Fixing Employment Discrimination Law

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FIXING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW

William R. Corbett*

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* © 2008 Frank L. Maraist Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center of Louisiana State University. I am grateful for a summer research grant from the LSU Law Center. I thank Professors Michael J. Zimmer and Henry L. Chambers, Jr. for helpful comments. I thank Heather D’Antonio, LSU Law Center, Class of 2009, for her research assistance.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE BROKEN PROOF STRUCTURES OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW

A. THE WRECK

THE employment discrimination law\(^1\) of the United States is broken. The proof structures or analytical frameworks\(^2\) that define how discrimination cases are litigated and how they are analyzed at all dispositive stages of litigation are in a state of extreme disrepair. Consequently, employment discrimination law is “running” poorly, and it is up to Congress to fix it. Congress must pass legislation to clarify the proof structures. Such a fix is badly needed to restore an acceptable level of clarity, predictability, and functionality in employment discrimination litigation.

There are two proof structures under the disparate treatment theory of discrimination: \(^3\) 1) *McDonnell Douglas* or pretext; and 2) mixed motives. Among several problems with these proof structures, the most significant is that no one knows which one applies in any given case. Furthermore, it is a mystery whether uniform disparate treatment proof structures are applicable to Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). While there is uncertainty regarding uniformity for disparate treatment, it is clear that there is one disparate impact\(^4\) proof structure for Title VII and one for the ADEA, and each has multiple problems and uncertainties.

The proof structures are the engines of employment discrimination law, and their current condition means that the wreck that is employment discrimination law needs an overhaul. Given statutes that simply say it is unlawful “to discriminate” in employment terms “because of” sex, race,

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2. “Proof structure” refers to what must be proven, in what order, and on whom the burden rests at each stage. The Supreme Court, in the decision in which it announced the *McDonnell Douglas* or pretext proof structure, described the thing it was creating: “The case before us raises significant questions as to the proper order and nature of proof in actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” *McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green*, 411 U.S. 792, 793-94 (1973).


4. Disparate impact is a theory of unintentional discrimination in which liability is based on the use of a facially neutral practice or criterion that produces a statistically significant impact on a protected group, and the practice cannot be justified. *Id*. Disparate impact has been described as being based on either strict liability or negligence. See *David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination*, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 931-36 (1993).
etc., the courts have used the proof structures to develop the procedural, evidentiary, and substantive law of employment discrimination law. Over the course of the forty-three years or so that employment discrimination law has existed, the Supreme Court has created the proof structures, and both the Supreme Court and Congress have clarified and modified them. Congress has stepped in and modified or clarified the proof structures legislatively when it deemed the Court to be moving in the wrong direction in developing the proof structures, as it did in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. At this stage, Congress needs to take its turn again. It may soon have an opportunity. Although the omnibus Civil Rights Act of 2008, which was introduced in Congress, would amend the employment discrimination laws in many important ways, the bill as introduced would not repair the proof structures. There is no more important task for Congress in fixing employment discrimination law than repairing the proof structures.

Consider the following hypothetical discussion between a federal district judge and his law clerk. The employment discrimination case described is far from unusual, and the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant is an everyday matter for courts adjudicating employment discrimination cases. If the law is close to as confused as I posit in this hypothetical (and it is), then the law is in urgent need of repair.

B. RULING ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT:
A HYPOTHETICAL SURVEY OF THE WRECK

“How do I rule on this motion, Clerk?” Judge Federal District bellows at his clerk.

“It’s very complicated, Judge. I am not sure how you should rule,” responds the clerk sheepishly.

Judge District is preparing to rule on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in an employment discrimination case in which John Q. Employee, a fifty-year-old white male, was not hired after applying to


6. Title VII is the oldest of our employment discrimination laws if we exclude the earlier Equal Pay Act, which amended the Fair Labor Standards Act. Title VII was enacted in 1964, but its effective date was July 2, 1965. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 716, 78 Stat. 241, 266 (1964) (stating that the effective date shall be one year after the date of enactment).


and being interviewed by defendant Employer. Employer hired an older African American woman. He filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging discrimination based on race, sex, and age. In the job classification for which the plaintiff applied and in its workforce as a whole, the employer has a much higher percentage of Caucasians and men than African-Americans and women. After receiving his right to sue letter, Employee filed suit in federal district court alleging both disparate treatment and disparate impact discrimination. After discovery, defendant Employer filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of all of the plaintiff’s employment discrimination claims. As is the custom of Judge District, he and his clerk read all the briefs, and they discuss the case.

“Well, Clerk, the briefs are clear and the law seems well defined. What do you see as the problem?”

“Judge, I think employment discrimination law is broken. Until the Supreme Court or Congress fixes it, I don’t know how you should rule on this motion.”

“That’s preposterous, Clerk. Your days on law review have made you too contemplative. Employment discrimination law has been around for over forty years, and I have seen it develop. It has been a very orderly process in which the Supreme Court has explained the law in several landmark cases. Surely you are not suggesting that Congress and the Supreme Court would leave the law so confused that judges could not rule on motions for summary judgment.”

“I don’t think it is that simple, your Honor. With all due respect, I think that is precisely the state of confusion in which Congress and the Court have left us.”

“Come now, we shall enjoy a nice discussion about employment discrimination law and determine how to rule on this motion. I shall explain employment discrimination law to you, and then you may write letters of apology to the Supreme Court and Congress. Let us begin with the claims for race, sex, and age discrimination under the disparate treatment theory. Disparate treatment is intentional discrimination, which the Supreme Court once labeled as ‘the most easily understood type of discrimination.’


11. See id.

basically qualified to perform the job, although the elements vary somewhat depending on what type of adverse employment action the employer took. At stage two, the employer has the burden of production to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. As everyone knows, stages one and two are easy to satisfy, and virtually no cases are resolved at those stages. So, this motion for summary judgment is likely to be resolved at stage three—the pretext stage. Now, Clerk, I'll grant you that the pretext stage is somewhat complex, and the Supreme Court has found it necessary to clarify its meaning in a couple of cases, but the Court did so. At stage three the task is to determine, on a motion for summary judgment, whether there is sufficient evidence that the defendant's articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for discrimination. That is, if we do not believe the reason given by the employer for taking the adverse employment action, then we may infer that the real reason is discriminatory, although we are not required to so infer. Now, I know that is a bit complicated, but the Court has been clear about this, and surely we can decide the disparate treatment claim under the analysis I have explained, Clerk."

"Judge, I am loathe to disagree with you, but I think there are a number of problems that make it much more complicated and less certain than you explained. First, it is not clear that the McDonnell Douglas analysis applies to plaintiff Employee's disparate treatment claims."

"Heresy!" exclaimed the indignant Judge District.

"No, Judge. As I am sure you know, the Supreme Court announced an alternative proof structure or analysis for disparate treatment claims in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. That case set forth the mixed-motives analysis, under which there are two stages. First, the plaintiff must prove that the protected characteristic was a motivating or substantial factor (the case produced no majority opinion on the standard of causation), and then the defendant could still win the case and avoid liability by proving the same-decision defense—that it would have taken the same adverse action for nondiscriminatory reasons. Congress stepped in to

15. See, e.g., Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 870 (11th Cir. 1985); George Rutherglen, Abolition in a Different Voice, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1463, 1474 (1992) ("The fact that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case in McDonnell Douglas usually is of no consequence because the plaintiff's burden of making out that case, and the defendant's rebuttal burden of showing a 'legitimate nondiscriminatory' reason, are so easily satisfied. Almost all individual cases under McDonnell Douglas come down to a determination whether the plaintiff has proved that the 'legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason' offered by the defendant is really a pretext for discrimination.").
17. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03.
18. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146-47.
20. See id.
21. Id.
modify and clarify the Price Waterhouse proof structure in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.22 First, Congress selected "motivating factor" as the standard of causation.23 Second, Congress changed the same-decision defense so that it does not operate as a complete affirmative defense, precluding liability, but instead limits the remedies that are available if the defendant "demonstrates" (satisfies the burden of persuasion) that it would have made the same employment decision absent the discriminatory reason."24

"Yes, of course, Clerk. I know about Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act," interjected Judge District. "But many more disparate treatment cases are analyzed under McDonnell Douglas or pretext because, as you should have learned in law school, the Price Waterhouse or mixed-motives analysis applies to only cases in which there is direct evidence of discrimination. There are far more cases involving circumstantial evidence of discrimination than those involving direct evidence."

"Judge, that was once the state of the law, but do you remember the Supreme Court's decision in 2003 in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa?25

"Yes, I read it, but it does not say very much, and it did not change anything I just explained to you."

"Well, your Honor, I certainly agree that the opinion says little. Indeed, the Court in a footnote declined to clarify the big picture of disparate treatment law.26 But some think that the Court's eradication of the criterion used to classify cases as pretext or mixed-motives necessarily changed the way disparate treatment cases are analyzed."

"Yes, I have heard that some academics have read the case as abrogating McDonnell Douglas,27 but the Court did not say that. It is very presumptuous of those ivory tower law professors to suggest that the Court sub silento overruled a well-established analysis that it had carefully developed over a period of more than thirty years."

