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Corporations — Common Law Liabilities for Insider Trading

Defendants, directors of a corporation whose stock was traded over the counter, allegedly acted on inside information of a decline in corporate earnings when they sold on the market stock from their personal holdings. Other stockholders, admittedly not purchasers from defendants, brought a derivative action for an accounting of the insiders' profits. The trial court dismissed for failure to state a cause of action and the appellate division reversed. Held, affirmed: Officers and directors may be liable at common law to their corporation, whether or not it suffers harm, for profits taken in stock transactions which result from use of inside information. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).

I. DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF DIRECTORS
DEALING IN COMPANY SHARES

A director's relation to his corporation or its shareholders is that of agent and, in some cases, trustee. His position is generally one of fiduciary obligation, but more specific implications of a director's trustee or agent status vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. When, on his own behalf, a director deals with a third party, whether or not a shareholder, in the stock of a corporation he directs, there are several views of his duties and potential liabilities.

No Fiduciary Duties. In some jurisdictions, a director has no fiduciary duty, either to the corporation or its shareholders, in the sale or purchase of stock with third parties. This rule has been called one of "unconscionable laxity," but it has had wide acceptance. It was the early New York rule, announced in Carpenter v. Danforth. There the court held

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1 Pleadings showed the amount in question to be about $800,000. Profits were computed as the difference between what defendants sold for and the market value of the stock after disclosure. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 80 (1969).
3 Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222, 234 (N.Y. Ch. 1832), citing the dictum by Chancellor Kent in Attorney-General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 371, 389 (N.Y. Ch. 1817); see 3 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 838 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Fletcher].
4 See Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 500 (1966); Annot., 84 A.L.R. 615 (1933).
6 H. Ballantine, Corporations § 80, at 213 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Ballantine].
8 52 Barb. 181 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868).
that before a director might be held liable to the stockholders with whom he dealt, he must be shown to have been guilty of "actual, positive" fraud, relied upon by the other party. The case involved a face-to-face transaction, but it presumably announced a rule for market transactions also. The court noted that in transactions on public stock exchanges, there could be no reliance and thus no liability, inasmuch as parties trade with an eye to market price of stocks as distinguished from real value based on the knowledge of insiders.

The rule that directors have no fiduciary duties in the trading of shares, either to the corporation or to individual shareholders, is supported by several arguments. One rationale is that since corporations ordinarily have no interest in their own shares and since the trusteeship of the director extends only so far as the corporation's business interests, the director's dealings in his corporation's shares are without the scope of the fiduciary relation. Another rationale is that stockholders are able to protect themselves by inspecting corporate books and records before trading. Critics of this view have noted that for large, publicly-traded corporations, such an inspection is hardly practical. On the other hand, for such corporations, insider trading has been suggested as an efficient means of entrepreneurial reward for employees.

Fiduciary Duty to Individual Shareholder. The fiduciary obligation of the director has sometimes extended to the individual shareholder for whose benefit the corporation's activities are conducted. Two standards of disclosure have come to reflect a rule that directors who trade with other stockholders owe a fiduciary duty to them as individuals. The "special facts" doctrine requires disclosure by the selling or purchasing director of any "special facts" affecting stock values. The "minority" doctrine imposes upon the director a duty to disclose all material information. The

9 Id. at 587.
12 Dunnett v. Arn, 71 F.2d 912, 918 (10th Cir. 1934).
13 Manne 131-45.
two standards are said to reach the same result in the cases, but the "special facts" doctrine is considered the less burdensome for the director. Under either doctrine, an injured stockholder may rescind his transaction or recover profits related to the breach of duty. The rule is one of fairness to the stockholder who is in a weak bargaining position, especially the stockholder of a publicly-traded company. Recovery by the individual stockholder prevents the accrual to directors of gains that belong to all stockholders. In close corporations, where the relationship of stockholders is often very similar to that of partners, the rule imposing fiduciary duties on stockholders inter sese has the same salutary effects it has in partnership law.

New York adopted the "special facts" doctrine first by a holding in a close corporation case, and subsequently in the cautious dictum of Fischer v. Guaranty Trust Co. In Fischer, the plaintiff sought recovery on behalf of the estate of a decedent who had purchased stock for a trivial sum and later resold it for a large sum which might have been larger had she been fully apprised of information affecting the stock value. About ten years after the stockholder died, a suit was brought on behalf of her estate by attorneys who were, but for the suit, strangers to the estate. The court noted that under the facts of the case it was faced with a "clearly ... champertous venture" and held against the individual stockholders, but conceded the possibility of a recovery in other circumstances.

