function. 341

The bottom line is that Justice Breyer’s framework for determining how closely (or, conversely, how loosely and deferentially) courts should scrutinize statutes implicating speech—an approach that hinges on evaluating whether core First Amendment values are endangered by legislation—provides a possible workaround for Reed’s mandate that strict scrutiny should apply in cases such as Austin, Doyle, and Otto where seemingly no harm to core First Amendment values is wrought. If courts considering the constitutionality of laws barring revenge pornography and SOCE on minors were to adopt Justice Breyer’s framework, then they would at least have a viable path for applying a lesser standard of

337. See supra Part III.


339. Id. Justice Breyer cited the Supreme Court’s ruling in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), in making this assertion in Expressions Hair Design. See Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring). The test created by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson for evaluating the validity of laws regulating truthful commercial speech about lawful goods and services is often said to be a form of intermediate scrutiny. See Corbin, supra note 15, at 1283 (“[T]he Supreme Court differentiates between commercial speech (such as advertising) and non-commercial speech, and subjects the former to intermediate scrutiny.”); Lili Levi, A “Fushtian Pact”? Native Advertising and the Future of the Press, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 680 n.172 (2015) (observing that in Central Hudson, the Court fashioned “a four-pronged standard of intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech”).


341. Id. at 2382–83.
review that has been embraced by a current Supreme Court Justice and courts in Europe. In turn, they would not need to engage in an approach like that in Austin, where the court both ignored precedent and fashioned its own novel approaches to bypass strict scrutiny. Courts embracing Justice Breyer’s values-and-interests approach would simply explain, and then conclude, that fundamental First Amendment values such as safeguarding political speech and promoting truth seeking in the public marketplace of ideas are not endangered by revenge pornography and anti-SOCE measures. As noted earlier, Judge Rosenberg in Otto, in fact, took into account whether core First Amendment values were threatened by the anti-SOCE ordinances at issue in concluding that intermediate scrutiny might be the best standard to apply. This represents a small, encouraging step toward lower court adoption of Justice Breyer’s approach in low-value speech cases.

VI. CONCLUSION

There is little doubt that these are turbulent times when it comes to selecting scrutiny standards in First Amendment jurisprudence, with U.S. Supreme Court Justices disagreeing along perceived political lines in high-profile cases about when heightened inquiry is warranted. To wit, Justice Kagan in 2018 lamented the Court’s conservative Justices “weaponizing the First Amendment” and turning it “into a sword” by using heightened scrutiny to strike down “workaday economic and regulatory policy.” In that case, Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, the conservatives used heightened scrutiny to deal a potentially severe financial blow to public-sector labor unions.

That same year, Justice Breyer criticized the Court’s conservative members for “suggesting that heightened scrutiny applies to much economic and social legislation.” Justice Breyer derided their scrutiny methodology for paying “a serious disservice” to traditional First Amend-

342. See supra notes 298–307 and accompanying text.
343. See generally Clay Calvert, Certifying Questions in First Amendment Cases: Free Speech, Statutory Ambiguity, and Definitive Interpretations, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1349, 1371, 1173 (2019) (referencing “[t]he rift over scrutiny separating conservative from liberal Justices,” and noting the “fracturing along political lines on such a fundamental issue as the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply in any given First Amendment case”).
345. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine L. Fisk, Exaggerating the Effects of Janus: A Reply to Professors Baude and Volokh, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 42, 42 (2018) (“Janus invalidated thousands of public sector labor-management contracts involving millions of government employees, and may have a substantial adverse effect on union membership and union revenues in the twenty-two states that allowed government employers to collect fair-share fees from union-represented employees who chose not to join the union.” (footnote omitted)).
ment goals, such as protecting unpopular opinions from censorship and promoting a robust marketplace of ideas and its truth-seeking telos.\textsuperscript{347} The conservative Justices’ decision in \textit{National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra} to apply heightened scrutiny and enjoin a law that helped women learn about government-sponsored abortion options is consistent with Kagan’s weaponization thesis in \textit{Janus}.\textsuperscript{348} Many scholars, in turn, fret about what has been called “the deregulatory use of the First Amendment in pursuit of a laissez faire, \textit{Lochner}-style market”\textsuperscript{349} and “the cynical use of the First Amendment to circumvent economic regulation.”\textsuperscript{350}

