Freeing State Courts to Disregard Lower Federal Court Constitutional Holdings

Boyd Mangrum

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tests of the *Restatement* to the specific facts of the case before them. However, this procedure raises one interesting question. In *Hyde* the court was dealing specifically with a breach of confidence in the appropriation of the trade secret. Though the court in *Hyde* discusses the *Restatement* rule at length, the final holding still relied only on the breach-of-confidence section. This point is accentuated by the fact that since 1958 only one other Texas trade secret case has specifically mentioned the *Restatement* rule, and in that case it was not the basis of the holding because the trade secret issue was dismissed.\(^4\) Because *DuPont* was a case of first impression, however, the Fifth Circuit had to apply what it thought to be the relevant Texas law.\(^4\) *Hyde* is the only case that mentions a cause of action for discovery by improper means. Since *Hyde* used section 757 of the *Restatement* as the basis of its decision, the use of the *Restatement* itself is not without precedent. It seems that it is upon this precedent that the Fifth Circuit decided *DuPont*. In applying the rule to the facts of *DuPont*, however, the court proceeded to adopt an even broader test for “improper” than that used in the *Restatement*.\(^4\) With this decision the court took a large step toward establishing higher standards of commercial morality in the business world by opening the door to civil liability for commercial espionage. It is hoped that the Texas courts will follow this precedent.

*Bruce A. Cheatham*

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**Freeing State Courts To Disregard Lower Federal Court Constitutional Holdings**

Richard Lawrence was convicted in state court of violating a city ordinance against interfering with the duties of a police officer.\(^1\) The conviction was appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois. Before that court ruled on the appeal, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in an unrelated action, declared the ordinance unconstitutional and void on its face.\(^2\) Thereafter the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed Lawrence's conviction without mentioning the federal court's invalidation of the ordinance.\(^3\) Lawrence then attempted an appeal to the United States Supreme Court, but the Court dismissed the

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\(^{4}\) Judge Goldberg put the *Erie* question very stylistically: "This is a case of first impression, for the Texas courts have not faced this precise factual issue, and sitting as a diversity court we must sensitize our *Erie* antennae to divine what the Texas courts would do if such a situation were presented to them." 431 F.2d at 1014.

\(^{4}\) *RESTATEMENT OF TORTS* § 757, comment f at 10 (1939); see notes 21, 41 supra, and accompanying texts.

\(^{1}\) *CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE* ch. 11, § 33 (1966). The ordinance was a broad prohibition against resisting or interfering with a police officer or "offering or endeavoring to do so." This ordinance was repealed by the city of Chicago on March 26, 1968. *Landry v. Daley*, 410 F.2d 551, 552 (7th Cir. 1969).

\(^{2}\) *Landry v. Daley*, 280 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Ill. 1968). The appeal of this decision by the city of Chicago was dismissed because of mootness since the ordinance had been repealed. *Landry v. Daley*, 410 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1969).

appeal by treating the jurisdictional statement as a petition for a writ of
certiorari and then denying it. During his confinement Lawrence applied for
a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The writ was denied, and an
appeal was taken to the court of appeals. Held, affirmed: State courts are
not bound by decisions of the lower federal courts on federal constitutional
questions. United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir.

I. THE HISTORICAL DICHOTOMY

The constitutional power given Congress to establish a lower federal
judiciary was quickly exercised through the Judiciary Act of 1789, which
created a dual court system that has been the source of much friction. A fea-
ture of the dual court system as it has developed is that both state courts and
lower federal courts at times must rule on federal constitutional questions.
The early reservations about the creation of a lower federal judiciary, an
aspect of the general distrust of the new central government, were later
expressed in state assertions of the powers of nullification and interposition.
Although this states' rights attitude has endured, it has not prevented the
federal judiciary from being firmly established as a legitimate and authorita-
tive arm of the federal government. Federal jurisdiction and decision-making
power have been extended and delineated.

