Prestige, Intrafirm Tournaments and Failure Aversion in Corporate Decisions

Authors

Todd T. Milbourn, Southern Methodist University (SMU) - SMU Cox School of BusinessFollow
Anjan V. Thakor, Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School; Financial Theory Group; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Laboratory for Financial EngineeringFollow
Richard L. Shockley, Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of FinanceFollow

Publication Date

2-1-1999

Abstract

The pervasive "tournament" style of organization is beneficial in that it allows shareholders to place the most talented managers in senior positions. We demonstrate that this benefit is achieved only at a cost: competition for promotions to prestigious positions induces excessive failure aversion among competing managers. Failure aversion emanates from the interaction between the huge rewards promised to the winning manager (the CEO) - the "winner-take-all" phenomenon - and the limited opportunities for managers to influence perceptions about their abilities. Failure aversion in turn corrupts corporate decisions, resulting in distorted project and effort choices. Importantly, it may not be possible to remove the resulting distortions through wage contracts as the organization architecture itself creates implicit contracts that constrain the efficacy of explicit compensation contracts.

Document Type

Article

Disciplines

Finance

DOI

10.2139/ssrn.160256

Source

SMU Cox: Finance (Topic)

Language

English