Computer Law Review and Technology Journal
Abstract
The Trademark Act of 19461 codified select portions of the common law on trademark and unfair competition. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, as it is more commonly known, protects consumers and competitors from the "reverse passing off' of one's work as another's. In Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., the United States Supreme Court recently considered whether section 43(a) prohibits the unattributed copying of works available in the public domain. The Ninth Circuit had found that Fox could bring a claim against Dastar (which had copied and repackaged without attribution a Fox video series) under the Lanham Act, even in the absence of an enforceable copyright. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court considered the meaning of the term "origin" as used in the Lanham Act, ultimately holding that, in this context, the term refers to the "producer of the tangible goods... offered for sale," and not the author of the idea contained or otherwise embodied within. The Court reasoned that while copyright law exists to protect authors, the Lanham Act primarily exists to protect consumers from confusion in the marketplace caused by manufacturers' false claims. Broadly interpreting the term "origin" to include authors would misconstrue the statutory language, disregard the history and purpose of the Act, conflict with and dangerously extend federal copyright law, and cause serious practical problems for enforcement and the Court's own precedent. Preserving the essential free marketplace of ideas, the Court in this case scored a direct hit in favor of artists and creators. The Court also seized a valuable opportunity to temper the increasingly inappropriate application of the Lanham Act to parties and practices beyond any possible Congressional intent.
Recommended Citation
Carrie Jones,
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
8
Computer L. Rev. & Tech. J.
445
(2004)
