SMU Law Review
Abstract
At the end of last term, Groff v. DeJoy “clarified” an earlier Supreme Court decision that had largely nullified Title VII’s duty that employers reasonably accommodate their workers’ religious practices by virtue of a very broad interpretation of a statutory exception. That exception permitted denying accommodation when the result would be “undue hardship,” and the Court in the earlier case had described that defense as triggered whenever the accommodation would impose “more than de minimis” costs. This atextual reading had the effect of largely erasing the duty, and over time became increasingly out of sync with the Court’s religious liberties decisions in other areas of the law. Groff corrected this result both by reading “undue hardship” to mean “substantial” costs and by excluding from the calculus costs to coworkers when the business itself remained unaffected. The result is a sea change in Title VII’s approach to religion. Groff, however, left important issues in its wake, including the fundamental questions of what it means to accommodate and which party has the burden of proving what. These issues could be largely ignored under a regime in which almost any meaningful accommodation was an undue hardship, but they will inevitably rise to prominence now that employers have lost their “get out of jail free” card. This article therefore undertakes a fresh look at Title VII in a post-Groff era. It concludes that, depending on the interpretation of “reasonable” accommodations, Title VII may radically transform the American workplace to render it much more hospitable to religious workers. That, however, is not an unmixed blessing since it may increase religious frictions.
Recommended Citation
Charles A. Sullivan,
Accommodating Religion After Groff,
77
SMU L. Rev.
655
(2024)