In the determination of federal rights under the Constitution it is no longer
disputed that under the supremacy clause the Supreme Court's decisions are
binding on all lower courts, both state and federal. What has never been

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2. As the court pointed out, in a particular dispute in which a lower federal court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, its adjudication is the law of the case
and thus binding. United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1076 (7th Cir.
1970); see Falgout v. People, 459 P.2d 572 (Colo. 1969). Another issue resolved by the
court, but not discussed in this Note, was the question of the mootness of the application
for a writ of habeas corpus. Lawrence had been released, but the court held that the appeal
was not moot because there were “potential disabilities or burdens” which might have re-
sulted from the conviction being on his record. Id. at 1074-75.
3. 13 U.S. CoNST. art. VI, § 2, which provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937), and Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S.
249 (1933) (declaratory judgments); Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593
(1926) (ancillary jurisdiction).
5. See, e.g., Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964); South Carolina v. Bailey,
289 U.S. 412 (1933); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209 (1914).
satisfactorily decided is the degree of authority with which lower federal courts speak in this area. The Supreme Court has not directly decided the matter, and there has been no real weight of authority established by lower court decisions.

II. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM

Two distinct general approaches seem to have been applied in regard to this problem area. First, judicial and statutory means of avoiding friction between federal and state courts have limited the incidence of cases presenting the question. Secondly, the issue has been expressly confronted in a sparse and inconsistent line of federal and state decisions.

Begging the Question. Perhaps the explanation for the paucity of authority on the question of the binding effect of lower federal court decisions is that traditionally direct conflicts have been avoided by the use of judicial abstention. The question of the duty of a state court to follow a lower federal court decision will not arise when the federal court abstains from the case, even though it has jurisdiction. A leading example of such forbearance is Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., in which a state action was being challenged in federal court on constitutional grounds, but there were questions of state law which might have made unnecessary any determination of constitutionality. The Court ordered the trial court to abstain, but to retain jurisdiction until the state court ruled on the state matters. Clearly such abstention would not be appropriate in a case in which the state statute would be unconstitutional no matter how the state court interpreted it, nor when the matters of state law are clear. Another possibly important exception to abstention is in cases in which "statutes are justifiably attacked on their face as abridging free expression, or as applied for the purpose of discouraging protected activities." The abstention doctrine is not statutory; it is rather
a developing judicial policy, a "judge-fashioned vehicle for according appropriate deference to the respective competence of the state and federal court systems."21

There have been several attempts by Congress to limit the area of state-federal judicial friction. Since 1793 the enjoining of state proceedings by federal courts has been restricted.22 The applicability of these statutes has not been free from ambiguity.23

The three-judge court acts provide for a special court of three judges, with direct appeal to the Supreme Court, when an injunction is sought against the enforcement of state statutes by state officers.24 Three judges are required only when injunctive relief is sought; therefore, a single federal judge can declare a statute unconstitutional when it is challenged but restraint against its enforcement is not sought.25

While the doctrine of abstention and the statutes mentioned have limited and defined the areas in which lower federal courts may act to obstruct state enforcement of challenged state laws, they have only avoided the question of the duty of a state court to follow a lower federal court's constitutional holding.

Facing the Problem Squarely. The question does not seem to have been considered extensively in the federal courts; however, the Fourth Circuit has held that "state courts may for policy reasons follow the decisions of the Court of Appeals whose circuit includes their state . . . [but] they are not obliged to do so."26 Prior to Lawrence this decision stood alone in the federal courts.

The state courts have not failed to consider the question, but they have failed to establish any clear weight of authority.27 Most of the decisions are terse and conclusory. For instance, the Oklahoma court of criminal appeals has declared it to be "axiomatic that in a case involving an interpretation of federal statutes . . . state courts of last resort are bound by all pertinent applicable federal statutes and decisions . . . ."28 Some state courts have based their decisions on policy rationale. The Supreme Court of California has stated:

Any rule which would require the state courts to follow in all cases the decisions of one or more lower federal courts would be undesirable, as it would have the effect of binding the state courts where neither the reasoning nor the number of federal cases is found persuasive. Such a rule would not sig-

26 Owsley v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 804, 805 (4th Cir. 1965).
27 The state authority is analyzed in Annot., 147 A.L.R. 857 (1943).
significantly promote uniformity in federal law, for the interpretation of an Act of Congress by a lower federal court does not bind other federal courts except those directly subordinate to it. 29

On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has reasoned that forum shopping would result were a state court not bound to follow a clear prior federal court holding. 30 The court held that, lacking a Supreme Court decision in point, the Third Circuit is the “ultimate arbiter in Pennsylvania” on federal questions. 31 The Supreme Court of Michigan has “adhered to the rule that a State court is bound by the authoritative holdings of Federal courts upon Federal questions.” 32 The court added, however, that when “the Federal circuit courts of appeals themselves are in disagreement upon the proper interpretation of a Federal act,” it feels free to select the interpretation which seems most reasonable. 33

An examination of the federal and state decisions reveals that there is a deep split in the authorities and that the analyses used by the courts in deciding the question have not been satisfactory.

