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Application of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to Tender Offers, The

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The tender offer for control presents a significant potential for liability under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, because it usually entails stock purchases that are large enough to make the tender offeror a “beneficial owner” within the meaning of the section, and because of the risk that the offeror will fail to achieve its objective, possibly necessitating a precipitous sale. Moreover, any argument in favor of liability under 16(b) will probably be pressed by the issuer, the principal enforcer under 16(b), because of the often cool relationship between the tender offeror and incumbent management.

On the other hand, because tender offers are usually made by outsiders, and in all events must be accompanied by full disclosure, tender offers do not involve a possibility of the type of abuse of inside information at which 16(b) was aimed. Additionally, because it is often the single tender offer transaction that makes the offeror a beneficial owner, there is a question whether the tender offer purchases are within the exemptive clause of 16(b) by reason of Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co.
Despite these considerations, the courts have failed to analyze the applicability of 16(b) to purchases in tender offers as a distinct type of transaction. Rather, some dispositions by tender offerors were exempted in *Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.*, 4 Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. 5 and *American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co.* 6 This approach has left uncertain the status of tender offers under 16(b).

This Article examines the relevant case law and offers an approach to the analysis of the application of 16(b) to purchases in tender offers.

**I. Tender Offers and the Purpose of Section 16(b)**

Although tender offers involve the potentiality for many kinds of abuse, an argument can be made that they necessarily do not present the possibility of the specific kind of abuse at which 16(b) was aimed.

During the congressional hearings on the provision that became 16(b), and in the preamble to the enacted section, Congress made it clear that section 16(b) was specifically concerned with the abuse by corporate fiduciaries of their inside knowledge of the affairs of their companies. Thomas Corcoran, the principal drafter of the provision, said that the function of 16(b) was to protect the investor "from being double crossed on the inside by men who know more about the stock than he does," 7 and described it as "simply an application of an old principle of the law that if you are an agent and you profit by inside information concerning the affairs of your principal, your profits go to your principal." 8 The House Report put this principle as follows: "Men charged with the administration of other people’s money must not use inside information to their own advantage." 9

Tender offers are not likely to involve the kind of abuse of inside information 16(b) was intended to reach, because they are generally employed by outsiders to gain control where there is some resistance by incumbent management. 10 Some commentators have concluded that tender offerors should not have a general duty to disclose information about the target because they are outsiders. 11 Congress seems to have agreed with this conclusion by not explicitly requiring in the Williams Act disclosure by cash tender offerors of information about the target.

It is true that tender offerors may engage in speculation. During the congressional hearings on the Williams Act concern was expressed that tender offerors may sometimes be motivated more by the quick profits made

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8. Id. at 133.
possible by a merger by the target in reaction to the tender offer (a "defensive merger") than by a wish to achieve control. The suggestion was made not only that 16(b) be used to deal with the problem, but that it be strengthened by giving the Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement powers under the section.13

As the then chairman of the SEC acknowledged,14 however, 16(b) was not intended to curb this kind of speculation. The tender offeror's activities are analogous to those of arbitrageurs, which are specifically exempted from section 16,15 in that the profits of the tender offeror, like those of the arbitrageur, are based on a knowledge of the market rather than on inside information.16 The Supreme Court noted in Kern that "[c]alculations of this sort . . . whether speculative or not and whether fair or unfair to other stockholders . . . do not represent the kind of speculative abuse at which the statute is aimed . . . ."17

If the tender offeror does not have a substantial inside position in the company, the offeror's activities are not within the intended scope of 16(b) even if it is not an adversary of target management and is receiving inside information as a tippee. The argument that outside tippees should not be reached by 16(b) has been advanced persuasively,18 and the Supreme Court accepted this argument in not imposing liability on a deputization theory in Blau v. Lehman Bros.19 That interpretation is supported by the legislative history of 16(b); congressional investigation of insiders focused on those who used their position to control corporate events.20 A provision separate from 16(b) in the original bill,21 which was ultimately dropped, covered tippees. All of this indicates that Congress intended to distinguish tippees and those covered by 16(b).22

Even if the tender offeror is a 16(b) insider, its special disclosure obligations under the Williams Act justify excluding it from the operation of 16(b). In recognition of their outsider status, cash tender offerors are not explicitly required to make disclosures about the target, and the courts have been reluctant to impose liability on tender offerors under the Williams Act for failure to disclose information about the target.23 The courts, however, have recognized a duty on the part of the tender offeror to disclose information

