Bankruptcy Discharge of Texas Marital Property Awards under Section 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code: Rethinking In Re Nunnally

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COMMENTS

BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE OF TEXAS MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDS UNDER SECTION 523(a)(5) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE:
RETHINKING IN RE NUNNALLY

by Blake L. Berryman

SECTION 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code states that a debtor's discharge in bankruptcy will not affect the debtor's liability on debts for alimony, maintenance, or support of a former spouse. In this way Congress has sought to balance the competing policies of ensuring that the debtor's family, often completely dependent upon the debtor for its support, is not left destitute by the debtor's bankruptcy, and of seeing that the debtor receives a financial fresh start on life. This Comment discusses how courts

3. Section 523(a) provides:
   A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt—
   (5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent that—
   (A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise (other than debts assigned pursuant to section 402(a)(26) of the Social Security Act, or any such debt which has been assigned to the Federal Government or to a State or any political subdivision of such State); or
   (B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support . . . .
4. Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1106 (6th Cir. 1983); Brock v. Barlow (In re Brock), 58 Bankr. 797, 806 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986); B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL ¶ 3.09[5], at 3-45 (rev. ed. 1986); Recent Developments—Section 523(a)(5): The Exception From Discharge of Alimony, Maintenance and Support Obligations, 4 BANKR. DEV. J. 109,109 (1987). The notion of the fresh start has long provided the guiding theme of bankruptcy law. The goal is often stated as "giv[ing] to the

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decide whether or not a given property award is dischargeable in bankruptcy under section 523(a)(5), and how they should decide. Primary attention falls on the decisions of the Fifth Circuit and of the bankruptcy courts within it, as they apply section 523(a)(5) to the divisions and obligations that Texas matrimonial property law allows divorce courts to order. This Comment first briefly summarizes the marital property law of Texas. Focusing on the leading Fifth Circuit case on the subject, In re Nunnally,⁵ the Comment examines the history and current status of the alimony exception to discharge in bankruptcy. The Comment then investigates the Sixth Circuit's innovative approach to the problem in In re Calhoun. ⁶ Finally, the Comment concludes by urging the Fifth Circuit to replace Nunnally with a modified Calhoun-type approach that one bankruptcy court in Texas has already endorsed.⁷

I. TEXAS MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDS ON DIVORCE

Texas law divides all property that either or both spouses own into three categories: the husband's separate property, the wife's separate property, and the spouses' community property.⁸ A spouse's separate property includes any property that the spouse owned before marriage, any property acquired during marriage by gift or inheritance, and any recovery for personal injury to the spouse during marriage except recovery that represents the spouse's diminished earning power during marriage.⁹ Community property consists of all other property that either spouse acquires during marriage.¹⁰

The Texas Family Code authorizes a court in a divorce proceeding to make an equitable division of the spouses' property.¹¹ The Code does not

honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.” Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); see Jackson, The Fresh Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1393, 1393 (1985).

The question arises, however, as to what role the bankruptcy courts are to play in the balancing of polices. See infra notes 197-199 and accompanying text.

5. 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975).
6. 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983).
9. Id.; Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 5.01(a) (Vernon 1975). In addition, separate property includes property that is traceable to previously held separate property. See McKinley v. McKinley, 496 S.W.2d 540, 543 (Tex. 1973); Love v. Robertson, 7 Tex. 6, 10-11 (1851); Snider v. Snider, 613 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1981, no writ). For a fuller discussion of the tracing principle, see J. McKnight & W. Reppy, Texas Matrimonial Property Law 38-47 (1983).
11. Id. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1987) provides:
(a) In a decree of divorce or annulment the court shall order a division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage.
(b) In a decree of divorce or annulment the court shall also order a division of the following real and personal property, wherever situated, in a manner that
require that a court divide the property equally between the spouses. In dividing the marital property between the spouses, the court is to weigh the equities of the parties, including fault in the breakup of the marriage and each spouse’s probable ability to meet future needs. Without a showing of some abuse of discretion an appellate court will not disturb a divorce court’s division of property. Texas divorce courts possess a broad range of options in allocating property between the spouses. The court need not actually divide each form of property into two parts; it can award one kind of property to one spouse and another kind to the other. The court can order property sold and the proceeds divided. It can award an indivisible type of property to one spouse and a money judgment to the other, securing payment of the judgment with a lien on the property given to one spouse. One important limitation on the court’s power to divide marital property, however, is that only community property is subject to division; each spouse keeps his or her own separate property.

Texas is the only state in the Union that does not allow permanent, court-ordered alimony. The two adjectives modifying “alimony” in the preceding sentence are important: Texas law permits a court to order temporary support payments to either spouse, and will enforce a contractual obligation to pay alimony. The Texas Supreme Court has declared that ordering

the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage:

1. property that was acquired by either spouse while domiciled elsewhere and that would have been community property if the spouse who acquired the property had been domiciled in this state at the time of the acquisition; or

2. property that was acquired by either spouse in exchange for real or personal property, and that would have been community property if the spouse who acquired the property so exchanged had been domiciled in this state at the time of its acquisition.


[T]he trial court may consider such factors as the spouses’ capacities and abilities, benefits which the party not at fault would have derived from continuation of the marriage, business opportunities, education, relative physical conditions, relative financial condition and obligations, disparity of ages, size of separate estates, and the nature of the property.

14. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 698; McKnight, supra note 13, at 435.

15. McKnight & Reppy, supra note 9, at 272.

16. Id.

17. Id.

18. Pedemeyer v. Pedemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 139-40 (Tex. 1977) (holding that separate property is not subject to division); Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 219-20 (Tex. 1982) (extending Pedemeyer to include separate personality).

19. Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 218 n.7 (Tex. 1982); McKnight, supra note 13, at 422.

20. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.59 (Vernon Supp. 1987). These payments must end, however, upon rendition of the final divorce decree. Id.

21. McKnight, supra note 13, at 422. The contractual support obligation becomes part of the divorce decree by virtue of § 3.631 of the Family Code, provided the court finds the agreement to be “just and right.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.631(b) (Vernon Supp. 1987). The Texas Supreme Court has defined the term “alimony,” for purposes of the proscription against
post-divorce alimony is contrary to the statutes and public policy of the State of Texas. On the other hand, a mere money judgment in favor of one former spouse is not necessarily void as an award of alimony. Such a judgment is valid if it is traceable to property that the obligor spouse holds at the end of the marriage.

II. THE ALIMONY EXCEPTION TO DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY

A. Historically

At common law and in the bankruptcy statutes the debtor's obligation to provide financial support for a spouse and children has always escaped the effect of discharge in bankruptcy. As one commentator has indicated, the courts have viewed family support less as a debt and more of a moral duty that should survive beyond the debtor's discharge. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 in its original form made no express reference to spouse and child support as excepted from discharge. In 1901, however, the United States Supreme Court held in Audubon v. Shufeldt that debts for alimony were not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Two years later, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act to exclude alimony and child support from the effect of discharge.


[T]he trial court may require one party to make monetary payments to the other after a divorce, so long as a division was referable to the rights and equities of the parties in and to the properties at the time of the dissolution of the marriage. In such a case, the courts have held that the division is not an allowance of permanent alimony in violation of the established public policy.