26. See id. at 94 n.1 ("This case does not require us to decide when, if ever, § 107 applies outside of the mixed-motive context."). The footnote should not be read as a rejection of the argument that mixed-motives has swallowed up the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis. Instead, it simply expressly limits the decision of the Court to the question the Court answered—a not uncommon device. See Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Role of Second-Order Uniformity in Disparate Treatment Law: McDonnell Douglas's Longevity and the Mixed-Motives Mess, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 511, 540-541 (2008).
"Your Honor, the problem for us is that the Court clearly did say in Desert Palace that there is no requirement in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that a plaintiff produce direct evidence in order to be entitled to a "motivating factor" jury instruction. With the dividing line erased between cases that are to be analyzed under the pretext analysis and those to be analyzed under mixed-motives, how do we know which one to use?"

"That is an interesting point, Clerk. How have the courts of appeals resolved that issue?"

"In short, not well, and the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in cases raising the issue. Some courts have said that Desert Palace did not change anything. Others, unsure about how to decide which analysis to apply, have applied both. One court held that McDonnell Douglas continues to apply to single-motive cases while a motivating factor analysis applies to mixed-motives cases."

"But, Clerk, how can we preserve distinctions between the analyses of single- and mixed-motives cases if Desert Palace erased the dividing line? How does a court know which type it is dealing with?"

"Judge, the Sixth Circuit in White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. seemed to rely on the complaint and how the plaintiff pled his claims. The court said that the plaintiff brought one claim pursuant to one section of Title VII and one pursuant to another section."

"Depending on the pleading, to separate them does not seem fair or reasonable. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish a notice pleading system in which specificity is not required."

"Indeed, your Honor. Reliance on how a claim is pled to decide which proof structure applies seems ill-advised and contrary to the Federal Rules and Supreme Court precedent. The Court rejected a require-

31. See White, 533 F.3d at 390 & n.4. The court said the single-motive claim was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and the mixed-motives claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
32. Id. at 390 & n.4. The court in discussing the claim analyzed under pretext and the claim analyzed under mixed motives, referred to the type of evidence presented in support of each (circumstantial and direct, respectively), although the court also discussed the Desert Palace abrogation of that line. See White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. 05-71201, 2007 WL 1119881 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 16, 2007).
33. See White, 533 F.3d at 390 & n.4.
34. See, e.g., Diamond, 416 F.3d at 317 n.3 ("Whether [plaintiff] pled a mixed-motive claim is irrelevant... because 'a case need not be characterized or labeled at the outset... [T]he complaint itself need not contain more than the allegation that the adverse employment action was taken because of a protected characteristic.'" (quoting Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 856 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)).
35. Id.
ment that pleadings must be strictly tied to the proof structures in *Swierkiewicz v. Sorenma N.A.*"\(^{36}\)

"Are there any other and better resolutions of this mess, Clerk?"

"Well, Judge, the most creative and ambitious resolution is that of the Fifth Circuit in *Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc.*\(^{37}\) In an age discrimination case, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that *Desert Palace* did effect a significant change.\(^{38}\) The court announced a 'modified *McDonnell Douglas* analysis in which the first two parts of the pretext analysis remain unchanged, and only the third part is modified.\(^{39}\) At part three, a plaintiff may prevail by proving either pretext or motivating factor.\(^{40}\) If the plaintiff proves motivating factor, then the same-decision defense is available to the defendant.\(^{41}\)

"That's more like it, Clerk. The Fifth Circuit has made things more manageable with that approach. How have other courts reacted?"

"No other circuit has adopted the 'modified *McDonnell Douglas*' approach,\(^{42}\) and even some panels within the Fifth Circuit have seemed unsure that *Rachid* is the framework that is generally applicable to all disparate treatment cases.\(^{43}\) Though the combined analysis does make our job easier, I do not understand the continuing relevance of the pretext prong. If motivating factor is enough, plaintiffs opposing motions for summary judgment always should insist on having their cases analyzed under motivating factor rather than pretext."

"Another good point, Clerk. I like *McDonnell Douglas*, and I am very comfortable analyzing summary judgments under it. It is like a comfortable old blanket. Let's say that pretext analysis continues to apply to motions for summary judgment, but does not apply thereafter. That should work, right?"

"Judge, that is what the Ninth Circuit said in its en banc decision in *Desert Palace*.\(^{44}\) However, could we apply one standard to analyzing a motion for summary judgment and then apply a different standard at trial? Isn't summary judgment supposed to determine, under the same standard applicable to a motion for judgment as a matter of law, whether there is any need for a jury resolution? It seems to me that we need to apply the same analysis to summary judgment that we will later apply to determining whether the jury gets to decide the case, and if so under what

\(^{36}\) *534 U.S. 506 (2002).*

\(^{37}\) *376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004).*

\(^{38}\) *Id. at 312.*

\(^{39}\) *Id.*

\(^{40}\) *Id.*

\(^{41}\) *Id. at 312-13.*

\(^{42}\) *See White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp, 533 F.3d 381, 398-99 (2008).*

\(^{43}\) *See Greene v. DaimlerChrysler Servs. of N. Am., 128 F. App'x 353, 356 n.7 (5th Cir. 2005) (stating that court need not consider the effect of *Desert Palace* and *Rachid* on the case before it).*

\(^{44}\) *See Costa v. Desert Palace, 299 F.3d 838, 854 (9th Cir. 2002), aff'd, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).*
"That is a good point, Clerk. But I am going to analyze this case at the summary judgment stage under McDonnell Douglas. The appellate courts can take the pretext analysis from me when they pry it from my cold, dead fingers."

"Okay, Judge. And the jury instructions will be what? Pretext-based? What if the defendant asks for the same-decision defense jury instruction?"

"We'll cross that bridge when we get to it. It will not be an issue if I grant the motion for summary judgment. I want you to analyze the disparate treatment claim under McDonnell Douglas, and then for good measure, analyze it under mixed motives, too, to see if the result is any different. Wait a minute; that will be a problem if it comes out differently. Do that combined, modified analysis the Fifth Circuit made up in Rachid. That should cover all bases."

"Okay, Judge. How about the disparate treatment claim based on age?"

"Same thing. Why should it be different from race and sex?"

"Some courts have said that whatever the Supreme Court did in Desert Palace, it had no effect on the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Thus, the mixed-motives analysis applicable to the age claim could be the Price Waterhouse version rather than the Civil Rights Act of 1991 version.

"But you said the Fifth Circuit Rachid case was an age discrimination case. The Fifth Circuit did not seem bothered by the distinction that you just made: that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not amend the ADEA."

"Right, Judge. The Fifth Circuit dispatched with that issue expeditiously, reasoning that the ADEA and Title VII statutory prohibitions are similar. But some other courts have rejected the Fifth Circuit’s harmonization or unification of the analyses, finding inadequate support for it in

45. Courts are divided on whether a McDonnell Douglas or pretext jury instruction should be given, although a majority hold that the burden-shifting scheme should not be included in jury instructions. See, e.g., Tymkovich, supra note 9, at 527-28. My point here is that classifying a case as single motive/pretext or mixed-motives has been understood as requiring different jury instructions. See Costa, 299 F.3d at 856 (describing the two possible jury instructions); Chambers, supra note 27, at 99 (“The fact that pretext and mixed-motives cases are interchangeable but can yield different jury instructions is troubling.”). Clearly, the statutory mixed-motives analysis enacted by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 requires jury instructions regarding motivating factor and the same-decision defense. The concern expressed by the clerk here is that if pretext cases and mixed-motives cases yield different jury instructions, the court should determine the type of case at summary judgment so that the standard of causation is the same at summary judgment and in the jury instructions. See Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 745 n.9 (8th Cir. 2004) (Magnuson, J., concurring).

46. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 361 (8th Cir.) (explaining that Desert Palace, which interpreted language in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, does not affect the application of Price Waterhouse to ADEA cases), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 680 (2008).

47. Id.


49. Id.
the statutes.\textsuperscript{50} I think the Fifth Circuit did it as a matter of convenience."

"Clerk, my head is beginning to hurt. I am all for convenience, and I think it may be in the interest of the courts and the public to simplify this law, so apply the modified \textit{McDonnell Douglas} analysis to the race, sex, and age disparate treatment claims. I see no reason why the analysis for age discrimination claims should be different from race and sex."

"As you wish, Judge, but the Supreme Court consistently has said that there are differences between age discrimination on the one hand, and race and sex discrimination on the other.\textsuperscript{51} For example, most recently the Court reiterated this in \textit{Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory}.\textsuperscript{52} Still, on the specific issue of the proof structure applicable to intentional discrimination cases, I agree with you."

"Good! Then apply the modified \textit{McDonnell Douglas} analysis and prepare proposed reasons for judgment."

"Okay, Judge. Now about the reverse discrimination issue, how do you want to handle that?"

"Apply the modified \textit{McDonnell Douglas} analysis. Is there anything else?"

"Yes, Judge. As you know, we have a white male asserting race and sex discrimination claims. Do you want me to make adjustments to the analysis because the claim is reverse discrimination, meaning a case with a plaintiff who is a member of a group that historically has not been a primary target of discrimination?"\textsuperscript{53}

"My word, Clerk, what adjustments would you make, and why would you make them?"