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14. Id. at 75-76.
17. 411 U.S. at 597.
21. 3 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 561, 568 (1962); 14 STAN. L. REV. 194, 195 (1961); *Hearings, supra note 7, at 135-37. Even if it was, that does not refute the fact that Congress did not intend to deal with the tippee problem in 16(b).
about the target where the offer would be misleading without such disclosure. Moreover, the Second Circuit has stated that a cash tender offeror may be held liable for a material misstatement or omission if it "knew the material facts that were misstated or . . . failed or refused to ascertain such facts when they were available to him or could have been discovered by him with reasonable effort." The effect of these cases is that the tender offeror will usually face civil liability under the Williams Act if it fails to disclose whatever material information it has, or may reasonably obtain, about the target. That is because the tender offeror is required to disclose such information as its plans for the target, and, therefore, must make some affirmative statements about the target and the target's prospects. Furthermore, stock tender offerors have been held to the high disclosure requirements of the 1933 Act notwithstanding their lack of access to the target.

Both the commentary and the cases have recognized that full disclosure may eliminate the possibility of 16(b)-type abuse, at least where the disclosure is in connection with the insider's opening transaction. While these authorities have dealt with corporate transactions such as mergers and reclassifications in which the insider and all shareholders are treated alike, such equal treatment is irrelevant to the opportunity to make short-swing profits and, therefore, does not serve to distinguish these transactions from tender offers. If all material information has been disclosed at the time of the opening transaction, the tender offeror must buy at a price that reflects inside information, and, therefore, cannot realize 16(b)-type short-swing profits. A tender offeror is, therefore, not likely to be a 16(b) insider. Even if it is, it arguably does not have an opportunity for 16(b)-type abuse. Nevertheless, as discussed below, whether tender offers are the subject of any general exclusion from the operation of 16(b) remains open to question under the present case law.

II. CURRENT APPLICATION OF 16(b) TO PURCHASES IN TENDER OFFERS

The courts that have given any consideration to whether purchases in tender offers should be subject to 16(b) have touched upon two points: First, whether tender offer purchases are "unorthodox" transactions and, there-

25. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). It is not clear whether the 10b-5 scienter standard applied in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), will be applied to cases under § 14(e).
fore, eligible for a "purpose" analysis under 16(b); and secondly, the appropriate treatment of tender offer purchases under the exemptive clause of 16(b). None of the courts have engaged in any extensive analysis.

The courts have identified two types of transactions for purposes of 16(b): "Cash-like," or "orthodox," transactions that resemble purchases or sales under contract law in the sense that an interest in a corporation is exchanged for some bargained-for consideration, and "unorthodox" transactions such as conversions, mergers, exchanges, reorganizations, reclassifications, and transactions in options and warrants. The courts have excluded only "unorthodox" transactions from 16(b).

Under this bifurcated approach, tender offers would probably be included in 16(b) irrespective of whether they present a possibility of 16(b)-type abuse simply because they are cash-like transactions. There is little clear authority on this point. In Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. Gulf & Western argued in the trial court that its exchange offer should be treated as unorthodox because there was no possibility for speculative abuse, thus reversing the usual order of analysis. The court responded that there was a possibility for speculative abuse without clearly articulating its reasons, and without considering the orthodox-unorthodox question. On the other hand, in Reliance the defendant's argument that it was not an insider and, therefore, not liable was rejected by the trial court on the ground that the transaction was a "simple, conventional acquisition of stock for cash."

The problem of subjecting tender offerors to liability in the face of the exemptive clause was recognized at least as early as 1968 when Manuel Cohen, then Chairman of the SEC, testified at the hearings on the Williams Act that 16(b) "is not as complete as a remedy for some of the takeover situation (sic) to which you have referred because some of them are made by persons who either were not more than 10% holders at the time of the acquisition or perhaps never reached that point . . . ."

In Reliance Emerson "invited tenders of up to 550,000 shares . . . reserving the right to purchase all shares tendered." When the offer expired Emerson elected to purchase the 152,282 shares that had been tendered. The court referred to this election as "the stock acquisition," apparently

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31. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970): "This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved . . . ."
32. See 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1069 (2d ed. 1961).
34. 372 F. Supp. 570 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
35. Id. at 576-79.
38. 306 F. Supp. at 589.
39. Id.
40. Id.
assuming that there was a single purchase at the time of acceptance of
tenders. Nevertheless, the court held that the purchase making Emerson a
ten percent holder was within 16(b).41 The court of appeals agreed with the
trial court's characterization of the facts42 and with the trial court's holding
as to the purchase.43 Since Reliance's petition for certiorari was limited to
the step-sale question, and no cross-petition was filed by Emerson on the
purchase question, the Supreme Court did not consider that question to be
before it.44