27. 181 U.S. 575 (1901).
28. Id. at 578. The Court reasoned that alimony was not a debt in the ordinary sense of the word:

Alimony does not arise from any business transaction, but from the relation of marriage. It is not founded on contract, express or implied, but on the natural and legal duty of the husband to support the wife. . . . Permanent alimony is regarded rather as a portion of the husband's estate to which the wife is equitably entitled, than as strictly a debt . . . .

Id. at 577-78.
29. Act of February 5, 1903, ch. 487, 32 Stat. 797, 798. Section 17(a) of the amended act provided: "A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except such as . . . (2) are . . . for alimony due or to become due, or for maintenance or support of wife or child . . . ." Id.
B. Under the Bankruptcy Code

Congress completely revamped the bankruptcy laws with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.30 This alteration occurred largely to accommodate changes in the commercial environment, including the widespread adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code and the explosion of consumer credit.31 Congress retained the alimony exception to discharge in section 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.32 Section 523(a)(5) did differ, however, from section 17(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 in several respects. First, Congress changed the word “wife” in section 17(a)(7) to “spouse” to remove lingering doubts as to the old provision’s constitutionality.33 Second, Congress added language referring to former spouses, to make it clear that section 523(a)(5) excepted from discharge obligations extending beyond dissolution of the marriage.34 One bankruptcy court has identified a third difference between section 17(a)(7) of the old Bankruptcy Act and section 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.35 The court noted that under section 17(a)(7) obligations imposed in a divorce decree were nondischargeable if considerations of support played any significant role in the determination of the award.36 Section 523(a)(5), by contrast, requires that the award be “actually in the nature of” alimony or support to be excepted from discharge, or essentially for the purpose of supporting the obligee former spouse.37

Under the Bankruptcy Code either the debtor or the obligee former spouse can file a complaint to determine whether an obligation created upon divorce is dischargeable.38 The obligee former spouse need not assert nondischargeability in the bankruptcy case. Unlike the discharge exceptions contained in paragraphs (2), (4), and (6) of section 523(a), which the creditor waives if he fails to assert them in the bankruptcy court, a former spouse can assert an exception to discharge under section 523(a)(5) at any time.39 The burden of persuasion rests with the party asserting nondischargeability.40

33. See In re Crist, 632 F.2d 1226, 1234 (5th Cir. 1980) (section 17(a) as written denies husbands equal protection of the laws), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1981).
36. Id.
37. See supra note 3; Fox, 5 Bankr. at 320. The Fox court concluded that this change should make it more difficult for an obligee former spouse to prove the alimony exception under § 523(a)(5) than under section 17(a). Fox, 5 Bankr. at 320. In In re Teter, 14 Bankr. 434, 436 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981), the court, although citing Fox favorably, required only that support considerations “play a part” in the creation of the obligation for a court to except it from discharge under § 523(a)(5).
38. See BANKR. R. 4007(a).
40. In re Benich, 811 F.2d 943, 945 (5th Cir. 1987); Long v. West (In re Long), 794 F.2d
In deciding whether a certain award of property arising from a divorce constitutes alimony, maintenance, or support within the meaning of section 523(a)(5), the courts observe two fundamental principles of law. The first is that the substance of the award, not its form, will determine dischargeability. The courts generally begin their analysis by trying to discern the underlying purpose of the obligation in question, and whether the parties considered the support needs of the recipient spouse in creating the debt. Consequently, the divorce court's designation of the award in the divorce decree will not control the bankruptcy court's decision regarding dischargeability.

The second general principle, related to the first, declares that federal, not state, law will decide whether a property award is alimony, maintenance, or support and, therefore, nondischargeable under section 523(a)(5). Under the old Bankruptcy Act the opposite was true as state law often controlled. The policy of letting state law govern issues of bankruptcy, however, led to the establishment of different standards for alimony, maintenance, and support in different states and impaired Congress's ability to provide uniform bankruptcy laws. Still, most bankruptcy courts do not ignore state domestic-relations law entirely, but look to it for guidance in deciding whether the divorce court intended the award to be for the support of the recipient former spouse. The bankruptcy court examines state-law criteria for award-
ing alimony or support. If these criteria were present at the time the divorce court rendered its decree, the bankruptcy court is more likely to find the obligation in question to be alimony, maintenance, or support, and therefore nondischargeable. Reference to state law appears appropriate, since the underlying obligation is a product of state law.

I. The Intent/Factor Approach

The determining question in a proceeding based on section 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code asks whether the obligation in dispute is "actually in the nature of" alimony or support. If the award is not one of support, but merely a division of property, section 523(a)(5) does not apply, and a discharge will relieve the debtor of personal liability on the debt. The bankruptcy courts have resorted to several methods to determine which obligations between former spouses are nondischargeable under section 523(a)(5). The majority of courts today use the intent/factor approach. Under this view, the intent of the divorce court, or of the spouses in the case of a property settlement, becomes crucial. The bankruptcy court will find the award in question nondischargeable only if it finds that the parties to the decree intended the award to serve as support for the recipient former spouse. The courts discern the parties' intent by applying a variety of factors, many of which constitute the same factors that state courts use in awarding alimony or dividing community property. Different bankruptcy courts enunciate different factors, but no one factor is dispositive.

One factor is the language that the divorce decree or property settlement uses. The bankruptcy court is likely to find an award that a decree or settle-
ment has labelled "alimony" to be nondischargeable under section 523(a)(5). Conversely, designating an award as a property settlement militates in favor of finding the award outside the scope of section 523(a)(5). The bankruptcy court may also pay heed to recitals in the divorce decree that a certain obligation is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. In In re Tosti, for example, the divorce court ordered the ex-husband to pay the ex-wife's attorney's fees. The court also ordered the ex-husband to assume the mortgage on the parties' house and to hold the ex-wife harmless thereon. The divorce decree recited that the award of attorney's fees was not dischargeable in bankruptcy; the decree was silent as to the dischargeability of the mortgage assumption. Reading the decree in its entirety, the bankruptcy court found an intent on the part of the divorce court that the mortgage assumption could be dischargeable. Based on this finding of an intent to discharge, the bankruptcy court held that the mortgage assumption was not in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.

Another factor that the courts apply is the debtor ex-spouse's treatment of the award on income tax returns. Section 215 of the Internal Revenue Code allows a taxpayer to deduct the amount of "alimony or separate maintenance payments" that the taxpayer has paid during the taxable year. If a debtor in bankruptcy has deducted payments made pursuant to an obligation arising from divorce, the bankruptcy court may hold the balance of the obligation nondischargeable. Section 71(a) of the Internal Revenue Code indicates that the obligee ex-spouse's gross income includes alimony received. Logically, such treatment by the recipient under an obligation ought to weigh in favor of nondischargeability as well. No cases, however, have addressed the effect of the obligee ex-spouse's tax treatment of the award.

