SMU Law Review Forum
Abstract
This Essay analyzes Donald Trump’s erosion of checks and balances during his presidency and how President Trump will likely seek to complete their collapse if he regains power. Its First Part shows that congressional willingness to check presidential abuses of power declined during Trump’s presidency and will likely get much weaker in a second term. It also shows that President Trump figured out how to evade checks and balances from Congress in his first term and examines his plans to further usurp congressional powers. Part Two looks at the judicial role in facilitating or checking presidential power through a lens sharpened by an effort to understand how checks and balances might collapse. This Essay’s analysis enables us to see how events that most observers experience as a series of disconnected dramatic clashes over policy (or that largely escape notice altogether) have partially collapsed the constraints that constitutional democracy depends upon, and how this collapse will likely accelerate if Trump becomes President again.
Recommended Citation
David M. Driesen,
Donald Trump and the Collapse of Checks and Balances,
77
SMU L. Rev. F.
199
(2024)