The problem was next considered by the trial court in Kern County.45
Occidental had offered to purchase up to 500,000 shares.46 The court's
findings of fact stated that "[b]y May 10, 1967, more than 500,000 shares of
Old Kern stock had been tendered to Occidental, enough to make Occiden-
tal a beneficial owner of more than 10 percent of Old Kern's issued and
outstanding stock."47 This is clearly a finding that Occidental became a
beneficial owner at the point of tender, and, therefore, that each tender
constituted a separate purchase under 16(b). Nevertheless, the court said in
its conclusions of law that by May 10 "[Occidental] had thus become, by
way of the single tender offer, the beneficial owner of more than 10 percent
of the capital stock of Old Kern . . . . The tender offer constituted a single
act of Occidental, whereby the company became a beneficial owner of more
than 10 percent of Old Kern's capital stock."48 The court cited cases on the
question of whether the purchase making one a ten percent holder is within
16(b).49 Therefore, the court apparently concluded, as had the court in
Reliance, that while only a single purchase was involved in the tender offer,
liability nevertheless attached where this purchase made the defendant a ten
percent holder. Occidental's appeal from this ruling was not discussed in the
decision of the court of appeals50 due to the court's reversal on other
grounds.51

Although the question was not before the Supreme Court in Kern because
of the defendant's victory in the court of appeals,52 the Court said: "Un-
questionably, one or more statutory purchases occur when one company,
seeking to gain control of another, acquires more than 10% of the stock of
the latter through a tender offer made to its shareholders."53

Finally, in Allis-Chalmers the Seventh Circuit did hold that an exchange
offer involved a single purchase and was within the exemptive clause. The
exemptive clause problem, however, had not been briefed,54 and the court

41. Id. at 589-90.
42. 434 F.2d 918, 920 (8th Cir. 1970).
43. Id. at 922-24.
44. See 404 U.S. at 421.
46. Id. at 574.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
49. Id.
51. Id. at 161 n.8.
52. The question of when Occidental became a "beneficial owner" was not raised. See
53. Id. at 584 (emphasis added).
54. Defendant argued that it was not an "insider" and referred to the exemptive clause
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...did not disclose its rationale for characterizing the offer as a single purchase. Therefore, it is not clear to what extent Allis-Chalmers would apply to other tender offers.

The Supreme Court's decision in Foremost-McKesson that an outsider's initial ten percent transaction is within the exemptive clause did not clarify the application of the exemptive clause to tender offers. The courts that have directly addressed the issue have agreed that a tender offer constitutes a single purchase, in which event, if it is the first purchase, it would fall within the exemptive clause under Foremost-McKesson. There is, however, contrary dictum in Kern, and whether the purchase is viewed as occurring on tender as in Kern, or on acceptance of tender as in Reliance, may be significant. The question must be considered open.

III. EXEMPTION FROM 16(b) OF SALES BY TENDER OFFERORS

The Supreme Court has shown an unwillingness to hold tender offerors liable under 16(b). In Reliance the Court followed an "objective" interpretation of 16(b) in permitting a tender offeror facing a defensive merger to minimize its liability by dividing its disposition into two transactions to avoid being a ten percent shareholder prior to the sale. This case is now superfluous in the light of Foremost-McKesson, because the last ten percent sold will now always be offset against the defendant's initial ten percent holding and will never result in liability.55

Pursuing a very different flexible approach to 16(b) in Kern, the Supreme Court went further in holding that neither the granting of an option nor the exchange of shares in a defensive merger by a tender offeror constituted 16(b) sales. In this case the Court was more plainly concerned with the problem of including tender offers within 16(b).56 The defendant57 and the court of appeals58 argued forcefully that imposing liability on tender offerors in a defensive merger situation would tip the delicate balance of power in a tender offer against the offeror, contrary to the interests of target shareholders and to the policy underlying the Williams Act to deal evenhandedly with tender offerors and target management.59 In the face of these arguments the Court said that "[i]f there are evils to be redressed by way of deterring those who would make tender offers, 16(b) does not appear to us to have been designed for this task."60

To say as the Second Circuit did in Crane that Kern created a special category under 16(b) for defensive mergers,61 may, however, be going too far. In Kern it was the defendant's lack of access to inside information and

58. 450 F.2d at 163-64.
59. See 113 CONG. REC. 24664 (1967) (remarks of Senator Williams in introducing the bill).
60. 411 U.S. at 597-98.
61. 510 F.2d at 1053.
inability to control the transaction that persuaded the Court not to impose liability. As the Court said: “We do not suggest that an exchange of stock pursuant to a merger may never result in Sec. 16(b) liability. But the involuntary nature of Occidental’s exchange, when coupled with the absence of the possibility of speculative abuse of inside information convinces us that Sec. 16(b) should not apply to transactions such as this one.” 62 A disposition in a defensive merger by a tender offeror that had some ability to control the transaction and some access to inside information may not be among “transactions such as this one” and would be within 16(b) under Kern. How little control or access the defendant must have to satisfy the Kern test is not clear.