57. In re Sullivan, 62 Bankr. 465, 471 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1986). In Sullivan the ex-wife expressly waived any right to alimony. The obligation described as a property settlement and found to be such arose when the ex-husband agreed to pay the ex-wife $16,000 per year for five years for the construction of a house for the ex-wife and their children. Id.
58. One commentator strongly suggests that any settlement agreement or court order clearly state whether the parties intend § 523(a)(5) to prevent discharge of each particular obligation. Murphy, The Dischargeability in Bankruptcy of Debts for Alimony and Property Settlements Arising From Divorce, 14 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 69, 79 (1986).
60. Id. at 134.
61. Id.
63. Id. § 215(a). The Internal Revenue Code defines "alimony or separate maintenance payment" as cash payments that (1) a spouse receives under a divorce or separation instrument (including a written separation agreement); (2) the creating instrument for which does not indicate the exclusion of such payments from the recipient spouse's gross income and the obligor spouse's deduction of such payments under § 215 of the Internal Revenue Code; (3) are not to occur while the obligor spouse and the obligee spouse are living together; and (4) are to terminate upon the death of the obligee spouse. Id. § 71(b)(1), (2)(B).
64. See In re Bell, 61 Bankr. 171, 175 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986); Harris v. Harris, 605 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Bankruptcy courts often look to the relative earning powers of the spouses at the time the divorce court rendered its decree to decide whether the court or the spouses intended that an award provide support for the obligee former spouse.66 The more the earning capacity of the obligor exceeds that of the obligee, the courts reason, the more likely it is that the divorce court created the awards in question for the purpose of meeting the support needs of the obligee ex-spouse.67 This finding, in turn, tends to make the obligation nondischargeable under section 523(a)(5).68

Two additional factors involve an examination of the form of the award. First, courts often check whether the ex-spouse will pay the obligation in dispute in periodic installments or in one lump sum. An award contemplating periodic payments, all other factors being equal, probably will be considered "in the nature of" alimony or support;69 conversely, a court is likely to determine that lump-sum arrangements create property divisions and thus, become dischargeable in bankruptcy.70 Second, the bankruptcy courts consider whether the obligation terminates on the death or remarriage of the obligee former spouse.71 Termination on either event indicates an intent to provide support for the recipient until someone else is bound to support him or her or until he or she no longer needs support. The courts, therefore, are more likely to find that the obligation is not dischargeable under section 523(a)(5).72 The opposite inference arises when the obligation is to continue in full force regardless of the obligee ex-spouse's death or remarriage.73

66. See In re Bell, 61 Bankr. 171, 175 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986) (ex-husband was attorney, and ex-wife possessed no marketable skills); In re Coffman, 52 Bankr. 667, 674 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985) (listing respective earning power as factor in § 523(a)(5) determination); In re Wesley, 36 Bankr. 526, 529-30 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (ex-husband's and ex-wife's earning capacities roughly equal; obligation held discharged); Hoffman & Murray, supra note 43, at 23 (noting court use of disparate earning capacity in § 523(a)(5) cases).


69. See, e.g., In re Coffman, 52 Bankr. 667, 672 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985); Carlife v. Fox (In re Fox), 5 Bankr. 317, 321 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980); Harris v. Harris, 605 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.).


73. See Stout v. Prussel, 691 F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); In re Wesley, 36 Bankr. 526, 530 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).

At least one bankruptcy court has referred to the obligor spouse's bad faith as a factor in deciding dischargeability under section 523(a)(5). Holland v. Holland (In re Holland), 48 Bankr. 874, 877 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984). In Holland the husband, in contemplation of divorce, agreed to assume and hold the wife harmless on a mortgage on which the spouses were jointly liable. One month after executing the agreement the husband filed a petition in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court, in ruling on the dischargeability of the hold-harmless agreement, implied that agreeing to assume joint debts with the present intention of discharging them in bankruptcy weighs against their dischargeability under § 523(a)(5). Id. at 877. Other
In summary, under the intent/factor approach to the question of dischargeability under section 523(a)(5), the bankruptcy court will try to divine the intent of the appropriate party or parties\textsuperscript{74} at the time the divorce court rendered its decree. If the original purpose behind the award in dispute was to establish a means of supporting the obligee ex-spouse, rather than as a simple allocation of joint property and liabilities, then the obligation survives the debtor's discharge. The factors discussed above merely represent examples of those that bankruptcy courts use in determining the parties' intent. Different courts apply different factors and weigh them in different ways.\textsuperscript{75}

2. **Approaches in the Fifth Circuit: Nunnally and Beyond**

The law in the Fifth Circuit on the alimony exception to discharge begins with \textit{In re Nunnally},\textsuperscript{76} decided in 1975 under section 17(a)(7) of the old Bankruptcy Act.\textsuperscript{77} In \textit{Nunnally} the Texas divorce court awarded the wife $41,779.41 as reimbursement for separate funds that the spouses used during the marriage to benefit their community estate.\textsuperscript{78} The court also ordered the husband to pay the wife's attorney's fees of $5,000. The former husband later filed for bankruptcy, without having paid the reimbursement or the attorney's fees. The question before the Fifth Circuit court was whether either or both of the awards in the divorce decree were excepted from discharge in bankruptcy. The court held that both were.\textsuperscript{79}

The court first analyzed the award for reimbursement. It pointed out that divorce courts in Texas, in dividing community property between spouses, may consider the parties' relative earning capacities, their future support needs, and the benefits that the innocent spouse would gain if the marriage were to continue.\textsuperscript{80} From this observation the court expounded on the relationship between Texas family law and federal bankruptcy law in language

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{74} The spouses, if the obligation in question originated in their agreement; the divorce court, if the court imposed the obligation on the obligor spouse.
  \item \textsuperscript{75} In \textit{In re Coffman}, 52 Bankr. 667 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985), the court enumerated eighteen criteria that the various courts have considered in separating nondischargeable support obligations from dischargeable property divisions. \textit{Id.} at 674-75.
  \item \textsuperscript{76} 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975).
  \item \textsuperscript{77} See supra note 29.
  \item \textsuperscript{78} Texas marital property law permits reimbursement for monies belonging to one marital estate (the husband's separate estate, the wife's separate estate, or the couple's community estate) that a party or parties use to profit another marital estate. See Trevino v. Trevino, 555 S.W.2d 792, 798 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1977, no writ) (reimbursed community estate for payments on separate debts); Horlock v. Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52, 56-58 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (reimbursed husband's separate estate for monies invested for benefit of community estate). See generally J. McKnight & W. Reppy, supra note 9, at 173-79 (discussing the doctrine of reimbursement and related issues). A right of reimbursement arises only upon dissolution of the marriage. Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561, 565 (Tex. 1964).
  \item \textsuperscript{79} \textit{Nunnally}, 506 F.2d at 1027.
  \item \textsuperscript{80} \textit{Id.} at 1026.
\end{itemize}
that, considering the court’s result, suggests that virtually all property awards from Texas divorce courts are not dischargeable.\footnote{81}

The ex-husband’s counsel presented the \textit{Nunnally} court with a dilemma that the court addressed in the sixth footnote of the opinion.\footnote{82} As mentioned previously, Texas law does not approve of permanent, court-ordered alimony.\footnote{83} The ex-husband argued, in essence, that the reimbursement award in reality constituted either alimony, therefore void under Texas law, or a property division, therefore dischargeable in bankruptcy. Either way, the ex-husband would owe nothing.\footnote{84} The court noted that under Texas law an award that looks like alimony remains valid if the court can trace it to property that either spouse owns.\footnote{85} The divorce court had left the ex-husband with fifty-two percent of his Navy pension rights, out of which, the court presumed, he could pay the reimbursement award.\footnote{86} The Fifth Circuit observed that reimbursement is not alimony; reimbursement merely restores property advanced from one marital estate to another.\footnote{87} The court emphasized the nonalimony qualities of the reimbursement award: a fixed amount payable in one lump sum.\footnote{88} The award for reimbursement, therefore, was not void as court-ordered alimony.\footnote{89}