"Some courts have modified the \textit{McDonnell Douglas} analysis in reverse discrimination cases by requiring more proof to establish a prima facie case.\textsuperscript{54} Usually, courts that do this say that they require evidence of 'background circumstances,' which suggest that this is an unusual employer that discriminates against a historically favored group."\textsuperscript{55}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{50} See Gross, 526 F.3d at 361.
\item \textsuperscript{51} See, e.g., Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2402-03 (2008).
\item \textsuperscript{52} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{55} See, e.g., Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67 (6th Cir. 1985). See also Sullivan, supra note 53, at 1065-71 (discussing background circumstances).
\end{itemize}
"Now, Clerk, why would we modify the analysis for reverse discrimination cases? Doing so seems discriminatory to me, which is quite ironic given that we are trying to enforce antidiscrimination laws."

"Judge, some courts have refused to modify the analysis at least in large part for that reason. It is important to remember, however, that employment discrimination law makes a number of distinctions, and thus it obviously does discriminate. The important question is whether there is a solid rationale for distinguishing between the proof structure applied to traditional discrimination cases and that applied to reverse discrimination cases. The best reason seems to be based on the presumptions underlying the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. As we discussed earlier, all the prima facie case essentially requires is that a plaintiff prove that she is in a protected class, is basically qualified for the job in question, and a job exists for which plaintiff was not chosen. Although this is easily satisfied in most cases, the Court has explained that the prima facie case rules out the two most common reasons for a person not getting a job: no job exists or the person is not qualified. With the most common nondiscriminatory reasons ruled out, the Court believed that discrimination occurs often enough to make it reasonable to infer discrimination, subject to rebuttal. However, that same inference may not be as reasonable for reverse discrimination because historically such discrimination has not been common. So, as you can see, when you think about the underlying rationale for the proof structure, modifying the prima facie case for reverse discrimination cases by requiring proof of additional background circumstances makes sense. However, the modification has been very controversial. One court expressed its consternation by saying that cases which apply the background circumstances requirement in reverse discrimination cases are inconsistent with antidiscrimination statutes."

"I understand, Clerk. I don’t want to jump into that controversy, so don’t modify the prima facie case with a ‘background circumstances’ requirement even if it makes sense to do so. Besides, with more minority-owned businesses and the current emphasis on diversity in the workplace, I suppose reverse discrimination may be more common than it used to be. Are we done with the disparate treatment claims?"

"I think so, Judge, but if the age discrimination claim is a reverse discrimination claim, as it seems it may be, then we do not need to apply any

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56. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 53, at 1080-84.
59. Id.
60. See Lind v. City of Battle Creek, 681 N.W.2d 334, 335 (Mich. 2004).
analysis to it. It can be dismissed as a matter of law. Younger people cannot claim that they were discriminated against in favor of older people on the basis of age."

"Now, wait a minute. Why not? The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) says 'age,' which could go either way—older or younger. Furthermore, I know the Supreme Court has approved reverse discrimination claims under Title VII.61

"Yes, Judge, that is all true, but the Supreme Court held that the ADEA does not provide for reverse discrimination claims in General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline.62

"That does not make sense to me. The statute says 'because of . . . age,'63 and does not say anything about younger or older. I recently read about a British case in which a younger plaintiff sued for age discrimination and won."64

"Shall I write that, notwithstanding what the Court said in General Dynamics Land Systems, the ADEA should be interpreted to permit reverse age discrimination claims and cite the British case?"

"No, Clerk, I don't think so. Some justices on the Supreme Court don't like to see any foreign law cited.65 If the age claim is a reverse discrimination claim, grant the summary judgment for the defendant, citing General Dynamics Land Systems. Okay, surely that takes care of the disparate treatment claims. Let's move on to disparate impact. This should be much easier than disparate treatment because Congress codified the disparate impact proof structure in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.66 You know the three-part analysis: 1) prima facie case consisting of a) employment practice that b) causes c) a statistically significant disparity; 2) employer's defense of business necessity and job relatedness; and 3) less discriminatory alternative employment practice."67

"Judge, I know that is how courts see it, although the structure established by Congress in the Civil Right Act of 1991 is not that clear. For example, the statute does not say that alternative employment practice (AEP) is the third stage of a three-part analysis. As the statute is written, "alternative employment practice" appears to be a freestanding theory of liability rather than the third stage in an analysis.68 Moreover, it is almost impossible to separate AEP from business necessity and job relatedness (BN/JR). How can a practice be a necessity if there is an alternative practice available that is nearly as effective and less discriminatory?"

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67. Id.
Courts generally have not been able to separate BN/JR and AEP into two stages."69

"Okay, well, treat BN/JR and AEP as two separate stages anyway. Any more problems?"

"Working backwards, my biggest problem at stage two is that Congress did not attempt to define BN/JR, and courts have struggled to define it.70 As some have explained it, before the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Supreme Court seemed to apply a sliding scale approach to BN/JR, being more deferential or less deferential to the employer depending on the type of job and what was at stake in second guessing the employer's determination of business necessity.71 Also, what did Congress have in mind by making the defense two parts—business necessity and job related? Are we really supposed to analyze both? Can a practice be a business necessity without being job related? Isn't job related redundant?"

"Clerk, I understand, but the statutory language is crystal clear. Even if you think job related is redundant, analyze both. As far as the appropriate standard for BN/JR, survey the case law and pick one. Any other problems?"

"Yes, regarding the prima facie case, there are problems with all three parts. First, what constitutes an employment practice is not clear. For example, the Supreme Court, in the case first holding that disparate impact is actionable under the ADEA, Smith v. City of Jackson, held that the employer's pay raise formula was not an employment practice.72 One could attribute that to its being an age case, but what constitutes an employment practice also has been vexing in Title VII cases. For example, in EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, the Eleventh Circuit said it found no employment practice in the employer's hiring procedures,73 although the dissent had no difficulty finding practices."

"So you will have to apply an amorphous standard to what constitutes an employment practice. Just add that to the amorphous standard for the defense of BN/JR. What are the problems with the rest of the PFC?"

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69. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1121-22 (11th Cir. 1993). There is not much Supreme Court precedent to provide guidance on "alternative employment practice." The Civil Rights Act provides that the law of "alternative employment practice" is to be "in accordance with the law as it existed" before Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio was decided. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) & (C). However, Wards Cove was the first Supreme Court opinion to use the term "alternative employment practice." See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 911, 964 (2005). Wards Cove used the term to explain the third stage of the disparate impact analysis as articulated in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). See William Gordon, The Evolution of the Disparate Impact Theory of Title VII: A Hypothetical Case Study, 44 Harv. J. on Legis. 529, 541 (2007).

70. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Market Power and Inequality: A Competitive Conduct Standard for Assessing When Disparate Impacts Are Unjustified, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 669, 670 (2007) ("The conflict over the appropriate scope of the business justification defense is longstanding.").

71. See infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.


73. EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1278 (11th Cir. 2000).

74. Id. at 1289-91 (Hull, J., dissenting).
"The Supreme Court announced a specific causation standard in *Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio*, saying that the plaintiff must 'specifically show' that each challenged practice has a significantly disparate impact.\(^{75}\) Although Congress overturned most of *Wards Cove* in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it appears to have codified the specific causation requirement.\(^{76}\) Here's the problem in this case: the plaintiff claims disparate impact in refusal to hire based on race, sex, and age. Let's put the age disparate impact claim to one side because it must be analyzed according to a different disparate impact proof structure. As for the race and sex claims, there is a problem because the employer has many more men and whites in the job classification for which plaintiff was denied employment and many more men and whites in its workforce as a whole. Therefore, it seems that under the specific causation standard plaintiff cannot prove that any specific practice of the employer caused a statistically significant underrepresentation."

"Ah, checkmate, Clerk. The Supreme Court explained in *Connecticut v. Teal* that the bottom line cannot be used to defeat a claim of discrimination.\(^{77}\) That is, if a practice or criterion is excluding a group disproportionately, it is no answer that the group is proportionately represented in the employer's workforce."

"True, Judge, but how do you reconcile that principle with *Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc.*?\(^{78}\) In that case, the employer had a maximum height requirement for drivers.\(^{79}\) The tall male applicant who was denied a job sued, asserting disparate impact.\(^{80}\) The court rejected his claim, noting that the employer's workforce had 189 male drivers and two female drivers.\(^{81}\) The court tried to distinguish *Connecticut v. Teal*, but the ground of distinction made no difference.\(^{82}\) Then the court buttressed its conclusion that the claim failed by noting that the case was a reverse discrimination case and saying the background circumstances requirement applicable to disparate treatment reverse discrimination cases also applies to disparate impact cases.\(^{83}\)

"I admit that *Livingston* poses some enigmas. How do you resolve them, Clerk?"