With respect to what constitutes the requisite control under Kern, there is a question whether the test is satisfied even if an insider is able to prevent the transaction, although this might entail substantial cost and inconvenience. In Gold v. Sloan 63 a defendant was held not liable under Kern, although he cast the deciding vote for the merger, in part because “the practical disadvantages of [opposing the merger] appear so obvious as to have made unrealistic any assumption that he might have done so.” 64 In Makofsky v. Ultra Dynamics Corp., 65 and in the Ninth Circuit decision in Foremost-McKesson, 66 however, sufficient control was found under Kern where the defendants’ bargaining position gave them some voice in the terms and timing of the transactions, but where issuers had significantly greater leverage.

Access to inside information under Kern would seem to be something more than is implied from large stockholdings or official position since Occidental did acquire a more than ten percent interest in Old Kern at the latest upon conclusion of its first offer. 67 Therefore, Kern would arguably retain significance even after the holding in Foremost-McKesson that, at least as to large stockholders, technical insider status prior to the first purchase is a prerequisite for liability.

Some of the cases applying Kern have so interpreted it. In Gold the court distinguished between the chief operating officer who actually participated in negotiations with the issuer and the chairman of the board who did not. Crane held that a defendant which received information was not liable because it did not receive the information by virtue of a position in the company, even though it was a ten percent shareholder at the time.

On the other hand, it is not clear whether the defendant may be deemed to have access to information if it is only slightly closer to the source than was Occidental. In Provident, Gold, and Allis-Chalmers the courts found opportunities for 16(b)-type abuse under Kern on the part of defendants who did

62. 411 U.S. at 600.
64. Id. at 350.
66. 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974). See Brief of Respondent at 4-5, Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 93 U.S. 232 (1976), to the effect that the resale of stock was the result of the issuer’s insistence on using its own securities as part of the purchase price.
67. See Comment, Exchange of Stock Pursuant to a “Defensive Merger” is not a “Sale” Within the Meaning of Section 16(b), 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1100 (1972).
not have positions in the issuers, but merely conferred with the issuers’ non-hostile management in connection with acquisitions. In fact, the trial court in Allis-Chalmers said that there is sufficient access where the defendant is not “locked . . . outside so effectively that [it] . . . could not have acquired inside information had it wanted to.” These cases indicate that Kern may be satisfied if the defendant is in a position to receive information as a tippee.69

Kern would seem not to exempt a defendant who has access to inside information but no ability to control the transaction. Prior to Kern it had been recognized that an insider may make a short-swing profit by buying the security of one issuer knowing the nonpublic fact that the security might soon be exchanged for stock having a greater market value.70 That possibility of abuse of inside information exists as long as the merger does not involve the exchange of “economic equivalents,” or securities that are substantially the same from a market standpoint.71 Because the insider’s profits result from knowing at the time of the purchase that the merger will take place, it should make no difference whether the insider can control the closing transaction.72

Finally, the Kern rule clearly does not apply to orthodox transactions, and the argument that “forced” cash sales should be exempted from 16(b) has been consistently rejected.73 Therefore, Kern does not help tender offerors faced by such problems as the threat of an antitrust action, the application of the Investment Company Act of 1940,74 or pressing loan obligations.75

The Kern rule is, therefore, far from an exemption of all tender offers from 16(b). It is, rather, a rule of uncertain application which may amount to

68. 372 F. Supp. at 579.
69. See text accompanying notes 18-22 supra for an argument contra.
70. See Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d at 353-55; compare Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F.2d at 162-63. In the latter case the court distinguished Newmark on the ground that Occidental, unlike RKO, had no knowledge of the impending merger.
73. Contra, Makofsky v. Ultra Dynamics Corp., 383 F. Supp. at 640, in which the court would impose liability only upon a finding of some control over the transaction by defendant, and Weinstock, Section 16(b) and the Doctrine of Speculative Abuse: How to Succeed in Being Subjective Without Really Trying, 29 BUS. LAW. 1153 (1974), arguing that control should be the principal factor in determining whether the transaction is within 16(b).
74. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 1, at 192-200.
75. See id. at 41-45.
an exemption of some tender offers, but on which tender offerors would be ill-advised to rely.

IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION OF 16(b) TO PURCHASES IN TENDER OFFERS

As indicated above, there are two principal questions with respect to the application of 16(b) to tender offer purchases. First, are purchases in a tender offer by one whose pre-offer purchases did not exceed ten percent of a class of target securities excluded under the exemptive clause? Secondly, aside from the exemptive clause, may tender offer purchases be excluded from 16(b) under a "purpose" approach although they are cash-like, "orthodox," transactions?

A. The Time of Purchase and the Exemptive Clause

When the tender offer makes the purchaser a beneficial owner of more than ten percent of a class of the target's securities, the transaction will be exempt under *Foremost-McKesson* if the tender offer constitutes a single purchase. On the other hand, if the tender offer is viewed as a series of separate purchases, the tender offeror becomes a ten percent beneficial owner prior to its purchase of all the shares in the tender offer and its purchase of the remaining shares will be within the proscription of 16(b). A comparison of *Reliance* and *Kern* suggests that the courts will be more willing to view the tender offer as consisting of a single purchase if the purchases occur simultaneously, as, for example, where all tenders are accepted at one time. Therefore, an analysis of tender offers under the exemptive clause is necessary to determine precisely when the purchase takes place for 16(b) purposes.76

A 16(b) transaction has generally been deemed not to have occurred on passage of title, but rather when the opportunity for speculative abuse first arises. That, in turn, has been held to be when the parties' rights and obligations become fixed.77

The argument has been advanced that the purchase transaction should be deemed to occur as soon as the insider has obtained a binding option to buy at a certain price, since at that point he may sell knowing that a profit is assured.78 In recognition of this opportunity for speculation, the SEC con-

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76. Of course, the time of purchase also determines when a sale can be made without incurring liability under 16(b). The considerations in connection with determining the time of purchase under 16(b) do not differ according to whether an exemptive clause or length of period problem is involved.


siders an optionee to be a beneficial owner for reporting purposes under 16(a). In *Newmark v. RKO* the Second Circuit followed this reasoning in holding the defendant to be a beneficial owner for purposes of 16(b) as of when it acquired an option to purchase, so that defendant's first purchase was not exempt.80

There is also some authority that the transaction occurs when the insider is obligated to perform even if it does not have a right to performance. This result is more difficult to justify under 16(b) because unless the other party is committed to the transaction, the insider has no position in the security against which to engage in short-swing speculation.81 In *Provident*, however, the Ninth Circuit held that the sale by Provident to the underwriters took place on execution of the underwriting agreement rather than upon closing even though the underwriters had the benefit of an "out" clause and, therefore, were not irrevocably bound to perform until closing.82 The Supreme Court criticized this holding,83 but did not reach the issue. *Blau v. Allen*84 and *Bershad v. McDonough*85 also held that the granting of an option triggered liability, but did so on the ground that the transaction was really a disguised sale.86

Thus, a 16(b) transaction may be deemed to occur when the insider either has both binding rights and obligations or merely a right to performance. It probably does not occur when an insider has only an obligation to perform. But when do the respective parties in a tender offer become bound for purposes of 16(b)?

A binding contract is created upon the stockholder's tender of shares in response to a tender offer.87 Although many tender offers are styled "invitation for tenders,"88 and others that are styled "offer" also state that an agreement is created only upon acceptance by the purchaser,89 the usual tender offer is a true offer in that it displays an intention by the tender offeror to enter into a contract upon tender.90 Moreover, the mere existence of conditions precedent to the duty of one party to perform will not usually

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79. SEC rule 16a-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2 (1976). But see SEC rules 16b-3, 16b-6, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16b-3, 16b-6 (1976), for apparently conflicting positions, and the discussion at note 112 infra concerning the difference between the functions of 16(a) and 16(b).
80. Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d at 356. Although the court's reasoning as to the effect of the acquisition of the option appears sound, it is difficult to understand how an insider can be a "beneficial owner" prior to its first purchase, or, in other words, how there can be two first purchases.
82. 506 F.2d at 606-07.
83. 423 U.S. at 238-39 nn.7 & 8.
85. 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971).
88. See E. Aranow & H. Einhorn, supra note 1, at 69 n.18.
90. See R.E. Crummer & Co. v. Nuveen, 147 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1945); Restatement of Contracts § 25 (1932); 1 Williston on Contracts § 26 (3d ed. 1957).
prevent the formation of a contract, although the tender offeror may impose a condition which is clearly precedent not only to the creation of duties under the contract, but to the existence of the contract itself. This was the case in *Allis-Chalmers* in which the approval of Gulf & Western shareholders was necessary to validate the exchange offer.

