Abstract
Power analysis attacks exploit the correlation between the information processed by an electronic system and the power consumption of the system. By powering an electronic system with an optical power source, we can prevent meaningful information from being leaked to the power pins and captured in power traces. The relatively constant current draw of the optical power source hides any variability in the power consumption of the target system caused by the logic gates' switching activity of the system as observed at the power pins. This thesis will provide evidence to show that using an optical power source should make it impossible for an attacker to extract meaningful information from the power trace of the monitored system, as measured at the power pins.
Degree Date
Fall 2021
Document Type
Thesis
Degree Name
M.S.
Department
Computer Science and Engineering
Advisor
Jennifer Dworak
Second Advisor
Gary Evans
Third Advisor
Scott McWilliams
Fourth Advisor
Frank Coyle
Subject Area
Computer Engineering
Format
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License
Recommended Citation
Tumac, Remus Valentin, "Using a Light-Based Power Source to Defeat Power Analysis Attacks" (2021). Computer Science and Engineering Theses and Dissertations. 22.
https://scholar.smu.edu/engineering_compsci_etds/22
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