Fiduciary Duty to Corporation. Federal statutes permit certain corpora-

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16 Seitz v. Fry, 152 Minn. 170, 188 N.W. 266 (1922); FLETCHER § 1168.2, at 861; Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who Purchase Shares, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 53, 59-63 (1960).
17 BALLANTINE § 80, at 213.
19 Dunnett v. Arn, 71 F.2d 912, 918 (10th Cir. 1934).
22 Saville v. Sweet, 234 App. Div. 236, 254 N.Y.S. 768 (1932), aff'd, 262 N.W. 567, 188 N.E. 67 (1933). During negotiations for the purchase of a controlling block of stock, the defendant officers had understated corporate earnings. The court said:

"It is not necessary to establish a technical case of fraud and deceit. The relation between plaintiff and defendants was like that of a fiduciary. Defendants were directors and officers of a very small corporation, whose stock was not listed or traded anywhere, whose business was small and known only to themselves, and who, in purchasing control from the plaintiff, were under a duty to disclose to her the full facts of the condition of the company . . . ."

tions to recover profits from short-swing trading by specified insiders.\textsuperscript{26} Such recovery is founded on a policy favoring fair trading for the public.\textsuperscript{27} Civil relief for violation of rule 10b-5 is available to traders in the stock of any corporation, regardless of size or number of stockholders,\textsuperscript{28} but seems permissible in favor of a corporation only if the corporation has been a seller or a purchaser.\textsuperscript{29} Thus, in companies not of a certain size\textsuperscript{30} federal law does not create any liability running from the director to the corporation for trading with third parties.

Two common law theories support the imposition upon a director of a fiduciary duty to his corporation in his stock transactions with third parties. The first, recognized judicially,\textsuperscript{31} applies the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation in the situation in which the corporation is engaged in stock transactions with the public. The director violates his duty of loyalty because his trading may be in competition with the corporation's market activity. In \textit{Brophy v. Cities Service Co.}\textsuperscript{32} a corporate officer's secretary had knowledge of a company's plans to purchase its own shares in the market and the secretary made purchases for himself before the company acquisitions began. His subsequent gains from appreciation in the stock's price were recoverable by the corporation regardless of whether it suffered loss, under the principle that an agent is not to derive any secret profit from information taken in confidence and in the course of his agency. The Delaware court noted that in the absence of special circumstances, corporate fiduciaries were free to trade in corporate stock, but the court held that the company's plans to purchase stock in the market were such special circumstances. Since the action was for unjust enrichment, no loss to the corporation needed to be shown.

The absence of a requirement for damages underscores the preventive policy equity adopts in dealing with conflicts of interest in fiduciary relations. Equity interests itself only in the possibility of conflict of personal interest and fiduciary duty.\textsuperscript{33} Protection of the fiduciary relation, once it is recognized to exist, has often aroused the conscience of the chancellor,\textsuperscript{34} and not surprisingly, an award for punitive damages has been allowed for breaches of fiduciary duty involving stock transactions.\textsuperscript{35}
The second common law theory supporting liability to the corporation for profits taken in trading on inside information is that the corporation has a property interest in the information. Judicially, this principle has been recognized when there has been a diversion of corporate opportunity, or at least a diversion of information useful to the corporation in the conduct of its profit-making activities. Commentators have advanced the theory in favor of a corporate recovery, as opposed to recovery by outside traders, in insider trading cases. Their argument has been that recovery by outside traders in an established market gives them a windfall for the fortuity of having traded with insiders. A practical argument rests on the difficulty, stemming from stock exchange mechanics, of linking insiders to any particular transaction.

Duty to Both Stockholders and Corporations. A New York court suggested in Von Au v. Augenheimer that when directors willfully drove down the price of stock by circulating false rumors of a company's weakened condition, a recovery might be had by both the corporation (for any damage to its credit) and stockholders (for the depressed value of their stock). Liability to both corporation and stockholder would also seem to be possible under existing law in the situation in which, without positive fraud, an insider with information of his corporation's plans for purchase or sale of its own stock, traded or sold to third parties.