The question of when a binding contract is formed must, however, be distinguished from the question of when the parties are irrevocably bound to perform under that contract. The tender offeror will rarely be irrevocably bound to perform prior to the time it actually purchases the shares by accepting tenders and paying for the stock. The offer will nearly always provide that the offeror’s obligation is subject to the nonoccurrence of a number of adverse events prior to the acceptance of tenders. This will especially be so following the decision in *Lowenschuss v. Kane* that a tender offeror that does not protect itself with such an “out” clause may be liable as a result of not proceeding with the offer even if the offer has been enjoined. Where the offer does contain an out clause, the nonoccurrence of any event specified in the clause prior to the acceptance of tenders is a condition precedent to the tender offeror’s duty of performance.

In the unlikely event that the offer does not contain an out clause, the offeror would be bound upon tender unless there were other conditions precedent to its duty of performance. Some offers do provide that the offeror is not bound to purchase any shares unless a certain minimum number are tendered; other offers limit the tender offeror’s obligation to a maximum number of shares, in which event the offer is required by the Williams Act to provide for the pro rata purchase of shares tendered within ten days after the beginning of the offer.

These conditions, however, tend to deter purchases by arbitrageurs, which are important to the success of most offers, and, thus, it is highly unlikely that a tender offeror would neglect to protect itself with an out clause while including one of the conditions just mentioned.

If, then, the transaction is deemed to occur for 16(b) purposes when the tender offeror is bound to perform, a 16(b) purchase in a tender offer will rarely occur before the tender offeror has actually accepted tenders. A

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93. Tender offers do not generally provide for a specific date by which tenders must be accepted, although tender offerors may not delay acceptance for an unreasonable amount of time. See *Salinger v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc.*, 324 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Pa. 1971); SEC proposed rule 144-2, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-12676, [1976] *Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)* § 80,659 (requiring the tender offeror to pay the offered consideration or return the securities within ten days after the termination of the offer). If the tender offeror does delay unreasonably, it would presumably be liable for damages resulting from the delay, but it would not at that point become bound to purchase the stock.

94. 520 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1975).


different conclusion is reached, however, if under *Newmark* the transaction is deemed to take place as soon as the shareholder becomes bound.

The shareholder is bound upon tender subject only to his right under section 14(d)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act\(^9\) to withdraw his shares at any time within seven days from the commencement of the offer. After the expiration of the seven-day period, the shareholder is bound even if the offeror is not.\(^9\) Since, as a result of the ten-day pro rata provision, a shareholder has little need to tender before the tenth day after the offer, many shareholders will wait further developments and tender near the end of the ten-day period, each becoming bound separately upon tender. Therefore, there is a greater likelihood that separate purchases will be deemed to take place under *Newmark* than if the purchase occurs when the tender offeror becomes bound by acceptance of tenders.\(^10\)

There are two considerations, however, which militate against deeming the transaction to take place either upon tender or on expiration of the withdrawal period. First, if the tender offeror is not an insider prior to the tender offer, the date of tender is not significant in terms of the tender offeror's opportunity for speculative abuse. The acquisition of a right to purchase stock may have a presumed effect on an insider's ability to use inside information, but does not necessarily confer access to information.\(^1\) Where a right to buy stock is acquired from the management or controlling stockholders of a corporation, the optionee then acquires leverage with those who control the flow of information, and as a prospective purchaser may become entitled to such information under the securities laws and the theory of common law fraud. The acquisition of rights from individual stockholders, however, effects no such change in the outside tender offeror's ability to obtain inside information.

The tender offer affects the outside tender offeror's access to inside information, if at all, only when the offer results in the winning of control from a hostile management. That does not occur at least until the tender offeror has the *irrevocable* power to vote the requisite number of shares. Even if the offeror requests the delivery of proxies with the transmittal of shares, the proxies will not be irrevocable until they are coupled with an interest in the company, which will not occur at least until the offeror has an obligation, rather than merely a right, to purchase the stock.\(^10\)

Secondly, there is support in the Supreme Court's decisions on 16(b) for

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\(^10\) This situation will be changed if the SEC promulgates proposed rule 14d-5(a), which makes the withdrawal period coextensive with the pro rata period. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-12676, [1976] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 80,659, at 86,698-99. Under that rule most tendering shareholders will become bound at once, upon expiration of the ten-day period, and there will arguably be a single purchase.