Yet, as this Article makes clear, lower courts in the 2019 cases of \textit{People v. Austin}, \textit{Doyle v. Hogan}, and \textit{Otto v. City of Boca Raton} actually defanged—or, at least, weakened—the First Amendment’s power when it is deployed to challenge laws regulating the seemingly low-value speech of both revenge pornography and SOCE. In doing so, these courts greased the legal skids for upholding the measures by ratcheting down the level of review.

Notably, the courts in these disputes navigated routes that bypassed \textit{Reed v. Town of Gilbert}’s mandate that facially content-based laws must clear strict scrutiny to be constitutional, regardless of a benign legislative motive.\textsuperscript{351} In \textit{Austin}, the Supreme Court of Illinois determined that intermediate scrutiny controlled by ignoring \textit{Reed} and, in its place, turned to: (1) \textit{Ward v. Rock Against Racism} for the pre-\textit{Reed} rule that the governmental purpose and intent underlying a law determines if it is content

\textsuperscript{347} Id. at 2383.
\textsuperscript{348} As Dean Erwin Chemerinsky and Professor Michele Goodwin explain:

\textit{In Janus v. American Federation}, Justice Elena Kagan in dissent spoke of the Court “weaponizing the First Amendment.” She was referring to conservatives turning to the First Amendment to strike down economic and social regulations that they don’t like. That is exactly what happened in \textit{NIFLA v. Becerra}: A Court majority that is hostile to reproductive rights used the First Amendment to invalidate a law that clearly should have been upheld.


\textsuperscript{349} Claudia E. Haupt, \textit{Licensing Knowledge}, 72 VAND. L. REV. 501, 504 (2019); see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905) (concluding that an individual’s liberty and freedom of contract trumped the government’s police power to enforce, in the interest of public health, a labor law limiting the number of hours per week that bakers could work); see also Richard Blum, \textit{Labor Picketing, the Right to Protest, and the Neoliberal First Amendment}, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 595, 600 (2019) (noting under Lochner’s “discredited approach[,] . . . the government was generally prohibited from regulating commercial activity”); Mila Sohoni, \textit{The Trump Administration and the Law of the Lochner Era}, 107 GEO. L.J. 1323, 1331 (2019) (“[T]he Lochner era is conventionally (and sometimes nostalgically) associated with notions of limited government and laissez-faire . . . .” (footnote omitted)).

\textsuperscript{350} Erica Goldberg, \textit{First Amendment Cynicism and Redemption}, 88 U. CIN. L. REV. 959, 962 (2019). This approach is also sometimes referred to as First Amendment libertarianism, under which attorneys “seek to use the First Amendment as a deregulatory tool to invalidate various compulsory laws such as label requirements, antidiscrimination restrictions, or healthcare mandates.” Nikolas Bowie, \textit{The Government-Could-Not-Work Doctrine}, 105 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2019).

\textsuperscript{351} See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text (describing this aspect of the holding in \textit{Reed}).
based or content neutral, (2) the secondary effects doctrine, which the U.S. Supreme Court has narrowly limited to laws regulating the location of and activities inside of sexually oriented businesses, and (3) a dichotomy separating laws that regulate private speech from those that restrict expression on matters of public concern.\footnote{352} This Article exposed problems with the high court of Illinois’s approach to scrutiny under all three of these gambits.\footnote{353} 

In Doyle, a federal district court in Maryland held that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate for measuring the validity of a statewide anti-SOCE statute, while in Otto, a federal district court in Florida also suggested—albeit, without definitively resolving—that intermediate scrutiny was applicable for analyzing two local anti-SOCE ordinances.\footnote{354} The workarounds for Reed in these cases pivoted on several variables. They included: (1) the fact that the laws regulated speech only in a limited context where it took on the form of a treatment, thereby pushing it closer to the conduct end of the continuum between expression and action; (2) the notion that the laws regulated the speech of licensed professionals speaking within their professional capacities; (3) reliance in Otto on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey; and (4) consideration in Otto of whether the ordinances negatively affected the traditional First Amendment goal of safeguarding a diverse public marketplace of ideas.