II. Diamond v. Oreamuno

The New York court of appeals forged an unprecedented holding in Diamond v. Oreamuno by bringing together established principles of common law, the sentiment of decisions applying federal securities law, and a remedy created by federal legislation for conduct related to, but not the same as, the conduct in Diamond.

Citing a number of cases based on the fiduciary duties of agents or trustees, the court stated the "general proposition, that [one who] acquires special knowledge or information by virtue of a confidential or fiduciary relationship . . . is not free to exploit that knowledge for his own benefit.

Holloway opinion does not rest on the "inside" nature of the information used by directors, but rather on the directors' breaches of fiduciary duty not to compete with the corporation.

E.g., Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. 138, 2 A.2d 225 (Ch. 1938), aff'd, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 103 (Sup. Ct. 1939).


This result might be possible in Texas. Cf. International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1963); Westwood v. Continental Can Co., 80 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1935). The latter case seems to adopt the special facts doctrine for Texas.

Note, infra note 38, at 308.


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benefit but must account to his principal for any profits derived there-
from." The court reasoned that since corporate directors are fiduciaries, 
as knowledge of a decline in company earnings can be acquired by vir-
tue of their fiduciary relation, then the directors must account to the 
corporation for any profits derived from that knowledge.

The court said that the concepts underlying a recovery on behalf of 
the corporation were "hardly . . . new" citing, inter alia, Brophy v. Cities 
Service Co.7 and section 16b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. How-
ever, these authorities scarcely detract from the newness of the Diamond 
holding. Brophy, on its face, applies only to the special circumstances 
rased by a corporation's plans to purchase its own shares.8 Section 16b of 
the Securities Exchange Act applies to only one type of market manipula-
tion (short-swing trading), only to corporations of a certain size and dis-
persed ownership, and only to certain insiders of those corporations.9 The 
court itself recognized that the primary policy supporting section 16b 
was protection of the investing public.

The court supported its proposition that the corporation might re-
cover whether or not it suffered loss10 by citing the Restatement (Second) 
of Agency section 38811 and cases from the law of trusts, agency, and cor-
porations.12 The Restatement, comment (e),13 does lend weight to the 
holding in Diamond, but heretofore no cases had lent weight to the Re-
statement in the area of directors' liabilities in stock transactions with 
third parties.14 Indeed, the widely spoken dictum that no loss is required 
on the part of the corporation is supported more by the logic of the pre-
ventive policy involved than by the facts of particular cases.15 In any 

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\[\text{Footnotes:}\]

3 Fletcher § 884, at 290, cites a number of precedents for the proposition that harm to
event, cases in which the no-loss language is invoked must reach the question of liability without loss only after a determination that the requisite fiduciary relation exists with respect to any given transaction. In applying the rule that no loss is required, the court cited a trusts case of its own, but did not mention the distinction made in that case between the fiduciary duties of the trustee and the corporate director.\footnote{66}

The court recognized that its result includes the possibility of double liability for the director, but it reasoned that the likelihood of a suit by purchasers is "quite remote."\footnote{67} In the argument of this case defendants admitted liability to purchasers, and such liability would appear to be likely in a federal action.\footnote{68} Liability to purchasers could also apparently be established under New York law,\footnote{69} but the Diamond opinion does not consider the relation of its holding to the possibility of recovery under the "special facts" doctrine. Perhaps the court paid indirect attention to the implications of its earlier precedents, when it conceded the possibility of superior claims by third parties and hinted that while the defendants might be subject to more than one suit, liability would not be "double" if the corporation's recovery were diminished by amounts refunded to injured purchasers.\footnote{70}

The court reasoned that the existence of an extensive federal statutory scheme did not weigh against the fashioning of new state remedies.\footnote{71} The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 specifically preserves any remedies which might exist at law or in equity,\footnote{72} and civil relief under rule 10b-5 is yet so undeveloped as not to deter the development of possibly concurrent state remedies.\footnote{73}