\(^1\) Compare *Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc.*, 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 400 U.S. 854 (1970), *with Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp.*, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 352 U.S. 831 (1956), in which the court refused to hold that the initial transaction took place upon the acquisition of a right to purchase the stock.

deeming the purchase to occur for 16(b) purposes on acceptance of tenders irrespective of when the opportunity for speculative abuse first arises. The Court has consistently construed 16(b) narrowly against liability. As noted above, the Court held in Reliance that when a 16(b) sale took place depended upon how the defendant structured its transaction. Most recently, in Foremost-McKesson, the Court justified its narrow construction of the exemptive clause in part by noting that "[i]t is inappropriate to reach the harsh result of imposing [section] 16(b)'s liability without fault on the basis of unclear language." Since the purchase takes place under the terms of the offer on acceptance of tenders, a narrow reading of the section would dictate that acceptance is when the purchase should be deemed to take place for purposes of 16(b).

There is, then, strong reason to believe that purchases in a tender offer do not occur for 16(b) purposes until the tender offeror's acceptance of tenders. If that is so, then the tender offeror that is not a ten percent shareholder prior to the offer can maximize the possibility that the transaction will be considered within the exemptive clause by accepting all the tenders at once, rather than separately as the tenders are made.

B. "Group" Purchases under 16(b)

Even if a tender offeror does not itself make purchases prior to the offer, the exemptive clause may not be applicable if the tender offeror can be held responsible for pre-offer purchases made by others.

To help ensure that the offer will succeed without expending its own funds, a tender offeror may employ various methods of putting target securities into friendly hands. These methods include formally agreeing to act in concert with another party in acquiring stock prior to the offer, sometimes committing itself to repurchasing the stock, or simply tipping institutional friends about the impending offer so that the institution will buy at low pre-offer prices with the purpose of tendering. The consequences under 16(b) of such practices are not clear.

Under the Williams Act purchases by separate individuals may be aggregated if the purchasers act as a "group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer." A group has been said to exist where there is an agreement to act together, irrespective of whether members of the group have beneficial ownership of or control over the stock held by others. In 1960 the SEC proposed a rule under 16(a), which was later withdrawn, that would have required joint reporting by "groups" defined in

103. See text at note 55 supra.
104. 423 U.S. at 244.
105. For descriptions of these activities, which have been referred to as "warehousing," and their legal consequences, see E. Aranow & H. Einhorn, supra note 1, at 25-29; Thomas, Warehousing, 3 Rev. Sec. Reg. 975 (1970); Institutional Investor Study Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2771-849 (1971).
language identical to that later adopted in the Williams Act.108

This group concept should not be carried over to 16(b). The pertinent provisions of the Williams Act are intended not to curb speculation by insiders, but simply to provide information about large accumulations of stock that may indicate a possible shift in corporate control.109 Although 16(a) is aimed at insider trading, it is intended primarily to force disclosure of aggregations of stock which may, but need not, involve violations of 16(b).110

Until recently, the courts have generally declined to make a defendant responsible under 16(b) for transactions or stockholdings of another unless the defendant not only reaped benefits from the stock, but exercised substantial control over it.111 The SEC, however, has regarded a person as beneficial owner of securities held by another for reporting purposes under 16(a) "if by reason of any contract, understanding, relationship, agreement or other arrangement he obtains therefrom benefits substantially equivalent to those of ownership."112

In *Whiting v. Dow Chemical Co.*113 the Second Circuit followed this rule in holding the defendant liable by reason of his wife's transactions when the transactions were jointly controlled but when the benefits were shared in the sense that the wife contributed to household expenses and to the joint estate. The court said that the reason for the SEC's rule was that the insider has an incentive to tip inside information when he will benefit,114 and that under the circumstances the present defendant could "use" inside information.115 *Whiting* was approved in *Altamil Corp. v. Pryor,*116 but in that case the husband did have control over the wife's transactions.

*Whiting* arguably supports the attribution of the "friends" transactions to the tender offeror. When purchases are made by allies of the tender offeror, "benefits substantially equivalent to those of ownership" are realized by the tender offeror, because the need of the tender offeror to raise funds with which to make the purchases itself is reduced.117 In such a situation the


113. 523 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1975).

114. Id. at 687.

115. Id. at 688.


tender offeror obviously has an incentive to tip inside information to the technical owner.

