Abstract
In this thesis, I use both theoretical and experimental methods to investigate incentive mechanisms of the sort commonly used by firms and governments. I have finished three chapters, two of which focus on how firms choose the appropriate incentive mechanisms to motivate their employees and the other one investigates how governments design mechanisms to improve social welfare. Chapter two provides a novel explanations why stock options are widely used in executive incentive contracts. Chapter three titled ``Ask Your Workers to Report Frequently, But Not Too Often'' studies how having employees reporting their progress to supervisors affects the employees' work effort. Chapter four entitled ``Arbitrage Opportunities: Anatomy and Remediation'' (jointly with Peter Bossaerts and Jason Shachat) introduces a experiment design to investigate how to eliminate persistent arbitrage opportunities in asset markets by regulating or deregulating market restrains.
Degree Date
Winter 12-2019
Document Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Department
Economics
Advisor
Tim Salmon
Second Advisor
Bo Chen
Third Advisor
Saltuk Ozerturk
Fourth Advisor
Danila Serra
Subject Area
Economics
Number of Pages
126
Format
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License
Recommended Citation
Xie, Kuangli, "Three essays on Incentive Mechanisms" (2019). Economics Theses and Dissertations. 9.
https://scholar.smu.edu/hum_sci_economics_etds/9