The \textit{Nunnally} court followed similar reasoning with regard to the award of attorney’s fees. The court noted that divorce courts in Texas can award attorney’s fees in divorce proceedings based on the same factors used to divide community property, including the respective abilities of the spouses to support themselves.\footnote{90} In \textit{Nunnally} the award of attorney’s fees appeared inseparable from the rest of the divorce decree; therefore, as with the award of reimbursement, the ex-husband’s discharge in bankruptcy did not affect the award of counsel fees.\footnote{91}

The next Fifth Circuit case to address the subject of divorce-award excep-

\footnote{81. \textit{Id.} at 1027. The court stated:}

\footnote{82. \textit{Id.} at 1027 n.6.}

\footnote{83. \textit{See supra} notes 19-23 and accompanying text.}

\footnote{84. \textit{Nunnally}, 506 F.2d at 1027 n.6.}

\footnote{85. \textit{Id.; see} Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 32-33 (Tex. 1967); McBean v. McBean, 371 S.W.2d 930, 932 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1963, no writ).}

\footnote{86. \textit{Nunnally}, 506 F.2d at 1027 n.6.}

\footnote{87. \textit{Id.}}

\footnote{88. \textit{Id.}}

\footnote{89. \textit{Id.}}

\footnote{90. \textit{Id.} at 1027.}

\footnote{91. \textit{Id.}}
tions to discharge was *Erspan v. Badgett*. Erspan made it clear that *Nunnally* still controlled within the circuit. The *Erspan* court used the same broad method of analysis as did the court in *Nunnally*. In *Erspan* the divorce court had ordered the ex-husband to pay the ex-wife one-half of all Army pension payments that he would receive in the future. The *Erspan* court took the opportunity to restate the exposition of law in *Nunnally* and, without further discussion, likened the pension award to the awards in *Nunnally*. The court concluded that the ex-husband’s obligation to pay was not dischargeable in bankruptcy.

In two recent cases the Fifth Circuit has shown a disinclination to follow the *Nunnally* analysis regarding the alimony exception to discharge in bankruptcy. The panel that decided *In re Chandler* appears to have come up with a new way of determining whether divorce-related obligations are dischargeable in bankruptcy, a mode of analysis entirely independent of section 523(a)(5). In that case a Texas divorce court awarded the wife $450 per month out of the husband’s Army pension benefits “as [her] sole and separate property.” In deciding whether the ex-husband’s subsequent bankruptcy relieved him of liability on the obligation, the Fifth Circuit held that the right to receive $450 per month became the ex-wife’s property as of the date of divorce, and as such did not constitute a debt that was dischargeable. The court found it unnecessary to discuss section 523(a)(5) because the ex-wife did not seek to have pre-petition arrearages in the obligation

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93. 647 F.2d at 555.
94. *Id.* The court stated:
   The essence of this Court’s decision in *Nunnally* is that, regardless of how a state may choose to define “alimony,” a federal court, for purposes of applying the federal bankruptcy laws, is not bound to the label that a state affixes to an award, and that, consistent with the objectives of federal bankruptcy policy, the substance of the award must govern.

95. *Id.*
96. 805 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1986).
97. *Id.* at 556.
98. *Id.* at 557. The divorce court had designated the ex-husband as trustee to receive the ex-wife’s interest in the pension and turn it over to her. The Fifth Circuit’s point may be that the monthly payments that the ex-wife was entitled to were not property of the bankruptcy estate, since the ex-husband held no cognizable interest in her share at the commencement of the bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a), (b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The bankruptcy court in *In re Manners*, 62 Bankr. 656 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1986), seems to have used a similar approach, although the *Manners* court emphasized that the Coast Guard, not the ex-husband, had the duty to pay the ex-wife her share of the ex-husband’s military pension following the divorce. *Id.* at 658; see 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c) (1982) (permitting state divorce courts to divide military pension rights between spouses); 32 C.F.R. § 63 (1986) (establishing procedure whereby recipient ex-spouse can receive his portion of military retirement benefits directly from United States). The *Manners* court found the obligation not to be a debt within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1982). *Manners*, 62 Bankr. at 658.

Alternatively, the Fifth Circuit in *Chandler* may have meant that the ex-wife’s interest in the army pension no longer constituted a “personal liability of the debtor,” so that a discharge in bankruptcy could not affect the ex-husband’s duty to remit the $450 each month. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1), (2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). At any rate, the court could have employed clearer reasoning and more citations to the Bankruptcy Code.
declared nondischargeable. 99

In In re Benich, 100 decided three months after Chandler, the Fifth Circuit had to decide whether an ex-husband’s agreement to make monthly payments to his ex-wife would survive the ex-husband’s discharge in bankruptcy. The ex-husband’s promise came in exchange for the ex-wife’s waiving her community interest in the ex-husband’s military pension. The court cited In re Nunnally three times, 101 but expressed approval of a far more fact-based application of the alimony exception to discharge than the Nunnally opinion contained. 102 The Benich panel discussed various characteristics of a support-type award and apparently embraced the intent/factor approach already discussed. 103 The court twice referred to the need to discern “the true nature of the debt” in determining dischargeability of divorce-related awards. 104 The circuit court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that the ex-husband’s payments were for support and therefore nondischargeable under section 523(a)(5). 105

The bankruptcy courts within the Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, have long been willing to examine more closely the circumstances surrounding Texas divorce awards in deciding dischargeability under section 523(a)(5). In In re Fox 106 the divorce court had ordered the ex-husband to pay to his former wife $250 per month, representing one-half of the ex-husband’s military pension. 107 The divorce court also ordered the ex-husband to make child support payments of an unspecified amount. The ex-husband thereafter filed a petition in bankruptcy, whereupon the ex-wife objected to the discharge of the pension award. In response to In re Nunnally, 108 the bankruptcy court declined to follow the Fifth Circuit’s decision for three reasons. 109 First, the Fifth Circuit court decided Nunnally under section 17(a)(7) of the old Bankruptcy Act, not under section 523(a)(5) of the Bank-