On the other hand, the realization of benefits sufficient to provide an incentive to tip information, or an ability to "use" inside information, without more, is probably not a sufficient basis for attributing the transactions of others to the tender offeror under 16(b). The question under 16(b) should not be whether outside tippees are likely to benefit from the insider's information, or whether the insider may, in general, "use" inside information, but whether the insider is able to realize short-swing profits by virtue of the tippees' purchases. The benefits accruing to the tender offeror from its friends' purchases are not such as to enable the tender offeror to realize profits from offsetting short-swing transactions, unlike the situation in Whiting in which the insider and his wife shared in the profit resulting from their transactions. Therefore, purchases by friends of the tender offeror should not be attributed to the tender offeror for purposes of 16(b). There is no assurance, however, that the courts will not follow Whiting to the opposite conclusion.

C. Tender Offers as Involving 16(b) "Purchases"

Although many tender offers will fall within the exemptive clause under the above analysis, tender offerors may still become ten percent shareholders before purchasing additional shares through pre-offer market purchases, multiple tender offers, or acceptance of tenders in separate transactions. Therefore, it is important to determine whether, aside from the exemptive clause, tender offers may properly be considered to be within 16(b).

As discussed above, a strong argument can be made that tender offers do not present the potential for 16(b)-type abuse regardless of whether they are made by outsiders or by 16(b) insiders. Under the approach that has generally been followed in applying 16(b), however, tender offers would be included within the section even if the courts agreed with this argument because a tender offer, as an "orthodox" transaction, would not be considered eligible for a purpose analysis.

The courts' refusal to look to legislative intent in applying 16(b) to cash transactions is essentially an application of the rule that courts should not construe a legislative provision contrary to its "plain meaning." The application of 16(b) according to its "plain meaning" makes no sense in this context. If the courts have assumed that merely because "purchase" generally includes bargained-for transactions, Congress necessarily intended 16(b) to include only such transactions, then the courts are incorrect. Congress never considered the applicability of 16(b) to tender offers. If Congress had considered this question, it would, as suggested above, have deemed the section inapplicable. The courts are also incorrect if they have concluded that what Congress intended is irrelevant in the face of the literal meaning of the provision. The letter of the statute should not prevail over

118. See notes 7-30 supra and accompanying text.
120. See notes 7-30 supra and accompanying text.
legislative intent. Certainly whether or not courts follow legislative intent should not depend on the form of the transaction. 121

There is ample authority for applying a statute in accordance with legislative intent but contrary to its "plain meaning." 122 Most notably, in a closely analogous situation, the Supreme Court decided in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman 123 that instruments denominated "stock" were not within the Securities Acts' definition of "security," even though "security" is defined to include "stock." 124 The Court stated:

[because securities transactions are economic in character Congress intended the application of these statutes to turn on the economic realities underlying a transaction, and not on the name appended thereto. Thus, in construing these Acts against the background of their purpose, we are guided by a traditional canon of statutory construction:

[that] a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers. 125

The "economic realities" are certainly no less important with respect to 16(b) than they were in Forman.

The courts should recognize that legislative intent may be taken into account irrespective of the form of the transaction, and exclude tender offer purchases from the operation of 16(b) on the ground that they do not involve a possibility for 16(b)-type abuse.

A better solution to the problem would be for the SEC to use its power under 16(b) to exempt transactions "not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection," 126 and promulgate a rule which exempts some or all tender offers, or at least clarifies the matter of when purchases in tender offers occur. Since tender offerors could rely on such a rule without fear of liability, 127 the rule would have the effect of creating much needed certainty in connection with the planning of business transactions.

Insofar as the power of the SEC to exempt tender offers is concerned, whether tender offers are within the literal language of 16(b) would be irrelevant. 128 On the other hand, at least one court has indicated that the SEC is not permitted to weigh the benefits and costs of bringing within 16(b) a transaction in which there is any possibility of speculative abuse. 129 Thus, a tender offer exemption might be struck down by a court that concluded that there is some possibility of 16(b)-type abuse in tender offers.

125. 421 U.S. at 849 (citations omitted).
V. Conclusion

The purpose of this Article was not to consider the question of whether tender offers should be regulated, but only whether they should be included within the narrow scope of 16(b). To require tender offerors to shape their activities in an effort to avoid 16(b) liability, or to disgorge their profits when they have not been nimble enough, is to exact a penalty without the corresponding benefit of deterring activities Congress has deemed harmful.

The formulation of general standards of liability under 16(b), particularly in *Kern*, has resulted in a lack of predictability in the administration of a statutory provision that was intended to be eminently predictable. Unpredictability may be, in general, a worthwhile price to pay for flexibility of operation, but it is unnecessary where a distinct type of transaction, such as the tender offer, can be recognized and dealt with in a rule of clear-cut applicability.
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