"*Livingston* exemplifies a couple of the most significant unresolved issues about disparate impact. First, is disparate impact really about individual rights rather than group rights? In *Connecticut v. Teal*, the Court insisted that employment discrimination law protects individual rights, not group rights.\(^{84}\) The dissent in *Teal* disagreed, saying the Court was

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79. *Id.* at 1251.
80. *Id.*
81. *Id.* at 1252-53.
82. *Id.*
83. *Id.*
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confusing the goal of Title VII with the legal theories for accomplishing that goal; while disparate treatment is about proving discrimination against individuals, disparate impact is about proving discrimination with reference to a group. If disparate impact is about protecting individuals against discrimination only as members of a group, then Livingston makes sense, as the employer hired many men and certainly did not discriminate against men. On the other hand, if disparate impact protects individuals as individuals, then the plaintiff should have recovered. Second, in what group must the disparate impact be manifested: the actual workforce of the employer or some hypothetical group mirroring the general public that could have applied for the job? In Livingston, for example, there was no underrepresentation of men in the employer's workforce, although everyone knows that a height limitation would disproportionately screen out men in a hypothetical applicant pool. In Livingston, looking at the PFC from the top (from the employment practice downward) it looks like a fairly strong disparate impact case. However, looking at it from the bottom (from the workforce upward) it looks like a nonexistent disparate impact case. There is yet another issue in Livingston. Should disparate impact theory even apply to reverse discrimination cases? Although the court stated that it would impose the additional background circumstances requirement for disparate impact in reverse discrimination cases, the court could have considered whether disparate impact even was intended to protect members of groups against whom there is no history of discrimination. This is a very controversial issue which also may raise constitutional concerns. So far, the scant case law on the issue recognizes the applicability of disparate impact to reverse discrimination cases, but the issue has not been thoroughly discussed in a difficult case. Because there are more Caucasians and men in the job classification for which the plaintiff applied, we may have such a case.

"Clerk, what constitutional issues are implicated if I rule that disparate impact does not apply to reverse discrimination cases?"

"The argument is that a judicial decision limiting disparate impact to traditional discrimination cases is a racial classification that is subject to strict scrutiny analysis under the equal protection clause, and therefore probably constitutionally infirm. However, there are arguments in the

85. Id. at 458-59 (Powell, J., dissenting).
87. Livingston, 802 F.2d at 1252.
89. Livingston, 802 F.2d at 1252.
91. See Sullivan, supra note 88, at 1550.
academic literature to the contrary." 92

"Clerk, we will not risk that constitutional fight. We will apply disparate impact to the reverse discrimination claims in the case before us without discussing the issue, much as the court did in Livingston. However, do not add the background circumstances requirement."

"Okay, your Honor. You are aware, of course, that the disparate impact analysis under the ADEA is different from that under Title VII. At a minimum, the statutory language requires that the defense of "reasonable factors other than age" (RFOA) replace business necessity and job relatedness as the applicable affirmative defense. 93 In Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory the Supreme Court recently explained this difference and the fact that there is no stage three rebuttal in the analysis analogous to "alternative employment practices." 94 Indeed, until the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Smith v. City of Jackson, it was not resolved that disparate impact theory was available under the ADEA. 95 The Supreme Court's explanation of the ADEA disparate impact analysis in Smith seems to make it very unlikely that plaintiffs will prevail. 96 The Court, however, did clarify in Meacham that RFOA is an affirmative defense for which the burden of persuasion is on the defendant." 97

"So, Clerk, I question why the Supreme Court and Congress have disfavored age discrimination by making it harder for plaintiffs to recover, but I accept your explanation of the differences."

"You realize the analysis I do under both disparate treatment and disparate impact will be fraught with uncertainty, Judge?"

"Yes, Clerk, I now understand that, but I find it baffling that Congress and the Supreme Court have not heretofore seen fit to provide certainty regarding the basic tools we must use at the key stages in litigation of employment discrimination cases." 98

"Well, your Honor, Congress stepped up to the plate and did significant revamping and clarification of both disparate impact and disparate treatment in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Perhaps it will do so again. But I should begin work on your opinion because that hope does not help us now."

97. Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2404.
98. See Michael Abbott, Note, A Swing and a Miss: The U.S. Supreme Court's Attempt to Resolve the Confusion Over the Proper Evidentiary Burden for Employment Discrimination Litigation in Costa v. Desert Palace, 30 J. Corp. L. 573, 591 (2005) ("Overall, with lower courts already making their own differing interpretations of Costa's effects, it appears that the only thing clear in the area of employment discrimination law is the existence of confusion.").
II. HOW DID THE WRECK OCCUR?

The odyssey of the proof structures is well chronicled, so I will render it here in succinct form.

A. DISPARATE TREATMENT: PRETEXT AND MIXED MOTIVES FROM MCDONNELL DOUGLAS AND PRICE WATERHOUSE TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 TO DESERT PALACE

The two proof structures were created by the Supreme Court, the pretext structure in *McDonnell Douglas v. Green* in 1973, and the mixed-motives structure in *Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins* in 1989. Although both were created by the Court, mixed-motives later would be modified and codified by Congress.

The Court held the pretext analysis applicable in a reverse discrimination case without much discussion of how it applies in *McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.* The *McDonnell Douglas* pretext analysis was further developed in a series of Supreme Court decisions: *Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine*, *St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks*, and *Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.* The Supreme Court never has held that the pretext analysis is applicable to analyze ADEA cases (although it has assumed it), and lower courts routinely have applied it. The Court seems to have approved the applicability of the pretext analysis to disabilities claims under the ADA in *Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez*.

The court announced the alternative proof structure, mixed motives, in *Price Waterhouse*. The plurality opinion and Justice O'Connor's concurrence applied different standards to the plaintiff's prima facie case, "motivating factor" applied by the plurality, and "substantial factor" by the concurrence. After *Price Waterhouse*, most courts applied substantial factor. Courts also grappled with the issue of under which proof structure any particular case should be analyzed. Most circuits seized upon the

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107. *Id.* at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
110. *Id.* at 265 (O'Conner, J., concurring).
dividing line cited by the O'Connor concurrence: cases in which there was direct evidence were analyzed under mixed-motives, and circumstantial evidence cases were analyzed under pretext.\footnote{111}{Id. at 270-71 (O'Connor, J., concurring).}

Congress made some changes in at least one disparate treatment proof structure in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Given the splintered Court decision in \textit{Price Waterhouse}, Congress clarified and fixed the mixed-motives proof structure. Congress codified "motivating factor" as the causation standard in the plaintiff's prima face case rather than "substantial factor."\footnote{112}{42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).} Congress also changed the analysis of \textit{Price Waterhouse} by providing that the same-decision defense is not a complete defense, avoiding liability.\footnote{113}{42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000).} Did Congress intend in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to make any changes in the pretext analysis? Congress did not say. Did the new statutory version of mixed motives apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which was not amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991? Congress did not say, but it placed the new statutory analysis in Title VII. Thus, many courts said that the \textit{Price Waterhouse} version of mixed motives continued to apply to ADEA disparate treatment claims.\footnote{115}{Id.}

As long as courts maintained a dividing line between cases to be analyzed under pretext and those to be analyzed under mixed motives, it was reasonable for courts to continue using the two proof structures and the rich body of case law developed under them. However, the Supreme Court obliterated this order when it held in \textit{Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa} that direct evidence is not required for a plaintiff to be entitled to a motivating factor jury instruction.\footnote{116}{Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003).} With that holding, the Court erased the line separating the cases analyzed under pretext and those analyzed under mixed motives. The Court based its holding on the fact that the language added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not say anything about "motivating factor" being limited to direct evidence cases.\footnote{117}{Id. at 99.} Did elimination of the dividing line mean that all disparate treatment cases were to be analyzed under mixed motives? The Court declined to say.\footnote{118}{In fact the Court said: "This case does not require us to decide when, if ever, § 107 applies outside of the mixed-motive context." Id. at 94 n.1. The lower courts were left with no guidance on deciding what to do with the two disparate treatment proof structures.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Id. at 270-71 (O'Connor, J., concurring).}
\item \textit{Id.} The limitation is significant, leaving the plaintiff with no money, although attorney's fees may be awarded.
\item \textit{See, e.g.,} Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc., 398 F.3d 345, 350 (5th Cir. 2005).
\end{itemize}
B. DISPARATE IMPACT: FROM GRIGGS TO WARDS COVE TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991

The history of disparate impact starts with the Supreme Court's recognition of the theory in 1971 in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.\(^ {119} \) Between Griggs and the codification of disparate impact in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, several major Supreme Court cases developed the proof structure. In 1982 in Connecticut v. Teal, the Court announced that if an employment practice causes a disparate impact, an employer cannot defend and win the case by fixing the disparate impact at the bottom line—by adjusting its numbers so that the group adversely affected by the practice is adequately represented in the work force or job classification.\(^ {120} \) In 1988 in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, the Court held that disparate impact analysis applies to subjective employment practices.\(^ {121} \) Then, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio in 1989, the Court radically changed the disparate impact analysis, making business necessity easier to satisfy and placing the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff.\(^ {122} \) Congress took aim at Wards Cove in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and created a statutory version of the disparate impact proof structure that modified most of the Wards Cove version of the analysis, except the requirement of specific causation between the employment practice and the statistical disparity.\(^ {123} \) Unfortunately, the statutory version developed by Congress presumed that the terms it used, such as "business necessity," "job related," and "alternative employment practice" were adequately defined by pre-Wards Cove case law. They were not. The Court held in Smith v. City of Jackson\(^ {124} \) in 2005 that the disparate impact analysis, although not the one created by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, is applicable under the ADEA. The Court continued to clarify the differences between the ADEA and Title VII analyses in 2008 in Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory.\(^ {125} \)