Finally, the Article contended that rather than engage in such questionable machinations as the courts did in Austin, Doyle, and Otto, judges confronting content-based laws that regulate new categories of speech—ones lacking a long history of regulation and punishment in the United States and therefore ones that cannot easily be positioned outside the ambit of First Amendment protection under the Supreme Court’s logic in United States v. Stevens\footnote{355}—that appear to be of negligible value in serving traditional First Amendment interests should embrace Justice Breyer’s proportionality approach to scrutiny. Justice Breyer’s approach, as described in Part V, takes into account the First Amendment values and interests served by protecting the speech in question, with the level of scrutiny fluctuating depending on whether core First Amendment interests are imperiled by the legislation.\footnote{356} It weighs the harms, if any, wrought to those fundamental values and interests by censoring the speech against the benefits to society reaped by suppressing it.

\footnote{352. See supra Section IV.A (addressing and critiquing the Supreme Court of Illinois’s analysis of the scrutiny issue in People v. Austin).}{353. See supra Section IV.A (addressing and critiquing the Supreme Court of Illinois’s analysis of the scrutiny issue in People v. Austin).}{354. See supra Section IV.B.1–2 (addressing and critiquing the federal district court decisions in both Doyle v. Hogan and Otto v. City of Boca Raton).}{355. See supra notes 36–47 and accompanying text (addressing Stevens and how it has been interpreted by scholars).}{356. See supra Part V.}
Ultimately, lower-court embracement of Justice Breyer’s proportionality approach to judicial review as a mechanism for evading strict scrutiny—especially in a dispute implicating a hot-button topic such as revenge pornography or SOCE—when the speech both lacks historical regulation and is of low value in serving core First Amendment interests might well tee up for possible Supreme Court reconsideration Reed’s mandate that facially content-based laws must overcome strict scrutiny. Justice Breyer’s long-standing endorsement of proportionality, when coupled with the concerns in Janus and Becerra of the Court’s two other remaining liberal Justices that heightened scrutiny is being unnecessarily deployed by the Court’s conservative members to attack economic and social legislation, indicates that mustering the requisite four votes to hear such a case may be feasible if just one conservative justice agrees to join them.357 Granting a petition for a writ of certiorari in such a case would not only afford the Court an opportunity to reexamine Reed but also present it with the chance to address a larger, more profound question. That macro-level question is whether the Court’s current categorical, tiers-of-scrutiny formula in First Amendment speech cases should be scrapped and supplanted by the more fluid, proportionality methodology for which Justice Breyer long has advocated.

Until the Court revisits Reed and its categorial approach, however, one might reasonably expect to see more courts follow in the footsteps of the Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Austin and create their own precedent-flouting workarounds for strict scrutiny in low-value speech cases. The path for escaping the doctrinal lockboxes of Stevens and Reed in order to ease the constitutional burden on regulating low-value speech better rests in Justice Breyer’s values-and-interests approach than in inventing questionable mechanisms in cases such as Austin.

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357. Justice Ginsburg’s death in September 2020 left Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan as the remaining liberals on the Court as of late 2020. Four justices must agree to hear a case for a petition for a writ of certiorari to be granted. See Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1073 (1988) (“[T]he Rule of Four means that the Court will grant certiorari whenever four Justices vote to do so . . . .’’); Ira P. Robbins, Justice by the Numbers: The Supreme Court and the Rule of Four—Or Is It Five?, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 12 (2002) (“When four Justices vote to review a case, all nine of the Justices are required to consider its merits absent any intervening factors that were not known or appreciated at the time the petition was granted.’’).