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100. 811 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1987).
101. Id. at 945 & nn.8, 9.
102. Id. at 945.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. In an interesting dictum the court seemed to dovetail Benich with the court’s decision in In re Chandler, 805 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1986). According to the court, if the argument had been over the dischargeability of the ex-wife’s interest in the pension benefits, rather than the agreed-upon payments in lieu thereof, Benich would have become a different case. Benich, 811 F.2d at 945. In that instance the court would not have discharged the ex-wife’s rights because her share in the pension would not be property of the bankruptcy estate. Id. For a comparison of this idea with the court’s expression in Chandler, see supra note 98.
106. 5 Bankr. 317 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980).
107. Id. at 318. The couple’s agreement, incorporated into the divorce decree, structured the award in question in this way: One half (1/2) of JAMES R. FOX’S United States Air Force retirement to be paid in monthly installments of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) beginning July 6, 1977, said award to be a debt against JAMES R. FOX in a negotiated amount of Seventy Thousand Dollars ($70,000.00) based on his life expectancy and other factors, evidenced by a note of even date in favor of BETTY L. FOX.
108. 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975). For a discussion of Nunnally, see supra notes 76-91 and accompanying text.
109. Fox, 5 Bankr. at 320.
The Fox court argued that the Bankruptcy Act made it easier on the obligee ex-spouse to prove the alimony exception to discharge. According to the Fox court the old Bankruptcy Act only required that considerations of support play some part in the creation of the obligation while the Bankruptcy Code requires that the award in question be "actually in the nature of" alimony or support; that is, that the award be *mainly* for the purpose of providing essential support for the obligee ex-spouse. Therefore, in the bankruptcy court's view, the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code overruled *Nunnally* to some extent. Second, the Fox court stated its belief that the decision in *Nunnally* was insufficiently tied to its facts. The Fox court observed that *Nunnally* seemed to rest on the proposition that Texas divorce courts make all property awards based on the respective support needs of the spouses. Under the *Nunnally* court's reasoning, therefore, the bankruptcy courts should except all Texas divorce awards from discharge in bankruptcy, irrespective of the circumstances giving rise to the obligation. The Fox court asserted that Congress could not have intended such a result. Third, the court in *Fox* took issue with *Nunnally*’s all-or-nothing approach. The Fox court saw no reason to believe that an obligation arising in divorce could not be partly dischargeable. The Fox court stated that a bankruptcy court should find nondischargeable only that portion of the award representing support or maintenance for the obligee ex-spouse; any amount beyond that should be dischargeable.

The Fox court decided that a more searching analysis of the facts was appropriate. The court presented a list of factors for determining whether the pension award was "actually in the nature of" support for Mrs. Fox, and therefore excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(5). These criteria included: (1) the spouses' relative earning capacities; (2) their comparative business opportunities; (3) their respective levels of education; (4) their health; (5) their probable requirements for support in the future; (6) responsibility in ending the marriage; and (7) the benefits accruing to the innocent spouse if the marriage had not ended. Applying the factors to the facts, the court viewed as critical the former spouses' disparate future earning capacity: Mr. Fox had worked steadily during the marriage, while Mrs. Fox...
had kept house and had little outside job experience.\textsuperscript{124} The court noted also that the retirement payments were to begin at the time the child support payments ended. The court took this as evidence that the support of Mrs. Fox was a factor in the creation of the pension payment obligation.\textsuperscript{125} The court, therefore, held the pension payments to be in the nature of support and nondischargeable under section 523(a)(5).\textsuperscript{126}

In \textit{In re Teter}\textsuperscript{127} the bankruptcy court had to determine the dischargeability of the husband's agreement in the couple's property settlement that caused a corporation, of which he was majority stockholder, to pay his wife $125 per week.\textsuperscript{128} The court indicated that the \textit{Nunnally} opinion had created confusion.\textsuperscript{129} While examining the particulars of the case the \textit{Teter} court listed facts pointing toward the support nature of the weekly payments: that the ex-wife did not in fact have to work for the corporation in order to get the money; that all five children of the marriage resided with the ex-wife; that the former spouses were of unequal earning power; and, that extrinsic evidence showed that the husband's main intention in agreeing to the payments was to provide necessities for his wife.\textsuperscript{130} The bankruptcy court concluded on the basis of the evidence that the wife's salary constituted payment of support and declared the obligation nondischargeable.\textsuperscript{131}

In \textit{In re Bell},\textsuperscript{132} decided in 1986, the spouses executed a property settlement that the divorce court incorporated into the divorce decree. In the settlement the husband agreed to pay his wife an undisclosed amount in 121 monthly installments. The husband filed for bankruptcy, and the wife sought to exclude the payment obligation from discharge under section 523(a)(5). As the \textit{Fox} court had done, the \textit{Bell} court listed several considerations for determining whether the obligation in question was really one of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{124} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{125} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{126} Id. The court expressly disregarded the fact that the parties structured the obligation as a debt. \textit{Id.} For the structure of the award, see \textit{supra} note 107. The substance of the award, not its form, controls the analysis under § 523(a)(5). Ravin \& Rosen, \textit{supra} note 24, at 7. In \textit{Fox} Judge Robert A. Wright of the 225th Judicial District Court testified as an expert witness on the reason behind the parties' use of the word "debt" in their agreement. At the time the spouses executed the instrument, it was unclear whether, under Texas law, a court could divide upon divorce the right to receive a military pension before the right had matured. Divorcing spouses often placed pension divisions in the form of promissory notes to ensure their enforceability. \textit{Fox}, 5 Bankr. at 321. The Texas Supreme Court removed the uncertainty in \textit{Cearley v. Cearley}, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976), when it held that such contingent rights are divisible. \textit{Id.} at 666; see \textit{also} McKnight, \textit{supra} note 13, at 426-29 (discussion of \textit{Cearley}).
  \item \textsuperscript{127} Id. at 666; see \textit{also} McKnight, \textit{supra} note 13, at 426-29 (discussion of \textit{Cearley}).
  \item \textsuperscript{128} The settlement stated:
    \begin{itemize}
      \item Husband agrees to cause Direct Fashions, Inc., (or at his election, some other entity) to continue employment of Wife, but as a consultant, for a salary of $125.00 per week with hospitalization and Social Security benefits. Wife . . . agrees to work at such times and places (consistent with her position and age as well as good taste) as her employer reasonably directs.
    \end{itemize}
    \textit{Id.} at 435.
  \item \textsuperscript{129} Id. at 435.
  \item \textsuperscript{130} Id. The husband stated in his deposition that he agreed to have his corporation make these payments in order to "help support her." \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{131} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{132} 61 Bankr. 171 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
\end{itemize}
The court noted that the ex-husband's earning capacity, as an attorney, far exceeded that of the ex-wife, who had simply maintained the family home during the marriage. The fact that the obligation was payable in periodic installments, and that the agreement resulted from extended arm's-length bargaining weighed in favor of nondischargeability under section 523(a)(5). In addition, the ex-husband had included the amount paid as an alimony deduction on his income tax. The court held on the basis of these considerations that the monthly payments constituted support of the ex-wife, rather than a property division, and therefore were nondischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code.

The bankruptcy courts in Texas, therefore, have employed a more pragmatic, fact-based analysis in addressing the issue of dischargeability under section 523(a)(5) than did the Fifth Circuit court in Nunnally. The courts in Fox, Teter, and Bell in essence applied the intent/factor approach. The remainder of this Comment describes and critically assesses a third way of dealing with section 523(a)(5).

3. In re Calhoun

In 1983 the Sixth Circuit set out an entirely new method for determining the dischargeability of marital property awards under the Bankruptcy Code. In In re Calhoun the husband agreed in contemplation of divorce to assume five debts on which both spouses were personally liable, and to hold the wife harmless on each. After the divorce the husband declared bankruptcy. The wife filed a complaint challenging the discharge of the husband's hold-harmless obligations. Judge Cornelia Kennedy, writing for the circuit court, criticized exclusive reliance on the parties' intent as determina-

133. Id. at 174-75. Factors of particular importance to the court in Bell were:

[T]he description and context of the disputed provisions in the divorce agreement; whether a lump sum or terminable periodic payments were provided for; . . . the relative earning power of the spouses, the adequacy of support absent the payments in question; the parties' negotiations and understanding of the provisions, and the function which the award was intended to accomplish.

134. Bell, 61 Bankr. at 174-75.

135. Id.

136. Id. For a discussion of the importance of how parties treat payment on their tax returns, see supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.

