Power analysis attacks exploit the correlation between the information processed by an electronic system and the power consumption of the system. By powering an electronic system with an optical power source, we can prevent meaningful information from being leaked to the power pins and captured in power traces. The relatively constant current draw of the optical power source hides any variability in the power consumption of the target system caused by the logic gates' switching activity of the system as observed at the power pins. This thesis will provide evidence to show that using an optical power source should make it impossible for an attacker to extract meaningful information from the power trace of the monitored system, as measured at the power pins.

Degree Date

Fall 2021

Document Type


Degree Name



Computer Science and Engineering


Jennifer Dworak

Second Advisor

Gary Evans

Third Advisor

Scott McWilliams

Fourth Advisor

Frank Coyle

Subject Area

Computer Engineering



Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License

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