Can Kindness be Matched? Dynamic Matching and Goal Matching in Civic Crowdfunding
Publication Date
9-26-2025
Abstract
This study investigates the impact of matching funds on donor behavior in civic crowdfunding. Using over ten years of data from Goteo.org, we compare the effects of goal matching (i.e., a lump-sum donation committed by the matcher conditional on the attainment of a pre-defined goal) and dynamic matching (i.e., real-time matching at a constant rate for each individual donation transaction). After preprocessing our data with Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) at a project level, we find in our project-day level analysis that goal matching increases contribution size after projects surpass their minimum goals (i.e., the minimum budget required to start the project) and dynamic matching decreases average contribution size before the minimum goals are reached. Further, contrary to conventional wisdom, both match funding schemes reduce backer (donor) participation. We also show that the effects of match funding are heterogeneous across Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): goal matching (but not dynamic matching) boosts the fundraising performance of ecological projects but dampens the performance of democratic projects, as compared to social projects. These results highlight the stage-contingent and context-dependent nature of match funding, offering insights for the design of more effective crowdfunding strategies.
Document Type
Article
Keywords
Civic Crowdfunding, Dynamic Matching, Goal Matching, Match Funding, Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM)
Disciplines
Business Administration, Management, and Operations
Source
SMU Cox: IT & Operations Management (Topic)
Language
English