137. Id. at 175. For a discussion of the factors important in Carlile v. Fox (In re Fox), 5 Bankr. 317 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980), see supra text accompanying note 123.

138. 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983).

139. Initially it was unclear whether the Calhoun rule would apply to obligations other than assumptions of joint debts. See B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 4, ¶ 3.09[5]. Before long, however, the courts applying Calhoun extended its holding to cover all cases under § 523(a)(5): "[T]o perceive it [Calhoun] only as a narrow assumption-of-debt case is to view the world through the wrong end of a telescope." In re Helm, 48 Bankr. 215, 220 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985); see In re Singer, 787 F.2d 1033, 1038 n.2 (6th Cir. 1986) (Guy, J., concurring); Taylor v. Lineberry (In re Lineberry), 55 Bankr. 510, 515 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985); Deatherage v. Wallace (In re Deatherage), 55 Bankr. 268, 271 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983). Courts have yet to decide whether the Calhoun analysis will apply in cases filed under chapters 11, 12, or 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.
tive of whether the award is dischargeable. In addition to the difficulties inherent in discerning intent, the Calhoun court found that section 523(a)(5) by its language does not turn on what the parties intended. The court pinpointed the fundamental problem of deciding which awards constitute support and which do not: all obligations created on divorce to some extent support the obligee ex-spouse, but not all should survive discharge under section 523(a)(5).

The heart of Calhoun is its three-part test for determining whether a given marital property obligation is dischargeable in bankruptcy. First, the state divorce court, or the spouses, if the obligation in question arose by agreement, must have intended to create the obligation as a means of supporting the obligee ex-spouse. In resolving the question of intent the bankruptcy court may refer to the form and content of the divorce decree, factors indicating the propriety of ordering support payments, as well as extrinsic evidence of the parties' negotiating stances and understanding of the provision in question.

Second, the obligation must in fact have the intended effect of meeting the obligee ex-spouse's and any children's day-to-day needs. Here the bankruptcy court must consider the obligee's support needs as compared with his ability to discharge those needs through independent support funds and the obligee's own assets. The court should also consider the likely effect on

140. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109.
141. See In re Helm, 48 Bankr. 215, 221 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) (court must determine the intent of each party under circumstances in which neither party is concerned with the legal characterization of the obligations).
143. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1108. The court stated:
   The initial difficulty is that every assumption of a joint loan obligation in a divorce settlement at least indirectly contributes to support. The former spouse is relieved of payments on that debt and thus has funds for other purposes including necessary support. Support in this broad sense results even if the assumption of joint marital debts is actually a division of property. It is clear from the statute and legislative history that Congress could not have intended that all assumptions of joint debts would be nondischargeable.

144. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109-10. Some courts describe the Calhoun rule as a four-part test, dividing the query into reasonableness and the setting of a reasonable dischargeable amount of the award into two separate steps. See In re Delaine, 56 Bankr. 460, 466 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985); In re Helm, 48 Bankr. 215, 221 n.17 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985). Under either analysis the result is the same. Freeburger & Bowels, What Divorce Court Giveth, Bankruptcy Court Taketh Away: A Review of the Dischargeability of Marital Support Obligations, 24 J. Fam. L. 587, 609 n.100 (1985).
145. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109.
146. Id. at 1108 n.7, 1109. The court specified several appropriate factors for consideration. Id. at 1108 n.7. The Calhoun court's list of factors substantially parallels those in Fox and Bell. Carlisle v. Fox (In re Fox), 5 Bankr. 317, 321 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980); In re Bell, 61 Bankr. 171, 175 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986); see In re Singer, 787 F.2d 1033, 1036 (6th Cir. 1986) (Guy, J., concurring).
147. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109.
148. Id.
the obligee of ordering the obligation discharged in bankruptcy. 149

Finally, if the first two tests are met, the bankruptcy court must determine whether the amount of the award is so far beyond that dictated by traditional notions of support as to be patently unreasonable. 150 At this point the court will look to the debtor ex-spouse's present ability to comply with the obligation. 151 To except from discharge the entire amount of an obligation that, although created with the intent and having the effect of providing support for the obligee ex-spouse, far exceeds the debtor's ability to pay, would do violence to the bankruptcy policy of extending to the debtor a fresh start on life. 152 If the court finds that the amount of the obligation is excessive, it must determine the portion of the award that appears reasonable in view of the debtor's post-bankruptcy financial condition. 153 Again, the court should refer to general state-law principles to guide it in fixing the limit on dischargeability. 154 The Calhoun court was sensitive to the fact that a bankruptcy court's determination of what is reasonable as support may have the practical effect of modifying the divorce decree, which federal courts lack jurisdiction to do. 155 Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court cannot avoid the inquiry into reasonableness, given Congress's mandates that only a divorce award "actually in the nature of" support is nondischargeable, and that a state court's determination of what is necessary for the nondebtor spouse's support is not controlling on the question of discharge. 156 The circuit court reversed and remanded to the bankruptcy court for reconsideration of whether the ex-husband's obligation was dischargeable under section 523(a)(5). 157

III. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In re Nunnally 158 cannot stand as the Fifth Circuit's definitive word on the alimony exception to discharge in bankruptcy. As the court in In re Fox 159 pointed out, the Nunnally court's application of law to facts leaves

149. Id. In deciding whether the obligation in question in fact provides necessary support, the bankruptcy court should define "necessary" with reference to the former spouses' standard of living during the marriage. In re Helm, 48 Bankr. 215, 224 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985).
150. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1110.
151. Id.
152. Id. For discussion of the bankruptcy policy of providing a fresh start, see supra note 4.
153. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1110.
154. Id. The court in Carlile v. Fox (In re Fox), 5 Bankr. 317 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980), also believed that a court could divide a marital property award into dischargeable and nondischargeable portions. Id. at 320. Indeed the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 confirms the idea. See 124 CONG. REC. 32,399 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards) (property award is dischargeable under section 523(a)(5) "to the extent that [the obligation] is not actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support").
155. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109-10 n.10.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1111.
158. 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975). For a discussion of Nunnally, see supra notes 76-91 and accompanying text.
much to be desired.\textsuperscript{160} The fact that Texas law does not permit alimony as such does not answer the question of dischargeability.\textsuperscript{161} In dividing property and debts, Texas divorce courts may consider the same elements that courts in alimony states refer to in awarding support payments.\textsuperscript{162} The substance of the award, not its label, determines its dischargeability.\textsuperscript{163} At this juncture, the \textit{Nunnally} court simply concluded that the award, a reimbursement to the wife's separate estate, was not dischargeable.\textsuperscript{164} Not only did the court fail to heed its own advice in not examining the substance of this particular award,\textsuperscript{165} but it engaged in faulty logic. The argument in \textit{Nunnally} seems to proceed in this manner: Texas divorce courts may consider support factors in creating obligations between spouses; some Texas divorce obligations, therefore, are based on support and are nondischargeable in bankruptcy; this obligation (or all obligations), therefore, is (are) nondischargeable.