III. LEGISLATIVELY FIXING THE PROOF STRUCTURES

A. LEGISLATE LIKE IT'S 1991

The proof structures, even the ones retrofitted in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, are fraught with problems, enigmas, and conundrums.\(^ {126} \) These frameworks are used by attorneys and judges to analyze all employment discrimination cases, and they are used by courts to rule on dispositive motions and to instruct juries. Thus, employment discrimination law is

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126. See supra Part I.B.
badly broken and in desperate need of repair.\footnote{127}

Congress must answer the call and repair the law by repairing the proof structures.\footnote{128} Why Congress rather than the Supreme Court? First, obviously Congress is better able to repair all the problems in one piece of legislation, whereas the Court would have to find cases presenting the issues and grant certiorari in a number of cases to fix them all. The problems are numerous enough and fundamental enough that they should be repaired in one fell swoop. While one may argue that problems can be resolved by the courts by permitting time for experimentation, this repair work is long overdue. Second, not only is the Court unable to deal with all of the problems in a short period of time, it has not demonstrated a willingness to fix the problems it could have fixed over long periods of time. The Court has not clarified the effect of Desert Palace on the disparate treatment proof structures since 2003, although there have been petitions for certiorari in cases raising the issue.\footnote{129} The Court has not decided a disparate impact case under Title VII since the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted. Finally, Congress demonstrated in the 1991 Act that it can identify specific problems (created by specific Supreme Court decisions) and fix them in a single piece of legislation. Congress recently acted to repair employment discrimination law with the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008.\footnote{130} One may respond that the political wrangling surrounding the failed Civil Rights Act of 1990 and the successful 1991 Act demonstrates a weakness of Congress that led to

\footnote{127. The lamentations regarding the state of the proof structures are numerous. For a recent article bemoaning the disparate treatment mess and surveying earlier critiques, see Prenkert, supra note 26, at 512.}

\footnote{128. In a recent article, Professor Martin Katz provided a way that the lower courts could fix the disparate treatment "quagmire." See Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment (Really), 59 Hastings L.J. 643, 659-81 (2008). Professor Katz stated, however, that a legislative solution was preferable. Id. at 659. I argue that legislative action is necessary to repair the broken proof structures of both disparate treatment and disparate impact. This is a big project that requires Congress to survey the big picture of employment discrimination law and choose how to fix it. Furthermore, when considering disparate treatment alone, Congress needs to make some decisions about the appropriate repair. I am not sure that the existing statutory proof structure (the motivating factor and same-decision defense analysis added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991) should be applied to all cases without some changes being made, which is what Professor Katz proposes courts should do.}

\footnote{129. See supra note 29.}

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some of the current problems. While that is true, the 1991 Act is still impressive for its recognition of fundamental problems with the proof structures revealed by the existing case law and its attempt to address them by drawing on the available case law. Thus, it is time for Congress to fix employment discrimination law as it did in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. As in 1991, the fix will not resolve all issues well, but Congress has the superior competence to fix numerous problems identified by and developed in the case law.

Before suggesting the specific changes that I think Congress should make, I offer a few observations regarding the limited scope of what this Article proposes. First, this is more about mechanics than theory, and a repair rather than building something new. Much academic scholarship focuses on theory to explain the failures and deficiencies of current employment discrimination law, and some go on to use theory to recommend reconceptualizations of the law. While those endeavors are important and worthwhile, rather than building something new, I will limit the changes to fixing problems with current parts. A related point is that the repairs I recommend, like the approach Congress took in 1991, will use available parts and not anything that must be custom ordered. The changes that I recommend do not effect a reconceptualization or reinvention of employment discrimination law; instead, they are directed at the more modest goal, for example, of selecting from among the causation standards that have been used by the courts the best one in view of the state of the law and society. These repairs will make employment discrimination law more certain, predictable, and functional.

In reworking the familiar law, however, Congress should draft carefully, recognizing that courts and lawyers in general do not like changes.

131. See supra note 7 for a discussion regarding the veto of the 1990 Act and passage and signing of the 1991 Act. Several of the problems with the proof structures can be traced to the Civil Rights Act of 1991. For example, the Supreme Court in Desert Palace eradicated the line dividing cases analyzed under pretext and those analyzed under mixed motives based on its interpretation of the 1991 Act—to be precise, what the Civil Rights Act did not say (that direct evidence is required for a case to come under mixed motives). Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003). The debate over whether changes wrought in the disparate treatment and impact proof structures by the 1991 Act apply to the ADEA stems from the fact that the Act was silent on that issue. The uncertainty of the courts over the proper standard for business necessity and job relatedness goes to the tortuous and ineffective draftsmanship in the 1991 Act after political wrangling on that issue.

132. Professor Prentkert has argued that Congressional action is needed to repair the mess of disparate treatment law. See Prentkert, supra note 26, at 560-61. Among the reasons Professor Prentkert cites are the following: (1) Congress needs to clarify by statute the standard of causation required for employment discrimination, thus producing uniformity among the employment discrimination statutes; (2) Congress has demonstrated its competence to fix courts' interpretations with which it disagrees; (3) courts have demonstrated that they "are not up to the task"; and (4) there is a "growing concern about some of the Supreme Court's recent interpretations of the civil rights statutes." Id. at 562-63.


They are conservative by nature, and they cling to that with which they are familiar. That conservatism can result in lawyers and judges interpreting the new law as more or less preserving the old law. For example, I thought that Desert Palace made it clear (though implicitly) that the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis could not be maintained as it had before that decision. I also predicted, however, that courts and lawyers would tenaciously hold on to the analysis that had become common and comfortable in its thirty-plus years of existence. Thus, Congress should be clear about changes that it is making to existing law. On the other hand, the conservatism of judges and lawyers also can work to rectify shortcomings in the legislation. For example, the proof structure for disparate impact in the 1991 Act does not clearly set forth the three-part analysis that Congress probably intended and that courts have interpreted it as codifying. However, because Congress used terms and concepts developed in the existing case law, courts have resorted to the prior case law in interpreting the legislation. This limited repair job, using the existing parts of employment discrimination law, will not give us a new Rolls Royce employment discrimination law, but we should be satisfied at this stage in the development of the law with a smooth-running version of the Chevy or Ford we took in to the shop. We won’t be as worried about what happens to it when we take it out and drive it around every day.

And now, we begin the repair job.

B. FIXING DISPARATE TREATMENT

Because most employment discrimination cases are individual disparate treatment cases and the mystery of what proof structure applies was raised by a Supreme Court opinion, this is the most important and most needed repair. As a starting point, Congress codified the mixed-motives proof structure with a “motivating factor” standard and a same-decision limitation on remedies in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The Supreme Court in Desert Palace read this amendment as not limiting the “motivating factor” standard to cases involving direct evidence. With the dividing line between cases analyzed under mixed motives and those analyzed under pretext erased, someone needs to say whether both proof structures continue to exist, and if they do, what is the new dividing line. In the aftermath of Desert Palace, Congress could do any of the following: 1) preserve the two proof structures and either overturn Desert Palace by reinstalling the prior direct evidence-circumstantial evidence dividing line or creating a new one; 2) merge the two analyses into one new one along the lines of what the Fifth Circuit did in Rachid v. Jack in the Box; or 3)

137. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
139. 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004); see supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
abrogate the pretext analysis by expressly making a single statutory proof structure applicable to all individual disparate treatment cases, and consider any modifications of the current mixed-motives statutory structure (the one created by the Civil Rights Act of 1991) that seem advisable in light of the abrogation of the pretext analysis and adoption of a single standard.

I urge that Congress choose the third option: dispensing with the pretext analysis and making the statutory mixed-motives analysis applicable to all disparate treatment cases. I suggest some modifications of the current statutory version of mixed motives, but I would retain the basic two-step framework. Because the mixed-motives analysis has been used by courts since the earlier version was articulated by the Supreme Court in 1989 in *Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins*, courts have experience with the analysis and should not require much guidance.

Because my proposed fix of the disparate treatment proof structures is not the choice of courts today, I first discuss why the other options should be rejected by Congress. Then I turn to my proposal.

### 1. Congress Should Not Change the Result of Desert Palace

Option 1 should not be chosen. Although the holding of *Desert Palace*, that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not require direct evidence to invoke the mixed-motives proof structure, is not the only possible interpretation of the 1991 amendment, *Desert Palace* on balance did a good thing. It does not appear that Congress had any notion of abrogating the *McDonnell Douglas* pretext analysis or erasing the well-known dividing line between pretext cases and mixed-motives cases with the 1991 amendments. Instead, the codification of mixed motives was directed at fixing the proof structure articulated by the Supreme Court in *Price Waterhouse*. However, I do not think that Congress should choose option 1 above, overturning *Desert Palace* or preserving the pretext analysis. Regardless of whether one likes the *McDonnell Douglas* pretext or mixed-motives proof structure better, the two proof structures were divided by a chimerical line that no one really understood or applied effectively. As the Ninth Circuit explained in its en banc opinion in *Desert Palace*, there were several approaches applied by the various circuits to defining the direct-circumstantial dividing line. The suggestion of a new dividing line, such as single-motive and mixed-motives cases, is not any more helpful because all cases present themselves as potential mixed-motives cases when the employer introduces evidence of its legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. Thus, *Desert Palace* actually did a good thing by erasing an ineffective and artificial dividing line, even if it misinterpreted what Congress intended to do in the 1991 Act.