III. UNITED STATES EX REL. LAWRENCE V. WOODS

The Seventh Circuit in Lawrence held that state courts are not bound by constitutional holdings of lower federal courts. The court “found no federal court decisions dealing directly with the point.” 34 Thus the 1965 Fourth Circuit opinion 35 and past Supreme Court dicta on the effect of the supremacy clause 36 were ignored. The court instead briefly mentioned the split in the

29 Rohr Aircraft Corp. v. County of San Diego, 51 Cal. 2d 759, 764, 336 P.2d 521, 524 (1959), rev’d on other grounds, 362 U.S. 628 (1960). See also People v. Bradley, 1 Cal. 3d 80, 460 P.2d 129, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1969). One writer has agreed with the court: The policy of uniformity which prompted the ruling in the Erie case does not militate against the conclusion that lower federal court decisions need have no more than persuasive effect in the state courts . . . . Whichever forum, state or federal, is chosen, the same opportunity for ultimate resolution by the Supreme Court is available. The uniformity thus assured prevents advantage being taken of temporary disharmony between state and lower federal court decisions.


30 Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 213 A.2d 670 (1965). A contrary opinion has been expressed: Evidently the prevention of forum shopping is not a factor in the federal rights situation. In FELA cases, in fact, Congress seems to have encouraged forum shopping for plaintiffs by granting concurrent jurisdiction to state courts. Actually, the federal-rights doctrine amounts to a sort of money-back guarantee to such a forum shopper. If a plaintiff picks a state court but it turns out that he made a mistake, he can rely on federal procedure to help bail him out.


31 213 A.2d at 672.


33 105 N.W.2d at 48. See also Robertson Lumber Co. v. Progressive Contractors, Inc., 160 N.W.2d 61 (N.D. 1968).

34 432 F.2d 1072, 1075 (7th Cir. 1970).

35 See note 26 supra, and accompanying text.

36 See note 13 supra.
state courts on the question, and then chose to adopt the view of the New Jersey and Iowa state courts. The decision does not make clear the magnitude of the split on the matter in the state courts, nor does it detail the various rationales used by the state courts in deciding the matter.

Deciding not to treat the issue in the context of the historical conflict between state and federal courts, the court thus omitted any reference to abstention or to the statutory restrictions mentioned above. Nor was any policy argument advanced. The reasoning used was simply that Supreme Court rulings on federal questions are binding on state and federal courts, but that since lower federal courts exercise no appellate jurisdiction over state courts, the decisions of lower federal courts are not binding on state courts. Thus, state courts may disregard prior lower federal court determinations of federal questions, and questioned state conduct such as that involved in Lawrence v. Woods may continue until it is specifically enjoined or until the state statute being enforced is held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

IV. CONCLUSION

In a two-page portion of the Lawrence opinion the Seventh Circuit cursorily disposed of an extremely important constitutional issue. The decision seems to raise more questions than it answers. When a lower federal court has declared a state statute unconstitutional, should not the decision be binding on the state courts if the state does not appeal the decision? If the Supreme Court denies certiorari, are the state courts free to disregard the lower federal courts? What about the proposition that since a federal circuit court encompasses the entire state, its ruling should be binding on the state's courts? The court did not discuss these questions. The attitude of the court seems to have been that if a complainant chooses to have his federal rights determined in a federal court, he must be able to persuade the court to grant an injunction against the enforcement of the state statute (something federal judges are naturally reluctant to do) or else he must see that the case gets to the Supreme Court (something which he has little control over).

The failure of the Seventh Circuit to weigh any policy considerations in its decision seems most unfortunate. Surely uniformity of federal law would...