Apart from the flaws of reasoning in \textit{Nunnally}, the case's result also appears suspect. An award of reimbursement is simply the restoration of a specific dollar amount that one marital estate advanced for the benefit of another.\textsuperscript{166} In effect a reimbursement award stands as an order compelling payment of a debt.\textsuperscript{167} Two bankruptcy courts have held reimbursement-type awards dischargeable in bankruptcy.\textsuperscript{168} In \textit{In re Lineberry}\textsuperscript{169} the divorce court awarded the wife $24,353.65 as representing her contribution to the family's living expenses in excess of what the husband contributed. The bankruptcy court treated the award as a judgment debt in favor of the wife and declared it discharged.\textsuperscript{170} \textit{In re Coffman}\textsuperscript{171} dealt with the dischargeability under section 523(a)(5) of a $1,250 award constituting the ex-husband's sole property (inheritance from his mother received during his marriage) used to help pay the mortgage on the spouses' home. The debtor ex-wife sought to have the obligation discharged in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court found the award to be in the nature of a property division, not a support obligation, and therefore not included in the alimony exception to

\begin{footnotes}
\item[160.] \textit{Id.} at 320.
\item[161.] \textit{Nunnally}, 506 F.2d at 1027; see supra note 81.
\item[162.] \textit{Nunnally}, 506 F.2d at 1027.
\item[163.] \textit{Id.}
\item[164.] \textit{Id.}
\item[165.] \textit{See In re} Teter, 14 Bankr. 434, 436 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
\item[166.] \textit{See supra} note 78.
\item[167.] \textit{See Horlock} v. \textit{Horlock}, 533 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd w.o.j.). The \textit{Horlock} court stated that:
\begin{quote}
it should be kept in mind that in seeking reimbursement the appellee does not ask to share in the actual assets which have been determined to be community property. Rather, the appellee seeks to recover an amount substantially equal to the amount of capital which he brought into the marriage as separate property and which he utilized for the benefit of the community estate.
\end{quote}
\textit{Id.}
\item[168.] Taylor \textit{v.} Lineberry (\textit{In re} Lineberry), 55 Bankr. 510, 515 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985);
\item[169.] 55 Bankr. 510 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985).
\item[170.] \textit{Id.} at 515. In Texas, however, separate property used to meet family living expenses is not reimbursable. Norris \textit{v.} Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 502-03, 260 S.W.2d 676, 683 (1953).
\item[171.] 52 Bankr. 667 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985).
\end{footnotes}
Both of the basic approaches to section 523(a)(5), the intent/factor method and the Calhoun method, appear superior to the Fifth Circuit's handling of the issue in Nunnally. The intent/factor approach has gained a foothold among bankruptcy courts in Texas, as it has among bankruptcy courts in the United States generally. This mode of analysis comports with Congress's intent that a section 523(a)(5) case turn on the specific facts and circumstances surrounding the individual award in controversy. Discerning the parties' intent is not enough, however, as section 523(a)(5) speaks not of intent but of awards "actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support." The Bankruptcy Code, therefore, seems to require further inquiry into the actual effect of the obligation on the obligee spouse. The Calhoun approach offers this added dimension.

The bankruptcy courts and commentators have hailed In re Calhoun as something of a breakthrough in analyzing the alimony exception to discharge in bankruptcy. Not only have courts inside and outside the Sixth Circuit followed the Calhoun test, but so has a Texas bankruptcy court. In In re Holland the husband and wife reached a property settlement agreement in which the husband agreed to assume a bank debt secured by a lien on the family's car. The parties also agreed to give the car to the wife. One month after the divorce the husband filed a petition in bankruptcy, and the wife sought to have the husband's debt assumption excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(5). The bankruptcy court listed the three Calhoun prerequisites for finding a divorce obligation nondischargeable in bankruptcy: intent to support, effect of support, and overall reason-
bleness with respect to the debtor's present ability to pay. The court listed eight factors pertinent to the question of intent. Relying largely on the fact that the husband was earning twice as much money as the wife, the court found an intent to create a support obligation. The Holland court also found that the loan assumption had the effect of providing necessary support for Mrs. Holland. To meet her daily needs and those of her child Mrs. Holland had to work outside the home, for which she needed an automobile free from the risk of foreclosure. Finally, the court held it was not unreasonable to require Mr. Holland to pay the debt he had agreed to assume since his earning capacity clearly exceeded that of his former wife, and his financial condition had not substantially changed since the time of the divorce. The court, therefore, held that the loan assumption was not discharged in bankruptcy.

In spite of the advantages that the Calhoun doctrine holds over other approaches, two objections persist. Both concern Calhoun's obtrusiveness into state domestic-relations law. The first objection questions the third test for a nondischargeable award, which requires the bankruptcy court to decide whether the amount of the particular obligation is reasonable in light of the debtor ex-spouse's present ability to fulfill it, and if it is not, to fix a reasonable limit on the amount that a court may exclude from discharge. Finding part of an award dischargeable and part nondischargeable reduces the liability of the debtor ex-spouse and thus effectively modifies the divorce court's decree. One line of argument criticizes the third test of Calhoun by asserting that section 523(a)(5) does not permit a bankruptcy court to inquire into the reasonableness of a divorce obligation or to separate an award into dischargeable and nondischargeable parts. The Calhoun

183. Id.; see Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1109-10 (6th Cir. 1983).
184. Holland, 48 Bankr. at 876. The court's factors included: (1) the existence of children of the marriage; (2) the ex-spouses' comparative income levels; (3) whether the obligation in controversy attached to the community property awarded to the debtor ex-spouse; (4) whether the nondebtor ex-spouse needed support at the time of divorce; (5) whether the dependence on the debtor ex-spouse during the marriage handicapped the nondebtor ex-spouse in gaining outside employment following the divorce; (6) the age and health of the nondebtor ex-spouse; (7) the ex-spouses' respective levels of wealth; and (8) whether the divorce decree itself reflected an intent to create a support obligation rather than a division of property. Id.
185. Id. at 877.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 4, ¶ 3.09[5].
192. In Deatherage v. Wallace (In re Deatherage), 55 Bankr. 268 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985), the bankruptcy court asserted that the third test of Calhoun did not compel bankruptcy courts to act as "super-divorce" courts. Id. at 271 n.3. The Calhoun analysis, the court continued, does not review the reasonableness of divorce awards; it merely separates dischargeable portions from nondischargeable ones. Id. This type of hair-splitting formalism does not aid the discussion. Clearly the effect of finding only half of a $1,000 divorce award reasonably necessary to support the nondebtor ex-spouse is to create a $500 award where a $1,000 award existed before.
193. See In re Helm, 48 Bankr. 215, 225 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985). Although following Calhoun, the Helm court noted that § 523(a)(5) "draws no dischargeability distinctions be-
court, however, successfully answered this criticism: bankruptcy courts must limit the amount of an award excepted from discharge to that portion that is truly for the support of the obligee ex-spouse. Any amount beyond that is discharged in bankruptcy. Reexamination of state divorce decrees is unavoidable because state law cannot control the question of dischargeability under section 523(a)(5).194

Others attack Calhoun's third test by arguing that the court misplaced its focus.195 The extent to which a divorce obligation is nondischargeable should depend on the support needs of the obligee ex-spouse, not on the debtor ex-spouse's ability to pay.196 This argument rejects the notion, implicit in Calhoun, that the bankruptcy court must in each case balance the policies of providing the debtor with a fresh start and seeing that the debtor's former spouse and children are taken care of. Congress must strike that balance, and it has done so in section 523(a)(5), which excepts from discharge in bankruptcy all obligations arising upon divorce to the extent that they are "actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support."197 Section 523(a)(5) says nothing of the debtor's ability or inability to meet the obligation, nor of the bankruptcy court's power to work equity in the individual case. By contrast, section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, which excludes from discharge debts for government education loans, expressly permits the bankruptcy court to consider the circumstances of the individual debtor in passing on the dischargeability of such a debt.198 The absence of similar language in section 523(a)(5) implies that Congress did not intend that bankruptcy courts apply equitable considerations in cases involving the alimony exception to discharge.199

The second major objection to the Calhoun rule is that bankruptcy courts should not consider the former spouses' present circumstances in deciding whether section 523(a)(5) applies.200 Calhoun does this at two points: in the second test, when the court looks to the nondebtor ex-spouse's current needs in between 'reasonable' and 'unreasonable' support; either an obligation is for support, and therefore nondischargeable, or it is not." Id.; see also In re Griffin, 39 Bankr. 112, 114 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1984) (practical problems of letting federal courts review decisions of state divorce courts).

194. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109 n.10.
195. See In re Yeates, 44 Bankr. 575, 579 (D. Utah 1984), aff'd, 807 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1986).
196. Id.
197. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B) (1982); Harrell v. Sharp (In re Harrell), 754 F.2d 902, 906 n.6 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Yeates, 44 Bankr. 575, 579 (D. Utah 1984) ("[T]he bankruptcy court must simply determine whether a particular debt is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support. If so, it cannot be discharged."). aff'd, 807 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1986).
198. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (1982). The bankruptcy court is to order a government educational loan debt discharged in bankruptcy if not to do so would "impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents." Id.
199. In re Comer, 27 Bankr. 1018, 1020-21 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 723 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1984); see In re Griffin, 39 Bankr. 112, 114 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1984).
200. The objection discussed in the previous paragraph focused on whether a bankruptcy court should reexamine a divorce award for reasonableness, and if so, whether the debtor ex-spouse's financial condition is at all relevant to the inquiry. The second objection concedes the bankruptcy court's power to hold part of an award dischargeable, but questions whether post-divorce changes in either ex-spouse's wealth or earning capacity should have a bearing on the
and assets; and in the third test, which emphasizes the debtor ex-spouse's present capacity to pay the obligation. The courts are split, even within the Sixth Circuit, as to whether Calhoun is correct in weighing post-divorce changes in the ex-spouses' financial situations. Those who would discount the parties' present circumstances and test the dischargeability of a divorce obligation at the time of the decree argue that to allow bankruptcy courts an ongoing right to review the propriety of divorce awards constitutes too great an interference with the jurisdiction of state courts. If the ex-spouses' financial positions have changed materially since the time of the divorce decree so that the original award no longer reflects the obligee's needs or the obligor's ability to pay, the obligor's remedy should lie in the state court with a petition for modification of the award, not in the bankruptcy court.

This argument fails to take into account the need to determine the extent

court's decision. Although these two criticisms are related, they attack different parts of the Calhoun rule, and for this reason, this Comment addresses them separately.

201. Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1109 (6th Cir. 1983) ("The distribution or existence of other property, for example, may make the continuing assumption of joint debts unnecessary for support, as might drastic changes in the former spouse's capabilities for self-support.").

202. Id. at 1110 n.11. The court declared:
If the circumstances of the debtor have changed from the time the obligation to the former spouse to pay joint debts was created so as to make such support now inequitable the bankruptcy court may consider the debtor's current general ability to pay insofar as it relates to the continuing obligation to assume the joint debts.

Id. (emphasis in original).

203. Compare Forsdick v. Turgeon, 812 F.2d 801, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1987) (changed circumstances of either ex-spouse irrelevant) and Draper v. Draper, 790 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1986) (changed circumstances of either ex-spouse irrelevant) and In re Quinn, 44 Bankr. 622, 624 n.5 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984) (obligee ex-spouse's present needs irrelevant) and In re Comer, 27 Bankr. 1018, 1020-21 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983) (changed circumstances of either ex-spouse irrelevant), aff'd, 723 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1984) with In re Bedingfield, 42 Bankr. 641, 646-47 (S.D. Ga. 1983) (debtor ex-spouse's present ability to pay is relevant) and In re Warner, 5 Bankr. 434, 442-43 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980) (obligee ex-spouse's present needs are relevant) (decided under former Bankruptcy Act, but with reference to Bankruptcy Code).


205. Harrell v. Sharp (In re Harrell), 754 F.2d 902, 907 & n.7 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Bell, 61 Bankr. 171, 176 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986); Ravin & Rosen, supra note 24, at 15.

206. Harrell v. Sharp (In re Harrell), 754 F.2d 902, 907 n.8 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Bell, 61 Bankr. 171, 176 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986); Ravin & Rosen, supra note 24, at 15; Recent Developments, supra note 4, at 116. Of the circuit courts that have addressed the issue, only the Sixth Circuit has held that bankruptcy courts must consider the ex-spouses' changed circumstances, if any, in deciding whether divorce related awards are dischargeable under § 523(a)(5). Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1110 n.11 (6th Cir. 1983). Three other circuits have held that changed circumstances are irrelevant. See Forsdick v. Turgeon, 812 F.2d 801, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1987); Draper v. Draper, 790 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Harrell, 754 F.2d at 907. The Tenth Circuit found it unnecessary to reach the question of changed circumstances in In re Yeates, 807 F.2d 874, 878 n.3 (10th Cir. 1986). Given this disagreement among the circuit courts, one hopes for a resolution by the Supreme Court in the near future.
to which support is the actual basis of a divorce award. An obligation created entirely for the support of the obligee ex-spouse might, because of improvements in the obligee's wealth or earning capacity, cease to be necessary in its entirety for the obligee's support. Such an award is no longer wholly in the nature of alimony or support, and a court may discharge some of it in bankruptcy. The policy of construing exceptions to discharge narrowly, in favor of the debtor, recommends such a reading of section 523(a)(5). The bankruptcy court, therefore, must consider any post-divorce changes in the nondebtor ex-spouse's support needs or ability to satisfy those needs. This examination occurs in the second test of Calhoun. Looking to the debtor's changed circumstances, however, appears less defensible, since section 523(a)(5) does not permit attention to the debtor's ability to pay. The courts should adopt a middle position that looks to the present needs and assets of the obligee ex-spouse, but disregards the debtor ex-spouse's capacity to fulfill the obligation in question.

IV. CONCLUSION

Unless Congress amends the Bankruptcy Code, this Comment recommends that the Fifth Circuit adopt a modified form of the Calhoun approach to section 523(a)(5). In re Nunnally relied on peculiar reasoning and...
reached a result that is at best debatable. Furthermore, the bankruptcy courts in Texas have not felt compelled to follow Nunnally, but have explored new ways of dealing with the alimony exception to discharge in bankruptcy. The Fifth Circuit should adopt the first and second tests of the Calhoun analysis. As for the third test, the court should ask whether the entire divorce obligation in controversy is reasonably necessary to meet the day-to-day needs of the obligee ex-spouse, based on that spouse’s present and projected requirements and capacity to fill them by means independent of the award in question. If the answer is no, the bankruptcy court should decide how much of the award is “actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support”\(^{212}\) and hold only that portion nondischargeable.