\footnote{66} The corporation is immaterial, but most of the cases state the rule without applying it. Higgins v. Shenango Pottery Co., 256 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1958) (diversion of corporate opportunity to partnership composed of officers and directors); Fleishhacker v. Blum, 109 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1940) (bank president took bonus for making a loan); Pratt v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 100 F.2d 833 (10th Cir. 1938) (geologist took interest in mineral leases for self); Western States Life Ins. Co. v. Lockwood, 166 Cal. 185, 155 P. 496 (1913) (director coerced secret profit from seller of plaintiff corporation's stock); Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. 138, 2 A.2d 225 (Ch. 1938), aff'd, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 103 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (diversion of corporate opportunity); Hoyt v. Hampe, 206 Iowa 206, 214 N.W. 718 (1927) (defendant directors diverted corporate funds to third-party purchaser of their stock in plaintiff corporation); Bromschwig v. Carthage Marble & White Lime Co., 334 Mo. 319, 66 S.W.2d 889 (1933) (defendant used corporate funds without paying interest to purchase stock in corporation); Lutherland, Inc. v. Dahlen, 352 Pa. 143, 53 A.2d 143 (1947) (defendant insider diverted to other corporations advantages arising from defaulted lease); Bailey v. Jacobs, 325 Pa. 187, 189 A. 320 (1937) (diversion of corporate funds to divert a corporate opportunity); Bird Coal & Iron Co. v. Humes, 157 Pa. 278, 27 A. 750 (1893) (director took profit from corporation's lessee).

\footnote{67} In re Bond & Mortgage Guar. Co., 303 N.Y. 923, 103 N.E.2d 721, 726 (1952). Attorneys for trustee on mortgage bonds were disqualified from taking a fee because they dealt in the certificates under the mortgage. The attorneys had the same duty not to do business with the trust as the trustees themselves. Citing Fischer v. Guaranty Trust Co., 259 App. Div. 176, 18 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1940), aff'd, 285 N.Y. 629, 248 N.E.2d 910, 914, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 85 (1969), the court said, "Such a situation is not comparable to the one now before us."


\footnote{69} 248 N.E.2d at 914, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 84.

\footnote{70} See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.

\footnote{71} 248 N.E.2d at 916, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 86.

\footnote{72} 248 N.E.2d at 914, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 84.


Diamond v. Oreamuno creates a new liability for corporate directors. It brings the common law and equity treatment of all corporate insiders to the point reached for some insiders under federal law. That point is one at which it is perilous for a director to trade at all in the stock of a corporation he directs. There are good reasons for closely limiting the Diamond holding to its facts. If the decision does not create a likelihood of double liability, it at least prepares the track for a race to the courthouse. The court did not consider the hardships it may visit on a corporation which recovers as in Diamond, only to face a later suit by those with a superior claim. The Diamond rule is clearly inapposite when, in a close corporation, an insider's purchases in breach of his duty establish for him such an ownership position that recovery by the corporation would largely inure to his benefit. The rule in any case would not be comforting to the stockholder who sold to an insider trading in violation of an alleged duty. For close corporations, an extension of the Diamond principle beyond the field of securities transactions would seem unfortunate in light of a frequent identity of interests of stockholders and the corporation, and in light of the absence of a strong public interest such as supports the parallel corporate recovery under federal law. Finally, it may be said that at some juncture, it will be undesirable to inject into the marketplace a rule against the morals thereof.

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64This possibility is recognized in N.Y.S.E., THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR AND THE INVESTING Public 12 (1962).
65See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
66Cf. Providence Trust Co. v. Geyer, 248 Pa. 423, 94 A. 77 (1915), in which defendant insiders bought corporate stock at par and sold it to X group at par plus $14. The court ruled that the defendants' held their profits in trust for stockholders at the time of their purchase from the corporation, since a recovery by the corporation would only benefit X group.
67RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388, comment (c) (1958), suggests the possible and unfortunate breadth of the Diamond holding: "[W]here a corporation has decided to operate an enterprise at a place where land values will be increased because of such operation, a corporate officer who takes advantage of his special knowledge to buy land in the vicinity is accountable for the profit he makes, even though such purchases have no adverse effect upon the enterprise." Such an application of Diamond would seem to take the director's liability beyond that of the strict trustee. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 203, comment (e) (1959).
An honest director would be in a difficult situation if he could neither buy nor sell on the stock exchange . . . stock in his corporation without first seeking out the other . . . ultimate party . . . and disclosing to him everything which a court or jury might later find that he then knew affecting the real or speculative value of such shares. Business of that nature is a matter to be governed by practical rules. Fiduciary obligations of directors ought not to be made so onerous that men of experience and ability will be deterred from accepting such office. Law in its sanctions is not co-extensive with morality.