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140. *See*, e.g., *Chambers*, *supra* note 27, at 92-93.
141. *See* *Zimmer*, *supra* note 99, at 1912-13
142. 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002), aff'd, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
2. Congress Should Not Codify a Proof Structure That Merges Pretext and Mixed Motives

How about option 2—codifying the Rachid solution of merging proof structures? Congress should consider this as an option, but ultimately, I recommend rejecting it. There are reasons to choose this option. The first thing that favors it is that it would preserve the pretext analysis that the courts love and to which they desperately are clinging. This is no small reason to preserve it. Courts have a rich body of case law and experience with it. Second, if plaintiffs have the option of going the pretext route at stage three rather than motivating factor, they may avoid the introduction of the same-decision defense and the limitation of remedies if that defense is successful. However, that poses the additional problem of what a plaintiff must do to preclude the same-decision defense in a given case and how the court makes the decision about the applicability of the same-decision defense; the issue of the dividing line reemerges.

The merged analysis and the preservation of the pretext analysis share several negatives. First, the pretext analysis is more difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy than the motivating factor standard of the mixed-motives proof structure. Although there is a debate about what level of causation the pretext analysis entails, it should suffice to say that it has been the understanding since Price Waterhouse that the mixed-motives proof structure was intended to give plaintiffs who could avail themselves of it an advantage over plaintiffs proceeding under pretext, at least at the prima facie case stage, and plaintiffs have sought the mixed-motives analysis, believing it to be favorable. If you tell a plaintiff that she can prevail by proving either motivating factor or pretext, you may as well dispense with pretext.

145. Professor Martin Katz has argued that no choice is required. See Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 167-68 (2007). He argues that the pretext analysis is no longer mandatory, but plaintiffs can use it as a way to prove motivating factor. No doubt he is correct that plaintiffs can introduce evidence of pretext to prove discrimination. However, retaining the proof structure, which has shifting burdens of production and case law regarding the meaning of each stage, is a mistake. Professor Katz argues for retention of a nonmandatory McDonnell Douglas. I think a nonmandatory McDonnell Douglas is a way of saying the pretext evidence is relevant to the motivating factor standard of causation (which is certainly true), and we can keep the proof structure without requiring plaintiffs to use it (which is problematic and destined to preserve confusion). My response to Professor Katz is that plaintiffs do not need the pretext proof structure preserved in order to render evidence of pretext relevant to discrimination under a motivating factor (or other causation) standard.
146. Although the pretext analysis has been understood as incorporating a but-for standard of causation, Professor Katz has argued that the pretext analysis actually incorporates a motivating factor standard of causation. See Katz, supra note 145, at 136-38. He does concede, however, that a “strong version” of the pretext analysis proves but-for causation. Id. at 139.
147. In Desert Palace v. Costa, for example, the issue that got the case to the Supreme Court was the plaintiff’s argument that she was entitled to a mixed-motives jury instruction, notwithstanding the lack of direct evidence.
148. Professor Katz argues that this is wrong because, when pretext is properly understood and used, a plaintiff is not required to choose pretext or mixed motives. See Katz,
Second, the McDonnell Douglas analysis, notwithstanding its long service, has significant problems. The prima facie case is the biggest problem. It was established and has remained low and easy to satisfy and consequently is not predictive of whether a plaintiff has a case on which she is likely to prevail at trial or even survive summary judgment. All one has to prove essentially is that there is a job and the plaintiff is basically qualified for it. The Supreme Court considered raising the requirements for the prima facie case and perhaps attempted to do so in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, but failed to do so. The easily satisfied prima facie case seems to be the reason that many courts have imposed an additional background circumstances requirement in reverse discrimination cases; the light prima facie case does not support an inference of prohibited discrimination against a plaintiff who is not a member of a group against which there has been a history of discrimination.

A federal court of appeals recently expressed the futility of and frustration caused by the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case:

Much ink has been spilled regarding the proper contours of the prima-facie-case aspect of McDonnell Douglas. But as we read the Supreme Court precedents . . . the prima facie case is a largely unnecessary sideshow. It has not benefited employees or employers; nor has it simplified or expedited court proceedings. In fact, it has done exactly the opposite, spawning enormous confusion and wasting litigant and judicial resources.

A rejoinder to the futility of the prima facie case is that it forces an employer, which generally may fire employees at will, to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action, thus giving the plaintiff a "target." The short answer to this is that, regardless of employment at will, almost every employer that is sued for discrimination offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, and this would be true without stages one and two of the pretext proof structure.

\[supra\] note 145, at 166. Professor Katz and I actually do not disagree on this because he says that those who argue that a mandatory McDonnell Douglas is dead are correct. Id. at 167. My point is that leaving McDonnell Douglas as a viable proof structure makes it more meaningful and influential procedurally than it should be; that is, courts accustomed to a mandatory version of McDonnell Douglas will continue to apply it that way.


152. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 53, at 1061-65.

153. Brady v. Office of the Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008). But see Hinds v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 523 F.3d 1187, 1201-02 & n.12 (10th Cir. 2008) (asserting that the court reserves the right to undertake each step in the analysis and that it "has not infrequently dismissed such claims for failure to establish a prima facie case of retaliation").

154. See Katz, supra note 145, at 183.
While part two of the pretext analysis, legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, has not been very problematic, the long-running debate about part three demonstrates another problem with the analysis. The pretext-only/pretext-plus debate was waged in law review articles and Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme Court eventually in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. left us with no categorical answer; that is, the Court said that evidence of pretext ordinarily would be enough to survive summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, but not necessarily always. One may think that we can live with the Reeves interpretation of the third stage, but problems remain with the meaning and effect of pretext. For example, in what types of cases is pretext evidence not sufficient to get a case to the fact finder?

In the end, Congress should reject a merged proof structure or the preservation of pretext as a proof structure because 1) the two proof structures have a history of operating as two different analyses and cannot be blended effectively; and 2) there are enough problems with the pretext analysis that it should not be retained.

3. Congress Should Adopt One Statutory Proof Structure Applicable to All Disparate Treatment Cases

The issue all along has been what a plaintiff must do to prove that employment discrimination occurred because of race, sex, etc. The Supreme Court and lower courts have addressed this issue in terms of standards of causation. Congress installed a statutory standard in the 1991 Act—"motivating factor." The second stage of the analysis provides that employers may avail themselves of the same-decision defense, which if the defendant is successful will limit remedies, eliminating all monetary remedies to the plaintiff. If Congress were to follow my recommendations and eliminate the pretext proof structure and choose to establish one statutory proof structure for all disparate treatment cases, the current statutory mixed-motives structure seems to be a good starting point. Because it is itself a modification of the Price Waterhouse mixed-motives analysis, courts have experience applying it. But before recommending that Congress simply amend the statute to say the current statutory mixed-motives analysis applies to all intentional discrimination cases, it is worth asking whether changes should be made in light of the fact that the pretext proof structure will be gone. In the 1991 Act, Congress clearly indicated the way in which it wished to modify the Price Waterhouse mixed-motives analysis. However, if Congress also had thought it were abolishing the pretext analysis and replacing it with a unified analysis, it


157. See id. at 154 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (speculating that the Court may have to provide guidance on this issue in a future opinion).
might have done things differently. Thus, Congress should consider modifications to the current statutory proof structure.

a. Congress Should Consider the Standard of Causation in the Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case but Ultimately Retain Motivating Factor

When Congress passed the 1991 Act it chose "motivating factor" as the standard of causation from the Price Waterhouse plurality opinion rather than "substantial factor" from Justice O'Connor's Price Waterhouse concurrence. Should the express abrogation of pretext and adoption of a unified proof structure call for the adoption of a different and more demanding standard of causation, such as substantial factor? That is a policy question for Congress, but I think the best answer is for Congress to retain "motivating factor" for at least two reasons. First, Congress should not amend the employment discrimination statutes to make it harder for plaintiffs to recover. The data indicates that employment discrimination cases are harder for plaintiffs to win than most other civil litigation.\(^{158}\) Second, the second stage of the statutory mixed-motives proof structure, the same-decision defense, incorporates a but-for causation standard (with the burden on the defendant) for the purpose of limiting remedies.\(^{159}\) Thus, the current analysis has a lenient causation standard at the first stage and a more stringent standard at the second stage. These causation standards should be maintained.

b. Congress Should Change the Effect of the Same-Decision Defense

Under Price Waterhouse, the same-decision defense at stage two was a complete defense to liability. In the 1991 Act, Congress changed that and made it more favorable to plaintiffs by making same decision a limitation on remedies rather than a complete defense. However, the limitation on remedies is substantial, leaving the plaintiff without any money (except possibly attorneys' fees) if the defendant prevails on same decision. When the mixed-motives proof structure was applicable to only a subset of disparate treatment cases, that significant limitation was perhaps not so troublesome, and after all, Congress had modified it from a complete defense. As the next step in the evolution of proof structures, as Congress makes mixed motives the only proof structure applicable in disparate treatment cases, Congress should again alter the same-decision defense. What should be the effect when a plaintiff proves that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor and the defendant proves that the charac-

\(^{158}\) See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001). One may argue that the loss rate for plaintiffs is attributable to an abundance of frivolous lawsuits and the decline of the occurrence of employment discrimination on invidious bases in the modern workplace, but that argument seems unfounded. See, e.g., Zimmer, supra note 99, at 1943-45.

