The Dialogue
Abstract
The decisions of the Supreme Court are constantly featured in news headlines with the accusation that the core institution of the judicial branch is completely politicized. In fact, justices are directly chosen by presidents who have clear political and constitutional agendas. But what about justices whose voting behavior and opinions seem less politically motivated than others? One major answer to that query may lie in the difference between constrained and unconstrained choices. When a president chooses a nominee based on political promises made or limitations imposed by other branches of government, that choice is constrained because those nominees must appeal to a broader political constituency and thus the selection pool is smaller. Among historical examples of constrained choices are Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter, all three of whom were instrumental in moderating the Court with their swing votes for the decades they were on the Court. In this paper, I explore the hypothesis that being a constrained choice makes a justice less faithful to their appointing president’s constitutional agenda by quantitatively assessing voting records across their tenures on three main issues: abortion, affirmative action, and the Establishment Clause. Ultimately, my research shows that constrained choices do tend to follow their appointing presidents’ agendas less faithfully and aggressively.
Recommended Citation
McCall, Tyler
(2025)
"Constraints and Conservatism: The Effect of Presidential Choices on Voting Patterns of Supreme Court Justices,"
The Dialogue: Vol. 10:
Iss.
1, Article 2.
Available at:
https://scholar.smu.edu/thedialogue/vol10/iss1/2