\(^{159}\) Katz, supra note 128, at 658.
teristic was not a but-for cause? Congress could reduce the remedy limitation, making it possible for a plaintiff to recover a monetary remedy.

I recommend one of two possibilities: 1) the same-decision defense cuts off compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief of reinstatement (instatement, promotion, etc.) and front pay, but not backpay; or 2) the same-decision defense cuts off punitive damages and injunctive relief such as reinstatement, but not backpay and compensatory damages. I favor the second of these options because the remedy for disparate treatment should provide relief for lost wages and compensation for emotional distress injuries that makes the plaintiff whole. This is the result that seems most consistent with the 1991 Act's enhancing of the remedies available under Title VII and the ADA by providing for damages (subject to a cap). Yet another possibility for modifying the same-decision defense may stem from legislation that already has been introduced in Congress. The proposed Civil Rights Act of 2008\(^{160}\) would remove the damage caps created by the 1991 Act.\(^{161}\) If that were to become the law generally, Congress could modify the same-decision defense to provide that when the defendant satisfies it, the cap on compensatory and punitive damages would become applicable.\(^{162}\)

c. Congress Should Adopt the Modified Mixed-Motives Structure for All Cases (and Not Modify it for Reverse Discrimination Cases)

The issue of whether and how to modify the proof structure in disparate treatment reverse discrimination cases is important and contentious. As discussed above, courts and others on both sides of this issue can become passionate.\(^{163}\) Indeed, this is an issue on which employment discrimination law can look very unfair to the general public. Fortunately, by adopting a single proof structure based on the current mixed-motives analysis, this problem can be obviated. Courts have adopted the background circumstances requirement in large part because of the very easily satisfied prima facie case of the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis. The motivating factor standard (or substantial factor, if Congress so chooses) seems an adequate standard for all discrimination cases, traditional or reverse, with no need for background circumstances. Although background circumstances perhaps could be required under a motivating fac-


161. The caps are based on number of employees of the employer, and they apply to disability claims and Title VII claims seeking jury trials and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000). Race discrimination cases brought pursuant to Section 1981 are not subject to the caps.

162. Because the caps of § 1981a are not applicable to race discrimination claims seeking damages under § 1981, this approach would require deciding whether to make race claims in which the defendant prevailed on the same-decision defense subject to the caps.

163. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
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tor standard, there is no case law on this issue. Moreover, it is the specificity of the elements of the pretext structure that suggests the need for and accommodates the addition of background circumstances as an additional element. It is the nonspecificity of a "motivating factor" standard that invites introduction of all relevant evidence but accommodates no additional elements.164

d. Congress Should Provide that the New Codified Proof Structure Applies to Disparate Treatment Claims Under All the Federal Employment Discrimination Laws

The idea that a Price Waterhouse version of the mixed-motives analysis applies to age discrimination claims under the ADEA is based on the fact that Congress in the 1991 Act did not amend the ADEA.165 This fact has not prevented some courts from applying a uniform mixed-motives analysis to Title VII and ADEA disparate treatment cases.166 Congress should resolve this issue by expressly providing that the one new proof structure applies to disparate treatment claims under Title VII, Section 1981, the ADEA, and the ADA. I can think of no good reason why intentional discrimination cases should be analyzed differently under these statutes.167 Although the disparate impact analysis is a bit different under Title VII and the ADEA,168 that is because the ADEA expressly provides for a different defense: "reasonable factors other than age" rather than business necessity/job relatedness. There is no reason in statutory language or policy that supports adopting a different proof structure for intentional discrimination cases.

The Fifth Circuit addressed this issue in Rachid v. Jack in the Box169 when it applied its modified McDonnell Douglas analysis to an age case, reasoning that any changes wrought by Desert Palace v. Costa were intended by the Court to apply equally to the ADEA. The similarity in language and purpose among the discrimination statutes should provide Congress adequate reason to make one proof structure applicable to all.170 If more reason is needed, simplicity and economy should be considered desirable bonuses. Employment discrimination law is complicated enough.

164. The Third Circuit recently held that a plaintiff in a mixed-motives case must prove that he has the basic qualifications for the job. See Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2008). While recognizing the relevance of that evidence to the claim, the court stated that it did not need to decide whether a mixed-motives plaintiff must prove each of the elements of a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case.
165. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 128, at 666-80.
166. See, e.g., Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004).
167. See Prenkert, supra note 26, passim.
169. 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004).
170. Professor Katz argues that a single mixed-motives analysis is supported by the following: the fact that the Supreme Court defined the causation standard in Price Waterhouse; that Congress reformed that causation standard in the Civil Rights Act of 1991; and the assumption of uniformity among the statutes. See Katz, supra note 128, at 669-70.
C. Fixing Disparate Impact

The Supreme Court has described disparate treatment as the most easily understood type of discrimination. This suggests that disparate impact is not as easily understood. Nor is it as easily fixed. Controversial from its origins, it has remained so, even after codification by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. It has been suggested recently that development of disparate impact may have been a mistake that stunted the development of a more robust disparate treatment theory. While it is interesting to ponder whether disparate impact should have been recognized and query how effective it is today, my task is repairing the proof structure, not abrogating the theory. First, even if we concluded that disparate impact either has too many problems or is not sufficiently effective in practice to justify repairs, one can only imagine the political firestorm that would be generated by a proposal to legislatively abolish disparate impact. Although firestorms are sometimes needed, the damage wrought by this one would be too great. Generally, it would be seen as retrenchment in U.S. employment discrimination law, and that is too large a price to pay. Moreover, it is worth noting that many other nations and international organizations recognize the disparate impact theory of discrimination, and “[t]he international marketplace of legal ideas provides a means of testing the value of a concept.”

One more matter before moving to repairing the three parts of the disparate impact proof structure: Should Congress provide that disparate impact is not applicable in cases of reverse discrimination? It is tempting to recommend this because the theory was explained by the Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. as knocking down artificial barriers intended to keep out those against whom discrimination has been practiced historically. On balance, however, Congress should resist the temptation to limit the applicability of disparate impact to traditional discrimination cases. First, disparate impact is controversial enough as it is, raising concerns about affirmative action and quotas. One of the most divisive things that can be done is to flaunt the fact that employment discrimination law is not always status blind or “color blind.” Although that clearly is true, it is an unpopular idea with some. Thus, limiting disparate im-

173. 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 88, at 1506 (“[T]here was at least something odd about using disparate impact to remove barriers to the employment of, say, whites.”).
174. See Sullivan, supra note 88, at 1506 (describing “resistance to an unbalanced application of the theory [as] reflect[ing] the increasingly reflexive colorblindness in our law and society, manifested by much of the present aversion to affirmative action”).
pact to traditional discrimination claims likely would harm the "moral authority" of employment discrimination law in the view of the public. Second, because it is so divisive, the restriction of disparate impact to traditional discrimination claims is not politically feasible. Congress should not do it because it is too controversial to pass, and merely raising it could jeopardize other needed repairs discussed herein. Third, there is the concern, at least, that such a restriction would be unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{175} At a minimum, the limiting of disparate impact to traditional discrimination cases would be constitutionally challenged. Whether it withstood the challenge, the public debate on this controversial and misunderstood issue would impugn employment discrimination law.

1. \textit{Harmonizing Title VII and ADEA Differences}

An initial matter to note here is to specify differences that may exist in the Title VII and the ADEA versions of disparate impact, whether statutory or case law developed differences. There may be a difference in the prima facie cases of the Title VII version and the ADEA version, and there is a statutory distinction in the defenses.

If the prima facie cases are different, it is a difference developed in the case law. When the Supreme Court recognized the applicability of disparate impact to age discrimination in \textit{Smith v. City of Jackson}, the Court stated that, because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not amend the ADEA, it is the pre-1991 \textit{Wards Cove} version of disparate impact that applies under the ADEA.\textsuperscript{176} What that meant was not at all clear. The Court revisited that statement in its decision in \textit{Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory}, in which the Court explained the \textit{Smith} statement as relating to "a plaintiff-employee's burden of identifying which particular practices allegedly cause an observed disparate impact."\textsuperscript{177} Curiously, although the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII to overturn some parts of \textit{Wards Cove},\textsuperscript{178} the Act seems to preserve the requirement that a plaintiff identify a specific employment practice.\textsuperscript{179} Thus, the meaning of the reference to the \textit{Wards Cove} version of disparate impact in \textit{Smith v. City of Jackson} was not effectively clarified in \textit{Meacham}. The Court also explained in \textit{Meacham} that the statement about \textit{Wards Cove} may have referred to the fact that disparate impact under the ADEA is narrower than under Title VII.\textsuperscript{180} As the Court points out in \textit{Smith}, however, ADEA disparate impact theory is rendered

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{175} \textit{Id. passim.}
  \item \textsuperscript{176} 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005).
  \item \textsuperscript{177} 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2404 (2008).
  \item \textsuperscript{178} I say "parts" rather than holdings because the parts of \textit{Wards Cove} regarding the defense of business necessity and job relatedness overturned by the 1991 Act appear to be dicta.
  \item \textsuperscript{179} "An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under this subchapter only if—(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
  \item \textsuperscript{180} \textit{Meacham}, 128 S. Ct. at 2404.
\end{itemize}
narrower by the Court's interpretation of the reasonable-factors-other-than-age defense as being less onerous for defendants to satisfy than the business necessity/job relatedness defense of Title VII. Ultimately, I see no reason for Congress to differentiate between the prima facie case for disparate impact under the ADEA and Title VII. If Congress agrees with the Supreme Court's statements in Smith and Meacham that disparate impact is meant to be narrower under the ADEA than under Title VII, that result can be maintained by leaving in place the Court's statements regarding the comparative stringency of the defenses.

The other difference between disparate impact under Title VII and the ADEA is the defense. Under Title VII, it is business necessity/job relatedness, and under the ADEA it is reasonable factors other than age (RFOA). This is established in the express language of the statutes. The Supreme Court pointed out this difference in Smith v. City of Jackson and Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory in explaining that plaintiffs will have more difficulty prevailing on disparate impact under the ADEA than under Title VII. If Congress wishes to change this result, it could amend the ADEA to replace the RFOA defense with the same revamped business necessity defense that I describe below for Title VII. However, if Congress agrees that it should be more difficult to win disparate impact claims under the ADEA, it should leave the RFOA defense as is. My guess is that there would be political pressure to harmonize the proof structures, both because there are powerful lobbying interests that support legislation protecting older persons, and because the reason for the distinction is not obvious. Simplicity and "nondiscrimination" favor a uniform proof structure. Thus, I recommend that Congress repeal the RFOA defense and replace it with the new business necessity defense that I recommend for Title VII. However, if Congress wishes to preserve the greater difficulty of winning ADEA disparate impact claims (compared with Title VII claims), then it should retain the RFOA defense.

2. Fixing the Three Parts of the Prima Facie Case

The three parts of the prima facie case fit together as follows: 1) particular employment practice 2) causes 3) a disparate impact. The first and last elements are problematic, but it seems to me that the last one is the one Congress needs to repair. As to the first element, Congress could change the requirement that the plaintiff identify a "particular" employment practice, but I think there are few good legislative solutions. What constitutes a sufficiently specific practice has been challenging in Title VII cases as well as in ADEA cases. For example, in EEOC v. Joe's

181. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240.
182. Id.
184. However, the Supreme Court has explained that age discrimination differs from some other types of discrimination covered by Title VII. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1993) (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 231 (1983)).
Stone Crab, Inc., a Title VII sex discrimination case, the majority and dissent disagreed about whether the employer's hiring procedure constituted a particular employment practice. In Smith v. City of Jackson, the Supreme Court, while recognizing the applicability of disparate impact to age discrimination, held that the city's pay plan designed to give larger raises to less senior police did not have a "specific test, requirement, or practice . . . that has an adverse impact on older workers." This uncertainty and caution regarding what constitutes a specific employment practice may be traceable to the Court's reluctant holding in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust that disparate impact applies to subjective practices as well as objective practices and criteria, and the holding in Wards Cove that plaintiffs must link a particular practice with the impact it causes and may not attack a bundle of practices.

I do not recommend that Congress do anything to modify the requirement that plaintiffs identify a particular employment practice. Congress could eliminate the requirement of identifying a particular practice and even repeal the exception, thus permitting plaintiffs to target a bundle of practices. However, Congress was not so inclined in 1991, even when overturning most of Wards Cove, and I doubt it will be now.

The part of the prima facie case that most needs clarification is the third part. In what group must disparate impact be established? The question raised by Livingston v. Roadway Express needs to be answered. Is a plaintiff required to prove an impact manifested in the employer's workforce? Or is it sufficient for a plaintiff to prove that a practice would produce a disparate impact in a group that could apply for and hold the job at issue—a hypothetical labor pool from the general population? The answer should be the latter under the reading of Connecticut v. Teal that I advocate, although Teal might be read more narrowly. I think Congress should add language to the proof structure to state that the practice must cause a disparate impact manifested in the actual workforce or in an alternative relevant labor pool. Congress could refer to Livingston and reject the holding of the case.

3. Fixing the Defense of Business Necessity/Job Relatedness

It is not obvious that a major repair is needed here as courts have worked fairly well with what they were given. However, Congress handled it so badly in the 1991 Act that the defense should be repaired. Rather than explaining the meaning of job relatedness and business necessity, Congress included a section in the Act that referred to an inter-
pretive memorandum for all standards referring to *Wards Cove*. That memorandum provides that “[t]he terms ‘business necessity’ and ‘job related’ are intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in *Griggs v. Duke Power Co.*, and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to *Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio*.191 With this statutory language, some have even argued that the 1991 Act did not change the *Wards Cove* version of the affirmative defense.192 Congress can and should provide more clarity than this.

The first problem with the business necessity/job relatedness defense is easily fixed. The job-related requirement should be dropped. Business necessity is the more rigorous standard, and usually it includes job relatedness. There may be some employment practices that satisfy business necessity, but not job relatedness. For example, a court may conclude that a nonfraternization or antinepotism policy is a business necessity, although such a policy may not be job related in a strict sense. Still, Congress should simplify this standard by deleting job relatedness. Most of the case law deals with the issue of business necessity, not job relatedness.

The second problem is the uncertainty of what business necessity means—how to define it. At one end of the spectrum is a rigorous (harder-to-satisfy) standard—a practice is a business necessity if it is or determines “minimum qualifications that are necessary to perform the job in question successfully.”193 At the other end is a less rigorous (more easily satisfied) standard such as the one articulated in *Wards Cove*—“serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer.”194 As judges and commentators have explained, there was no settled definition for the business necessity standard before *Wards Cove*.195 A dissenting judge in *Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transportation Authority* described the standard as variable, depending on the nature of the job, with employers benefiting from the more deferential standard particularly in jobs involving safety issues.196 Arguments can be made for any of the definitions of business necessity as well as for leaving the courts the flexibility to apply a sliding scale to different types of jobs. Although this problem is not a catastrophic failure, Congress should repair what it mishandled in 1991. I recommend that Congress adopt the stringent standard for business necessity. Although that standard may

not seem to give adequate deference to the judgment of employers in some types of jobs, which the sliding scale can accommodate, the recommendation that I make below, regarding alternative employment practices, should soften the blow and ameliorate that concern.

4. Fixing Alternative Employment Practice

It is difficult to conceptualize how a court meaningfully and sensibly can evaluate business necessity without taking into account the prospect of alternative practices. Particularly under a stringent standard of business necessity, how can one determine that a practice is necessary unless one considers possible alternative practices? For example, in *Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta*, after deciding that the clean-shaven policy was a business necessity for firefighters, the Eleventh Circuit gave short shrift to the plaintiff's argument that a shaving clinic, permitting shadow beards, was an alternative employment practice. The court explained that alternative employment practice necessarily was intertwined with business necessity: "As we have explained above in addressing the City's business necessity defense, the firefighters have failed to create a genuine issue that shadow beards are safe."198

Curiously, the unusual drafting of the provision codifying disparate impact in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not even seem to create a three-part proof structure: it provides that a defendant is liable if a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case unless a defendant "demonstrate(s)" business necessity and job related or the plaintiff proves alternative employment practice. Congress should amend Title VII to provide that alternative employment practices is not a separate step in the analysis but is instead a factor to be taken into account in evaluating business necessity. This amendment would be a change in the existing law.

There is more that Congress might do with alternative employment practice, but I do not recommend doing more. For example, it is understood that the alternative practice should be less discriminatory and still accomplish the employer's objective. This raises two salient issues: 1) How much less discriminatory must the alternative practice be?; and 2) How effective must the alternative be in accomplishing the employer's objective (i.e., must it be equally effective)? Although these are important issues under alternative employment practice, I think they are difficult to address in legislation and should be left to courts to work out.

IV. CONCLUSION

The proof structures of disparate treatment (pretext and mixed motives) and disparate impact form the engine of employment discrimination law. They are used to draft pleadings, to conduct discovery, to move

197. 2 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 1993).
198. Id. at 1122.
for summary judgment, to organize evidence for presentation at trial, to move for judgment as a matter of law, and to craft jury instructions. Although these analyses are primarily about evidence and procedure, they have become the focal point of discrimination law and have shaped how we think about the substance of discrimination “because of” protected characteristics. Over the life of employment discrimination law, the proof structures have evolved and been modified by the Supreme Court, the lower courts, and Congress. Congress last intervened to fix the proof structures when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Since that time, many issues have developed that have left the proof structures sputtering. It is now so bad that judges do not know how to analyze motions for summary judgment or properly instruct juries. It is time for Congress to step in again and fix employment discrimination law. No repair could be more important than a thorough checking and servicing of the proof structures. With that repair, employment discrimination law will be good for many more miles. While considering a number of changes to employment discrimination law, Congress should focus on job number one—fixing the engine.